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   1 <html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"><title>Fri kultur</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2"><meta name="description" content="Om forfatteren Lawrense Lessig (http://www.lessig.org), professor i juss og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School, er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i Creative Commons (http://creativecommons.org). Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code: And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public Knowledge. Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's &quot;e.biz 25,&quot; og omtalt som en av Scientific American's &quot;50 visjonærer&quot;. Etter utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."></head><body bgcolor="white" text="black" link="#0000FF" vlink="#840084" alink="#0000FF"><div lang="nb" class="book" title="Fri kultur"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="index"></a>Fri kultur</h1></div><div><h2 class="subtitle">Hvordan store medieaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
   2 og kontrollere kreativiteten</h2></div><div><div class="authorgroup"><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Lawrence</span> <span class="surname">Lessig</span></h3></div></div></div><div><p class="releaseinfo">Versjon 2004-02-10</p></div><div><p class="copyright">Opphavsrett © 2004 Lawrence Lessig</p></div><div><div class="legalnotice" title="Rettslig merknad"><a name="id2673734"></a><p>
   3      <span class="inlinemediaobject"><img src="images/cc.png" align="middle" width="100%" alt="Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert"></span>
   4    </p><p>
   5 Denne versjonen av <em class="citetitle">Fri Kultur</em> er lisensiert med en
   6 Creative Commons-lisens.  Denne lisensen tillater ikke-kommersiell
   7 utnyttelse av verket, hvis opphavsinnehaveren er navngitt.  For mer
   8 informasjon om lisensen, klikk på ikonet over eller besøk <a class="ulink" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/" target="_top">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</a>
   9    </p></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">2004-03-25</p></div><div><div class="abstract" title="Om forfatteren"><p class="title"><b>Om forfatteren</b></p><p>
  10 Lawrense Lessig (<a class="ulink" href="http://www.lessig.org" target="_top">http://www.lessig.org</a>), professor i juss
  11 og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School,
  12 er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i
  13 Creative Commons (<a class="ulink" href="http://creativecommons.org" target="_top">http://creativecommons.org</a>).
  14 Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code:
  15 And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i
  16 Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public
  17 Knowledge.  Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the
  18 Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's "e.biz
  19 25," og omtalt som en av Scientific American's "50 visjonærer".  Etter
  20 utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law
  21 School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit
  22 Court of Appeals.
  23   </p></div></div></div><hr></div><div class="dedication" title="Dedikasjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="id2629396"></a>Dedikasjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
  24 Til Eric Eldred &#8212; hvis arbeid først trakk meg til denne saken, og for
  25 hvem saken fortsetter.
  26 </p></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="preface"><a href="#preface">Forord</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-introduction">1. Introduksjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="part"><a href="#c-piracy">I. "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#creators">2. Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#mere-copyists">3. Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#catalogs">4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#pirates">5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#piracy">6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="part"><a href="#c-property">II. "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#founders">7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#recorders">8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#transformers">9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#collectors">10. Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#property-i">11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="part"><a href="#c-puzzles">III. Nøtter</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#chimera">12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#harms">13. Kapittel tolv: Skader</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="part"><a href="#c-balances">IV. Maktfordeling</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#eldred">14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#eldred-ii">15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-conclusion">16. Konklusjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-afterword">17. Etterord</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#usnow">Oss, nå</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#themsoon">Dem, snart</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-notes">18. Notater</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-acknowledgments">19. Takk til</a></span></dt><dt><span class="index"><a href="#id2707297">Indeks</a></span></dt></dl></div><div class="list-of-figures"><p><b>Figuroversikt</b></p><dl><dt>11.1. <a href="#fig-1331">How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
  27 the right or regulation.</a></dt><dt>11.2. <a href="#fig-1361">Law has a special role in affecting the three.</a></dt><dt>11.3. <a href="#fig-1371">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</a></dt><dt>11.4. <a href="#fig-1381">effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</a></dt><dt>11.5. <a href="#fig-1441">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</a></dt><dt>11.6. <a href="#fig-1442">"Opphavsrett" i dag.</a></dt><dt>11.7. <a href="#fig-1521">Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.</a></dt><dt>11.8. <a href="#fig-1531">Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.</a></dt><dt>11.9. <a href="#fig-1541">Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
  28 copyrighted work.</a></dt><dt>11.10. <a href="#fig-1542">Uregulert kopiering anses som "rimelig bruk".</a></dt><dt>11.11. <a href="#fig-1551">Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
  29 regulated.</a></dt><dt>11.12. <a href="#fig-1611">Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.</a></dt><dt>11.13. <a href="#fig-1612">List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</a></dt><dt>11.14. <a href="#fig-1621">E-bok av Aristoteles "Politikk"</a></dt><dt>11.15. <a href="#fig-1622">Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politikk".</a></dt><dt>11.16. <a href="#fig-1631">List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".</a></dt><dt>11.17. <a href="#fig-1641">List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".</a></dt><dt>11.18. <a href="#fig-1711">VCR/handgun cartoon.</a></dt><dt>11.19. <a href="#fig-1761">Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.</a></dt></dl></div><div class="list-of-tables"><p><b>tabelloversikt</b></p><dl><dt>6.1. <a href="#t1">Mønster for respons fra rett og kongress</a></dt><dt>11.1. <a href="#t2">Law status in 1790</a></dt><dt>11.2. <a href="#t3">Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory</a></dt><dt>11.3. <a href="#t4">Law status in 1975</a></dt><dt>11.4. <a href="#t5">Law status now</a></dt></dl></div><div class="colophon" title="Kolofon"><h2 class="title"><a name="id2680765"></a>Kolofon</h2><p>
  30 Du kan kjøpe en kopi av denne boken ved å klikke på en av lenkene nedenfor:
  31 </p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" type="number" compact><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.amazon.com/" target="_top">Amazon</a></p></li><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/" target="_top">B&amp;N</a></p></li><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.penguin.com/" target="_top">Penguin</a></p></li></ul></div><p>
  32 Andre bøker av Lawrence Lessig
  33 </p><p>
  34 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
  35 </p><p>
  36 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
  37 </p><p>
  38 The Penguin Press, New York
  39 </p><p>
  40 Fri Kultur
  41 </p><p>
  42 Hvordan store medieaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
  43 og kontrollere kreativiteten
  44 </p><p>
  45 Lawrence Lessig
  46 </p><p>
  47 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.  375 Hudson Street
  48 New York, New York
  49 </p><p>
  50 Opphavsrettbeskyttet © Lawrence Lessig.  Alle rettigheter reservert.
  51 </p><p>
  52 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
  53 <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
  54 © 2003 by The New York Times Co.  Reprinted with permission.
  55 </p><p>
  56 Cartoon in <a class="xref" href="#fig-1711" title="Figur 11.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.">Figur 11.18, &#8220;VCR/handgun cartoon.&#8221;</a> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
  57 Media Services, Inc.  All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
  58 </p><p>
  59 Diagram in <a class="xref" href="#fig-1761" title="Figur 11.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.">Figur 11.19, &#8220;Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.&#8221;</a> courtesy of the office of FCC
  60 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
  61 </p><p>
  62 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
  63 </p><p>
  64 Lessig, Lawrence.  Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law
  65 to lock down culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
  66 </p><p>
  67 p. cm.
  68 </p><p>
  69 Includes index.
  70 </p><p>
  71 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
  72 </p><p>
  73 1. Intellectual property&#8212;United States. 2. Mass media&#8212;United
  74 States.
  75 </p><p>
  76 3. Technological innovations&#8212;United States. 4. Art&#8212;United
  77 States. I. Title.
  78 </p><p>
  79 KF2979.L47
  80 </p><p>
  81 343.7309'9&#8212;dc22
  82 </p><p>
  83 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
  84 </p><p>
  85 Printed in the United States of America
  86 </p><p>
  87 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
  88 </p><p>
  89 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
  90 </p><p>
  91 Oversatt til bokmål av Petter Reinholdtsen og Anders Hagen
  92 Jarmund. Kildefilene til oversetterprosjektet er <a class="ulink" href="https://github.com/petterreinholdtsen/free-culture-lessig" target="_top">tilgjengelig
  93 fra github</a>.  Rapporter feil med oversettelsen via github.
  94 </p><p>
  95 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this
  96 publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval
  97 system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
  98 photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission
  99 of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.  The
 100 scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via
 101 any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and
 102 punishable by law.  Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and
 103 do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
 104 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
 105 </p></div><div class="preface" title="Forord"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="preface"></a>Forord</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxpoguedavid"></a><p>
 106 David Pogue, en glimrende skribent og forfatter av utallige tekniske
 107 datarelaterte tekster, skrev dette på slutten av hans gjennomgang av min
 108 første bok, <em class="citetitle">Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace</em>:
 109 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 110 I motsetning til faktiske lover, så har ikke internett-programvare
 111 kapasiteten til å straffe.  Den påvirker ikke folk som ikke er online (og
 112 kun en veldig liten minoritet av verdens befolkning er online).  Og hvis du
 113 ikke liker systemet på internett, så kan du alltid slå av
 114 modemet.<sup>[<a name="preface01" href="#ftn.preface01" class="footnote">1</a>]</sup>
 115 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 116 Pogue var skeptisk til argumentet som er kjernen av boken &#8212; at
 117 programvaren, eller "koden", fungerte som en slags lov &#8212; og foreslo i
 118 sin anmeldelse den lykkelig tanken at hvis livet i cyberspace gikk dårlig,
 119 så kan vi alltid som med en trylleformel slå over en bryter og komme hjem
 120 igjen. Slå av modemet, koble fra datamaskinen, og eventuelle problemer som
 121 finnes <span class="emphasis"><em>den</em></span> virkeligheten ville ikke "påvirke" oss mer.
 122 </p><p>
 123
 124 Pogue kan ha hatt rett i 1999 &#8212; jeg er skeptisk, men det kan
 125 hende. Men selv om han hadde rett da, så er ikke argumentet gyldig
 126 nå. <em class="citetitle">Fri Kultur</em> er om problemene internett forårsaker
 127 selv etter at modemet er slått av.  Den er et argument om hvordan slagene
 128 som nå brer om seg i livet on-line har fundamentalt påvirket "folk som er
 129 ikke pålogget."  Det finnes ingen bryter som kan isolere oss fra
 130 internettets effekt.
 131 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2629553"></a><p>
 132 Men i motsetning til i boken <em class="citetitle">Code</em>, er argumentet her
 133 ikke så mye om internett i seg selv. Istedet er det om konsekvensen av
 134 internett for en del av vår tradisjon som er mye mer grunnleggende, og
 135 uansett hvor hardt dette er for en geek-wanna-be å innrømme, mye viktigere.
 136 </p><p>
 137 Den tradisjonen er måten vår kultur blir laget på.  Som jeg vil forklare i
 138 sidene som følger, kommer vi fra en tradisjon av "fri kultur"&#8212;ikke
 139 "fri" som i "fri bar" (for å låne et uttrykk fra stifteren av fri
 140 programvarebevegelsen<sup>[<a name="id2629535" href="#ftn.id2629535" class="footnote">2</a>]</sup>), men "fri" som i
 141 "talefrihet", "fritt marked", "frihandel", "fri konkurranse", "fri vilje" og
 142 "frie valg".  En fri kultur støtter og beskytter skapere og oppfinnere.
 143 Dette gjør den direkte ved å tildele immaterielle rettigheter.  Men det gjør
 144 den indirekte ved å begrense rekkevidden for disse rettighetene, for å
 145 garantere at neste generasjon skapere og oppfinnere forblir <span class="emphasis"><em>så fri
 146 som mulig</em></span> fra kontroll fra fortiden.  En fri kultur er ikke en
 147 kultur uten eierskap, like lite som et fritt marked er et marked der alt er
 148 gratis.  Det motsatte av fri kultur er "tillatelseskultur"&#8212;en kultur
 149 der skapere kun kan skape med tillatelse fra de mektige, eller fra skaperne
 150 fra fortiden.
 151 </p><p>
 152 Hvis vi forsto denne endringen, så tror jeg vi ville stå imot den.  Ikke
 153 "vi" på venstresiden eller "dere" på høyresiden, men vi som ikke har
 154 investert i den bestemt kulturindustrien som har definert det tjuende
 155 århundre. Enten du er på venstre eller høyresiden, hvis du i denne forstand
 156 ikke har interesser, vil historien jeg forteller her gi deg problemer. For
 157 endringene jeg beskriver påvirker verdier som begge sider av vår politiske
 158 kultur anser som grunnleggende.
 159 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2630534"></a><p>
 160 Vi så et glimt av dette tverrpolitiske raseri på forsommeren i 2003. Da FCC
 161 vurderte endringer i reglene for medieeierskap som ville slakke på
 162 begrensningene rundt mediekonsentrasjon, sendte en ekstraordinær koalisjon
 163 mer enn 700 000 brev til FCC for å motsette seg endringen.  Mens William
 164 Safire beskrev å marsjere "ubehagelig sammen med CodePink Women for Peace
 165 and the National Rifle Association, mellom liberale Olympia Snowe og
 166 konservative Ted Stevens", formulerte han  kanskje det enkleste uttrykket
 167 for hva som var på spill: konsentrasjonen av makt.  Så spurte han:
 168 <a class="indexterm" name="id2630553"></a>
 169 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 170 Høres dette ikke-konservativt ut?  Ikke for meg.  Denne konsentrasjonen av
 171 makt&#8212;politisk, selskapsmessig, pressemessig, kulturelt&#8212;bør være
 172 bannlyst av konservative.  Spredningen av makt gjennom lokal kontroll, og
 173 derigjennom oppmuntre til individuell deltagelse, er essensen i føderalismen
 174 og det største uttrykk for demokrati.<sup>[<a name="id2630576" href="#ftn.id2630576" class="footnote">3</a>]</sup>
 175 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 176 Denne idéen er et element i argumentet til <em class="citetitle">Fri
 177 Kultur</em>, selv om min fokus ikke bare er på konsentrasjonen av
 178 makt som følger av konsentrasjonen i eierskap, men mer viktig, og fordi det
 179 er mindre synlig, på konsentrasjonen av makt som er resultat av en radikal
 180 endring i det effektive virkeområdet til loven.  Loven er i endring, og
 181 endringen forandrer på hvordan vår kultur blir skapt. Den endringen bør
 182 bekymre deg&#8212;Uansett om du bryr deg om internett eller ikke, og uansett
 183 om du er til venstre for Safires eller til høyre. Inspirasjonen til tittelen
 184 og mye av argumentet i denne boken kommer fra arbeidet til Richard Stallman
 185 og Free Software Foundation. Faktisk, da jeg leste Stallmans egne tekster på
 186 nytt, spesielt essyene i <em class="citetitle">Free Software, Free Society</em>,
 187 innser jeg at alle de teoretiske innsiktene jeg utvikler her er innsikter
 188 som Stallman beskrev for tiår siden.  Man kan dermed godt argumentere for at
 189 dette verket kun er et avledet verk.
 190 </p><p>
 191
 192 Jeg godtar kritikken, hvis det faktisk er kritikk.  Arbeidet til en advokat
 193 er alltid avledede verker, og jeg mener ikke å gjøre noe mer i denne boken
 194 enn å minne en kultur om en tradisjon som alltid har vært deres egen. Som
 195 Stallman forsvarer jeg denne tradisjonen på grunnlag av verdier. Som
 196 Stallman tror jeg dette er verdiene til frihet.  Og som Stallman, tror jeg
 197 dette er verdier fra vår fortid som må forsvares i vår fremtid.  En fri
 198 kultur har vært vår fortid, men vil bare være vår fremtid hvis vi endrer
 199 retningen vi følger akkurat nå.  På samme måte som Stallmans argumenter for
 200 fri programvare, treffer argumenter for en fri kultur på forvirring som er
 201 vanskelig å unngå, og enda vanskeligere å forstå.  En fri kultur er ikke en
 202 kultur uten eierskap. Det er ikke en kultur der kunstnere ikke får
 203 betalt. En kultur uten eierskap eller en der skaperne ikke kan få betalt, er
 204 anarki, ikke frihet.  Anarki er ikke hva jeg fremmer her.
 205 </p><p>
 206 I stedet er den frie kulturen som jeg forsvarer i denne boken en balanse
 207 mellom anarki og kontroll.  En fri kultur, i likhet med et fritt marked, er
 208 fylt med eierskap.  Den er fylt med regler for eierskap og kontrakter som
 209 blir håndhevet av staten.  Men på samme måte som det frie markedet blir
 210 pervertert hvis dets eierskap blir føydalt, så kan en fri kultur bli ødelagt
 211 av ekstremisme i eierskapsrettighetene som definerer den.  Det er dette jeg
 212 frykter om vår kultur i dag.  Det er som motpol til denne ekstremismen at
 213 denne boken er skrevet.
 214 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.preface01" href="#preface01" class="para">1</a>] </sup>
 215 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," <em class="citetitle">New York
 216 Times</em>, 30. januar 2000
 217 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2629535" href="#id2629535" class="para">2</a>] </sup>
 218 Richard M. Stallman, <em class="citetitle">Fri programvare, Frie samfunn</em> 57
 219 (Joshua Gay, red. 2002).
 220 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2630576" href="#id2630576" class="para">3</a>] </sup> William Safire, "The Great Media Gulp," <em class="citetitle">New York
 221 Times</em>, 22. mai 2003.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2630583"></a>
 222 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 1. Introduksjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-introduction"></a>Kapittel 1. Introduksjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
 223 17. desember 1903, på en vindfylt strand i Nord-Carolina i såvidt under
 224 hundre sekunder, demonstrerte Wright-brødrene at et selvdrevet fartøy tyngre
 225 enn luft kunne fly.  Øyeblikket var elektrisk, og dens betydning ble alment
 226 forstått. Nesten umiddelbart, eksploderte interessen for denne nye
 227 teknologien som muliggjorde bemannet luftfart og en hærskare av oppfinnere
 228 begynte å bygge videre på den.
 229 </p><p>
 230 Da Wright-brødrene fant opp flymaskinen, hevdet loven i USA at en grunneier
 231 ble antatt å eie ikke bare overflaten på området sitt, men også alt landet
 232 under bakken, helt ned til senterpunktet i jorda, og alt volumet over
 233 bakken, "i ubestemt grad, oppover".<sup>[<a name="id2628954" href="#ftn.id2628954" class="footnote">4</a>]</sup> I
 234 mange år undret lærde over hvordan en best skulle tolke idéen om at
 235 eiendomsretten gikk helt til himmelen. Betød dette at du eide stjernene?
 236 Kunne en dømme gjess for at de regelmessig og med vilje tok seg inn på annen
 237 manns eiendom?
 238 </p><p>
 239 Så kom flymaskiner, og for første gang hadde dette prinsippet i lovverket i
 240 USA&#8212;dypt nede i grunnlaget for vår tradisjon og akseptert av de
 241 viktigste juridiske tenkerne i vår fortid&#8212;en betydning. Hvis min
 242 eiendom rekker til himmelen, hva skjer når United flyr over mitt område?
 243 Har jeg rett til å nekte dem å bruke min eiendom?  Har jeg mulighet til å
 244 inngå en eksklusiv avtale med Delta Airlines?  Kan vi gjennomføre en auksjon
 245 for å finne ut hvor mye disse rettighetene er verdt?
 246 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2683230"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2683255"></a><p>
 247 I 1945 ble disse spørsmålene en føderal sak. Da bøndene Thomas Lee og Tinie
 248 Causby i Nord Carolina begynte å miste kyllinger på grunn av lavtflygende
 249 militære fly (vettskremte kyllinger fløy tilsynelatende i låveveggene og
 250 døde), saksøkte Causbyene regjeringen for å trenge seg inn på deres
 251 eiendom. Flyene rørte selvfølgelig aldri overflaten på Causbys' eiendom. Men
 252 hvis det stemte som Blackstone, Kent, og Cola hadde sagt, at deres eiendom
 253 strakk seg "i ubestemt grad, oppover," så hadde regjeringen trengt seg inn
 254 på deres eiendom, og Causbys ønsket å sette en stopper for dette.
 255 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2683274"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2683280"></a><p>
 256 Høyesterett gikk med på å ta opp Causbys sak. Kongressen hadde vedtatt at
 257 luftfartsveiene var tilgjengelig for alle, men hvis ens eiendom virkelig
 258 rakk til himmelen, da kunne muligens kongressens vedtak ha vært i strid med
 259 grunnlovens forbud mot å "ta" eiendom uten kompensasjon.  Retten erkjente at
 260 "det er gammel doktrine etter sedvane at en eiendom rakk til utkanten av
 261 universet.", men dommer Douglas hadde ikke tålmodighet for forhistoriske
 262 doktriner.  I et enkelt avsnitt, ble hundrevis av år med
 263 eiendomslovgivningen strøket. Som han skrev på vegne av retten,
 264 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 265 [Denne] doktrinen har ingen plass i den moderne verden.  Luften er en
 266 offentlig motorvei, slik kongressen har erklært.  Hvis det ikke var
 267 tilfelle, ville hver eneste transkontinentale flyrute utsette operatørene
 268 for utallige søksmål om inntrenging på annen manns eiendom.  Idéen er i
 269 strid med sunn fornuft.  Å anerkjenne slike private krav til luftrommet
 270 ville blokkere disse motorveiene, seriøst forstyrre muligheten til kontroll
 271 og utvikling av dem i fellesskapets interesse og overføre til privat
 272 eierskap det som kun fellesskapet har et rimelig krav til.<sup>[<a name="id2683318" href="#ftn.id2683318" class="footnote">5</a>]</sup>
 273 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 274 "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft."
 275 </p><p>
 276
 277 Det er hvordan loven vanligvis fungerer.  Ikke ofte like brått eller
 278 utålmodig, men til slutt er dette hvordan loven fungerer.  Det var ikke
 279 stilen til Douglas å utbrodere.  Andre dommere ville ha skrevet mange flere
 280 sider før de nådde sin konklusjon, men for Douglas holdt det med en enkel
 281 linje: "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft.".  Men uansett om det tar flere
 282 sider eller kun noen få ord, så er det en genial egenskap med et
 283 lovpraksis-system, slik som vårt er, at loven tilpasser seg til aktuelle
 284 teknologiene.  Og mens den tilpasser seg, så endres den.  Idéer som var
 285 solide som fjell i en tidsalder knuses i en annen.
 286 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2683383"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2683390"></a><p>
 287 Eller, det er hvordan ting skjer når det ikke er noen mektige på andre siden
 288 av endringen.  Causbyene var bare bønder.  Og selv om det uten tvil var
 289 mange som dem som var lei av den økende trafikken i luften (og en håper ikke
 290 for mange kyllinger flakset seg inn i vegger), ville Causbyene i verden
 291 finne det svært hardt å samles for å stoppe idéen, og teknologien, som
 292 Wright-brødrene hadde ført til verden.  Wright-brødrene spyttet flymaskiner
 293 inn i den teknologiske meme-dammen. Idéen spredte seg deretter som et virus
 294 i en kyllingfarm. Causbyene i verden fant seg selv omringet av "det synes
 295 rimelig" gitt teknologien som Wright-brødrene hadde produsert.  De kunne stå
 296 på sine gårder, med døde kyllinger i hendene, og heve knyttneven mot disse
 297 nye teknologiene så mye de ville.  De kunne ringe sine representanter eller
 298 til og med saksøke.  Men når alt kom til alt, ville kraften i det som virket
 299 "åpenbart" for alle andre&#8212;makten til "sunn fornuft"&#8212;ville vinne
 300 frem.  Deres "personlige interesser" ville ikke få lov til å nedkjempe en
 301 åpenbar fordel for fellesskapet.
 302 </p><p>
 303 Edwin Howard Armstrong er en av USAs glemte oppfinnergenier. Han dukket opp
 304 på oppfinnerscenen etter titaner som Thomas Edison og Alexander Graham
 305 Bell.  Alle hans bidrag på området radioteknologi gjør han til kanskje den
 306 viktigste av alle enkeltoppfinnere i de første femti årene av radio.  Han
 307 var bedre utdannet enn Michael Faraday, som var bokbinderlærling da han
 308 oppdaget elektrisk induksjon i 1831.  Men han hadde like god intuisjon om
 309 hvordan radioverden virket, og ved minst tre anledninger, fant Armstrong opp
 310 svært viktig teknologier som brakte vår forståelse av radio et hopp videre.
 311 <a class="indexterm" name="id2683453"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2683462"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2683468"></a>
 312 </p><p>
 313 Dagen etter julaften i 1933, ble fire patenter utstedt til Armstrong for
 314 hans mest signifikante oppfinnelse&#8212;FM-radio.  Inntil da hadde
 315 forbrukerradioer vært amplitude-modulert (AM) radio.  Tidens teoretikere
 316 hadde sagt at frekvens-modulert (FM) radio.  De hadde rett når det gjelder
 317 et smalt bånd av spektrumet.  Men Armstrong oppdaget at frekvens-modulert
 318 radio i et vidt bånd i spektrumet leverte en forbløffende gjengivelse av
 319 lyd, med mye mindre senderstyrke og støy.
 320 </p><p>
 321 Den 5. november 1935 demonstrerte han teknologien på et møte hos institutt
 322 for radioingeniører ved Empire State-bygningen i New York City.  Han vred
 323 radiosøkeren over en rekke AM-stasjoner, inntil radioen låste seg mot en
 324 kringkasting som han hadde satt opp 27 kilometer unna.  Radioen ble helt
 325 stille, som om den var død, og så, med en klarhet ingen andre i rommet noen
 326 gang hadde hørt fra et elektrisk apparat, produserte det lyden av en
 327 opplesers stemme: "Dette er amatørstasjon W2AG ved Yonkers, New York, som
 328 opererer på frekvensmodulering ved to og en halv meter."
 329 </p><p>
 330 Publikum hørte noe ingen hadde trodd var mulig:
 331 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 332 Et glass vann ble fylt opp foran mikrofonen i Yonkers, og det hørtes ut som
 333 et plass som ble fylt opp. . . . Et papir ble krøllet og revet opp, og det
 334 hørtes ut som papir og ikke som en sprakende skogbrann. . . . Sousa-marsjer
 335 ble spilt av fra plater og en pianosolo og et gitarnummer ble
 336 utført. . . . Musikken ble presentert med en livaktighet som sjeldent om
 337 noen gang før hadde vært hørt fra en radio-"musikk-boks".<sup>[<a name="id2683533" href="#ftn.id2683533" class="footnote">6</a>]</sup>
 338 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 339
 340 Som vår egen sunn fornuft forteller oss, hadde Armstrong oppdaget en mye
 341 bedre radioteknologi.  Men på tidspunktet for hans oppfinnelse, jobbet
 342 Armstrong for RCA. RCA var den dominerende aktøren i det da dominerende
 343 AM-radiomarkedet. I 1935 var det tusen radiostasjoner over hele USA, men
 344 stasjonene i de store byene var alle eid av en liten håndfull selskaper.
 345
 346 </p><p>
 347 Presidenten i RCA, David Sarnoff, en venn av Armstrong, var ivrig etter å få
 348 Armstrong til å oppdage en måte å fjerne støyen fra AM-radio. Så Sarnoff var
 349 ganske spent da Armstrong fortalte ham at han hadde en enhet som fjernet
 350 støy fra "radio.".   Men da Armstrong demonstrerte sin oppfinnelse, var ikke
 351 Sarnoff fornøyd.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2683574"></a>
 352 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 353 Jeg trodde Armstrong ville finne opp et slags filter for å fjerne skurring
 354 fra AM-radioen vår. Jeg trodde ikke han skulle starte en revolusjon &#8212;
 355 starte en hel forbannet ny industri i konkurranse med RCA.<sup>[<a name="id2683481" href="#ftn.id2683481" class="footnote">7</a>]</sup>
 356 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 357 Armstrongs oppfinnelse truet RCAs AM-herredømme, så selskapet lanserte en
 358 kampanje for å knuse FM-radio. Mens FM kan ha vært en overlegen teknologi,
 359 var Sarnoff en overlegen taktiker. En forfatter beskrev det slik,
 360 <a class="indexterm" name="id2683616"></a>
 361 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 362 Kreftene til fordel for FM, i hovedsak ingeniørfaglige, kunne ikke overvinne
 363 tyngden til strategien utviklet av avdelingene for salg, patenter og juss
 364 for å undertrykke denne trusselen til selskapets posisjon.  For FM utgjorde,
 365 hvis det fikk utvikle seg uten begrensninger . . . en komplett endring i
 366 maktforholdene rundt radio . . . og muligens fjerningen av det nøye
 367 begrensede AM-systemet som var grunnlaget for RCA stigning til
 368 makt.<sup>[<a name="id2683639" href="#ftn.id2683639" class="footnote">8</a>]</sup>
 369 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 370 RCA holdt først teknologien innomhus, og insistere på at det var nødvendig
 371 med ytterligere tester. Da Armstrong, etter to år med testing, ble
 372 utålmodig, begynte RCA å bruke sin makt hos myndighetene til holde tilbake
 373 den generelle spredningen av FM-radio. I 1936, ansatte RCA den tidligere
 374 lederen av FCC og ga ham oppgaven med å sikre at FCC tilordnet
 375 radiospekteret på en måte som ville kastrere FM&#8212;hovedsakelig ved å
 376 flytte FM-radio til et annet band i spekteret. I første omgang lyktes ikke
 377 disse forsøkene.  Men mens Armstrong og nasjonen var distrahert av andre
 378 verdenskrig, begynte RCAs arbeid å bære frukter.  Like etter at krigen var
 379 over, annonserte FCC et sett med avgjørelser som ville ha en klar effekt:
 380 FM-radio ville bli forkrøplet.Lawrence lessing beskrevet det slik,
 381 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 382 Serien med slag mot kroppen som FM-radio mottok rett etter krigen, i en
 383 serie med avgjørelser manipulert gjennom FCC av de store radiointeressene,
 384 var nesten utrolige i deres kraft og underfundighet.<sup>[<a name="id2683655" href="#ftn.id2683655" class="footnote">9</a>]</sup>
 385 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2683694"></a><p>
 386 For å gjøre plass i spektrumet for RCAs nyeste satsingsområde, televisjon,
 387 skulle FM-radioens brukere flyttes til et helt nytt band i spektrumet.
 388 Sendestyrken til FM-radioene ble også redusert, og gjorde at FM ikke lenger
 389 kunne brukes for å sende programmer fra en del av landet til en annen.
 390 (Denne endringen ble sterkt støttet av AT&amp;T, på grunn av at fjerningen
 391 av FM-videresendingsstasjoner ville bety at radiostasjonene ville bli nødt
 392 til å kjøpe kablede linker fra AT&amp;T.)  Spredningen av FM-radio var
 393 dermed kvalt, i hvert fall midlertidig.
 394 </p><p>
 395 Armstrong sto imot RCAs innsats. Som svar motsto RCA Armstrongs patenter.
 396 Etter å ha bakt FM-teknologi inn i den nye standarden for TV, erklærte RCS
 397 patentene ugyldige&#8212;uten grunn og nesten femten år etter at de ble
 398 utstedet.  De nektet dermed å betale ham for bruken av patentene.  I seks år
 399 kjempet Armstrong en dyr søksmålskrig for å forsvare patentene sine.  Til
 400 slutt, samtidig som patentene utløp, tilbød RCA et forlik så lavt at det
 401 ikke engang dekket Armstrongs advokatregning.  Beseiret, knust og nå blakk,
 402 skrev Armstrong i 1954 en kort beskjed til sin kone, før han gikk ut av et
 403 vindu i trettende etasje og falt i døden.
 404 </p><p>
 405
 406 Dette er slik loven virker noen ganger.  Ikke ofte like tragisk, og sjelden
 407 med heltemodig drama, men noen ganger er det slik det virker. Fra starten
 408 har myndigheter og myndighetsorganer blitt tatt til fange. Det er mer
 409 sannsynlig at de blir fanget når en mektig interesse er truet av enten en
 410 juridisk eller teknologisk endring.  Denne mektige interessen utøver for
 411 ofte sin innflytelse hos myndighetene til å få myndighetene til å beskytte
 412 den.  Retorikken for denne beskyttelsen er naturligvis alltid med fokus på
 413 fellesskapets beste.  Realiteten er noe annet.  Idéer som kan være solide
 414 som fjell i en tidsalder, men som overlatt til seg selv, vil falle sammen i
 415 en annen, er videreført gjennom denne subtile korrupsjonen i vår politiske
 416 prosess.  RCA hadde hva Causby-ene ikke hadde: Makten til å undertrykke
 417 effekten av en teknologisk endring.
 418 </p><p>
 419 Det er ingen enkeltoppfinner av Internet.  Ei heller er det en god dato som
 420 kan brukes til å markere når det ble født.  Likevel har internettet i løpet
 421 av svært kort tid blitt en del av vanlige amerikaneres liv.  I følge the Pew
 422 Internet and American Life-prosjektet, har 58 prosent av amerikanerne hatt
 423 tilgang til internettet i 2002, opp fra 49 prosent to år
 424 tidligere.<sup>[<a name="id2683774" href="#ftn.id2683774" class="footnote">10</a>]</sup> Det tallet kan uten
 425 problemer passere to tredjedeler av nasjonen ved utgangen av 2004.
 426 </p><p>
 427 Etter hvert som internett er blitt integrert inn i det vanlige liv har ting
 428 blitt endret.  Noen av disse endringene er teknisk&#8212;internettet har
 429 gjort kommunikasjon raskere, det har redusert kostnaden med å samle inn
 430 data, og så videre.  Disse tekniske endringene er ikke fokus for denne
 431 boken.  De er viktige.  De er ikke godt forstått.  Men de er den type ting
 432 som ganske enkelt ville blir borte hvis vi alle bare slo av internettet.  De
 433 påvirker ikke folk som ikke bruker internettet, eller i det miste påvirker
 434 det ikke dem direkte.  De er et godt tema for en bok om internettet.  Men
 435 dette er ikke en bok om internettet.
 436 </p><p>
 437 I stedet er denne boken om effekten av internettet ut over internettet i seg
 438 selv.  En effekt på hvordan kultur blir skapt.  Min påstand er at
 439 internettet har ført til en viktig og ukjent endring i denne prosessen.
 440 Denne endringen vil forandre en tradisjon som er like gammel som republikken
 441 selv.  De fleste, hvis de la merke til denne endringen, ville avvise den.
 442 Men de fleste legger ikke engang merke til denne endringen som internettet
 443 har introdusert.
 444 </p><p>
 445
 446 Vi kan få en følelse av denne endringen ved å skille mellom kommersiell og
 447 ikke-kommersiell kultur, ved å knytte lovens reguleringer til hver av dem.
 448 Med "kommersiell kultur" mener jeg den delen av vår kultur som er produsert
 449 og solgt eller produsert for å bli solgt.  Med "ikke-kommersiell kultur"
 450 mener jeg alt det andre. Da gamle menn satt rundt i parker eller på
 451 gatehjørner og fortalte historier som unger og andre lyttet til, så var det
 452 ikke-kommersiell kultur.  Da Noah Webster publiserte sin "Reader", eller
 453 Joel Barlow sin poesi, så var det kommersiell kultur.
 454 </p><p>
 455 Fra historisk tid, og for omtrent hele vår tradisjon, har ikke-kommersiell
 456 kultur i hovedsak ikke vært regulert.  Selvfølgelig, hvis din historie var
 457 utuktig, eller hvis dine sanger forstyrret freden, kunne loven gripe inn.
 458 Men loven var aldri direkte interessert i skapingen eller spredningen av
 459 denne form for kultur, og lot denne kulturen være "fri".  Den vanlige måten
 460 som vanlige individer delte og formet deres kultur&#8212;historiefortelling,
 461 formidling av scener fra teater eller TV, delta i fan-klubber, deling av
 462 musikk, laging av kassetter&#8212;ble ikke styrt av lovverket.
 463 </p><p>
 464 Fokuset på loven var kommersiell kreativitet.  I starten forsiktig, etter
 465 hvert betraktelig, beskytter loven insentivet til skaperne ved å tildele dem
 466 en eksklusiv rett til deres kreative verker, slik at de kan selge disse
 467 eksklusive rettighetene på en kommersiell markedsplass.<sup>[<a name="id2683868" href="#ftn.id2683868" class="footnote">11</a>]</sup> Dette er også, naturligvis, en viktig del av
 468 kreativitet og kultur, og det har blitt en viktigere og viktigere del i
 469 USA.  Men det var på ingen måte dominerende i vår tradisjon.  Det var i
 470 stedet bare en del, en kontrollert del, balansert mot det frie.
 471 </p><p>
 472 Denne grove inndelingen mellom den frie og den kontrollerte har nå blitt
 473 fjernet.<sup>[<a name="id2683904" href="#ftn.id2683904" class="footnote">12</a>]</sup> Internettet har satt scenen
 474 for denne fjerningen, og pressen frem av store medieaktører har loven nå
 475 påvirket det.  For første gang i vår tradisjon, har de vanlige måtene som
 476 individer skaper og deler kultur havnet innen rekekvidde for reguleringene
 477 til loven, som har blitt utvidet til å dra inn i sitt kontrollområde den
 478 enorme mengden kultur og kreativitet som den aldri tidligere har nådd over.
 479 Teknologien som tok vare på den historiske balansen&#8212;mellom bruken av
 480 den delen av kulturen vår som var fri og bruken av vår kultur som krevde
 481 tillatelse&#8212;har blitt borte.  Konsekvensen er at vi er mindre og mindre
 482 en fri kultur, og mer og mer en tillatelseskultur.
 483 </p><p>
 484 Denne endringen blir rettferdiggjort som nødvendig for å beskytte
 485 kommersiell kreativitet.  Og ganske riktig, proteksjonisme er nøyaktig det
 486 som motiverer endringen.  Men proteksjonismen som rettferdiggjør endringene
 487 som jeg skal beskrive lenger ned er ikke den begrensede og balanserte typen
 488 som har definert loven tidligere.  Dette er ikke en proteksjonisme for å
 489 beskytte artister.  Det er i stedet en proteksjonisme for å beskytte
 490 bestemte forretningsformer.  Selskaper som er truet av potensialet til
 491 internettet for å endre måten både kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell kultur
 492 blir skapt og delt, har samlet seg for å få lovgiverne til å bruke loven for
 493 å beskytte selskapene.  Dette er historien om RCA og Armstrong, og det er
 494 drømmen til Causbyene.
 495 </p><p>
 496 For internettet har sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mulighet for mange til å
 497 delta i prosessen med å bygge og kultivere en kultur som rekker lagt utenfor
 498 lokale grenselinjer.  Den makten har endret markedsplassen for å lage og
 499 kultivere kultur generelt, og den endringen truer i neste omgang etablerte
 500 innholdsindustrier. Internettet er dermed for industriene som bygget og
 501 distribuerte innhold i det tjuende århundret hva FM-radio var for AM-radio,
 502 eller hva traileren var for jernbaneindustrien i det nittende århundret:
 503 begynnelsen på slutten, eller i hvert fall en markant endring. Digitale
 504 teknologier, knyttet til internettet, kunne produsere et mye mer
 505 konkurransedyktig og levende marked for å bygge og kultivere kultur.  Dette
 506 markedet kunne inneholde en mye videre og mer variert utvalg av skapere.
 507 Disse skaperne kunne produsere og distribuere et mye mer levende utvalg av
 508 kreativitet. Og avhengig av noen få viktige faktorer, så kunne disse
 509 skaperne tjenere mer i snitt fra dette systemet enn skaperne gjør i
 510 dag&#8212;så lenge RCA-ene av i dag ikke bruker loven til å beskytte dem
 511 selv mot denne konkurransen.
 512 </p><p>
 513 Likevel, som jeg argumenterer for i sidene som følger, er dette nøyaktig det
 514 som skjer i vår kultur i dag.  Dette som er dagens ekvivalenter til tidlig
 515 tjuende århundres radio og nittende århundres jernbaner bruker deres makt
 516 til å få loven til å beskytte dem mot dette nye, mer effektive, mer levende
 517 teknologi for å bygge kultur. De lykkes i deres plan om å gjøre om
 518 internettet før internettet gjør om på dem.
 519 </p><p>
 520 Det ser ikke slik ut for mange.  Kamphandlingene over opphavsrett og
 521 internettet er fjernt for de fleste.  For de få som følger dem, virker de i
 522 hovedsak å handle om et enklere sett med spørsmål&#8212;hvorvidt
 523 "piratvirksomhet" vil bli akseptert, og hvorvidt "eiendomsretten" vil bli
 524 beskyttet.  "Krigen" som har blitt erklært mot teknologiene til
 525 internettet&#8212;det presidenten for Motion Picture Association of America
 526 (MPAA) Jack Valenti kaller sin "egen terroristkrig"<sup>[<a name="id2684032" href="#ftn.id2684032" class="footnote">13</a>]</sup>&#8212;har blitt rammet inn som en kamp om å følge
 527 loven og respektere eiendomsretten.  For å vite hvilken side vi bør ta i
 528 denne krigen, de fleste tenker at vi kun trenger å bestemme om hvorvidt vi
 529 er for eiendomsrett eller mot den.
 530 </p><p>
 531 Hvis dette virkelig var alternativene, så ville jeg være enig med Jack
 532 Valenti og innholdsindustrien.  Jeg tror også på eiendomsretten, og spesielt
 533 på viktigheten av hva Mr. Valenti så pent kaller "kreativ eiendomsrett".
 534 Jeg tror at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at loven, riktig innstilt, bør
 535 straffe "piratvirksomhet", både på og utenfor internettet.
 536 </p><p>
 537 Men disse enkle trosoppfatninger maskerer et mye mer grunnleggende spørsmål
 538 og en mye mer dramatisk endring. Min frykt er at med mindre vi begynner å
 539 legge merke til denne endringen, så vil krigen for å befri verden fra
 540 internettets "pirater" også fjerne verdier fra vår kultur som har vært
 541 integrert til vår tradisjon helt fra starten.
 542 </p><p>
 543 Disse verdiene bygget en tradisjon som, for i hvert fall de første 180 årene
 544 av vår republikk, garanterte skaperne rettigheten til å bygge fritt på deres
 545 fortid, og beskyttet skaperne og innovatørene fra både statlig og privat
 546 kontroll.  Det første grunnlovstillegget beskyttet skaperne fra statlig
 547 kontroll.  Og som professor Neil Netanel kraftfylt argumenterer,<sup>[<a name="id2684097" href="#ftn.id2684097" class="footnote">14</a>]</sup> opphavsrettslov, skikkelig balansert, beskyttet
 548 skaperne mot privat kontroll.  Vår tradisjon var dermed hverken Sovjet eller
 549 tradisjonen til velgjørere.  I stedet skar det ut en bred manøvreringsrom
 550 hvor skapere kunne kultivere og utvide vår kultur.
 551 </p><p>
 552 Likevel har lovens respons til internettet, når det knyttes sammen til
 553 endringer i teknologien i internettet selv, ført til massiv økting av den
 554 effektive reguleringen av kreativitet i USA.  For å bygge på eller kritisere
 555 kulturen rundt oss må en spørre, som Oliver Twist, om tillatelse først.
 556 Tillatelse er, naturligvis, ofte innvilget&#8212;men det er ikke ofte
 557 innvilget til den kritiske eller den uavhengige.  Vi har bygget en slags
 558 kulturell adel.  De innen dette adelskapet har et enkelt liv, mens de på
 559 utsiden har det ikke.  Men det er adelskap i alle former som er fremmed for
 560 vår tradisjon.
 561 </p><p>
 562 Historien som følger er om denne krigen.  Er det ikke om "betydningen av
 563 teknologi" i vanlig liv.  Jeg tror ikke på guder, hverken digitale eller
 564 andre typer.  Det er heller ikke et forsøk på å demonisere noen individer
 565 eller gruppe, jeg tro heller ikke i en djevel, selskapsmessig eller på annen
 566 måte.  Det er ikke en moralsk historie.  Ei heller er det et rop om hellig
 567 krig mot en industri.
 568 </p><p>
 569 Det er i stedet et forsøk på å forstå en håpløst ødeleggende krig som er
 570 inspirert av teknologiene til internettet, men som rekker lang utenfor dens
 571 kode.  Og ved å forstå denne kampen er den en innsats for å finne veien til
 572 fred.  Det er ingen god grunn for å fortsette dagens batalje rundt
 573 internett-teknologiene.  Det vil være til stor skade for vår tradisjon og
 574 kultur hvis den får lov til å fortsette ukontrollert. Vi må forstå kilden
 575 til denne krigen.  Vi må finne en løsning snart.
 576 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2684180"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2684185"></a><p>
 577 Lik Causbyenes kamp er denne krigen, delvis, om "eiendomsrett". Eiendommen i
 578 denne krigen er ikke like håndfast som den til Causbyene, og ingen uskyldige
 579 kyllinger har så langt mistet livet.  Likevel er idéene rundt denne
 580 "eiendomsretten" like åpenbare for de fleste som Causbyenes krav om
 581 ukrenkeligheten til deres bondegård var for dem. De fleste av oss tar for
 582 gitt de uvanlig mektige krav som eierne av "immaterielle rettigheter" nå
 583 hevder.  De fleste av oss, som Causbyene, behandler disse kravene som
 584 åpenbare.  Og dermed protesterer vi, som Causbyene,, når ny teknologi griper
 585 inn i denne eiendomsretten.  Det er så klart for oss som det var fro dem at
 586 de nye teknologiene til internettet "tar seg til rette" mot legitime krav
 587 til "eiendomsrett".  Det er like klart for oss som det var for dem at loven
 588 skulle ta affære for å stoppe denne inntrengingen i annen manns eiendom.
 589 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2684228"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2684234"></a><p>
 590
 591 Og dermed, når nerder og teknologer forsvarer sin tids Armstrong og
 592 Wright-brødenes teknologi, får de lite sympati fra de fleste av oss. Sunn
 593 fornuft gjør ikke opprør.  I motsetning til saken til de uheldige Causbyene,
 594 er sunn fornuft på samme side som eiendomseierne i denne krigen.  I
 595 motsetning til hos de heldige Wright-brødrene, har internettet ikke
 596 inspirert en revolusjon til fordel for seg.
 597 </p><p>
 598 Mitt håp er å skyve denne sunne fornuften videre.  Jeg har blitt stadig mer
 599 overrasket over kraften til denne idéen om immaterielle rettigheter og, mer
 600 viktig, dets evne til å slå av kritisk tanke hos lovmakere og innbyggere.
 601 Det har aldri før i vår historie vært så mye av vår "kultur" som har vært
 602 "eid" enn det er nå.  Og likevel har aldri før konsentrasjonen av makt til å
 603 kontrollere <span class="emphasis"><em>bruken</em></span> av kulturen vært mer akseptert uten
 604 spørsmål enn det er nå.
 605 </p><p>
 606 Gåten er, hvorfor det?  Er det fordi vi fått en innsikt i sannheten om
 607 verdien og betydningen av absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur? Er det
 608 fordi vi har oppdaget at vår tradisjon med å avvise slike absolutte krav var
 609 feil?
 610 </p><p>
 611 Eller er det på grunn av at idéer om absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur
 612 gir fordeler til RCA-ene i vår tid, og passer med vår ureflekterte
 613 intuisjon?
 614 </p><p>
 615 Er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår tradisjon om fri kultur en
 616 forekomst av USA som korrigerer en feil fra sin fortid, slik vi gjorde det
 617 etter en blodig krig mot slaveri, og slik vi sakte gjør det mot
 618 forskjellsbehandling?  Eller er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår
 619 tradisjon med fri kultur nok et eksempel på at vårt politiske system er
 620 fanget av noen få mektige særinteresser?
 621 </p><p>
 622 Fører sunn fornuft til det ekstreme i dette spørsmålet på grunn av at sunn
 623 fornuft faktisk tror på dette ekstreme?  Eller står sunn fornuft i stillhet
 624 i møtet med dette ekstreme fordi, som med Armstrong versus RCA, at den mer
 625 mektige siden har sikret seg at det har et mye mer mektig synspunkt?
 626 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2684324"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2684330"></a><p>
 627
 628 Jeg forsøker ikke å være mystisk.  Mine egne synspunkter er klare. Jeg mener
 629 det var riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør mot ekstremismen til
 630 Causbyene.  Jeg mener det ville være riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør
 631 mot de ekstreme krav som gjøres i dag på vegne av "immaterielle
 632 rettigheter".  Det som loven krever i dag er mer å mer like dumt som om
 633 lensmannen skulle arrestere en flymaskin for å trenge inn på annen manns
 634 eiendom.  Men konsekvensene av den nye dumskapen vil bli mye mer
 635 dyptgripende.
 636
 637 </p><p>
 638 Basketaket som pågår akkurat nå senterer seg rundt to idéer:
 639 "piratvirksomhet" og "eiendom".  Mitt mål med denne bokens neste to deler er
 640 å utforske disse to idéene.
 641 </p><p>
 642 Metoden min er ikke den vanlige metoden for en akademiker.  Jeg ønsker ikke
 643 å pløye deg inn i et komplisert argument, steinsatt med referanser til
 644 obskure franske teoretikere&#8212;uansett hvor naturlig det har blitt for
 645 den rare sorten vi akademikere har blitt.  Jeg vil i stedet begynne hver del
 646 med en samling historier som etablerer en sammenheng der disse
 647 tilsynelatende enkle idéene kan bli fullt ut forstått.
 648 </p><p>
 649 De to delene setter opp kjernen i påstanden til denne boken: at mens
 650 internettet faktisk har produsert noe fantastisk og nytt, bidrar våre
 651 myndigheter, presset av store medieaktører for å møte dette "noe nytt" til å
 652 ødelegge noe som er svært gammelt.  I stedet for å forstå endringene som
 653 internettet kan gjøre mulig, og i stedet for å ta den tiden som trengs for å
 654 la "sunn fornuft" finne ut hvordan best svare på utfordringen, så lar vi de
 655 som er mest truet av endringene bruke sin makt til å endre loven&#8212;og
 656 viktigere, å bruke sin makt til å endre noe fundamentalt om hvordan vi
 657 alltid har fungert.
 658 </p><p>
 659 Jeg tror vi tillater dette, ikke fordi det er riktig, og heller ikke fordi
 660 de fleste av oss tror på disse endringene.  Vi tillater det på grunn av at
 661 de interessene som er mest truet er blant de mest mektige aktørene i vår
 662 deprimerende kompromitterte prosess for å utforme lover. Denne boken er
 663 historien om nok en konsekvens for denne type korrupsjon&#8212;en konsekvens
 664 for de fleste av oss forblir ukjent med.
 665 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2628954" href="#id2628954" class="para">4</a>] </sup>
 666 St. George Tucker, <em class="citetitle">Blackstone's Commentaries</em> 3 (South
 667 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
 668 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2683318" href="#id2683318" class="para">5</a>] </sup>
 669 USA mot Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. Domstolen fant at det kunne være
 670 å "ta" hvis regjeringens bruk av sitt land reelt sett hadde ødelagt verdien
 671 av eiendomen til Causby.  Dette eksemplet ble foreslått for meg i Keith
 672 Aokis flotte stykke, "(intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward
 673 a cultural Geography of Authorship", <em class="citetitle">Stanford Law
 674 Review</em> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. Se også Paul Goldstein,
 675 <em class="citetitle">Real Property</em> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press
 676 (1984)), 1112&#8211;13.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2683352"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2683348"></a>
 677 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2683533" href="#id2683533" class="para">6</a>] </sup>
 678 Lawrence Lessing, <em class="citetitle">Man of High Fidelity:: Edwin Howard
 679 Armstrong</em> (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
 680 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2683481" href="#id2683481" class="para">7</a>] </sup> Se "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," første
 681 elektroniske kirke i USA, hos www.webstationone.com/fecha, tilgjengelig fra
 682 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #1</a>.
 683 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2683639" href="#id2683639" class="para">8</a>] </sup>Lessing, 226.
 684 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2683655" href="#id2683655" class="para">9</a>] </sup>
 685 Lessing, 256.
 686 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2683774" href="#id2683774" class="para">10</a>] </sup>
 687 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
 688 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American Life
 689 Project, 15. april 2003: 6, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #2</a>.
 690 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2683868" href="#id2683868" class="para">11</a>] </sup>
 691 Dette er ikke det eneste formålet med opphavsrett, men det er helt klart
 692 hovedformålet med opphavsretten slik den er etablert i føderal grunnlov.
 693 Opphavsrettslovene i delstatene beskyttet historisk ikke bare kommersielle
 694 interesse når det gjaldt publikasjoner, men også personverninteresser.  Ved
 695 å gi forfattere eneretten til å publisere først, ga delstatenes
 696 opphavsrettslovene forfatterne makt til å kontrollere spredningen av fakta
 697 om seg selv. Se Samuel D. Warren og Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy",
 698 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193, 198&#8211;200.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2683534"></a>
 699 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2683904" href="#id2683904" class="para">12</a>] </sup>
 700 Se Jessica Litman, <em class="citetitle">Digital Copyright</em> (New York:
 701 Prometheus bøker, 2001), kap. 13.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2683912"></a>
 702 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2684032" href="#id2684032" class="para">13</a>] </sup>
 703 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates Use New Tools
 704 to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," <em class="citetitle">New York
 705 Times</em>, 17. januar 2002.
 706 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2684097" href="#id2684097" class="para">14</a>] </sup>
 707 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," <em class="citetitle">Yale
 708 Law Journal</em> 106 (1996): 283.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2684106"></a>
 709 </p></div></div></div><div class="part" title='Del I. "Piratvirksomhet"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="c-piracy"></a>Del I. "Piratvirksomhet"</h1></div></div></div><div class="partintro" title='"Piratvirksomhet"'><div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxmansfield1"></a><p>
 710 Helt siden loven begynte å regulere kreative eierrettigheter, har det vært
 711 en krig mot "piratvirksomhet".  De presise konturene av dette konseptet,
 712 "piratvirksomhet", har vært vanskelig å tegne opp, men bildet av
 713 urettferdighet er enkelt å beskrive.  Som Lord Mansfield skrev i en sak som
 714 utvidet rekkevidden for engelsk opphavsrettslov til å inkludere noteark,
 715 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 716 En person kan bruke kopien til å spille den, men han har ingen rett til å
 717 robbe forfatteren for profitten, ved å lage flere kopier og distribuere
 718 etter eget forgodtbefinnende.<sup>[<a name="id2684466" href="#ftn.id2684466" class="footnote">15</a>]</sup>
 719 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2684480"></a></blockquote></div><p>
 720
 721 I dag er vi midt inne i en annen "krig" mot "piratvirksomhet". Internettet
 722 har fremprovosert denne krigen.  Internettet gjør det mulig å effektivt spre
 723 innhold.  Peer-to-peer (p2p) fildeling er blant det mest effektive av de
 724 effektive teknologier internettet muliggjør. Ved å bruke distribuert
 725 intelligens, kan p2p-systemer muliggjøre enkel spredning av innhold på en
 726 måte som ingen forestilte seg for en generasjon siden.
 727
 728 </p><p>
 729 Denne effektiviteten respekterer ikke de tradisjonelle skillene i
 730 opphavsretten. Nettverket skiller ikke mellom deling av
 731 opphavsrettsbeskyttet og ikke opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold. Dermed har det
 732 vært deling av en enorm mengde opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold.  Denne
 733 delingen har i sin tur ansporet til krigen, på grunn av at eiere av
 734 opphavsretter frykter delingen vil "frata forfatteren overskuddet."
 735 </p><p>
 736 Krigerne har snudd seg til domstolene, til lovgiverne, og i stadig større
 737 grad til teknologi for å forsvare sin "eiendom" mot denne
 738 "piratvirksomheten".  En generasjon amerikanere, advarer krigerne, blir
 739 oppdratt til å tro at "eiendom" skal være "gratis".  Glem tatoveringer, ikke
 740 tenk på kroppspiercing&#8212;våre barn blir <span class="emphasis"><em>tyver</em></span>!
 741 </p><p>
 742 Det er ingen tvil om at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at pirater bør
 743 straffes.  Men før vi roper på bødlene, bør vi sette dette
 744 "piratvirksomhets"-begrepet i en sammenheng.  For mens begrepet blir mer og
 745 mer brukt, har det i sin kjerne en ekstraordinær idé som nesten helt sikkert
 746 er feil.
 747 </p><p>
 748 Idéen høres omtrent slik ut:
 749 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 750 Kreativt arbeid har verdi.  Når jeg bruker, eller tar, eller bygger på det
 751 kreative arbeidet til andre, så tar jeg noe fra dem som har verdi.  Når jeg
 752 tar noe av verdi fra noen andre, bør jeg få tillatelse fra dem.  Å ta noe
 753 som har verdi fra andre uten tillatelse er galt.  Det er en form for
 754 piratvirksomhet.
 755 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2684579"></a><p>
 756 Dette synet går dypt i de pågående debattene.  Det er hva jussprofessor
 757 Rochelle Dreyfuss ved NYU kritiserer som "hvis verdi, så rettighet"-teorien
 758 for kreative eierrettigheter <sup>[<a name="id2684594" href="#ftn.id2684594" class="footnote">16</a>]</sup>&#8212;hvis det finnes verdi, så må noen ha rettigheten til denne
 759 verdien.  Det er perspektivet som fikk komponistenes rettighetsorganisasjon,
 760 ASCAP, til å saksøke jentespeiderne for å ikke betale for sangene som
 761 jentene sagt rundt jentespeidernes leirbål.<sup>[<a name="id2684614" href="#ftn.id2684614" class="footnote">17</a>]</sup> Det fantes "verdi" (sangene), så det måtte ha vært en
 762 "rettighet"&#8212;til og med mot jentespeiderne.
 763 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2684642"></a><p>
 764
 765 Denne idéen er helt klart en mulig forståelse om hvordan kreative
 766 eierrettigheter bør virke.  Det er helt klart et mulig design for et
 767 lovsystem som beskytter kreative eierrettigheter.  Men teorien om "hvis
 768 verdi, så rettighet" for kreative eierrettigheter har aldri vært USAs teori
 769 for kreative eierrettigheter.  It har aldri stått rot i vårt lovverk.
 770 </p><p>
 771 I vår tradisjon har immaterielle rettigheter i stedet vært et instrument.
 772 Det bygger fundamentet for et rikt kreativt samfunn, men er fortsatt servilt
 773 til verdien av kreativitet.  Dagens debatt har snudd dette helt rundt.  Vi
 774 har blitt så opptatt av å beskytte instrumentet at vi mister verdien av
 775 syne.
 776 </p><p>
 777 Kilden til denne forvirringen er et skille som loven ikke lenger bryr seg om
 778 å markere&#8212;skillet mellom å gjenpublisere noens verk på den ene siden,
 779 og bygge på og gjøre om verket på den andre.  Da opphavsretten kom var det
 780 kun publisering som ble berørt. Opphavsretten i dag regulerer begge.
 781 </p><p>
 782 Før teknologiene til internettet dukket opp, betød ikke denne begrepsmessige
 783 sammenblandingen mye.  Teknologiene for å publisere var kostbare, som betød
 784 at det meste av publisering var kommersiell. Kommersielle aktører kunne
 785 håndtere byrden pålagt av loven&#8212;til og med byrden som den bysantiske
 786 kompleksiteten som opphavsrettsloven har blitt.  Det var bare nok en kostnad
 787 ved å drive forretning.
 788 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2684696"></a><p>
 789 Men da internettet dukket opp, forsvant denne naturlige begrensningen til
 790 lovens virkeområde.  Loven kontrollerer ikke bare kreativiteten til
 791 kommersielle skapere, men effektivt sett kreativiteten til alle. Selv om
 792 utvidelsen ikke ville bety stort hvis opphavsrettsloven kun regulerte
 793 "kopiering", så betyr utvidelsen mye når loven regulerer så bredt og obskurt
 794 som den gjør.  Byrden denne loven gir oppveier nå langt fordelene den ga da
 795 den ble vedtatt&#8212;helt klart slik den påvirker ikke-kommersiell
 796 kreativitet, og i stadig større grad slik den påvirker kommersiell
 797 kreativitet.  Dermed, slik vi ser klarere i kapitlene som følger, er lovens
 798 rolle mindre og mindre å støtte kreativitet, og mer og mer å beskytte
 799 enkelte industrier mot konkurranse.  Akkurat på tidspunktet da digital
 800 teknologi kunne sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mengde med kommersiell og
 801 ikke-kommersiell kreativitet, tynger loven denne kreativiteten med sinnsykt
 802 kompliserte og vage regler og med trusselen om uanstendig harde straffer.
 803 Vi ser kanskje, som Richard Florida skriver, "Fremveksten av den kreative
 804 klasse"<sup>[<a name="id2684705" href="#ftn.id2684705" class="footnote">18</a>]</sup> Dessverre ser vi også en
 805 ekstraordinær fremvekst av reguleringer av denne kreative klassen.
 806 </p><p>
 807 Disse byrdene gir ingen mening i vår tradisjon.  Vi bør begynne med å forstå
 808 den tradisjonen litt mer, og ved å plassere dagens slag om oppførsel med
 809 merkelappen "piratvirksomhet" i sin rette sammenheng.
 810 </p><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#creators">2. Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#mere-copyists">3. Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#catalogs">4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#pirates">5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#piracy">6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2684466" href="#id2684466" class="para">15</a>] </sup>
 811
 812
 813 <em class="citetitle">Bach</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Longman</em>, 98
 814 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
 815 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2684594" href="#id2684594" class="para">16</a>] </sup>
 816
 817
 818 Se Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
 819 Pepsi Generation," <em class="citetitle">Notre Dame Law Review</em> 65 (1990):
 820 397.
 821 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2684614" href="#id2684614" class="para">17</a>] </sup>
 822
 823 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay Up,"
 824 <em class="citetitle">Wall Street Journal</em>, 21. august 1996, tilgjengelig
 825 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #3</a>; Jonathan
 826 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
 827 Speech, No One Wins," <em class="citetitle">Boston Globe</em>, 24. november
 828 2002.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2684632"></a>
 829 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2684705" href="#id2684705" class="para">18</a>] </sup>
 830
 831 I <em class="citetitle">The Rise of the Creative Class</em> (New York: Basic
 832 Books, 2002), dokumenterer Richard Florida en endring i arbeidsstokken mot
 833 kreativitetsarbeide.  Hans tekst omhandler derimot ikke direkte de juridiske
 834 vilkår som kreativiteten blir muliggjort eller hindret under.  Jeg er helt
 835 klart enig med ham i viktigheten og betydningen av denne endringen, men jeg
 836 tror også at vilkårene som disse endringene blir aktivert under er mye
 837 vanskeligere.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2684769"></a>
 838 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 2. Kapittel en: Skaperne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="creators"></a>Kapittel 2. Kapittel en: Skaperne</h2></div></div></div><p>
 839 I 1928 ble en tegnefilmfigur født.  En tidlig Mikke Mus debuterte i mai
 840 dette året, i en stille flopp ved navn <em class="citetitle">Plane Crazy</em>.
 841 I november, i Colony teateret i New York City, ble den første vidt
 842 distribuerte tegnefilmen med synkronisert lyd, <em class="citetitle">Steamboat
 843 Willy</em>, vist frem med figuren som skulle bli til Mikke Mus.
 844 </p><p>
 845 Film med synkronisert lyd hadde blitt introdusert et år tidligere i filmen
 846 <em class="citetitle">The Jazz Singer</em>.  Suksessen fikk Walt Disney til å
 847 kopiere teknikken og mikse lyd med tegnefilm.  Ingen visste hvorvidt det
 848 ville virke eller ikke, og om det fungere, hvorvidt publikum villa ha sans
 849 for det.  Men da Disney gjorde en test sommeren 1928, var resultatet
 850 entydig.  Som Disney beskriver dette første eksperimentet,
 851 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 852
 853 Et par av guttene mine kunne lese noteark, og en av dem kunne spille
 854 munnspill.  Vi stappet dem inn i et rom hvor de ikke kunne se skjermen, og
 855 gjorde det slik at lyden de spilte ble sendt videre til et rom hvor våre
 856 koner og venner var plassert for å se på bildet.
 857
 858 </p><p>
 859 Guttene brukte et note- og lydeffekt-ark.  Etter noen dårlige oppstarter,
 860 kom endelig lyd og handling i gang med et smell. Munnspilleren spilte
 861 melodien, og resten av oss i lydavdelingen slamret på tinnkasseroller og
 862 blåste på slide-fløyte til rytmen. Synkroniseringen var nesten helt riktig.
 863 </p><p>
 864 Effekten på vårt lille publikum var intet mindre enn elektrisk.  De reagerte
 865 nesten instinktivt til denne union av lyd og bevegelse.  Jeg trodde de
 866 tullet med meg.  Så de puttet meg i publikum og satte igang på nytt.  Det
 867 var grufullt, men det var fantastisk.  Og det var noe nytt!<sup>[<a name="id2684884" href="#ftn.id2684884" class="footnote">19</a>]</sup>
 868 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 869 Disneys daværende partner, og en av animasjonsverdenens mest ekstraordinære
 870 talenter, Ub Iwerks, uttalte det sterkere: "Jeg har aldri vært så begeistret
 871 i hele mitt liv. Ingenting annet har noen sinne vært like bra." <a class="indexterm" name="id2684906"></a>
 872 </p><p>
 873 Disney hadde laget noe helt nyt, basert på noe relativt nytt. Synkronisert
 874 lyd ga liv til en form for kreativitet som sjeldent hadde&#8212;unntatt fra
 875 Disneys hender&#8212;vært noe annet en fyllstoff for andre filmer.  Gjennom
 876 animasjonens tidligere historie var det Disneys oppfinnelse som satte
 877 standarden som andre måtte sloss for å oppfylle.  Og ganske ofte var Disneys
 878 store geni, hans gnist av kreativitet, bygget på arbeidet til andre.
 879 </p><p>
 880 Dette er kjent stoff.  Det du kanskje ikke vet er at 1928 også markerer en
 881 annen viktig overgang.  I samme år laget et komedie-geni (i motsetning til
 882 tegnefilm-geni) sin siste uavhengig produserte stumfilm.  Dette geniet var
 883 Buster Keaton.  Filmen var <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr</em>.
 884 </p><p>
 885 Keaton ble født inn i en vauderville-familie i 1895.  I stumfilm-æraen hadde
 886 han mestret bruken av bredpenslet fysisk komedie på en måte som tente
 887 ukontrollerbar latter fra hans publikum. <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill,
 888 Jr</em>. var en klassiker av denne typen, berømt blant film-elskere
 889 for sine utrolige stunts.  Filmen var en klassisk Keaton&#8212;fantastisk
 890 populær og blant de beste i sin sjanger.
 891 </p><p>
 892 <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr</em>. kom før Disneys tegnefilm
 893 Steamboat Willie.  Det er ingen tilfeldighet at titlene er så
 894 like. Steamboat Willie er en direkte tegneserieparodi av Steamboat
 895 Bill,<sup>[<a name="id2684978" href="#ftn.id2684978" class="footnote">20</a>]</sup> og begge bygger på en felles sang
 896 som kilde.  Det er ikke kun fra nyskapningen med synkronisert lyd i
 897 <em class="citetitle">The Jazz Singer</em> at vi får <em class="citetitle">Steamboat
 898 Willie</em>.  Det er også fra Buster Keatons nyskapning Steamboat
 899 Bill, Jr., som igjen var inspirert av sangen "Steamboat Bill", at vi får
 900 Steamboat Willie.  Og fra Steamboat Willie får vi så Mikke Mus.
 901 </p><p>
 902 Denne "låningen" var ikke unik, hverken for Disney eller for industrien.
 903 Disney apet alltid etter full-lengde massemarkedsfilmene rundt
 904 ham.<sup>[<a name="id2685031" href="#ftn.id2685031" class="footnote">21</a>]</sup> Det samme gjorde mange andre.
 905 Tidlige tegnefilmer er stappfulle av etterapninger&#8212;små variasjoner
 906 over suksessfulle temaer, gamle historier fortalt på nytt.  Nøkkelen til
 907 suksess var brilliansen i forskjellene.  Med Disney var det lyden som ga
 908 gnisten til hans animasjoner.  Senere var det kvaliteten på hans arbeide
 909 relativt til de masseproduserte tegnefilmene som han konkurrerte med.
 910 Likevel var disse bidragene bygget på toppen av fundamentet som var lånt.
 911 Disney bygget på arbeidet til andre som kom før han, og skapte noe nytt ut
 912 av noe som bare var litt gammelt.
 913 </p><p>
 914 Noen ganger var låningen begrenset, og noen ganger var den betydelig. Tenkt
 915 på eventyrene til brødrene Grimm.  Hvis du er like ubevisst som jeg var, så
 916 tror du sannsynlighvis at disse fortellingene er glade, søte historier som
 917 passer for ethvert barn ved leggetid.  Realiteten er at Grimm-eventyrene er,
 918 for oss, ganske dystre.  Det er noen sjeldne og kanskje spesielt ambisiøse
 919 foreldre som ville våge å lese disse blodige moralistiske historiene til
 920 sine barn, ved leggetid eller hvilken som helst annet tidspunkt.
 921 </p><p>
 922
 923 Disney tok disse historiene og fortalte dem på nytt på en måte som førte dem
 924 inn i en ny tidsalder. Han ga historiene liv, med både karakterer og
 925 lys. Uten å fjerne bitene av frykt og fare helt, gjorde han morsomt det som
 926 var mørkt og satte inn en ekte følelse av medfølelse der det før var
 927 frykt. Og ikke bare med verkene av brødrene Grimm.  Faktisk er katalogen
 928 over Disney-arbeid som baserer seg på arbeidet til andre ganske forbløffende
 929 når den blir samlet: <em class="citetitle">Snøhvit</em> (1937),
 930 <em class="citetitle">Fantasia</em> (1940), <em class="citetitle">Pinocchio</em>
 931 (1940), <em class="citetitle">Dumbo</em> (1941), <em class="citetitle">Bambi</em>
 932 (1942), <em class="citetitle">Song of the South</em> (1946),
 933 <em class="citetitle">Askepott</em> (1950), <em class="citetitle">Alice in
 934 Wonderland</em> (1951), <em class="citetitle">Robin Hood</em> (1952),
 935 <em class="citetitle">Peter Pan</em> (1953), <em class="citetitle">Lady og
 936 landstrykeren</em> (1955), <em class="citetitle">Mulan</em> (1998),
 937 <em class="citetitle">Tornerose</em> (1959), <em class="citetitle">101
 938 dalmatinere</em> (1961), <em class="citetitle">Sverdet i steinen</em>
 939 (1963), og <em class="citetitle">Jungelboken</em> (1967)&#8212;for ikke å nevne
 940 et nylig eksempel som vi bør kanskje glemme raskt, <em class="citetitle">Treasure
 941 Planet</em> (2003). I alle disse tilfellene, har Disney (eller
 942 Disney, Inc.) hentet kreativitet fra kultur rundt ham, blandet med
 943 kreativiteten fra sitt eget ekstraordinære talent, og deretter brent denne
 944 blandingen inn i sjelen til sin kultur. Hente, blande og brenne.
 945 </p><p>
 946 Dette er en type kreativitet.  Det er en kreativitet som vi bør huske på og
 947 feire.  Det er noen som vil si at det finnes ingen kreativitet bortsett fra
 948 denne typen.  Vi trenger ikke gå så langt for å anerkjenne dens betydning.
 949 Vi kan kalle dette "Disney-kreativitet", selv om det vil være litt
 950 misvisende.  Det er mer presist "Walt Disney-kreativitet"&#8212;en
 951 uttrykksform og genialitet som bygger på kulturen rundt oss og omformer den
 952 til noe annet.
 953 </p><p> I 1928 var kulturen som Disney fritt kunne trekke veksler på relativt
 954 fersk.  Allemannseie i 1928 var ikke veldig gammelt og var dermed ganske
 955 levende.  Gjennomsnittelig vernetid i opphavsretten var bare rundt tredve
 956 år&#8212;for den lille delen av kreative verk som faktisk var
 957 opphavsrettsbeskyttet.<sup>[<a name="id2685173" href="#ftn.id2685173" class="footnote">22</a>]</sup> Det betyr at i
 958 tredve år, i gjennomsnitt, hadde forfattere eller kreative verks
 959 opphavsrettighetsinnehaver en "eksklusiv rett" til a kontrollere bestemte
 960 typer bruk av verket.  For å bruke disse opphavsrettsbeskyttede verkene på
 961 de begrensede måtene krevde tillatelse fra opphavsrettsinnehaveren.
 962 </p><p>
 963 Når opphavsrettens vernetid er over, faller et verk i det fri og blir
 964 allemannseie.  Ingen tillatelse trengs da for å bygge på eller bruke dette
 965 verket.  Ingen tillatelse og dermed, ingen advokater. Allemannseie er en
 966 "advokat-fri sone".  Det meste av innhold fra det nittende århundre var
 967 dermed fritt tilgjengelig for Disney å bruke eller bygge på i 1928.  Det var
 968 tilgjengelig for enhver&#8212;uansett om de hadde forbindelser eller ikke,
 969 om de var rik eller ikke, om de var akseptert eller ikke&#8212;til å bruke
 970 og bygge videre på.
 971 </p><p>
 972
 973 Dette er slik det alltid har vært&#8212;inntil ganske nylig.  For
 974 mesteparten av vår historie, har allemannseiet vært like over horisonten.
 975 Fram til 1978 var den gjennomsnittlige opphavsrettslige vernetiden aldri mer
 976 enn trettito år, som gjorde at det meste av kultur fra en og en halv
 977 generasjon tidligere var tilgjengelig for enhver å bygge på uten tillatelse
 978 fra noen.  Tilsvarende for i dag ville være at kreative verker fra 1960- og
 979 1970-tallet nå ville være fritt tilgjengelig for de neste Walt Disney å
 980 bygge på uten tillatelse.  Men i dag er allemannseie presumtivt kun for
 981 innhold fra før mellomkrigstiden.
 982 </p><p>
 983 Walt Disney hadde selvfølgelig ikke monopol på "Walt Disney-kreativitet".
 984 Det har heller ikke USA.  Normen med fri kultur har, inntil nylig, og
 985 unntatt i totalitære nasjoner, vært bredt utnyttet og svært universell.
 986 </p><p>
 987 Vurder for eksempel en form for kreativitet som synes underlig for mange
 988 amerikanere, men som er overalt i japansk kultur:
 989 <em class="citetitle">manga</em>, eller tegneserier.  Japanerne er fanatiske når
 990 det gjelder tegneserier.  Over 40 prosent av publikasjoner er tegneserier,
 991 og 30 prosent av publikasjonsomsetningen stammer fra tegneserier.  De er
 992 over alt i det japanske samfunnet, tilgjengelig fra ethvert
 993 tidsskriftsutsalg, og i hendene på en stor andel av pendlere på Japans
 994 ekstraordinære system for offentlig transport.
 995 </p><p>
 996 Amerikanere har en tendens til å se ned på denne formen for kultur. Det er
 997 et lite attraktivt kjennetegn hos oss.  Vi misforstår sannsynligvis mye
 998 rundt manga, på grunn av at få av oss noen gang har lest noe som ligner på
 999 historiene i disse "grafiske historiene" forteller.  For en japaner dekker
1000 manga ethvert aspekt ved det sosiale liv.  For oss er tegneserier "menn i
1001 strømpebukser".  Og uansett er det ikke slik at T-banen i New York er full
1002 av folk som leser Joyse eller Hemingway for den saks skyld.  Folk i ulike
1003 kulturer skiller seg ut på forskjellig måter, og japanerne på dette
1004 interessante viset.
1005 </p><p>
1006 Men mitt formål her er ikke å forstå manga.  Det er å beskrive en variant av
1007 manga som fra en advokats perspektiv er ganske merkelig, men som fra en
1008 Disneys perspektiv er ganske godt kjent.
1009 </p><p>
1010
1011 Dette er fenomenet <em class="citetitle">doujinshi</em>.  Doujinshi er også
1012 tegneserier, men de er slags etterapings-tegneserier.  En rik etikk styrer
1013 de som skaper doujinshi.  Det er ikke doujinshi hvis det
1014 <span class="emphasis"><em>bare</em></span> er en kopi.  Kunstneren må gjøre et bidrag til
1015 kunsten han kopierer ved å omforme det enten subtilt eller betydelig.  En
1016 doujinshi-tegneserie kan dermed ta en massemarkeds-tegneserie og utvikle den
1017 i en annen retning&#8212;med en annen historie-linje.  Eller tegneserien kan
1018 beholde figuren som seg selv men endre litt på utseendet.  Det er ingen
1019 bestemt formel for hva som gjør en doujinshi tilstrekkelig "forskjellig".
1020 Men de må være forskjellige hvis de skal anses som ekte doujinshi.  Det er
1021 faktisk komiteer som går igjennom doujinshi for å bli med på messer, og
1022 avviser etterapninger som bare er en kopi.
1023 </p><p>
1024 Disse etterapings-tegneseriene er ikke en liten del av manga-markedet.  Det
1025 er enorme.  Mer en 33 000 "sirkler" av skapere over hele Japan som
1026 produserer disse bitene av Walt Disney-kreativitet.  Mer en 450 000 japanere
1027 samles to ganger i året, i den største offentlige samlingen i langet, for å
1028 bytte og selge dem.  Dette markedet er parallelt med det kommersielle
1029 massemarkeds-manga-markedet.  På noen måter konkurrerer det åpenbart med det
1030 markedet, men det er ingen vedvarende innsats fra de som kontrollerer det
1031 kommersielle manga-markedet for å stenge doujinshi-markedet.  Det blomstrer,
1032 på tross av konkurransen og til tross for loven.
1033 </p><p>
1034 Den mest gåtefulle egenskapen med doujinshi-markedet, for de som har
1035 juridisk trening i hvert fall, er at det overhodet tillates å eksistere.
1036 Under japansk opphavsrettslov, som i hvert fall på dette området (på
1037 papiret) speiler USAs opphavsrettslov, er doujinshi-markedet ulovlig.
1038 Doujinshi er helt klart "avledede verk".  Det er ingen generell praksis hos
1039 doujinshi-kunstnere for å sikre seg tillatelse hos manga-skaperne.  I stedet
1040 er praksisen ganske enkelt å ta og endre det andre har laget, slik Walt
1041 Disney gjorde med <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr</em>.  For både
1042 japansk og USAs lov, er å "ta" uten tillatelse fra den opprinnelige
1043 opphavsrettsinnehaver ulovlig.  Det er et brudd på opphavsretten til det
1044 opprinnelige verket å lage en kopi eller et avledet verk uten tillatelse fra
1045 den opprinnelige rettighetsinnehaveren.
1046 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxwinickjudd"></a><p>
1047 Likevel eksisterer dette illegale markedet og faktisk blomstrer i Japan, og
1048 etter manges syn er det nettopp fordi det eksisterer at japansk manga
1049 blomstrer.  Som USAs tegneserieskaper Judd Winick fortalte meg, "I
1050 amerikansk tegneseriers første dager var det ganske likt det som foregår i
1051 Japan i dag. . . . Amerikanske tegneserier kom til verden ved å kopiere
1052 hverandre. . . . Det er slik [kunstnerne] lærer å tegne&#8212;ved å se i
1053 tegneseriebøker og ikke følge streken, men ved å se på dem og kopiere dem"
1054 og bygge basert på dem.<sup>[<a name="id2685344" href="#ftn.id2685344" class="footnote">23</a>]</sup>
1055 </p><p>
1056 Amerikanske tegneserier nå er ganske annerledes, forklarer Winick, delvis på
1057 grunn av de juridiske problemene med å tilpasse tegneserier slik doujinshi
1058 får lov til.  Med for eksempel Supermann, fortalte Winick meg, "er det en
1059 rekke regler, og du må følge dem".  Det er ting som Supermann "ikke kan"
1060 gjøre.  "For en som lager tegneserier er det frustrerende å måtte begrense
1061 seg til noen parameter som er femti år gamle."
1062 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2685468"></a><p>
1063 Normen i Japan reduserer denne juridiske utfordringen.  Noen sier at det
1064 nettopp er den oppsamlede fordelen i det japanske mangamarkedet som
1065 forklarer denne reduksjonen.  Jussprofessor Salil Mehra ved Temple
1066 University hypotiserer for eksempel med at manga-markedet aksepterer disse
1067 teoretiske bruddene fordi de får mangamarkedet til å bli rikere og mer
1068 produktivt.  Alle ville få det verre hvis doujinshi ble bannlyst, så loven
1069 bannlyser ikke doujinshi.<sup>[<a name="id2685494" href="#ftn.id2685494" class="footnote">24</a>]</sup>
1070 </p><p>
1071 Problemet med denne historien, derimot, og som Mehra helt klart erkjenner,
1072 er at mekanismen som produserer denne "hold hendene borte"-responsen ikke er
1073 forstått.  Det kan godt være at markedet som helhet gjør det bedre hvis
1074 doujinshi tillates i stedet for å bannlyse den, men det forklarer likevel
1075 ikke hvorfor individuelle opphavsrettsinnehavere ikke saksøker.  Hvis loven
1076 ikke har et generelt unntak for doujinshi, og det finnes faktisk noen
1077 tilfeller der individuelle manga-kunstnere har saksøkt doujinshi-kunstnere,
1078 hvorfor er det ikke et mer generelt mønster for å blokkere denne "frie
1079 takingen" hos doujinshi-kulturen?
1080 </p><p>
1081 Jeg var fire nydelige måneder i Japan, og jeg stilte dette spørsmål så ofte
1082 som jeg kunne.  Kanskje det beste svaret til slutt kom fra en venn i et
1083 større japansk advokatfirma. "Vi har ikke nok advokater", fortalte han meg
1084 en ettermiddag.  Det er "bare ikke nok ressurser til å tiltale tilfeller som
1085 dette".
1086 </p><p>
1087
1088 Dette er et tema vi kommer tilbake til: at lovens regulering både er en
1089 funksjon av ordene i bøkene, og kostnadene med å få disse ordene til å ha
1090 effekt.  Akkurat nå er det endel åpenbare spørsmål som presser seg frem:
1091 Ville Japan gjøre det bedre med flere advokater? Ville manga være rikere
1092 hvis doujinshi-kunstnere ble regelmessig rettsforfulgt?  Ville Japan vinne
1093 noe viktig hvis de kunne stoppe praksisen med deling uten kompensasjon?
1094 Skader piratvirksomhet ofrene for piratvirksomheten, eller hjelper den dem?
1095 Ville advokaters kamp mot denne piratvirksomheten hjelpe deres klienter,
1096 eller skade dem? La oss ta et øyeblikks pause.
1097 </p><p>
1098 Hvis du er som meg et tiår tilbake, eller som folk flest når de først
1099 begynner å tenke på disse temaene, da bør du omtrent nå være rådvill om noe
1100 du ikke hadde tenkt igjennom før.
1101 </p><p>
1102 Vi lever i en verden som feirer "eiendom".  Jeg er en av de som feierer.
1103 Jeg tror på verdien av eiendom generelt, og jeg tror også på verdien av den
1104 sære formen for eiendom som advokater kaller "immateriell
1105 eiendom".<sup>[<a name="id2685588" href="#ftn.id2685588" class="footnote">25</a>]</sup> Et stort og variert samfunn
1106 kan ikke overleve uten eiendom, og et moderne samfunn kan ikke blomstre uten
1107 immaterielle eierrettigheter.
1108 </p><p>
1109 Men det tar bare noen sekunders refleksjon for å innse at det er masse av
1110 verdi der ute som "eiendom" ikke dekker.  Jeg mener ikke "kjærlighet kan
1111 ikke kjøpes med penger" men heller, at en verdi som ganske enkelt er del av
1112 produksjonsprosessen, både for kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell produksjon.
1113 Hvis Disneys animatører hadde stjålet et sett med blyanter for å tegne
1114 Steamboat Willie, vi ville ikke nølt med å dømme det som galt&#8212;selv om
1115 det er trivielt og selv om det ikke blir oppdaget.  Men det var intet galt,
1116 i hvert fall slik loven var da, med at Disney tok fra Buster Keaton eller
1117 fra Grimm-brødrene.  Det var intet galt med å ta fra Keaton, fordi Disneys
1118 bruk ville blitt ansett som "rimelig".  Det var intet galt med å ta fra
1119 brødrene Grimm fordi deres verker var allemannseie.
1120 </p><p>
1121
1122 Dermed, selv om de tingene som Disney tok&#8212;eller mer generelt, tingene
1123 som blir tatt av enhver som utøver Walt Disney-kreativitet&#8212;er
1124 verdifulle, så anser ikke vår tradisjon det som galt å ta disse tingene.
1125 Noen ting forblir frie til å bli tatt i en fri kultur og denne friheten er
1126 bra.
1127 </p><p>
1128 Det er det samme med doujinshi-kulturen.  Hvis en doujinshi-kunstner brøt
1129 seg inn på kontoret til en forlegger, og stakk av med tusen kopier av hans
1130 siste verk&#8212;eller bare en kopi&#8212;uten å betale, så ville vi uten å
1131 nøle si at kunstneren har gjort noe galt.  I tillegg til å ha trengt seg inn
1132 på andres eiendom, ville han ha stjålet noe av verdi. Loven forbyr stjeling
1133 i enhver form, uansett hvor stort eller lite som blir tatt.
1134 </p><p>
1135 Likevel er det en åpenbar motvilje, selv blant japanske advokater, for å si
1136 at etterapende tegneseriekunstnere "stjeler".  Denne formen for Walt
1137 Disney-kreativitet anses som rimelig og riktig, selv om spesielt advokater
1138 synes det er vanskelig å forklare hvorfor.
1139 </p><p>
1140 Det er det same med tusen eksempler som dukker opp over alt med en gang en
1141 begynner å se etter dem.  Forskene bygger på arbeidet til andre forskere
1142 uten å spørre eller betale for privilegiet. ("Unnskyld meg, professor
1143 Einstein, men kan jeg få tillatelse til å bruke din relativitetsteori til å
1144 vise at du tok feil om kvantefysikk?") Teatertropper viser frem
1145 bearbeidelser av verkene til Shapespere uten å sikre seg noen tillatelser.
1146 (Er det <span class="emphasis"><em>noen</em></span> som tror at Shakespeare ville vært mer
1147 spredt i vår kultur om det var et sentralt rettighetsklareringskontor for
1148 Shakespeare som alle som laget Shakespear-produksjoner måtte appelere til
1149 først?)  Og Hollywood går igjennom sykluser med en bestemt type filmer: fem
1150 astroidefilmer i slutten av 1990-tallet, to vulkamkatastrofefilmer i 1997.
1151 </p><p>
1152
1153 Skapere her og overalt har alltid og til alle tider bygd på kreativiteten
1154 som eksisterte før og som omringer dem nå.  Denne byggingen er alltid og
1155 overalt i det minste delvis gjort uten tillatelse og uten å kompensere den
1156 opprinnelige skaperen.  Intet samfunn, fritt eller kontrollert, har noen
1157 gang krevd at enhver bruk skulle bli betalt for eller at tillatelse for Walt
1158 Disney-kreativitet alltid måtte skaffes.  Istedet har ethvert samfunn latt
1159 en bestemt bit av sin kultur være fritt tilgjenglig for alle å ta&#8212;frie
1160 samfunn muligens i større grad enn ufrie, men en viss grad i alle samfunn.
1161
1162 </p><p>
1163 Det vanskelige spørsmålet er derfor ikke <span class="emphasis"><em>om</em></span> en kultur
1164 er fri.  Alle kulturer er frie til en viss grad. Det vanskelige spørsmålet
1165 er i stedet "<span class="emphasis"><em>hvor</em></span> fri er denne kulturen er?" Hvor mye
1166 og hvor bredt, er kulturen fritt tilgjengelig for andre å ta, og bygge på?
1167 Er den friheten begrenset til partimedlemmer?  Til medlemmer av
1168 kongefamilien?  Til de ti største selskapene på New York-børsen?  Eller er
1169 at frihet bredt tilgjengelig? Til kunstnere generelt, uansett om de er
1170 tilknyttet til nasjonalmuseet eller ikke?  Til musikere generelt, uansett om
1171 de er hvite eller ikke? Til filmskapere generelt, uansett om de er
1172 tilknyttet et studio eller ikke?
1173 </p><p>
1174 Frie kulturer er kulturer som etterlater mye åpent for andre å bygge på.
1175 Ufrie, eller tillatelse-kulturer etterlater mye mindre.  Vår var en fri
1176 kultur. Den er på tur til å bli mindre fri.
1177 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2684884" href="#id2684884" class="para">19</a>] </sup>
1178
1179
1180 Leonard Maltin, <em class="citetitle">Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1181 Cartoons</em> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&#8211;35.
1182 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2684978" href="#id2684978" class="para">20</a>] </sup>
1183
1184
1185 Jeg er takknemlig overfor David Gerstein og hans nøyaktige historie,
1186 beskrevet på <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #4</a>.  I
1187 følge Dave Smith ved the Disney Archives, betalte Disney for å bruke
1188 musikken til fem sanger i <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Willie</em>:
1189 "Steamboat Bill," "The Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara),
1190 "Joyful Hurry No. 1" (Baron), og "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). En sjette sang, "The
1191 Turkey in the Straw," var allerede allemannseie.  Brev fra David Smith til
1192 Harry Surden, 10. juli 2003, tilgjenglig i arkivet til forfatteren.
1193 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2685031" href="#id2685031" class="para">21</a>] </sup>
1194
1195
1196 Han var også tilhenger av allmannseiet. Se Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse that
1197 Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5. mars 2002, fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #5</a>.
1198 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2685173" href="#id2685173" class="para">22</a>] </sup>
1199
1200
1201 Inntil 1976 ga opphavsrettsloven en forfatter to mulige verneperioder: en
1202 initiell periode, og en fornyingsperiode.  Jeg har beregnet
1203 "gjennomsnittlig" vernetid ved å finne vektet gjennomsnitt av de totale
1204 registreringer for et gitt år, og andelen fornyinger.  Hvis 100
1205 opphavsretter ble registrert i år 1, bare 15 av dem ble fornyet, og
1206 fornyingsvernetiden er 28 år, så er gjennomsnittelig vernetid 32,2
1207 år. Fornyingsdata og andre relevante data ligger på nettsidene tilknyttet
1208 denne boka, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
1209 #6</a>.
1210 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2685344" href="#id2685344" class="para">23</a>] </sup>
1211
1212
1213 For en utmerket historie, se Scott McCloud, <em class="citetitle">Reinventing
1214 Comics</em> (New York: Perennial, 2000).
1215 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2685494" href="#id2685494" class="para">24</a>] </sup>
1216
1217
1218 Se Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All
1219 the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" <em class="citetitle">Rutgers Law
1220 Review</em> 55 (2002): 155, 182. "det kan være en kollektiv økonomisk
1221 rasjonalitet som får manga- og anime-kunstnere til ikke å saksøke for
1222 opphavsrettsbrudd. Én hypotese er at alle manga-kunstnere kan være bedre
1223 stilt hvis de setter sin individuelle egeninteresse til side og bestemmer
1224 seg for ikke å forfølge sine juridiske rettigheter. Dette er essensielt en
1225 løsning på fangens dilemma."
1226 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2685588" href="#id2685588" class="para">25</a>] </sup>
1227
1228 Begrepet <em class="citetitle">immateriell eiendom</em> er av relativ ny
1229 opprinnelse. Se See Siva Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
1230 Copywrongs</em>, 11 (New York: New York University Press, 2001). Se
1231 også Lawrence Lessig, <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em> (New York:
1232 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. Begrepet presist beskriver et sett med
1233 "eiendoms"-rettigheter&#8212;opphavsretter, patenter, varemerker og
1234 forretningshemmeligheter&#8212;men egenskapene til disse rettighetene er
1235 svært forskjellige.<a class="indexterm" name="id2685606"></a>
1236 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 3. Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="mere-copyists"></a>Kapittel 3. Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxphotography"></a><p>
1237 I 1839 fant Louis Daguerre opp den første praktiske teknologien for å
1238 produsere det vi ville kalle "fotografier".  Rimelig nok ble de kalt
1239 "daguerreotyper".  Prosessen var komplisert og kostbar, og feltet var dermed
1240 begrenset til profesjonelle og noen få ivrige og velstående amatører.  (Det
1241 var til og med en amerikansk Daguerre-forening som hjalp til med å regulere
1242 industrien, slik alle slike foreninger gjør, ved å holde konkurransen ned
1243 slikat prisene var høye.)  <a class="indexterm" name="id2685834"></a>
1244 </p><p>
1245 Men til tross for høye priser var etterspørselen etter daguerreotyper
1246 sterk.  Dette inspirerte oppfinnere til å finne enklere og billigere måter å
1247 lage "automatiske bilder".  William Talbot oppdaget snart en prosess for å
1248 lage "negativer".  Men da negativene var av glass, og måtte holdes fuktige,
1249 forble prosessen kostbar og tung.  På 1870-tallet ble tørrplater utviklet,
1250 noe som gjorde det enklere å skille det å ta et bilde fra å fremkalle det.
1251 Det var fortsatt plater av glass, og dermed var det fortsatt ikke en prosess
1252 som var innenfor rekkevidden til de fleste amatører. <a class="indexterm" name="id2685854"></a>
1253 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxeastmangeorge"></a><p>
1254
1255 Den teknologiske endringen som gjorde masse-fotografering mulig skjedde ikke
1256 før i 1888, og det var takket være en eneste mann. George Eastman, selv en
1257 amatørfotograf, var frustrert over den plate-baserte fotografi-teknologien.
1258 I et lysglimt av innsikt (for å si det slik), forsto Eastman at hvis filmen
1259 kunne gjøres bøybar, så kunne den holdes pæ en enkel rull.  Denne rullen
1260 kunne så sendes til en fremkaller, og senke kostnadene til fotografering
1261 vesentlig.  Ved å reduseere kostnadene, forventet Eastman at han dramatisk
1262 kunne utvide andelen fotografer.
1263 </p><p>
1264 Eastman utviklet bøybart, emulsjons-belagt papirfil og plasserte ruller med
1265 dette i små, enkle kameraer: Kodaken.  Enheten ble markedsfør med grunnlag
1266 dens enkelhet. "Du trykker på knappen og vi fikser resten."<sup>[<a name="id2685902" href="#ftn.id2685902" class="footnote">26</a>]</sup> Som han beskrev det i <em class="citetitle">The Kodak
1267 Primer</em>:
1268 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1269 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that any
1270 person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work that only an
1271 expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or child, who has
1272 sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and press a button, with an
1273 instrument which altogether removes from the practice of photography the
1274 necessity for exceptional facilities or, in fact, any special knowledge of
1275 the art. It can be employed without preliminary study, without a darkroom
1276 and without chemicals.<sup>[<a name="id2685930" href="#ftn.id2685930" class="footnote">27</a>]</sup>
1277 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1278 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded with film,
1279 and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an Eastman factory,
1280 where the film was developed. Over time, of course, the cost of the camera
1281 and the ease with which it could be used both improved. Roll film thus
1282 became the basis for the explosive growth of popular photography. Eastman's
1283 camera first went on sale in 1888; one year later, Kodak was printing more
1284 than six thousand negatives a day.  From 1888 through 1909, while industrial
1285 production was rising by 4.7 percent, photographic equipment and material
1286 sales increased by 11 percent.<sup>[<a name="id2685973" href="#ftn.id2685973" class="footnote">28</a>]</sup> Eastman
1287 Kodak's sales during the same period experienced an average annual increase
1288 of over 17 percent.<sup>[<a name="id2685981" href="#ftn.id2685981" class="footnote">29</a>]</sup>
1289 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2685990"></a><p>
1290
1291
1292 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not economic. It
1293 was social. Professional photography gave individuals a glimpse of places
1294 they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography gave them the ability to
1295 record their own lives in a way they had never been able to do before. As
1296 author Brian Coe notes, "For the first time the snapshot album provided the
1297 man on the street with a permanent record of his family and its
1298 activities. . . . For the first time in history there exists an authentic
1299 visual record of the appearance and activities of the common man made
1300 without [literary] interpretation or bias."<sup>[<a name="id2686010" href="#ftn.id2686010" class="footnote">30</a>]</sup>
1301 </p><p>
1302 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of expression.  The
1303 pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of expression, of course. But it
1304 took years of training before they could be deployed by amateurs in any
1305 useful or effective way. With the Kodak, expression was possible much sooner
1306 and more simply. The barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at
1307 its "quality"; professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a
1308 child study how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the
1309 experience of creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave
1310 ordinary people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1311 have before.
1312 </p><p>
1313 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously, Eastman's
1314 genius was an important part. But also important was the legal environment
1315 within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in the history of
1316 photography, there was a series of judicial decisions that could well have
1317 changed the course of photography substantially.  Courts were asked whether
1318 the photographer, amateur or professional, required permission before he
1319 could capture and print whatever image he wanted. Their answer was
1320 no.<sup>[<a name="id2686045" href="#ftn.id2686045" class="footnote">31</a>]</sup>
1321 </p><p>
1322
1323 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1324 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1325 building whose photograph he shot&#8212;pirating something of value. Some
1326 even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as Disney was not free to
1327 take the pencils that his animators used to draw Mickey, so, too, should
1328 these photographers not be free to take images that they thought valuable.
1329 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2686077"></a><p>
1330 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.  Sure,
1331 there may be something of value being used. But citizens should have the
1332 right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.  (Louis
1333 Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought the rule should
1334 be different for images from private spaces.<sup>[<a name="id2686100" href="#ftn.id2686100" class="footnote">32</a>]</sup>) It may be that this means that the photographer gets something for
1335 nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from <em class="citetitle">Steamboat
1336 Bill, Jr</em>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be free
1337 to capture an image without compensating the source.
1338 </p><p>
1339 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these early
1340 decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no permission would be
1341 required before an image could be captured and shared with others. Instead,
1342 permission was presumed. Freedom was the default.  (The law would eventually
1343 craft an exception for famous people: commercial photographers who snap
1344 pictures of famous people for commercial purposes have more restrictions
1345 than the rest of us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured
1346 without clearing the rights to do the capturing.<sup>[<a name="id2686144" href="#ftn.id2686144" class="footnote">33</a>]</sup>)
1347 </p><p>
1348 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had the law
1349 gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the photographer,
1350 then the photographer would have had to demonstrate permission. Perhaps
1351 Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate permission, too, before it
1352 developed the film upon which images were captured. After all, if permission
1353 were not granted, then Eastman Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft"
1354 committed by the photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1355 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting from the
1356 "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could imagine the law
1357 then requiring that some form of permission be demonstrated before a company
1358 developed pictures. We could imagine a system developing to demonstrate that
1359 permission.
1360 </p><p>
1361
1362
1363
1364 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be very hard
1365 to see how photography could have flourished as it did if the requirement
1366 for permission had been built into the rules that govern it. Photography
1367 would have existed. It would have grown in importance over
1368 time. Professionals would have continued to use the technology as they
1369 did&#8212;since professionals could have more easily borne the burdens of
1370 the permission system. But the spread of photography to ordinary people
1371 would not have occurred. Nothing like that growth would have been
1372 realized. And certainly, nothing like that growth in a democratic technology
1373 of expression would have been realized.  If you drive through San
1374 Francisco's Presidio, you might see two gaudy yellow school buses painted
1375 over with colorful and striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place
1376 of the name of a school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the
1377 projects that these busses enable.  These buses are filled with technologies
1378 that teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1379 film of your VCR.  Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think! is a
1380 project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand and critique
1381 the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each year, these busses
1382 travel to more than thirty schools and enable three hundred to five hundred
1383 children to learn something about media by doing something with media.  By
1384 doing, they think. By tinkering, they learn.
1385 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2686191"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2686227"></a><p>
1386 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is increasingly
1387 so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has fallen
1388 dramatically.  As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good real-time
1389 digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get professional
1390 quality for $595."<sup>[<a name="id2686243" href="#ftn.id2686243" class="footnote">34</a>]</sup> These buses are
1391 filled with technology that would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten
1392 years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but
1393 classrooms across the country where kids are learning more and more of
1394 something teachers call "media literacy."
1395 </p><p>
1396
1397 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just Think!,
1398 puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and deconstruct media
1399 images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the way media works, the
1400 way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and the way people access it."
1401 <a class="indexterm" name="id2686271"></a>
1402 </p><p>
1403 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most people,
1404 literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway and noticing
1405 split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know about.
1406 </p><p>
1407 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of television
1408 commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000 commercials
1409 generally,<sup>[<a name="id2686292" href="#ftn.id2686292" class="footnote">35</a>]</sup> it is increasingly important
1410 to understand the "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the
1411 written word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to
1412 write by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1413 constructing lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1414 </p><p>
1415 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy as
1416 crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has written
1417 understands how difficult writing is&#8212;how difficult it is to sequence
1418 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1419 understandable&#8212;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1420 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works, how it
1421 holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers emotion or
1422 builds suspense.
1423 </p><p>
1424 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.  But
1425 even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about the
1426 film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not from
1427 reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then reflecting
1428 upon what one has written. One learns to write with images by making them
1429 and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1430 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2686336"></a><p>
1431 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film, as
1432 Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1433 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the USC School
1434 of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was about "the placement
1435 of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and texture."<sup>[<a name="id2686351" href="#ftn.id2686351" class="footnote">36</a>]</sup> But as computers open up an interactive space where
1436 a story is "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1437 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1438 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.  But when he
1439 tried to design a computer game based on one of his works, it was a new
1440 craft he had to learn. How to lead people through a game without their
1441 feeling they have been led was not obvious, even to a wildly successful
1442 author.<sup>[<a name="id2686391" href="#ftn.id2686391" class="footnote">37</a>]</sup>
1443 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2686413"></a><p>
1444 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley describes,
1445 "people are very surprised about how they are led through a film. [I]t is
1446 perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you have no idea. If a
1447 filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were led." If you know you were
1448 led through a film, the film has failed.
1449 </p><p>
1450 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&#8212;one that goes beyond text to
1451 include audio and visual elements&#8212;is not about making better film
1452 directors.  The aim is not to improve the profession of filmmaking at all.
1453 Instead, as Daley explained,
1454 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1455 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide is not
1456 access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the language that
1457 that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people can write with this
1458 language, and all the rest of us are reduced to being read-only.
1459 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1460 "Skrivebeskyttet." Passive mottakerne av kultur produsert andre
1461 steder. Sofapoteter. Forbrukere. Dette er medieverden fra det tjuende
1462 århundre.
1463 </p><p>
1464 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point: It
1465 could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better understanding
1466 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the tools that
1467 enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy, and this
1468 literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the appropriate
1469 language for what they need to create or express."<sup>[<a name="id2686465" href="#ftn.id2686465" class="footnote">38</a>]</sup> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
1470 language of the twenty-first century."<sup>[<a name="id2686483" href="#ftn.id2686483" class="footnote">39</a>]</sup>
1471 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2686491"></a><p>
1472 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1473 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1474 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the Institute for
1475 Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe one particularly
1476 poignant example of a project they ran in a high school.  The high school
1477 was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles school. In all the traditional
1478 measures of success, this school was a failure. But Daley and Barish ran a
1479 program that gave kids an opportunity to use film to express meaning about
1480 something the students know something about&#8212;gun violence.
1481 </p><p>
1482 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively new
1483 problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was getting the
1484 kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them away. The "kids
1485 were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night," said Barish. They were
1486 working harder than in any other class to do what education should be
1487 about&#8212;learning how to express themselves.
1488 </p><p>
1489 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple tools
1490 to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said this class
1491 produced a series of projects that showed something about gun violence that
1492 few would otherwise understand. This was an issue close to the lives of
1493 these students. The project "gave them a tool and empowered them to be able
1494 to both understand it and talk about it," Barish explained. That tool
1495 succeeded in creating expression&#8212;far more successfully and powerfully
1496 than could have been created using only text. "If you had said to these
1497 students, `you have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands
1498 up and gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
1499 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students can do
1500 well. Yet neither is text a form in which <span class="emphasis"><em>these</em></span> ideas
1501 can be expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its
1502 connection to this form of expression.
1503 </p><p>
1504
1505
1506
1507 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part, of
1508 course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education, Daley
1509 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing meaning." To say
1510 that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing is only about
1511 teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&#8212;and increasingly, not the
1512 most powerful part&#8212;of constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the
1513 most moving part of our interview,
1514 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1515 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing meaning. If all
1516 you give them is text, they're not going to do it.  Because they can't. You
1517 know, you've got Johnny who can look at a video, he can play a video game,
1518 he can do graffiti all over your walls, he can take your car apart, and he
1519 can do all sorts of other things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny
1520 comes to school and you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do
1521 matters." Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
1522 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
1523 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you can
1524 do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think reflects
1525 that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw for me
1526 something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video camera and
1527 . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and make a little
1528 movie." But instead, really help you take these elements that you
1529 understand, that are your language, and construct meaning about the
1530 topic. . . .
1531 </p><p>
1532 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of course, is eventually,
1533 as it has happened in all these classes, they bump up against the fact, "I
1534 need to explain this and I really need to write something." And as one of
1535 the teachers told Stephanie, they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8
1536 times, till they got it right.
1537 </p><p>
1538
1539 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They needed to say
1540 something, as opposed to just jumping through your hoops. They actually
1541 needed to use a language that they didn't speak very well. But they had come
1542 to understand that they had a lot of power with this language."
1543 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1544 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
1545 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the world
1546 shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for that week,
1547 and for weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold
1548 the story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a retelling,
1549 because we had seen the events that were described. The genius of this awful
1550 act of terrorism was that the delayed second attack was perfectly timed to
1551 assure that the whole world would be watching.
1552 </p><p>
1553 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music scored
1554 for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across the
1555 screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance," and
1556 seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have increasingly
1557 come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the entertainment is
1558 tragedy.
1559 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2686625"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2686631"></a><p>
1560 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September 11,"
1561 those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different production as
1562 well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same events. Yet these
1563 Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some people constructed photo
1564 pages that captured images from around the world and presented them as slide
1565 shows with text. Some offered open letters. There were sound
1566 recordings. There was anger and frustration.  There were attempts to provide
1567 context. There was, in short, an extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in
1568 the sense Mike Godwin uses the term in his book <em class="citetitle">Cyber
1569 Rights</em>, around a news event that had captured the attention of
1570 the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there was also the Internet.
1571 </p><p>
1572
1573 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&#8212;though I do think the
1574 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean instead
1575 to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a Kodak, the
1576 Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a movie by a student
1577 on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed with sound or
1578 text.
1579 </p><p>
1580 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet allows
1581 these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of people,
1582 practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
1583 tradition&#8212;not just that culture can be captured mechanically, and
1584 obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but that this
1585 mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely spread
1586 practically instantaneously.
1587 </p><p>
1588 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the same
1589 time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was just beginning
1590 to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or blog. The blog is a kind
1591 of public diary, and within some cultures, such as in Japan, it functions
1592 very much like a diary. In those cultures, it records private facts in a
1593 public way&#8212;it's a kind of electronic <em class="citetitle">Jerry
1594 Springer</em>, available anywhere in the world.
1595 </p><p>
1596 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different character.
1597 There are some who use the space simply to talk about their private
1598 life. But there are many who use the space to engage in public
1599 discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing others who are
1600 mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about the decisions they
1601 make, offering solutions to problems we all see: blogs create the sense of a
1602 virtual public meeting, but one in which we don't all hope to be there at
1603 the same time and in which conversations are not necessarily linked. The
1604 best of the blog entries are relatively short; they point directly to words
1605 used by others, criticizing with or adding to them.  They are arguably the
1606 most important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
1607 </p><p>
1608
1609 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as it
1610 does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most difficult for
1611 those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy has atrophied.  Of
1612 course we have elections, and most of the time the courts allow those
1613 elections to count. A relatively small number of people vote in those
1614 elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally professionalized
1615 and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
1616 </p><p>
1617 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy means rule by
1618 the people, but rule means something more than mere elections. In our
1619 tradition, it also means control through reasoned discourse.  This was the
1620 idea that captured the imagination of Alexis de Tocqueville, the
1621 nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the most important account of
1622 early "Democracy in America." It wasn't popular elections that fascinated
1623 him&#8212;it was the jury, an institution that gave ordinary people the
1624 right to choose life or death for other citizens.  And most fascinating for
1625 him was that the jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would
1626 impose. They deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they
1627 tried to persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
1628 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to come to
1629 an end.<sup>[<a name="id2686672" href="#ftn.id2686672" class="footnote">40</a>]</sup>
1630 </p><p>
1631 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its place,
1632 there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some are
1633 pushing to create just such an institution.<sup>[<a name="id2686759" href="#ftn.id2686759" class="footnote">41</a>]</sup> And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
1634 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or place
1635 for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
1636 </p><p>
1637 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to occur.  We,
1638 the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a strong norm
1639 against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about politics with people
1640 you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics with people you
1641 disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated, and isolated discourse
1642 becomes more extreme.<sup>[<a name="id2686784" href="#ftn.id2686784" class="footnote">42</a>]</sup> We say what our
1643 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
1644 </p><p>
1645
1646 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
1647 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they want
1648 to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.  Technologies that
1649 enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail, increase the opportunity
1650 for communication. Blogs allow for public discourse without the public ever
1651 needing to gather in a single public place.
1652 </p><p>
1653 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
1654 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
1655 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and the
1656 left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian, but
1657 there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
1658 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
1659 </p><p>
1660 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The name
1661 Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race but for
1662 blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading is having an
1663 effect.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2686827"></a>
1664 </p><p>
1665 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
1666 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott "misspoke"
1667 at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising Thurmond's
1668 segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this story would
1669 disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight hours. It did. But he
1670 didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The bloggers kept researching
1671 the story. Over time, more and more instances of the same "misspeaking"
1672 emerged. Finally, the story broke back into the mainstream press. In the
1673 end, Lott was forced to resign as senate majority leader.<sup>[<a name="id2686846" href="#ftn.id2686846" class="footnote">43</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2686855"></a>
1674 </p><p>
1675 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures don't
1676 exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and newspapers are
1677 commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.  If they lose
1678 readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
1679 </p><p>
1680 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they can
1681 focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a particularly
1682 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as the
1683 number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks of
1684 stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been selected by a
1685 very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
1686 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxwinerdave"></a><p>
1687
1688 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle from
1689 the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this movement and
1690 a software author for many decades, told me, another difference is the
1691 absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you have to take the
1692 conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.  "An amateur
1693 journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the conflict of
1694 interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of get it out of
1695 the way."
1696 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2686907"></a><p>
1697 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more concentrated
1698 (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more from the public
1699 than an unconcentrated media can&#8212;as CNN admitted it did after the Iraq
1700 war because it was afraid of the consequences to its own
1701 employees.<sup>[<a name="id2686733" href="#ftn.id2686733" class="footnote">44</a>]</sup> It also needs to sustain a
1702 more coherent account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
1703 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink
1704 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
1705 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer
1706 a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
1707 told her <span class="emphasis"><em>that</em></span> they were writing "the story.")
1708 </p><p> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate&#8212;"amateur" not in
1709 the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning
1710 not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much broader range
1711 of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when
1712 hundreds from across the southwest United States turned to the Internet to
1713 retell what they had seen.<sup>[<a name="id2686942" href="#ftn.id2686942" class="footnote">45</a>]</sup> And it
1714 drives readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as
1715 Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly
1716 with our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"&#8212;with all the
1717 benefits, and costs, that might entail.
1718 </p><p>
1719
1720 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
1721 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for public
1722 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
1723 "journalism" is happy about this&#8212;some journalists have been told to
1724 curtail their blogging.<sup>[<a name="id2686972" href="#ftn.id2686972" class="footnote">46</a>]</sup> But it is clear
1725 that we are still in transition. "A lot of what we are doing now is warm-up
1726 exercises," Winer told me.  There is a lot that must mature before this
1727 space has its mature effect.  And as the inclusion of content in this space
1728 is the least infringing use of the Internet (meaning infringing on
1729 copyright), Winer said, "we will be the last thing that gets shut down."
1730 </p><p>
1731 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you don't
1732 have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper." That is
1733 true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.  As more and more
1734 citizens express what they think, and defend it in writing, that will change
1735 the way people understand public issues. It is easy to be wrong and
1736 misguided in your head. It is harder when the product of your mind can be
1737 criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare human who admits that he has
1738 been persuaded that he is wrong. But it is even rarer for a human to ignore
1739 when he has been proven wrong.  The writing of ideas, arguments, and
1740 criticism improves democracy.  Today there are probably a couple of million
1741 blogs where such writing happens. When there are ten million, there will be
1742 something extraordinary to report.
1743 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2687038"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxbrownjohnseely"></a><p>
1744 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.  His work,
1745 as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the creation of
1746 knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
1747 </p><p>
1748 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
1749 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
1750 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his real
1751 excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
1752 </p><p>
1753
1754 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up," he
1755 explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower engines,
1756 automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies enable a different
1757 kind of tinkering&#8212;with abstract ideas though in concrete form. The
1758 kids at Just Think! not only think about how a commercial portrays a
1759 politician; using digital technology, they can take the commercial apart and
1760 manipulate it, tinker with it to see how it does what it does. Digital
1761 technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or "free collage," as Brown calls
1762 it. Many get to add to or transform the tinkering of many others.
1763 </p><p>
1764 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
1765 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose source
1766 code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a FS/OSS
1767 program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of FS/OSS
1768 technology works can tinker with the code.
1769 </p><p>
1770 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform," as
1771 Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .  unleash a free
1772 collage on the community, so that other people can start looking at your
1773 code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can improve it." Each
1774 effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major
1775 apprenticeship platform."
1776 </p><p>
1777 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.  They
1778 are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the abstract, and
1779 this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're doing in your
1780 garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .  You are
1781 tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the more you
1782 improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
1783 </p><p>
1784 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
1785 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts it,
1786 "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
1787 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
1788 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
1789 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if you
1790 are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot you
1791 can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor these
1792 multiple forms of intelligence."
1793 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2687139"></a><p>
1794
1795 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and Just
1796 Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well as
1797 creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind of
1798 recognition.
1799 </p><p>
1800 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.  Indeed, as
1801 we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is increasingly
1802 highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father had the right to
1803 tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that your child will have
1804 the right to tinker with the images she finds all around.  The law and,
1805 increasingly, technology interfere with a freedom that technology, and
1806 curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
1807 </p><p>
1808 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
1809 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>)  has developed a
1810 powerful argument in favor of the "right to tinker" as it applies to
1811 computer science and to knowledge in general.<sup>[<a name="id2687179" href="#ftn.id2687179" class="footnote">47</a>]</sup> But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It
1812 is about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
1813 </p><p>
1814 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
1815 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think and want
1816 to learn."
1817 </p><p>
1818 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will evince, "we
1819 are building a legal system that completely suppresses the natural
1820 tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an architecture
1821 that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal system that closes down
1822 that part of the brain."
1823 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2687210"></a><p>
1824 Vi bygger en teknologi som tar magien til Kodag, misker inn bevegelige
1825 bilder og lyd, og legger inn plass for kommentarer og en mulighet til å spre
1826 denne kreativiteten over alt.  Men vi bygger loven for å stenge ned denne
1827 teknologien.
1828 </p><p>
1829 "Ikke måten å drive en kultur på", sa Brewster Kahle, som vi møtte i
1830 kapittel <a class="xref" href="#collectors" title="Kapittel 10. Kapittel ni: Samlere">10</a>,
1831 kommenterte til meg i et sjeldent øyeblikk av nedstemthet.
1832 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2685902" href="#id2685902" class="para">26</a>] </sup>
1833
1834
1835 Reese V. Jenkins, <em class="citetitle">Images and Enterprise</em> (Baltimore:
1836 Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1837 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2685930" href="#id2685930" class="para">27</a>] </sup>
1838
1839 Brian Coe, <em class="citetitle">The Birth of Photography</em> (New York:
1840 Taplinger Publishing, 1977), 53.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2685938"></a>
1841 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2685973" href="#id2685973" class="para">28</a>] </sup>
1842
1843
1844 Jenkins, 177.
1845 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2685981" href="#id2685981" class="para">29</a>] </sup>
1846
1847
1848 Basert på et diagram i Jenkins, s. 178.
1849 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686010" href="#id2686010" class="para">30</a>] </sup>
1850
1851
1852 Coe, 58.
1853 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686045" href="#id2686045" class="para">31</a>] </sup>
1854
1855
1856 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <em class="citetitle">Pavesich</em>
1857 v. <em class="citetitle">N.E. Life Ins. Co</em>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1858 <em class="citetitle">Foster-Milburn Co</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Chinn</em>,
1859 123090 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909); <em class="citetitle">Corliss</em>
1860 v. <em class="citetitle">Walker</em>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.  Dist. Ct. 1894).
1861 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686100" href="#id2686100" class="para">32</a>] </sup>
1862
1863 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1864 <em class="citetitle">Harvard Law Review</em> 4 (1890): 193.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2686109"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2686117"></a>
1865 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686144" href="#id2686144" class="para">33</a>] </sup>
1866
1867
1868 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," <em class="citetitle">Law and
1869 Contemporary Problems</em> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser,
1870 "Privacy," <em class="citetitle">California Law Review</em> 48 (1960)
1871 398&#8211;407; <em class="citetitle">White</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Samsung
1872 Electronics America, Inc</em>., 971 F.  2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992),
1873 cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
1874 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686243" href="#id2686243" class="para">34</a>] </sup>
1875
1876
1877 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and Software You
1878 Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst, februar 2002,
1879 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #7</a>.
1880 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686292" href="#id2686292" class="para">35</a>] </sup>
1881
1882
1883 Judith Van Evra, <em class="citetitle">Television and Child Development</em>
1884 (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family
1885 and TV Study," <em class="citetitle">Denver Post</em>, 25 May 1997, B6.
1886 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686351" href="#id2686351" class="para">36</a>] </sup>
1887
1888 Intervju med Elizabeth Daley og Stephanie Barish, 13. desember 2002.
1889 <a class="indexterm" name="id2686358"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2686367"></a>
1890 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686391" href="#id2686391" class="para">37</a>] </sup>
1891
1892
1893 Se Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4. november
1894 2000, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
1895 #8</a>; "Timeline," 22. november 2000, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #9</a>.
1896 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686465" href="#id2686465" class="para">38</a>] </sup>
1897
1898 Intervju med Daley og Barish.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2686472"></a>
1899 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686483" href="#id2686483" class="para">39</a>] </sup>
1900
1901
1902 Ibid.
1903 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686672" href="#id2686672" class="para">40</a>] </sup>
1904
1905
1906 Se for eksempel Alexis de Tocqueville, <em class="citetitle">Democracy in
1907 America</em>, bk. 1, overs.  Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
1908 2000), kap. 16.
1909 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686759" href="#id2686759" class="para">41</a>] </sup>
1910
1911
1912 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," <em class="citetitle">Journal of
1913 Political Philosophy</em> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
1914 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686784" href="#id2686784" class="para">42</a>] </sup>
1915
1916
1917 Cass Sunstein, <em class="citetitle">Republic.com</em> (Princeton: Princeton
1918 University Press, 2001), 65&#8211;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
1919 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686846" href="#id2686846" class="para">43</a>] </sup>
1920
1921
1922 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New York
1923 Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
1924 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686733" href="#id2686733" class="para">44</a>] </sup>
1925
1926
1927 Telefonintervju med David Winer, 16. april 2003.
1928 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686942" href="#id2686942" class="para">45</a>] </sup>
1929
1930
1931 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of Information
1932 Online," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
1933 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
1934 Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #10</a>.
1935 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2686972" href="#id2686972" class="para">46</a>] </sup>
1936
1937 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?"
1938 <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news
1939 organizations have been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a
1940 CNN correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war
1941 on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year
1942 Steve Olafson, a <em class="citetitle">Houston Chronicle</em> reporter, was
1943 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym, that
1944 dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")  <a class="indexterm" name="id2687004"></a>
1945 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2687179" href="#id2687179" class="para">47</a>] </sup>
1946
1947
1948 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
1949 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,"
1950 <em class="citetitle">Communications of the Association for Computer
1951 Machinery</em> 43 (2000): 9.
1952 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="catalogs"></a>Kapittel 4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger</h2></div></div></div><p>
1953 Høsten 2001, ble Jesse Jordan fra Oceanside, New York, innrullert som
1954 førsteårsstudent ved Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, i Troy, New York.
1955 Hans studieprogram ved RPI var informasjonsteknologi.  Selv om han ikke var
1956 en programmerer, bestemte Jesse seg i oktober å begynne å fikle med en
1957 søkemotorteknologi som var tilgjengelig på RPI-nettverket.
1958 </p><p>
1959 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.  It
1960 offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering to
1961 information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
1962 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
1963 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to imagine
1964 and then build, a generation for the network age.
1965 </p><p>
1966 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to one
1967 another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything available on the
1968 RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network is designed to
1969 enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as more intimate
1970 access to other members of the RPI community.
1971 </p><p>
1972
1973 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google brought the
1974 Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving the quality of
1975 search on the network. Specialty search engines can do this even better. The
1976 idea of "intranet" search engines, search engines that search within the
1977 network of a particular institution, is to provide users of that institution
1978 with better access to material from that institution.  Businesses do this
1979 all the time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
1980 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
1981 </p><p>
1982 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.  Microsoft, for
1983 example, has a network file system that makes it very easy for search
1984 engines tuned to that network to query the system for information about the
1985 publicly (within that network) available content.  Jesse's search engine was
1986 built to take advantage of this technology. It used Microsoft's network file
1987 system to build an index of all the files available within the RPI network.
1988 </p><p>
1989 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.  Indeed,
1990 his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had built. His
1991 single most important improvement over those engines was to fix a bug within
1992 the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a user's computer to
1993 crash. With the engines that existed before, if you tried to access a file
1994 through a Windows browser that was on a computer that was off-line, your
1995 computer could crash. Jesse modified the system a bit to fix that problem,
1996 by adding a button that a user could click to see if the machine holding the
1997 file was still on-line.
1998 </p><p>
1999 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six months,
2000 he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By March, the system
2001 was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one million files in his
2002 directory, including every type of content that might be on users'
2003 computers.
2004 </p><p>
2005
2006 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which students
2007 could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or research; copies
2008 of information pamphlets; movie clips that students might have created;
2009 university brochures&#8212;basically anything that users of the RPI network
2010 made available in a public folder of their computer.
2011 </p><p>
2012 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the files
2013 that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that means, of
2014 course, that three quarters were not, and&#8212;so that this point is
2015 absolutely clear&#8212;Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files
2016 in their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
2017 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a university
2018 where he was studying information science, and hence, tinkering was the
2019 aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from
2020 this tinkering; he was not connected to any business that would make any
2021 money from this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2022 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2023 supposed to do.
2024 </p><p>
2025 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at RPI. The
2026 dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association of America, the
2027 RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three other students whom he
2028 didn't even know, two of them at other universities.  A few hours later,
2029 Jesse was served with papers from the suit.  As he read these papers and
2030 watched the news reports about them, he was increasingly astonished.
2031 </p><p>
2032 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything wrong. . . .  I
2033 don't think there's anything wrong with the search engine that I ran or
2034 . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't modified it in any way that
2035 promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the search engine
2036 in a way that would make it easier to use"&#8212;again, a <span class="emphasis"><em>search
2037 engine</em></span>, which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows
2038 filesharing system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of
2039 the RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2040 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do with
2041 music.
2042 </p><p>
2043
2044 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a network and
2045 had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They demanded that he pay
2046 them the damages for his wrong. For cases of "willful infringement," the
2047 Copyright Act specifies something lawyers call "statutory damages." These
2048 damages permit a copyright owner to claim $150,000 per infringement. As the
2049 RIAA alleged more than one hundred specific copyright infringements, they
2050 therefore demanded that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2051 </p><p>
2052 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2053 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2054 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case was
2055 different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same: huge
2056 demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.  If you
2057 added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in the United
2058 States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2059 <span class="emphasis"><em>billion</em></span>&#8212;six times the <span class="emphasis"><em>total</em></span>
2060 profit of the film industry in 2001.<sup>[<a name="id2687424" href="#ftn.id2687424" class="footnote">48</a>]</sup>
2061 </p><p>
2062 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.  An
2063 uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They demanded to
2064 know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved $12,000 from summer jobs and
2065 other employment. They demanded $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2066 </p><p>
2067 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He refused. They
2068 wanted him to agree to an injunction that would essentially make it
2069 impossible for him to work in many fields of technology for the rest of his
2070 life. He refused. They made him understand that this process of being sued
2071 was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief
2072 lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay
2073 another visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2074 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2075 </p><p>
2076
2077 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.  But
2078 Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the American
2079 legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even win. But the cost of
2080 fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be at least $250,000. If
2081 he won, he would not recover that money. If he won, he would have a piece of
2082 paper saying he had won, and a piece of paper saying he and his family were
2083 bankrupt.
2084 </p><p>
2085 Så Jesse hadde et mafia-lignende valg: $250,000 og en sjanse til å vinne,
2086 eller $12.000 og et forlik.
2087 </p><p>
2088 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.  Let's
2089 put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.  Where is the
2090 morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in scapegoatism? The
2091 RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The president of the RIAA is
2092 reported to make more than $1 million a year.  Artists, on the other hand,
2093 are not well paid. The average recording artist makes $45,900.<sup>[<a name="id2630278" href="#ftn.id2630278" class="footnote">49</a>]</sup> There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect and
2094 direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a student for
2095 running a search engine?<sup>[<a name="id2630294" href="#ftn.id2630294" class="footnote">50</a>]</sup>
2096 </p><p>
2097 23. juni overførte Jesse alle sine oppsparte midler til advokaten som jobbet
2098 for RIA.  Saken mot ham ble trukket.  Og med dette, ble unggutten som hadde
2099 fiklet med en datamaskin og blitt saksøkt for 15 millioner dollar en
2100 aktivist:
2101 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2102 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be an
2103 activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I ever
2104 foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely absurd what the
2105 RIAA has done.
2106 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2107 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As his
2108 father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2109 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2110 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the wrong
2111 message. And he wants to correct the record."
2112 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2687424" href="#id2687424" class="para">48</a>] </sup>
2113
2114
2115
2116 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks: Suit
2117 Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," <em class="citetitle">Professional Media Group
2118 LCC</em> 6 (2003): 5, tilgjengelig fra 2003 WL 55179443.
2119 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2630278" href="#id2630278" class="para">49</a>] </sup>
2120
2121
2122 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2123 (27&#8211;2042&#8212;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2124 the Arts, <em class="citetitle">More Than One in a Blue Moon</em> (2000).
2125 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2630294" href="#id2630294" class="para">50</a>] </sup>
2126
2127
2128 Douglas Lichtman kommer med et relatert poeng i "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2129 <em class="citetitle">Wall Street Journal</em>, 10. september 2003, A24.
2130 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="pirates"></a>Kapittel 5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
2131 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without their
2132 permission&#8212;if "if value, then right" is true&#8212;then the history of
2133 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of "big
2134 media" today&#8212;film, records, radio, and cable TV&#8212;was born of a
2135 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2136 pirates join this generation's country club&#8212;until now.
2137 </p><div class="section" title="Film"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="film"></a>Film</h2></div></div></div><p>
2138
2139 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<sup>[<a name="id2630375" href="#ftn.id2630375" class="footnote">51</a>]</sup> Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast
2140 to California in the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that
2141 patents granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls
2142 were exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2143 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative property&#8212;patents.
2144 Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property gave
2145 him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2146 </p><p>
2147 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2148 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2149 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with the
2150 license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to themselves as
2151 independents protested the trust and carried on business without submitting
2152 to the Edison monopoly. In the summer of 1909 the independent movement was
2153 in full-swing, with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2154 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2155 </p><p>
2156 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2157 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement by
2158 forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company to block
2159 the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics that have
2160 become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment,
2161 discontinued product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
2162 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all U.S. film
2163 exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent William Fox who
2164 defied the Trust even after his license was revoked.<sup>[<a name="id2630434" href="#ftn.id2630434" class="footnote">52</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2630461"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2630468"></a>
2165 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2166 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like Fox. And
2167 no less than today, these independents were vigorously resisted.  "Shooting
2168 was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents' resulting in loss of
2169 negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life and limb frequently
2170 occurred."<sup>[<a name="id2630484" href="#ftn.id2630484" class="footnote">53</a>]</sup> That led the independents to
2171 flee the East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2172 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And
2173 the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
2174 </p><p>
2175
2176 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement of federal
2177 law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the patent holder a
2178 truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that time), by the time
2179 enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had expired. A new industry
2180 had been born, in part from the piracy of Edison's creative property.
2181 </p></div><div class="section" title="Innspilt musikk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="recordedmusic"></a>Innspilt musikk</h2></div></div></div><p>
2182 Plateindustrien ble født av en annen type piratvirksomhet, dog for å forstå
2183 hvordan krever at en setter seg inn i detaljer om hvordan loven regulerer
2184 musikk.
2185 </p><p>
2186 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines for
2187 reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player piano), the
2188 law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of their music and
2189 the exclusive right to control public performances of their music. In other
2190 words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's 1899 hit "Happy Mose,"
2191 the law said I would have to pay for the right to get a copy of the musical
2192 score, and I would also have to pay for the right to perform it publicly.
2193 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2688034"></a><p>
2194 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph or
2195 Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear enough that I
2196 would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I performed in making
2197 this recording. And it was clear enough that I would have to pay for any
2198 public performance of the work I was recording.  But it wasn't totally clear
2199 that I would have to pay for a "public performance" if I recorded the song
2200 in my own house (even today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing
2201 their songs in the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in
2202 your brain are not&#8212;yet&#8212; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2203 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own home,
2204 it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more importantly, it
2205 wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I then made copies of
2206 those recordings.  Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively
2207 pirate someone else's song without paying its composer anything.
2208 </p><p>
2209
2210 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about this capacity to
2211 pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge put it,
2212 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2213 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an opera. A
2214 publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and copyrights
2215 it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who cut music rolls
2216 and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the composer and publisher
2217 without any regard for [their] rights.<sup>[<a name="id2688080" href="#ftn.id2688080" class="footnote">54</a>]</sup>
2218 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2219 The innovators who developed the technology to record other people's works
2220 were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and genius of American
2221 composers,"<sup>[<a name="id2688103" href="#ftn.id2688103" class="footnote">55</a>]</sup> and the "music publishing
2222 industry" was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one
2223 pirate."<sup>[<a name="id2688113" href="#ftn.id2688113" class="footnote">56</a>]</sup> As John Philip Sousa put it,
2224 in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money out of my pieces, I
2225 want a share of it."<sup>[<a name="id2688124" href="#ftn.id2688124" class="footnote">57</a>]</sup>
2226 </p><p>
2227 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too, do the
2228 arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the player piano
2229 argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the introduction of automatic
2230 music players has not deprived any composer of anything he had before their
2231 introduction." Rather, the machines increased the sales of sheet
2232 music.<sup>[<a name="id2688142" href="#ftn.id2688142" class="footnote">58</a>]</sup> In any case, the innovators
2233 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2234 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2235 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company wrote, "is
2236 the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas musical, literary
2237 or artistic, except as defined by statute."<sup>[<a name="id2688148" href="#ftn.id2688148" class="footnote">59</a>]</sup>
2238 </p><p>
2239
2240 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2241 <span class="emphasis"><em>and</em></span> the recording artist. Congress amended the law to
2242 make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of
2243 their music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete control
2244 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2245 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once the
2246 composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of copyright law
2247 that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer authorizes a recording of
2248 his song, others are free to record the same song, so long as they pay the
2249 original composer a fee set by the law.
2250 </p><p>
2251 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will refer
2252 to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose key
2253 terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright Act in
2254 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of recordings so long
2255 as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)  the fee set by the statute.
2256 </p><p>
2257 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham writes a
2258 novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham gives the
2259 publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge whatever he wants
2260 for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is thus set by Grisham,
2261 and copyright law ordinarily says you have no permission to use Grisham's
2262 work except with permission of Grisham.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2688218"></a>
2263 </p><p>
2264 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And thus, in
2265 effect, the law <span class="emphasis"><em>subsidizes</em></span> the recording industry
2266 through a kind of piracy&#8212;by giving recording artists a weaker right
2267 than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over
2268 their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less
2269 control are the recording industry and the public. The recording industry
2270 gets something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public
2271 gets access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2272 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2273 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would stifle
2274 follow-on creativity.<sup>[<a name="id2630400" href="#ftn.id2630400" class="footnote">60</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2688259"></a>
2275 </p><p>
2276 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2277 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2278 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary relates,
2279 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2280 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory license system
2281 must be retained. They asserted that the record industry is a
2282 half-billion-dollar business of great economic importance in the United
2283 States and throughout the world; records today are the principal means of
2284 disseminating music, and this creates special problems, since performers
2285 need unhampered access to musical material on nondiscriminatory
2286 terms. Historically, the record producers pointed out, there were no
2287 recording rights before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory
2288 license as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2289 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of recorded music,
2290 with the public being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2291 choice.<sup>[<a name="id2688291" href="#ftn.id2688291" class="footnote">61</a>]</sup>
2292 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2293 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their creative
2294 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2295 </p></div><div class="section" title="Radio"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="radio"></a>Radio</h2></div></div></div><p>
2296 Radio was also born of piracy.
2297 </p><p>
2298 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a "public
2299 performance" of the composer's work.<sup>[<a name="id2688327" href="#ftn.id2688327" class="footnote">62</a>]</sup> As
2300 I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)  an
2301 exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio station thus
2302 owes the composer money for that performance.
2303 </p><p>
2304
2305 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a copy
2306 of the <span class="emphasis"><em>composer's</em></span> work. The radio station is also
2307 performing a copy of the <span class="emphasis"><em>recording artist's</em></span> work. It's
2308 one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's
2309 choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle
2310 Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the value of the composition
2311 performed on the radio station.  And if the law were perfectly consistent,
2312 the radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work, just
2313 as it pays the composer of the music for his work.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2688393"></a>
2314
2315
2316 </p><p>
2317 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
2318 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station need
2319 only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of something for
2320 nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for free, even if it
2321 must pay the composer something for the privilege of playing the song.
2322 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxmadonna"></a><p>
2323 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.  Imagine
2324 it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize public
2325 performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your song in public,
2326 she has to get your permission.
2327 </p><p>
2328 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She then
2329 decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top hit. Under
2330 our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get some money. But
2331 Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on the sale of her CDs. The
2332 public performance of her recording is not a "protected" right. The radio
2333 station thus gets to <span class="emphasis"><em>pirate</em></span> the value of Madonna's work
2334 without paying her anything.
2335 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2688444"></a><p>
2336 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
2337 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
2338 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law ordinarily
2339 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the choice for
2340 him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take something for
2341 nothing.
2342 </p></div><div class="section" title="Kabel-TV"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="cabletv"></a>Kabel-TV</h2></div></div></div><p>
2343
2344 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
2345 </p><p>
2346
2347 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
2348 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content that
2349 they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies started
2350 selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay for what they
2351 sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing broadcasters' content, but more
2352 egregiously than anything Napster ever did&#8212; Napster never charged for
2353 the content it enabled others to give away.
2354 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2688479"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2688495"></a><p>
2355 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.  Rosel
2356 Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of "unfair and
2357 potentially destructive competition."<sup>[<a name="id2688506" href="#ftn.id2688506" class="footnote">63</a>]</sup>
2358 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable TV,
2359 but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association of
2360 Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
2361 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<sup>[<a name="id2688522" href="#ftn.id2688522" class="footnote">64</a>]</sup> As another broadcaster put it,
2362 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2363 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the only
2364 business I know of where the product that is being sold is not paid
2365 for.<sup>[<a name="id2688539" href="#ftn.id2688539" class="footnote">65</a>]</sup>
2366 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2367 Igjen, kravene til opphavsrettsinnehaverne virket rimelige nok:
2368 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2369 Alt vi ber om er en veldig enkel ting, at folk som tar vår eiendom gratis
2370 betaler for den.  Vi forsøker å stoppe piratvirksomhet og jeg kan ikke tenke
2371 på et svakere ord for å beskrive det.  Jeg tror det er sterkere ord som
2372 ville passe.<sup>[<a name="id2688567" href="#ftn.id2688567" class="footnote">66</a>]</sup>
2373 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2374 Disse var "gratispassasjerer", sa presidenten Charlton Heston i Screen
2375 Actor's Guild, som "tok lønna fra skuespillerne"<sup>[<a name="id2688585" href="#ftn.id2688585" class="footnote">67</a>]</sup>
2376 </p><p>
2377 Men igjen, det er en annen side i debatten.  Som assisterende justisminister
2378 Edwin Zimmerman sa det,
2379 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2380 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any copyright
2381 protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright holders who are
2382 already compensated, who already have a monopoly, should be permitted to
2383 extend that monopoly. . . . The question here is how much compensation they
2384 should have and how far back they should carry their right to
2385 compensation.<sup>[<a name="id2688612" href="#ftn.id2688612" class="footnote">68</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2688630"></a>
2386 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2387 Opphavsrettinnehaverne tok kabelselskapene til retten. Høyesterett fant to
2388 ganger at kabelselskaper ikke skyldte opphavsrettinnehaverne noen ting.
2389 </p><p>
2390 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question of
2391 whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated." In the
2392 end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it resolved the
2393 question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable companies would
2394 have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but the price they would
2395 have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.  The price was set by law,
2396 so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto power over the emerging
2397 technologies of cable. Cable companies thus built their empire in part upon
2398 a "piracy" of the value created by broadcasters' content.
2399 </p><p>
2400 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means using value
2401 from someone else's creative property without permission from that
2402 creator&#8212;as it is increasingly described today<sup>[<a name="id2688617" href="#ftn.id2688617" class="footnote">69</a>]</sup> &#8212; then <span class="emphasis"><em>every</em></span> industry
2403 affected by copyright today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind
2404 of piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. . . . The list is long and could
2405 well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
2406 generation&#8212;until now.
2407 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2630375" href="#id2630375" class="para">51</a>] </sup>
2408
2409 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2410 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
2411 Copywrongs</em>, 87&#8211;93, which details Edison's "adventures"
2412 with copyright and patent.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2630285"></a>
2413 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2630434" href="#id2630434" class="para">52</a>] </sup>
2414
2415
2416 J. A. Aberdeen, <em class="citetitle">Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent
2417 Motion Picture Producers</em> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and
2418 expanded texts posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture
2419 Patents Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #11</a>. For a discussion of
2420 the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits imposed by
2421 Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
2422 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright"
2423 (September 2002), University of Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in
2424 Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 159.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2630484" href="#id2630484" class="para">53</a>] </sup>
2425
2426
2427 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," <em class="citetitle">The Silents
2428 Majority</em>, arkivert på <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #12</a>.
2429 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688080" href="#id2688080" class="para">54</a>] </sup>
2430
2431
2432 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on S. 6330
2433 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th Cong. 59, 1st
2434 sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of South Dakota,
2435 chairman), reprinted in <em class="citetitle">Legislative History of the Copyright
2436 Act</em>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2437 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2438 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688103" href="#id2688103" class="para">55</a>] </sup>
2439
2440
2441 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223 (statement of
2442 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2443 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688113" href="#id2688113" class="para">56</a>] </sup>
2444
2445
2446 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226 (statement of
2447 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2448 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688124" href="#id2688124" class="para">57</a>] </sup>
2449
2450
2451 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23 (statement of
2452 John Philip Sousa, composer).
2453 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688142" href="#id2688142" class="para">58</a>] </sup>
2454
2455
2456
2457 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&#8211;84
2458 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music Perforating
2459 Company of New York).
2460 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688148" href="#id2688148" class="para">59</a>] </sup>
2461
2462
2463 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2464 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2465 Graphophone Company Association).
2466 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2630400" href="#id2630400" class="para">60</a>] </sup>
2467
2468
2469
2470 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2471 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st sess.,
2472 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted in
2473 <em class="citetitle">Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</em>,
2474 E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman
2475 Reprints, 1976).
2476 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688291" href="#id2688291" class="para">61</a>] </sup>
2477
2478
2479 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee on
2480 the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8 March
2481 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to this report.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688327" href="#id2688327" class="para">62</a>] </sup>
2482
2483 See 17 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>, sections 106 and 110. At
2484 the beginning, record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast"
2485 and other messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
2486 radio station.  Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning
2487 attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See
2488 <em class="citetitle">RCA Manufacturing
2489 Co</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Whiteman</em>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
2490 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.  Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag:
2491 Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright,"
2492 <em class="citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review</em> 70 (2003): 281.
2493 <a class="indexterm" name="id2688352"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2688361"></a>
2494 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688506" href="#id2688506" class="para">63</a>] </sup>
2495
2496
2497 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
2498 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
2499 on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)  (statement of Rosel
2500 H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
2501 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688522" href="#id2688522" class="para">64</a>] </sup>
2502
2503
2504 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
2505 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
2506 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688539" href="#id2688539" class="para">65</a>] </sup>
2507
2508
2509 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
2510 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
2511 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688567" href="#id2688567" class="para">66</a>] </sup>
2512
2513
2514 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.  Krim,
2515 president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of United
2516 Artists Television, Inc.).
2517 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688585" href="#id2688585" class="para">67</a>] </sup>
2518
2519
2520 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 209 (vitnemål fra Charlton Heston,
2521 president i Screen Actors Guild).
2522 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688612" href="#id2688612" class="para">68</a>] </sup>
2523
2524 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.  Zimmerman,
2525 acting assistant attorney general).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2688590"></a>
2526 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688617" href="#id2688617" class="para">69</a>] </sup>
2527
2528
2529 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <em class="citetitle">The
2530 Engine of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&#8212;The Myth of Free
2531 Information</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #13</a>. "The threat of
2532 piracy&#8212;the use of someone else's creative work without permission or
2533 compensation&#8212;has grown with the Internet."
2534 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="piracy"></a>Kapittel 6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
2535 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in
2536 many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized
2537 taking of other people's content within a commercial context. Despite the
2538 many justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
2539 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
2540 </p><p>
2541
2542 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking" that is
2543 more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems wrong to
2544 many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this taking
2545 "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.  For the harm
2546 of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than outright copying, and
2547 the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has so often done in the
2548 past.
2549
2550 </p><div class="section" title="Piracy I"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="piracy-i"></a>Piracy I</h2></div></div></div><p>
2551 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there are
2552 businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted content,
2553 copy it, and sell it&#8212;all without the permission of a copyright
2554 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
2555 every year to physical piracy<sup>[<a name="id2688705" href="#ftn.id2688705" class="footnote">70</a>]</sup> (that
2556 works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it
2557 loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
2558 </p><p>
2559 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this book, nor
2560 in the argument that most people make when talking about the subject of this
2561 book, should draw into doubt this simple point: This piracy is wrong.
2562 </p><p>
2563 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made for
2564 it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one hundred
2565 years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign copyrights. We
2566 were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might therefore seem
2567 hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other developing nations
2568 treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our existence,
2569 treated as right.
2570 </p><p>
2571 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban the
2572 taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
2573 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works without the
2574 permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.  The copy shops
2575 in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law does protect
2576 foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops violate that law. So
2577 the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a moral wrong, but a
2578 legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal wrong, but a locally
2579 legal wrong as well.
2580 </p><p>
2581
2582 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
2583 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose not to
2584 protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a pirate nation,
2585 but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar childhood.
2586 </p><p>
2587 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are its
2588 laws regardless of their source. The international law under which these
2589 nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden of
2590 intellectual property law.<sup>[<a name="id2688830" href="#ftn.id2688830" class="footnote">71</a>]</sup> In my view,
2591 more developing nations should take advantage of that opportunity, but when
2592 they don't, then their laws should be respected. And under the laws of these
2593 nations, this piracy is wrong.
2594 </p><p>
2595 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in any
2596 case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access to
2597 American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have bought those
2598 American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any less money than they
2599 otherwise would have had.<sup>[<a name="id2688875" href="#ftn.id2688875" class="footnote">72</a>]</sup>
2600 </p><p>
2601 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many thousands
2602 of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay for the content they
2603 have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree the harm caused by such
2604 taking. Extremists in this debate love to say, "You wouldn't go into Barnes
2605 &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf without paying; why should it
2606 be any different with on-line music?" The difference is, of course, that
2607 when you take a book from Barnes &amp; Noble, it has one less book to
2608 sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3 from a computer network, there is
2609 not one less CD that can be sold.  The physics of piracy of the intangible
2610 are different from the physics of piracy of the tangible.
2611 </p><p>
2612
2613 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a property
2614 right of a very special sort, it <span class="emphasis"><em>is</em></span> a property
2615 right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to
2616 decide the terms under which content is shared. If the copyright owner
2617 doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important
2618 statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish
2619 of the copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
2620 copyrighted content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
2621 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is wrong to
2622 take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have a property
2623 system, and that system is properly balanced to the technology of a time,
2624 then it is wrong to take property without the permission of a property
2625 owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
2626 </p><p>
2627 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
2628 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal" Windows,
2629 that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.  Microsoft loses the value of
2630 the software that was taken. But it gains users who are used to life in the
2631 Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation grows more wealthy, more and more
2632 people will buy software rather than steal it. And hence over time, because
2633 that buying will benefit Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If
2634 instead of pirating Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux
2635 operating system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
2636 Microsoft.  Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2688970"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2688977"></a>
2637 <a class="indexterm" name="id2688983"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2688994"></a>
2638 </p><p>
2639 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
2640 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law students,
2641 for example, are given free access to the two largest legal databases. The
2642 companies marketing both hope the students will become so used to their
2643 service that they will want to use it and not the other when they become
2644 lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
2645 </p><p>
2646 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the alcoholic
2647 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will make it
2648 more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we ordinarily allow
2649 businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give their product
2650 away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can
2651 give its product away, as it did, for example, with Internet Explorer to
2652 fight Netscape. A property right means giving the property owner the right
2653 to say who gets access to what&#8212;at least ordinarily. And if the law
2654 properly balances the rights of the copyright owner with the rights of
2655 access, then violating the law is still wrong.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2688753"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2689019"></a>
2656 </p><p>
2657
2658
2659 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy, and I
2660 certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts at
2661 justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy is
2662 rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it steals; it
2663 doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives someone access
2664 to something that the law says he should not have.  Nothing has changed to
2665 draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy is flat out wrong.
2666 </p><p>
2667 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
2668 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or at
2669 least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the way it is
2670 increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful and productive,
2671 to produce either new content or new ways of doing business.  Neither our
2672 tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all "piracy" in that sense of
2673 the term.
2674 </p><p>
2675 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest piracy
2676 concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we need to
2677 understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before we condemn it
2678 to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
2679 </p><p>
2680 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
2681 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
2682 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable TV, no
2683 one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
2684 </p><p>
2685 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They should push
2686 us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this sharing to survive.
2687 </p></div><div class="section" title="Piracy II"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="piracy-ii"></a>Piracy II</h2></div></div></div><p>
2688
2689 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s] the
2690 author of [his] profit."<sup>[<a name="id2689102" href="#ftn.id2689102" class="footnote">73</a>]</sup> This means we
2691 must determine whether and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how
2692 strongly the law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to
2693 assure the author of his profit.
2694 </p><p>
2695 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of the
2696 Napster technology had not made any major technological innovations.  Like
2697 every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and, arguably, off the
2698 Internet as well<sup>[<a name="id2689125" href="#ftn.id2689125" class="footnote">74</a>]</sup>), Shawn Fanning and
2699 crew had simply put together components that had been developed
2700 independently.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2689155"></a>
2701 </p><p>
2702 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999, Napster
2703 amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After eighteen months,
2704 there were close to 80 million registered users of the system.<sup>[<a name="id2689168" href="#ftn.id2689168" class="footnote">75</a>]</sup> Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other
2705 services emerged to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p
2706 service. It boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are
2707 different architecturally, though not very different in function: Each
2708 enables users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
2709 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&#8212;
2710 or your 20,000 best friends.
2711 </p><p>
2712 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans have
2713 tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in September 2002
2714 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded music&#8212;28 percent of
2715 Americans older than 12.<sup>[<a name="id2689203" href="#ftn.id2689203" class="footnote">76</a>]</sup> A survey by
2716 the NPD group quoted in <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em> estimated
2717 that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to exchange content in
2718 May 2003.<sup>[<a name="id2689231" href="#ftn.id2689231" class="footnote">77</a>]</sup> The vast majority of these
2719 are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive quantity of content is
2720 being "taken" on these networks. The ease and inexpensiveness of
2721 file-sharing networks have inspired millions to enjoy music in a way that
2722 they hadn't before.
2723 </p><p>
2724 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
2725 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright infringement,
2726 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more complicated than one
2727 might think. So consider&#8212;a bit more carefully than the polarized
2728 voices around this debate usually do&#8212;the kinds of sharing that file
2729 sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
2730 </p><p>
2731
2732
2733 Fildelerne deler ulike typer innhold.  Vi kan derel disse ulike typene inn i
2734 fire typer.
2735 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="A"><li class="listitem"><p>
2736
2737 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
2738 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying the CD,
2739 these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether everyone who
2740 takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't make it available
2741 for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who
2742 would.  The latter are the target of category A: users who download instead
2743 of purchasing.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2689284"></a>
2744 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2745
2746
2747 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before purchasing
2748 it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist he's not heard
2749 of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This is a kind of
2750 targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed.  If the friend recommending
2751 the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation, then one could expect
2752 that the recommendations will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
2753 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
2754 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2755
2756
2757 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted content
2758 that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased because the
2759 transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of sharing networks is
2760 among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were part of your childhood
2761 but have long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on the
2762 network. (One friend told me that when she discovered Napster, she spent a
2763 solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She was astonished at the range and mix
2764 of content that was available.)  For content not sold, this is still
2765 technically a violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is
2766 not selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&#8212;the same
2767 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to a
2768 local collector.
2769 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2770
2771
2772
2773
2774 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access to content
2775 that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner wants to give away.
2776 </p></li></ol></div><p>
2777 Hvordan balanserer disse ulike delingstypene?
2778 </p><p>
2779 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the perspective of
2780 the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the perspective of
2781 economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<sup>[<a name="id2689353" href="#ftn.id2689353" class="footnote">78</a>]</sup> Type B sharing is illegal but plainly
2782 beneficial. Type C sharing is illegal, yet good for society (since more
2783 exposure to music is good)  and harmless to the artist (since the work is
2784 not otherwise available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard
2785 question to answer&#8212;and certainly much more difficult than the current
2786 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
2787 </p><p>
2788 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how harmful
2789 type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood, composers
2790 complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained about radio, and
2791 broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music industry complains that
2792 type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is "devastating" the industry.
2793 </p><p>
2794 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how harmful is harder
2795 to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's practice to blame
2796 technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette recording is a
2797 good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young put it, "Rather
2798 than exploiting this new, popular technology, the labels fought
2799 it."<sup>[<a name="id2689398" href="#ftn.id2689398" class="footnote">79</a>]</sup> The labels claimed that every
2800 album taped was an album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent
2801 in 1981, the industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
2802 problem, and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
2803 </p><p>
2804 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity to enact
2805 regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record turnaround. "In
2806 the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was not the fault of the
2807 tapers&#8212;who did not [stop after MTV came into being]&#8212;but had to a
2808 large extent resulted from stagnation in musical innovation at the major
2809 labels."<sup>[<a name="id2689436" href="#ftn.id2689436" class="footnote">80</a>]</sup>
2810 </p><p>
2811 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is wrong
2812 today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to the industry
2813 in particular, and society in general&#8212;or at least the society that
2814 inherits the tradition that gave us the film industry, the record industry,
2815 the radio industry, cable TV, and the VCR&#8212;the question is not simply
2816 whether type A sharing is harmful. The question is also
2817 <span class="emphasis"><em>how</em></span> harmful type A sharing is, and how beneficial the
2818 other types of sharing are.
2819 </p><p>
2820 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
2821 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.  The
2822 "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type A sharing
2823 exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records through sampling
2824 than they lost through substitution, then sharing networks would actually
2825 benefit music companies on balance. They would therefore have little
2826 <span class="emphasis"><em>static</em></span> reason to resist them.
2827
2828 </p><p>
2829 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because of file
2830 sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales actually suggest
2831 it might be close.
2832 </p><p>
2833 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent, from 882
2834 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<sup>[<a name="id2689499" href="#ftn.id2689499" class="footnote">81</a>]</sup> This confirms a trend over the past few years. The
2835 RIAA blames Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other
2836 causes that could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a
2837 more than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
2838 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
2839 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average price
2840 of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<sup>[<a name="id2689543" href="#ftn.id2689543" class="footnote">82</a>]</sup> Competition from other forms of media could also
2841 account for some of the decline. As Jane Black of
2842 <em class="citetitle">BusinessWeek</em> notes, "The soundtrack to the film
2843 <em class="citetitle">High Fidelity</em> has a list price of $18.98. You could
2844 get the whole movie [on DVD] for $19.99."<sup>[<a name="id2689576" href="#ftn.id2689576" class="footnote">83</a>]</sup>
2845 </p><p>
2846
2847
2848
2849 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales is
2850 because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period that the
2851 RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA estimates that 2.1
2852 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus, although 2.6 times the total
2853 number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7
2854 percent.
2855 </p><p>
2856 There are too many different things happening at the same time to explain
2857 these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable: The recording
2858 industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between downloading a song
2859 and stealing a CD?"&#8212;but their own numbers reveal the difference. If I
2860 steal a CD, then there is one less CD to sell. Every taking is a lost
2861 sale. But on the basis of the numbers the RIAA provides, it is absolutely
2862 clear that the same is not true of downloads. If every download were a lost
2863 sale&#8212;if every use of Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his]
2864 profit"&#8212;then the industry would have suffered a 100 percent drop in
2865 sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold
2866 were downloaded for free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent,
2867 then there is a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a
2868 CD."
2869 </p><p>
2870 These are the harms&#8212;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's assume,
2871 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the recording
2872 industry. What value does it produce in addition to these costs?
2873 </p><p>
2874 One benefit is type C sharing&#8212;making available content that is
2875 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially available.
2876 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of tracks that
2877 are no longer commercially available.<sup>[<a name="id2689600" href="#ftn.id2689600" class="footnote">84</a>]</sup>
2878 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
2879 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
2880 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
2881 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic sense
2882 <span class="emphasis"><em>to the company</em></span> to make it available.
2883 </p><p>
2884 In real space&#8212;long before the Internet&#8212;the market had a simple
2885 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are thousands
2886 of used book and used record stores in America today.<sup>[<a name="id2689657" href="#ftn.id2689657" class="footnote">85</a>]</sup> These stores buy content from owners, then sell the
2887 content they buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell
2888 this content, <span class="emphasis"><em>even if the content is still under
2889 copyright</em></span>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used book and
2890 record stores are commercial entities; their owners make money from the
2891 content they sell; but as with cable companies before statutory licensing,
2892 they don't have to pay the copyright owner for the content they sell.
2893 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2689704"></a><p>
2894 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used record
2895 stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the content
2896 available isn't making money from making the content available.  It is also
2897 different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a record, I don't
2898 have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone shares my 1949 recording
2899 of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs," I still have it. That difference would
2900 matter economically if the owner of the copyright were selling the record in
2901 competition to my sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that
2902 is not currently commercially available. The Internet is making it
2903 available, through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
2904 </p><p>
2905 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
2906 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may well
2907 be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
2908 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
2909 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be shut as
2910 well?
2911 </p><p>
2912
2913 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable type D
2914 sharing to occur&#8212;the sharing of content that copyright owners want to
2915 have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This sharing
2916 clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author Cory Doctorow,
2917 for example, released his first novel, <em class="citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
2918 Kingdom</em>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
2919 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
2920 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read part
2921 on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If they liked
2922 it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is type D
2923 content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then both he and
2924 society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a great book!)
2925 </p><p>
2926 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society with
2927 no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem of type A
2928 sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we lose something
2929 important in order to protect type A content.
2930 </p><p>
2931 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry understandably
2932 says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask, "How much has society
2933 gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies? What is the content that
2934 otherwise would be unavailable?"
2935 </p><p>
2936 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter, much
2937 of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good.  And
2938 like the piracy I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#pirates" title='Kapittel 5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"'>5</a>, much of this piracy is motivated by a new way of
2939 spreading content caused by changes in the technology of distribution. Thus,
2940 consistent with the tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording
2941 industry, and cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing
2942 is how best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
2943 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
2944 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be found
2945 only with time.
2946 </p><p>
2947 Men er ikke krigen bare en krig mot ulovlig deling?  Er ikke angrepsmålet
2948 bare det du kaller type A-deling?
2949 </p><p>
2950 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The effect of
2951 the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far beyond that
2952 one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the Napster case
2953 itself. When Napster told the district court that it had developed a
2954 technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified infringing
2955 material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4 percent was not
2956 good enough. Napster had to push the infringements "down to
2957 zero."<sup>[<a name="id2689813" href="#ftn.id2689813" class="footnote">86</a>]</sup>
2958 </p><p>
2959 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
2960 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to assure
2961 that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance with the
2962 law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of VCRs or 100
2963 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns are used in compliance
2964 with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.  The court's ruling means that
2965 we as a society must lose the benefits of p2p, even for the totally legal
2966 and beneficial uses they serve, simply to assure that there are zero
2967 copyright infringements caused by p2p.
2968 </p><p>
2969 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the content
2970 industry that we know today. The history of American law has been a process
2971 of balance. As new technologies changed the way content was distributed, the
2972 law adjusted, after some time, to the new technology.  In this adjustment,
2973 the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights of creators while protecting
2974 innovation. Sometimes this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes
2975 less.
2976 </p><p>
2977 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the interests
2978 of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers against the
2979 interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to composers, but
2980 also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but at a price set
2981 by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the recordings made by
2982 these recording artists, and they complained to Congress that their
2983 "creative property" was not being respected (since the radio station did not
2984 have to pay them for the creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their
2985 claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
2986 </p><p>
2987 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts rejected the
2988 claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content they rebroadcast,
2989 Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to compensation, but at a
2990 level set by the law. It likewise gave cable companies the right to the
2991 content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
2992 </p><p>
2993
2994
2995
2996 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player pianos,
2997 served two important goals&#8212;indeed, the two central goals of any
2998 copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators would have
2999 the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.  Second, the law assured
3000 that copyright holders would be paid for the content that was
3001 distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply required cable TV to pay
3002 copyright holders whatever they demanded for their content, then copyright
3003 holders associated with broadcasters would use their power to stifle this
3004 new technology, cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use
3005 broadcasters' content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized
3006 cable. Thus Congress chose a path that would assure
3007 <span class="emphasis"><em>compensation</em></span> without giving the past (broadcasters)
3008 control over the future (cable).
3009 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2689910"></a><p>
3010 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major producers and
3011 distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another technology, the
3012 video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today, VCRs) that Sony had
3013 produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's claim against Sony was
3014 relatively simple: Sony produced a device, Disney and Universal claimed,
3015 that enabled consumers to engage in copyright infringement. Because the
3016 device that Sony built had a "record" button, the device could be used to
3017 record copyrighted movies and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the
3018 copyright infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3019 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3020 </p><p>
3021
3022 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did decide to
3023 design its machine to make it very simple to record television shows. It
3024 could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct copying from a
3025 television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the machine to copy
3026 only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the line. It was clear that
3027 there were many television shows that did not grant anyone permission to
3028 copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no doubt the majority of shows would not
3029 have authorized copying. And in the face of this obvious preference, Sony
3030 could have designed its system to minimize the opportunity for copyright
3031 infringement. It did not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold
3032 it responsible for the architecture it chose.
3033 </p><p>
3034 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal champion. Valenti
3035 called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are 20, 30, 40 million of
3036 these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by millions of `tapeworms,'
3037 eating away at the very heart and essence of the most precious asset the
3038 copyright owner has, his copyright."<sup>[<a name="id2689958" href="#ftn.id2689958" class="footnote">87</a>]</sup>
3039 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and creative
3040 judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation on the
3041 after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of tapings that
3042 will adversely impact on the future of the creative community in this
3043 country. It is simply a question of basic economics and plain common
3044 sense."<sup>[<a name="id2689975" href="#ftn.id2689975" class="footnote">88</a>]</sup> Indeed, as surveys would later
3045 show, percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or
3046 more<sup>[<a name="id2689984" href="#ftn.id2689984" class="footnote">89</a>]</sup> &#8212; a use the Court would
3047 later hold was not "fair." By "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the
3048 means of an exemption from copyright infringementwithout creating a
3049 mechanism to compensate copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would
3050 "take from the owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive
3051 right to control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and
3052 thereby profit from its reproduction."<sup>[<a name="id2689892" href="#ftn.id2689892" class="footnote">90</a>]</sup>
3053 </p><p>
3054 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme Court. In
3055 the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Hollywood in
3056 its jurisdiction&#8212;leading Judge Alex Kozinski, who sits on that court,
3057 refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&#8212;held that Sony would be liable
3058 for the copyright infringement made possible by its machines. Under the
3059 Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar technology&#8212;which Jack
3060 Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry"
3061 (worse yet, it was a <span class="emphasis"><em>Japanese</em></span> Boston Strangler of the
3062 American film industry)&#8212;was an illegal technology.<sup>[<a name="id2690018" href="#ftn.id2690018" class="footnote">91</a>]</sup>
3063 </p><p>
3064
3065 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.  And in
3066 its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of when and
3067 whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the Court wrote,
3068 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3069 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
3070 Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
3071 copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the
3072 institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
3073 competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
3074 technology.<sup>[<a name="id2690064" href="#ftn.id2690064" class="footnote">92</a>]</sup>
3075 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3076 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.  But as with
3077 the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress ignored the
3078 request. Congress was convinced that American film got enough, this "taking"
3079 notwithstanding.  If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
3080 </p><div class="table"><a name="t1"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 6.1. Mønster for respons fra rett og kongress</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Mønster for respons fra rett og kongress" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char">CASE</th><th align="char">WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</th><th align="char">RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</th><th align="char">RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Innspillinger</td><td align="char">Komponister</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Statutory license</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Radio</td><td align="char">Innspillingsartister</td><td align="char">N/A</td><td align="char">Ingenting</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Kabel-TV</td><td align="char">Kringkastere</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Statutory license</td></tr><tr><td align="char">VCR</td><td align="char">Filmskapere</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Ingenting</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
3081 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the way
3082 content was distributed.<sup>[<a name="id2690194" href="#ftn.id2690194" class="footnote">93</a>]</sup> In each case,
3083 throughout our history, that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on
3084 someone else's work.
3085 </p><p>
3086
3087 In <span class="emphasis"><em>none</em></span> of these cases did either the courts or
3088 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <span class="emphasis"><em>none</em></span> of these
3089 cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should assure that the
3090 copyright holder get all the value that his copyright created. In every
3091 case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy." In every case, Congress
3092 acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in the behavior of the "pirates."
3093 In each case, Congress allowed some new technology to benefit from content
3094 made before. It balanced the interests at stake.
3095
3096 </p><p>
3097 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that make up
3098 the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes sense. Was Walt
3099 Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators had to ask
3100 permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and spread images as
3101 a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better regulated? Is it
3102 really right that building a search engine should expose you to $15 million
3103 in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had controlled film? Should
3104 every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get permission to record a song?
3105 </p><p>
3106 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition has
3107 answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated, copyright
3108 "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible
3109 uses of his work."<sup>[<a name="id2690275" href="#ftn.id2690275" class="footnote">94</a>]</sup> Instead, the
3110 particular uses that the law regulates have been defined by balancing the
3111 good that comes from granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an
3112 exclusive right creates. And this balancing has historically been done
3113 <span class="emphasis"><em>after</em></span> a technology has matured, or settled into the mix
3114 of technologies that facilitate the distribution of content.
3115 </p><p>
3116 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the Internet is
3117 changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet (wires
3118 vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network should not
3119 become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should the law become
3120 a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists (or more accurately,
3121 distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail in the last chapter of
3122 this book, we should be securing income to artists while we allow the market
3123 to secure the most efficient way to promote and distribute content. This
3124 will require changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes
3125 should be designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
3126 public interest that innovation continue.
3127 </p><p>
3128
3129
3130 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly superior mode
3131 of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies can be ideally
3132 efficient in moving content across a widely diverse network.  Left to
3133 develop, they could make the network vastly more efficient.  Yet these
3134 "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in <em class="citetitle">The New
3135 York Times</em>, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<sup>[<a name="id2690339" href="#ftn.id2690339" class="footnote">95</a>]</sup> Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the
3136 copyright warriors raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about
3137 balance and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our
3138 content," the warriors insist, "is our <span class="emphasis"><em>property</em></span>. Why
3139 should we wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have
3140 to wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
3141 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask
3142 whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
3143 </p><p>
3144 "It is <span class="emphasis"><em>our property</em></span>," the warriors insist. "And it
3145 should be protected just as any other property is protected."
3146 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688705" href="#id2688705" class="para">70</a>] </sup>
3147
3148
3149 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
3150 <em class="citetitle">The Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</em>,
3151 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3152 #14</a>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3153 <em class="citetitle">Financial Times</em>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3154 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688830" href="#id2688830" class="para">71</a>] </sup>
3155
3156 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3157 <em class="citetitle">Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?</em> (New York: The New
3158 Press, 2003), 10&#8211;13, 209.  The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
3159 Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create
3160 administrative and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights,
3161 a costly proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights
3162 may lead to higher prices for staple industries such as agriculture. Critics
3163 of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens imposed upon developing
3164 countries and benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does
3165 permit governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3166 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may be
3167 able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3168 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS
3169 framework.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2688149"></a>
3170 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2688875" href="#id2688875" class="para">72</a>] </sup>
3171
3172 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3173 Liebowitz, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy</em> (New York:
3174 Amacom, 2002), 144&#8211;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy
3175 on the copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3176 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3177 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if pirating
3178 were not an option." Ibid., 149.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2688839"></a>
3179 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689102" href="#id2689102" class="para">73</a>] </sup>
3180
3181
3182 <em class="citetitle">Bach</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Longman</em>, 98
3183 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3184 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689125" href="#id2689125" class="para">74</a>] </sup>
3185
3186 See Clayton M. Christensen, <em class="citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
3187 Revolutionary National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do
3188 Business</em> (New York: HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen
3189 examines why companies that give rise to and dominate a product area are
3190 frequently unable to come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses
3191 for their own products.  This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3192 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3193 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <em class="citetitle">Future</em>,
3194 89&#8211;92, 139.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2688884"></a>
3195 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689168" href="#id2689168" class="para">75</a>] </sup>
3196
3197
3198 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3199 <em class="citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle</em>, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock
3200 'n' Roll Suicide," <em class="citetitle">New Scientist</em>, 6 July 2002, 42;
3201 Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO, Secures New Financing,"
3202 <em class="citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle</em>, 23 May 2003, C1; "Napster's
3203 Wake-Up Call," <em class="citetitle">Economist</em>, 24 June 2000, 23; John
3204 Naughton, "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London)
3205 <em class="citetitle">Times</em>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3206 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689203" href="#id2689203" class="para">76</a>] </sup>
3207
3208
3209
3210 See Ipsos-Insight, <em class="citetitle">TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music
3211 Distribution</em> (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of
3212 Americans aged twelve and older have downloaded music off of the Internet
3213 and 30 percent have listened to digital music files stored on their
3214 computers.
3215 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689231" href="#id2689231" class="para">77</a>] </sup>
3216
3217
3218 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," <em class="citetitle">New
3219 York Times</em>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3220 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689353" href="#id2689353" class="para">78</a>] </sup>
3221
3222 Se Liebowitz, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy</em>,
3223 148&#8211;49.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2689143"></a>
3224 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689398" href="#id2689398" class="para">79</a>] </sup>
3225
3226
3227 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <em class="citetitle">Technology Evolution and the
3228 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</em> (2003), 3. This report
3229 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding practice of
3230 cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a
3231 cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping is killing music." At the
3232 time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical Assessment
3233 conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers
3234 older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.  Congress, Office
3235 of Technology Assessment, <em class="citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying: Technology
3236 Challenges the Law</em>, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3237 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&#8211;56.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689436" href="#id2689436" class="para">80</a>] </sup>
3238
3239
3240 U.S. Congress, <em class="citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying</em>, 4.
3241 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689499" href="#id2689499" class="para">81</a>] </sup>
3242
3243
3244 See Recording Industry Association of America, <em class="citetitle">2002 Yearend
3245 Statistics</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #15</a>. A later report
3246 indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry Association of
3247 America, <em class="citetitle">Some Facts About Music Piracy</em>, 25 June 2003,
3248 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #16</a>:
3249 "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music have fallen by 26
3250 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million units in 2002 in the
3251 United States (based on units shipped).  In terms of sales, revenues are
3252 down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6 billion last year (based on
3253 U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music industry worldwide has gone from
3254 a $39 billion industry in 2000 down to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based
3255 on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3256 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689543" href="#id2689543" class="para">82</a>] </sup>
3257 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13. februar
3258 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3259 #17</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2689557"></a>
3260 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689576" href="#id2689576" class="para">83</a>] </sup>
3261
3262
3263 Ibid.
3264 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689600" href="#id2689600" class="para">84</a>] </sup>
3265
3266
3267 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3268 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&#8212;Coming
3269 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
3270 the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared statement of
3271 the Future of Music Coalition), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #18</a>.
3272 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689657" href="#id2689657" class="para">85</a>] </sup>
3273
3274
3275 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3276 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3277 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <em class="citetitle">The
3278 Quiet Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</em> (2002),
3279 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3280 #19</a>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3281 National Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3282 Results," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3283 #20</a>.
3284 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689813" href="#id2689813" class="para">86</a>] </sup>
3285
3286
3287 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34- 35
3288 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183 MHP, available at
3289 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #21</a>. For an account
3290 of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn, <em class="citetitle">All
3291 the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</em> (New
3292 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&#8211;82.
3293 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689958" href="#id2689958" class="para">87</a>] </sup>
3294
3295
3296 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on S. 1758
3297 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess.,
3298 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion Picture Association
3299 of America, Inc.).
3300 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689975" href="#id2689975" class="para">88</a>] </sup>
3301
3302
3303 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
3304 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689984" href="#id2689984" class="para">89</a>] </sup>
3305
3306
3307 <em class="citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Sony
3308 Corp. of America</em>, 480 F. Supp. 429, (C.D. Cal., 1979).
3309 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2689892" href="#id2689892" class="para">90</a>] </sup>
3310
3311
3312 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony of Jack
3313 Valenti).
3314 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690018" href="#id2690018" class="para">91</a>] </sup>
3315
3316
3317 <em class="citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Sony
3318 Corp. of America</em>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.  1981).
3319 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690064" href="#id2690064" class="para">92</a>] </sup>
3320
3321
3322 <em class="citetitle">Sony Corp. of America</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Universal City
3323 Studios, Inc</em>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
3324 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690194" href="#id2690194" class="para">93</a>] </sup>
3325
3326 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
3327 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example, was
3328 regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy Congress
3329 imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and controlling the
3330 technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (Title 17 of the
3331 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
3332 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
3333 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
3334 Lessig, <em class="citetitle">Future</em>, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to
3335 the Broadcast Flag," <em class="citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review</em>
3336 70 (2003): 293&#8211;96.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2689835"></a>
3337 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690275" href="#id2690275" class="para">94</a>] </sup>
3338
3339
3340 <em class="citetitle">Sony Corp. of America</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Universal City
3341 Studios, Inc</em>., 464 U.S. 417, (1984).
3342 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690339" href="#id2690339" class="para">95</a>] </sup>
3343
3344
3345 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software Echoes Past
3346 Efforts," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 22 September 2003, C3.
3347 </p></div></div></div></div><div class="part" title='Del II. "Eiendom"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="c-property"></a>Del II. "Eiendom"</h1></div></div></div><div class="partintro" title='"Eiendom"'><div></div><p>
3348
3349
3350
3351 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of property. It can
3352 be owned and sold, and the law protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the
3353 copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the
3354 supply and demand that partially determine the price she can get.
3355 </p><p>
3356 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a bit
3357 misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
3358 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
3359 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you put in
3360 your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I take it,
3361 you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
3362 <span class="emphasis"><em>idea</em></span> you had to put a picnic table in the
3363 backyard&#8212;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a table, and putting
3364 it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking then?
3365 </p><p>
3366 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus ideas,
3367 though that's an important difference. The point instead is that in the
3368 ordinary case&#8212;indeed, in practically every case except for a narrow
3369 range of exceptions&#8212;ideas released to the world are free. I don't take
3370 anything from you when I copy the way you dress&#8212;though I might seem
3371 weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
3372 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true when I
3373 copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea from me,
3374 receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
3375 taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<sup>[<a name="id2690413" href="#ftn.id2690413" class="footnote">96</a>]</sup>
3376 </p><p>
3377 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the reach of the
3378 law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that I won't discuss
3379 here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or expression without my
3380 permission: The law turns the intangible into property.
3381 </p><p>
3382 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&#8212;the details, in other
3383 words&#8212;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of turning the
3384 intangible into property emerged, we need to place this "property" in its
3385 proper context.<sup>[<a name="id2690458" href="#ftn.id2690458" class="footnote">97</a>]</sup>
3386 </p><p>
3387 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the preceding
3388 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright material is
3389 property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are its limits? How
3390 does it function in practice? After these stories, the significance of this
3391 true statement&#8212;"copyright material is property"&#8212; will be a bit
3392 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different from
3393 the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
3394 </p><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#founders">7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#recorders">8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#transformers">9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#collectors">10. Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#property-i">11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690413" href="#id2690413" class="para">96</a>] </sup>
3395
3396
3397 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
3398 <em class="citetitle">The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</em>, vol. 6 (Andrew
3399 A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&#8211;34.
3400 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690458" href="#id2690458" class="para">97</a>] </sup>
3401
3402
3403 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
3404 intangible.  A property right is simply a right that an individual has
3405 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach
3406 to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to
3407 which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What
3408 Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together," <em class="citetitle">Arizona Law
3409 Review</em> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
3410 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="founders"></a>Kapittel 7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</h2></div></div></div><p>
3411 William Shakespeare skrev <em class="citetitle">Romeo og Julie</em> i
3412 1595. Skuespillet ble først utgitt i 1597. Det var det ellevte store
3413 skuespillet Shakespeare hadde skrevet. Han fortsatte å skrive skuespill helt
3414 til 1613, og stykkene han skrevhar fortsatt å definere angloamerikansk
3415 kultur siden. Så dypt har verkene av en 1500-talls forfatter sunket inn i
3416 vår kultur at vi ofte ikke engang kjenner kilden. Jeg overhørte en gang noen
3417 som kommentere Kenneth Branaghs utgave av Henry V: "Jeg likte det, men
3418 Shakespeare er så full av klisjeer."
3419 </p><p>
3420
3421 I 1774, nesten 180 år etter at <em class="citetitle">Romeo og Julie</em> ble
3422 skrevet, mente mange at "opphavsretten" kun tilhørte én eneste utgiver i
3423 London, John Tonson. <sup>[<a name="id2690534" href="#ftn.id2690534" class="footnote">98</a>]</sup> Tonson var den
3424 mest fremstående av en liten gruppe utgivere kalt "the Conger"<sup>[<a name="id2690564" href="#ftn.id2690564" class="footnote">99</a>]</sup>, som kontrollerte boksalget i England gjennom hele
3425 1700-tallet. The Conger hevdet at de hadde en evigvarende rett over "kopier"
3426 av bøker de hadde fått av forfatterne. Denne evigvarende retten innebar at
3427 ingen andre kunne publisere kopier av disse bøkene. Slik ble prisen på
3428 klassiske bøker holdt oppe; alle konkurrenter som lagde bedre eller
3429 billigere utgaver, ble fjernet.
3430 </p><p>
3431 Men altså, det er noe spennende med året 1774 for alle som vet litt om
3432 opphavsretts-lovgivning. Det mest kjente året for opphavsrett er 1710, da
3433 det britiske parlamentet vedtok den første loven. Denne loven er kjent som
3434 "Statute of Anne" og sa at alle publiserte verk skulle være beskyttet i
3435 fjorten år, en periode som kunne fornyes én gang dersom forfatteren ennå
3436 levde, og at alle verk publisert i eller før 1710 skulle ha en ekstraperiode
3437 på 22 tillegsår.<sup>[<a name="id2690601" href="#ftn.id2690601" class="footnote">100</a>]</sup> På grunn av denne
3438 loven, så skulle <em class="citetitle">Rome og Julie</em> ha falt i det fri i
3439 1731. Hvordan kunne da Tonson fortsatt ha kontroll over verket i 1774?
3440 </p><p>
3441 Årsaken var ganske enkelt at engelskmennene ennå ikke hadde bestemt hva
3442 opphavsrett innebar -- faktisk hadde ingen i verden det. På den tiden da
3443 engelskmennene vedtok "Statute of Anne", var det ingen annen lovgivning om
3444 opphavsrett. Den siste loven som regulerte utgivere var lisensieringsloven
3445 av 1662, utløpt i 1695. At loven ga utgiverne monopol over publiseringen,
3446 noe som gjorde det enklere for kronen å kontrollere hva ble publisert. Men
3447 etter at det har utløpt, var det ingen positiv lov som sa at utgiverne hadde
3448 en eksklusiv rett til å trykke bøker.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2690641"></a>
3449 </p><p>
3450 At det ikke fantes noen <span class="emphasis"><em>positiv</em></span> lov, betydde ikke at
3451 det ikke fantes noen lov. Den anglo-amerikanske juridiske tradisjon ser både
3452 til lover skapt av politikere (det lovgivende statsorgen)og til lover
3453 (prejudikater) skapt av domstolene for å bestemme hvordan folket skal
3454 leve. Vi kaller politikernes lover for positiv lov og vi kaller lovene fra
3455 dommerne sedvanerett."Common law" angir bakgrunnen for de lovgivendes
3456 lovgivning; retten til lovgiving, vanligvis kan trumfe at bakgrunnen bare
3457 hvis det går gjennom en lov til å forskyve den. Og så var det virkelige
3458 spørsmålet etter lisensiering lover hadde utløpt om felles lov beskyttet
3459 opphavsretten, uavhengig av lovverket positiv.
3460 </p><p>
3461
3462 Dette spørsmålet var viktig for utgiverne eller "bokselgere," som de ble
3463 kalt, fordi det var økende konkurranse fra utenlandske utgivere, Særlig fra
3464 Skottland hvor publiseringen og eksporten av bøker til England hadde økt
3465 veldig. Denne konkurransen reduserte fortjenesten til "The Conger", som
3466 derfor krevde at parlamentet igjen skulle vedta en lov for å gi dem
3467 eksklusiv kontroll over publisering. Dette kravet resulterte i "Statute of
3468 Anne".
3469 </p><p>
3470 "Statute of Anne" ga forfatteren eller "eieren" av en bok en eksklusiv rett
3471 til å publisere denne boken. Men det var, til bokhandernes forferdelse en
3472 viktig begrensning, nemlig hvor lenge denne retten skulle vare. Etter dette
3473 gikk trykkeretten bort og verket falt i det fri og kunne trykkes av hvem som
3474 helst. Det var ihvertfall det lovgiverne hadde tenkt.
3475 </p><p>
3476 Men nå det mest interessante med dette: Hvorfor ville parlamentet begrense
3477 trykkeretten? Sprøsmålet er ikke hvorfor de bestemte seg for denne perioden,
3478 men hvorfor ville de begrense retten <span class="emphasis"><em>i det hele tatt?</em></span>
3479 </p><p>
3480 Bokhandlerne, og forfatterne som de representerte, hadde et veldig sterkt
3481 krav. Ta <em class="citetitle">romeo og Julie</em> som et eksempel: Skuespillet
3482 ble skrevet av Shakespeare. Det var hans kreativitet som brakte det til
3483 verden. Han krenket ikke noens rett da han skrev dette verket (det er en
3484 kontroversiell påstanden, men det er urelevant), og med sin egen rett skapte
3485 han verket, han gjorde det ikke noe vanskeligere for andre til å lage
3486 skuespill. Så hvorfor skulle loven tillate at noen annen kunne komme og ta
3487 Shakespeares verkuten hans, eller hans arvingers, tillatelse? Hvilke grunner
3488 finnes for å tillate at noen "stjeler" Shakespeares verk?
3489 </p><p>
3490 Svaret er todel. Først må vi se på noe spesielt med oppfatningen av
3491 opphavsrett som fantes på tidspunktet da "Statute of Anne" ble
3492 vedtatt. Deretter må vi se på noe spesielt med bokhandlerne.
3493 </p><p>
3494
3495 Først om opphavsretten. I de siste tre hundre år har vi kommet til å bruke
3496 begrepet "copyright" i stadig videre forstand. Men i 1710 var det ikke så
3497 mye et konsept som det var en bestemt rett. Opphavsretten ble født som et
3498 svært spesifikt sett med begrensninger: den forbød andre å reprodusere en
3499 bok. I 1710 var "kopi-rett" en rett til å bruke en bestemt maskin til å
3500 replikere en bestemt arbeid. Den gikk ikke utover dette svært smale
3501 formålet. Den kontrollerte ikke mer generelt hvordan et verk kunne
3502 <span class="emphasis"><em>brukes</em></span>. Idag inkluderer retten en stor samling av
3503 restriksjoner på andres frihet: den gir forfatteren eksklusiv rett til å
3504 kopiere, eksklusiv rett til å distribuere, eksklusiv rett til å fremføre, og
3505 så videre.
3506 </p><p>
3507 Så selv om f. eks. opphavsretten til Shakespeares verker var evigvarende,
3508 betydde det under den opprinnelige betydningen av begrepet at ingen kunne
3509 trykke Shakespeares arbeid uten tillatelse fra Shakespeares arvinger. Den
3510 ville ikke ha kontrollert noe mer, for eksempel om hvordan verket kunne
3511 fremføres, om verket kunne oversettes eller om Kenneth Branagh ville hatt
3512 lov til å lage filmer. "Kopi-retten" var bare en eksklusiv rett til å
3513 trykke--ikke noe mindre, selvfølgelig, men heller ikke mer.
3514 </p><p>
3515 Selv dnne begrensede retten ble møtt med skepsis av britene. De hadde hatt
3516 en lang og stygg erfaring med "eksklusive rettigheter," spesielt "enerett"
3517 gitt av kronen. Engelskmennene hadde utkjempet en borgerkrig delvis mot
3518 kronens praksis med å dele ut monopoler--spesielt monopoler for verk som
3519 allerede eksisterte. Kong Henrik VIII hadde gitt patent til å trykke Bibelen
3520 og monopol til Darcy for å lage spillkort. Det engelske parlamentet begynte
3521 å kjempe tilbake mot denne makten hos kronen. I 1656 ble "Statute of
3522 Monopolis" vedtatt for å begrense monopolene på patenter for nye
3523 oppfinnelser. Og i 1710 var parlamentet ivrig etter å håndtere det voksende
3524 monopolet på publisering.
3525 </p><p>
3526 Dermed ble "kopi-retten", når den sees på som en monopolrett, en rettighet
3527 som bør være begrenset. (Uansett hvor overbevisende påstanden om at "det er
3528 min eiendom, og jeg skal ha for alltid," prøv hvor overbevisende det er når
3529 men sier "det er mitt monopol, og jeg skal ha det for alltid.") Staten ville
3530 beskytte eneretten, men bare så lenge det gavnet samfunnet. Britene så
3531 skadene særinteresserte kunne skape; de vedtok en lov for å stoppe dem.
3532 </p><p>
3533 Dernest, om bokhandlerne. Det var ikke bare at kopiretten var et
3534 monopol. Det var også et monopol holdt av bokhandlerne. En bokhandler høres
3535 greie og ufarlige ut for oss, men slik var det ikke i syttenhundretallets
3536 England. Medlemmene i "the Conger" ble av en voksende mengde sett på som
3537 monopolister av verste sort - et verktøy for kronens undertrykkelse, de
3538 solgte Englands frihet mot å være garantert en monopolskinntekt. Men
3539 monopolistene ble kvast kritisert: Milton beskrev dem som "gamle
3540 patentholdere og monopolister i bokhandlerkunsten"; de var "menn som derfor
3541 ikke hadde  et ærlig arbeide hvor utdanning er nødvendig."<sup>[<a name="id2690843" href="#ftn.id2690843" class="footnote">101</a>]</sup>
3542 </p><p>
3543 Mange trodde at den makten bokhandlerne utøvde over spredning av kunnskap,
3544 var til skade for selve spredningen, men på dette tidspunktet viste
3545 Opplysningen viktigheten av utdannelse og kunnskap for alle. idéen om at
3546 kunnskap burde være gratis er et kjennetegn for tiden, og disse kraftige
3547 kommersielle interesser forstyrret denne idéen.
3548 </p><p>
3549 For å balansere denne makten, besluttet Parlamentet å øke konkurransen blant
3550 bokhandlerne, og den enkleste måten å gjøre det på, var å spre mengden av
3551 verdifulle bøker. Parlamentet begrenset derfor begrepet om opphavsrett, og
3552 garantert slik at verdifulle bøker ville bli frie for alle utgiver å
3553 publisere etter en begrenset periode. Slik ble det å gi eksisterende verk en
3554 periode på tjueen år et kompromiss for å bekjempe bokhandlernes
3555 makt. Begrensninger med dato var en indirekte måte å skape konkurranse
3556 mellom utgivere, og slik en skapelse og spredning av kultur.
3557 </p><p>
3558 Når 1731 (1710+21) kom, ble bokhandlerne engstelige. De så konsekvensene av
3559 mer konkurranse, og som alle konkurrenter, likte de det ikke. Først
3560 ignorerte bokhandlere ganske enkelt "Statute of Anne", og fortsatte å kreve
3561 en evigvarende rett til å kontrollere publiseringen. Men i 1735 og 1737 de
3562 prøvde å tvinge Parlamentet til å utvide periodene. Tjueen år var ikke nok,
3563 sa de; de trengte mer tid.
3564 </p><p>
3565 Parlamentet avslo kravene, Som en pamflett sa, i en vending som levere ennå
3566 idag,
3567 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3568 Jeg ser ingen grunn til å gi en utvidet perioden nå som ikke ville kunne gi
3569 utvidelser om igjen og om igjen, så fort de gamle utgår; så dersom dette
3570 lovforslaget blir vedtatt, vil effekten være: at et evig monopol blir skapt,
3571 et stort nederlag for handelen, et angrep mot kunnskapen, ingen fordel for
3572 forfatterne, men en stor avgift for folket; og alt dette kun for å øke
3573 bokhandlernes personlige rikdom.<sup>[<a name="id2690921" href="#ftn.id2690921" class="footnote">102</a>]</sup>
3574 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3575 Etter å ha mislyktes i Parlamentet gikk utgiverne til rettssalen i en rekke
3576 saker. Deres argument var enkelt og direkte: "Statute of Anne" ga
3577 forfatterne en viss beskyttelse gjennom positiv loven, men denne
3578 beskyttelsenvar ikke ment som en erstatning for felles lov. Istedet var de
3579 ment å supplere felles lov. Ifølge sedvanerett var det galt å ta en annen
3580 persons kreative eiendom og bruke den uten hans tillatelse. "Statute of
3581 Anne", hevdet bokhandlere, endret ikke dette faktum. Derfor betydde ikke det
3582 at beskyttelsen gitt av "Statute of Anne" utløp, at beskyttelsen fra
3583 sedvaneretten utløp: Ifølge sedvaneretten hadde de rett til å fordømme
3584 publiseringen av en bok, selv følgelig om "Statute of Anne" sa at de var
3585 falt i det fri. Dette, mente de, var den eneste måten å beskytte
3586 forfatterne.
3587 </p><p>
3588 Dette var et godt argument, og hadde støtte fra flere av den tidens ledende
3589 jurister. Det viste også en ekstraordinær chutzpah. Inntail da, som
3590 jusprofessor Raymond Pattetson har sagt, "var utgiverne ... like bekymret
3591 for forfatterne som en gjeter for sine lam."<sup>[<a name="id2690988" href="#ftn.id2690988" class="footnote">103</a>]</sup> Bokselgerne brydde seg ikke det spor om forfatternes
3592 rettigheter. Deres bekymring var den monopolske inntekten forfatterens verk
3593 ga.
3594 </p><p>
3595 Men bokhandlernes argument ble ikke godtatt uten kamp. Helten fra denne
3596 kampen var den skotske bokselgeren Alexander Donaldson.<sup>[<a name="id2691015" href="#ftn.id2691015" class="footnote">104</a>]</sup>
3597 </p><p>
3598 Donaldson var en fremmed for Londons "the Conger". Han startet in karriere i
3599 Edinburgh i 1750. Hans forretningsidé var billige kopier av standardverk
3600 falt i det fri, ihvertfall fri ifølge "Statute of Anne".<sup>[<a name="id2691037" href="#ftn.id2691037" class="footnote">105</a>]</sup> Donaldsons forlag vokste og ble "et sentrum for
3601 litterære skotter." "Blant dem," skriver professor Mark Rose, var "den unge
3602 James Boswell som, sammen med sin venn Andrew Erskine, publiserte en hel
3603 antologi av skotsk samtidspoesi sammen med Donaldson."<sup>[<a name="id2691056" href="#ftn.id2691056" class="footnote">106</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2691065"></a>
3604 </p><p>
3605 Da Londons bokselgere prøvde å få stengt Donaldsons butikk i Skottland, så
3606 flyttet han butikken til London. Her solgte han billige utgaver av "de mest
3607 populære, engelske bøker, i kamp mot sedvanerettens rett til litterær
3608 eiendom." <sup>[<a name="id2691082" href="#ftn.id2691082" class="footnote">107</a>]</sup> Bøkene hans var mellom 30%
3609 og 50% billigere enn "the Conger"s, og han baserte sin rett til denne
3610 konkurransen på at bøkene, takket være "Statute of Anne", var falt i det
3611 fri.
3612 </p><p>
3613 Londons bokselgere begynte straks å slå ned mot "pirater" som
3614 Donaldson. Flere tiltak var vellykkede, den viktigste var den tidlig seieren
3615 i kampen mellom <em class="citetitle">Millar</em> og
3616 <em class="citetitle">Taylor</em>.
3617 </p><p>
3618 Millar var en bokhandler som i 1729 hadde kjøpt opp rettighetene til James
3619 Thomsons dikt "The Seasons". Millar hadde da full beskyttelse gjennom
3620 "Statute of Anne", men etter at denne beskyttelsen var uløpt, begynte Robert
3621 Taylor å trykke et konkurrerende bind. Millar gikk til sak, og hevdet han
3622 hadde en evig rett gjennom sedvaneretten, uansett hva "Statute of Anne"
3623 sa.<sup>[<a name="id2691128" href="#ftn.id2691128" class="footnote">108</a>]</sup>
3624 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxmansfield2"></a><p>
3625 Til moderne juristers forbløffelse, var en av, ikke bare datidens, men en av
3626 de største dommere i engelsk historie, Lord Mansfield, enig med
3627 bokhandlerne. Uansett hvilken beskyttelse "Statute of Anne" gav
3628 bokhandlerne, så sa han at den ikke fortrengte noe fra
3629 sedvaneretten. Spørsmålet var hvorvidt sedvaneretten beskyttet forfatterne
3630 mot pirater. Mansfield svar var ja: Sedvaneretten nektet Taylor å
3631 reprodusere Thomsons dikt uten Millars tillatelse. Slik gav sedvaneretten
3632 bokselgerne en evig publiseringsrett til bøker solgt til dem.
3633 </p><p>
3634
3635 Ser man på det som et spørsmål innen abstrakt jus - dersom man resonnere som
3636 om rettferdighet bare var logisk deduksjon fra de første bud - kunne
3637 Mansfields konklusjon gitt mening. Men den overså det Parlamentet hadde
3638 kjempet for i 1710: Hvordan man på best mulig vis kunne innskrenke
3639 utgivernes monopolmakt. Parlamentets strategi hadde vært å kjøpe fred
3640 gjennom å tilby en beskyttelsesperiode også for eksisterende verk, men
3641 perioden måtte være så kort at kulturen ble utsatt for konkurranse innen
3642 rimelig tid. Storbritannia skulle vokse fra den kontrollerte kulturen under
3643 kronen, inn i en fri og åpen kultur.
3644 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2691195"></a><p>
3645 Kampen for å forsvare "Statute of Anne"s begrensninger sluttet uansett ikke
3646 der, for nå kommer Donaldson.
3647 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2691210"></a><p>
3648 Millar døde kort tid etter sin seier. Boet hans solgte rettighetene over
3649 Thomsons dikt til et syndikat av utgivere, deriblant Thomas
3650 Beckett.<sup>[<a name="id2691223" href="#ftn.id2691223" class="footnote">109</a>]</sup> Da ga Donaldson ut en
3651 uautorisert utgave av Thomsons verk. Etter avgjørelsen i
3652 <em class="citetitle">Millar</em>-saken, gikk Beckett til sak mot
3653 Donaldson. Donaldson tok saken inn for Overhuset, som da fungerte som en
3654 slags høyesterett. I februar 1774 hadde dette organet muligheten til å tolke
3655 Parlamentets mening med utøpsdatoen fra seksti år før.
3656 </p><p>
3657 Rettssaken <em class="citetitle">Donaldson</em> mot
3658 <em class="citetitle">Beckett</em> fikk en enorm oppmerksomhet i hele
3659 Storbritannia. Donaldsons advokater mente at selv om det før fantes en del
3660 rettigheter i sedvaneretten, så var disse fortrengt av "Statute of
3661 Anne". Etter at "Statute of Anne" var blitt vedtatt, skulle den eneste
3662 lovlige beskyttelse for trykkerett kom derfra. Og derfor, mente de, i tråd
3663 med vilkårene i "Statute of Anne", falle i det fri så fort
3664 beskyttelsesperioden var over.
3665 </p><p>
3666 Overhuset var en merkelig institusjon. Juridiske spørsmål ble presentert for
3667 huset, og ble først stemt over av "juslorder", medlemmer av enspesiell
3668 rettslig gruppe som fungerte nesten slik som justiariusene i vår
3669 Høyesterett. Deretter, etter at "juslordene" hadde stemt, stemte resten av
3670 Overhuset.
3671 </p><p>
3672
3673 Rapportene om juslordene stemmer er uenige. På enkelte punkter ser det ut
3674 som om evigvarende beskyttelse fikk flertall. Men det er ingen tvil om
3675 hvordan resten av Overhuset stemte. Med en majoritet på to mot en (22 mot
3676 11) stemte de ned forslaget om en evig beskyttelse. Uansett hvordan man
3677 hadde tolket sedvaneretten, var nå kopiretten begrenset til en periode, og
3678 etter denne ville verket falle i det fri.
3679 </p><p>
3680 "Å falle i det fri". Før rettssaken <em class="citetitle">Donaldson</em> mot
3681 <em class="citetitle">Beckett</em> var det ingen klar oppfatning om hva å falle
3682 i det fri innebar. Før 1774 var det jo en allmenn oppfatning om at
3683 kopiretten var evigvarende. Men etter 1774 ble Public Domain født.For første
3684 gang i angloamerikansk historie var den lovlige beskyttelsen av et verk
3685 utgått, og de største verk i engelsk historie - inkludert Shakespeare,
3686 Bacon, Milton, Johnson og Bunyan - var frie.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2691320"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2691326"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2691332"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2691339"></a>
3687 <a class="indexterm" name="id2691345"></a>
3688 </p><p>
3689 Vi kan knapt forestille oss det, men denne avgjørelsen fra Overhuset fyrte
3690 opp under en svært populær og politisk reaksjon. I Skottland, hvor de fleste
3691 piratugiverne hadde holdt til, ble avgjørelsen feiret i gatene. Som
3692 <em class="citetitle">Edinburgh Advertiser</em> skrev "Ingen privatsak har noen
3693 gang fått slik oppmerksomhet fra folket, og ingen sak som har blitt prøvet i
3694 Overhuset har interessert så mange enkeltmennesker." "Stor glede i Edinburgh
3695 etter seieren over litterær eiendom: bål og *illuminations*.<sup>[<a name="id2691374" href="#ftn.id2691374" class="footnote">110</a>]</sup>
3696 </p><p>
3697 I London, ihvertfall blant utgiverne, var reaksjonen like sterk, men i
3698 motsatt retning. <em class="citetitle">Morning Chronicle</em> skrev:
3699 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3700 Gjennom denne avgjørelsen ... er verdier til nesten 200 000 pund, som er
3701 blitt ærlig kjøpt gjennom allment salg, og som i går var eiendom, er nå
3702 redusert til ingenting. Bokselgerne i London og Westminster, mange av dem
3703 har solgt hus og eiendom for å kjøpe kopirettigheter, er med ett ruinerte,
3704 og mange som gjennom mange år har opparbeidet kompetanse for å brødfø
3705 familien, sitter nå uten en shilling til sine.<sup>[<a name="id2691404" href="#ftn.id2691404" class="footnote">111</a>]</sup>
3706 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3707
3708
3709 Ruinert er en overdrivelse. Men det er ingen overdrivelse å si at endringen
3710 var stor. Vedtaket fra Overhuset betydde at bokhandlerne ikke lenger kunnen
3711 kontrollere hvordan kulturen i England ville vokse og utvikle seg. Kulturen
3712 i England var etter dette <span class="emphasis"><em>fri</em></span>. Ikke i den betydning at
3713 kopiretten ble ignorert, for utgiverne hadde i en begrenset periode rett
3714 over trykkingen. Og heller ikke i den betydningen at bøker kunne stjeles,
3715 for selv etter at boken var falt i det fri, så måtte den kjøpes. Men
3716 <span class="emphasis"><em>fri</em></span> i betydningen at kulturen og dens vekst ikke lenger
3717 var kontrollert av en liten gruppe utgivere. Som alle frie markeder, ville
3718 dette markedet vokse og utvikle seg etter tilbud og etterspørsel. Den
3719 engelske kulturen ble nå formet slik flertallet Englands lesere ville at det
3720 skulle formes - gjennom valget av hva de kjøpte og skrev, gjennom valget av
3721 *memes* de gjentok og beundret. Valg i en <span class="emphasis"><em>konkurrerende
3722 sammenheng</em></span>, ikke der hvor valgene var om hvilken kultur som
3723 skulle være tilgjengelig for folket og hvor deres tilgang til den ble styrt
3724 av noen få, på tros av flertallets ønsker.
3725 </p><p>
3726 Til sist, dette var en verden hvor Parlamentet var antimonopolistisk, og
3727 holdt stand mot utgivernes krav. I en verden hvor parlamentet er lett å
3728 påvirke, vil den frie kultur være mindre beskyttet.
3729 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690534" href="#id2690534" class="para">98</a>] </sup>
3730
3731
3732 Jacob Tonson er vanligvis husket for sin omgang med 1700-tallets litterære
3733 storheter, spesielt John Dryden, og for hans kjekke"ferdige versjoner" av
3734 klassiske verk. I tillegg til <em class="citetitle">Romeo og Julie</em>, utga
3735 han en utrolig rekke liste av verk som ennå er hjertet av den engelske
3736 kanon, inkludert de samlede verk av Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, John Milton, og
3737 John Dryden. Se Keith Walker: "Jacob Tonson, Bookseller,"
3738 <em class="citetitle">American Scholar</em> 61:3 (1992): 424-31.
3739 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690564" href="#id2690564" class="para">99</a>] </sup>
3740
3741
3742 Lyman Ray Patterson, <em class="citetitle">Copyright in Historical
3743 Perspective</em> (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968),
3744 151&#8211;52.
3745 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690601" href="#id2690601" class="para">100</a>] </sup>
3746
3747 Som Siva Vaidhyanathan så pent argumenterer, er det feilaktige å kalle dette
3748 en "opphavsrettslov." Se Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
3749 Copywrongs</em>, 40.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2690612"></a>
3750 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690843" href="#id2690843" class="para">101</a>] </sup>
3751
3752
3753
3754 Philip Wittenberg, <em class="citetitle">The Protection and Marketing of Literary
3755 Property</em> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
3756 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690921" href="#id2690921" class="para">102</a>] </sup>
3757
3758
3759 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending in the
3760 House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the Eighth Year of the
3761 Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
3762 Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
3763 Copies, during the Times therein mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici
3764 Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
3765 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
3766 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2690988" href="#id2690988" class="para">103</a>] </sup>
3767
3768 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,"
3769 <em class="citetitle">Vanderbilt Law Review</em> 40 (1987): 28. For en
3770 fantastisk overbevisende fortelling, se Vaidhyanathan, 37&#8211;48.
3771 <a class="indexterm" name="id2690574"></a>
3772 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691015" href="#id2691015" class="para">104</a>] </sup>
3773
3774
3775 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <em class="citetitle">Authorship and
3776 Copyright</em> (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&#8211;69.
3777 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691037" href="#id2691037" class="para">105</a>] </sup>
3778
3779
3780 Mark Rose, <em class="citetitle">Authors and Owners</em> (Cambridge: Harvard
3781 University Press, 1993), 92.
3782 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691056" href="#id2691056" class="para">106</a>] </sup>
3783
3784
3785 Ibid., 93.
3786 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691082" href="#id2691082" class="para">107</a>] </sup>
3787
3788
3789 Lyman Ray Patterson, <em class="citetitle">Copyright in Historical
3790 Perspective</em>, 167 (quoting Borwell).
3791 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691128" href="#id2691128" class="para">108</a>] </sup>
3792
3793
3794 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
3795 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," <em class="citetitle">Wayne Law
3796 Review</em> 29 (1983): 1152.
3797 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691223" href="#id2691223" class="para">109</a>] </sup>
3798
3799
3800 Ibid., 1156.
3801 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691374" href="#id2691374" class="para">110</a>] </sup>
3802
3803
3804 Rose, 97.
3805 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691404" href="#id2691404" class="para">111</a>] </sup>
3806
3807
3808 Ibid.
3809 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="recorders"></a>Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</h2></div></div></div><p>
3810 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and has been
3811 very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and as a teacher
3812 myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students feel for him. (I
3813 met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.  He was their god.)
3814 </p><p>
3815 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break, he told me
3816 a story about the freedom to create with film in America today.
3817 </p><p>
3818 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring Cycle. The
3819 focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.  Stagehands are a
3820 particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.  During a show, they
3821 hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in the lighting loft. They
3822 make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2691507"></a>
3823 </p><p>
3824
3825 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands playing
3826 checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.  Playing on the
3827 television set, while the stagehands played checkers and the opera company
3828 played Wagner, was <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>. As Else judged it,
3829 this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special about
3830 the scene.
3831 </p><p>
3832 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
3833 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <em class="citetitle">The
3834 Simpsons</em>.  For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and
3835 of course, to use copyrighted material you need the permission of the
3836 copyright owner, unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
3837 </p><p>
3838 Else called <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> creator Matt Groening's office
3839 to get permission.  Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
3840 four-and-a-halfsecond image on a tiny television set in the corner of the
3841 room. How could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he
3842 told Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
3843 <a class="indexterm" name="id2691551"></a>
3844 </p><p>
3845 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted to be
3846 careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.  Else
3847 called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one room shot
3848 of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission, Else said. He was
3849 just confirming the permission with Fox.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2691567"></a>
3850 </p><p>
3851 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered . . . that
3852 Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&#8212;or at least that someone
3853 [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And second, Fox "wanted
3854 ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use this four-point-five
3855 seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> which
3856 was in the corner of the shot."
3857 </p><p>
3858 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone he
3859 thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera.  He explained
3860 to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .  We're asking for your
3861 educational rate on this." That was the educational rate, Herrera told
3862 Else. A day or so later, Else called again to confirm what he had been told.
3863 </p><p>
3864
3865 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you have
3866 your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the clip of
3867 <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em> in the corner of a shot in a documentary
3868 film about Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else,
3869 "And if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
3870 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
3871 money."
3872 </p><p>
3873 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing on
3874 the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce this
3875 reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very last
3876 minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the shot
3877 with a clip from another film that he had worked on, <em class="citetitle">The Day
3878 After Trinity</em>, from ten years before.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2691624"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2691630"></a>
3879 </p><p>
3880 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
3881 copyright to <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>. That copyright is their
3882 property.  To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
3883 permission of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of
3884 the <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> copyright were one of the uses
3885 restricted by the law, then he would need to get the permission of the
3886 copyright owner before he could use the work in that way. And in a free
3887 market, it is the owner of the copyright who gets to set the price for any
3888 use that the law says the owner gets to control.
3889 </p><p>
3890 For example, "public performance" is a use of <em class="citetitle">The
3891 Simpsons</em> that the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a
3892 selection of favorite episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets
3893 to come see "My Favorite <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em>," then you need to
3894 get permission from the copyright owner. And the copyright owner (rightly,
3895 in my view) can charge whatever she wants&#8212;$10 or $1,000,000. That's
3896 her right, as set by the law.
3897 </p><p>
3898 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first thought
3899 is "fair use."<sup>[<a name="id2691677" href="#ftn.id2691677" class="footnote">112</a>]</sup> Else's use of just 4.5
3900 seconds of an indirect shot of a <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> episode is
3901 clearly a fair use of <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>&#8212;and fair use
3902 does not require the permission of anyone.
3903 </p><p>
3904
3905
3906 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
3907 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3908 The <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the
3909 gulf between what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what
3910 is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make
3911 and broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly fair
3912 use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the concept in any
3913 concrete way. Here's why:
3914 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
3915
3916
3917 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy Errors
3918 and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed "visual cue sheet"
3919 listing the source and licensing status of each shot in the film. They take
3920 a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the
3921 application process to a halt.
3922 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3923
3924 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first place. But I
3925 knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of tracking down and
3926 stopping unlicensed <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> usage, just as George
3927 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <em class="citetitle">Star Wars</em>
3928 usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted
3929 free or cheap license to four seconds of <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em>. As
3930 a documentary producer working to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing
3931 I wanted was to risk legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to
3932 defend a principle.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2691772"></a>
3933 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3934
3935
3936
3937 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law School
3938 . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed that Fox would
3939 "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your life," regardless of the
3940 merits of my claim. He made clear that it would boil down to who had the
3941 bigger legal department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
3942
3943 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3944
3945
3946 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the project, when we
3947 are up against a release deadline and out of money.
3948 </p></li></ol></div></blockquote></div><p>
3949 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
3950 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.  But in
3951 practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of the law,
3952 tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means that the
3953 effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law has the
3954 right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
3955 </p><p>
3956 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
3957 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
3958 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
3959 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
3960 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691677" href="#id2691677" class="para">112</a>] </sup>
3961
3962
3963 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers
3964 don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with
3965 William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
3966 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>" (draft on file with author), University of
3967 Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
3968 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="transformers"></a>Kapittel 9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2691836"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2691842"></a><p>
3969 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc.  Starwave was an
3970 innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop
3971 digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave
3972 began investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
3973 anticipation of the power of networks.
3974 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2691858"></a><p>
3975 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by the
3976 emerging market for CD-ROM technology&#8212;not to distribute film, but to
3977 do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.  In 1993, he
3978 launched an initiative to develop a product to build retrospectives on the
3979 work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was Clint Eastwood. The
3980 idea was to showcase all of the work of Eastwood, with clips from his films
3981 and interviews with figures important to his career.
3982 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2691866"></a><p>
3983 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and as a
3984 director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood, asking him
3985 about his career. Because Starwave produced those interviews, it was free to
3986 include them on the CD.
3987 </p><p>
3988
3989
3990 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so Starwave
3991 wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career: posters,
3992 scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood made. Most of his
3993 career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was relatively easy to get
3994 permission for that content.
3995 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2691900"></a><p>
3996 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our goal was
3997 that we were going to have a clip from every one of Eastwood's films," Alben
3998 told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No one had ever really done
3999 this before," Alben explained. "No one had ever tried to do this in the
4000 context of an artistic look at an actor's career."
4001 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2691916"></a><p>
4002 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.  Slade asked,
4003 "Well, what will it take?"
4004 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2691927"></a><p>
4005 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from everyone who
4006 appears in these films, and the music and everything else that we want to
4007 use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go for it."<sup>[<a name="id2691939" href="#ftn.id2691939" class="footnote">113</a>]</sup>
4008 </p><p>
4009 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what clearing
4010 those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films could have a claim
4011 to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD- ROMs had not been specified
4012 in the contracts for the actors, so there was no clear way to know just what
4013 Starwave was to do.
4014 </p><p>
4015 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious pride in his
4016 resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his tale, Alben
4017 recounted just what they did:
4018 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4019 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.  We made some
4020 artistic decisions about what film clips to include&#8212;of course we were
4021 going to use the "Make my day" clip from <em class="citetitle">Dirty
4022 Harry</em>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's
4023 wiggling under the gun and you need to get his permission.  And then you
4024 have to decide what you are going to pay him.
4025 </p><p>
4026
4027
4028 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate for
4029 the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of less than
4030 a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the rate at the time
4031 was about $600.  So we had to identify the people&#8212;some of them were
4032 hard to identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
4033 crashing through the glass&#8212;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And
4034 then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we
4035 just started calling people.
4036 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2692000"></a><p>
4037 Some actors were glad to help&#8212;Donald Sutherland, for example, followed
4038 up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.  Others were
4039 dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask, "Hey, can I pay you $600
4040 or maybe if you were in two films, you know, $1,200?" And they would say,
4041 "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love to get $1,200." And some of course were a
4042 bit difficult (estranged ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and
4043 his team had cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint
4044 Eastwood's career.
4045 </p><p>
4046 It was one <span class="emphasis"><em>year</em></span> later&#8212;"and even then we weren't
4047 sure whether we were totally in the clear."
4048 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2692037"></a><p>
4049 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and the
4050 only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive project for
4051 the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
4052 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4053 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their hands
4054 and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's the music,
4055 there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the actors." But we
4056 just broke it down. We just put it into its constituent parts and said,
4057 "Okay, there's this many actors, this many directors, . . . this many
4058 musicians," and we just went at it very systematically and cleared the
4059 rights.
4060 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4061
4062
4063
4064 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood loved it,
4065 and it sold very well.
4066 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2692071"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2692077"></a><p>
4067 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to take a
4068 year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
4069 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is nothing so
4070 useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
4071 all."<sup>[<a name="id2692091" href="#ftn.id2692091" class="footnote">114</a>]</sup> Did it make sense, I asked Alben,
4072 that this is the way a new work has to be made?
4073 </p><p>
4074 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources, and
4075 the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be made. Does
4076 it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what anybody really
4077 thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that you would have to
4078 go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
4079 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4080 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie, he or she
4081 gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of that performance is
4082 used in a new product that is a retrospective of somebody's career, I don't
4083 think that that person . . . should be compensated for that.
4084 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4085 Or at least, is this <span class="emphasis"><em>how</em></span> the artist should be
4086 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of
4087 statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use
4088 of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
4089 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit
4090 permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of
4091 the creative process could be made to be more clean?
4092 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4093
4094 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
4095 mechanism&#8212;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
4096 subject to estranged former spouses&#8212;you'd see a lot more of this work,
4097 because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a retrospective of
4098 someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with lots of media from that
4099 person's career. You'd build in a cost as the producer of one of these
4100 things. You'd build in a cost of paying X dollars to the talent that
4101 performed. But it would be a known cost. That's the thing that trips
4102 everybody up and makes this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If
4103 you knew I have a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to
4104 cost me X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get investments
4105 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I want
4106 a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going to cost
4107 me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for money," then
4108 it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
4109 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2692172"></a><p>
4110 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
4111 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access that
4112 the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a year, how long
4113 would it take someone else? And how much creativity is never made just
4114 because the costs of clearing the rights are so high? These costs are the
4115 burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a Republican hat for a moment, and
4116 get angry for a bit. The government defines the scope of these rights, and
4117 the scope defined determines how much it's going to cost to negotiate
4118 them. (Remember the idea that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the
4119 pilot purchasing flythrough rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles
4120 to San Francisco.)  These rights might well have once made sense; but as
4121 circumstances change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a
4122 well-trained, regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and
4123 ask, "Does this still make sense?"
4124 </p><p>
4125
4126 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only a
4127 few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
4128 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I was
4129 asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer from an
4130 L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a friend, Robert
4131 Fairbank, had produced.
4132 </p><p>
4133 Videoen var en glimrende sammenstilling av filmer fra hver periode i det
4134 tjuende århundret, rammet inn rundt idéen om en episode i TV-serien
4135 <em class="citetitle">60 Minutes</em>. Utførelsen var perfekt, ned til seksti
4136 minutter stoppeklokken. Dommerne elsket enhver minutt av den.
4137 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2692241"></a><p>
4138 Da lysene kom på, kikket jeg over til min medpaneldeltager, David Nimmer,
4139 kanskje den ledende opphavsrettakademiker og utøver i nasjonen. Han hadde en
4140 forbauset uttrykk i ansiktet sitt, mens han tittet ut over rommet med over
4141 250 godt underholdte dommere. Med en en illevarslende tone, begynte han sin
4142 tale med et spørsmål: "Vet dere hvor mange føderale lover som nettopp brutt
4143 i dette rommet?"
4144 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2692261"></a><p>
4145 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this film
4146 hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the rights to
4147 these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law.  Of course,
4148 it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for this
4149 violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle of federal marshals
4150 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point: A year before
4151 anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two years before another
4152 member of our panel, David Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth
4153 Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that
4154 the law would not be friendly to the capacities that this technology would
4155 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
4156 couldn't easily do them legally.
4157 </p><p>
4158 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone building
4159 a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut and paste
4160 architecture of the Internet created&#8212;in a second you can find just
4161 about any image you want; in another second, you can have it planted in your
4162 presentation.
4163 </p><p>
4164 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and its
4165 archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never before
4166 imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on computers
4167 around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes images of
4168 politicians and blends them with music to create biting political
4169 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of the most biting
4170 criticism of the record industry that there is through the mixing of Flash!
4171 and music.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2692289"></a>
4172 </p><p>
4173 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators wanted
4174 to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
4175 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is never
4176 made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the clearance
4177 rules, it doesn't get released.
4178 </p><p>
4179 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of rights so
4180 that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or mix as they
4181 see fit. We could even make this change without necessarily requiring that
4182 the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the system could simply
4183 make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate artists without requiring
4184 an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for example, that says "the
4185 royalty owed the copyright owner of an unregistered work for the derivative
4186 reuse of his work will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in
4187 escrow for the copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could
4188 benefit from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
4189 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he registers
4190 the work.
4191 </p><p>
4192 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be for
4193 objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made; which if
4194 made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.  What reason
4195 would anyone have to oppose it?
4196 </p><p>
4197
4198 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers,
4199 the comic genius of <em class="citetitle">Saturday Night Live</em> and Austin
4200 Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works would work
4201 together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the agreement, DreamWorks
4202 "will acquire the rights to existing motion picture hits and classics, write
4203 new storylines and&#8212;with the use of stateof-the-art digital
4204 technology&#8212;insert Myers and other actors into the film, thereby
4205 creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
4206 </p><p>
4207 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained, "Film
4208 Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing films and
4209 allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap artists have been
4210 doing this for years with music and now we are able to take that same
4211 concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is quoted as saying, "If
4212 anyone can create a way to bring old films to new audiences, it is Mike."
4213 </p><p>
4214 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if you
4215 don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point about this
4216 announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage remains under
4217 copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks announcement is just this: It
4218 is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is free to sample. Any general freedom
4219 to build upon the film archive of our culture, a freedom in other contexts
4220 presumed for us all, is now a privilege reserved for the funny and
4221 famous&#8212;and presumably rich.
4222 </p><p>
4223 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
4224 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use." Much
4225 of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would rely upon so
4226 weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason that the
4227 privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the legal rights
4228 for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.  These costs
4229 mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to defend your fair
4230 use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions so you don't have to
4231 rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative process is a process of
4232 paying lawyers&#8212;again a privilege, or perhaps a curse, reserved for the
4233 few.
4234 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2691939" href="#id2691939" class="para">113</a>] </sup>
4235
4236 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
4237 publicity&#8212;rights an artist has to control the commercial exploitation
4238 of his image.  But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix, Burn" creativity, as
4239 this chapter evinces.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2691868"></a>
4240 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2692091" href="#id2692091" class="para">114</a>] </sup>
4241
4242
4243 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
4244 <em class="citetitle">Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services
4245 Acquisition</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #22</a>.
4246 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 10. Kapittel ni: Samlere"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="collectors"></a>Kapittel 10. Kapittel ni: Samlere</h2></div></div></div><p>
4247 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&#8212;computer codes designed to "spider,"
4248 or automatically search the Internet and copy content&#8212;began running
4249 across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based information
4250 onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San Francisco's
4251 Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet, they started
4252 again. Over and over again, once every two months, these bits of code took
4253 copies of the Internet and stored them.
4254 </p><p>
4255 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of copies. And
4256 at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive that these
4257 copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the world. Using a
4258 technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could enter a Web page, and
4259 see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well as when those pages
4260 changed.
4261 </p><p>
4262 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have appreciated.  In
4263 the dystopia described in <em class="citetitle">1984</em>, old newspapers were
4264 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved of
4265 by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
4266 </p><p>
4267
4268
4269 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was no way
4270 ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the story that was
4271 printed on the date published on the paper.
4272 </p><p>
4273 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today, there's no
4274 way for you to know whether the content you are reading is the same as the
4275 content you read before. The page may seem the same, but the content could
4276 easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's library&#8212;constantly
4277 updated, without any reliable memory.
4278 </p><p>
4279 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and the
4280 Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet was. You have
4281 the power to see what you remember. More importantly, perhaps, you also have
4282 the power to find what you don't remember and what others might prefer you
4283 forget.<sup>[<a name="id2692469" href="#ftn.id2692469" class="footnote">115</a>]</sup>
4284 </p><p>
4285 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
4286 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction of your
4287 hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to Bull Connor's
4288 water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public library and look at the
4289 newspapers. Those papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they
4290 exist in paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back
4291 and remember&#8212;not just what it is convenient to remember, but remember
4292 something close to the truth.
4293 </p><p>
4294 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to repeat
4295 it. That's not quite correct. We <span class="emphasis"><em>all</em></span> forget
4296 history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we
4297 forget. More directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
4298 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it, for
4299 schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this
4300 knowedge.
4301 </p><p>
4302
4303 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
4304 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the quintessentially
4305 transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more important in forming and
4306 reforming society, it becomes more and more important to maintain in some
4307 historical form. It's just bizarre to think that we have scads of archives
4308 of newspapers from tiny towns around the world, yet there is but one copy of
4309 the Internet&#8212;the one kept by the Internet Archive.
4310 </p><p>
4311 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
4312 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
4313 researcher.  In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
4314 success.  It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
4315 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The Internet
4316 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie of the
4317 Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion pages, and it
4318 was growing at about a billion pages a month.
4319 </p><p>
4320 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in human
4321 history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty terabytes of
4322 material"&#8212;and was "ten times larger than the Library of Congress." And
4323 this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set out to build. In
4324 addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been constructing the Television
4325 Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more ephemeral than the
4326 Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture was constructed through
4327 television, only a tiny proportion of that culture is available for anyone
4328 to see today. Three hours of news are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt
4329 University&#8212;thanks to a specific exemption in the copyright law. That
4330 content is indexed, and is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But
4331 other than that, [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you
4332 were Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
4333 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
4334 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4335
4336 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown? Remember
4337 that back and forth surreal experience of a politician interacting with a
4338 fictional television character? If you were a graduate student wanting to
4339 study that, and you wanted to get those original back and forth exchanges
4340 between the two, the <em class="citetitle">60 Minutes</em> episode that came out
4341 after it . . . it would be almost impossible. . . . Those materials are
4342 almost unfindable. . . .
4343 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4344 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded in
4345 newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is recorded
4346 on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world where researchers
4347 trying to understand the effect of media on nineteenthcentury America will
4348 have an easier time than researchers trying to understand the effect of
4349 media on twentieth-century America?
4350 </p><p>
4351 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
4352 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
4353 libraries.  These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
4354 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once the
4355 copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
4356 </p><p>
4357 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of Congress
4358 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long as such
4359 deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to borrow back the
4360 deposits&#8212;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915 alone, there were
4361 more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back." Thus, when the
4362 copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any library. The copy
4363 exists&#8212;if it exists at all&#8212;in the library archive of the film
4364 company.<sup>[<a name="id2692533" href="#ftn.id2692533" class="footnote">116</a>]</sup>
4365 </p><p>
4366 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts were
4367 originally not copyrighted&#8212;there was no way to capture the broadcasts,
4368 so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled capturing,
4369 broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law required they make a
4370 copy of each broadcast for the work to be "copyrighted." But those copies
4371 were simply kept by the broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the
4372 government didn't demand them.  The content of this part of American culture
4373 is practically invisible to anyone who would look.
4374 </p><p>
4375
4376 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and his
4377 allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty stations from
4378 around the world and hit the Record button. After September 11, Kahle,
4379 working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations from around the
4380 world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their coverage during the week
4381 of September 11 available free on-line.  Anyone could see how news reports
4382 from around the world covered the events of that day.
4383 </p><p>
4384 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
4385 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning films
4386 other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted), Kahle
4387 established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize 1,300 films in
4388 this archive and post those films on the Internet to be downloaded for
4389 free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells copies of these films as
4390 stock footage. What he has discovered is that after he made a significant
4391 chunk available for free, his stock footage sales went up
4392 dramatically. People could easily find the material they wanted to use. Some
4393 downloaded that material and made films on their own. Others purchased
4394 copies to enable other films to be made.  Either way, the archive enabled
4395 access to this important part of our culture.  Want to see a copy of the
4396 "Duck and Cover" film that instructed children how to save themselves in the
4397 middle of nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film
4398 in a few minutes&#8212;for free.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2692650"></a>
4399 </p><p>
4400 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
4401 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
4402 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law doesn't
4403 require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in an archive
4404 by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
4405 </p><p>
4406 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to this
4407 content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His aim is
4408 to ensure competition in access to this important part of our culture.  Not
4409 during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but during a
4410 second life that all creative property has&#8212;a noncommercial life.
4411 </p><p>
4412
4413 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit of
4414 creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
4415 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial market
4416 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
4417 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
4418 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial market,
4419 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
4420 </p><p>
4421 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our tradition has
4422 always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers the news every
4423 day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is used to wrap fish
4424 or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive of knowledge
4425 about our history. In this second life, the content can continue to inform
4426 even if that information is no longer sold.
4427 </p><p>
4428 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print very
4429 quickly (the average today is after about a year<sup>[<a name="id2692749" href="#ftn.id2692749" class="footnote">117</a>]</sup>). After it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores
4430 without the copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where
4431 many get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are
4432 thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely important to
4433 the spread and stability of culture.
4434 </p><p>
4435 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for creative
4436 property does not hold true with the most important components of popular
4437 culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
4438 these&#8212;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&#8212;there is no
4439 guarantee of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've
4440 replaced libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture,
4441 what's accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
4442 Beyond that, culture disappears.
4443 </p><p>
4444
4445 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this so. It
4446 would have been insanely expensive to collect and make accessible all
4447 television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily
4448 high. So even though the law in principle would have restricted the ability
4449 of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the real restriction was
4450 economics. The market made it impossibly difficult to do anything about this
4451 ephemeral culture; the law had little practical effect.
4452 </p><p>
4453 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is that
4454 for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
4455 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or distributed
4456 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all books
4457 published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
4458 moving images and sound.
4459 </p><p>
4460 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
4461 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but we are
4462 for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As Kahle
4463 describes,
4464 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4465 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
4466 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of movies,
4467 . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during the twentieth
4468 century. There are about twenty-six million different titles of books. All
4469 of these would fit on computers that would fit in this room and be able to
4470 be afforded by a small company.  So we're at a turning point in our
4471 history. Universal access is the goal. And the opportunity of leading a
4472 different life, based on this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the
4473 things humankind would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of
4474 Alexandria, putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
4475 press.
4476 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4477
4478 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
4479 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
4480 libraries or archives could be. <span class="emphasis"><em>When</em></span> the commercial
4481 life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it
4482 does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and
4483 culture, remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
4484 it; some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
4485 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
4486 become unimaginable for much of our past&#8212;a future
4487 <span class="emphasis"><em>for</em></span> our past. The technology of digital arts could make
4488 the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
4489 </p><p>
4490 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
4491 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to call
4492 these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem, the
4493 "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also someone's
4494 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that Kahle and
4495 others would exercise.
4496 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2692469" href="#id2692469" class="para">115</a>] </sup>
4497
4498
4499 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White House
4500 changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press release
4501 stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later changed,
4502 without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." E-mail from
4503 Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
4504 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2692533" href="#id2692533" class="para">116</a>] </sup>
4505
4506
4507 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
4508 Library of Congress," <em class="citetitle">Film Library Quarterly</em> 13
4509 nos. 2&#8211;3 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <em class="citetitle">Nitrate Won't Wait: A
4510 History of Film Preservation in the United States</em> ( Jefferson,
4511 N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
4512 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2692749" href="#id2692749" class="para">117</a>] </sup>
4513
4514
4515 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord, Bar
4516 Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," <em class="citetitle">Chicago
4517 Tribune</em>, 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published
4518 between 1927 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony
4519 Reese, "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,"
4520 <em class="citetitle">Boston College Law Review</em> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
4521 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="property-i"></a>Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
4522 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association of
4523 America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
4524 administration&#8212;literally. The famous picture of Johnson's swearing-in
4525 on Air Force One after the assassination of President Kennedy has Valenti in
4526 the background. In his almost forty years of running the MPAA, Valenti has
4527 established himself as perhaps the most prominent and effective lobbyist in
4528 Washington.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2692858"></a>
4529 </p><p>
4530 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
4531 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal was to
4532 defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.  The
4533 organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
4534 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its board is
4535 made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major producers and
4536 distributors of motion picture and television programs in the United States:
4537 Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth
4538 Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Warner Brothers.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2692916"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2692921"></a>
4539 <a class="indexterm" name="id2692928"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2692934"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2692940"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2692946"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2692953"></a>
4540 </p><p>
4541
4542
4543 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before him has
4544 had as much influence over that organization, or over Washington. As a
4545 Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important political skill of a
4546 Southerner&#8212;the ability to appear simple and slow while hiding a
4547 lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays the simple, humble
4548 man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four books, who finished high
4549 school at the age of fifteen and flew more than fifty combat missions in
4550 World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When Valenti went to Washington, he mastered
4551 the city in a quintessentially Washingtonian way.
4552 </p><p>
4553 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our culture
4554 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting the MPAA rating
4555 system, it has probably avoided a great deal of speech-regulating harm. But
4556 there is an aspect to the organization's mission that is both the most
4557 radical and the most important. This is the organization's effort,
4558 epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine the meaning of "creative
4559 property."
4560 </p><p>
4561 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy perfectly:
4562 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4563 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
4564 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men and
4565 women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central theme which
4566 animates this entire debate: <span class="emphasis"><em>Creative property owners must be
4567 accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other property
4568 owners in the nation</em></span>. That is the issue.  That is the
4569 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
4570 debates to follow must rest.<sup>[<a name="id2693009" href="#ftn.id2693009" class="footnote">118</a>]</sup>
4571 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4572
4573 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
4574 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The "central
4575 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this: "Creative
4576 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protections resident in
4577 all other property owners in the nation." There are no second-class
4578 citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should be no second-class
4579 property owners.
4580 </p><p>
4581 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated with
4582 such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we use
4583 elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a claim
4584 made by <span class="emphasis"><em>anyone</em></span> who is serious in this debate than this
4585 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is
4586 perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and
4587 scope of "creative property." His views have <span class="emphasis"><em>no</em></span>
4588 reasonable connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull
4589 of his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
4590 Washington.
4591 </p><p>
4592 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and precise
4593 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<sup>[<a name="id2693061" href="#ftn.id2693061" class="footnote">119</a>]</sup> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that "creative
4594 property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and protection resident
4595 in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were
4596 given the same rights as all other property owners, that would effect a
4597 radical, and radically undesirable, change in our tradition.
4598 </p><p>
4599 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for our
4600 tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry that is
4601 instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British overturned in
4602 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a powerful few would
4603 exercise powerful control over how our creative culture would develop.
4604 </p><p>
4605
4606 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you that,
4607 historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to convince
4608 you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our history.  We have
4609 always treated rights in creative property differently from the rights
4610 resident in all other property owners. They have never been the same. And
4611 they should never be the same, because, however counterintuitive this may
4612 seem, to make them the same would be to fundamentally weaken the opportunity
4613 for new creators to create.  Creativity depends upon the owners of
4614 creativity having less than perfect control.
4615 </p><p>
4616 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful of
4617 the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric notwithstanding, in
4618 assuring that the new can displace them. No organization does. No person
4619 does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)  But what's good for the MPAA is
4620 not necessarily good for America. A society that defends the ideals of free
4621 culture must preserve precisely the opportunity for new creativity to
4622 threaten the old.  To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally
4623 wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
4624 Constitution itself.
4625 </p><p>
4626 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly did
4627 they love property that they built into the Constitution an important
4628 requirement. If the government takes your property&#8212;if it condemns your
4629 house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&#8212;it is required,
4630 under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you "just compensation"
4631 for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a
4632 certain sense, sacred. It cannot <span class="emphasis"><em>ever</em></span> be taken from the
4633 property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
4634 </p><p>
4635
4636 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what Valenti
4637 calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the power to
4638 create "creative property," the Constitution <span class="emphasis"><em>requires</em></span>
4639 that after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
4640 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
4641 Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
4642 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not have any
4643 obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
4644 Constitution that requires compensation for your land requires that you lose
4645 your "creative property" right without any compensation at all.
4646 </p><p>
4647 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of property
4648 are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be treated
4649 differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in our
4650 tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be accorded
4651 the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is effectively
4652 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
4653 </p><p>
4654 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.  There
4655 was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.  The
4656 Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be appointed
4657 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college to
4658 produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it did in
4659 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be the first to
4660 admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected some of those
4661 mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should reject as well. So
4662 my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
4663 </p><p>
4664 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at least
4665 try to understand <span class="emphasis"><em>why</em></span>. Why did the framers, fanatical
4666 property types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be
4667 given the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
4668 creative property there must be a public domain?
4669 </p><p>
4670 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the history of
4671 these "creative property" rights, and the control that they enabled.  Once
4672 we see clearly how differently these rights have been defined, we will be in
4673 a better position to ask the question that should be at the core of this
4674 war: Not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> creative property should be protected,
4675 but how. Not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> we will enforce the rights the law
4676 gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
4677 ought to be. Not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> artists should be paid, but
4678 whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
4679 control how culture develops.
4680 </p><p>
4681
4682
4683
4684 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about how
4685 property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way than the
4686 narrow language of the law allows. In <em class="citetitle">Code and Other Laws of
4687 Cyberspace</em>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
4688 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks how
4689 four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the
4690 right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
4691 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1331"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.1. How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
4692 the right or regulation.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4693 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or group
4694 that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each case
4695 throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.  For
4696 simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)  The ovals represent
4697 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&#8212; either
4698 constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious constraint
4699 (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening punishments after the
4700 fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for example, you
4701 willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song from her latest CD
4702 and posting it on the Web, you can be punished with a $150,000 fine. The
4703 fine is an ex post punishment for violating an ex ante rule. It is imposed
4704 by the state.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2692968"></a>
4705 </p><p>
4706 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an individual
4707 for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is imposed by a
4708 community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be no law against
4709 spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished if you spit on the
4710 ground while standing in line at a movie. The punishment might not be harsh,
4711 though depending upon the community, it could easily be more harsh than many
4712 of the punishments imposed by the state. The mark of the difference is not
4713 the severity of the rule, but the source of the enforcement.
4714 </p><p>
4715 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected through
4716 conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you do N. These
4717 constraints are obviously not independent of law or norms&#8212;it is
4718 property law that defines what must be bought if it is to be taken legally;
4719 it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But given a set of norms,
4720 and a background of property and contract law, the market imposes a
4721 simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or group might behave.
4722 </p><p>
4723 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
4724 "architecture"&#8212;the physical world as one finds it&#8212;is a
4725 constraint on behavior.  A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get
4726 across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community
4727 to integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
4728 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with the
4729 market, architecture effects its constraint through simultaneous
4730 conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing contracts,
4731 or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
4732 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces
4733 this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
4734 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
4735 </p><p>
4736
4737
4738
4739 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is obvious:
4740 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by
4741 another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.
4742 </p><p>
4743 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the effective
4744 freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any particular thing, we
4745 have to consider how these four modalities interact.  Whether or not there
4746 are other constraints (there may well be; my claim is not about
4747 comprehensiveness), these four are among the most significant, and any
4748 regulator (whether controlling or freeing)  must consider how these four in
4749 particular interact.
4750 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxdrivespeed"></a><p>
4751 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high speed. That
4752 freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say how fast you
4753 can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in part restricted
4754 by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most rational drivers;
4755 governors in buses, as another example, set the maximum rate at which the
4756 driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel
4757 efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly
4758 constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not
4759 constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
4760 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The same
4761 norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
4762 </p><p>
4763
4764 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear: While
4765 these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a special role
4766 in affecting the three.<sup>[<a name="id2693378" href="#ftn.id2693378" class="footnote">120</a>]</sup> The law, in
4767 other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a
4768 particular modality.  Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on
4769 gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to drive more slowly. The law
4770 might be used to mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty
4771 of driving rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize
4772 reckless driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be
4773 more strict&#8212;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
4774 limit, for example&#8212;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
4775 driving.
4776 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2693398"></a><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1361"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.2. Law has a special role in affecting the three.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1361.png" alt="Law has a special role in affecting the three."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4777 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To understand
4778 the effective protection of liberty or protection of property at any
4779 particular moment, we must track these changes over time. A restriction
4780 imposed by one modality might be erased by another. A freedom enabled by one
4781 modality might be displaced by another.<sup>[<a name="id2693443" href="#ftn.id2693443" class="footnote">121</a>]</sup>
4782 </p><div class="section" title="Hvorfor Hollywood har rett"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="hollywood"></a>Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</h2></div></div></div><p>
4783 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just how,
4784 Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress and the
4785 courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that rallying makes
4786 sense.
4787 </p><p>
4788 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the Internet:
4789 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1371"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.3. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4790
4791
4792 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
4793 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on those
4794 who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by technologies
4795 that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture) and expensive to
4796 copy and share content (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by
4797 norms we all recognize&#8212;kids, for example, taping other kids'
4798 records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but
4799 the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
4800 this form of infringement.
4801 </p><p>
4802 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and p2p
4803 sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically, as does
4804 the constraint of the market. And as both the market and architecture relax
4805 the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The happy balance (for the
4806 warriors, at least) of life before the Internet becomes an effective state
4807 of anarchy after the Internet.
4808 </p><p>
4809
4810 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
4811 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
4812 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of protection
4813 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq after the fall
4814 of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the looting that
4815 results.
4816 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1381"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.4. effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1381.png" alt="effective state of anarchy after the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4817 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
4818 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce Department
4819 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995, this mix of
4820 regulatory modalities had already been identified and the strategy to
4821 respond already mapped. In response to the changes the Internet had
4822 effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should strengthen intellectual
4823 property law, (2) businesses should adopt innovative marketing techniques,
4824 (3) technologists should push to develop code to protect copyrighted
4825 material, and (4) educators should educate kids to better protect copyright.
4826 </p><p>
4827
4828 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&#8212;if it was to
4829 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
4830 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry to
4831 push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life you have
4832 as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if something comes
4833 along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a flood plain have no
4834 hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild (and rebuild again) when a
4835 flood (architecture) wipes away their property (law). Farmers have no
4836 hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when a virus
4837 (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to
4838 the government to bail them out when imports (market) wipe out the
4839 U.S. steel industry.
4840 </p><p>
4841 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's campaign
4842 to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a technological
4843 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the changing
4844 technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the content
4845 industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown describes it, its
4846 "architecture of revenue."
4847 </p><p>
4848 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
4849 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because technology
4850 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't follow that the
4851 government should intervene to support that old way of doing
4852 business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20 percent of
4853 their traditional film market to the emerging technologies of digital
4854 cameras.<sup>[<a name="id2693653" href="#ftn.id2693653" class="footnote">122</a>]</sup> Does anyone believe the
4855 government should ban digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have
4856 weakened the freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban
4857 trucks from roads <span class="emphasis"><em>for the purpose of</em></span> protecting the
4858 railroads? Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
4859 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring commercial
4860 comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that
4861 this change has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
4862 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
4863 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch to only
4864 ten channels within an hour?)
4865 </p><p>
4866 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.  In a free
4867 society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and free trade,
4868 the government's role is not to support one way of doing business against
4869 others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect them against loss. If
4870 the government did this generally, then we would never have any progress. As
4871 Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in 1991, in a memo criticizing software
4872 patents, "established companies have an interest in excluding future
4873 competitors."<sup>[<a name="id2693702" href="#ftn.id2693702" class="footnote">123</a>]</sup> And relative to a
4874 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and FM
4875 radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight not only the
4876 market but also the government is a world in which competitors with new
4877 ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and increasingly
4878 concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under Brezhnev.
4879 <a class="indexterm" name="id2693722"></a>
4880 </p><p>
4881 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
4882 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the government
4883 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to guarantee that
4884 that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the duty of policy
4885 makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they create, in response
4886 to the request of those hurt by changing technology, are changes that
4887 preserve the incentives and opportunities for innovation and change.
4888 </p><p>
4889 In the context of laws regulating speech&#8212;which include, obviously,
4890 copyright law&#8212;that duty is even stronger. When the industry
4891 complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in a
4892 way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be especially
4893 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government to get into
4894 the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and dangers of that
4895 game are precisely why our framers created the First Amendment to our
4896 Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of
4897 speech." So when Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge"
4898 the freedom of speech, it should ask&#8212; carefully&#8212;whether such
4899 regulation is justified.
4900 </p><p>
4901
4902 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether the changes
4903 that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are "justified." My argument
4904 is about their effect. For before we get to the question of justification, a
4905 hard question that depends a great deal upon your values, we should first
4906 ask whether we understand the effect of the changes the content industry
4907 wants.
4908 </p><p>
4909 Her kommer metaforen som vil forklare argumentet.
4910 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxddt"></a><p>
4911 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss chemist Paul
4912 Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work demonstrating the
4913 insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the insecticide was widely
4914 used around the world to kill disease-carrying pests. It was also used to
4915 increase farm production.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2693799"></a>
4916 </p><p>
4917 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
4918 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
4919 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
4920 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2693816"></a><p>
4921 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <em class="citetitle">Silent Spring</em>,
4922 which argued that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having
4923 unintended environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
4924 reproduce.  Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2693832"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2693838"></a>
4925 </p><p>
4926 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did not aim
4927 to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems produced
4928 another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than the problems that
4929 were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the problems DDT caused were
4930 worse than the problems it solved, at least when considering the other, more
4931 environmentally friendly ways to solve the problems that DDT was meant to
4932 solve.
4933 </p><p>
4934
4935 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James Boyle
4936 appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
4937 culture.<sup>[<a name="id2693868" href="#ftn.id2693868" class="footnote">124</a>]</sup> His point, and the point I
4938 want to develop in the balance of this chapter, is not that the aims of
4939 copyright are flawed. Or that authors should not be paid for their work. Or
4940 that music should be given away "for free." The point is that some of the
4941 ways in which we might protect authors will have unintended consequences for
4942 the cultural environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And
4943 just as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
4944 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
4945 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
4946 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware of
4947 our actions' effects on the environment.
4948 </p><p>
4949 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly this
4950 effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic effect on
4951 the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But there should
4952 also be little doubt that when you add together the changes in copyright law
4953 over time, plus the change in technology that the Internet is undergoing
4954 just now, the net effect of these changes will not be only that copyrighted
4955 work is effectively protected. Also, and generally missed, the net effect of
4956 this massive increase in protection will be devastating to the environment
4957 for creativity.
4958 </p><p>
4959 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences for free
4960 culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will be lost.
4961 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2693924"></a></div><div class="section" title="Opphav"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="beginnings"></a>Opphav</h2></div></div></div><p>
4962 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
4963 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
4964 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English aim to
4965 avoid overly powerful publishers.
4966 </p><p>
4967 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to Congress in
4968 a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I, section
4969 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
4970 </p><p>
4971
4972 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
4973 by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
4974 to their respective Writings and Discoveries.  We can call this the
4975 "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does not say. It does not say
4976 Congress has the power to grant "creative property rights." It says that
4977 Congress has the power <span class="emphasis"><em>to promote progress</em></span>. The grant
4978 of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of
4979 enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
4980 </p><p>
4981 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw in
4982 chapter <a class="xref" href="#founders" title="Kapittel 7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne">7</a>, the
4983 English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few would not
4984 exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
4985 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers followed
4986 the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the English, the framers
4987 reinforced that objective, by requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors"
4988 only.
4989 </p><p>
4990 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
4991 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
4992 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built a
4993 structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them short. To
4994 prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the federal
4995 government from establishing a church. To prevent concentrating power in the
4996 federal government, they built structures to reinforce the power of the
4997 states&#8212;including the Senate, whose members were at the time selected
4998 by the states, and an electoral college, also selected by the states, to
4999 select the president. In each case, a <span class="emphasis"><em>structure</em></span> built
5000 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to prevent
5001 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
5002 </p><p>
5003 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
5004 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
5005 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
5006 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210 years
5007 since they first struck its design.
5008 </p><p>
5009
5010 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes in
5011 technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a particular
5012 concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we started here:
5013 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1441"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.5. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5014 Vi kommer til å ende opp her:
5015 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1442"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.6. "Opphavsrett" i dag.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1442.png" alt='"Opphavsrett" i dag.'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5016
5017 La meg forklare hvordan.
5018
5019 </p></div><div class="section" title="Loven: Varighet"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="lawduration"></a>Loven: Varighet</h2></div></div></div><p>
5020 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it faced
5021 the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that the English
5022 had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws protecting creative
5023 property, and some believed that these laws simply supplemented common law
5024 rights that already protected creative authorship.<sup>[<a name="id2694083" href="#ftn.id2694083" class="footnote">125</a>]</sup> This meant that there was no guaranteed public
5025 domain in the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
5026 common law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work published in
5027 the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
5028 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public domain
5029 to reprint and distribute works.
5030 </p><p>
5031 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
5032 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
5033 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.  Just
5034 as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the copyrights for
5035 all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any state copyrights
5036 expired as well.
5037 </p><p>
5038 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a federal
5039 copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If the author was
5040 alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could opt to renew the
5041 copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not renew the copyright, his
5042 work passed into the public domain.
5043 </p><p>
5044 Selv om det ble skapt mange verker i USA i de første 10 årene til
5045 republikken, så ble kun 5 prosent av verkene registrert under det føderale
5046 opphavsrettsregimet.  Av alle verker skapt i USA både før 1790 og fra 1790
5047 fram til 1800, så ble 95 prosent øyeblikkelig allemannseie (public
5048 domain). Resten ble allemannseie etter maksimalt 20 år, og som oftest etter
5049 14 år.<sup>[<a name="id2694148" href="#ftn.id2694148" class="footnote">126</a>]</sup>
5050 </p><p>
5051
5052 Dette fornyelsessystemet var en avgjørende del av det amerikanske systemet
5053 for opphavsrett.  Det sikret at maksimal vernetid i opphavsretten bare ble
5054 gitt til verker der det var ønsket. Etter den første perioden på fjorten år,
5055 hvis forfatteren ikke så verdien av å fornye sin opphavsrett, var det heller
5056 ikke verdt det for samfunnet å håndheve opphavsretten.
5057 </p><p>
5058 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
5059 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small minority of
5060 them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the balance allowed their
5061 work to pass into the public domain.<sup>[<a name="id2694215" href="#ftn.id2694215" class="footnote">127</a>]</sup>
5062 </p><p>
5063 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work has an
5064 actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall out of
5065 print after one year.<sup>[<a name="id2694243" href="#ftn.id2694243" class="footnote">128</a>]</sup> When that
5066 happens, the used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the
5067 books are no longer <span class="emphasis"><em>effectively</em></span> controlled by
5068 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time is to
5069 sell the books as used books; that use&#8212;because it does not involve
5070 publication&#8212;is effectively free.
5071 </p><p>
5072 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
5073 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28 years to
5074 a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright from 14 years to
5075 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic, the term increased once
5076 again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal term of 14 years to 28 years,
5077 setting a maximum term of 56 years.
5078 </p><p>
5079 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
5080 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress has
5081 extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty years,
5082 Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the extensions
5083 of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.  In 1976,
5084 Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.  And in 1998,
5085 in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress extended the term
5086 of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
5087 </p><p>
5088
5089 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing of
5090 works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the public
5091 domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five years, or 70
5092 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years after the Sonny
5093 Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the public domain, zero
5094 copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue of the expiration of a
5095 copyright term.
5096 </p><p>
5097 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
5098 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the framers
5099 established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright owner to
5100 renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of renewal meant
5101 that works that no longer needed copyright protection would pass more
5102 quickly into the public domain. The works remaining under protection would
5103 be those that had some continuing commercial value.
5104 </p><p>
5105 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For all works
5106 created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&#8212;the maximum
5107 term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty years. For
5108 corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992, Congress
5109 abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created before 1978. All
5110 works still under copyright would be accorded the maximum term then
5111 available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term was ninety-five years.
5112 </p><p>
5113 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to assure
5114 that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public domain. And
5115 indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is even possible to
5116 put works into the public domain. The public domain is orphaned by these
5117 changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement that terms be "limited,"
5118 we have no evidence that anything will limit them.
5119 </p><p>
5120 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
5121 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to renew
5122 their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright in 1973 was
5123 just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal requirement, the
5124 average term of copyright is now the maximum term.  In thirty years, then,
5125 the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95 years.<sup>[<a name="id2694339" href="#ftn.id2694339" class="footnote">129</a>]</sup>
5126 </p></div><div class="section" title="Loven: Virkeområde"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="lawscope"></a>Loven: Virkeområde</h2></div></div></div><p>
5127 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.  The
5128 scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those changes are not
5129 necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent of the changes if we're
5130 to keep this debate in context.
5131 </p><p>
5132 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps, charts,
5133 and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
5134 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave the
5135 author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That means
5136 someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the work without
5137 the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted by a copyright
5138 was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right did not extend to
5139 what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not, therefore, interfere
5140 with the right of someone other than the author to translate a copyrighted
5141 book, or to adapt the story to a different form (such as a drama based on a
5142 published book).
5143 </p><p>
5144 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright today
5145 are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the right covers
5146 practically any creative work that is reduced to a tangible form. It covers
5147 music as well as architecture, drama as well as computer programs. It gives
5148 the copyright owner of that creative work not only the exclusive right to
5149 "publish" the work, but also the exclusive right of control over any
5150 "copies" of that work. And most significant for our purposes here, the right
5151 gives the copyright owner control over not only his or her particular work,
5152 but also any "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In
5153 this way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
5154 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way on the
5155 initial creative work.
5156 </p><p>
5157
5158 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
5159 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
5160 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition to the
5161 renewal requirement, for most of the history of American copyright law,
5162 there was a requirement that a work be registered before it could receive
5163 the protection of a copyright. There was also a requirement that any
5164 copyrighted work be marked either with that famous © or the word
5165 <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright</em></span>. And for most of the history of American
5166 copyright law, there was a requirement that works be deposited with the
5167 government before a copyright could be secured.
5168 </p><p>
5169 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible understanding
5170 that for most works, no copyright was required. Again, in the first ten
5171 years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible for copyright were never
5172 copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the norm: Most works apparently didn't
5173 need copyright, so registration narrowed the regulation of the law to the
5174 few that did. The same reasoning justified the requirement that a work be
5175 marked as copyrighted&#8212;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright
5176 was being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
5177 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
5178 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the original
5179 author.
5180 </p><p>
5181 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when we
5182 decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement that you
5183 register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is automatic; the
5184 copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with a ©; and the
5185 copyright exists whether or not you actually make a copy available for
5186 others to copy.
5187 </p><p>
5188 Vurder et praktisk eksempel for å forstå omfanget av disse forskjellene.
5189 </p><p>
5190 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who actually
5191 copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you against another
5192 publisher's taking your book and republishing it without your
5193 permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers so as to prevent
5194 that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were 174 publishers in the
5195 United States.<sup>[<a name="id2694464" href="#ftn.id2694464" class="footnote">130</a>]</sup> The Copyright Act was
5196 thus a tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative
5197 market in the United States&#8212;publishers.
5198 </p><p>
5199
5200
5201 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem by
5202 hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act was totally
5203 unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made a play based upon
5204 it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of those activities were
5205 regulated by the original copyright act. These creative activities remained
5206 free, while the activities of publishers were restrained.
5207 </p><p>
5208 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
5209 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail, every
5210 note to your spouse, every doodle, <span class="emphasis"><em>every</em></span> creative act
5211 that's reduced to a tangible form&#8212;all of this is automatically
5212 copyrighted.  There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection
5213 follows the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
5214 </p><p>
5215 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of fair use
5216 exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they copy it to
5217 republish it or to share an excerpt.
5218 </p><p>
5219 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would control
5220 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of today
5221 that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative rights."
5222 If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your book without
5223 permission. No one can translate it without permission.  CliffsNotes can't
5224 make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All of these derivative
5225 uses of your original work are controlled by the copyright holder. The
5226 copyright, in other words, is now not just an exclusive right to your
5227 writings, but an exclusive right to your writings and a large proportion of
5228 the writings inspired by them.
5229 </p><p>
5230 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our framers,
5231 though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this expansion was
5232 created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower copyright.  If I write a
5233 book, can you change one word and then claim a copyright in a new and
5234 different book? Obviously that would make a joke of the copyright, so the
5235 law was properly expanded to include those slight modifications as well as
5236 the verbatim original work.
5237 </p><p>
5238
5239 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within a free
5240 culture&#8212;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the law
5241 applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
5242 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone else's
5243 work. But whatever <span class="emphasis"><em>that</em></span> wrong is, transforming someone
5244 else's work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
5245 all&#8212;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
5246 protect derivative rights at all.<sup>[<a name="id2694556" href="#ftn.id2694556" class="footnote">131</a>]</sup>
5247 Whether or not you go that far, it seems plain that whatever wrong is
5248 involved is fundamentally different from the wrong of direct piracy.
5249 </p><p>
5250 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I can
5251 go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I can go to
5252 court and get an injunction against your transformative use of my
5253 book.<sup>[<a name="id2694602" href="#ftn.id2694602" class="footnote">132</a>]</sup> These two different uses of my
5254 creative work are treated the same.
5255 </p><p>
5256 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should you be
5257 able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from it without
5258 paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature called "Mickey
5259 Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to
5260 trade on the value that Disney originally created?
5261 </p><p>
5262 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
5263 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower: simply to
5264 make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the rights
5265 originally granted.
5266 </p></div><div class="section" title="Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="lawreach"></a>Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</h2></div></div></div><p>
5267 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
5268 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users, and
5269 authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making copies,
5270 and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<sup>[<a name="id2694652" href="#ftn.id2694652" class="footnote">133</a>]</sup>
5271 </p><p>
5272
5273
5274 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
5275 <span class="emphasis"><em>copy</em></span>right law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's
5276 argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative property" deserves the
5277 "same rights" as all other property, it is the <span class="emphasis"><em>obvious</em></span>
5278 that we need to be most careful about. For while it may be obvious that in
5279 the world before the Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright
5280 law, upon reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the
5281 Internet, copies should <span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span> be the trigger for
5282 copyright law. More precisely, they should not <span class="emphasis"><em>always</em></span>
5283 be the trigger for copyright law.
5284 </p><p>
5285 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this very
5286 slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the Internet
5287 should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which the law of
5288 copyright automatically applies,<sup>[<a name="id2694713" href="#ftn.id2694713" class="footnote">134</a>]</sup>
5289 because it is clear that the current reach of copyright was never
5290 contemplated, much less chosen, by the legislators who enacted copyright
5291 law.
5292 </p><p>
5293 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely empty
5294 circle.
5295 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1521"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.7. Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1521.png" alt="Alle potensielle bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5296
5297
5298 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent all
5299 its potential <span class="emphasis"><em>uses</em></span>. Most of these uses are unregulated
5300 by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a book,
5301 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone the book,
5302 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a book, that act
5303 is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that after the first sale
5304 of a book, the copyright owner can impose no further conditions on the
5305 disposition of the book). If you sleep on the book or use it to hold up a
5306 lamp or let your puppy chew it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright
5307 law, because those acts do not make a copy.
5308 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1531"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.8. Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1531.png" alt="Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5309 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated by
5310 copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It is
5311 therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands at
5312 the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
5313 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
5314 diagram on next page).
5315 </p><p>
5316 Til slutt er det en tynn skive av ellers regulert kopierings-bruk som
5317 forblir uregluert på grunn av at loven anser dette som "rimelig bruk".
5318 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1541"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.9. Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
5319 copyrighted work.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1541.png" alt="Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5320 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats as
5321 unregulated because public policy demands that they remain unregulated.  You
5322 are free to quote from this book, even in a review that is quite negative,
5323 without my permission, even though that quoting makes a copy. That copy
5324 would ordinarily give the copyright owner the exclusive right to say whether
5325 the copy is allowed or not, but the law denies the owner any exclusive right
5326 over such "fair uses" for public policy (and possibly First Amendment)
5327 reasons.
5328 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1542"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.10. Uregulert kopiering anses som "rimelig bruk".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1542.png" alt='Uregulert kopiering anses som "rimelig bruk".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p> </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1551"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.11. Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
5329 regulated.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1551.png" alt="Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5330
5331
5332 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
5333 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
5334 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
5335 </p><p>
5336 Enter the Internet&#8212;a distributed, digital network where every use of a
5337 copyrighted work produces a copy.<sup>[<a name="id2694659" href="#ftn.id2694659" class="footnote">135</a>]</sup> And
5338 because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a digital
5339 network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were
5340 presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated. No longer is
5341 there a set of presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom
5342 associated with a copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the
5343 copyright, because each use also makes a copy&#8212;category 1 gets sucked
5344 into category 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
5345 copyrighted work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
5346 burden of this shift.
5347 </p><p>
5348
5349 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
5350 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be no
5351 plausible <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright</em></span>-related argument that the copyright
5352 owner could make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
5353 nothing to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
5354 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
5355 use&#8212;reading&#8212; could be regulated by copyright law because none of
5356 those uses produced a copy.
5357 </p><p>
5358 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different set of
5359 rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book only once or
5360 only once a month, then <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright law</em></span> would aid the
5361 copyright owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
5362 accidental feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
5363 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says you
5364 may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or any portion
5365 of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to
5366 the copyright owner's wish.
5367 </p><p>
5368 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim just now is
5369 not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim is only to make
5370 clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other points also become
5371 clear:
5372 </p><p>
5373 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker ever
5374 intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the presumptively
5375 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no evidence at all that
5376 policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed our policy here to
5377 shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of free culture before the
5378 Internet.
5379 </p><p>
5380 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of transformative
5381 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong in
5382 commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
5383 <span class="emphasis"><em>any</em></span> transformation you make of creative work using a
5384 machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with
5385 a story and releasing it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a
5386 requirement of justification.  However troubling the expansion with respect
5387 to copying a particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect
5388 to transformative uses of creative work.
5389 </p><p>
5390
5391 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary burden
5392 on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.  If a
5393 copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read a book
5394 on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a violation of
5395 my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation about whether I
5396 have a fair use right to read, because before the Internet, reading did not
5397 trigger the application of copyright law and hence the need for a fair use
5398 defense. The right to read was effectively protected before because reading
5399 was not regulated.
5400 </p><p>
5401 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for free
5402 culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights depend upon fair
5403 use&#8212;never even addressing the earlier question about the expansion in
5404 effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in fair use makes sense
5405 when the vast majority of uses are <span class="emphasis"><em>unregulated</em></span>. But
5406 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the protections of
5407 fair use are not enough.
5408 </p><p>
5409 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was in the
5410 business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available to video
5411 stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
5412 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put the
5413 trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
5414 </p><p>
5415 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began to
5416 think about the Internet as another way to distribute these previews.  The
5417 idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by giving on-line
5418 stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can
5419 read a few pages of a book before you buy the book, so, too, you would be
5420 able to sample a bit from the movie on-line before you bought it.
5421 </p><p>
5422
5423 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors that it
5424 intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet (rather than
5425 sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two years later, Disney
5426 told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video Pipeline asked Disney to
5427 talk about the matter&#8212;he had built a business on distributing this
5428 content as a way to help sell Disney films; he had customers who depended
5429 upon his delivering this content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video
5430 Pipeline stopped the distribution immediately.  Video Pipeline thought it
5431 was within their "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So
5432 they filed a lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in
5433 fact their rights.
5434 </p><p>
5435 Disney countersued&#8212;for $100 million in damages. Those damages were
5436 predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully infringed" on
5437 Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of willful infringement, it
5438 can award damages not on the basis of the actual harm to the copyright
5439 owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the statute. Because Video
5440 Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of Disney movies to enable
5441 video stores to sell copies of those movies, Disney was now suing Video
5442 Pipeline for $100 million.
5443 </p><p>
5444 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
5445 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
5446 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim in
5447 court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
5448 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
5449 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
5450 Disney's permission.
5451 </p><p>
5452 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
5453 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
5454 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control how
5455 people got access to their content. Once a video was in the marketplace, the
5456 "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he wished,
5457 including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the entire
5458 movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to
5459 centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
5460 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
5461 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
5462 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
5463 </p><p>
5464
5465
5466 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for control
5467 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say you
5468 can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.  But
5469 the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble
5470 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.  Competition
5471 protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does
5472 not even question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger
5473 when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
5474 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you read
5475 a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But in a
5476 competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this happening
5477 are quite slight.
5478 </p><p>
5479 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
5480 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
5481 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
5482 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private owners
5483 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
5484 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
5485 </p></div><div class="section" title="Arkitektur og lov: Makt"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="lawforce"></a>Arkitektur og lov: Makt</h2></div></div></div><p>
5486 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a second
5487 important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
5488 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
5489 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
5490 </p><p>
5491 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
5492 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.  The law,
5493 meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human, trained in the
5494 tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that tradition embraced,
5495 who said whether and how the law would restrict your freedom.
5496 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2695168"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxmarxbrothers"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxwarnerbrothers"></a><p>
5497 Det er en berømt historie om en kamp mellom Marx-brødrene (the Marx
5498 Brothers) og Warner Brothers.  Marx-brødrene planla å lage en parodi av
5499 <em class="citetitle">Casablanca</em>. Warner Brothers protesterte.  De skrev et
5500 ufint brev til Marx-brødrene og advarte dem om at det ville få seriøse
5501 juridiske konsekvenser hvis de gikk videre med sin plan.<sup>[<a name="id2695215" href="#ftn.id2695215" class="footnote">136</a>]</sup>
5502 </p><p>
5503 Dette fikk Marx-brødrene til å svare tilbake med samme mynt.  De advarte
5504 Warner Brothers om at Marx-brødrene "var brødre lenge før dere var
5505 det".<sup>[<a name="id2695236" href="#ftn.id2695236" class="footnote">137</a>]</sup> Marx-brødrene eide derfor ordet
5506 <em class="citetitle">Brothers</em>, og hvis Warner Brothers insisterte på å
5507 forsøke å kontrollere <em class="citetitle">Casablanca</em>, så ville
5508 Marx-brødrene insistere på kontroll over <em class="citetitle">Brothers</em>.
5509 </p><p>
5510 Det var en absurd og hul trussel, selvfølgelig, fordi Warner Brothers, på
5511 samme måte som Marx-brødrene, visste at ingen domstol noensinne ville
5512 håndheve et slikt dumt krav. Denne ekstremismen var irrelevant for de ekte
5513 friheter som alle (inkludert Warner Brothers) nøt godt av.
5514 </p><p>
5515 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on the
5516 Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a machine:
5517 Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by the copyright
5518 owner, get built into the technology that delivers copyrighted content. It
5519 is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem with code regulations
5520 is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code would not get the humor of the
5521 Marx Brothers. The consequence of that is not at all funny.
5522 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2695294"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2695302"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxadobeebookreader"></a><p>
5523 La oss se på livet til min Adobe eBook Reader.
5524 </p><p>
5525 En ebok er en bok levert i elektronisk form.  En Adobe eBook er ikke en bok
5526 som Adobe har publisert.  Adobe produserer kun programvaren som utgivere
5527 bruker å levere e-bøker.  Den bidrar med teknologien, og utgiveren leverer
5528 innholdet ved hjelp av teknologien.
5529 </p><p>
5530 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook Reader.
5531 </p><p>
5532
5533 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this e-book
5534 library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the public domain:
5535 <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em>, for example, is in the public domain.
5536 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My own book
5537 <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em> is not yet within the public
5538 domain.  Consider <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em> first. If you click on
5539 my e-book copy of <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em>, you'll see a fancy
5540 cover, and then a button at the bottom called Permissions.
5541 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1611"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.12. Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1611.png" alt="Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5542 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the permissions
5543 that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
5544 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1612"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.13. List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1612.png" alt="List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5545
5546
5547 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the clipboard
5548 of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far, I've copied no
5549 text to the clipboard.)  I also have the permission to print ten pages from
5550 the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the permission to use the Read Aloud
5551 button to hear <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em> read aloud through the
5552 computer.
5553 </p><p>
5554 Her er e-boken for et annet allemannseid verk (inkludert oversettelsen):
5555 Aristoteles <em class="citetitle">Politikk</em>  <a class="indexterm" name="id2695427"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2695433"></a>
5556 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1621"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.14. E-bok av Aristoteles "Politikk"</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1621.png" alt='E-bok av Aristoteles "Politikk"'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5557 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted at
5558 all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear the book.
5559 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1622"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.15. Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politikk".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1622.png" alt='Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politikk".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5560 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the original
5561 e-book version of my last book, <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em>:
5562 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1631"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.16. List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1631.png" alt='List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5563 Ingen kopiering, ingen utskrift, og våg ikke å prøve å lytte til denne
5564 boken!
5565 </p><p>
5566 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&#8212; as if
5567 the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.  For works
5568 under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have the power&#8212;up
5569 to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not under copyright, there
5570 is no such copyright power.<sup>[<a name="id2695512" href="#ftn.id2695512" class="footnote">138</a>]</sup> When my
5571 e-book of <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em> says I have the permission to
5572 copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten days, what that
5573 really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control
5574 how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would
5575 enable.
5576 </p><p>
5577 The control comes instead from the code&#8212;from the technology within
5578 which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are permissions,
5579 they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal with. When a
5580 teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she knows (unless
5581 she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but will suffer a
5582 punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the
5583 permission to make ten copies of the text into the computer's memory, that
5584 means that after I've made ten copies, the computer will not make any
5585 more. The same with the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook
5586 Reader will not print any more pages.  It's the same with the silly
5587 restriction that says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my
5588 book aloud&#8212;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
5589 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply won't
5590 read aloud.
5591 </p><p>
5592
5593 These are <span class="emphasis"><em>controls</em></span>, not permissions. Imagine a world
5594 where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried
5595 to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
5596 <a class="indexterm" name="id2695568"></a>
5597 </p><p>
5598 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
5599 <span class="emphasis"><em>law</em></span> as copyright <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span>. The
5600 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified by
5601 courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that are coded
5602 by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into the law are
5603 always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are built into the
5604 technology have no similar built-in check.
5605 </p><p>
5606 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the controls
5607 built into the technology? Software used to be sold with technologies that
5608 limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those were trivial
5609 protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these protections
5610 as well?
5611 </p><p>
5612 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe eBook
5613 Reader.
5614 </p><p>
5615 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
5616 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free on the
5617 Adobe site was a copy of <em class="citetitle">Alice's Adventures in
5618 Wonderland</em>.  This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet
5619 when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
5620 <a class="indexterm" name="id2695618"></a>
5621 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1641"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.17. List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1641.png" alt="List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in Wonderland&quot;."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5622
5623
5624 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to copy,
5625 not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the "permissions"
5626 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
5627 </p><p>
5628 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.  For the
5629 text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read Aloud button;
5630 it said you did not have the permission to read the book aloud. That led
5631 some people to think that Adobe was restricting the right of parents, for
5632 example, to read the book to their children, which seemed, to say the least,
5633 absurd.
5634 </p><p>
5635 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying to
5636 restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only restricting
5637 the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book read aloud. But
5638 the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would Adobe thus agree that a
5639 consumer was free to use software to hack around the restrictions built into
5640 the eBook Reader? If some company (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to
5641 disable the technological protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a
5642 blind person, say, could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe
5643 agree that such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer
5644 because the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
5645 </p><p>
5646 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most innovative
5647 companies developing strategies to balance open access to content with
5648 incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's technology enables
5649 control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this control.  That incentive
5650 is understandable, yet what it creates is often crazy.
5651 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2695685"></a><p>
5652 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite story
5653 of mine that makes the same point.
5654 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxaibo"></a><p>
5655 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo learns tricks,
5656 cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity and that doesn't
5657 leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
5658 </p><p>
5659
5660 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world have set up
5661 clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web site to enable
5662 information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set up aibopet.com
5663 (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site), and on that site he
5664 provided information about how to teach an Aibo to do tricks in addition to
5665 the ones Sony had taught it.
5666 </p><p>
5667 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.  You
5668 teach a computer how to do something by programming it differently.  So to
5669 say that aibopet.com was giving information about how to teach the dog to do
5670 new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com was giving information to users
5671 of the Aibo pet about how to hack their computer "dog" to make it do new
5672 tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
5673 </p><p>
5674 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
5675 <em class="citetitle">hack</em> has a particularly unfriendly
5676 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror
5677 movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them,
5678 <em class="citetitle">hack</em> is a much more positive
5679 term. <em class="citetitle">Hack</em> just means code that enables the program
5680 to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy a
5681 new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer doesn't
5682 run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be happy
5683 to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a driver to enable
5684 the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
5685 </p><p>
5686 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a community like
5687 to challenge themselves and others with increasingly difficult
5688 tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
5689 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
5690 ethically.
5691 </p><p>
5692 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program and
5693 offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to dance
5694 jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever bit of
5695 tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature than Sony had
5696 built.
5697 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2695788"></a><p>
5698
5699 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the United
5700 States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience, is it
5701 permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We forget that
5702 stories about the backcountry still flow across much of the world. So let's
5703 just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime anywhere (anymore) to
5704 dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog to dance jazz. Nor should it
5705 be a crime (though we don't have a lot to go on here) to teach your robot
5706 dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a completely legal activity. One imagines
5707 that the owner of aibopet.com thought, <span class="emphasis"><em>What possible problem could
5708 there be with teaching a robot dog to dance?</em></span>
5709 </p><p>
5710 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&#8212; not
5711 literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic named Ed
5712 Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic is well known and
5713 respected. He was hired by the government in the Microsoft case to test
5714 Microsoft's claims about what could and could not be done with its own
5715 code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his brilliance and his
5716 coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft lawyers, Ed Felten stood his
5717 ground. He was not about to be bullied into being silent about something he
5718 knew very well.
5719 </p><p>
5720 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<sup>[<a name="id2695833" href="#ftn.id2695833" class="footnote">139</a>]</sup> He and a group of colleagues were working on a
5721 paper to be submitted at conference.  The paper was intended to describe the
5722 weakness in an encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
5723 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
5724 </p><p>
5725 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content owners to
5726 exercise much better control over their content than the Internet, as it
5727 originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI hoped to develop a
5728 standard that would allow the content owner to say "this music cannot be
5729 copied," and have a computer respect that command.  The technology was to be
5730 part of a "trusted system" of control that would get content owners to trust
5731 the system of the Internet much more.
5732 </p><p>
5733 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.  In
5734 exchange for providing contestants with the code to an SDMI-encrypted bit of
5735 content, contestants were to try to crack it and, if they did, report the
5736 problems to the consortium.
5737 </p><p>
5738
5739
5740 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and the
5741 team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption systems
5742 would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team thought it
5743 worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
5744 </p><p>
5745 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
5746 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not just
5747 because it is the law, but also because it is a really great idea. A
5748 strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to encourage a wide
5749 range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in turn, to improve the
5750 systems or people or ideas criticized.
5751 </p><p>
5752 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper describing
5753 the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free music, or
5754 building and deploying this technology. The paper was an academic essay,
5755 unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the weakness in the
5756 SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently constituted, succeed.
5757 </p><p>
5758 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they then
5759 received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the aibopet.com
5760 hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony wrote:
5761 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5762 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent AIBO-ware's
5763 copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the anti-circumvention
5764 provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
5765 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5766 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system of
5767 encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter from an
5768 RIAA lawyer that read:
5769 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5770
5771 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the Public
5772 Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by the
5773 Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions under the
5774 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
5775 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5776 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the spread
5777 of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made spreading such
5778 information an offense.
5779 </p><p>
5780 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear about
5781 cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively dead; the
5782 response was to find technologies that might compensate.  These new
5783 technologies would be copyright protection technologies&#8212; technologies
5784 to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted material. They
5785 were designed as <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span> to modify the original
5786 <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span> of the Internet, to reestablish some protection
5787 for copyright owners.
5788 </p><p>
5789 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this code
5790 designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
5791 <span class="emphasis"><em>legal code</em></span> intended to buttress <span class="emphasis"><em>software
5792 code</em></span> which itself was intended to support the <span class="emphasis"><em>legal
5793 code of copyright</em></span>.
5794 </p><p>
5795 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to the
5796 extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did not end at
5797 the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated devices that were
5798 designed to circumvent copyright protection measures. It was designed to ban
5799 those devices, whether or not the use of the copyrighted material made
5800 possible by that circumvention would have been a copyright violation.
5801 </p><p>
5802
5803 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
5804 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to dance
5805 jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted material. But
5806 as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did not enable
5807 subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that aibopet.com's hack
5808 was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet fair use is not a defense
5809 to the DMCA. The question is not whether the use of the copyrighted material
5810 was a copyright violation. The question is whether a copyright protection
5811 system was circumvented.
5812 </p><p>
5813 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the same line
5814 of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a copyright protection
5815 system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer suggested, Felten himself was
5816 distributing a circumvention technology.  Thus, even though he was not
5817 himself infringing anyone's copyright, his academic paper was enabling
5818 others to infringe others' copyright.
5819 </p><p>
5820 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in 1981 by
5821 Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that the VCR could
5822 be banned because it was a copyright-infringing technology: It enabled
5823 consumers to copy films without the permission of the copyright owner. No
5824 doubt there were uses of the technology that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
5825 "<em class="citetitle">Mr. Rogers</em>," for example, had testified in that case
5826 that he wanted people to feel free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
5827 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5828 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
5829 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that it's
5830 a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show them
5831 at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all of this
5832 new technology that allows people to tape the "Neighborhood" off-the-air,
5833 and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood" because that's what I produce, that
5834 they then become much more active in the programming of their family's
5835 television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by
5836 others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always been "You are an
5837 important person just the way you are. You can make healthy decisions."
5838 Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a
5839 person to be more active in the control of his or her life, in a healthy
5840 way, is important.<sup>[<a name="id2696082" href="#ftn.id2696082" class="footnote">140</a>]</sup>
5841 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5842
5843
5844 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were some uses
5845 that were illegal, the court held the companies producing the VCR
5846 responsible.
5847 </p><p>
5848 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to the DMCA.
5849 </p><p>
5850 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
5851 </p><p>
5852 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright circumvention
5853 technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for different
5854 ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive pirating of
5855 copyrighted material&#8212;a bad end. Or they can be used to enable the use
5856 of particular copyrighted materials in ways that would be considered fair
5857 use&#8212;a good end.
5858 </p><p>
5859
5860 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most would agree
5861 such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target practice or to
5862 protect against an intruder. At least some would say that such a use would
5863 be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good and bad uses.
5864 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1711"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1711.png" alt="VCR/handgun cartoon."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5865 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world where guns
5866 are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and circumvention
5867 technologies) are illegal. Flash: <span class="emphasis"><em>No one ever died from copyright
5868 circumvention</em></span>. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
5869 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but permits
5870 guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
5871 </p><p>
5872 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are changing the
5873 balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright owners restrict
5874 fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would attempt to evade the
5875 restrictions on fair use that they impose through code. Technology becomes a
5876 means by which fair use can be erased; the law of the DMCA backs up that
5877 erasing.
5878 </p><p>
5879 This is how <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span> becomes <span class="emphasis"><em>law</em></span>. The
5880 controls built into the technology of copy and access protection become
5881 rules the violation of which is also a violation of the law. In this way,
5882 the code extends the law&#8212;increasing its regulation, even if the
5883 subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute
5884 fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the
5885 law; code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&#8212;at
5886 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the nasty
5887 letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
5888 </p><p>
5889 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and law
5890 that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is the ease
5891 with which infringements of the law can be detected. For contrary to the
5892 rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the Internet, no one
5893 knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing technologies deployed on
5894 the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who committed a legal wrong. The
5895 technologies of the Internet are open to snoops as well as sharers, and the
5896 snoops are increasingly good at tracking down the identity of those who
5897 violate the rules.
5898 </p><p>
5899
5900
5901 For example, imagine you were part of a <em class="citetitle">Star Trek</em> fan
5902 club. You gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of
5903 fan fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
5904 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then simply
5905 continue it.<sup>[<a name="id2696221" href="#ftn.id2696221" class="footnote">141</a>]</sup>
5906 </p><p>
5907 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated activity.
5908 No matter what happened inside your club room, you would never be interfered
5909 with by the copyright police. You were free in that space to do as you
5910 wished with this part of our culture. You were allowed to build on it as you
5911 wished without fear of legal control.
5912 </p><p>
5913 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
5914 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
5915 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would quickly find
5916 your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon the ownership of the
5917 series that you're depicting, could well inspire a lawyer's threat. And
5918 ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely costly indeed.  The law of
5919 copyright is extremely efficient. The penalties are severe, and the process
5920 is quick.
5921 </p><p>
5922 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change in the
5923 ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts the law's
5924 balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at which you
5925 traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just one step before
5926 the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you transmitted. That
5927 is, in effect, what is happening here.
5928 </p></div><div class="section" title="Marked: Konsentrasjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="marketconcentration"></a>Marked: Konsentrasjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
5929
5930 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&#8212;tripled in the past
5931 thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as well&#8212;from
5932 regulating only publishers to now regulating just about everyone. And
5933 copyright's reach has changed, as every action becomes a copy and hence
5934 presumptively regulated. And as technologists find better ways to control
5935 the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly enforced through
5936 technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is easier to find and
5937 easier to control. This regulation of the creative process, which began as a
5938 tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the market for creative work, has
5939 become the single most important regulator of creativity there is. It is a
5940 massive expansion in the scope of the government's control over innovation
5941 and creativity; it would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth
5942 to copyright's control.
5943 </p><p>
5944 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it weren't
5945 for one more change that we must also consider. This is a change that is in
5946 some sense the most familiar, though its significance and scope are not well
5947 understood. It is the one that creates precisely the reason to be concerned
5948 about all the other changes I have described.
5949 </p><p>
5950 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.  In
5951 the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone a radical
5952 alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the media.  Before
5953 this change happened, the different forms of media were owned by separate
5954 media companies. Now, the media is increasingly owned by only a few
5955 companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC announced in June 2003,
5956 most expect that within a few years, we will live in a world where just
5957 three companies control more than percent of the media.
5958 </p><p>
5959 Det er her to sorter endringer: omfanget av konsentrasjon, og dens natur.
5960 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2696325"></a><p>
5961 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John McCain
5962 summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media ownership, "five
5963 companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<sup>[<a name="id2696336" href="#ftn.id2696336" class="footnote">142</a>]</sup> The five recording labels of Universal Music Group,
5964 BMG, Sony Music Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8
5965 percent of the U.S. music market.<sup>[<a name="id2696348" href="#ftn.id2696348" class="footnote">143</a>]</sup> The
5966 "five largest cable companies pipe programming to 74 percent of the cable
5967 subscribers nationwide."<sup>[<a name="id2696361" href="#ftn.id2696361" class="footnote">144</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2696372"></a>
5968 </p><p>
5969
5970 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation, the
5971 nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
5972 seventy-five stations. Today <span class="emphasis"><em>one</em></span> company owns more than
5973 1,200 stations.  During that period of consolidation, the total number of
5974 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two largest
5975 broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's revenues. Overall, just
5976 four companies control 90 percent of the nation's radio advertising
5977 revenues.
5978 </p><p>
5979 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well.  Today, there are
5980 six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than there were
5981 eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the nation's
5982 circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in the United
5983 States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all film revenue. The
5984 ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent of all cable
5985 revenue. This is a market far from the free press the framers sought to
5986 protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well protected&#8212; by the
5987 market.
5988 </p><p>
5989 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious change is in
5990 the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows put it in a recent
5991 article about Rupert Murdoch, <a class="indexterm" name="id2696413"></a>
5992 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5993 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system unmatched in its
5994 integration. They supply content&#8212;Fox movies . . .  Fox TV shows
5995 . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus newspapers and books. They sell
5996 the content to the public and to advertisers&#8212;in newspapers, on the
5997 broadcast network, on the cable channels. And they operate the physical
5998 distribution system through which the content reaches the
5999 customers. Murdoch's satellite systems now distribute News Corp. content in
6000 Europe and Asia; if Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that
6001 system will serve the same function in the United States.<sup>[<a name="id2696428" href="#ftn.id2696428" class="footnote">145</a>]</sup>
6002 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6003 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not just large
6004 companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies owning as many
6005 outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this pattern better than a
6006 thousand words could do:
6007 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1761"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1761.png" alt="Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
6008
6009
6010 Betyr denne konsentrasjonen noe?  Påvirker det hva som blir laget, eller hva
6011 som blir distribuert?  Eller er det bare en mer effektiv måte å produsere og
6012 distribuere innhold?
6013 </p><p>
6014 Mitt syn var at konsentrasjonen ikke betød noe.  Jeg tenkte det ikke var noe
6015 mer enn en mer effektiv finansiell struktur.  Men nå, etter å ha lest og
6016 hørt på en haug av skapere prøve å overbevise meg om det motsatte, har jeg
6017 begynt å endre mening.
6018 </p><p>
6019 Her er en representativ historie som kan foreslå hvorfor denne integreringen
6020 er viktig.
6021 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2696508"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2696514"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2696520"></a><p>
6022 I 1969 laget Norman Lear en polit for <em class="citetitle">All in the
6023 Family</em>.  Han tok piloten til ABC, og nettverket likte det ikke.
6024 Da sa til Lear at det var for på kanten.  Gjør det om igjen. Lear lagde
6025 piloten på nytt, mer på kanten enn den første.  ABC ble fra seg.  Du får
6026 ikke med deg poenget, fortalte de Lear.  Vi vil ha det mindre på kanten,
6027 ikke mer.
6028 </p><p>
6029 I stedet for å føye seg, to Lear ganske enkelt serien sin til noen andre.
6030 CBS var glad for å ha seriene, og ABC kunne ikke stoppe Lear fra å gå til
6031 andre.  Opphavsretten som Lear hadde sikret uavhengighet fra
6032 nettverk-kontroll.<sup>[<a name="id2696554" href="#ftn.id2696554" class="footnote">146</a>]</sup>
6033 </p><p>
6034
6035
6036
6037 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade the
6038 networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law required a
6039 separation between the networks and the content producers; that separation
6040 would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992, because of these rules,
6041 the vast majority of prime time television&#8212;75 percent of it&#8212;was
6042 "independent" of the networks.
6043 </p><p>
6044 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.  After
6045 that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.  In 1985, there were
6046 twenty-five independent television production studios; in 2002, only five
6047 independent television studios remained. "In 1992, only 15 percent of new
6048 series were produced for a network by a company it controlled. Last year,
6049 the percentage of shows produced by controlled companies more than
6050 quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16 new series were produced
6051 independently of conglomerate control, last year there was one."<sup>[<a name="id2696590" href="#ftn.id2696590" class="footnote">147</a>]</sup> In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was
6052 owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and
6053 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week produced by network
6054 studios increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television
6055 hours per week produced by independent studios decreased 63%."<sup>[<a name="id2696626" href="#ftn.id2696626" class="footnote">148</a>]</sup>
6056 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2696634"></a><p>
6057 Today, another Norman Lear with another <em class="citetitle">All in the
6058 Family</em> would find that he had the choice either to make the show
6059 less edgy or to be fired: The content of any show developed for a network is
6060 increasingly owned by the network.
6061 </p><p>
6062 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership of
6063 those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As Barry
6064 Diller said to Bill Moyers, <a class="indexterm" name="id2696656"></a>
6065 <a class="indexterm" name="id2696662"></a>
6066 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
6067 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on their
6068 channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes through their
6069 controlled distribution system, then what you get is fewer and fewer actual
6070 voices participating in the process. [We u]sed to have dozens and dozens of
6071 thriving independent production companies producing television programs. Now
6072 you have less than a handful.<sup>[<a name="id2696680" href="#ftn.id2696680" class="footnote">149</a>]</sup>
6073 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6074 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such large
6075 and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.  Increasingly
6076 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from networks like
6077 this is increasingly tailored to the message the network wants to
6078 convey. This is not the communist party, though from the inside, it must
6079 feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question without risk of
6080 consequence&#8212;not necessarily banishment to Siberia, but punishment
6081 nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are quashed. This is not
6082 the environment for a democracy.
6083 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2696704"></a><p>
6084 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
6085 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
6086 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
6087 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.  The
6088 same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media companies
6089 would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<sup>[<a name="id2696739" href="#ftn.id2696739" class="footnote">150</a>]</sup> Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not,
6090 sprint. Yet if the field is only open to the giants, there will be far too
6091 little sprinting.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2696768"></a>
6092 </p><p>
6093 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media market to say
6094 with certainty what concentration and integration will do. The efficiencies
6095 are important, and the effect on culture is hard to measure.
6096 </p><p>
6097 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly suggest
6098 the concern.
6099 </p><p>
6100 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
6101 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
6102 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
6103 </p><p>
6104
6105 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to any
6106 position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound mistake. I
6107 am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once wrecked by
6108 drugs&#8212;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all quite legal. I
6109 believe this war is a profound mistake because the collateral damage from it
6110 is so great as to make waging the war insane.  When you add together the
6111 burdens on the criminal justice system, the desperation of generations of
6112 kids whose only real economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the
6113 queering of constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance
6114 this war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
6115 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the local
6116 drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal benefit in
6117 reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
6118 </p><p>
6119 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it is
6120 through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we depend
6121 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about these issues.
6122 </p><p>
6123 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched a
6124 media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced scores
6125 of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In one series
6126 (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing the idea of
6127 legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral damage from the
6128 war. One advances an argument in favor of drug legalization. The other
6129 responds in a powerful and effective way against the argument of the
6130 first. In the end, the first guy changes his mind (hey, it's
6131 television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on the pro-legalization
6132 campaign.
6133 </p><p>
6134 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
6135 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
6136 </p><p>
6137 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
6138 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
6139 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
6140 war. Can you do it?
6141 </p><p>
6142
6143 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
6144 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in the
6145 world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your message will be
6146 heard then?
6147 </p><p>
6148 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
6149 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
6150 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
6151 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First Amendment, but
6152 the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to choose what they
6153 run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media will refuse one side of a
6154 crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.  And the courts will
6155 defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<sup>[<a name="id2696870" href="#ftn.id2696870" class="footnote">151</a>]</sup>
6156 </p><p>
6157 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&#8212;if we lived in a
6158 media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media throws
6159 that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control access to the
6160 media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which political
6161 positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in an obvious
6162 and important way, concentration matters. You might like the positions the
6163 handful of companies selects. But you should not like a world in which a
6164 mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
6165 </p></div><div class="section" title="Sammen"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="together"></a>Sammen</h2></div></div></div><p>
6166 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the copyright
6167 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In the abstract,
6168 it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No sane sort who is
6169 not an anarchist could disagree.
6170 </p><p>
6171
6172 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&#8212; when we
6173 recognize how it might now interact with both technology and markets to mean
6174 that the effective constraint on the liberty to cultivate our culture is
6175 dramatically different&#8212;the claim begins to seem less innocent and
6176 obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to supplement the law's control,
6177 and (2) the power of concentrated markets to weaken the opportunity for
6178 dissent, if strictly enforcing the massively expanded "property" rights
6179 granted by copyright fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture
6180 to cultivate and build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this
6181 property should be redefined.
6182 </p><p>
6183 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish copyright
6184 or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total mistake,
6185 disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within our culture
6186 today.
6187 </p><p>
6188 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
6189 notwithstanding.  And these massive shifts in the effective power of
6190 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
6191 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
6192 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether
6193 another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that increases
6194 copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
6195 adjustment to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
6196 regulation&#8212;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
6197 </p><p>
6198 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of constant
6199 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and geeks now
6200 flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a short period of
6201 time, as the technologies of distribution and creation have changed and as
6202 lobbyists have pushed for more control by copyright holders. Changes in the
6203 past in response to changes in technology suggest that we may well need
6204 similar changes in the future. And these changes have to be
6205 <span class="emphasis"><em>reductions</em></span> in the scope of copyright, in response to
6206 the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the market enable.
6207 </p><p>
6208
6209 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that we
6210 see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add together
6211 the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and changing technology,
6212 together they produce an astonishing conclusion: <span class="emphasis"><em>Never in our
6213 history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the development of
6214 our culture than now</em></span>.
6215 </p><p>
6216 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were perpetual, they
6217 affected only that precise creative work. Not when only publishers had the
6218 tools to publish, for the market then was much more diverse. Not when there
6219 were only three television networks, for even then, newspapers, film
6220 studios, radio stations, and publishers were independent of the
6221 networks. <span class="emphasis"><em>Never</em></span> has copyright protected such a wide
6222 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
6223 remotely as long. This form of regulation&#8212;a tiny regulation of a tiny
6224 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding&#8212;is now a
6225 massive regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
6226 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the
6227 most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
6228 known.<sup>[<a name="id2697074" href="#ftn.id2697074" class="footnote">152</a>]</sup>
6229 </p><p>
6230 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
6231 </p><p>
6232 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
6233 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have distinguished
6234 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now combine these two
6235 distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes that copyright law has
6236 undergone.  In 1790, the law looked like this:
6237 </p><div class="table"><a name="t2"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 11.1. Law status in 1790</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Law status in 1790" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Publiser</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6238
6239 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by copyright
6240 law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as copyright attached
6241 only with registration, and only those who intended to benefit commercially
6242 would register, copying through publishing of noncommercial work was also
6243 free.
6244 </p><p>
6245 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
6246 </p><div class="table"><a name="t3"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 11.2. Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Publiser</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6247 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&#8212;if published,
6248 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time, means if offered
6249 commercially. But noncommercial publishing and transformation were still
6250 essentially free.
6251 </p><p>
6252 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after this
6253 change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the technology of
6254 copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law expanded.  Thus by 1975,
6255 as photocopying machines became more common, we could say the law began to
6256 look like this:
6257 </p><div class="table"><a name="t4"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 11.3. Law status in 1975</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Law status in 1975" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Kopier</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">©/Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6258 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say, copy
6259 machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial market
6260 remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital technologies,
6261 especially in the context of a digital network, means that the law now looks
6262 like this:
6263 </p><div class="table"><a name="t5"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 11.4. Law status now</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Law status now" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Kopier</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6264
6265 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most creativity was
6266 not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&#8212; commercial or
6267 not, transformative or not&#8212;with the same rules designed to regulate
6268 commercial publishers.
6269 </p><p>
6270 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation that does
6271 no good. So the question that we should be asking just now is whether
6272 extending the regulations of copyright law into each of these domains
6273 actually does any good.
6274 </p><p>
6275 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.  But I
6276 also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when regulating (as it
6277 regulates just now) noncommercial copying and, especially, noncommercial
6278 transformation. And increasingly, for the reasons sketched especially in
6279 chapters <a class="xref" href="#recorders" title="Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne">8</a> and
6280 <a class="xref" href="#transformers" title="Kapittel 9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere">9</a>, one might
6281 well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
6282 transformation.  More commercial transformative work would be created if
6283 derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
6284 </p><p>
6285 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of course
6286 copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any property, the
6287 state ought to protect it. But first impressions notwithstanding,
6288 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<sup>[<a name="id2697442" href="#ftn.id2697442" class="footnote">153</a>]</sup>)  has been crafted to balance the important need to
6289 give authors and artists incentives with the equally important need to
6290 assure access to creative work. This balance has always been struck in light
6291 of new technologies.  And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
6292 did not control <span class="emphasis"><em>at all</em></span> the freedom of others to build
6293 upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
6294 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free
6295 culture.
6296 </p><p>
6297
6298 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important limits on
6299 the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very birth of
6300 "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by granting
6301 copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story of chapter
6302 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar concern that is
6303 increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair use right
6304 become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding statutory rights
6305 where markets might stifle innovation is another familiar limit on the
6306 property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And granting archives and
6307 libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property notwithstanding, is
6308 a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free
6309 cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But the nature of the
6310 property that builds a free culture is very different from the extremist
6311 vision that dominates the debate today.
6312 </p><p>
6313 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In response
6314 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
6315 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing and
6316 distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed in a way
6317 that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property right that
6318 is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or was intended to
6319 be. The property right that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted
6320 toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened
6321 in a world in which creation requires permission and creativity must check
6322 with a lawyer.
6323 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2693009" href="#id2693009" class="para">118</a>] </sup>
6324
6325
6326 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.  4794,
6327 H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcommittee on
6328 Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee
6329 on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd
6330 sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
6331 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2693061" href="#id2693061" class="para">119</a>] </sup>
6332
6333
6334 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
6335 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
6336 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
6337 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
6338 ordinary meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman,
6339 <em class="citetitle">Private Property and the Constitution</em> (New Haven:
6340 Yale University Press, 1977), 26&#8211;27.
6341 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2693378" href="#id2693378" class="para">120</a>] </sup>
6342
6343
6344 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6345 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6346 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right
6347 self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the other three is
6348 more timidly expressed.  See Lawrence Lessig, <em class="citetitle">Code: And Other
6349 Laws of Cyberspace</em> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&#8211;95;
6350 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," <em class="citetitle">Journal of Legal
6351 Studies</em>, June 1998.
6352 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2693443" href="#id2693443" class="para">121</a>] </sup>
6353
6354 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6355 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6356 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6357 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6358 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6359 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss
6360 of freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries
6361 of ordinary life.  I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view,
6362 which depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6363 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of
6364 liberty. As I argued in <em class="citetitle">Code</em>, we come from a long
6365 tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question
6366 of what the government did when.  John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6367 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of
6368 government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, <em class="citetitle">On Liberty</em>
6369 (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.  John R. Commons famously
6370 defended the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the
6371 market; John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and
6372 Warren J. Samuels, eds., <em class="citetitle">John R. Commons: Selected
6373 Essays</em> (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with
6374 Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical disabilities
6375 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making access
6376 to those places easier; 42 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>,
6377 section 12101 (2000).  Each of these interventions to change existing
6378 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of those
6379 interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the effective
6380 liberty that each of these groups might face.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2693491"></a>
6381 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2693653" href="#id2693653" class="para">122</a>] </sup>
6382
6383
6384 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6385 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #23</a>. For a more recent
6386 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6387 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6 October 2003, available at
6388 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #24</a>.
6389 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2693702" href="#id2693702" class="para">123</a>] </sup>
6390
6391
6392 Fred Warshofsky, <em class="citetitle">The Patent Wars</em> (New York: Wiley,
6393 1994), 170&#8211;71.
6394 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2693868" href="#id2693868" class="para">124</a>] </sup>
6395
6396
6397 Se for eksempel James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6398 Environmentalism for the Net?" <em class="citetitle">Duke Law Journal</em> 47
6399 (1997): 87.
6400 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694083" href="#id2694083" class="para">125</a>] </sup>
6401
6402 William W. Crosskey, <em class="citetitle">Politics and the Constitution in the History
6403 of the United States</em> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953),
6404 vol. 1, 485&#8211;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6405 Law of the Land,' <span class="emphasis"><em>the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6406 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</em></span>" (emphasis
6407 added).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2694099"></a>
6408 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694148" href="#id2694148" class="para">126</a>] </sup>
6409
6410
6411 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790 to
6412 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <em class="citetitle">A
6413 History of Book Publishing in the United States</em>, vol. 1,
6414 <em class="citetitle">The Creation of an Industry, 1630&#8211;1865</em> (New
6415 York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000 imprints recorded before 1790, only
6416 twelve were copyrighted under the 1790 act; William J. Maher,
6417 <em class="citetitle">Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension and the Copyright Law of
6418 1790 in Historical Context</em>, 7&#8211;10 (2002), available at
6419 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #25</a>.  Thus, the
6420 overwhelming majority of works fell immediately into the public domain. Even
6421 those works that were copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly,
6422 because the term of copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was
6423 fourteen years, with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen
6424 years. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694215" href="#id2694215" class="para">127</a>] </sup>
6425
6426
6427 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For instance, of
6428 the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were renewed in 1910. For
6429 a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
6430 "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright," <em class="citetitle">Studies on
6431 Copyright</em>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1963),
6432 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William M. Landes and
6433 Richard A.  Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6434 <em class="citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review</em> 70 (2003): 471,
6435 498&#8211;501, and accompanying figures.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694243" href="#id2694243" class="para">128</a>] </sup>
6436
6437
6438 Se Ringer, kap. 9, n. 2.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694339" href="#id2694339" class="para">129</a>] </sup>
6439
6440
6441 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the first
6442 year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never more than
6443 thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and Posner,
6444 "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6445 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694464" href="#id2694464" class="para">130</a>] </sup>
6446
6447
6448 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of
6449 American Literature," 29 <em class="citetitle">New York University Journal of
6450 International Law and Politics</em> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth,
6451 ed., Federal Copyright Records, 1790&#8211;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6452
6453 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694556" href="#id2694556" class="para">131</a>] </sup>
6454
6455 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," <em class="citetitle">Legal
6456 Affairs</em>, julu/august 2003,tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #26</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2694582"></a>
6457 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694602" href="#id2694602" class="para">132</a>] </sup>
6458
6459
6460 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument about
6461 the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective of the
6462 First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See Jed
6463 Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,"
6464 <em class="citetitle">Yale Law Journal</em> 112 (2002): 1&#8211;60 (see
6465 especially pp. 53&#8211;59).
6466 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694652" href="#id2694652" class="para">133</a>] </sup>
6467
6468
6469 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6470 regulates more than "copies"&#8212;a public performance of a copyrighted
6471 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't make
6472 a copy; 17 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>, section 106(4). And it
6473 certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 <em class="citetitle">United States
6474 Code</em>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the existing law
6475 (which regulates "copies;" 17 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>,
6476 section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6477 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694713" href="#id2694713" class="para">134</a>] </sup>
6478
6479
6480 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends, we
6481 should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for its
6482 extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the basis of
6483 arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6484 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2694659" href="#id2694659" class="para">135</a>] </sup>
6485
6486
6487 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather
6488 that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not
6489 make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be
6490 designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies
6491 remain.
6492 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2695215" href="#id2695215" class="para">136</a>] </sup>
6493
6494
6495 Se David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," <em class="citetitle">Law and
6496 Contemporary Problems</em> 44 (1981): 172&#8211;73.
6497 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2695236" href="#id2695236" class="para">137</a>] </sup>
6498
6499 Ibid. Se også Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
6500 Copywrongs</em>, 1&#8211;3.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2695227"></a>
6501 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2695512" href="#id2695512" class="para">138</a>] </sup>
6502
6503
6504 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
6505 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
6506 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
6507 obligation (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
6508 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would not
6509 necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
6510 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2695833" href="#id2695833" class="para">139</a>] </sup>
6511
6512 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
6513 <em class="citetitle">Science</em> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play
6514 Dead: Sony Muzzles the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,"
6515 <em class="citetitle">American Prospect</em>, January 2002; "Court Dismisses
6516 Computer Scientists' Challenge to DMCA," <em class="citetitle">Intellectual Property
6517 Litigation Reporter</em>, 11 December 2001; Bill Holland, "Copyright
6518 Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," <em class="citetitle">Billboard</em>, May
6519 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com, April 2001;
6520 Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked Questions about
6521 <em class="citetitle">Felten and USENIX</em> v. <em class="citetitle">RIAA</em>
6522 Legal Case," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
6523 #27</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2695871"></a>
6524 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696082" href="#id2696082" class="para">140</a>] </sup>
6525
6526
6527 <em class="citetitle">Sony Corporation of America</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Universal
6528 City Studios, Inc</em>., 464 U.S. 417, 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers
6529 never changed his view about the VCR. See James Lardner, <em class="citetitle">Fast
6530 Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of the VCR</em>
6531 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&#8211;71.
6532 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696221" href="#id2696221" class="para">141</a>] </sup>
6533
6534
6535 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
6536 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," <em class="citetitle">Loyola of Los
6537 Angeles Entertainment Law Journal</em> 17 (1997): 651.
6538 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696336" href="#id2696336" class="para">142</a>] </sup>
6539
6540
6541 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
6542 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)  (statement
6543 of Senator John McCain).  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696348" href="#id2696348" class="para">143</a>] </sup>
6544
6545
6546 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to Slide,"
6547 <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 23 December 2002.
6548 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696361" href="#id2696361" class="para">144</a>] </sup>
6549
6550
6551 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," <em class="citetitle">Charleston
6552 Gazette</em>, 31 May 2003.
6553 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696428" href="#id2696428" class="para">145</a>] </sup>
6554
6555 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," <em class="citetitle">Atlantic Monthly</em>
6556 (September 2003): 89.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2696444"></a>
6557 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696554" href="#id2696554" class="para">146</a>] </sup>
6558
6559
6560 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center Forum,
6561 "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis, Missouri, 3 April
6562 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #28</a>; for the Lear story,
6563 not included in the prepared remarks, see <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #29</a>).
6564 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696590" href="#id2696590" class="para">147</a>] </sup>
6565
6566
6567 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
6568 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
6569 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union and
6570 the Consumer Federation of America), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #30</a>. Kimmelman quotes
6571 Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West, in her Remarks
6572 at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February 2003.
6573 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696626" href="#id2696626" class="para">148</a>] </sup>
6574
6575
6576 Ibid.
6577 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696680" href="#id2696680" class="para">149</a>] </sup>
6578
6579
6580 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," <em class="citetitle">Now with Bill
6581 Moyers</em>, Bill Moyers, 25 April 2003, redigert avskrift
6582 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
6583 #31</a>.
6584 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696739" href="#id2696739" class="para">150</a>] </sup>
6585
6586
6587 Clayton M. Christensen, <em class="citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
6588 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do
6589 Business</em> (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
6590 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean
6591 Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and
6592 Market Concepts in Technological Evolution," <em class="citetitle">Research
6593 Policy</em> 14 (1985): 235&#8211;51. For a more recent study, see
6594 Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan, <em class="citetitle">Creative Destruction: Why
6595 Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market&#8212;and How to
6596 Successfully Transform Them</em> (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
6597 2001).  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696870" href="#id2696870" class="para">151</a>] </sup>
6598
6599 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
6600 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
6601 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
6602 policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
6603 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
6604 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and returned
6605 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.  These
6606 restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for example,
6607 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection
6608 from TV Networks," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 13 March 2003,
6609 C4.  Outside of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC
6610 or the courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general
6611 overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
6612 Advertising on Television and Radio," <em class="citetitle">Yale Law and Policy
6613 Review</em> 6 (1988): 449&#8211;79, and for a more recent summary of
6614 the stance of the FCC and the courts, see <em class="citetitle">Radio-Television News
6615 Directors Association</em> v. <em class="citetitle">FCC</em>, 184 F. 3d
6616 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
6617 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
6618 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel
6619 buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni
6620 Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #32</a>. The ground was that
6621 the criticism was "too controversial." <a class="indexterm" name="id2696918"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2696927"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2696933"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2696939"></a>
6622 <a class="indexterm" name="id2696945"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2696952"></a>
6623 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2697074" href="#id2697074" class="para">152</a>] </sup>
6624
6625 Siva Vaidhyanathan fanger et lignende poeng i hans "fire kapitulasjoner" for
6626 opphavsrettsloven i den digitale tidsalder. Se Vaidhyanathan, 159&#8211;60.
6627 <a class="indexterm" name="id2696896"></a>
6628 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2697442" href="#id2697442" class="para">153</a>] </sup>
6629
6630
6631 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist movement
6632 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance public
6633 and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of Property,"
6634 in <em class="citetitle">Nomos XXII: Property</em>, J. Roland Pennock and John
6635 W.  Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
6636 </p></div></div></div></div><div class="part" title="Del III. Nøtter"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="c-puzzles"></a>Del III. Nøtter</h1></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#chimera">12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#harms">13. Kapittel tolv: Skader</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="chimera"></a>Kapittel 12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxchimera"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxwells"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxtcotb"></a><p>
6637 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez
6638 trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in
6639 the Peruvian Andes.<sup>[<a name="id2697572" href="#ftn.id2697572" class="footnote">154</a>]</sup> The valley is
6640 extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate,
6641 slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent
6642 fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an
6643 opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed
6644 Man is King." So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a
6645 king.
6646 </p><p>
6647 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of sight
6648 to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are "blind."
6649 They don't have the word <em class="citetitle">blind</em>. They think he's just
6650 thick.  Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
6651 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to
6652 control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
6653 understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute,
6654 and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
6655 </p><p>
6656
6657
6658 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
6659 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his affection,
6660 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in the whole of
6661 creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's description of what he
6662 sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies, and she listened to his
6663 description of the stars and the mountains and her own sweet white-lit
6664 beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells
6665 tells us, and "she could only half understand, but she was mysteriously
6666 delighted."
6667 </p><p>
6668 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted" love,
6669 the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her father instructs,
6670 "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything right." They take
6671 Nunez to the village doctor.
6672 </p><p>
6673 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain is
6674 affected," he reports.
6675 </p><p>
6676 "What affects it?" the father asks.  "Those queer things that are called the
6677 eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect his brain."
6678 </p><p>
6679 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty that in
6680 order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple and easy
6681 surgical operation&#8212;namely, to remove these irritant bodies [the
6682 eyes]."
6683 </p><p>
6684
6685 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform Nunez
6686 of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.  (You'll have
6687 to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I believe in free
6688 culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)  It sometimes happens
6689 that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
6690 "chimera." A chimera is a single creature with two sets of DNA. The DNA in
6691 the blood, for example, might be different from the DNA of the skin. This
6692 possibility is an underused plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows
6693 with 100 percent certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at
6694 the scene. . . ."
6695 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2697668"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2697676"></a><p>
6696 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were impossible.  A
6697 single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of DNA is that it is
6698 the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two individuals have
6699 the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person can have two different
6700 sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of a "person" should reflect this
6701 reality.
6702 </p><p>
6703 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
6704 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not unfairly
6705 enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing with a
6706 chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is p2p file
6707 sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.  One side
6708 says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
6709 records&#8212;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
6710 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
6711 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just send
6712 the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant respects,
6713 just like what every executive in every recording company no doubt did as a
6714 kid: sharing music.
6715 </p><p>
6716 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is on a
6717 p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then sure, my
6718 friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of "friends" beyond
6719 recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can get access. Whether or
6720 not sharing my music with my best friend is what "we have always been
6721 allowed to do," we have not always been allowed to share music with "our ten
6722 thousand best friends."
6723 </p><p>
6724 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking into
6725 a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out with it,"
6726 that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally) releases a
6727 new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free copy to
6728 take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2697731"></a>
6729 </p><p>
6730
6731
6732
6733 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD from
6734 Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a CD from
6735 Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and something to show on
6736 my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note that when I take a
6737 CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that might be imposed on me, under
6738 California law, at least, is $1,000.  According to the RIAA, by contrast, if
6739 I download a ten-song CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
6740 </p><p>
6741 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that it
6742 is both&#8212;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It is
6743 a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side asserts, we
6744 need to begin to think about how we should respond to this chimera. What
6745 rules should govern it?
6746 </p><p>
6747 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We could,
6748 with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a felony. We
6749 could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages just because
6750 file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get universities to
6751 monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no computer is used to commit
6752 this crime. These responses might be extreme, but each of them has either
6753 been proposed or actually implemented.<sup>[<a name="id2697772" href="#ftn.id2697772" class="footnote">155</a>]</sup>
6754
6755 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2697849"></a><p>
6756 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act as
6757 though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be no
6758 copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making copyrighted
6759 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip: regulated, if
6760 at all, by social norms but not by law.
6761 </p><p>
6762 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.  Rather than
6763 embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace something that
6764 recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book with a sketch of a
6765 system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter is to show just how
6766 awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
6767 <span class="emphasis"><em>either</em></span> extreme would be worse than a reasonable
6768 alternative.  But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
6769 of the two extremes.
6770 </p><p>
6771
6772
6773
6774 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the middle of
6775 the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land grab is
6776 occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give content holders
6777 a kind of control over our culture that they have never had before. And in
6778 this extremism, many an opportunity for new innovation and new creativity
6779 will be lost.
6780 </p><p>
6781 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My focus
6782 instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war will also
6783 kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so broadly among our
6784 citizens, and we have just begun to see the innovation that this power will
6785 unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the passing of one cycle of
6786 innovation around technologies to distribute content. The law is responsible
6787 for this passing. As the vice president for global public policy at one of
6788 these new innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
6789 protection for copyrighted material,
6790 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
6791 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted material,
6792 and we want to protect those rights.
6793 </p><p>
6794 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the major
6795 labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright interests, nor is it
6796 necessarily the best. It is simply too early to answer that question. Market
6797 forces operating naturally may very well produce a totally different
6798 industry model.
6799 </p><p>
6800 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make with
6801 respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the market for
6802 digital media and the manner in which digital media are distributed. This in
6803 turn will directly influence the options that are available to consumers,
6804 both in terms of the ease with which they will be able to access digital
6805 media and the equipment that they will require to do so. Poor choices made
6806 this early in the game will retard the growth of this market, hurting
6807 everyone's interests.<sup>[<a name="id2697934" href="#ftn.id2697934" class="footnote">156</a>]</sup>
6808 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6809 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal, one of "the
6810 major labels." Its position on these matters has now changed.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2697957"></a>
6811 </p><p>
6812 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash piracy. It
6813 will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will kill
6814 opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
6815 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2697572" href="#id2697572" class="para">154</a>] </sup>
6816
6817
6818 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
6819 <em class="citetitle">The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</em>, Michael
6820 Sherborne, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
6821 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2697772" href="#id2697772" class="para">155</a>] </sup>
6822
6823 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
6824 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, "Copyright
6825 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available at
6826 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #33</a>. Reps. John
6827 Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill
6828 that would treat unauthorized on-line copying as a felony offense with
6829 punishments ranging as high as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
6830 "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy," <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles
6831 Times</em>, 17 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #34</a>. Civil penalties are
6832 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
6833 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
6834 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer, see
6835 <em class="citetitle">RIAA</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Verizon Internet Services (In
6836 re. Verizon Internet Services)</em>, 240 F.  Supp. 2d 24
6837 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
6838 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful arsenal
6839 in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from $12,000 to
6840 $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on university
6841 networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98 billion the RIAA
6842 could seek should the matter proceed to court. See Elizabeth Young,
6843 "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com, August 2003, available
6844 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #35</a>. For an
6845 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
6846 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer identities,
6847 see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students,"
6848 <em class="citetitle">Boston Globe</em>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #36</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2697839"></a>
6849 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2697934" href="#id2697934" class="para">156</a>] </sup>
6850
6851
6852 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
6853 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
6854 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, House
6855 Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter Harter,
6856 vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards, EMusic.com), available
6857 in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony File.  </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 13. Kapittel tolv: Skader"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="harms"></a>Kapittel 13. Kapittel tolv: Skader</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
6858
6859 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has launched
6860 a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
6861 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both direct
6862 and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these damages will be
6863 suffered most by our own people.
6864 </p><p>
6865 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
6866 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to extend
6867 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war justified?
6868 </p><p>
6869 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the first
6870 time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the power of
6871 the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in our
6872 history.
6873 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2698005"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2698011"></a><p>
6874 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on the
6875 side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims of control
6876 in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical rejection of "piracy"
6877 still has play.
6878 </p><p>
6879
6880
6881 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to describe
6882 just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite confident
6883 the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The first two
6884 protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in the wings to fight
6885 today's monopolists of culture.
6886 </p><div class="section" title="Constraining Creators"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="constrain"></a>Constraining Creators</h2></div></div></div><p>
6887 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital technologies.
6888 These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture and share
6889 content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what humans have done
6890 since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and communicate. But capturing and
6891 sharing through digital technology is different. The fidelity and power are
6892 different. You could send an e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on
6893 Comedy Central, or you could send the clip. You could write an essay about
6894 the inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
6895 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
6896 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could weave
6897 together a string&#8212;a mash-up&#8212; of songs from your favorite artists
6898 in a collage and make it available on the Net.
6899 </p><p>
6900 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
6901 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture, and in
6902 part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but it explodes
6903 the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology of digital
6904 "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily diverse
6905 creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that creativity is
6906 applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of citizens to use
6907 technology to express and criticize and contribute to the culture all
6908 around.
6909 </p><p>
6910
6911 Teknologien har dermed gitt oss en mulighet til å gjøre noe med kultur som
6912 bare har vært mulig for enkeltpersoner i små grupper, isolert fra andre
6913 grupper. Forestill deg en gammel mann som forteller en historie til en
6914 samling med naboer i en liten landsby.  Forestill deg så den samme
6915 historiefortellingen utvidet til å nå over hele verden.
6916 </p><p>
6917 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In the
6918 current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for a
6919 moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web sites that
6920 offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites that catalog
6921 cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound to criticize
6922 politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles on remote
6923 topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative work spread
6924 across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this work is
6925 presumptively illegal.
6926 </p><p>
6927 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the examples of
6928 extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to proliferate. It is
6929 impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed and what's not, and at the
6930 same time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly harsh.  The
6931 four students who were threatened by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3
6932 was just one) were threatened with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search
6933 engines that permitted songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&#8212;which
6934 defrauded investors of $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in
6935 market capitalization of over $200 billion&#8212;received a fine of a mere
6936 $750 million.<sup>[<a name="id2698126" href="#ftn.id2698126" class="footnote">157</a>]</sup> And under legislation
6937 being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who negligently removes the
6938 wrong leg in an operation would be liable for no more than $250,000 in
6939 damages for pain and suffering.<sup>[<a name="id2698162" href="#ftn.id2698162" class="footnote">158</a>]</sup> Can
6940 common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where the maximum fine for
6941 downloading two songs off the Internet is more than the fine for a doctor's
6942 negligently butchering a patient? <a class="indexterm" name="id2698199"></a>
6943 </p><p>
6944 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely high
6945 penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either never
6946 be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this creative
6947 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys "pirates." We
6948 make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public domain, because the
6949 boundaries of the public domain are designed to be unclear. It never pays to
6950 do anything except pay for the right to create, and hence only those who can
6951 pay are allowed to create. As was the case in the Soviet Union, though for
6952 very different reasons, we will begin to see a world of underground
6953 art&#8212;not because the message is necessarily political, or because the
6954 subject is controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is
6955 legally fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
6956 States.<sup>[<a name="id2697755" href="#ftn.id2697755" class="footnote">159</a>]</sup> In what does their "illegality"
6957 consist? In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that
6958 is critical or reflective.
6959 </p><p>
6960 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the changing
6961 law. I described that change in detail in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>. But an even bigger part has to do with
6962 the increasing ease with which infractions can be tracked. As users of
6963 file-sharing systems discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for
6964 copyright owners to get courts to order Internet service providers to reveal
6965 who has what content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a
6966 list of the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that
6967 anyone could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
6968 </p><p>
6969 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether his painting
6970 infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day painter, using the
6971 tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web, must worry all the
6972 time. Images are all around, but the only safe images to use in the act of
6973 creation are those purchased from Corbis or another image farm. And in
6974 purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free market in pencils; we needn't
6975 worry about its effect on creativity. But there is a highly regulated,
6976 monopolized market in cultural icons; the right to cultivate and transform
6977 them is not similarly free.
6978 </p><p>
6979 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I described
6980 in chapter <a class="xref" href="#recorders" title="Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne">8</a>, in
6981 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have been
6982 lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was fair use, and
6983 hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a use.
6984 </p><p>
6985
6986
6987
6988 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend
6989 your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system for
6990 defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&#8212;in practically
6991 every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers too
6992 slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the justice
6993 underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich.
6994 For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides itself
6995 on the rule of law.
6996 </p><p>
6997 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
6998 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law should
6999 allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system has become
7000 that anyone actually believes this. The rules that publishers impose upon
7001 writers, the rules that film distributors impose upon filmmakers, the rules
7002 that newspapers impose upon journalists&#8212; these are the real laws
7003 governing creativity. And these rules have little relationship to the "law"
7004 with which judges comfort themselves.
7005 </p><p>
7006 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful infringement of
7007 a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of dollars to even defend
7008 against a copyright infringement claim, and which would never return to the
7009 wrongfully accused defendant anything of the costs she suffered to defend
7010 her right to speak&#8212;in that world, the astonishingly broad regulations
7011 that pass under the name "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in
7012 that world, it takes a studied blindness for people to continue to believe
7013 they live in a culture that is free.
7014 </p><p>
7015 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
7016 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7017
7018 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people are
7019 being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
7020 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still won't
7021 get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not going to get
7022 it distributed in the mainstream media unless you've got a little note from
7023 a lawyer saying, "This has been cleared." You're not even going to get it on
7024 PBS without that kind of permission. That's the point at which they control
7025 it.
7026 </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="section" title="Constraining Innovators"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="innovators"></a>Constraining Innovators</h2></div></div></div><p>
7027 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty story&#8212;creativity
7028 quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada yada. Maybe that doesn't get you
7029 going. Maybe you think there's enough weird art out there, and enough
7030 expression that is critical of what seems to be just about everything.  And
7031 if you think that, you might think there's little in this story to worry
7032 you.
7033 </p><p>
7034 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.  Indeed,
7035 it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme promarket
7036 ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special one at that, 188
7037 pages into a book like this), then you can see this other aspect by
7038 substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of "free culture." The
7039 point is the same, even if the interests affecting culture are more
7040 fundamental.
7041 </p><p>
7042 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the same
7043 charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of course,
7044 concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&#8212;at a minimum, we
7045 need rules of property and contract, and courts to enforce both. Likewise,
7046 in this culture debate, everyone concedes that at least some framework of
7047 copyright is also required. But both perspectives vehemently insist that
7048 just because some regulation is good, it doesn't follow that more regulation
7049 is better. And both perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which
7050 regulation simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect
7051 themselves against the competitors of tomorrow.
7052 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2698394"></a><p>
7053
7054 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory strategy
7055 that I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>. The consequence of this massive threat of liability
7056 tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is that innovators who want to
7057 innovate in this space can safely innovate only if they have the sign-off
7058 from last generation's dominant industries.  That lesson has been taught
7059 through a series of cases that were designed and executed to teach venture
7060 capitalists a lesson. That lesson&#8212;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry
7061 calls a "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&#8212;has been
7062 learned.
7063 </p><p>
7064 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning I told in
7065 <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em> and which has progressed in a way
7066 that even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
7067 </p><p>
7068 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com.  MP3.com was
7069 keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to facilitate new
7070 ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to facilitate new ways to
7071 create content. Unlike the major labels, MP3.com offered creators a venue to
7072 distribute their creativity, without demanding an exclusive engagement from
7073 the creators.
7074 </p><p>
7075 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
7076 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
7077 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
7078 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie Raitt. And
7079 so on.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2698463"></a>
7080 </p><p>
7081 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
7082 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this preference
7083 data. In January 2000, the company launched a service called
7084 my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would sign into an
7085 account and then insert into her computer a CD. The software would identify
7086 the CD, and then give the user access to that content.  So, for example, if
7087 you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then wherever you were&#8212;at work or at
7088 home&#8212;you could get access to that music once you signed into your
7089 account. The system was therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
7090 </p><p>
7091
7092 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But that
7093 opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the my.mp3.com
7094 service was to give users access to their own content, and as a by-product,
7095 by seeing the content they already owned, to discover the kind of content
7096 the users liked.
7097 </p><p>
7098 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000 CDs to
7099 a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who uploaded the music,
7100 but that would have taken a great deal of time, and would have produced a
7101 product of questionable quality.) It therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a
7102 store, and started the process of making copies of those CDs. Again, it
7103 would not serve the content from those copies to anyone except those who
7104 authenticated that they had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while
7105 this was 50,000 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers
7106 something they had already bought.
7107 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxvivendiuniversal"></a><p>
7108 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels, headed
7109 by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled with four of
7110 the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found MP3.com to have been
7111 guilty of willful infringement with respect to the fifth. Applying the law
7112 as it is, the judge imposed a fine against MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com
7113 then settled with the remaining plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over
7114 $54 million. Vivendi purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
7115 </p><p>
7116 Den delen av historien har jeg fortalt før.  Nå kommer konklusjonen.
7117 </p><p>
7118 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
7119 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they had a
7120 good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be considered
7121 legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it should have been
7122 obvious that the courts would find this behavior illegal; therefore, this
7123 lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had dared to suggest that the law
7124 was less restrictive than the labels demanded.
7125 </p><p>
7126
7127 Den åpenbare hensikten med dette søksmålet (som ble avsluttet med et forlik
7128 for et uspesifisert beløp like etter at saken ikke lenger fikk
7129 pressedekning), var å sende en melding som ikke kan misforstås til advokater
7130 som gir råd til klienter på dette området: Det er ikke bare dine klienter
7131 som får lide hvis innholdsindustrien retter sine våpen mot dem.  Det får
7132 også du.  Så de av dere som tror loven burde være mindre restriktiv bør
7133 innse at et slikt syn på loven vil koste deg og ditt firma dyrt.
7134 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2698567"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2698575"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2698582"></a><p>
7135 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003, Universal
7136 and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the venture capital firm
7137 (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of its development, its
7138 cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner (Hank Barry).<sup>[<a name="id2698595" href="#ftn.id2698595" class="footnote">160</a>]</sup> The claim here, as well, was that the VC should
7139 have recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
7140 industry should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
7141 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim
7142 of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
7143 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at risk
7144 not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.  Your investment
7145 buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.  So extreme has the
7146 environment become that even car manufacturers are afraid of technologies
7147 that touch content. In an article in <em class="citetitle">Business 2.0</em>,
7148 Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
7149 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><a class="indexterm" name="id2698637"></a><p>
7150 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in the car,
7151 there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW engineers in Germany
7152 had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via the car's built-in sound system,
7153 but that the company's marketing and legal departments weren't comfortable
7154 with pushing this forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are
7155 sold in the United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <sup>[<a name="id2698653" href="#ftn.id2698653" class="footnote">161</a>]</sup>
7156 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7157 Dette er verden til mafiaen&#8212;fylt med "penger eller livet"-trusler, som
7158 ikke er regulert av domstolene men av trusler som loven gir
7159 rettighetsinnehaver mulighet til å komme med. Det er et system som åpenbart
7160 og nødvendigvis vil kvele ny innovasjon. Det er vanskelig nok å starte et
7161 selskap. Det blir helt umulig hvis selskapet er stadig truet av søksmål.
7162 </p><p>
7163
7164
7165
7166 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
7167 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
7168 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
7169 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and by
7170 embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law imposes, that
7171 uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more conservative than is
7172 right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking tickets, we'd not
7173 only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much less driving. The same
7174 principle applies to innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this
7175 uncertain and unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation
7176 and much less creativity.
7177 </p><p>
7178 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
7179 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
7180 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
7181 systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
7182 industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
7183 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant competition.
7184 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of competition.
7185 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect of too
7186 much control in the market is to produce an overregulatedregulated market.
7187 </p><p>
7188
7189 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is the
7190 first important way in which the changes I have described will burden
7191 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&#8212;a culture in
7192 which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again, I am not
7193 antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I am certainly
7194 not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its limits. And
7195 leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the high costs that
7196 our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an
7197 embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our profession should
7198 therefore do everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at
7199 least do everything it can to limit the reach of the law where the law is
7200 not doing any good. The transaction costs buried within a permission culture
7201 are enough to bury a wide range of creativity.  Someone needs to do a lot of
7202 justifying to justify that result.  The uncertainty of the law is one burden
7203 on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more directly. This is
7204 the effort by many in the content industry to use the law to directly
7205 regulate the technology of the Internet so that it better protects their
7206 content.
7207 </p><p>
7208 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
7209 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the Internet's
7210 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this feature is a
7211 "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content distributors have
7212 a harder time controlling the distribution of content.  One obvious response
7213 to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet less efficient. If the
7214 Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says, we should break the
7215 kneecaps of the Internet.
7216 </p><p>
7217 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of the
7218 content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that would
7219 require computers to determine whether the content they access is protected
7220 or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<sup>[<a name="id2698787" href="#ftn.id2698787" class="footnote">162</a>]</sup> Congress has already launched proceedings to
7221 explore a mandatory "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device
7222 capable of transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would
7223 disable the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast
7224 flag. Other members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers
7225 from liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
7226 copyright violators and disable their machines.<sup>[<a name="id2698810" href="#ftn.id2698810" class="footnote">163</a>]</sup>
7227
7228 </p><p>
7229
7230 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the code, why
7231 not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any regulation of technical
7232 infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular technology of the
7233 day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on the technology, but
7234 will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly those requirements.
7235 </p><p>
7236 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by Intel,
7237 tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
7238 impose.<sup>[<a name="id2698833" href="#ftn.id2698833" class="footnote">164</a>]</sup> Their argument was obviously
7239 not that copyright should not be protected. Instead, they argued, any
7240 protection should not do more harm than good.
7241 </p><p>
7242 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
7243 innovation&#8212;again, a story that will be quite familiar to the free
7244 market crowd.
7245 </p><p>
7246 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form of
7247 regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.  When
7248 done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done wrong, it is
7249 regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
7250 </p><p>
7251 As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, despite this feature of copyright as regulation, and
7252 subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica Litman in her book
7253 <em class="citetitle">Digital Copyright</em>,<sup>[<a name="id2698873" href="#ftn.id2698873" class="footnote">165</a>]</sup> overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter 10
7254 details, when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a
7255 balance to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
7256 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as in the
7257 case of the VCR) has been another.
7258 </p><p>
7259 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed with the
7260 rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between the claims of a
7261 new technology and the legitimate rights of content creators, both the
7262 courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions that will have the
7263 effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
7264 </p><p>
7265 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<sup>[<a name="id2698908" href="#ftn.id2698908" class="footnote">166</a>]</sup> It has been mirrored in the responses threatened
7266 and actually implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
7267 here.<sup>[<a name="id2698943" href="#ftn.id2698943" class="footnote">167</a>]</sup> But there is one example that
7268 captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the demise of Internet
7269 radio.
7270 </p><p>
7271
7272
7273
7274 As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#pirates" title='Kapittel 5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"'>5</a>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording artist
7275 doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she is also the
7276 composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a version of "Happy
7277 Birthday"&#8212;to memorialize her famous performance before President
7278 Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&#8212; then whenever that recording was
7279 played on the radio, the current copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would
7280 get some money, whereas Marilyn Monroe would not.
7281 </p><p>
7282 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some sense. The
7283 justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The recording artist
7284 thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio station was making it
7285 more likely that her records would be purchased.  Thus, the recording artist
7286 got something, even if only indirectly.  Probably this reasoning had less to
7287 do with the result than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists
7288 were quite good at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require
7289 compensation to the recording artists.
7290 </p><p>
7291 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a technology to
7292 stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast travels
7293 across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.  Thus, I can
7294 "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting in San
7295 Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a regular radio
7296 station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
7297 </p><p>
7298 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there are
7299 potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could tune in
7300 to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture for broadcast
7301 radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of broadcasters and clear
7302 broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore be more competitive
7303 than regular radio; it could provide a wider range of selections. And
7304 because the potential audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche
7305 stations could easily develop and market their content to a relatively large
7306 number of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
7307 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
7308 </p><p>
7309
7310
7311
7312 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an improvement
7313 potentially vastly more significant than the FM improvement over AM, since
7314 not only is the technology better, so, too, is the competition. Indeed,
7315 there is a direct parallel between the fight to establish FM radio and the
7316 fight to protect Internet radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's
7317 struggle to enable FM radio,
7318 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7319 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the shortwaves,
7320 thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in the crowded
7321 longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of stations would be
7322 limited only by economics and competition rather than by technical
7323 restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation that had grown up in
7324 radio to that following the invention of the printing press, when
7325 governments and ruling interests attempted to control this new instrument of
7326 mass communications by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was
7327 broken only when it became possible for men freely to acquire printing
7328 presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention
7329 as the printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
7330 shackles.<sup>[<a name="id2699069" href="#ftn.id2699069" class="footnote">168</a>]</sup>
7331 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7332 This potential for FM radio was never realized&#8212;not because Armstrong
7333 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated the power of
7334 "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<sup>[<a name="id2698849" href="#ftn.id2698849" class="footnote">169</a>]</sup> to retard the growth of this competing technology.
7335 </p><p>
7336 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For again, there
7337 is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of Internet radio
7338 stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are those imposed by the
7339 law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first question we should ask is,
7340 what copyright rules would govern Internet radio?
7341 </p><p>
7342
7343 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a new
7344 industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very powerful
7345 lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon of Internet
7346 radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt a different rule
7347 for Internet radio than the rule that applies to terrestrial radio. While
7348 terrestrial radio does not have to pay our hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when
7349 it plays her hypothetical recording of "Happy Birthday" on the air,
7350 <span class="emphasis"><em>Internet radio does</em></span>. Not only is the law not neutral
7351 toward Internet radio&#8212;the law actually burdens Internet radio more
7352 than it burdens terrestrial radio.
7353 </p><p>
7354 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor William Fisher
7355 estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree popular music to
7356 (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four hours a day, the total
7357 artist fees that radio station would owe would be over $1 million a
7358 year.<sup>[<a name="id2699129" href="#ftn.id2699129" class="footnote">170</a>]</sup> A regular radio station
7359 broadcasting the same content would pay no equivalent fee.
7360 </p><p>
7361 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
7362 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
7363 would have to collect the following data from <span class="emphasis"><em>every listening
7364 transaction</em></span>:
7365 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
7366 name of the service;
7367 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7368 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
7369 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7370 type of program (archived/looped/live);
7371 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7372 date of transmission;
7373 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7374 time of transmission;
7375 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7376 time zone of origination of transmission;
7377 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7378 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
7379 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7380 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
7381 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7382 sound recording title;
7383 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7384 ISRC code of the recording;
7385 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7386 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of
7387 compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of
7388 the track;
7389 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7390 featured recording artist;
7391 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7392 retail album title;
7393 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7394 recording label;
7395 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7396 UPC code of the retail album;
7397 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7398 catalog number;
7399 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7400 copyright owner information;
7401 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7402 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
7403 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7404 name of the service or entity;
7405 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7406 channel or program;
7407 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7408 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
7409 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7410 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
7411 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7412 time zone where the signal was received (user);
7413 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7414 Unique User identifier;
7415 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7416 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
7417 </p></li></ol></div><p>
7418 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting requirements,
7419 pending further study. And he also changed the original rates set by the
7420 arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the basic difference
7421 between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains: Internet radio has to
7422 pay a <span class="emphasis"><em>type of copyright fee</em></span> that terrestrial radio does
7423 not.
7424 </p><p>
7425 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the economic
7426 consequences from Internet radio that would justify these differences? Was
7427 the motive to protect artists against piracy?
7428 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2699340"></a><p>
7429 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious to
7430 everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public Policy at
7431 Real Networks, told me,
7432 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7433
7434 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented some testimony
7435 about what they thought a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, and
7436 it was much higher. It was ten times higher than what radio stations pay to
7437 perform the same songs for the same period of time. And so the attorneys
7438 representing the webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
7439 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because here we
7440 have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and that should
7441 establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so high, you're going to
7442 drive the small webcasters out of business. . . ."
7443 </p><p>
7444 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an industry
7445 with thousands of webcasters, <span class="emphasis"><em>we think it should be an industry
7446 with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a high rate and it's a
7447 stable, predictable market</em></span>." (Emphasis added.)
7448 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7449 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so that
7450 this platform of potentially immense competition, which would cause the
7451 diversity and range of content available to explode, would not cause pain to
7452 the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right or the left, who
7453 should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is practically no one, on
7454 either the right or the left, who is doing anything effective to prevent it.
7455 </p></div><div class="section" title="Corrupting Citizens"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="corruptingcitizens"></a>Corrupting Citizens</h2></div></div></div><p>
7456 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
7457 dinosaurs a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
7458 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
7459 </p><p>
7460 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was important
7461 to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation corrupts
7462 citizens and weakens the rule of law.
7463 </p><p>
7464
7465 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with every war
7466 of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very large number
7467 of citizens. According to <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em>, 43
7468 million Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<sup>[<a name="id2699427" href="#ftn.id2699427" class="footnote">171</a>]</sup> According to the RIAA, the behavior of those 43 million Americans
7469 is a felony. We thus have a set of rules that transform 20 percent of
7470 America into criminals. As the RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the
7471 Napsters and Kazaas of the world, but against students building search
7472 engines, and increasingly against ordinary users downloading content, the
7473 technologies for sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal
7474 use. It is an arms race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side
7475 inviting a more extreme response by the other.
7476 </p><p>
7477 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American legal
7478 system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it knew that in
7479 Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The threat of having to
7480 pay either all the money in the world in damages ($15,000,000) or almost all
7481 the money in the world to defend against paying all the money in the world
7482 in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)  led Jordan to choose to pay all the
7483 money he had in the world ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same
7484 strategy animates the RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
7485 2003, the RIAA sued 261 individuals&#8212;including a twelve-year-old girl
7486 living in public housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what
7487 file sharing was.<sup>[<a name="id2699119" href="#ftn.id2699119" class="footnote">172</a>]</sup> As these scapegoats
7488 discovered, it will always cost more to defend against these suits than it
7489 would cost to simply settle. (The twelve year old, for example, like Jesse
7490 Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000 to settle the case.) Our law is an
7491 awful system for defending rights. It is an embarrassment to our
7492 tradition. And the consequence of our law as it is, is that those with the
7493 power can use the law to quash any rights they oppose.
7494 </p><p>
7495 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just something
7496 more extreme than anything we've seen before. We experimented with alcohol
7497 prohibition, at a time when the per capita consumption of alcohol was 1.5
7498 gallons per capita per year. The war against drinking initially reduced that
7499 consumption to just 30 percent of its preprohibition levels, but by the end
7500 of prohibition, consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
7501 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast number
7502 were criminals.<sup>[<a name="id2699502" href="#ftn.id2699502" class="footnote">173</a>]</sup> We have launched a war
7503 on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated narcotics that 7
7504 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<sup>[<a name="id2699515" href="#ftn.id2699515" class="footnote">174</a>]</sup> That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
7505 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast majority
7506 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex tax system
7507 that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.<sup>[<a name="id2699532" href="#ftn.id2699532" class="footnote">175</a>]</sup> We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an
7508 endless array of ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a
7509 result, a huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
7510 <a class="indexterm" name="id2699548"></a>
7511 </p><p>
7512 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
7513 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
7514 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told a
7515 class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students who
7516 have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and sometimes
7517 drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven cars. These
7518 are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the norm. And then we,
7519 as law professors, are supposed to teach them how to behave
7520 ethically&#8212;how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds separate, or
7521 honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that your case is
7522 over. Generations of Americans&#8212;more significantly in some parts of
7523 America than in others, but still, everywhere in America today&#8212;can't
7524 live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a
7525 certain degree of illegality.
7526 </p><p>
7527 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law more
7528 severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how to make
7529 that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense depends, in part, at
7530 least, upon whether the costs of the law, both intended and collateral,
7531 outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and collateral, do outweigh
7532 the benefits, then the law ought to be changed.  Alternatively, if the costs
7533 of the existing system are much greater than the costs of an alternative,
7534 then we have a good reason to consider the alternative.
7535 </p><p>
7536
7537
7538
7539 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
7540 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
7541 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But that
7542 wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the week. A
7543 society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
7544 </p><p>
7545 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations, but
7546 that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends upon people
7547 obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we as citizens
7548 experience violating the law, the less we respect the law. Obviously, in
7549 most cases, the important issue is the law, not respect for the law. I don't
7550 care whether the rapist respects the law or not; I want to catch and
7551 incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether my students respect the
7552 law. And I do care if the rules of law sow increasing disrespect because of
7553 the extreme of regulation they impose.  Twenty million Americans have come
7554 of age since the Internet introduced this different idea of "sharing." We
7555 need to be able to call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not
7556 "felons."
7557 </p><p>
7558 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
7559 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
7560 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be asking is
7561 not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be whether this
7562 particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve the proper
7563 ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to assure that artists
7564 get paid without transforming forty-three million Americans into felons?
7565 Does it make sense if there are other ways to assure that artists get paid
7566 without transforming America into a nation of felons?
7567 </p><p>
7568 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
7569 </p><p>
7570
7571 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces of
7572 plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought.  The law
7573 protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a copyright
7574 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used record store
7575 and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the recordings is free.
7576 </p><p>
7577 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of phonograph
7578 records that is effectively free. Because these recordings were made without
7579 copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy, or "rip," music from my
7580 records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed, Apple Corporation went so far as
7581 to suggest that "freedom" was a right: In a series of commercials, Apple
7582 endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn" capacities of digital technologies.
7583 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2699658"></a><p>
7584 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large process
7585 at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing them in one
7586 archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful program called
7587 Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music: Bach, Baroque,
7588 Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others&#8212;the potential is
7589 endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists, these technologies
7590 help build a creativity with play lists that is itself independently
7591 valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and meaningful in their own
7592 right.
7593 </p><p>
7594 This use is enabled by unprotected media&#8212;either CDs or records.  But
7595 unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens (or so
7596 the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair return
7597 from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to experiment with
7598 technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These technologies, for
7599 example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or they might enable spy
7600 programs to identify ripped content on people's machines.
7601 </p><p>
7602
7603 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of your
7604 own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker circles,
7605 and get technology to disable the technologies that protect the
7606 content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that doesn't
7607 bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people, these
7608 protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving use of
7609 CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to the world
7610 where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of plastic or were
7611 part of a massively complex "digital rights management" system.
7612 </p><p>
7613 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination of the
7614 ability to freely move content, then these technologies to interfere with
7615 the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what if there were
7616 another way to assure that artists are paid, without locking down any
7617 content? What if, in other words, a different system could assure
7618 compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom to move content
7619 easily?
7620 </p><p>
7621 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer a
7622 version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now, the only
7623 point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system achieved
7624 the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright system achieved,
7625 but left consumers and creators much more free, then we'd have a very good
7626 reason to pursue this alternative&#8212;namely, freedom.  The choice, in
7627 other words, would not be between property and piracy; the choice would be
7628 between different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
7629 </p><p>
7630 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without turning
7631 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature of this
7632 alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for producing
7633 and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today control the vast
7634 majority of the distribution of content in the world, would no longer
7635 exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go the way of the
7636 horse-drawn buggy.
7637 </p><p>
7638 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
7639 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this new form
7640 of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree million Americans
7641 as criminals and their own survival.
7642 </p><p>
7643 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not understandable
7644 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack Valenti is charming;
7645 but not so charming as to justify giving up a tradition as deep and
7646 important as our tradition of free culture.  There's one more aspect to this
7647 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and follows
7648 directly from any war of prohibition.  As Electronic Frontier Foundation
7649 attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that
7650 "arises whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
7651 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
7652 <a class="indexterm" name="id2699770"></a>
7653 </p><p>
7654 "Hvis du kan behandle noen som en antatt lovbryter," forklarer von Lohmann,
7655 <a class="indexterm" name="id2699784"></a>
7656 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7657 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections evaporate to
7658 one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright infringer, how can you
7659 hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright infringer, how can
7660 you hope to be secure against seizures of your computer? How can you hope to
7661 continue to receive Internet access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon
7662 as we think, "Oh, well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well,
7663 what this campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
7664 percentage of the American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
7665 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7666 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public into
7667 criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
7668 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
7669 </p><p>
7670 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
7671 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over the
7672 names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
7673 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a judge,
7674 and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of an Internet
7675 user is revealed.
7676 </p><p>
7677
7678 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy to
7679 sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have downloaded
7680 copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've seen, the
7681 potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a family's computer
7682 is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the family could be liable
7683 for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop the RIAA from suing a number of
7684 these families, just as they had sued Jesse Jordan.<sup>[<a name="id2699834" href="#ftn.id2699834" class="footnote">176</a>]</sup>
7685
7686 </p><p>
7687 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the RIAA. A
7688 report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the RIAA had adopted
7689 to track Napster users.<sup>[<a name="id2699875" href="#ftn.id2699875" class="footnote">177</a>]</sup> Using a
7690 sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a
7691 fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those
7692 MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
7693 </p><p>
7694 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a friend gives a
7695 CD to your daughter&#8212;a collection of songs just like the cassettes you
7696 used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does your daughter, where
7697 these songs came from. But she copies these songs onto her computer. She
7698 then takes her computer to college and connects it to a college network, and
7699 if the college network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she
7700 hasn't properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to
7701 do that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as
7702 a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning to
7703 deploy,<sup>[<a name="id2699726" href="#ftn.id2699726" class="footnote">178</a>]</sup> your daughter can lose the
7704 right to use the university's computer network.  She can, in some cases, be
7705 expelled.
7706 </p><p>
7707 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire a
7708 lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead that
7709 she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that they came
7710 from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes her. But the
7711 university might not believe her. It might treat this "contraband" as
7712 presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students have already
7713 learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in the middle of wars of
7714 prohibition. This war is no different.  Says von Lohmann, <a class="indexterm" name="id2699970"></a>
7715 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7716 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million Americans
7717 that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a situation where the
7718 civil liberties of those people are very much in peril in a general
7719 matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where you could randomly
7720 choose any person off the street and be confident that they were committing
7721 an unlawful act that could put them on the hook for potential felony
7722 liability or hundreds of millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly
7723 we all speed, but speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely
7724 forfeit civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
7725 closest analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has eroded
7726 all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many Americans as
7727 criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of
7728 magnitude larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
7729 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a slippery
7730 slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty million of
7731 them.
7732 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7733 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under the
7734 law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&#8212; securing
7735 rights to authors&#8212;without these millions being considered "criminals,"
7736 who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is American, a constant war
7737 on our own people or a concerted effort through our democracy to change our
7738 law?
7739 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698126" href="#id2698126" class="para">157</a>] </sup>
7740
7741 See Lynne W. Jeter, <em class="citetitle">Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at
7742 WorldCom</em> (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204;
7743 for details of the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins
7744 U.S. District Court Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
7745 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #37</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2698149"></a>
7746 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698162" href="#id2698162" class="para">158</a>] </sup>
7747  The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
7748 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For an
7749 overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,' Say
7750 Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #38</a>, and "Senate Turns Back
7751 Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #39</a>. President Bush has
7752 continued to urge tort reform in recent months.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2698186"></a>
7753 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2697755" href="#id2697755" class="para">159</a>] </sup>
7754
7755
7756
7757 Se Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," <em class="citetitle">Wired</em>,
7758 7. juli 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #40</a>. For en oversikt over
7759 utstillingen, se <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7760 #41</a>.
7761 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698595" href="#id2698595" class="para">160</a>] </sup>
7762
7763
7764 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," <em class="citetitle">Los
7765 Angeles Times</em>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the
7766 effects on innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The
7767 Music Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
7768 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #42</a>.  See also
7769 Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles
7770 Times</em>, 28 May 2001.
7771 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698653" href="#id2698653" class="para">161</a>] </sup>
7772
7773 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," <em class="citetitle">Business
7774 2.0</em>, 16. juni 2003, tilgjengelig via <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #43</a>. Jeg er Dr. Mohammad
7775 Al-Ubaydli takknemlig mot for dette eksemplet.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2698670"></a>
7776 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698787" href="#id2698787" class="para">162</a>] </sup>
7777
7778 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and the
7779 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School (2003),
7780 33&#8211;35, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7781 #44</a>.
7782 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698810" href="#id2698810" class="para">163</a>] </sup>
7783
7784 GartnerG2, 26&#8211;27.
7785 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698833" href="#id2698833" class="para">164</a>] </sup>
7786
7787 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes, February
7788 2002 (Entertainment).
7789 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698873" href="#id2698873" class="para">165</a>] </sup>
7790
7791 Jessica Litman, <em class="citetitle">Digital Copyright</em> (Amherst, N.Y.:
7792 Prometheus Books, 2001).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2698880"></a>
7793 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698908" href="#id2698908" class="para">166</a>] </sup>
7794
7795
7796 The only circuit court exception is found in <em class="citetitle">Recording Industry
7797 Association of America (RIAA)</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Diamond Multimedia
7798 Systems</em>, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of
7799 appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player
7800 were not liable for contributory copyright infringement for a device that is
7801 unable to record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function
7802 is to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard drive).
7803 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
7804 <em class="citetitle">Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
7805 Inc</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Grokster, Ltd</em>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
7806 1029 (C.D.  Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
7807 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
7808 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
7809 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698943" href="#id2698943" class="para">167</a>] </sup>
7810
7811 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
7812 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
7813 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
7814 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In August
7815 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
7816 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
7817 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
7818 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
7819 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act,
7820 which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
7821 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
7822 World," 27 June 2003, 33&#8211;34, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #44</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2698951"></a>
7823 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699069" href="#id2699069" class="para">168</a>] </sup>
7824
7825
7826 Lessing, 239.
7827 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2698849" href="#id2698849" class="para">169</a>] </sup>
7828
7829
7830 Ibid., 229.
7831 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699129" href="#id2699129" class="para">170</a>] </sup>
7832
7833 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright Arbitration
7834 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example offered by
7835 Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw (Stanford), 3 July
7836 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain submitted
7837 testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.  See Jonathan
7838 Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
7839 Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #45</a>.  For an excellent
7840 analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry
7841 Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," <em class="citetitle">Antitrust
7842 Bulletin</em> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these
7843 are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected
7844 from digital entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is
7845 done in the name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the
7846 play of powerful interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral
7847 way." <a class="indexterm" name="id2699158"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2699167"></a>
7848 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699427" href="#id2699427" class="para">171</a>] </sup>
7849
7850 Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew Internet
7851 and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #46</a>.  The Pew Internet and
7852 American Life Project reported that 37 million Americans had downloaded
7853 music files from the Internet by early 2001.
7854 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699119" href="#id2699119" class="para">172</a>] </sup>
7855
7856
7857 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,"
7858 <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles Times</em>, 10 September 2003, Business.
7859 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699502" href="#id2699502" class="para">173</a>] </sup>
7860
7861
7862 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
7863 Prohibition," <em class="citetitle">American Economic Review</em> 81, no. 2
7864 (1991): 242.
7865 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699515" href="#id2699515" class="para">174</a>] </sup>
7866
7867
7868 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government Reform
7869 Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of John
7870 P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
7871 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699532" href="#id2699532" class="para">175</a>] </sup>
7872
7873
7874 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax Compliance,"
7875 <em class="citetitle">Journal of Economic Literature</em> 36 (1998): 818 (survey
7876 of compliance literature).
7877 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699834" href="#id2699834" class="para">176</a>] </sup>
7878
7879
7880 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single Mother in
7881 Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants," <em class="citetitle">Washington
7882 Post</em>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull
7883 Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File
7884 Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being Sued,"
7885 <em class="citetitle">Orlando Sentinel Tribune</em>, 30 August 2003, C1;
7886 Jefferson Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," <em class="citetitle">USA
7887 Today</em>, 15 September 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No
7888 Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>,
7889 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a Criminal?"
7890 <em class="citetitle">Toronto Star</em>, 18 September 2003, P7.
7891 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699875" href="#id2699875" class="para">177</a>] </sup>
7892
7893
7894 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses Some
7895 Methods Used," CNN.com, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #47</a>.
7896 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2699726" href="#id2699726" class="para">178</a>] </sup>
7897
7898
7899 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
7900 <em class="citetitle">Boston Globe</em>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank
7901 Ahrens, "Four Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File
7902 Sharing at Colleges," <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, 4 April 2003,
7903 E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,"
7904 <em class="citetitle">Christian Science Monitor</em>, 2 September 2003, 20;
7905 Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two
7906 Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible," <em class="citetitle">Chicago
7907 Tribune</em>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy
7908 Guns on Universities," <em class="citetitle">Internet News</em>, 30 January
7909 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7910 #48</a>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman Orientation
7911 This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing,"
7912 <em class="citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle</em>, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid,
7913 Letters Are Weapons at Universities," <em class="citetitle">USA Today</em>, 26
7914 September 2000, 3D.
7915 </p></div></div></div></div><div class="part" title="Del IV. Maktfordeling"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="c-balances"></a>Del IV. Maktfordeling</h1></div></div></div><div class="partintro" title="Maktfordeling"><div></div><p>
7916 Så her er bildet: Du står på siden av veien. Bilen din er på brann. Du er
7917 sint og opprørt fordi du delvis bidro til å starte brannen. Nå vet du ikke
7918 hvordan du slokker den.  Ved siden av deg er en bøtte, fylt med
7919 bensin. Bensin vil åpenbart ikke slukke brannen.
7920 </p><p>
7921 Mens du tenker over situasjonen, kommer noen andre forbi.  I panikk griper
7922 hun bøtta, og før du har hatt sjansen til å be henne stoppe&#8212;eller før
7923 hun forstår hvorfor hun bør stoppe&#8212;er bøtten i svevet.  Bensinen er på
7924 tur mot den brennende bilen.  Og brannen som bensinen kommer til å fyre opp
7925 vil straks sette fyr på alt i omgivelsene.
7926 </p><p>
7927 En krig om opphavsrett pågår over alt&#8212; og vi fokuserer alle på feil
7928 ting.  Det er ingen tvil om at dagens teknologier truer eksisterende
7929 virksomheter.  Uten tvil kan de true artister.  Men teknologier endrer seg.
7930 Industrien og teknologer har en rekke måter å bruke teknologi til å beskytte
7931 dem selv mot dagens trusler på Internet.  Dette er en brann som overlatt til
7932 seg selv vil brenne ut.
7933 </p><p>
7934
7935
7936 Likevel er ikke besluttningstagere villig til å la denne brannen i fred.
7937 Ladet med masse penger fra lobbyister er de lystne på å gå i mellom for å
7938 fjerne problemet slik de oppfatter det.  Men problemet slik de oppfatter det
7939 er ikke den reelle trusselen som denne kulturen står med ansiktet mot.  For
7940 mens vi ser på denne lille brannen i hjørnet er det en massiv endring i
7941 hvordan kultur blir skapt som pågår over alt.
7942 </p><p>
7943 På en eller annen måte må vi klare å snu oppmerksomheten mot dette mer
7944 viktige og fundametale problemet.  Vi må finne en måte å unngå å helle
7945 bensin på denne brannen.
7946 </p><p>
7947 Vi har ikke funne denne måten ennå.  Istedet synes vi å være fanget i en
7948 enklere og sort-hvit tenkning.  Uansett hvor mange folk som presser på for å
7949 gjøre rammen for debatten litt bredere, er det dette enkle sort-hvit-synet
7950 som består.  Vi kjører sakte forbi og stirrer på brannen når vi i stedet
7951 burde holde øynene på veien.
7952 </p><p>
7953 Denne utfordringen har vært livet mitt de siste årene.  Det har også vært
7954 min falitt.  I de to neste kapittlene, beskriver jeg en liten innsats, så
7955 langt uten suksess, på å finne en måte å endre fokus på denne debatten.  Vi
7956 må forstå disse mislyktede forsøkene hvis vi skal forstå hva som kreves for
7957 å lykkes.
7958 </p><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#eldred">14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#eldred-ii">15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></span></dt></dl></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="eldred"></a>Kapittel 14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred</h2></div></div></div><p>
7959 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
7960 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least one
7961 did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in
7962 New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
7963 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would make this
7964 nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
7965 </p><p>
7966 It didn't work&#8212;at least for his daughters. They didn't find Hawthorne
7967 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave birth to a
7968 hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a library of public
7969 domain works by scanning these works and making them available for free.
7970 </p><p>
7971
7972 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain works,
7973 though even a copy would have been of great value to people across the world
7974 who can't get access to printed versions of these works. Instead, Eldred was
7975 producing derivative works from these public domain works. Just as Disney
7976 turned Grimm into stories more accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred
7977 transformed Hawthorne, and many others, into a form more
7978 accessible&#8212;technically accessible&#8212;today.
7979 </p><p>
7980 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same source
7981 as Disney's. Hawthorne's <em class="citetitle">Scarlet Letter</em> had passed
7982 into the public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
7983 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover Press
7984 and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and produce printed
7985 editions, which they sell in bookstores across the country. Others, such as
7986 Disney, take these stories and turn them into animated cartoons, sometimes
7987 successfully (<em class="citetitle">Cinderella</em>), sometimes not
7988 (<em class="citetitle">The Hunchback of Notre Dame</em>, <em class="citetitle">Treasure
7989 Planet</em>). These are all commercial publications of public domain
7990 works.
7991 </p><p>
7992 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of public
7993 domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally thousands of
7994 others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have discovered this
7995 platform of expression and now use it to share works that are, by law, free
7996 for the taking. This has produced what we might call the "noncommercial
7997 publishing industry," which before the Internet was limited to people with
7998 large egos or with political or social causes. But with the Internet, it
7999 includes a wide range of individuals and groups dedicated to spreading
8000 culture generally.<sup>[<a name="id2700231" href="#ftn.id2700231" class="footnote">179</a>]</sup>
8001 </p><p>
8002 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's collection
8003 of poems <em class="citetitle">New Hampshire</em> was slated to pass into the
8004 public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
8005 library.  But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, in 1998, for the
8006 eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the terms of existing
8007 copyrights&#8212;this time by twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add
8008 any works more recent than 1923 to his collection until 2019.  Indeed, no
8009 copyrighted work would pass into the public domain until that year (and not
8010 even then, if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same
8011 period, more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
8012 </p><p>
8013
8014
8015 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), enacted in
8016 memory of the congressman and former musician Sonny Bono, who, his widow,
8017 Mary Bono, says, believed that "copyrights should be forever."<sup>[<a name="id2700285" href="#ftn.id2700285" class="footnote">180</a>]</sup>
8018
8019 </p><p>
8020 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
8021 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
8022 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a second law
8023 passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act of publishing
8024 would make Eldred a felon&#8212;whether or not anyone complained. This was a
8025 dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer to undertake.
8026 </p><p>
8027 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
8028 constitutional scholar whose first passion was constitutional
8029 interpretation.  And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
8030 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as importantly
8031 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
8032 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8033 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .  by securing
8034 for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to their
8035 . . . Writings. . . .
8036 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8037 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting clause of
8038 Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause granting power
8039 to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do something&#8212;for
8040 example, to regulate "commerce among the several states" or "declare War."
8041 But here, the "something" is something quite specific&#8212;to "promote
8042 . . . Progress"&#8212;through means that are also specific&#8212; by
8043 "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
8044 </p><p>
8045 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of extending
8046 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me about this was, if
8047 Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then the Constitution's
8048 requirement that terms be "limited" will have no practical effect. If every
8049 time a copyright is about to expire, Congress has the power to extend its
8050 term, then Congress can achieve what the Constitution plainly
8051 forbids&#8212;perpetual terms "on the installment plan," as Professor Peter
8052 Jaszi so nicely put it.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2700310"></a>
8053 </p><p>
8054 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember sitting
8055 late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious consideration
8056 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's practice of extending
8057 existing terms. That failure may in part be why Congress seemed so
8058 untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the practice had become so
8059 lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that copyright owners will be willing
8060 to pay a great deal of money to see their copyright terms extended. And so
8061 Congress is quite happy to keep this gravy train going.
8062 </p><p>
8063 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
8064 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
8065 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the beneficiaries
8066 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce it to
8067 act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can do. Why
8068 not limit its actions to those things it must do&#8212;and those things that
8069 pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
8070 </p><p>
8071 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one of the
8072 very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to make money one
8073 hundred years after it was created. The Estate of Robert Frost is a good
8074 example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry continues to be extraordinarily
8075 valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate benefits greatly from any extension
8076 of copyright, since no publisher would pay the estate any money if the poems
8077 Frost wrote could be published by anyone for free.
8078 </p><p>
8079 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from three of
8080 Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems is about to
8081 expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.  Your financial
8082 adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim report:
8083 </p><p>
8084
8085 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B, and C
8086 will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be receiving
8087 the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of those works.
8088 </p><p>
8089 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that could change
8090 this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the terms of copyright
8091 by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily valuable to us. So we
8092 should hope this bill passes."
8093 </p><p>
8094 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something about it?"
8095 </p><p>
8096 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute to the
8097 campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that they support
8098 the bill."
8099 </p><p>
8100 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want to know
8101 whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much would we get if this
8102 extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How much is it worth?"
8103 </p><p>
8104 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue to get
8105 at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the `discount
8106 rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent), then this law
8107 would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
8108 </p><p>
8109 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the correct
8110 conclusion:
8111 </p><p>
8112 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than $1,000,000 in
8113 campaign contributions if we were confident those contributions would assure
8114 that the bill was passed?"
8115 </p><p>
8116 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to contribute up
8117 to the `present value' of the income you expect from these copyrights. Which
8118 for us means over $1,000,000."
8119 </p><p>
8120
8121 You quickly get the point&#8212;you as the member of the board and, I trust,
8122 you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every beneficiary
8123 in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same choice: If they
8124 can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights, they will benefit
8125 greatly from that extension. And so each time copyrights are about to
8126 expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get the copyright term
8127 extended.
8128 </p><p>
8129 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation can be
8130 bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in the world to
8131 buy further extensions of copyright.
8132 </p><p>
8133 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
8134 Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved real. Ten of the
8135 thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House received the maximum
8136 contribution from Disney's political action committee; in the Senate, eight
8137 of the twelve sponsors received contributions.<sup>[<a name="id2700496" href="#ftn.id2700496" class="footnote">181</a>]</sup> The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over $1.5 million
8138 lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more than $200,000 in
8139 campaign contributions.<sup>[<a name="id2700511" href="#ftn.id2700511" class="footnote">182</a>]</sup> Disney is
8140 estimated to have contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in
8141 the cycle.<sup>[<a name="id2700526" href="#ftn.id2700526" class="footnote">183</a>]</sup>
8142
8143 </p><p>
8144 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least, it need not
8145 be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this reality about the
8146 never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term was central to my
8147 thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed to interpreting and
8148 applying the Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the
8149 power to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
8150 constitutional requirement that terms be "limited." If they could extend it
8151 once, they would extend it again and again and again.
8152 </p><p>
8153
8154 It was also my judgment that <span class="emphasis"><em>this</em></span> Supreme Court would
8155 not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
8156 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power of
8157 Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the power
8158 granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional scholars, the most
8159 famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's decision in 1995 to
8160 strike down a law that banned the possession of guns near schools.
8161 </p><p>
8162 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted powers very
8163 broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
8164 only "commerce among the several states" (aka "interstate commerce"), the
8165 Supreme Court had interpreted that power to include the power to regulate
8166 any activity that merely affected interstate commerce.
8167 </p><p>
8168 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was no
8169 limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every activity, when
8170 considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.  A Constitution
8171 designed to limit Congress's power was instead interpreted to impose no
8172 limit.
8173 </p><p>
8174 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed that in
8175 <em class="citetitle">United States</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>. The
8176 government had argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
8177 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values,
8178 and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government
8179 whether there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce
8180 under the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there was
8181 not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then that
8182 activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the government
8183 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
8184 </p><p>
8185 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments," the
8186 Chief Justice wrote.<sup>[<a name="id2700616" href="#ftn.id2700616" class="footnote">184</a>]</sup> If anything
8187 Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be considered interstate
8188 commerce, then there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in
8189 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> was reaffirmed five years later in
8190 <em class="citetitle">United States</em>
8191 v. <em class="citetitle">Morrison</em>.<sup>[<a name="id2700643" href="#ftn.id2700643" class="footnote">185</a>]</sup>
8192 </p><p>
8193
8194 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
8195 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<sup>[<a name="id2700663" href="#ftn.id2700663" class="footnote">186</a>]</sup>
8196 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should yield the
8197 conclusion that Congress can't extend an existing term. If Congress could
8198 extend an existing term, then there would be no "stopping point" to
8199 Congress's power over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that
8200 there is such a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to
8201 grant copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
8202 term of existing copyrights.
8203 </p><p>
8204 <span class="emphasis"><em>If</em></span>, that is, the principle announced in
8205 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> stood for a principle.  Many believed the
8206 decision in <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> stood for politics&#8212;a
8207 conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its
8208 power over Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
8209 rejected that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
8210 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
8211 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides
8212 cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring.  I was
8213 not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine
8214 Justices were going to be petty politicians.
8215 </p><p>
8216 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the argument in
8217 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> was not about. By insisting on the
8218 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
8219 piracy.  Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
8220 piracy&#8212;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work
8221 and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was
8222 just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
8223 already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had gotten
8224 the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In exchange for
8225 a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new work. But now
8226 these entities were using their power&#8212;expressed through the power of
8227 lobbyists' money&#8212;to get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That
8228 twenty-year dollop would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was
8229 fighting a piracy that affects us all.
8230 </p><p>
8231 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief before the
8232 Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association wrote that the public
8233 domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<sup>[<a name="id2700743" href="#ftn.id2700743" class="footnote">187</a>]</sup> But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our
8234 constitutional system, our law requires it. Some may not like the
8235 Constitution's requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a
8236 pirate's charter.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2700768"></a>
8237 </p><p>
8238 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on copyright as a
8239 way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily influence the
8240 development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric Eldred discovered,
8241 we have set up a system that assures that copyright terms will be repeatedly
8242 extended, and extended, and extended. We have created the perfect storm for
8243 the public domain. Copyrights have not expired, and will not expire, so long
8244 as Congress is free to be bought to extend them again.
8245 </p><p>
8246 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being extended.
8247 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too valuable for
8248 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from copyright
8249 extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's.  Forget Mickey
8250 Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from the 1920s and 1930s
8251 that have continuing commercial value. The real harm of term extension comes
8252 not from these famous works. The real harm is to the works that are not
8253 famous, not commercially exploited, and no longer available as a result.
8254 </p><p>
8255 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to 1942)
8256 affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 2 percent of that
8257 work has any continuing commercial value. It was the copyright holders for
8258 that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.  But the law and its effect were
8259 not limited to that 2 percent. The law extended the terms of copyright
8260 generally.<sup>[<a name="id2700818" href="#ftn.id2700818" class="footnote">188</a>]</sup>
8261
8262 </p><p>
8263
8264 Think practically about the consequence of this extension&#8212;practically,
8265 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal work. In 1930,
8266 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those books were still in
8267 print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you wanted to make available
8268 to the world in your iArchive project the remaining 9,873. What would you
8269 have to do?
8270 </p><p>
8271 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were still
8272 under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are not
8273 on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the titles and
8274 authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration and renewal
8275 records for works published in 1930. That will produce a list of books still
8276 under copyright.
8277 </p><p>
8278 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate the
8279 current copyright owners. How would you do that?
8280 </p><p>
8281 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright owners
8282 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be thousands and
8283 thousands of government monopolies without there being at least a list?
8284 </p><p>
8285 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in 1959, of
8286 the person who registered the copyright. But just think practically about
8287 how impossibly difficult it would be to track down thousands of such
8288 records&#8212;especially since the person who registered is not necessarily
8289 the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
8290 </p><p>
8291 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the apologists for
8292 the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright owners?"
8293 </p><p>
8294 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <span class="emphasis"><em>are</em></span> plenty
8295 of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles
8296 to cars.  And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty
8297 good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in
8298 your backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a
8299 pretty good way to know who owns what tangible property.
8300 </p><p>
8301
8302 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who owns the house
8303 by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see a car, there is
8304 ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the car. If you see a
8305 bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a house, it's fairly
8306 easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you happen to see a baseball
8307 lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look around for a second for some
8308 kids playing ball. If you don't see any kids, then okay: Here's a bit of
8309 property whose owner we can't easily determine. It is the exception that
8310 proves the rule: that we ordinarily know quite well who owns what property.
8311 </p><p>
8312 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.  The
8313 library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've already
8314 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors' names, of
8315 course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or passed down in an
8316 estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who owns what, you would have to
8317 hire a private detective. The bottom line: The owner cannot easily be
8318 located. And in a regime like ours, in which it is a felony to use such
8319 property without the property owner's permission, the property isn't going
8320 to be used.
8321 </p><p>
8322 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be digitized,
8323 and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the consequence for other
8324 creative works is much more dire.
8325 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2700951"></a><p>
8326 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios, which
8327 owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a direct
8328 beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were made between
8329 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <em class="citetitle">The Lucky
8330 Dog</em>, is currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made
8331 after 1923 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee
8332 controls the exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal
8333 of money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
8334 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent films."<sup>[<a name="id2700973" href="#ftn.id2700973" class="footnote">189</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2700989"></a>
8335 </p><p>
8336 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in this
8337 culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme Court that
8338 the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left standing, destroy
8339 a whole generation of American film.
8340 </p><p>
8341
8342 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has any
8343 continuing commercial value. The rest&#8212;to the extent it survives at
8344 all&#8212;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that some of this work
8345 not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be valuable by the owners of
8346 the vaults. For this to occur, however, the commercial benefit from the work
8347 must exceed the costs of making the work available for distribution.
8348 </p><p>
8349 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.  For most
8350 of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very high; digital
8351 technology has lowered these costs substantially. While it cost more than
8352 $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white film in 1993, it can now
8353 cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of mm film.<sup>[<a name="id2701026" href="#ftn.id2701026" class="footnote">190</a>]</sup>
8354
8355 </p><p>
8356 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most important.
8357 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
8358 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
8359 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
8360 locate the copyright owner.
8361 </p><p>
8362 Or more accurately, <span class="emphasis"><em>owners</em></span>. As we've seen, there isn't
8363 only a single copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't
8364 a single person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
8365 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
8366 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
8367 exceptionally high.
8368 </p><p>
8369 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
8370 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
8371 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when she
8372 does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you have
8373 made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
8374 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
8375 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way, you
8376 have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have to
8377 talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
8378 </p><p>
8379
8380 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed these
8381 costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the benefit would
8382 outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old films, Agee
8383 argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until the copyright
8384 expires.
8385 </p><p>
8386 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will have
8387 expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and nitrate stock
8388 dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal canisters in which
8389 they are now stored will be filled with nothing more than dust.
8390 </p><p>
8391 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has
8392 continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a
8393 crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright
8394 creates incentives to produce and distribute the creative work. For that
8395 tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of free expression."
8396 </p><p>
8397 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the creative
8398 work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've indicated, most books
8399 go out of print within one year. The same is true of music and
8400 film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.  And when a
8401 creative work falls out of favor with the commercial distributors, the
8402 commercial life ends.
8403 </p><p>
8404 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't keep
8405 libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and we don't
8406 have archives of films because we expect people to choose between spending
8407 Friday night watching new movies and spending Friday night watching a 1930
8408 news documentary. The noncommercial life of culture is important and
8409 valuable&#8212;for entertainment but also, and more importantly, for
8410 knowledge. To understand who we are, and where we came from, and how we have
8411 made the mistakes that we have, we need to have access to this history.
8412 </p><p>
8413
8414 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.  In
8415 this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in this
8416 context do no good.
8417 </p><p>
8418 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of our
8419 history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
8420 <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright-related use</em></span> that would be inhibited by an
8421 exclusive right.  When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a
8422 publisher.  But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a
8423 used book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
8424 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
8425 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
8426 </p><p>
8427 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring a
8428 film&#8212;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&#8212;were so high,
8429 it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains
8430 of a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
8431 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the end
8432 of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
8433 </p><p>
8434 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most of our
8435 history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works that lost
8436 their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works would not have
8437 interfered with anything.
8438 </p><p>
8439 But this situation has now changed.
8440 </p><p>
8441 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital technologies
8442 is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.  Digital
8443 technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access to all sorts
8444 of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now imagine digitizing
8445 it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once a film goes out of
8446 distribution, we could digitize it and make it available to everyone,
8447 forever. Digital technologies give new life to copyrighted material after it
8448 passes out of its commercial life. It is now possible to preserve and assure
8449 universal access to this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
8450 </p><p>
8451
8452
8453 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing this
8454 digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
8455 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires permission
8456 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other aspect of
8457 our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these things
8458 available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want to
8459 explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
8460 radically different context.
8461 </p><p>
8462 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
8463 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law gets in
8464 the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
8465 <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright</em></span> purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to
8466 enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
8467 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright
8468 is serving no purpose <span class="emphasis"><em>at all</em></span> related to the spread of
8469 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
8470 expression. Copyright is a brake.
8471 </p><p>
8472 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for Brewster
8473 Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.  So won't
8474 Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading culture widely?"
8475 </p><p>
8476 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
8477 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble offered
8478 to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that eliminate the need
8479 for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a library is to serve
8480 what "the market" would demand. But if you think the role of a library is
8481 bigger than this&#8212;if you think its role is to archive culture, whether
8482 there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture or not&#8212;then we
8483 can't count on the commercial market to do our library work for us.
8484 </p><p>
8485 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We should
8486 rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable culture. My
8487 message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the market is not
8488 doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the freedom to fill the
8489 gaps. As one researcher calculated for American culture, 94 percent of the
8490 films, books, and music produced between and 1946 is not commercially
8491 available. However much you love the commercial market, if access is a
8492 value, then 6 percent is a failure to provide that value.<sup>[<a name="id2701263" href="#ftn.id2701263" class="footnote">191</a>]</sup>
8493
8494 </p><p>
8495 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
8496 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the Sonny
8497 Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two central claims
8498 that we made were (1) that extending existing terms violated the
8499 Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that extending terms by
8500 another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
8501 </p><p>
8502 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an argument.  A
8503 panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also dismissed our
8504 claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But that decision at
8505 least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative judges on that
8506 court. That dissent gave our claims life.
8507 </p><p>
8508 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that copyrights
8509 be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as it was simple:
8510 If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no "stopping point" to
8511 Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The power to extend existing
8512 terms means Congress is not required to grant terms that are "limited."
8513 Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to interpret the term "limited
8514 Times" to give it meaning. And the best interpretation, Judge Sentelle
8515 argued, would be to deny Congress the power to extend existing terms.
8516 </p><p>
8517 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to hear the
8518 case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for important
8519 cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a whole, where
8520 the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
8521 </p><p>
8522
8523 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.  This
8524 time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
8525 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the most
8526 liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had overstepped its
8527 bounds.
8528 </p><p>
8529 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the Supreme
8530 Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It hears about one
8531 hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand appeals.) And it
8532 practically never reviews a decision that upholds a statute when no other
8533 court has yet reviewed the statute.
8534 </p><p>
8535 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by granting our
8536 petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument was set for October of
8537 2002. The summer would be spent writing briefs and preparing for argument.
8538 </p><p>
8539 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
8540 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we lost
8541 the appeal. And if you know something more than just the minimum, you
8542 probably think there was no way this case could have been won. After our
8543 defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and
8544 supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed
8545 cause. And none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail
8546 from my client, Eric Eldred.
8547 </p><p>
8548 Men min klient og disse vennene tok feil. Denne saken kunne vært vunnet. Det
8549 burde ha vært vunnet.  Og uansett hvor hardt jeg prøver å fortelle den
8550 historien til meg selv, kan jeg aldri unnslippe troen på at det er min feil
8551 at vi ikke vant.
8552 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2701392"></a><p>
8553
8554 Feil ble gjort tidlig, skjønt den ble først åpenbart på slutten. Vår sak
8555 hadde støtte hos en ekstraordinær advokat, Geoffrey Stewart, helt fra
8556 starten, og hos advokatfirmaet hadde han flyttet til, Jones, Day, Reavis og
8557 Pogue. Jones Day mottok mye press fra sine opphavsrettsbeskyttende klienter
8558 på grunn av sin støtte til oss.  De ignorert dette presset (noe veldig få
8559 advokatfirmaer noen sinne ville gjøre), og ga alt de hadde gjennom hele
8560 saken.
8561 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2701415"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2701421"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2701427"></a><p>
8562 Det var tre viktige advokater på saken fra Jones DaY. Geoff Stewart var den
8563 først, men siden ble Dan Bromberg og Don Ayer ganske involvert. Bromberg og
8564 Ayer spesielt hadde en felles oppfatning om hvordan denne saken ville bli
8565 vunnet: vi ville bare vinne, fortalte de gjentatte ganger til meg, hvis vi
8566 få problemet til å virke "viktig" for Høyesterett. Det måtte synes som om
8567 dramatisk skade ble gjort til ytringsfriheten og fri kultur, ellers ville de
8568 aldri stemt mot "de mektigste mediaselskapene i verden".
8569 </p><p>
8570 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act was a
8571 dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still think it
8572 is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based on how
8573 important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be "right" as
8574 in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be that
8575 way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the framers of
8576 our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the CTEA was
8577 unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful interpretation of what
8578 the First Amendment means would yield the conclusion that the power to
8579 extend existing copyright terms is unconstitutional, I was not persuaded
8580 that we had to sell our case like soap.  Just as a law that bans the
8581 swastika is unconstitutional not because the Court likes Nazis but because
8582 such a law would violate the Constitution, so too, in my view, would the
8583 Court decide whether Congress's law was constitutional based on the
8584 Constitution, not based on whether they liked the values that the framers
8585 put in the Constitution.
8586 </p><p>
8587 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and the harm
8588 caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review? There was no
8589 reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they weren't convinced that
8590 this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we didn't need to persuade them
8591 that this law was bad, we needed to show why it was unconstitutional.
8592 </p><p>
8593
8594 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter and in
8595 which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced that the Court
8596 would not hear our arguments if it thought these were just the arguments of
8597 a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was not about to launch into a
8598 new field of judicial review if it seemed that this field of review was
8599 simply the preference of a small political minority.  Although my focus in
8600 the case was not to demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to
8601 demonstrate that it was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument
8602 against a background of briefs that covered the full range of political
8603 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
8604 <span class="emphasis"><em>law</em></span> and not politics, then, we tried to gather the
8605 widest range of credible critics&#8212;credible not because they were rich
8606 and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated that this law
8607 was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
8608 </p><p>
8609 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
8610 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very beginning.
8611 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In November 1998,
8612 she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the Republican Congress for
8613 allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you sometimes wonder why bills
8614 that create a financial windfall to narrow special interests slide easily
8615 through the intricate legislative process, while bills that benefit the
8616 general public seem to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial
8617 documented, was the power of money.  Schlafly enumerated Disney's
8618 contributions to the key players on the committees. It was money, not
8619 justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control,
8620 Schlafly argued.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2701534"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2701540"></a>
8621 </p><p>
8622 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief supporting
8623 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the core claim in
8624 the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of existing copyrights,
8625 there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.  That strong
8626 conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
8627 </p><p>
8628 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as it
8629 gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free Software
8630 Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux possible). They
8631 included a powerful brief about the costs of uncertainty by Intel. There
8632 were two law professors' briefs, one by copyright scholars and one by First
8633 Amendment scholars. There was an exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the
8634 world's experts in the history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there
8635 was a new brief by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
8636 <a class="indexterm" name="id2701569"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2701578"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2701584"></a>
8637 </p><p>
8638 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal argument,
8639 there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and archives, including
8640 the Internet Archive, the American Association of Law Libraries, and the
8641 National Writers Union.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2701598"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2701605"></a>
8642 </p><p>
8643 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the argument I've
8644 already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that unless the law
8645 was struck, a whole generation of American film would disappear. The other
8646 made the economic argument absolutely clear.
8647 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2701620"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2701626"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2701632"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2701639"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2701645"></a><p>
8648 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including five
8649 Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Milton
8650 Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as the list of
8651 Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political spectrum. Their
8652 conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible claim that extending the
8653 terms of existing copyrights would do anything to increase incentives to
8654 create. Such extensions were nothing more than "rent-seeking"&#8212;the
8655 fancy term economists use to describe special-interest legislation gone
8656 wild.
8657 </p><p>
8658 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered to
8659 write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with us from
8660 the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we added three
8661 lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan Morrison, a
8662 lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had made constitutional
8663 history with a series of seminal victories in the Supreme Court defending
8664 individual rights; my colleague and dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued
8665 many cases in the Court, and who had advised us early on about a First
8666 Amendment strategy; and finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
8667 <a class="indexterm" name="id2701655"></a>
8668 </p><p>
8669 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
8670 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give media
8671 companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried was the only
8672 one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up for something he
8673 believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer in the Supreme
8674 Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that limited Congress's power
8675 in the context of the Commerce Clause. And while he had argued many
8676 positions in the Supreme Court that I personally disagreed with, his joining
8677 the cause was a vote of confidence in our argument.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2701701"></a>
8678 </p><p>
8679 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of friends, as
8680 well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included historians or
8681 economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were written
8682 exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and copyright holders.
8683 </p><p>
8684 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain from the
8685 law. The congressmen were not surprising either&#8212;they were defending
8686 their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of contributions such power
8687 induced. And of course it was not surprising that the copyright holders
8688 would defend the idea that they should continue to have the right to control
8689 who did what with content they wanted to control.
8690 </p><p>
8691 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was better for the
8692 Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to Dr. Seuss's work&#8212; better
8693 than allowing it to fall into the public domain&#8212;because if this
8694 creativity were in the public domain, then people could use it to "glorify
8695 drugs or to create pornography."<sup>[<a name="id2701731" href="#ftn.id2701731" class="footnote">192</a>]</sup> That
8696 was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection"
8697 of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license
8698 <em class="citetitle">Porgy and Bess</em> to anyone who refuses to use African
8699 Americans in the cast.<sup>[<a name="id2701756" href="#ftn.id2701756" class="footnote">193</a>]</sup> That's their
8700 view of how this part of American culture should be controlled, and they
8701 wanted this law to help them effect that control.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2701770"></a>
8702 </p><p>
8703 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this debate.
8704 When Congress decides to extend the term of existing copyrights, Congress is
8705 making a choice about which speakers it will favor.  Famous and beloved
8706 copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate and Dr. Seuss, come to
8707 Congress and say, "Give us twenty years to control the speech about these
8708 icons of American culture. We'll do better with them than anyone else."
8709 Congress of course likes to reward the popular and famous by giving them
8710 what they want. But when Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak
8711 in a certain way, that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally
8712 meant to block.
8713 </p><p>
8714 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA mean
8715 that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
8716 copyrights&#8212;extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
8717 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
8718 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.  Between
8719 February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing for this
8720 case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
8721 </p><p>
8722 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we called
8723 "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest." The Conservatives
8724 included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice
8725 Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had been the most consistent in
8726 limiting Congress's power. They were the five who had supported the
8727 <em class="citetitle">Lopez/Morrison</em> line of cases that said that an
8728 enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's powers had
8729 limits.
8730 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2701820"></a><p>
8731
8732 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
8733 Congress's power. These four&#8212;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
8734 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&#8212;had repeatedly argued that the
8735 Constitution gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement
8736 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
8737 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four justices
8738 were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed with, they
8739 were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
8740 </p><p>
8741 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to her
8742 general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of gender are
8743 involved), she had been particularly deferential in the context of
8744 intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an excellent and
8745 well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from the same
8746 intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with the writings
8747 of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this context to do as it
8748 wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
8749 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2701854"></a><p>
8750 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
8751 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly favored
8752 deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were also very
8753 sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly believed, there was a
8754 very important free speech argument against these retrospective extensions.
8755 </p><p>
8756 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
8757 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest judges
8758 on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just means that no
8759 simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he had consistently argued
8760 for limits in the context of intellectual property generally. We were fairly
8761 confident he would recognize limits here.
8762 </p><p>
8763 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus had to be:
8764 on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these five and
8765 get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single overriding argument
8766 that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives' most important
8767 jurisprudential innovation&#8212;the argument that Judge Sentelle had relied
8768 upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power must be interpreted so
8769 that its enumerated powers have limits.
8770 </p><p>
8771
8772 This then was the core of our strategy&#8212;a strategy for which I am
8773 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
8774 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> case, under the government's argument here,
8775 Congress would always have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If
8776 anything was plain about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was
8777 that this power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
8778 Court to reconcile <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> with
8779 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce was
8780 limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright be
8781 limited.
8782 </p><p>
8783 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has done
8784 it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government claimed that
8785 from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
8786 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say that
8787 practice is unconstitutional.
8788 </p><p>
8789 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We certainly
8790 agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in and in 1909. And of
8791 course, in 1962, Congress began extending existing terms
8792 regularly&#8212;eleven times in forty years.
8793 </p><p>
8794
8795 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress extended
8796 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.  It then
8797 extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare extensions
8798 are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending existing
8799 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that restraint was
8800 now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there was no reason to
8801 expect that cycle would end. This Court had not hesitated to intervene where
8802 Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.  There was no reason it
8803 couldn't intervene here.  Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in
8804 October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
8805 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to help in
8806 the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where wannabe justices
8807 fire questions at wannabe winners.
8808 </p><p>
8809 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a single
8810 point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to the
8811 power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that terms would be
8812 effectively unlimited; going with us would give Congress a clear line to
8813 follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots were an effective practice; I
8814 found ways to take every question back to this central idea.
8815 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2701972"></a><p>
8816 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the skeptic. He
8817 had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor General Charles
8818 Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme Court. And in his review
8819 of the moot, he let his concern speak: <a class="indexterm" name="id2701985"></a>
8820 </p><p>
8821 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be willing
8822 to upset this practice that the government says has been a consistent
8823 practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see the
8824 harm&#8212;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they don't see
8825 that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
8826 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2701994"></a><p>
8827
8828 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but he didn't
8829 understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the right
8830 thing&#8212;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
8831 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court does the
8832 right thing&#8212;not because of politics but because it is right. As I
8833 listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood his
8834 point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.  Let the
8835 politicians learn to see that it was also good.  The night before the
8836 argument, a line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The
8837 case had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
8838 culture. Hundreds stood in line for the chance to see the
8839 proceedings. Scores spent the night on the Supreme Court steps so that they
8840 would be assured a seat.
8841 </p><p>
8842 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can ask for
8843 seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for my
8844 parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get a seat in a
8845 special section reserved for them. And senators and congressmen have a
8846 special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of course, the press
8847 has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on the Court. As we
8848 entered that morning, there was no place that was not taken. This was an
8849 argument about intellectual property law, yet the halls were filled. As I
8850 walked in to take my seat at the front of the Court, I saw my parents
8851 sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table, I saw Jack Valenti sitting
8852 in the special section ordinarily reserved for family of the Justices.
8853 </p><p>
8854 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began where I
8855 intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's power. This
8856 was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether those enumerated
8857 powers had any limit.
8858 </p><p>
8859 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.  The history
8860 was bothering her.
8861 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8862 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often through the years,
8863 and if you are right, don't we run the risk of upsetting previous extensions
8864 of time? I mean, this seems to be a practice that began with the very first
8865 act.
8866 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8867 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face of
8868 what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again was to
8869 emphasize limits on Congress's power.
8870 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8871
8872 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in mind,
8873 then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their words that gives
8874 effect to what they had in mind, and the answer is yes.
8875 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8876 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen where the
8877 Court was going. The first was a question by Justice Kennedy, who observed,
8878 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8879 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that the '76 act,
8880 too, should have been declared void, and that we might leave it alone
8881 because of the disruption, is that for all these years the act has impeded
8882 progress in science and the useful arts.  I just don't see any empirical
8883 evidence for that.
8884 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8885 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a student, I
8886 answered,
8887 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8888 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.  Nothing
8889 in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical assertion about
8890 impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a structural limit necessary
8891 to assure that what would be an effectively perpetual term not be permitted
8892 under the copyright laws.
8893 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2702135"></a><p>
8894 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right answer
8895 was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any number of
8896 briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And here was the
8897 place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a softball; my answer
8898 was a swing and a miss.
8899 </p><p>
8900 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
8901 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>
8902 ruling, and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
8903 </p><p>
8904
8905 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all sympathetic.
8906 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
8907
8908
8909 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8910 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the right to copy
8911 verbatim other people's books, don't you?
8912 </p><p>
8913 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that should be in the
8914 public domain and would be in the public domain but for a statute that
8915 cannot be justified under ordinary First Amendment analysis or under a
8916 proper reading of the limits built into the Copyright Clause.
8917 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8918 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument; for now the
8919 Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia asked Solicitor
8920 General Olson,
8921 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8922 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited time
8923 would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely the
8924 argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited time which is
8925 extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited time.
8926 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8927 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.  Olson's
8928 flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed to the
8929 academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if this were the
8930 first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright and Patent Clause
8931 power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I closed by pointing out the
8932 long history of the Court imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of
8933 the Copyright and Patent Clause&#8212; indeed, the very first case striking
8934 a law of Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon
8935 the Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
8936 Court to my side.
8937 </p><p>
8938
8939 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I wished I
8940 could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had answered
8941 differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me optimistic.
8942 </p><p>
8943 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit? Over
8944 and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was precisely the
8945 answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not imagine how the Court
8946 could understand that the government believed Congress's power was unlimited
8947 under the terms of the Copyright Clause, and sustain the government's
8948 argument. The solicitor general had made my argument for me. No matter how
8949 often I tried, I could not understand how the Court could find that
8950 Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
8951 Copyright Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe
8952 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&#8212;in
8953 particular, the Conservatives&#8212;would feel itself constrained by the
8954 rule of law that it had established elsewhere.
8955 </p><p>
8956 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office and
8957 missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the
8958 message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
8959 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
8960 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
8961 </p><p>
8962 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the phone off
8963 the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat down to see where I
8964 had been wrong in my reasoning.
8965 </p><p>
8966 My <span class="emphasis"><em>reasoning</em></span>. Here was a case that pitted all the money
8967 in the world against <span class="emphasis"><em>reasoning</em></span>. And here was the last
8968 naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
8969 </p><p>
8970 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would distinguish the
8971 principle in this case from the principle in
8972 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case
8973 was not even cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did
8974 not even appear in the Court's opinion.
8975 </p><p>
8976
8977
8978
8979 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.  Consistent
8980 with her view that Congress's power was not limited generally, she had found
8981 Congress's power not limited here.
8982 </p><p>
8983 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&#8212;for her, and for Justice
8984 Souter. Neither believes in <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>. It would be too
8985 much to expect them to write an opinion that recognized, much less
8986 explained, the doctrine they had worked so hard to defeat.
8987 </p><p>
8988 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I was
8989 reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile limited
8990 powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the Progress
8991 Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could reconcile the two
8992 simply <span class="emphasis"><em>by not addressing the argument</em></span>. There was no
8993 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.  There was
8994 therefore no principle that followed from the <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>
8995 case: In that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this
8996 context it would not.
8997 </p><p>
8998 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values they
8999 would respect? By what right did they&#8212;the silent five&#8212;get to
9000 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the values
9001 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that I said I
9002 hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue here was
9003 important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I might hate a
9004 system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional values that it
9005 will respect, that is the system we have.
9006 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2702325"></a><p>
9007 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's opinion
9008 was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
9009 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension of
9010 terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had governed in the
9011 context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court discounted the
9012 parallel&#8212;without explaining how the very same words in the Progress
9013 Clause could come to mean totally different things depending upon whether
9014 the words were about patents or copyrights.  The Court let Justice Stevens's
9015 charge go unanswered.
9016 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2702344"></a><p>
9017
9018
9019 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever written, was
9020 external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of copyrights has
9021 become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said that under the
9022 current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8 percent of the value of a
9023 perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the actual number was
9024 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the point was clear: If the
9025 Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and the existing term was so
9026 long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
9027 </p><p>
9028 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But because
9029 neither believed in the <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> case, neither was
9030 willing to push it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was
9031 decided without anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried
9032 from Judge Sentelle. It was <em class="citetitle">Hamlet</em> without the
9033 Prince.
9034 </p><p>
9035 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when depression
9036 gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure the
9037 depression. This anger was of two sorts.
9038 </p><p>
9039 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been one
9040 thing for them to have explained why the principle of
9041 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> didn't apply in this case. That wouldn't have
9042 been a very convincing argument, I don't believe, having read it made by
9043 others, and having tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been
9044 an act of integrity.  These justices in particular have repeatedly said that
9045 the proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&#8212;to
9046 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in light
9047 of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
9048 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was
9049 their "originalism" now?
9050 </p><p>
9051
9052 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain what the
9053 framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they did; they joined
9054 an opinion that never once tried to explain how the structure of that clause
9055 would affect the interpretation of Congress's power. And they joined an
9056 opinion that didn't even try to explain why this grant of power could be
9057 unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause would be limited. In short, they had
9058 joined an opinion that did not apply to, and was inconsistent with, their
9059 own method for interpreting the Constitution. This opinion may well have
9060 yielded a result that they liked. It did not produce a reason that was
9061 consistent with their own principles.
9062 </p><p>
9063 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with myself.  For I
9064 had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of the law as
9065 it is.
9066 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2702455"></a><p>
9067 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for idealism
9068 about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.  Most have a
9069 much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this case would be won
9070 based on whether I could convince the Justices that the framers' values were
9071 important, I fought the idea, because I didn't want to believe that that is
9072 how this Court decides. I insisted on arguing this case as if it were a
9073 simple application of a set of principles.  I had an argument that followed
9074 in logic. I didn't need to waste my time showing it should also follow in
9075 popularity.
9076 </p><p>
9077
9078 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I can see
9079 a hundred places where the answers could have taken the conversation in
9080 different directions, where the truth about the harm that this unchecked
9081 power will cause could have been made clear to this Court. Justice Kennedy
9082 in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically, corrected his
9083 question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown the First
9084 Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the question to make the
9085 logical point. I had shown them how they could strike this law of Congress
9086 if they wanted to. There were a hundred places where I could have helped
9087 them want to, yet my stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have
9088 stood before hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion
9089 in that effort to persuade; but I refused to stand before this audience and
9090 try to persuade with the passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis
9091 on which a court should decide the issue.
9092 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2702497"></a><p>
9093 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it have
9094 been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or Kathleen
9095 Sullivan? <a class="indexterm" name="id2702508"></a>
9096 </p><p>
9097 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court was not
9098 ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It would take
9099 a great deal more to show our society why our framers were right. And when
9100 we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
9101 </p><p>
9102 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in doing
9103 anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have little
9104 reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had stepped
9105 down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could have
9106 persuaded.
9107 </p><p>
9108 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
9109 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
9110 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case
9111 was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
9112 not be raised until it is.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2702539"></a>
9113 </p><p>
9114
9115 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and publicly,
9116 that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have been persuaded,
9117 then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that here again Peter
9118 was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in a way that would do
9119 some good or they were not ready to hear this case in a way that would do
9120 some good. Either way, the decision to bring this case&#8212;a decision I
9121 had made four years before&#8212;was wrong.  While the reaction to the Sonny
9122 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's
9123 decision was mixed.  No one, at least in the press, tried to say that
9124 extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over
9125 ideas. Where the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had
9126 been skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
9127 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was
9128 attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful
9129 law. <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em> wrote in its editorial,
9130 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
9131 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are seeing
9132 the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of copyright
9133 perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment, one that should
9134 not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on the entire creative
9135 output of humanity is one of the reasons we live in a time of such fruitful
9136 creative ferment.
9137 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9138 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of hilarious
9139 images&#8212;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view of the
9140 case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page. The "powerful and
9141 wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like
9142 that.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2702412"></a>
9143 </p><p>
9144 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the quote from
9145 <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em>. That "grand experiment" we call
9146 the "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey, I
9147 shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in our
9148 Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I fathered, the
9149 Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A better lawyer would
9150 have made them see differently.
9151 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700231" href="#id2700231" class="para">179</a>] </sup>
9152
9153
9154 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
9155 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world of
9156 noncommercial pornographers&#8212;people who were distributing porn but were
9157 not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution.  Such a
9158 class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the costs of
9159 distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got
9160 special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the
9161 Communications Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
9162 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
9163 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial publishers
9164 after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the world before the
9165 Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at least as important to
9166 protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect noncommercial pornographers.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700285" href="#id2700285" class="para">180</a>] </sup>
9167
9168
9169 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to
9170 last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
9171 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
9172 copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is
9173 also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one
9174 day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress," 144
9175 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
9176 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700496" href="#id2700496" class="para">181</a>] </sup>
9177
9178 Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse
9179 Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
9180 <em class="citetitle">Chicago Tribune</em>, 17. oktober 1998, 22.
9181 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700511" href="#id2700511" class="para">182</a>] </sup>
9182
9183 Se Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information Age,"
9184 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9185 #49</a>.
9186 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700526" href="#id2700526" class="para">183</a>] </sup>
9187
9188
9189 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
9190 <em class="citetitle">Congressional Quarterly This Week</em>, 8. august 1990,
9191 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9192 #50</a>.
9193 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700616" href="#id2700616" class="para">184</a>] </sup>
9194
9195 <em class="citetitle">United States</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>, 514
9196 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
9197 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700643" href="#id2700643" class="para">185</a>] </sup>
9198
9199
9200 <em class="citetitle">United States</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Morrison</em>, 529
9201 U.S. 598 (2000).
9202 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700663" href="#id2700663" class="para">186</a>] </sup>
9203
9204
9205 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
9206 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the context of
9207 the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the government
9208 would allow the government unending power to regulate commerce&#8212;the
9209 limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The same point is true in
9210 the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's
9211 interpretation would allow the government unending power to regulate
9212 copyrights&#8212;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
9213 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700743" href="#id2700743" class="para">187</a>] </sup>
9214
9215
9216 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
9217 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S.
9218 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #51</a>.
9219 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700818" href="#id2700818" class="para">188</a>] </sup>
9220
9221 The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
9222 Congressional Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal
9223 ranges. See Brief of Petitioners, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9224 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 7, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #52</a>.
9225 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2700973" href="#id2700973" class="para">189</a>] </sup>
9226
9227
9228 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
9229 <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles Times</em>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld,
9230 "Classic Movies, Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today
9231 on Striking Down Copyright Extension," <em class="citetitle">Orlando Sentinel
9232 Tribune</em>, 9 October 2002.
9233 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2701026" href="#id2701026" class="para">190</a>] </sup>
9234
9235
9236 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
9237 Petitoners, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9238 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618),
9239 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by the
9240 Internet Archive, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9241 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #53</a>.
9242 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2701263" href="#id2701263" class="para">191</a>] </sup>
9243
9244
9245 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20 December
9246 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9247 #54</a>.
9248 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2701731" href="#id2701731" class="para">192</a>] </sup>
9249
9250
9251 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9252 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S.  (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
9253 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2701756" href="#id2701756" class="para">193</a>] </sup>
9254
9255
9256 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins
9257 the Fray," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 28 March 1998, B7.
9258 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="eldred-ii"></a>Kapittel 15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</h2></div></div></div><p>
9259 The day <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> was decided, fate would have it that I
9260 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
9261 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> was denied&#8212;meaning the case was really
9262 finally over&#8212;fate would have it that I was giving a speech to
9263 technologists at Disney World.)  This was a particularly long flight to my
9264 least favorite city. The drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because
9265 of traffic, so I opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
9266 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2702637"></a><p>
9267 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
9268 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head the same
9269 advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is important. And
9270 alternating with that command was the question of Justice Kennedy: "For all
9271 these years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts. I
9272 just don't see any empirical evidence for that." And so, having failed in
9273 the argument of constitutional principle, finally, I turned to an argument
9274 of politics.
9275 </p><p>
9276
9277 <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em> published the piece. In it, I
9278 proposed a simple fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the
9279 copyright owner would be required to register the work and pay a small
9280 fee. If he paid the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of
9281 copyright. If he did not, the work passed into the public domain.
9282 </p><p>
9283 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.  Eric
9284 Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as he said
9285 early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
9286 </p><p>
9287 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this is either
9288 the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright Term Deregulation
9289 Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear and obvious: Remove
9290 copyright where it is doing nothing except blocking access and the spread of
9291 knowledge. Leave it for as long as Congress allows for those works where its
9292 worth is at least $1. But for everything else, let the content go.
9293 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2702701"></a><p>
9294 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed it in
9295 an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters expressing
9296 support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people can see the
9297 copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican might say, here
9298 government regulation is simply getting in the way of innovation and
9299 creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the government is
9300 blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no good reason. Indeed,
9301 there is no real difference between Democrats and Republicans on this
9302 issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm of the present system.
9303 </p><p>
9304 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
9305 requirement.  For one of the hardest things about the current system for
9306 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to look
9307 for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not required, since
9308 marking content is not required, since no formality at all is required, it
9309 is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask permission to use
9310 or license their work. This system would lower these costs, by establishing
9311 at least one registry where copyright owners could be identified.
9312 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2702734"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2702740"></a><p>
9313
9314 As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, formalities in copyright law were removed in 1976,
9315 when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning any formal requirement
9316 before a copyright is granted.<sup>[<a name="id2702758" href="#ftn.id2702758" class="footnote">194</a>]</sup> The
9317 Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural rights
9318 don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American tradition
9319 that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were to be
9320 protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the dignity of
9321 the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not upon the
9322 special favor of the government.
9323 </p><p>
9324 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is absurd
9325 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a world
9326 without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread "Walt Disney
9327 creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to know what's
9328 protected and what's not.
9329 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2702806"></a><p>
9330 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin in
9331 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne Convention in 1908,
9332 to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as the
9333 abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated because the
9334 stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was as if a Charles
9335 Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
9336 <em class="citetitle">i</em> or cross a <em class="citetitle">t</em> resulted in the
9337 loss of widows' only income.
9338 </p><p>
9339 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
9340 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
9341 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
9342 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities totally,
9343 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more equitable system
9344 of registration.
9345 </p><p>
9346 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration in the
9347 nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was also a
9348 hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save the
9349 starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory burden
9350 imposed upon creators.
9351 </p><p>
9352
9353 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was a moral
9354 claim as well. There was no reason that creative property should be a
9355 second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table, his rights
9356 over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the government.  He has
9357 a property right over the table "naturally," and he can assert that right
9358 against anyone who would steal the table, whether or not he has informed the
9359 government of his ownership of the table.
9360 </p><p>
9361 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
9362 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative property
9363 being second-class property. The argument in favor of formalities turns upon
9364 the special problems that creative property presents.  The law of
9365 formalities responds to the special physics of creative property, to assure
9366 that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
9367 </p><p>
9368 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just because
9369 you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is to be
9370 effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just because
9371 you must register the car with the state and tag it with a license.  In both
9372 of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important reason to secure
9373 registration&#8212;both because it makes the markets more efficient and
9374 because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without a registration
9375 system for land, landowners would perpetually have to guard their
9376 property. With registration, they can simply point the police to a
9377 deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would be much
9378 easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden to sell a
9379 stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but those
9380 burdens produce a much better system of protection for property generally.
9381 </p><p>
9382 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
9383 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
9384 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
9385 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
9386 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
9387 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property with
9388 confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is the author
9389 and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in a world without
9390 formalities. Complex, expensive, <span class="emphasis"><em>lawyer</em></span> transactions
9391 take their place.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2702908"></a>
9392 </p><p>
9393 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono Act that we
9394 tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it didn't "get."
9395 Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no way easily to
9396 build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright terms were, as Justice
9397 Story said they would be, "short," then this wouldn't matter much. For
9398 fourteen years, under the framers' system, a work would be presumptively
9399 controlled. After fourteen years, it would be presumptively uncontrolled.
9400 </p><p>
9401 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the inability to
9402 know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a huge and obvious
9403 burden on the creative process. If the only way a library can offer an
9404 Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a lawyer to clear the rights
9405 to every image and sound, then the copyright system is burdening creativity
9406 in a way that has never been seen before <span class="emphasis"><em>because there are no
9407 formalities</em></span>.
9408 </p><p>
9409 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If it is
9410 worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the longer
9411 term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how to get your
9412 permission if they want to use your work. And you will get the benefit of an
9413 extended copyright term.
9414 </p><p>
9415 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
9416 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
9417 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public domain
9418 where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a movie based
9419 on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
9420 </p><p>
9421 Noen bekymrer seg over byrden på forfattere. Gjør ikke byrden med å
9422 registrere verket at beløpet $1 egentlig er misvisende?  Er ikke
9423 ekstraarbeidet verdt mer enn $1? Er ikke dette det virkelige problemet med
9424 registrering?
9425 </p><p>
9426
9427 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
9428 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no doubt
9429 because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
9430 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must address
9431 the real problem of <span class="emphasis"><em>governments</em></span> standing at the core of
9432 any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
9433 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it was
9434 Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
9435 registration.  The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click registration
9436 fifty years after a work was published. Based upon historical data, that
9437 system would move up to 98 percent of commercial work, commercial work that
9438 no longer had a commercial life, into the public domain within fifty
9439 years. What do you think?
9440 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2702995"></a><p>
9441 Da Steve Forbes støttet idéen, begynte enkelte i Washington å følge
9442 med. Mange kontaktet meg med tips til representanter som kan være villig til
9443 å introdusere en Eldred-lov. og jeg hadde noen få som foreslo direkte at de
9444 kan være villige til å ta det første skrittet.
9445 </p><p>
9446 En representant, Zoe Lofgren fra California, gikk så langt som å få
9447 lovforslaget utarbeidet. Utkastet løste noen problemer med internasjonal
9448 lov. Det påla de enklest mulige forutsetninger på innehaverne av
9449 opphavsretter. I mai 2003 så det ut som om loven skulle være introdusert.
9450 16. mai, postet jeg på Eldred Act-bloggen, "vi er nære".  Det oppstod en
9451 generell reaksjon i blogg-samfunnet om at noe godt kunne skje her.
9452 <a class="indexterm" name="id2703028"></a>
9453 </p><p>
9454 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and the
9455 MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give the view of
9456 the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti informed the
9457 congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred Act. The reasons are
9458 embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their thinness shows something clear
9459 about what this debate is really about.
9460 </p><p>
9461
9462 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central concept
9463 in the proposed bill"&#8212;that copyrights be renewed. That was true, but
9464 irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred long before the
9465 Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.  Second, they argued that
9466 the proposal would harm poor copyright owners&#8212;apparently those who
9467 could not afford the $1 fee. Third, they argued that Congress had determined
9468 that extending a copyright term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in
9469 the case of the small percentage of work covered by copyright law that is
9470 still commercially valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal
9471 would not cut off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth,
9472 the MPAA argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
9473 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are certainly
9474 less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright whose owner is
9475 not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the copyright to a story
9476 underlying a film were to pass into the public domain. But what risk is
9477 that? If it is in the public domain, then the film is a valid derivative
9478 use.
9479 </p><p>
9480 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to do
9481 this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are thousands of
9482 copyright owners who don't even know they have a copyright to give. Whether
9483 they are free to give away their copyright or not&#8212;a controversial
9484 claim in any case&#8212;unless they know about a copyright, they're not
9485 likely to.
9486 </p><p>
9487 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law reacting to
9488 changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.  In the other,
9489 common sense was delayed. The difference between the two stories was the
9490 power of the opposition&#8212;the power of the side that fought to defend
9491 the status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
9492 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
9493 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
9494 </p><p>
9495 Jeg brukte disse to tilfellene som en måte å ramme inn krigen som denne
9496 boken har handlet om.  For her er det også en ny teknologi som tvinger loven
9497 til å reagere.  Og her bør vi også spørre, er loven i tråd med eller i strid
9498 med sunn fornuft.  Hvis sunn fornuft støtter loven, hva forklarer denne
9499 sunne fornuften?
9500 </p><p>
9501
9502
9503
9504 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the copyright
9505 owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and harmful, and the
9506 law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is p2p sharing, it is easy
9507 to understand why the law backs the owners still: Much of this sharing is
9508 wrong, even if much is harmless. When the issue is copyright terms for the
9509 Mickey Mouses of the world, it is possible still to understand why the law
9510 favors Hollywood: Most people don't recognize the reasons for limiting
9511 copyright terms; it is thus still possible to see good faith within the
9512 resistance.
9513 </p><p>
9514 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred Act,
9515 then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked selfinterest
9516 driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary range of content that
9517 is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with any copyright owner's desire
9518 to exercise continued control over his content. It would simply liberate
9519 what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark Content" that fills archives around the
9520 world. So when the warriors oppose a change like this, we should ask one
9521 simple question:
9522 </p><p>
9523 Hva ønsker denne industrien egentlig?
9524 </p><p>
9525 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So the
9526 effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about protecting
9527 <span class="emphasis"><em>their</em></span> content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an
9528 effort to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is
9529 another step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
9530 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
9531 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require
9532 <span class="emphasis"><em>their</em></span> permission first.
9533 </p><p>
9534 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side is. The
9535 most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as its aim not
9536 the protection of "property" but the rejection of a tradition.  Their aim is
9537 not simply to protect what is theirs. <span class="emphasis"><em>Their aim is to assure that
9538 all there is is what is theirs</em></span>.
9539 </p><p>
9540
9541 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not hard
9542 to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public domain
9543 tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA feared the
9544 competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public domain connected to
9545 a public that now has the means to create with it and to share its own
9546 creation.
9547 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2703181"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2703187"></a><p>
9548 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is as if
9549 the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the Causbys and
9550 demands that their remote and useless property rights be respected, so that
9551 these remote and forgotten copyright holders might block the progress of
9552 others.
9553 </p><p>
9554 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
9555 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so long
9556 as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of the
9557 Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission society." The
9558 past can be cultivated only if you can identify the owner and gain
9559 permission to build upon his work. The future will be controlled by this
9560 dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
9561 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2702758" href="#id2702758" class="para">194</a>] </sup>
9562
9563
9564 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
9565 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
9566 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
9567 author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act, every text
9568 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
9569 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any formality."
9570 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article 5(2) of
9571 the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue to impose
9572 some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as a condition
9573 of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
9574 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.  Copies of
9575 books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in the British
9576 Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar of Authors where
9577 the author's true name can be filed in the case of anonymous or pseudonymous
9578 works. Paul Goldstein, <em class="citetitle">International Intellectual Property Law,
9579 Cases and Materials</em> (New York: Foundation Press, 2001),
9580 153&#8211;54.  </p></div></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 16. Konklusjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-conclusion"></a>Kapittel 16. Konklusjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
9581 Det er mer enn trettifem millioner mennesker over hele verden med
9582 AIDS-viruset. Tjuefem millioner av dem bor i Afrika sør for Sahara.  Sytten
9583 millioner har allerede dødd.  Sytten millioner afrikanere er prosentvis
9584 proporsjonalt med syv millioner amerikanere.  Viktigere er det at dette er
9585 17 millioner afrikanere.
9586 </p><p>
9587 Det finnes ingen kur for AIDS, men det finnes medisiner som kan hemme
9588 sykdommens utvikling.  Disse antiretrovirale terapiene er fortsatt
9589 eksperimentelle, men de har hatt en dramatisk effekt allerede.  I USA øker
9590 AIDS-pasienter som regelmessig tar en cocktail av disse medisinene sin
9591 levealder med ti til tjue år. For noen gjøre medisinene sykdommen nesten
9592 usynlig.
9593 </p><p>
9594 Disse medisinene er dyre.  Da de ble først introdusert i USA, kostet de
9595 mellom $10 000 og $15 000 pr. person hvert år.  I dag koster noen av dem $25
9596 000 pr. år.  Med disse prisene har, selvfølgelig, ingen afrikansk stat  råd
9597 til medisinen for det store flertall av sine innbyggere: $15 000 er tredve
9598 ganger brutto nasjonalprodukt pr. innbygger i Zimbabwe.  Med slike priser er
9599 disse medisinene fullstendig utilgjengelig.<sup>[<a name="id2703268" href="#ftn.id2703268" class="footnote">195</a>]</sup>
9600 </p><p>
9601
9602
9603 Disse prisene er ikke høye fordi ingrediensene til medisinene er dyre.
9604 Disse prisene er høye fordi medisinene er beskyttet av patenter.
9605 Farmasiselskapene som produserer disse livreddende blandingene nyter minst
9606 tjue års monopol på sine oppfinnelser.  De bruker denne monopolmakten til å
9607 hente ut så mye de kan fra markedet.  Ved hjelp av denne makten holder de
9608 prisene høye.
9609 </p><p>
9610 Det er mange som er skeptiske til patenter, spesielt patenter på
9611 medisiner. Det er ikke jeg. Faktisk av alle forskningsområder som kan være
9612 støttet av patenter, er forskning på medisiner, etter min mening, det
9613 klareste tilfelle der patenter er nødvendig. Patenter gir et farmasøytiske
9614 firma en viss forsikring om at hvis det lykkes i å finne opp et nytt
9615 medikament som kan behandle en sykdom, vil det kunne tjene tilbake
9616 investeringen og mer til. Dette ber sosialt et ekstremt verdifullt
9617 insentiv. Jeg er den siste personen som vil argumentere for at loven skal
9618 avskaffe dette, i det minste uten andre endringer.
9619 </p><p>
9620 Men det er én ting å støtte patenter, selv patenter på medisiner. Det er en
9621 annen ting å avgjøre hvordan en best skal håndtere en krise. Og i det
9622 afrikanske ledere begynte å erkjenne ødeleggelsen AIDS brakte, begynte de å
9623 se etter måter å importere HIV-medisiner til kostnader betydelig under
9624 markedspris.
9625 </p><p>
9626 I 1997 forsøkte Sør-Afrika seg på en tilnærming.  Landet vedtok en lov som
9627 tillot import av patenterte medisiner som hadde blitt produsert og solgt i
9628 en annen nasjons marked med godkjenning fra patenteieren.  For eksempel,
9629 hvis medisinen var solgt i India, så kunne den bli importert inn til Afrika
9630 fra India.  Dette kalles "parallellimport" og er generelt tillatt i
9631 internasjonal handelslovgivning, og spesifikt tillatt i den europeiske
9632 union.<sup>[<a name="id2703345" href="#ftn.id2703345" class="footnote">196</a>]</sup>
9633 </p><p>
9634 Men USA var imot lovendringen.  Og de nøyde seg ikke med å være imot. Som
9635 International Intellectual Property Association karakteriserte det,
9636 "Myndighetene i USA presset Sør-Afrika . . . til å ikke tillate tvungen
9637 lisensiering eller parallellimport"<sup>[<a name="id2703382" href="#ftn.id2703382" class="footnote">197</a>]</sup>
9638 Gjennom kontoret til USAs handelsrepresentant (USTR), ba myndighetene
9639 Sør-Afrika om å endre loven&#8212;og for å legge press bak den
9640 forespørselen, listet USTR i 1998 opp Sør-Afrika som et land som burde
9641 vurderes for handelsrestriksjoner.  Samme år gikk mer enn førti
9642 farmasiselskaper til retten for å utfordre myndighetenes handlinger. USA
9643 fikk selskap av andre myndigheter fra EU.  Deres påstand, og påstanden til
9644 farmasiselskapene, var at Sør-Afrika brøt sine internasjonale forpliktelser
9645 ved å distriminere mot en bestemt type patenter&#8212;farmasøytiske
9646 patenter.  Kravet fra disse myndighetene, med USA i spissen, var at
9647 Sør-Afrika skulle respektere disse patentene på samme måte som alle andre
9648 patenter, uavhengig av eventuell effekt på behandlingen av AIDS i
9649 Sør-Afrika.<sup>[<a name="id2703411" href="#ftn.id2703411" class="footnote">198</a>]</sup>
9650 </p><p>
9651 Vi bør sette intervensjonen til USA i sammenheng.  Det er ingen tvil om at
9652 patenter ikke er den viktigste årsaken til at Afrikanere ikke har tilgang
9653 til medisiner.  Fattigdom og den totale mangel på effektivt helsevesen betyr
9654 mer. Men uansett om patenter er en viktigste grunnen eller ikke, så har
9655 prisen på medisiner en effekt på etterspørselen, og patenter påvirker
9656 prisen. Så uansett, massiv eller marginal, så var det en effekt av våre
9657 myndigheters intervensjon for å stoppe flyten av medisiner inn til Afrika.
9658 </p><p>
9659 Ved å stoppe flyten av HIV-behandling til Afrika, sikret ikke myndighetene i
9660 USA medisiner til USA borgere. Dette er ikke som hvete (hvis de spise det så
9661 kan ikke vi spise det). Det som USA i effekt intervenerte for å stoppe, var
9662 flyten av kunnskap: Informasjon om hvordan en kan ta kjemikalier som finnes
9663 i Afrika og gjøre disse kjemikaliene om til medisiner som kan redde 15 til
9664 30 millioner liv.
9665 </p><p>
9666 Intervensjonen fra USA ville heller ikke beskytte fortjenesten til
9667 medisinselskapene i USA&#8212; i hvert fall ikke betydelig.  Det var jo ikke
9668 slik at disse landene hadde mulighet til å kjøpe medisinene til de prisene
9669 som medisinselskapene forlangte.  Igjen var afrikanerne for fattige til å ha
9670 råd til disse medisinene til de tilbudte prisene.  Å blokkere for
9671 parallellimport av disse medisinene ville ikke øke salget til de amerikanske
9672 selskapene betydelig.
9673 </p><p>
9674 I stedet var argumentet til fordel for restriksjoner på denne flyten av
9675 informasjon, som var nødvendig for å redde millioner av liv, et argument om
9676 eiendoms ukrenkelighet.<sup>[<a name="id2703505" href="#ftn.id2703505" class="footnote">199</a>]</sup>  Det var på
9677 grunn av at "intellektuell eiendom" ville bli krenket at disse medisinene
9678 ikke skulle flomme inn til Afrika.  Det var prinsippet om viktigheten av
9679 "intellektuell eiendom" som fikk disse myndighetsaktørene til å intervenere
9680 mot Sør-Afrikas mottiltak mot AIDS.
9681 </p><p>
9682 La oss ta et skritt tilbake for et øyeblikk.  En gang om tredve år vil våre
9683 barn se tilbake på oss og spørre, hvordan kunne vi la dette skje?  Hvordan
9684 kunne vi tillate å gjennomføre en politikk hvis direkte kostnad var få 15
9685 til 30 millioner afrikanere til å dø raskere, og hvis eneste virkelige
9686 fordel var å opprettholde "ukrenkeligheten" til en idé?  Hva slags
9687 berettigelse kan noen sinne eksistere for en politikk som resulterer i så
9688 mange døde?  Hva slags galskap er det egentlig som tillater at så mange dør
9689 for slik en abstraksjon?
9690 </p><p>
9691 Noen skylder på farmasiselskapene.  Det gjør ikke jeg.  De er selskaper, og
9692 deres ledere er lovpålagt å tjene penger for selskapene.  De presser på for
9693 en bestemt patentpolitikk, ikke på grunn av idealer, men fordi det er dette
9694 som gjør at de tjener mest penger.  Og dette gjør kun at de tjener mest
9695 penger på grunn av en slags korrupsjon i vårt politiske system&#8212; en
9696 korrupsjon som farmasiselskapene helt klart ikke er ansvarlige for.
9697 </p><p>
9698 Denne korrupsjonen er våre egne politikeres manglende integritet.  For
9699 medisinprodusentene ville elske&#8212;sier de selv, og jeg tror dem &#8212;
9700 å selge sine medisiner så billig som de kan til land i Afrika og andre
9701 steder. Det er utfordringer de må løse å sikre at medisinene ikke kommer
9702 tilbake til USA, men dette er bare teknologiske utfordring. De kan bli
9703 overvunnet.
9704 </p><p>
9705
9706 Et annet problem kan derimot ikke løses. Det er frykten for at en politiker
9707 som skal vise seg og kaller inn lederne hos medisinprodusentene til høring i
9708 senatet eller representantenes hus og spør, "hvordan har det seg at du kan
9709 selge HIV-medisinen i Afrika for bare $1 pr. pille, mens samme pille koster
9710 en amerikansker $1500?" Da det ikke finnes et "kjapt svar" på det
9711 spørsmålet, ville effekten bli regulering av priser i Amerika.
9712 Medisinprodusentene unngård dermed denne spiralen ved å sikre at det første
9713 steget ikke tas.  De forsterker idéen om at eierrettigheter skal være
9714 ukrenkelige.  De legger seg på en rasjonell strategi i en irrasjonell
9715 omgivelse, med den utilsiktede konsekvens at kanskje millioner dør.  Og den
9716 rasjonelle strategien rammes dermed inn ved hjel av dette
9717 ideal&#8212;helligheten til en idé som kalles "immaterielle rettigheter".
9718 </p><p>
9719 Så når du konfronteres av ditt barns sunne fornuft, hva vil du si?  Når den
9720 sunne fornuften hos en generasjon endelig gjør opprør mot hva vi har gjort,
9721 hvordan vil vi rettferdiggjøre det?  Hva er argumentet?
9722 </p><p>
9723 En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk støtte til
9724 patentsystemet uten å måtte nå alle overalt på nøyaktig samme måte. På samme
9725 måte som en fornuftig opphavsrettspolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk
9726 støtte til et opphavsretts-system uten å måtte regulere spredningen av
9727 kultur perfekt og for alltid.  En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for
9728 og gi sterk støtte til et patentsystem uten å måtte blokkere spredning av
9729 medisiner til et land som uansett ikke er rikt nok til å ha råd til
9730 markedsprisen.  En fornuftig politikk kan en dermed si kunne være en
9731 balansert politikk.  For det meste av vår historie har både opphavsrett- og
9732 patentpolitikken i denne forstand vært balansert.
9733 </p><p>
9734
9735 Men vi som kultur har mistet denne følelsen for balanse.  Vi har mistet det
9736 kritiske blikket som hjelper oss til å se forkjellen mellom sannhet og
9737 ekstremisme.  En slags eiendomsfundamentalisme, uten grunnlag i vår
9738 tradisjon, hersker nå i vår kultur&#8212;sært, og med konsekvenser mer
9739 alvorlig for spredningen av idéer og kultur enn nesten enhver annen politisk
9740 enkeltavgjørelse vi som demokrati kan fatte.  En enkel idé blender oss, og
9741 under dekke av mørket skjer mye som de fleste av oss ville avvist hvis vi
9742 hadde fulgt med.  Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om eierskap til idéer at
9743 vi ikke engang legger merke til hvor uhyrlig det er å nekte tilgang til
9744 idéer for et folk som dør uten dem.  Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om
9745 eiendom til kulturen at vi ikke engang stiller spørsmål ved når kontrollen
9746 over denne eiendommen fjerner vår evne, som folk, til å utvikle vår kultur
9747 demokratisk.  Blindhet blir vår sunne fornuft, og utfordringen for enhver
9748 som vil gjenvinne retten til å dyrke vår kultur er å finne en måte å få
9749 denne sunne fornuften til å åpne sine øyne.
9750 </p><p>
9751 Så langt sover sunn fornuft.  Det er intet opprør.  Sunn fornuft ser ennå
9752 ikke hva det er å gjøre opprør mot.  Ekstremismen som nå domunerer denne
9753 debatten resonerer med idéer som virker naturlige, og resonansen er
9754 forsterket av våre moderne RCA-ene.  De fører en frenetisk krig for å
9755 bekjempe "piratvirksomhet" og knuser kreativitetskultur.  De forsvarer idéen
9756 om "kreativt eierskap", mens de endrer ekte skapere til moderne
9757 leilendinger.  De blir fornermet av idéen om at rettigheter skulle være
9758 balanserte, selv om hver av hovedaktørene i denne innholdskrigen selv hadde
9759 fordeler av et mer balansert ideal.  Hykleriet rår.  Men i en by som
9760 Washington blir ikke hykleriet en gang lakt merke til.  Mektige lobbyister,
9761 kompliserte problemer og MTV-oppmerksomhetsspenn gir en "perfekt storm" for
9762 fri kultur.
9763 </p><p>
9764 I august 2003 brøt en kamp ut i USA om en avgjørelse fra World Intellectual
9765 Property Organiation om å avlyse et møte.<sup>[<a name="id2703630" href="#ftn.id2703630" class="footnote">200</a>]</sup> På forespørsel fra en lang rekke med interresenter hadde WIPO
9766 bestemt å avholde et møte for å diskutere "åpne og sammarbeidende prosjekter
9767 for å skape goder for felleskapet".  Disse prosjektene som hadde lyktes i å
9768 produsere goder for fellesskapet uten å basere seg eksklusivt på bruken av
9769 proprietære immaterielle rettigheter.  Eksempler inkluderer internettet og
9770 verdensveven, begge som ble utviklet på grunnlag av protokoller i
9771 allemannseie.  Det hadde med en begynnende trend for å støtte åpne
9772 akademiske tidsskrifter, og inkluderte Public Library of Science-prosjektet
9773 som jeg beskriver i etterordet.  Det inkluderte et prosjekt for a utvikle
9774 enkeltnukleotidforskjeller (SNPs), som er antatt å få stor betydning i
9775 biomedisinsk forskning.  (Dette ideelle prosjektet besto av et konsortium av
9776 Wellcome Trust og farmasøytiske og teknologiske selskaper, inkludert
9777 Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
9778 Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, og
9779 Searle.)  Det inkluderte Globalt posisjonssystem (GPS) som Ronald Reagen
9780 frigjorde tidlig på 1980-tallet.  Og det inkluderte "åpen kildekode og fri
9781 programvare". <a class="indexterm" name="id2703807"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2703815"></a>
9782 </p><p>
9783 Formålet med møtet var å vurdere denne rekken av prosjekter fra et felles
9784 perspektiv: at ingen av disse prosjektene hadde som grunnlag immateriell
9785 ekstremisme. I stedet, hos alle disse, ble immaterielle rettigheter
9786 balansert med avtaler om å holde tilgang åpen, eller for å legge
9787 begrensninger på hvordan proprietære krav kan bli brukt.
9788 </p><p>
9789 Dermed var, fra perspektivet i denne boken, denne konferansen
9790 ideell.<sup>[<a name="id2703840" href="#ftn.id2703840" class="footnote">201</a>]</sup> Prosjektene innenfor temaet var
9791 både kommersielle og ikkekommersielle verker.  De involverte i hovedsak
9792 vitenskapet, men fra mange perspektiver.  Og WIPO var et ideelt sted for
9793 denne diskusjonen, siden WIPO var den fremstående internasjonale aktør som
9794 drev med immaterielle rettighetsspørsmål.
9795 </p><p>
9796
9797 Faktisk fikk jeg en gang offentlig kjeft for å ikke anerkjenne dette faktum
9798 om WIPO.  I februar 2003 leverte jeg et hovedinnlegg på en forberedende
9799 konferanse for World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).  På en
9800 pressekonferanse før innlegget, ble jeg spurt hva jeg skulle snakke om.  Jeg
9801 svarte at jeg skulle snakke litt om viktigheten av balanse rundt
9802 immaterielle verdier for utviklingen av informasjonssamfunnet.  Ordstyreren
9803 på arrangementet avbrøt meg da brått for å informere meg og journalistene
9804 tilstede at ingen spørsmål rundt immaterielle verdier ville bli diskutert av
9805 WSIS, da slike spørsmål kun skulle diskuteres i WIPO.  I innlegget jeg hadde
9806 forberedt var temaet om immaterielle verdier en forholdvis liten del av det
9807 hele.  Men etter denne forbløffende uttalelsen, gjorde jeg immaterielle
9808 verdier til hovedfokus for mitt innlegg.  Det var ikke mulig å snakke om et
9809 "informasjonssamfunn" uten at en også snakket om andelen av informasjon og
9810 kultur som ikke er vernet av opphavsretten.  Mitt innlegg gjorde ikke min
9811 overivrige moderator veldig glad.  Og hun hadde uten tvil rett i at omfanget
9812 til vern av immaterielle rettigheter normalt hørte inn under WIPO.  Men
9813 etter mitt syn, kunne det ikke bli for mye diskusjon om hvor mye
9814 immaterielle rettigheter som trengs, siden etter mitt syn, hadde selve ideen
9815 om en balanse rundt immaterielle rettigheter hadde gått tapt.
9816 </p><p>
9817 Så uansett om WSIS kan diskutere balanse i intellektuell eiendom eller ikke,
9818 så hadde jeg trodd det var tatt for gitt at WIPO kunne og burde.  Og dermed
9819 møtet om "åpne og samarbeidende prosjekter for å skape fellesgoder" virker å
9820 passe perfekt for WIPOs agenda.
9821 </p><p>
9822 Men det er ett prosjekt i listen som er svært kontroversielt, i hvert fall
9823 blant lobbyister. Dette prosjektet er "åpen kildekode og fri
9824 programvare". Microsoft spesielt er skeptisk til diskusjon om emnet. Fra
9825 deres perspektiv, ville en konferanse for å diskutere åpen kildekode og fri
9826 programvare være som en konferanse for å diskutere Apples operativsystem.
9827 Både åpen kildekode og fri programvare konkurrerer med Microsofts
9828 programvare.  Og internasjonalt har mange myndigheter begynt å utforske krav
9829 om at de skal bruke åpen kildekode eller fri programvare, i stedet for
9830 "proprietær programvare," til sine egne interne behov.
9831 </p><p>
9832 Jeg mener ikke å gå inn i den debatten her.  Det er viktig kun for å gjøre
9833 det klart at skillet ikke er mellom kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell
9834 programvare.  Det er mange viktige selskaper som er fundamentalt avhengig av
9835 fri programvare, der IBM er den mest fremtredende.  IBM har i stadig større
9836 grad skiftet sitt fokus til GNU/Linux-operativsystemet, det mest berømte
9837 biten av "fri programvare"&#8212;og IBM er helt klart en kommernsiell
9838 aktør. Dermed er det å støtte "fri programvare" ikke å motsette seg
9839 kommersielle aktører.  Det er i stedet å støtte en måte å drive
9840 programvareutvikling som er forskjellig fra Microsofts.<sup>[<a name="id2703688" href="#ftn.id2703688" class="footnote">202</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2703993"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2704000"></a>
9841 </p><p>
9842
9843 Mer viktig for våre formål, er at å støtte "åpen kildekode og fri
9844 programvare" ikke er å motsette seg opphasvrett. "Åpen kildekode og fri
9845 programvare" er ikke programvare uten opphavsrettslig vern. Istedet, på
9846 samme måte som programvare fra Microsoft, insisterer opphavsrettsinnehaverne
9847 av fri programvare ganske sterkt at vilkårene i deres programvarelisens blir
9848 respektert av de som tar i bruk fri programvare.  Vilkårene i den lisensen
9849 er uten tvil forskjellig fra vilkårene i en proprietær programvarelisens.
9850 For eksempel krever fri programvare lisensiert med den generelle offentlige
9851 lisensen (GPL), at kildekoden for programvare gjøres tilgjengelig for alle
9852 som endrer og redistribuerer programvaren.  Men dette kravet er kun
9853 effektivt hvis opphavsrett råder over programvare.  Hvis opphavsretten ikke
9854 råder over programvare, så kunne ikke fri programvare pålegge slike krav på
9855 de som tar i bruk programvaren.  Den er dermed like avhengig av
9856 opphavsrettsloven som Microsoft.
9857 </p><p>
9858 Det er dermed forståelig at Microsoft, som utviklere av proprietær
9859 programvare, gikk imot et slikt WIPO-møte, og like fullt forståelig at de
9860 bruker sine lobbyister til å få USAs myndigheter til å gå imot møtet.  Og
9861 ganske riktig, det er akkurat dette som i følge rapporter hadde skjedd.  I
9862 følge Jonathan Krim i <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, lyktes
9863 Microsofts lobbyister i å få USAs myndigheter til å legge ned veto mot et
9864 slikt møte.<sup>[<a name="id2704063" href="#ftn.id2704063" class="footnote">203</a>]</sup> Og uten støtte fra USA ble
9865 møtet avlyst.
9866 </p><p>
9867 Jeg klandrer ikke Microsoft for å gjøre det de kan for å fremme sine egne
9868 interesser i samsvar med loven. Og lobbyvirksomhet mot myndighetene er
9869 åpenbart i samsvar med loven. Det er ikke noe overraskende her med deres
9870 lobbyvirksomhet, og ikke veldig overraskende at den mektigste
9871 programvareprodusenten i USA har lyktes med sin lobbyvirksomhet.
9872 </p><p>
9873 Det som var overraskende var USAs regjerings begrunnelse for å være imot
9874 møtet.  Igjen, siterert av krim, forklarte Lois Boland, direktør for
9875 internasjonale forbindelser ved USAs patent og varemerkekontor, at
9876 "programvare med åpen kildekode går imot til formålet til WIPO, som er å
9877 fremme immatterielle rettigheter.".  Hun skal i følge sitatet ha sagt, "Å
9878 holde et møte som har som formål å fraskrive seg eller frafalle slike
9879 rettigheter synes for oss å være i strid med formålene til WIPO."
9880 </p><p>
9881 Disse utsagnene er forbløffende på flere nivåer.
9882 </p><p>
9883 For det første er de ganske enkelt enkelt ikke riktige.  Som jeg beskrev, er
9884 det meste av åpen kildekode og fri programvare fundamentalt avhengig av den
9885 immaterielle retten kalt "opphavsrett".  Uten den vil begresningene definert
9886 av disse lisensene ikke fungere. Dermed er det å si at de "går imot"
9887 formålet om å fremme immaterielle rettigheter å avsløre en ekstraordinær
9888 mangel på forståelse&#8212;den type feil som er tilgivelig hos en førsteårs
9889 jusstudent, men pinlig fra en høyt plassert statstjenestemann som håndterer
9890 utfordringer rundt immaterielle rettigheter.
9891 </p><p>
9892 For det andre, hvem har noen gang hevdet at WIPOs eksklusive mål var å
9893 "fremme" immaterielle rettigheter maksimalt?  Som jeg fikk kjeft om på den
9894 forberedende konferansen til WSIS, skal WIPO vurdere ikke bare hvordan best
9895 beskytte immaterielle rettigheter, men også hva som er den beste balansen
9896 rundt immaterielle rettigheter.  Som enhver økonom og advokat vet, er det
9897 vanskelige spørsmålet i immaterielle rettighetsjuss å finne den balansen.
9898 Men at det skulle være en grense, trodde jeg, var ubestridt.  Man ønsker å
9899 spørre Ms. boland om generelle medisiner (medisiner basert på medisiner med
9900 patenter som er utløpt) i strid med WIPOs oppdrag?  Svekker allemannseie
9901 immaterielle rettigheter?  Ville det vært bedre om internettets protokoller
9902 hadde vært patentert?
9903 </p><p>
9904 For det tredje, selv om en tror at formålet med WIPO var å maksimere
9905 immaterielle rettigheter, så innehas immaterielle rettigheter, i vår
9906 tradisjon, av individer og selskaper.  De får bestemme hva som skal gjøres
9907 med disse rettighetene, igjen fordi det er <span class="emphasis"><em>de</em></span> som eier
9908 rettigetene. Hvis de ønsker å "frafalle" eller "frasi" seg sine rettigheter,
9909 så er det helt etter boka i vår tradisjon.  Når Bill Gates gir bort mer enn
9910 $20 milliarder til gode formål, så er ikke det uforenelig med målene til
9911 eiendomssystemet.  Det er heller tvert i mot, akkurat hva eiendomssysstemet
9912 er ment å oppnå, at individer har retten til å bestemme hva de vil gjøre med
9913 <span class="emphasis"><em>sin</em></span> eiendom.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2704201"></a>
9914 </p><p>
9915
9916 Når Ms. Boland sier at det er noe galt med et møte "som har som sitt formål
9917 å fraskrive eller frafalle slike rettigheter", så sier hun at WIPO har en
9918 interesse i å påvirke valgene til enkeltpersoner som eier immaterielle
9919 rettigheter.  At på en eller annen WIPOs oppdrag bør være å stoppe individer
9920 fra å "frakrive" eller "frafalle" seg sine immaterielle rettigheter.  At
9921 interessen til WIPO ikke bare er  maksimale immaterielle rettigheter, men
9922 også at de skal utøves på den mest ekstreme og restriktive mulig måten.
9923 </p><p>
9924 Det er en historie om akkurat et slikt eierskapssystem som er velkjent i den
9925 anglo-amerikansk tradisjon.  Det kalles "føydalisme". Under føydalismen var
9926 eiendommer ikke bare kontrollert av et relativt lite antall individer og
9927 aktører.  Men det føydale systemet hadde en sterk interesse i å sikre at
9928 landeier i systemet ikke svekke føydalismen ved å frigjøre folkene og
9929 eiendomene som de kontrollerte til det frie markedet.  Føydalismen var
9930 avhengig av maksimal kontroll og konsentrasjon.  Det sloss mot enhver frihet
9931 som kunne forstyrre denne kontrollen.
9932 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2704240"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2704247"></a><p>
9933 Som Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite beskriver, dette er nøyaktig det valget
9934 vi nå gjør om immaterielle rettigheter.<sup>[<a name="id2704259" href="#ftn.id2704259" class="footnote">204</a>]</sup>
9935 Vi kommer til å få et informasjonssamfunn.  Så mye er sikkert.  Vårt eneste
9936 valg nå er hvorvidt dette informasjonssamfunnet skal være
9937 <span class="emphasis"><em>fritt</em></span> eller <span class="emphasis"><em>føydalt</em></span>.  Trenden er
9938 mot det føydale.
9939 </p><p>
9940 Da denne bataljen brøt ut, blogget jeg om dette.  En heftig debatt brøt ut i
9941 kommentarfeltet.  Ms. Boland hadde en rekke støttespillere som forsøkte å
9942 vise hvorfor hennes kommentarer ga mening.  Men det var spesielt en
9943 kommentar som gjorde meg trist.  En anonym kommentator skrev,
9944 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
9945
9946 George, du misforstår Lessig: Han snakker bare om verden slik den burde være
9947 ("målet til WIPO, og målet til enhver regjering, bør være å fremme den
9948 riktige balansen for immaterielle rettigheter, ikke bare å fremme
9949 immaterielle rettigheter"), ikke som den er.  Hvis vi snakket om verden slik
9950 den er, så har naturligvis Boland ikke sagt noe galt.  Men i verden slik
9951 Lessig vil at den skal være, er det åpenbart at hun har sagt noe galt.  En
9952 må alltid være oppmerksom på forskjellen mellom Lessigs og vår verden.
9953 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9954 Jeg gikk glipp av ironien først gangen jeg leste den. Jeg lese den raskt og
9955 trodde forfatteren støttet idéen om at det våre myndigheter burde gjøre var
9956 å søke balanse. (Min kritikk av Ms Boland, selvfølgelig, var ikke om
9957 hvorvidt hun søkte balanse eller ikke; min kritikk var at hennes kommentarer
9958 avslørte en feil kun en førsteårs jussstudent burde kunne gjøre. Jeg har
9959 noen illusjon om ekstremismen hos våre myndigheter, uansett om de er
9960 republikanere eller demokrater. Min eneste tilsynelatende illusjon er
9961 hvorvidt våre myndigheter bør snakke sant eller ikke.)
9962 </p><p>
9963 Det var dermot åpenbart at den som postet meldingen ikke støttet idéen.  I
9964 stedet latterliggjorde forfatteren selve idéen om at i den virkelig verden
9965 skulle "målet" til myndighetene være "å fremme den riktige balanse" for
9966 immaterielle rettigheter.  Det var åpenbart tåpelig for ham.  Og det
9967 avslørte åpenbart, trodde han, min egen tåpelige utopisme.  "Typisk for en
9968 akademiker", kunne forfatteren like gjerne ha fortsatt.
9969 </p><p>
9970 Jeg forstår kritikken av akademisk utopisme.  Jeg mener også at utopisme er
9971 tåpelig, og jeg vil være blant de første til å gjøre narr av de aburde
9972 urealisistiske idealer til akademikere gjennom historien (og ikke bare i
9973 vårt eget lands historie).
9974 </p><p>
9975 Men når det har blitt dumt å anta at rollen til våre myndigheter bør være å
9976 "oppnå balanse", da kan du regne meg blant de dumme, for det betyr at dette
9977 faktisk har blitt ganske seriøst.  Hvis det bør være åpenbart for alle at
9978 myndighetene ikke søker å oppnå balanse, at myndighetene ganske enkelt et
9979 verktøy for de mektigste lobbyistene, at ideen om å forvente bedre av
9980 myndighetene er absurd, at ideen om å kreve at myndighetene snakker sant og
9981 ikke lyver bare er naiv, hva har da vi, det mektigste demokratiet i verden,
9982 blitt?
9983 </p><p>
9984
9985 Det kan være galskap å forvente at en mektig myndigshetsperson skal si
9986 sannheten. Det kan være galskap å tro at myndighetenes politikk skal gjøre
9987 mer enn å tjene de mektigste interesser. Det kan være galskap å argumentere
9988 for å bevare en tradisjon som har vært en del av vår tradisjon for
9989 mesteparten av vår historie&#8212;fri kultur.
9990 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2704384"></a><p>
9991 Hvis dette er galskap, så la det være mer gærninger.  Snart. Det finnes
9992 øyeblikk av håp i denne kampen. Og øyeblikk som overrasker. Da FCC vurderte
9993 mindre strenge eierskapregler, som ville ytterligere konsentrere
9994 mediaeierskap, dannet det seg en en ekstraordinær koalisjon på tvers av
9995 partiene for å bekjempe endringen. For kanskje første gang i historien
9996 organiserte interesser så forskjellige som NRA, ACLU, moveon.org, William
9997 Safire, Ted Turner og Codepink Women for Piece seg for å protestere på denne
9998 endringen i FCC-reglene.  Så mange som 700 000 brev ble sendt til FCC med
9999 krav om flere høringer og et annet resultat.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2704405"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2704412"></a>
10000 </p><p>
10001 Disse protestene stoppet ikke FCC, men like etter stemte en bred koalisjon i
10002 senatet for å reversere avgjørelsen i FCC. De fientlige høringene som ledet
10003 til avstemmingen avslørte hvor mektig denne bevegelsen hadde blitt.  Det var
10004 ingen betydnigsfull støtte for FCCs avgjørelse, mens det var bred og
10005 vedvarende støtte for å bekjempe ytterligere konsentrasjon i media.
10006 </p><p>
10007 Men selv denne bevegelsen går glipp av en viktig brikke i puslespillet.  Å
10008 være stor er ikke ille i seg selv. Frihet er ikke truet bare på grunn av at
10009 noen blir veldig rik, eller på grunn av at det bare er en håndfull store
10010 aktører.  Den dårlige kvaliteten til Big Macs eller Quartar Punders betyr
10011 ikke at du ikke kan få en god hamburger andre steder.
10012 </p><p>
10013 Faren med mediekonsentrasjon kommer ikke fra selve konsentrasjonen, men
10014 kommer fra føydalismen som denne konsentrasjonen fører til når den kobles
10015 til endringer i opphavsretten. Det er ikke kun at det er noen mektige
10016 selskaper som styrer en stadig voksende andel av mediene. Det er at denne
10017 konsentrasjonen kan påkalle en like oppsvulmet rekke
10018 rettigheter&#8212;eiendomsrettigheter i en historisk ekstrem form&#8212;som
10019 gjør størrelsen ille.
10020 </p><p>
10021 Det er derfor betydningsfullt at så mange vil kjempe for å kreve konkurranse
10022 og økt mangfold. Likevel, hvis kampanjen blir forstått til å kun gjelde
10023 størrelse, så er ikke det veldig overraskende. Vi amerikanere har en lang
10024 historie med å slåss mot "stort", klokt eller ikke. At vi kan være motivert
10025 til å slåss mot "store" igjen ikke noe nytt.
10026 </p><p>
10027 Det ville vært noe nytt, og noe veldig viktig, hvis like mange kan være med
10028 på en kampanje for å bekjempe økende ekstremisme bygget inn i idéen om
10029 "intellektuell eiendom".  Ikke fordi balanse er fremmed for vår
10030 tradisjon. Jeg agumenterer for at balanse er vår tradisjon.  Men fordi evnen
10031 til å tenke kritisk på omfanget av alt som kalles "eiendom" ikke er lenger
10032 er godt trent i denne tradisjonen.
10033 </p><p>
10034 Hvis vi var Akilles, så ville dette være vår hæl. Dette ville være stedet
10035 for våre tragedie.
10036 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2704504"></a><p>
10037 Mens jeg skriver disse avsluttende ordene, er nyhetene fylt med historier om
10038 at RIAA saksøker nesten tre hundre individer.<sup>[<a name="id2704517" href="#ftn.id2704517" class="footnote">205</a>]</sup>  Eminem har nettopp blitt saksøkt for å ha "samplet" noen andres
10039 musikk.<sup>[<a name="id2704564" href="#ftn.id2704564" class="footnote">206</a>]</sup>  Historien om hvordan Bob Dylan
10040 har "stjålet" fra en japansk forfatter har nettopp gått verden
10041 over.<sup>[<a name="id2704581" href="#ftn.id2704581" class="footnote">207</a>]</sup>  En på innsiden i
10042 Hollywood&#8212;som insisterer på at han må forbli anonym&#8212;rapporterer
10043 "en utrolig samtale med disse studiofolkene.  De har fantastisk [gammelt]
10044 innhold som de ville elske å bruke, men det kan de ikke på grunn av at de
10045 først må klarere rettighetene.  De har hauger med ungdommer som kunne gjøre
10046 fantastiske ting med innholdet, men det vil først kreve hauger med advokater
10047 for å klarere det først".  Kongressrepresentanter snakker om å gi datavirus
10048 politimyndighet for å ta ned datamaskiner som antas å bryte loven.
10049 Universiteter truer med å utvise ungdommer som bruker en datamaskin for å
10050 dele innhold.
10051 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2704617"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2704623"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2704629"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2704636"></a><p>
10052
10053 I mens på andre siden av atlanteren har BBC nettopp annonsert at de vil
10054 bygge opp et "kreativt arkiv" som britiske borgere kan laste ned BBC-innhold
10055 fra, og rippe, mikse og brenne det ut.<sup>[<a name="id2704652" href="#ftn.id2704652" class="footnote">208</a>]</sup>
10056 Og i Brasil har kulturministeren, Gilberto Gil, i seg selv en folkehelt i
10057 brasiliansk musikk, slått seg sammen med Creative Commons for å gi ut
10058 innhold og frie lisenser i dette latinamerikanske landet.<sup>[<a name="id2704673" href="#ftn.id2704673" class="footnote">209</a>]</sup>  Jeg har fortalt en mørk historie.  Sannheten mer
10059 mer blandet.  En teknologi har gitt oss mer frihet.  Sakte begynner noen å
10060 forstå at denne friheten trenger ikke å bety anarki.  Vi kan få med oss fri
10061 kultur inn i det tjueførste århundre, uten at artister taper og uten at
10062 potensialet for digital teknologi blir knust.  Det vil kreve omtanke, og
10063 viktigere, det vil kreve at noen omforme RCAene av i dag til Causbyere.
10064 </p><p>
10065
10066 Sunn fornuft må gjøre opprør. Den må handle for å frigjøre kulturen. Og
10067 snart, hvis dette potensialet skal noen gang bli realisert.
10068
10069
10070
10071 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2703268" href="#id2703268" class="para">195</a>] </sup>
10072
10073 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
10074 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
10075 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10076 #55</a>. I følge en pressemelding fra verdens helseorganisasjon sendt ut
10077 9. juli 2002, mottar kun 320 000 av de 6 millioner som trenger medisiner i
10078 utviklingsland dem de trenger&#8212;og halvparten av dem er i Brasil.
10079 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2703345" href="#id2703345" class="para">196</a>] </sup>
10080
10081 Se Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: <em class="citetitle">Who
10082 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</em> (New York: The New Press, 2003),
10083 37.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2703354"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2703362"></a>
10084 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2703382" href="#id2703382" class="para">197</a>] </sup>
10085
10086
10087 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <em class="citetitle">Patent
10088 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a
10089 Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property Organization</em>
10090 (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #56</a>. For a firsthand
10091 account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing Before the
10092 Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House
10093 Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22
10094 July 1999), 150&#8211;57 (statement of James Love).
10095 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2703411" href="#id2703411" class="para">198</a>] </sup>
10096
10097
10098 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <em class="citetitle">Patent
10099 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, en
10100 rapport forberedt for the World Intellectual Property
10101 Organization</em> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2703505" href="#id2703505" class="para">199</a>] </sup>
10102
10103
10104
10105 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's Needs at
10106 Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," <em class="citetitle">San Francisco
10107 Chronicle</em>, 24 May 1999, A1, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #57</a> ("compulsory licenses
10108 and gray markets pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property
10109 protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
10110 Access to Essential Medicines," <em class="citetitle">Foreign Policy in
10111 Focus</em> 4:23 (August 1999), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #58</a> (describing
10112 U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the
10113 HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property
10114 Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," <em class="citetitle">Widener Law Symposium
10115 Journal</em> (Spring 2001): 175.
10116
10117 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2703630" href="#id2703630" class="para">200</a>] </sup>
10118
10119 Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," <em class="citetitle">Washington
10120 Post</em>, august 2003, E1, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #59</a>; William New, "Global
10121 Group's Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," <em class="citetitle">National
10122 Journal's Technology Daily</em>, 19. august 2003, tilgjengelig  fra
10123 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #60</a>; William New,
10124 "U.S. Official Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," <em class="citetitle">National
10125 Journal's Technology Daily</em>, 19. august 2003, tilgjengelig fra
10126 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #61</a>.
10127 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2703840" href="#id2703840" class="para">201</a>] </sup>
10128
10129 Jeg bør nevne at jeg var en av folkene som ba WIPO om dette møtet.
10130 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2703688" href="#id2703688" class="para">202</a>] </sup>
10131
10132
10133 Microsofts posisjon om åpen kildekode og fri programvare er mer
10134 sofistikert.  De har flere ganger forklart at de har ikke noe problem med
10135 programvare som er "åpen kildekode" eller programvare som er allemannseie.
10136 Microsofts prinsipielle motstand er mot "fri programvare" lisensiert med en
10137 "copyleft"-lisens, som betyr at lisensen krever at de som lisensierer skal
10138 adoptere same vilkår for ethvert avledet verk.  Se Bradford L. Smith, "The
10139 Future of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,"
10140 <em class="citetitle">Government Policy Toward Open Source Software</em>
10141 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
10142 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
10143 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10144 #62</a>. Se også Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
10145 <em class="citetitle">The Commercial Software Model</em>, diskusjon ved New York
10146 University Stern School of Business (3. mai 2001), tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #63</a>.
10147 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2704063" href="#id2704063" class="para">203</a>] </sup>
10148
10149
10150 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #64</a>.
10151 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2704259" href="#id2704259" class="para">204</a>] </sup>
10152
10153 Se Drahos with Braithwaite, <em class="citetitle">Information Feudalism</em>,
10154 210&#8211;20.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2703405"></a>
10155 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2704517" href="#id2704517" class="para">205</a>] </sup>
10156
10157
10158 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, september 2003,
10159 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10160 #65</a>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8
10161 september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #66</a>; Soni Sangha og Phyllis
10162 Furman sammen med Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song, N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among
10163 261 Cited as Sharers," <em class="citetitle">New York Daily News</em>,
10164 9. september 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets;
10165 Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10166 <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, 10. september 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
10167 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," <em class="citetitle">Wired News</em>,
10168 10. september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #67</a>.
10169 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2704564" href="#id2704564" class="para">206</a>] </sup>
10170
10171
10172 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
10173 17. september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #68</a>.
10174 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2704581" href="#id2704581" class="para">207</a>] </sup>
10175
10176
10177
10178 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for Dylan
10179 Songs," Kansascity.com, 9. juli 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #69</a>.
10180
10181 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2704652" href="#id2704652" class="para">208</a>] </sup>
10182
10183 "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," pressemelding fra BBC,
10184 24. august 2003, tilgjengelig  fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #70</a>.
10185 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2704673" href="#id2704673" class="para">209</a>] </sup>
10186
10187
10188 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6. august 2003,
10189 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10190 #71</a>.
10191 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 17. Etterord"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-afterword"></a>Kapittel 17. Etterord</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#usnow">Oss, nå</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#themsoon">Dem, snart</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><p>
10192
10193
10194
10195 I hvert fall noen av de som har lest helt hit vil være enig med meg om at
10196 noe må gjøres for å endre retningen vi holder.  Balansen i denne boken
10197 kartlegger hva som kan gjøres.
10198 </p><p>
10199 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now, and that
10200 which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson that we can
10201 draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that it requires
10202 remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
10203 </p><p>
10204 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
10205 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators, authors,
10206 musicians, filmmakers, scientists&#8212;all to tell this story in their own
10207 words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
10208 </p><p>
10209 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of having
10210 an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people think
10211 matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands opposed, but
10212 still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I sketch changes that
10213 Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
10214 </p><div class="section" title="Oss, nå"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="usnow"></a>Oss, nå</h2></div></div></div><p>
10215 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far has
10216 been framed at the extremes&#8212;as a grand either/or: either property or
10217 anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is
10218 the choice, then the warriors should win.
10219 </p><p>
10220 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are extremes in
10221 this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There are those who
10222 believe in maximal copyright&#8212;"All Rights Reserved"&#8212; and those
10223 who reject copyright&#8212;"No Rights Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved"
10224 sorts believe that you should ask permission before you "use" a copyrighted
10225 work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able
10226 to do with content as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or
10227 not.
10228 </p><p>
10229
10230 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
10231 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
10232 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
10233 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
10234 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
10235 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively unprotected.
10236 </p><p>
10237 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite equal)
10238 by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this book. Through
10239 legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's design, copyright
10240 holders have been able to change the essential character of the environment
10241 of the original Internet. If the original architecture made the effective
10242 default "no rights reserved," the future architecture will make the
10243 effective default "all rights reserved." The architecture and law that
10244 surround the Internet's design will increasingly produce an environment
10245 where all use of content requires permission.  The "cut and paste" world
10246 that defines the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and
10247 paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
10248 </p><p>
10249 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&#8212;neither "all
10250 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&#8212;
10251 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content as
10252 they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of freedoms
10253 that we could just take for granted before.
10254 </p><div class="section" title="Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="examples"></a>Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</h3></div></div></div><p>
10255 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
10256 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before the
10257 Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about our lives
10258 that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore and browsed
10259 through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need to worry about
10260 explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of
10261 your browsing habits was assured.
10262 </p><p>
10263 Hva gjorde at det var sikret?
10264 </p><p>
10265 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, your privacy was
10266 assured because of an inefficient architecture for gathering data and hence
10267 a market constraint (cost) on anyone who wanted to gather that data. If you
10268 were a suspected spy for North Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your
10269 privacy would not be assured.  But that's because the CIA would (we hope)
10270 find it valuable enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But
10271 for most of us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly
10272 inefficient architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust
10273 amount of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
10274 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many places,
10275 not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs
10276 that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
10277 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2704872"></a><p>
10278 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular has
10279 become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you browse the
10280 pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked at. You know this
10281 because at the side of the page, there's a list of "recently viewed"
10282 pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net and the function of
10283 cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the data than not. The friction
10284 has disappeared, and hence any "privacy" protected by the friction
10285 disappears, too.
10286 </p><p>
10287 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry about
10288 libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that people
10289 should have the "right" to browse in a library without the government
10290 knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties, too), then this
10291 change in the technology of monitoring might concern you. If it becomes
10292 simple to gather and sort who does what in electronic spaces, then the
10293 friction-induced privacy of yesterday disappears.
10294 </p><p>
10295
10296 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy" on the
10297 Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what friction
10298 before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what friction
10299 did.<sup>[<a name="id2704910" href="#ftn.id2704910" class="footnote">210</a>]</sup> And whether you're in favor of
10300 those laws or not, it is the pattern that is important here. We must take
10301 affirmative steps to secure a kind of freedom that was passively provided
10302 before. A change in technology now forces those who believe in privacy to
10303 affirmatively act where, before, privacy was given by default.
10304 </p><p>
10305 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
10306 movement. When computers with software were first made available
10307 commercially, the software&#8212;both the source code and the
10308 binaries&#8212; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data
10309 General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
10310 about controlling their software.
10311 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2704950"></a><p>
10312 Dette var verden Richard Stallman ble født inn i, og mens han var forsker
10313 ved MIT, lærte han til å elske samfunnet som utviklet seg når en var fri til
10314 å utforske og fikle med programvaren som kjørte på datamaskiner. Av den
10315 smarte sorten selv, og en talentfull programmerer, begynte Stallman å basere
10316 seg frihet til å legge til eller endre på andre personers arbeid.
10317 </p><p>
10318 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In a
10319 math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that someone
10320 offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a theorem, you could
10321 take what someone else did and change it. In a classics department, if you
10322 believed a colleague's translation of a recently discovered text was flawed,
10323 you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you
10324 should be free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
10325 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like anything
10326 else?
10327 </p><p>
10328 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue for
10329 computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from one system
10330 to another, it became economically attractive (at least in the view of some)
10331 to hide the code of your program. So, too, as companies started selling
10332 peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just take your printer driver
10333 and copy it, then that would make it easier for me to sell a printer to the
10334 market than it was for you.
10335 </p><p>
10336
10337 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the early
10338 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.  The world of
10339 free software had been erased by a change in the economics of computing. And
10340 as he believed, if he did nothing about it, then the freedom to change and
10341 share software would be fundamentally weakened.
10342 </p><p>
10343 Derfor, i 1984, startet Stallmann på et prosjekt for å bygge et fritt
10344 operativsystem, slik i hvert fall en flik av fri programvare skulle
10345 overleve.  Dette var starten på GNU-prosjektet, som "Linux"-kjernen til
10346 Linus Torvalds senere ble lagt til i for å produsere
10347 GNU/Linux-operativsystemet. <a class="indexterm" name="id2705028"></a>
10348 <a class="indexterm" name="id2705034"></a>
10349 </p><p>
10350 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of software
10351 that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free Software
10352 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the source code
10353 for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone building upon
10354 GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free as well. This would
10355 assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code would develop that
10356 remained free for others to build upon. His fundamental goal was freedom;
10357 innovative creative code was a byproduct.
10358 </p><p>
10359 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now do for
10360 privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that was taken
10361 for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses that bind
10362 copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a space where free
10363 software would survive. He was actively protecting what before had been
10364 passively guaranteed.
10365 </p><p>
10366 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates with
10367 the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and scientific
10368 journals are produced.
10369 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxacademocjournals"></a><p>
10370
10371 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
10372 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them to
10373 libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
10374 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
10375 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
10376 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
10377 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
10378 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
10379 service.  Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and anyone is
10380 free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free to
10381 charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme Court
10382 opinion through their respective services.
10383 </p><p>
10384 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
10385 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive for
10386 people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.  The law has
10387 agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed to flourish. And if
10388 there's nothing wrong with selling the public domain, then there could be
10389 nothing wrong, in principle, with selling access to material that is not in
10390 the public domain.
10391 </p><p>
10392 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data was
10393 through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to browse this
10394 data except by paying for a subscription?
10395 </p><p>
10396 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
10397 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
10398 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to the
10399 library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts because the
10400 library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand the risks of a
10401 certain treatment could research those risks by reading all available
10402 articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a function of the
10403 institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of paper journals
10404 (architecture)&#8212;namely, that it was very hard to control access to a
10405 paper journal.
10406 </p><p>
10407 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding that
10408 libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This means
10409 that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries begin to
10410 disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing technology
10411 and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
10412 </p><p>
10413 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to restore the
10414 freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science (PLoS), for
10415 example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making scientific research
10416 available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors of scientific work submit
10417 that work to the Public Library of Science.  That work is then subject to
10418 peer review. If accepted, the work is then deposited in a public, electronic
10419 archive and made permanently available for free. PLoS also sells a print
10420 version of its work, but the copyright for the print journal does not
10421 inhibit the right of anyone to redistribute the work for free.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2705157"></a>
10422 </p><p>
10423 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for granted
10424 before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.  There's no
10425 doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional publishers and
10426 their efforts to make money from the exclusive distribution of content. But
10427 competition in our tradition is presumptively a good&#8212;especially when
10428 it helps spread knowledge and science.
10429 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2705167"></a></div><div class="section" title="Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="oneidea"></a>Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</h3></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxcc"></a><p>
10430 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
10431 increasing control effected through law and technology.
10432 </p><p>
10433 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation
10434 established in Massachusetts, but with its home at Stanford University. Its
10435 aim is to build a layer of <span class="emphasis"><em>reasonable</em></span> copyright on top
10436 of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to
10437 build upon other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express
10438 the freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags, tied
10439 to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this
10440 possible.
10441 </p><p>
10442
10443 <span class="emphasis"><em>Simple</em></span>&#8212;which means without a middleman, or
10444 without a lawyer.  By developing a free set of licenses that people can
10445 attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content
10446 that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
10447 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers automatically
10448 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three expressions
10449 together&#8212;a legal license, a human-readable description, and
10450 machine-readable tags&#8212;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
10451 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
10452 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal that
10453 the person associated with the license believes in something different than
10454 the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the CC mark, which does
10455 not mean that copyright is waived, but that certain freedoms are given.
10456 </p><p>
10457 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their precise
10458 contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The creator can choose a
10459 license that permits any use, so long as attribution is given. She can
10460 choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.  She can choose a
10461 license that permits any use so long as the same freedoms are given to other
10462 uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is
10463 made. Or any use at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so
10464 long as full copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
10465 </p><p>
10466 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
10467 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional fair
10468 use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way that
10469 subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
10470 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content, governed by
10471 a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build upon. Voluntary
10472 choice of individuals and creators will make this content available. And
10473 that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a public domain.
10474 </p><p>
10475 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons.  And of
10476 course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
10477 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from many is
10478 that we are not interested only in talking about a public domain or in
10479 getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our aim is to build a
10480 movement of consumers and producers of content ("content conducers," as
10481 attorney Mia Garlick calls them)  who help build the public domain and, by
10482 their work, demonstrate the importance of the public domain to other
10483 creativity.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2705292"></a>
10484 </p><p>
10485 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
10486 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture are
10487 produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written centuries
10488 ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have imagined. The
10489 rules may well have made sense against a background of technologies from
10490 centuries ago, but they do not make sense against the background of digital
10491 technologies. New rules&#8212;with different freedoms, expressed in ways so
10492 that humans without lawyers can use them&#8212;are needed. Creative Commons
10493 gives people a way effectively to begin to build those rules.
10494 </p><p>
10495 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some participate
10496 to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example, is a science
10497 fiction author. His first novel, <em class="citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
10498 Kingdom</em>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
10499 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
10500 </p><p>
10501 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher reasoned
10502 like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)  those who will buy
10503 Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2) those who may never
10504 hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for free on the
10505 Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book instead of buying
10506 it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)  will download Cory's book, like
10507 it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.  If there are more
10508 (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line
10509 will probably <span class="emphasis"><em>increase</em></span> sales of Cory's book.
10510 </p><p>
10511 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that conclusion.
10512 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the publisher had
10513 expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was a total success.
10514 </p><p>
10515
10516 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content was
10517 confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner, who wrote a
10518 book about the free software movement titled <em class="citetitle">Free for
10519 All</em>, made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a
10520 Creative Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
10521 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
10522 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as well.
10523 </p><p>
10524 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
10525 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the Commons. There
10526 are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other reasons. Many who use
10527 the "sampling license" do so because anything else would be
10528 hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are free, for commercial
10529 or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from the licensed work; they
10530 are just not free to make full copies of the licensed work available to
10531 others. This is consistent with their own art&#8212;they, too, sample from
10532 others. Because the <span class="emphasis"><em>legal</em></span> costs of sampling are so high
10533 (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
10534 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow" Public
10535 Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so high<sup>[<a name="id2705376" href="#ftn.id2705376" class="footnote">211</a>]</sup>), these artists release into the creative
10536 environment content that others can build upon, so that their form of
10537 creativity might grow.
10538 </p><p>
10539 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
10540 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
10541 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is, you
10542 are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved" model. Good
10543 for you, but many do not. Many believe that however appropriate that rule is
10544 for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate description of how most
10545 creators view the rights associated with their content. The Creative Commons
10546 license expresses this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the
10547 chance to say it to others.
10548 </p><p>
10549
10550 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over 1 million
10551 objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next step is
10552 partnerships with middleware content providers to help them build into their
10553 technologies simple ways for users to mark their content with Creative
10554 Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and celebrate creators who
10555 build content based upon content set free.
10556 </p><p>
10557 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not mere
10558 arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first step to
10559 showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
10560 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve this
10561 rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary steps are
10562 possible.
10563 </p><p>
10564 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by individuals and
10565 creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the creative field. The
10566 project does not compete with copyright; it complements it. Its aim is not
10567 to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it easier for authors and
10568 creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and cheaply. That
10569 difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread more easily.
10570 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2705466"></a></div></div><div class="section" title="Dem, snart"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="themsoon"></a>Dem, snart</h2></div></div></div><p>
10571 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will also
10572 take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before the
10573 politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.  But
10574 that also means that we have time to build awareness around the changes that
10575 we need.
10576 </p><p>
10577 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general, and
10578 one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each is a
10579 step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way to our
10580 end.
10581 </p><div class="section" title="1. Flere formaliteter"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="formalities"></a>1. Flere formaliteter</h3></div></div></div><p>
10582 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
10583 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.  If
10584 you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
10585 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
10586 </p><p>
10587
10588
10589 These are all formalities associated with property. They are requirements
10590 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
10591 </p><p>
10592 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a copyright,
10593 regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You don't have to
10594 register. You don't even have to mark your content. The default is control,
10595 and "formalities" are banished.
10596 </p><p>
10597 Why?
10598 </p><p>
10599 As I suggested in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a good
10600 one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities imposed a burden
10601 on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it was progress when the
10602 law relaxed the formal requirements that a copyright owner must bear to
10603 protect and secure his work. Those formalities were getting in the way.
10604 </p><p>
10605 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
10606 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that burdens
10607 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with
10608 whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the creative work of
10609 others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&#8212; there is no
10610 simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the massive increase in
10611 the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is a necessary step for
10612 any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the <span class="emphasis"><em>lack</em></span>
10613 of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
10614 </p><p>
10615 The law should therefore change this requirement<sup>[<a name="id2705571" href="#ftn.id2705571" class="footnote">212</a>]</sup>&#8212;but it should not change it by going back to the old, broken
10616 system. We should require formalities, but we should establish a system that
10617 will create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
10618 </p><p>
10619 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work, registering
10620 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally, the first of
10621 these three was something the copyright owner did; the second two were
10622 something the government did. But a revised system of formalities would
10623 banish the government from the process, except for the sole purpose of
10624 approving standards developed by others.
10625 </p><div class="section" title="Registrering og fornying"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="registration"></a>Registrering og fornying</h4></div></div></div><p>
10626 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with the
10627 Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
10628 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
10629 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the burden
10630 of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.  And as
10631 the Copyright Office is not a main target of government policymaking, the
10632 office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus, when people who
10633 know something about the process hear this idea about formalities, their
10634 first reaction is panic&#8212;nothing could be worse than forcing people to
10635 deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
10636 </p><p>
10637 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition of
10638 extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer think
10639 innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.  Just because
10640 there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't follow that the
10641 government must actually administer the role. Instead, we should be creating
10642 incentives for private parties to serve the public, subject to standards
10643 that the government sets.
10644 </p><p>
10645 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.  There
10646 are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.  Domain name
10647 owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their registration
10648 alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net), there is a central
10649 registry. The actual registrations are, however, performed by many competing
10650 registrars. That competition drives the cost of registering down, and more
10651 importantly, it drives the ease with which registration occurs up.
10652 </p><p>
10653
10654 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
10655 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry, but
10656 it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should establish a
10657 database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
10658 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete with
10659 one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for registering and
10660 renewing copyrights. That competition would substantially lower the burden
10661 of this formality&#8212;while producing a database of registrations that
10662 would facilitate the licensing of content.
10663 </p></div><div class="section" title="Merking"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="marking"></a>Merking</h4></div></div></div><p>
10664 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
10665 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh punishment for
10666 failing to comply with a regulatory rule&#8212;akin to imposing the death
10667 penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.  Here again,
10668 there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be enforced in this
10669 way. And more importantly, there is no reason a marking requirement needs to
10670 be enforced uniformly across all media.
10671 </p><p>
10672 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is copyrighted
10673 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also makes it easy
10674 to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use the work.
10675 </p><p>
10676 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was that
10677 different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't clear
10678 how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A new
10679 marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing the
10680 differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to evolve as
10681 technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special signal from the
10682 failure to mark&#8212;not the loss of the copyright, but the loss of the
10683 right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
10684 </p><p>
10685
10686 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work to be
10687 published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that failure need
10688 not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could instead be that
10689 anyone has the right to use this work, until the copyright owner complains
10690 and demonstrates that it is his work and he doesn't give
10691 permission.<sup>[<a name="id2705702" href="#ftn.id2705702" class="footnote">213</a>]</sup> The meaning of an unmarked
10692 work would therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
10693 complain, then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
10694 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.  This
10695 would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark their work.
10696 </p><p>
10697 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be marked. Here
10698 again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies evolve. The best way
10699 to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the Copyright Office's role to
10700 that of approving standards for marking content that have been crafted
10701 elsewhere.
10702 </p><p>
10703 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
10704 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The Copyright
10705 Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could be made. The
10706 Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it judged preferable,
10707 and it would base that choice <span class="emphasis"><em>solely</em></span> upon the
10708 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the registration
10709 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to innovate; but we
10710 would count on the government to keep the product of innovation in line with
10711 its other important functions.
10712 </p><p>
10713 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration requirements.
10714 If photographs were marked by author and year, there would be little reason
10715 not to allow a photographer to reregister, for example, all photographs
10716 taken in a particular year in one quick step. The aim of the formality is
10717 not to burden the creator; the system itself should be kept as simple as
10718 possible.
10719 </p><p>
10720 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing system
10721 does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to make things
10722 unclear.
10723 </p><p>
10724 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
10725 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.  It
10726 would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it would be
10727 simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular kind of content;
10728 it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew that assertion at
10729 the appropriate time.
10730 </p></div></div><div class="section" title="2. Kortere vernetid"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="shortterms"></a>2. Kortere vernetid</h3></div></div></div><p>
10731 Vernetiden i opphavsretten har gått fra fjorten år til nittifem år der
10732 selskap har forfatterskapet , og livstiden til forfatteren pluss sytti år
10733 for individuelle forfattere.
10734 </p><p>
10735 In <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em>, I proposed a
10736 seventy-five-year term, granted in five-year increments with a requirement
10737 of renewal every five years.  That seemed radical enough at the time. But
10738 after we lost <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
10739 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, the proposals became even more
10740 radical. <em class="citetitle">The Economist</em> endorsed a proposal for a
10741 fourteen-year copyright term.<sup>[<a name="id2705827" href="#ftn.id2705827" class="footnote">214</a>]</sup> Others
10742 have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
10743 </p><p>
10744 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in copyright's
10745 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four principles
10746 that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
10747 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
10748
10749
10750 <span class="emphasis"><em>Keep it short:</em></span> The term should be as long as necessary
10751 to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
10752 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
10753 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
10754 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal regulations
10755 when it no longer benefits an author.
10756 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10757
10758
10759
10760 <span class="emphasis"><em>Gjør det enkelt:</em></span> Skillelinjen mellom verker uten
10761 opphavsrettslig vern og innhold som er beskyttet må forbli klart.  Advokater
10762 liker uklarheten som "rimelig bruk" og forskjellen mellom "idéer" og
10763 "uttrykk" har.  Denne type lovverk gir dem en masse arbeid.  Men de som
10764 skrev grunnloven hadde en enklere idé: vernet versus ikke vernet. Verdien av
10765 korte vernetider er at det er lite behov for å bygge inn unntak i
10766 opphavsretten når vernetiden holdes kort.  En klar og aktiv "advokat-fri
10767 sone" gjør komplesiteten av "rimelig bruk" og "idé/uttrykk" mindre nødvendig
10768 å håndtere.
10769
10770 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10771
10772 <span class="emphasis"><em>Keep it alive:</em></span> Copyright should have to be renewed.
10773 Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be
10774 required to signal periodically that he wants the protection continued. This
10775 need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly
10776 protection has to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes
10777 for a veteran to apply for a pension.<sup>[<a name="id2705915" href="#ftn.id2705915" class="footnote">215</a>]</sup>
10778 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't require
10779 authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
10780 <a class="indexterm" name="id2705934"></a>
10781 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10782
10783
10784 <span class="emphasis"><em>Keep it prospective:</em></span> Whatever the term of copyright
10785 should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once
10786 given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the
10787 law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
10788 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got fewer
10789 authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct
10790 that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we
10791 will not increase the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can
10792 increase the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
10793 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
10794 increasing their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.  What's
10795 not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do about that now.  </p></li></ol></div><p>
10796 Disse endringene vil sammen gi en <span class="emphasis"><em>gjennomsnittlig</em></span>
10797 opphavsrettslig vernetid som er mye kortere enn den gjeldende vernetiden.
10798 Frem til 1976 var gjennomsnittelig vernetid kun 32.2 år.  Vårt mål bør være
10799 det samme.
10800 </p><p>
10801 Uten tvil vil ekstremistene kalle disse idéene "radikale". (Tross alt, så
10802 kaller jeg dem "ekstremister".) Men igjen, vernetiden jeg anbefalte var
10803 lengre enn vernetiden under Richard Nixon. hvor "radikalt" kan det være å be
10804 om en mer sjenerøs opphavsrettighet enn da Richard Nixon var president?
10805 </p></div><div class="section" title="3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="freefairuse"></a>3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</h3></div></div></div><p>
10806 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally granted
10807 property owners the right to control their property from the ground to the
10808 heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property rights quickly
10809 changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional challenge.  It made no sense
10810 anymore to grant that much control, given the emergence of that new
10811 technology.
10812 </p><p>
10813 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive right"
10814 to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive right to "their
10815 writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that are
10816 sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
10817 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the right to
10818 release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
10819 </p><p>
10820 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it expanded the
10821 exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control translations and
10822 dramatizations of a work.<sup>[<a name="id2706044" href="#ftn.id2706044" class="footnote">216</a>]</sup> The courts
10823 have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This
10824 expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
10825 Benjamin Kaplan.
10826 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
10827 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a large range
10828 of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense the oddity of
10829 accepting such an enlargement of copyright while yet intoning the
10830 abracadabra of idea and expression.<sup>[<a name="id2706068" href="#ftn.id2706068" class="footnote">217</a>]</sup>
10831 </p></blockquote></div><p>
10832 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
10833 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
10834 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that a
10835 copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.  Consider
10836 each limitation in turn.
10837 </p><p>
10838 <span class="emphasis"><em>Term:</em></span> If Congress wants to grant a derivative right,
10839 then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect
10840 John Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at
10841 least I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that
10842 right to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
10843 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
10844 after the creative work is done.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2706098"></a>
10845 </p><p>
10846 <span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Likewise should the scope of derivative rights
10847 be narrowed.  Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are
10848 important.  Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines
10849 around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
10850 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses, perhaps
10851 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer makes
10852 sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the creative
10853 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses
10854 into the machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does
10855 to the creative process. Smothers it.
10856 </p><p>
10857 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the Clint
10858 Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for foreseeable
10859 derivative rights&#8212;turning a book into a movie, or a poem into a
10860 musical score&#8212;it doesn't make sense to require negotiation for the
10861 unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much more sense.
10862 </p><p>
10863 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are protected, and
10864 the presumption should be that other uses are not protected.  This is the
10865 reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul Goldstein.<sup>[<a name="id2706152" href="#ftn.id2706152" class="footnote">218</a>]</sup> His view is that the law should be written so that
10866 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
10867 </p><p>
10868 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
10869 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of the
10870 Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the incentives
10871 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a strong
10872 copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
10873 </p><p>
10874
10875 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection beyond the
10876 part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon certain statutory
10877 conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great deal of culture
10878 to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights regime, that reuse
10879 would earn artists more income.
10880 </p></div><div class="section" title="4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="liberatemusic"></a>4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</h3></div></div></div><p>
10881 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't be
10882 fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most people,
10883 most pressing&#8212;music. There is no other policy issue that better
10884 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing of
10885 music.
10886 </p><p>
10887 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the Internet's
10888 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more powerfully than any
10889 other single application. It was the Internet's killer app&#8212;possibly in
10890 two senses of that word. It no doubt was the application that drove demand
10891 for bandwidth. It may well be the application that drives demand for
10892 regulations that in the end kill innovation on the network.
10893 </p><p>
10894 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
10895 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed, performed,
10896 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving an exclusive
10897 right to a composer to control public performances of his work, and to a
10898 performing artist to control copies of her performance.
10899 </p><p>
10900 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
10901 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course, that's not
10902 all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#piracy" title='Kapittel 6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"'>6</a>, they enable four
10903 different kinds of sharing:
10904 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="A"><li class="listitem"><p>
10905
10906
10907 Det er noen som bruker delingsnettverk som erstatninger for å kjøpe CDer.
10908 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10909
10910
10911 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample, on the way to
10912 purchasing CDs.
10913 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10914
10915
10916
10917
10918 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk til å få tilgang til innhold som
10919 ikke lenger er i salg, men fortsatt er vernet av opphavsrett eller som ville
10920 ha vært altfor vanskelig å få kjøpt via nettet.
10921 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10922
10923
10924 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk for å få tilgang til innhold som
10925 ikke er opphavsrettsbeskyttet, eller for å få tilgang som
10926 opphavsrettsinnehaveren åpenbart går god for.
10927 </p></li></ol></div><p>
10928 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It must
10929 avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The eagerness
10930 with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover, should depend upon
10931 the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net effect of sharing is
10932 actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is significantly
10933 weakened.
10934 </p><p>
10935 As I said in chapter <a class="xref" href="#piracy" title='Kapittel 6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"'>6</a>, the actual harm caused by sharing is controversial.  For
10936 the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is real. I assume,
10937 in other words, that type A sharing is significantly greater than type B,
10938 and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
10939 </p><p>
10940 Uansett, det er et avgjørende faktum om den gjeldende teknologiske
10941 omgivelsen som vi må huske på hvis vi skal forstå hvordan loven bør reagere.
10942 </p><p>
10943 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
10944 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
10945 content.  It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of
10946 content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and
10947 slow&#8212;we in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at
10948 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and
10949 down. Although wireless access is growing, most of us still get access
10950 across wires. Most only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The
10951 idea of the always on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
10952 </p><p>
10953
10954 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to the
10955 Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should not make
10956 policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should make policy on
10957 the basis of where the technology is going. The question should not be, how
10958 should the law regulate sharing in this world? The question should be, what
10959 law will we require when the network becomes the network it is clearly
10960 becoming? That network is one in which every machine with electricity is
10961 essentially on the Net; where everywhere you are&#8212;except maybe the
10962 desert or the Rockies&#8212;you can instantaneously be connected to the
10963 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service,
10964 where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
10965 </p><p>
10966 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that give
10967 you access to content on the fly&#8212;such as Internet radio, content that
10968 is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the critical
10969 point: When it is <span class="emphasis"><em>extremely</em></span> easy to connect to services
10970 that give access to content, it will be <span class="emphasis"><em>easier</em></span> to
10971 connect to services that give you access to content than it will be to
10972 download and store content <span class="emphasis"><em>on the many devices you will have for
10973 playing content</em></span>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
10974 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
10975 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially is. Content
10976 services will compete with content sharing, even if the services charge
10977 money for the content they give access to. Already cell-phone services in
10978 Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell phones (enhanced with plugs
10979 for headphones). The Japanese are paying for this content even though "free"
10980 content is available in the form of MP3s across the Web.<sup>[<a name="id2706397" href="#ftn.id2706397" class="footnote">219</a>]</sup>
10981
10982 </p><p>
10983
10984 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
10985 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
10986 sharing&#8212;to the extent there is a real problem&#8212;is a problem that
10987 will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to the
10988 Internet.  And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy makers today
10989 to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology that will be gone
10990 tomorrow.  The question should not be how to regulate the Internet to
10991 eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve that problem away). The question
10992 instead should be how to assure that artists get paid, during this
10993 transition between twentieth-century models for doing business and
10994 twenty-first-century technologies.
10995 </p><p>
10996 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems" here
10997 to solve. Let's start with type D content&#8212;uncopyrighted content or
10998 copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The "problem" with this
10999 content is to make sure that the technology that would enable this kind of
11000 sharing is not rendered illegal. You can think of it this way: Pay phones
11001 are used to deliver ransom demands, no doubt.  But there are many who need
11002 to use pay phones who have nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to
11003 ban pay phones in order to eliminate kidnapping.
11004 </p><p>
11005 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was, at
11006 one time, published and is no longer available. It may be unavailable
11007 because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the record label he
11008 signed with to carry his work. Or it may be unavailable because the work is
11009 forgotten. Either way, the aim of the law should be to facilitate the access
11010 to this content, ideally in a way that returns something to the artist.
11011 </p><p>
11012 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of print,
11013 it may still be available in libraries and used book stores. But libraries
11014 and used book stores don't pay the copyright owner when someone reads or
11015 buys an out-of-print book. That makes total sense, of course, since any
11016 other system would be so burdensome as to eliminate the possibility of used
11017 book stores' existing. But from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of
11018 his content without his being compensated is less than ideal.
11019 </p><p>
11020 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
11021 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of the
11022 music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial providers would
11023 be free, under this rule, to "share" that content, even though the sharing
11024 involved making a copy. The copy here would be incidental to the trade; in a
11025 context where commercial publishing has ended, trading music should be as
11026 free as trading books.
11027 </p><p>
11028
11029
11030
11031 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would ensure
11032 that artists get something from the trade of their work. For example, if the
11033 law set a low statutory rate for the commercial sharing of content that was
11034 not offered for sale by a commercial publisher, and if that rate were
11035 automatically transferred to a trust for the benefit of the artist, then
11036 businesses could develop around the idea of trading this content, and
11037 artists would benefit from this trade.
11038 </p><p>
11039 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep works
11040 available commercially. Works that are available commercially would not be
11041 subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect the right to charge
11042 whatever they want for content if they kept the work commercially
11043 available. But if they don't keep it available, and instead, the computer
11044 hard disks of fans around the world keep it alive, then any royalty owed for
11045 such copying should be much less than the amount owed a commercial
11046 publisher.
11047 </p><p>
11048 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is hard only
11049 because the extent of the problem will change over time, as the technologies
11050 for gaining access to content change. The law's solution should be as
11051 flexible as the problem is, understanding that we are in the middle of a
11052 radical transformation in the technology for delivering and accessing
11053 content.
11054 </p><p>
11055 Så her er en løsning som i første omgang kan virke veldig undelig for begge
11056 sider i denne krigen, men som jeg tror vil gi mer mening når en får tenkt
11057 seg om.
11058 </p><p>
11059 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic claim of
11060 the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)  has harmed a
11061 set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to be protected,
11062 then the content industry should be compensated for that harm. Just as the
11063 technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions of Americans, or the
11064 technology of asbestos caused grave illness to thousands of miners, so, too,
11065 has the technology of digital networks harmed the interests of the content
11066 industry.
11067 </p><p>
11068
11069
11070 Jeg elsker internett, så jeg liker ikke å sammenligne det med tobakk eller
11071 asbest.  Men analogien er rimelig når en ser det fra lovens perspektiv. Og
11072 det foreslår en rimelig respons: I stedet for å forsøke å ødelegge internett
11073 eller p2p-teknologien som i dag skader innholdsleverandører på internett, så
11074 bør vi finne en relativt enkel måte å kompensere de som blir skadelidende.
11075 </p><p>
11076 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been floated by
11077 Harvard law professor William Fisher.<sup>[<a name="id2706558" href="#ftn.id2706558" class="footnote">220</a>]</sup>
11078 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
11079 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission would
11080 (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to
11081 evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once
11082 the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
11083 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the basis of
11084 those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The compensation would
11085 be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
11086 </p><p>
11087 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
11088 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
11089 <em class="citetitle">Promises to Keep</em>. The modification that I would make
11090 is relatively simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing
11091 copyright system.  I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim
11092 of the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
11093 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at facilitating
11094 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal after a period of
11095 years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free exchange of content,
11096 supported through a taxation system, then it can be continued. If this form
11097 of protection is no longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the
11098 old system of controlling access.
11099 </p><p>
11100
11101 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim is
11102 not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the system
11103 supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But the aims of
11104 semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes I described were
11105 accomplished&#8212;in particular, the limits on derivative uses. A system
11106 that simply charges for access would not greatly burden semiotic democracy
11107 if there were few limitations on what one was allowed to do with the content
11108 itself.
11109 </p><p>
11110 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of "harm" to
11111 an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation would be
11112 outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This background system
11113 to compensate would also not need to interfere with innovative proposals
11114 such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted when Apple launched the
11115 MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being easier than free is. This has
11116 proven correct: Apple has sold millions of songs at even the very high price
11117 of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents, the cost is the equivalent of a per-song
11118 CD price, though the labels have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's
11119 move was countered by Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a
11120 song. And no doubt there will be a great deal of competition to offer and
11121 sell music on-line.
11122 </p><p>
11123 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free" music
11124 from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known for thirty
11125 years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than that, there is
11126 nothing impossible at all about "competing with free." Indeed, if anything,
11127 the competition spurs the competitors to offer new and better products. This
11128 is precisely what the competitive market was to be about. Thus in Singapore,
11129 though piracy is rampant, movie theaters are often luxurious&#8212;with
11130 "first class" seats, and meals served while you watch a movie&#8212;as they
11131 struggle and succeed in finding ways to compete with "free."
11132 </p><p>
11133 Dette konkurranseregimet, med en sikringsmekanisme å sikre at kunstnere ikke
11134 taper, ville bidra mye til nyskapning innen levering av
11135 innhold. Konkurransen ville fortsette å redusere type-A-deling.  Det ville
11136 inspirere en ekstraordinær rekke av nye innovatører&#8212;som ville ha
11137 retten til a bruke innhold, og ikke lenger frykte usikre og barbarisk
11138 strenge straffer fra loven.
11139 </p><p>
11140 Oppsummert, så er dette mitt forslag:
11141 </p><p>
11142
11143
11144
11145 Internett er i endring. Vi bør ikke regulere en teknologi i endring. Vi bør
11146 i stedet regulere for å minimere skaden påført interesser som er berørt av
11147 denne teknologiske endringen, samtidig vi muliggjør, og oppmuntrer, den mest
11148 effektive teknologien vi kan lage.
11149 </p><p>
11150 Vi kan minimere skaden og samtidig maksimere fordelen med innovasjon ved å
11151 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
11152
11153
11154 garantere retten til å engasjere seg i type-D-deling;
11155 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
11156
11157
11158 tillate ikke-kommersiell type-C-deling uten erstatningsansvar, og
11159 kommersiell type-C-deling med en lav og fast rate fastsatt ved lov.
11160 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
11161
11162
11163 mens denne overgangen pågår, skattlegge og kompensere for type-A-deling, i
11164 den grad faktiske skade kan påvises.
11165 </p></li></ol></div><p>
11166 Men hva om "piratvirksomheten" ikke forsvinner?  Hva om det finnes et
11167 konkurranseutsatt marked som tilbyr innhold til en lav kostnad, men et
11168 signifikant antall av forbrukere fortsetter å "ta" innhold uten å betale?
11169 Burde loven gjøre noe da?
11170 </p><p>
11171 Ja, det bør den.  Men, nok en gang, hva den bør gjøre avhenger hvordan
11172 realitetene utvikler seg. Disse endringene fjerner kanskje ikke all
11173 type-A-deling. Men det virkelige spørmålet er ikke om de eliminerer deling i
11174 abstrakt betydning.  Det virkelige spørsmålet er hvilken effekt det har på
11175 markedet.  Er det bedre (a) å ha en teknologi som er 95 prosent sikker og
11176 gir et marked av størrelse <em class="citetitle">x</em>, eller (b) å ha en
11177 teknologi som er 50 prosent sikker, og som gir et marked som er fem ganger
11178 større enn <em class="citetitle">x</em>?  Mindre sikker kan gi mer uautorisert
11179 deling, men det vil sannsynligvis også gi et mye større marked for
11180 autorisert deling. Det viktigste er å sikre kunstneres kompensasjon uten å
11181 ødelegge internettet.  Når det er på plass, kan det hende det er riktig å
11182 finne måter å spore opp de smålige piratene.
11183 </p><p>
11184
11185 Men vi er langt unna å spikke problemet ned til dette delsettet av
11186 type-A-delere.  Og vårt fokus inntil er der bør ikke være å finne måter å
11187 ødelegge internettet.  Var fokus inntil vi er der bør være hvordan sikre at
11188 artister får betalt, mens vi beskytter rommet for nyskapning og kreativitet
11189 som internettet er.
11190 </p></div><div class="section" title="5. Spark en masse advokater"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="firelawyers"></a>5. Spark en masse advokater</h3></div></div></div><p>
11191 Jeg er en advokat. Jeg lever av å utdanne advokater. Jeg tror på loven. Jeg
11192 tror på opphavsrettsloven. Jeg har faktisk viet livet til å jobbe med loven,
11193 ikke fordi det er mye penger å tjene, men fordi det innebærer idealer som
11194 jeg elsker å leve opp til.
11195 </p><p>
11196 Likevel har mye av denne boken vært kritikk av advokater, eller rollen
11197 advokater har spilt i denne debatten.  Loven taler om idealer, mens det er
11198 min oppfatning av vår yrkesgruppe er blitt for knyttet til klienten.  Og i
11199 en verden der rike klienter har sterke synspunkter vil uviljen hos vår
11200 yrkesgruppe til å stille spørsmål med eller protestere mot dette sterke
11201 synet ødelegge loven.
11202 </p><p>
11203 Indisiene for slik bøyning er overbevisene.  Jeg er angrepet som en
11204 "radikal" av mange innenfor yrket, og likevel er meningene jeg argumenterer
11205 for nøyaktig de meningene til mange av de mest moderate og betydningsfulle
11206 personene i historien til denne delen av loven. Mange trodde for eksempel at
11207 vår utfordring til lovforslaget om å utvide opphavsrettens vernetid var
11208 galskap.  Mens bare tredve år siden mente den dominerende foreleser og
11209 utøver i opphavsrettsfeltet, Melville Nimmer, at den var
11210 åpenbar.<sup>[<a name="id2706932" href="#ftn.id2706932" class="footnote">221</a>]</sup>
11211
11212 </p><p>
11213 Min kritikk av rollen som advokater har spilt i denne debatten handler
11214 imidlertid ikke bare om en profesjonell skjevhet. Det handler enda viktigere
11215 om vår manglende evne til å faktisk ta inn over oss hva loven koster.
11216 </p><p>
11217 Økonomer er forventet å være gode til å forstå utgifter og inntekter.  Men
11218 som oftest antar økonomene uten peiling på hvordan det juridiske systemet
11219 egentlig fungerer, at transaksjonskostnaden i det juridiske systemet er
11220 lav.<sup>[<a name="id2706965" href="#ftn.id2706965" class="footnote">222</a>]</sup>  De ser et system som har
11221 eksistert i hundrevis av år, og de antar at det fungerer slik grunnskolens
11222 samfunnsfagsundervisning lærte dem at det fungerer.
11223 </p><p>
11224
11225
11226 Men det juridiske systemet fungerer ikke. Eller for å være mer nøyaktig, det
11227 fungerer kun for de med mest ressurser.  Det er ikke fordi systemet er
11228 korrupt. Jeg tror overhodet ikke vårt juridisk system (på føderalt nivå, i
11229 hvert fall) er korrupt. Jeg mener ganske enkelt at på grunn av at kostnadene
11230 med vårt juridiske systemet er så hårreisende høyt vil en praktisk talt
11231 aldri oppnå rettferdighet.
11232 </p><p>
11233 Disse kostnadene forstyrrer fri kultur på mange vis.  En advokats tid
11234 faktureres hos de største firmaene for mer enn $400 pr. time. Hvor mye tid
11235 bør en slik advokat bruke på å lese sakene nøye, eller undersøke obskure
11236 rettskilder.  Svaret er i økende grad: svært lite. Jussen er avhengig av
11237 nøye formulering og utvikling av doktrine, men nøye formulering og utvikling
11238 av doktrine er avhengig av nøyaktig arbeid.  Men nøyaktig arbeid koster for
11239 mye, bortsett fra i de mest høyprofilerte og kostbare sakene.
11240 </p><p>
11241 Kostbarheten, klomsetheten og tilfeldigheten til dette systemet håner vår
11242 tradisjon. Og advokater, såvel som akademikere, bør se det som sin plikt å
11243 endre hvordan loven praktiseres&#8212; eller bedre, endre loven slik at den
11244 fungerer. Det er galt at systemet fungerer godt bare for den øverste
11245 1-prosenten av klientene.  Det kan gjøres radikalt mer effektivt, og billig,
11246 og dermed radikalt mer rettferdig.
11247 </p><p>
11248 Men inntil en slik reform er gjennomført, bør vi som samfunn holde lover
11249 unna områder der vi vet den bare vil skade.  Og det er nettopp det loven
11250 altfor ofte vil gjøre hvis for mye av vår kultur er lovregulert.
11251 </p><p>
11252 Tenk på de fantastiske tingene ditt barn kan gjøre eller lage med digital
11253 teknologi&#8212;filmen, musikken, web-siden, bloggen. Eller tenk på de
11254 fantastiske tingene ditt fellesskap kunne få til med digital
11255 teknologi&#8212;en wiki, oppsetting av låve, kampanje til å endre noe. Tenk
11256 på alle de kreative tingene, og tenk deretter på kald sirup helt inn i
11257 maskinene. Dette er hva et hvert regime som krever tillatelser fører
11258 til. Dette er virkeligheten slik den var i Brezhnevs Russland.
11259 </p><p>
11260
11261 Loven bør regulere i visse områder av kulturen&#8212;men det bør regulere
11262 kultur bare der reguleringen bidrar positivt. Likevel tester advokater
11263 sjeldent sin kraft, eller kraften som de fremmer, mot dette enkle pragmatisk
11264 spørsmålet: "vil det bidra positivt?".  Når de blir utfordret om det
11265 utvidede rekkevidden til loven, er advokat-svaret, "Hvorfor ikke?"
11266 </p><p>
11267 Vi burde spørre: "Hvorfor?". Vis meg hvorfor din regulering av kultur er
11268 nødvendig og vis meg hvordan reguleringen bidrar positivt.  Før du kan vise
11269 meg begge, holde advokatene din unna.
11270 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2704910" href="#id2704910" class="para">210</a>] </sup>
11271
11272
11273
11274 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
11275 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," <em class="citetitle">Stanford
11276 Technology Law Review</em> 1 (2001): par. 6&#8211;18, available at
11277 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #72</a> (describing
11278 examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey
11279 Rosen, <em class="citetitle">The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an
11280 Anxious Age</em> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
11281 between technology and privacy).</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2705376" href="#id2705376" class="para">211</a>] </sup>
11282
11283
11284
11285 <em class="citetitle">Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
11286 Culture Wars</em> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
11287 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #72</a>.
11288 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2705571" href="#id2705571" class="para">212</a>] </sup>
11289
11290
11291 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
11292 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
11293 by other countries as well.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2705702" href="#id2705702" class="para">213</a>] </sup>
11294
11295
11296 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not solved
11297 here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated system
11298 than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
11299 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2705827" href="#id2705827" class="para">214</a>] </sup>
11300
11301
11302
11303 "A Radical Rethink," <em class="citetitle">Economist</em>, 366:8308 (25. januar
11304 2003): 15, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11305 #74</a>.
11306 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2705915" href="#id2705915" class="para">215</a>] </sup>
11307
11308
11309 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
11310 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001), tilgjengelig
11311 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #75</a>.
11312 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2706044" href="#id2706044" class="para">216</a>] </sup>
11313
11314
11315 Benjamin Kaplan, <em class="citetitle">An Unhurried View of Copyright</em> (New
11316 York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 32.
11317 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2706068" href="#id2706068" class="para">217</a>] </sup>
11318
11319 Ibid., 56.
11320 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2706152" href="#id2706152" class="para">218</a>] </sup>
11321
11322 Paul Goldstein, <em class="citetitle">Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the
11323 Celestial Jukebox</em> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003),
11324 187&#8211;216.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2704921"></a>
11325 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2706397" href="#id2706397" class="para">219</a>] </sup>
11326
11327
11328 For eksempel, se, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3 April
11329 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11330 #76</a>.
11331 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2706558" href="#id2706558" class="para">220</a>] </sup>
11332
11333 William Fisher, <em class="citetitle">Digital Music: Problems and
11334 Possibilities</em> (last revised: 10 October 2000), available at
11335 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #77</a>; William Fisher,
11336 <em class="citetitle">Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
11337 Entertainment</em> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University
11338 Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #78</a>. Professor Netanel has
11339 proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial sharing from the
11340 reach of copyright and would establish compensation to artists to balance
11341 any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
11342 Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #79</a>. For other proposals,
11343 see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back Broadband?" <em class="citetitle">Washington
11344 Post</em>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on behalf of Sharman
11345 Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman of the Senate
11346 Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #80</a>; Serguei Osokine,
11347 <em class="citetitle">A Quick Case for Intellectual Property Use Fee
11348 (IPUF)</em>, 3 March 2002, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #81</a>; Jefferson Graham,
11349 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," <em class="citetitle">USA
11350 Today</em>, 13 May 2002, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #82</a>; Steven M. Cherry,
11351 "Getting Copyright Right," IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
11352 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #83</a>; Declan
11353 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August 2002,
11354 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #84</a>.
11355 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
11356 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
11357 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
11358 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
11359 debate by about a decade. See <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #85</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2706658"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2706666"></a>
11360 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2706932" href="#id2706932" class="para">221</a>] </sup>
11361
11362
11363 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer Memorial
11364 Lecture), <em class="citetitle">UCLA law Review</em> 48 (2001): 1057,
11365 1069&#8211;70.
11366 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2706965" href="#id2706965" class="para">222</a>] </sup>
11367
11368 Et godt eksempel er arbeidet til professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz bør få
11369 ros for sin nøye gjennomgang av data om opphavsrettsbrudd, som fikk ham til
11370 å stille spørsmål med sin egen uttalte posisjon&#8212;to ganger.  I starten
11371 predicated han at nedlasting ville påføre industrien vesentlig skade.  Han
11372 endret så sitt syn etter i lys av dataene, og han har siden endret sitt syn
11373 på nytt.  Sammenlign Stan J. Liebowitz, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking the Network
11374 Economy: The True Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace</em> (New
11375 York: Amacom, 2002), (gikk igjennom hans originale syn men uttrykte skepsis)
11376 med Stan J.  Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?"
11377 artikkelutkast, juni 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #86</a>.  Den nøye analysen til
11378 Liebowitz er ekstremt verdifull i sin estimering av effekten av
11379 fildelingsteknologi.  Etter mitt syn underestimerer han forøvrig kostnaden
11380 til det juridiske system.  Se, for eksempel,
11381 <em class="citetitle">Rethinking</em>, 174&#8211;76.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2706943"></a>
11382 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 18. Notater"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-notes"></a>Kapittel 18. Notater</h2></div></div></div><p>
11383 I denne teksten er det referanser til lenker på verdensveven.  Og som alle
11384 som har forsøkt å bruke nettet vet, så vil disse lenkene være svært
11385 ustabile.  Jeg har forsøkt å motvirke denne ustabiliteten ved å omdirigere
11386 lesere til den originale kilden gjennom en nettside som hører til denne
11387 boken.  For hver lenke under, så kan du gå til http://free-culture.cc/notes
11388 og finne den originale kilden ved å klikke på nummeret etter #-tegnet.  Hvis
11389 den originale lenken fortsatt er i live, så vil du bli omdirigert til den
11390 lenken.  Hvis den originale lenken har forsvunnet, så vil du bli omdirigert
11391 til en passende referanse til materialet.
11392 </p></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 19. Takk til"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-acknowledgments"></a>Kapittel 19. Takk til</h2></div></div></div><p>
11393 Denne boken er produktet av en lang og så langt mislykket kamp som begynte
11394 da jeg leste om Eric Eldreds krig for å sørge for at bøker forble
11395 frie. Eldreds innsats bidro til å lansere en bevegelse, fri
11396 kultur-bevegelsen, og denne boken er tilegnet ham.
11397 </p><p>
11398 Jeg fikk veiledning på ulike steder fra venner og akademikere, inkludert
11399 Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner, Mark Rose og
11400 Kathleen Sullivan. Og jeg fikk korreksjoner og veiledning fra mange
11401 fantastiske studenter ved Stanford Law School og Stanford University. Det
11402 inkluderer Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James P. Fellers, Christopher
11403 Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman, Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn,
11404 Brian-Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng og Erica Platt. Jeg er særlig takknemlig
11405 overfor Catherine Crump og Harry Surden, som hjalp til med å styre deres
11406 forskning og til Laura Lynch, som briljant håndterte hæren de samlet, samt
11407 bidro med sitt egen kritisk blikk på mye av dette.
11408 </p><p>
11409
11410 Yuko Noguchi hjalp meg å forstå lovene i Japan, så vel som Japans
11411 kultur. Jeg er henne takknemlig, og til de mange i Japan som hjalp meg med
11412 forundersøkelsene til denne boken: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto
11413 Misaki, Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata og Yoshihiro
11414 Yonezawa.  Jeg er også takknemlig til professor Nobuhiro Nakayama og Tokyo
11415 University Business Law Center, som ga meg muligheten til å bruke tid i
11416 Japan, og Tadashi Shiraishi og Kiyokazu Yamagami for deres generøse hjelp
11417 mens jeg var der.
11418 </p><p>
11419 Dette er de tradisjonelle former for hjelp som akademikere regelmessig
11420 trekker på. Men i tillegg til dem, har Internett gjort det mulig å motta råd
11421 og korrigering fra mange som jeg har aldri møtt.  Blant de som har svart med
11422 svært nyttig råd etter forespørsler om boken på bloggen min er Dr. Muhammed
11423 Al-Ubaydli, David Gerstein og Peter Dimauro, I tillegg en lang liste med de
11424 som hadde spesifikke ideer om måter å utvikle mine argumenter på.  De
11425 inkluderte Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
11426 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
11427 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
11428 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred
11429 Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.  Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer,
11430 Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg,
11431 Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink,"
11432 Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," og Richard Yanco. (jeg beklager hvis jeg gikk
11433 glipp av noen, med datamaskiner kommer feil og en krasj i e-postsystemet
11434 mitt gjorde at jeg mistet en haug med flotte svar.)
11435 </p><p>
11436 Richard Stallman og Michael Carroll har begge lest hele boken i utkast, og
11437 hver av dem har bidratt med svært nyttige korreksjoner og råd. Michael hjalp
11438 meg å se mer tydelig betydningen av regulering for avledede verker . Og
11439 Richard korrigerte en pinlig stor mengde feil.  Selv om mitt arbeid er
11440 delvis inspirert av Stallmans, er han ikke enig med meg på vesentlige steder
11441 i denne boken.
11442 </p><p>
11443 Til slutt, og for evig, er jeg Bettina takknemlig, som alltid har insistert
11444 på at det ville være endeløs lykke utenfor disse kampene, og som alltid har
11445 hatt rett.  Denne trege eleven er som alltid takknemlig for hennes
11446 evigvarende tålmodighet og kjærlighet.
11447 </p></div><div class="index" title="Indeks"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="id2707297"></a>Indeks</h2></div></div></div><div class="index"><div class="indexdiv"><h3>Symboler</h3><dl><dt>"Country of the Blind, The" (Wells), <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>A</h3><dl><dt>ABC, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Adobe eBook Reader, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>Adromeda, <a class="indexterm" href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></dt><dt>Agee, Michael, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Aibo robothund, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>akademiske tidsskrifter, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Akerlof, George, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Alben, Alex, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>alcohol prohibition, <a class="indexterm" href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></dt><dt>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll), <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>All in the Family, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Allen, Paul, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt><dt>Amazon, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>American Association of Law Libraries, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Anello, Douglas, <a class="indexterm" href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></dt><dt>Aristoteles, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>Arrow, Kenneth, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>artister</dt><dd><dl><dt>publicity rights on images of, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt></dl></dd><dt>ASCAP, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2684425">"Piratvirksomhet"</a></dt><dt>AT&amp;T, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Ayer, Don, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>B</h3><dl><dt>Bacon, Francis, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Barish, Stephanie, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Barry, Hank, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Beatles, <a class="indexterm" href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></dt><dt>Beckett, Thomas, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Bell, Alexander Graham, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Berlin Act (1908), <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>Berman, Howard L., <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Bern-konvensjonen (1908), <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>Bernstein, Leonard, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></dt><dt>Betamax, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></dt><dt>Black, Jane, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></dt><dt>BMG, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>BMW, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Boies, David, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt><dt>Bolling, Ruben, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Braithwaite, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Brandeis, Louis D., <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Breyer, Stephen, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Bromberg, Dan, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Brown, John Seely, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Buchanan, James, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Bunyan, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Burdick, Quentin, <a class="indexterm" href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></dt><dt>Bush, George W., <a class="indexterm" href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>C</h3><dl><dt>Camp Chaos, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt><dt>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel), <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Carson, Rachel, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></dt><dt>Casablanca, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>Causby, Thomas Lee, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Causby, Tinie, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>CBS, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>chimeras, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></dt><dt>Christensen, Clayton M., <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Clark, Kim B., <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>CNN, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Coase, Ronald, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>CodePink Women in Peace, <a class="indexterm" href="#preface">Forord</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Coe, Brian, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Comcast, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Commons, John R., <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Creative Commons, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></dt><dt>Crichton, Michael, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Crosskey, William W., <a class="indexterm" href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>D</h3><dl><dt>Daguerre, Louis, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Daley, Elizabeth, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>dataspill, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Day After Trinity, The, <a class="indexterm" href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></dt><dt>DDT, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></dt><dt>Dean, Howard, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Diller, Barry, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Disney, Inc., <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Drahos, Peter, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Dreyfuss, Rochelle, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2684425">"Piratvirksomhet"</a></dt><dt>Drucker, Peter, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt><dt>Dylan, Bob, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>E</h3><dl><dt>Eagle Forum, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Eastman, George, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Edison, Thomas, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Elektronisk forpost-stiftelsen (EFF), <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></dt><dt>Erskine, Andrew, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>F</h3><dl><dt>Fallows, James, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Fanning, Shawn, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></dt><dt>Faraday, Michael, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Fisher, William, <a class="indexterm" href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></dt><dt>Florida, Richard, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2684425">"Piratvirksomhet"</a></dt><dt>Forbes, Steve, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>fotografering, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Fried, Charles, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Friedman, Milton, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>G</h3><dl><dt>Garlick, Mia, <a class="indexterm" href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></dt><dt>Gates, Bill, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>General Film Company, <a class="indexterm" href="#film">Film</a></dt><dt>Gershwin, George, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Gil, Gilberto, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>GNU/Linux-operativsystemet, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Goldstein, Paul, <a class="indexterm" href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></dt><dt>Gracie Films, <a class="indexterm" href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></dt><dt>Grisham, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>H</h3><dl><dt>Hand, Learned, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a></dt><dt>Hummer, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>I</h3><dl><dt>Iwerks, Ub, <a class="indexterm" href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>J</h3><dl><dt>Jaszi, Peter, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Johnson, Lyndon, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Johnson, Samuel, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>K</h3><dl><dt>kjørehastighet, begrensninger på, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>L</h3><dl><dt>Lear, Norman, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Licensing Act (1662), <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Liebowitz, Stan, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></dt><dt>Linux-operativsystemet, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Litman, Jessica, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Lofgren, Zoe, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>Lott, Trent, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Lovett, Lyle, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>Lucas, George, <a class="indexterm" href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></dt><dt>Lucky Dog, The, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>M</h3><dl><dt>Madonna, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2684425">"Piratvirksomhet"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2684425">"Piratvirksomhet"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Marijuana Policy Project, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Marx Brothers, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>McCain, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>MGM, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Microsoft</dt><dd><dl><dt>Windows operating system of, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></dt></dl></dd><dt>Milton, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Movie Archive, <a class="indexterm" href="#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></dt><dt>Moyers, Bill, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Müller, Paul Hermann, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>N</h3><dl><dt>Nashville Songwriters Association, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>National Writers Union, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>NBC, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Needleman, Rafe, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Netanel, Neil Weinstock, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></dt><dt>Nimmer, David, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>P</h3><dl><dt>Paramount Pictures, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Picker, Randal C., <a class="indexterm" href="#film">Film</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>PLoS (Public Library of Science), <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Pogue, David, <a class="indexterm" href="#preface">Forord</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#preface">Forord</a></dt><dt>Politikk, (Aristotles), <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>S</h3><dl><dt>Safire, William, <a class="indexterm" href="#preface">Forord</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>San Francisco Opera, <a class="indexterm" href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></dt><dt>Sarnoff, David, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Schlafly, Phyllis, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Shakespeare, William, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Silent Sprint (Carson), <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></dt><dt>Sony Pictures Entertainment, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Stallman, Richard, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Steward, Geoffrey, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>T</h3><dl><dt>Talbot, William, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Turner, Ted, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Twentieth Century Fox, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>U</h3><dl><dt>Universal Pictures, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>V</h3><dl><dt>Vaidhyanathan, Siva, <a class="indexterm" href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#film">Film</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#together">Sammen</a></dt><dt>veterans' pensions, <a class="indexterm" href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></dt><dt>Vivendi Universal, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>von Lohmann, Fred, <a class="indexterm" href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>W</h3><dl><dt>Warner Brothers, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>Warren, Samuel D., <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Wells, H. G., <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></dt><dt>Windows, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></dt><dt>Winer, Dave, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Winick, Judd, <a class="indexterm" href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></dt><dt>WJOA, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Worldcom, <a class="indexterm" href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></dt><dt>WRC, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>Y</h3><dl><dt>Yanofsky, Dave, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>Z</h3><dl><dt>Zimmerman, Edwin, <a class="indexterm" href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></dt><dt>Zittrain, Jonathan, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2684425">"Piratvirksomhet"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></dt></dl></div></div></div></div></body></html>