archive/freeculture.nb.html

   1 <html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"><title>Fri kultur</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2"><meta name="description" content="Om forfatteren Lawrense Lessig (http://www.lessig.org), professor i juss og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School, er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i Creative Commons (http://creativecommons.org). Forfatteren har gitt ut av The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code: And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public Knowledge. Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's &quot;e.biz 25,&quot; og omtalt som en av Scientific American's &quot;50 visjonærer&quot;. Etter utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."></head><body bgcolor="white" text="black" link="#0000FF" vlink="#840084" alink="#0000FF"><div lang="nb" class="book" title="Fri kultur"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="index"></a>Fri kultur</h1></div><div><h2 class="subtitle">Hvordan store mediaaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
   2 og kontrollere kreativiteten</h2></div><div><div class="authorgroup"><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Lawrence</span> <span class="surname">Lessig</span></h3></div></div></div><div><p class="releaseinfo">Versjon 2004-02-10</p></div><div><p class="copyright">Opphavsrett © 2004 Lawrence Lessig</p></div><div><div class="legalnotice" title="Rettslig merknad"><a name="id2721571"></a><p>
   3 Denne versjonen av Fri Kultur er lisensert med en Creative Commons-lisens.
   4 Denne lisensen tillater ikke-kommersiell utnyttelse av verket, hvis
   5 opphavsinnehaveren er navngitt.  For mer informasjon om lisensen, klikk på
   6 ikonet over eller besøk <a class="ulink" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/" target="_top">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</a>
   7   </p></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">2004-03-25</p></div><div><div class="abstract" title="Om forfatteren"><p class="title"><b>Om forfatteren</b></p><p>
   8 Lawrense Lessig (<a class="ulink" href="http://www.lessig.org/" target="_top">http://www.lessig.org</a>), professor i
   9 juss og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law
  10 School, er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og
  11 styreleder i Creative Commons (<a class="ulink" href="http://creativecommons.org/" target="_top">http://creativecommons.org</a>).
  12 Forfatteren har gitt ut av The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code:
  13 And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i
  14 Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public
  15 Knowledge.  Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the
  16 Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's "e.biz
  17 25," og omtalt som en av Scientific American's "50 visjonærer".  Etter
  18 utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law
  19 School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit
  20 Court of Appeals.
  21   </p></div></div></div><hr></div><div class="dedication" title="Dedikasjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="id2721295"></a>Dedikasjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
  22 Til Eric Eldred &#8212; hvis arbeid først trakk meg til denne saken, og for
  23 hvem saken fortsetter.
  24 </p><p>
  25 </p><div class="figure"><a name="CreativeCommons"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 1. Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/cc.png" alt="Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert"></div></div></div><p><br class="figure-break">
  26 </p></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="preface"><a href="#preface">Forord</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-introduction">1. Introduksjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-piracy">2. "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#catalogs">Kapittel tre: Kataloger</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#pirates">Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#piracy">Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-property">3. "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-puzzles">4. Nøtter</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-balances">5. Maktfordeling</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-conclusion">6. Konklusjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-afterword">7. Etterord</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#usnow">Oss, nå</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbyggeing av fri kultur: En idé</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#themsoon">Dem, snart</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-notes">8. Notater</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-acknowledgments">9. Takk til</a></span></dt></dl></div><div class="list-of-figures"><p><b>Figuroversikt</b></p><dl><dt>1. <a href="#CreativeCommons">Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert</a></dt><dt>3.1. <a href="#fig-1331">How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
  27 the right or regulation.</a></dt><dt>3.2. <a href="#fig-1361">Law has a special role in affecting the three.</a></dt><dt>3.3. <a href="#fig-1371">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</a></dt><dt>3.4. <a href="#fig-1381">effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</a></dt><dt>3.5. <a href="#fig-1441">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</a></dt><dt>3.6. <a href="#fig-1442">"Opphavsrett" i dag.</a></dt><dt>3.7. <a href="#fig-1521">Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.</a></dt><dt>3.8. <a href="#fig-1531">Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.</a></dt><dt>3.9. <a href="#fig-1541">Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
  28 copyrighted work.</a></dt><dt>3.10. <a href="#fig-1542">Unregulated copying considered "fair uses."</a></dt><dt>3.11. <a href="#fig-1551">Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
  29 regulated.</a></dt><dt>3.12. <a href="#fig-1611">Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.</a></dt><dt>3.13. <a href="#fig-1612">List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</a></dt><dt>3.14. <a href="#fig-1621">E-book of Aristotle;s "Politics"</a></dt><dt>3.15. <a href="#fig-1622">Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politics".</a></dt><dt>3.16. <a href="#fig-1631">List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".</a></dt><dt>3.17. <a href="#fig-1641">List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".</a></dt><dt>3.18. <a href="#fig-1711">VCR/handgun cartoon.</a></dt><dt>3.19. <a href="#fig-1761">Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.</a></dt></dl></div><div class="list-of-tables"><p><b>tabelloversikt</b></p><dl><dt>2.1. <a href="#t1">Tabell</a></dt><dt>3.1. <a href="#t2"></a></dt><dt>3.2. <a href="#t3"></a></dt><dt>3.3. <a href="#t4"></a></dt><dt>3.4. <a href="#t5"></a></dt></dl></div><div class="colophon" title="Kolofon"><h2 class="title"><a name="id2763591"></a>Kolofon</h2><p>
  30 Du kan kjøpe en kopi av denne boken ved å klikke på en av lenkene nedenfor:
  31 </p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" type="number" compact><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.amazon.com/" target="_top">Amazon</a></p></li><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/" target="_top">B&amp;N</a></p></li><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.penguin.com/" target="_top">Penguin</a></p></li></ul></div><p>
  32 Andre bøker av Lawrence Lessig
  33 </p><p>
  34 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
  35 </p><p>
  36 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
  37 </p><p>
  38 The Penguin Press, New York
  39 </p><p>
  40 Fri Kultur
  41 </p><p>
  42 Hvordan store mediaaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
  43 og kontrollere kreativiteten
  44 </p><p>
  45 Lawrence Lessig
  46 </p><p>
  47 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.  375 Hudson Street
  48 New York, New York
  49 </p><p>
  50 Opphavsrettbeskyttet © Lawrence Lessig.  Alle rettigheter reservert.
  51 </p><p>
  52 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity," The
  53 New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright © 2003 by The New York
  54 Times Co.  Reprinted with permission.
  55 </p><p>
  56 Cartoon in <a class="xref" href="#fig-1711" title="Figur 3.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.">Figur 3.18, &#8220;VCR/handgun cartoon.&#8221;</a> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
  57 Media Services, Inc.  All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
  58 </p><p>
  59 Diagram in <a class="xref" href="#fig-1761" title="Figur 3.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.">Figur 3.19, &#8220;Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.&#8221;</a> courtesy of the office of FCC
  60 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
  61 </p><p>
  62 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
  63 </p><p>
  64 Lessig, Lawrence.  Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law
  65 to lock down culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
  66 </p><p>
  67 p. cm.
  68 </p><p>
  69 Includes index.
  70 </p><p>
  71 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
  72 </p><p>
  73 1. Intellectual property&#8212;United States. 2. Mass media&#8212;United
  74 States.
  75 </p><p>
  76 3. Technological innovations&#8212;United States. 4. Art&#8212;United
  77 States. I. Title.
  78 </p><p>
  79 KF2979.L47
  80 </p><p>
  81 343.7309'9&#8212;dc22
  82 </p><p>
  83 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
  84 </p><p>
  85 Printed in the United States of America
  86 </p><p>
  87 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
  88 </p><p>
  89 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
  90 </p><p>
  91 Oversatt til bokmål av Petter Reinholdtsen og Anders Hagen
  92 Jarmund. Kildefilene til oversetterprosjektet er <a class="ulink" href="https://github.com/petterreinholdtsen/free-culture-lessig" target="_top">tilgjengelig
  93 fra github</a>.  Rapporter feil med oversettelsen via github.
  94 </p><p>
  95 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this
  96 publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval
  97 system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
  98 photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission
  99 of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.  The
 100 scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via
 101 any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and
 102 punishable by law.  Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and
 103 do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
 104 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
 105 </p></div><div class="preface" title="Forord"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="preface"></a>Forord</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxpoguedavid"></a><p>
 106 David Pogue, en glimrende skribent og forfatter av utallige tekniske
 107 datarelaterte tekster, skrev dette på slutten av hans gjennomgang av min
 108 første bok, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace:
 109 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 110 I motsetning til faktiske lover, så har ikke internett-programvare
 111 kapasiteten til å straffe.  Den påvirker ikke folk som ikke er online (og
 112 kun en veldig liten minoritet av verdens befolkning er online).  Og hvis du
 113 ikke liker systemet på internett, så kan du alltid slå av
 114 modemet.<sup>[<a name="preface01" href="#ftn.preface01" class="footnote">1</a>]</sup>
 115 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 116 Pogue var skeptisk til argumentet som er kjernen av boken &#8212; at
 117 programvaren, eller "koden", fungerte som en slags lov &#8212; og foreslo i
 118 sin anmeldelse den lykkelig tanken at hvis livet i cyberspace gikk dårlig,
 119 så kan vi alltid som med en trylleformel slå over en bryter og komme hjem
 120 igjen. Slå av modemet, koble fra datamaskinen, og eventuelle problemer som
 121 finnes der ville ikke "påvirke" oss mer.
 122 </p><p>
 123
 124 Pogue kan ha hatt rett i 1999 &#8212; jeg er skeptisk, men det kan
 125 hende. Men selv om han hadde rett da, så er ikke argumentet gyldig nå. Fri
 126 Kultur er om problemene internett forårsaker selv etter at modemet er slått
 127 av.  Den er et argument om hvordan slagene som nå brer om seg i livet
 128 on-line har fundamentalt påvirket "folk som er ikke pålogget."  Det finnes
 129 ingen bryter som kan isolere oss fra internettets effekt.
 130 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2722074"></a><p>
 131 Men i motsetning til i boken Code, er argumentet her ikke så mye om
 132 internett i seg selv. Istedet er det om konsekvensen av internett for en del
 133 av vår tradisjon som er mye mer grunnleggende, og uansett hvor hardt dette
 134 er for en geek-wanna-be å innrømme, mye viktigere.
 135 </p><p>
 136 Den tradisjonen er måten vår kultur blir laget på.  Som jeg vil forklare i
 137 sidene som følger, kommer vi fra en tradisjon av "fri kultur"&#8212;ikke
 138 "fri" som i "fri bar" (for å låne et uttrykk fra stifteren av fri
 139 programvarebevegelsen<sup>[<a name="id2722059" href="#ftn.id2722059" class="footnote">2</a>]</sup>), men "fri" som i
 140 "talefrihet", "fritt marked", "frihandel", "fri konkurranse", "fri vilje" og
 141 "frie valg".  En fri kultur støtter og beskytter skapere og oppfinnere.
 142 Dette gjør den direkte ved å tildele immaterielle rettigheter.  Men det gjør
 143 den indirekte ved å begrense rekkevidden for disse rettighetene, for å
 144 garantere at neste generasjon skapere og oppfinnere er så fri som mulig fra
 145 kontroll fra fortiden.  En fri kultur er ikke en kultur uten eierskap, like
 146 lite som et fritt marked er et marked der alt er gratis.  Det motsatte av
 147 fri kultur er "tillatelseskultur"&#8212;en kultur der skapere kun kan skape
 148 med tillatelse fra de mektige, eller fra skaperne fra fortiden.
 149 </p><p>
 150 Hvis vi forsto denne endringen, så tror jeg vi ville stå imot den.  Ikke
 151 "vi" på venstresiden eller "dere" på høyresiden, men vi som ikke har
 152 investert i den bestemt kulturindustrien som har definert det tjuende
 153 århundre. Enten du er på venstre eller høyresiden, hvis du i denne forstand
 154 ikke har interesser, vil historien jeg forteller her gi deg problemer. For
 155 endringene jeg beskriver påvirker verdier som begge sider av vår politiske
 156 kultur anser som grunnleggende.
 157 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2722142"></a><p>
 158 Vi så et glimt av dette tverrpolitiske raseri på forsommeren i 2003. Da FCC
 159 vurderte endringer i reglene for medieeierskap som ville slakke på
 160 begrensningene rundt mediakonsentrasjon, sendte en ekstraordinær koalisjon
 161 mer enn 700 000 brev til FCC for å motsette seg endringen.  Mens William
 162 Safire beskrev å marsjere "ubehagelig sammen med CodePink Women for Peace
 163 and the National Rifle Association, mellom liberale Olympia Snowe og
 164 konservative Ted Stevens", formulerte han  kanskje det enkleste uttrykket
 165 for hva som var på spill: konsentrasjonen av makt.  Så spurte han:
 166 <a class="indexterm" name="id2720576"></a>
 167 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 168 Høres dette ikke-konservativt ut?  Ikke for meg.  Denne konsentrasjonen av
 169 makt&#8212;politisk, selskapsmessig, pressemessig, kulturelt&#8212;bør være
 170 bannlyst av konservative.  Spredningen av makt gjennom lokal kontroll, og
 171 derigjennom oppmuntre til individuell deltagelse, er essensen i føderalismen
 172 og det største uttrykk for demokrati.<sup>[<a name="id2720599" href="#ftn.id2720599" class="footnote">3</a>]</sup>
 173 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 174 Denne idéen er et element i argumentet til Fri Kultur, selv om min fokus
 175 ikke bare er på konsentrasjonen av makt som følger av konsentrasjonen i
 176 eierskap, men mer viktig, og fordi det er mindre synlig, på konsentrasjonen
 177 av makt som er resultat av en radikal endring i det effektive virkeområdet
 178 til loven.  Loven er i endring, og endringen forandrer på hvordan vår kultur
 179 blir skapt. Den endringen bør bekymre deg&#8212;Uansett om du bryr deg om
 180 internett eller ikke, og uansett om du er til venstre for Safires eller til
 181 høyre. Inspirasjonen til tittelen og mye av argumentet i denne boken kommer
 182 fra arbeidet til Richard Stallman og Free Software Foundation. Faktisk, da
 183 jeg leste Stallmans egne tekster på nytt, spesielt essyene i Free Software,
 184 Free Society, innser jeg at alle de teoretiske innsiktene jeg utvikler her
 185 er innsikter som Stallman beskrev for tiår siden.  Man kan dermed godt
 186 argumentere for at dette verket kun er et avledet verk.
 187 </p><p>
 188
 189 Jeg godtar kritikken, hvis det faktisk er kritikk.  Arbeidet til en advokat
 190 er alltid avledede verker, og jeg mener ikke å gjøre noe mer i denne boken
 191 enn å minne en kultur om en tradisjon som alltid har vært deres egen. Som
 192 Stallman forsvarer jeg denne tradisjonen på grunnlag av verdier. Som
 193 Stallman tror jeg dette er verdiene til frihet.  Og som Stallman, tror jeg
 194 dette er verdier fra vår fortid som må forsvares i vår fremtid.  En fri
 195 kultur har vært vår fortid, men vil bare være vår fremtid hvis vi endrer
 196 retningen vi følger akkurat nå.  På samme måte som Stallmans argumenter for
 197 fri programvare, treffer argumenter for en fri kultur på forvirring som er
 198 vanskelig å unngå, og enda vanskeligere å forstå.  En fri kultur er ikke en
 199 kultur uten eierskap. Det er ikke en kultur der kunstnere ikke får
 200 betalt. En kultur uten eierskap eller en der skaperne ikke kan få betalt, er
 201 anarki, ikke frihet.  Anarki er ikke hva jeg fremmer her.
 202 </p><p>
 203 I stedet er den frie kulturen som jeg forsvarer i denne boken en balanse
 204 mellom anarki og kontroll.  En fri kultur, i likhet med et fritt marked, er
 205 fylt med eierskap.  Den er fylt med regler for eierskap og kontrakter som
 206 blir håndhevet av staten.  Men på samme måte som det frie markedet blir
 207 pervertert hvis dets eierskap blir føydalt, så kan en fri kultur bli ødelagt
 208 av ekstremisme i eierskapsrettighetene som definerer den.  Det er dette jeg
 209 frykter om vår kultur i dag.  Det er som motpol til denne ekstremismen at
 210 denne boken er skrevet.
 211 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.preface01" href="#preface01" class="para">1</a>] </sup>
 212 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30. januar
 213 2000
 214 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2722059" href="#id2722059" class="para">2</a>] </sup>
 215 Richard M. Stallman, Fri programvare, Frie samfunn 57 (Joshua Gay,
 216 red. 2002).
 217 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2720599" href="#id2720599" class="para">3</a>] </sup> William Safire, "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22. mai 2003.
 218 <a class="indexterm" name="id2720604"></a>
 219 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 1. Introduksjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-introduction"></a>Kapittel 1. Introduksjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
 220 17. desember 1903, på en vindfylt strand i Nord-Carolina i såvidt under
 221 hundre sekunder, demonstrerte Wright-brødrene at et selvdrevet fartøy tyngre
 222 enn luft kunne fly.  Øyeblikket var elektrisk, og dens betydning ble alment
 223 forstått. Nesten umiddelbart, eksploderte interessen for denne nye
 224 teknologien som muliggjorde bemannet luftfart og en hærskare av oppfinnere
 225 begynte å bygge videre på den.
 226 </p><p>
 227 Da Wright-brødrene fant opp flymaskinen, hevdet loven i USA at en grunneier
 228 ble antatt å eie ikke bare overflaten på området sitt, men også alt landet
 229 under bakken, helt ned til senterpunktet i jorda, og alt volumet over
 230 bakken, "i ubestemt grad, oppover".<sup>[<a name="id2722197" href="#ftn.id2722197" class="footnote">4</a>]</sup> I
 231 mange år undret lærde over hvordan en best skulle tolke idéen om at
 232 eiendomsretten gikk helt til himmelen. Betød dette at du eide stjernene?
 233 Kunne en dømme gjess for at de regelmessig og med vilje tok seg inn på annen
 234 manns eiendom?
 235 </p><p>
 236 Så kom flymaskiner, og for første gang hadde dette prinsippet i lovverket i
 237 USA&#8212;dypt nede i grunnlaget for vår tradisjon og akseptert av de
 238 viktigste juridiske tenkerne i vår fortid&#8212;en betydning. Hvis min
 239 eiendom rekker til himmelen, hva skjer når United flyr over mitt område?
 240 Har jeg rett til å nekte dem å bruke min eiendom?  Har jeg mulighet til å
 241 inngå en eksklusiv avtale med Delta Airlines?  Kan vi gjennomføre en auksjon
 242 for å finne ut hvor mye disse rettighetene er verdt?
 243 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2722215"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2722240"></a><p>
 244 I 1945 ble disse spørsmålene en føderal sak. Da bøndene Thomas Lee og Tinie
 245 Causby i Nord Carolina begynte å miste kyllinger på grunn av lavtflygende
 246 militære fly (vettskremte kyllinger fløy tilsynelatende i låveveggene og
 247 døde), saksøkte Causbyene regjeringen for å trenge seg inn på deres
 248 eiendom. Flyene rørte selvfølgelig aldri overflaten på Causbys' eiendom. Men
 249 hvis det stemte som Blackstone, Kent, og Cola hadde sagt, at deres eiendom
 250 strakk seg "i ubestemt grad, oppover," så hadde regjeringen trengt seg inn
 251 på deres eiendom, og Causbys ønsket å sette en stopper for dette.
 252 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2722260"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2722267"></a><p>
 253 Høyesterett gikk med på å ta opp Causbys sak. Kongressen hadde vedtatt at
 254 luftfartsveiene var tilgjengelig for alle, men hvis ens eiendom virkelig
 255 rakk til himmelen, da kunne muligens kongressens vedtak ha vært i strid med
 256 grunnlovens forbud mot å "ta" eiendom uten kompensasjon.  Retten erkjente at
 257 "det er gammel doktrine etter sedvane at en eiendom rakk til utkanten av
 258 universet.", men dommer Douglas hadde ikke tålmodighet for forhistoriske
 259 doktriner.  I et enkelt avsnitt, ble hundrevis av år med
 260 eiendomslovgivningen strøket. Som han skrev på vegne av retten,
 261 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 262 [Denne] doktrinen har ingen plass i den moderne verden.  Luften er en
 263 offentlig motorvei, slik kongressen har erklært.  Hvis det ikke var
 264 tilfelle, ville hver eneste transkontinentale flyrute utsette operatørene
 265 for utallige søksmål om inntrenging på annen manns eiendom.  Idéen er i
 266 strid med sunn fornuft.  Å anerkjenne slike private krav til luftrommet
 267 ville blokkere disse motorveiene, seriøst forstyrre muligheten til kontroll
 268 og utvikling av dem i fellesskapets interesse og overføre til privat
 269 eierskap det som kun fellesskapet har et rimelig krav til.<sup>[<a name="id2722306" href="#ftn.id2722306" class="footnote">5</a>]</sup>
 270 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 271 "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft."
 272 </p><p>
 273
 274 Det er hvordan loven vanligvis fungerer.  Ikke ofte like brått eller
 275 utålmodig, men til slutt er dette hvordan loven fungerer.  Det var ikke
 276 stilen til Douglas å utbrodere.  Andre dommere ville ha skrevet mange flere
 277 sider før de nådde sin konklusjon, men for Douglas holdt det med en enkel
 278 linje: "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft.".  Men uansett om det tar flere
 279 sider eller kun noen få ord, så er det en genial egenskap med et
 280 lovpraksis-system, slik som vårt er, at loven tilpasser seg til aktuelle
 281 teknologiene.  Og mens den tilpasser seg, så endres den.  Idéer som var
 282 solide som fjell i en tidsalder knuses i en annen.
 283 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2722405"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2722412"></a><p>
 284 Eller, det er hvordan ting skjer når det ikke er noen mektige på andre siden
 285 av endringen.  Causbyene var bare bønder.  Og selv om det uten tvil var
 286 mange som dem som var lei av den økende trafikken i luften (og en håper ikke
 287 for mange kyllinger flakset seg inn i vegger), ville Causbyene i verden
 288 finne det svært hardt å samles for å stoppe idéen, og teknologien, som
 289 Wright-brødrene hadde ført til verden.  Wright-brødrene spyttet flymaskiner
 290 inn i den teknologiske meme-dammen. Idéen spredte seg deretter som et virus
 291 i en kyllingfarm. Causbyene i verden fant seg selv omringet av "det synes
 292 rimelig" gitt teknologien som Wright-brødrene hadde produsert.  De kunne stå
 293 på sine gårder, med døde kyllinger i hendene, og heve knyttneven mot disse
 294 nye teknologiene så mye de ville.  De kunne ringe sine representanter eller
 295 til og med saksøke.  Men når alt kom til alt, ville kraften i det som virket
 296 "åpenbart" for alle andre&#8212;makten til "sunn fornuft"&#8212;ville vinne
 297 frem.  Deres "personlige interesser" ville ikke få lov til å nedkjempe en
 298 åpenbar fordel for fellesskapet.
 299 </p><p>
 300 Edwin Howard Armstrong er en av USAs glemte oppfinnergenier. Han dukket opp
 301 på oppfinnerscenen etter titaner som Thomas Edison og Alexander Graham
 302 Bell.  Alle hans bidrag på området radioteknologi gjør han til kanskje den
 303 viktigste av alle enkeltoppfinnere i de første femti årene av radio.  Han
 304 var bedre utdannet enn Michael Faraday, som var bokbinderlærling da han
 305 oppdaget elektrisk induksjon i 1831.  Men han hadde like god intuisjon om
 306 hvordan radioverden virket, og ved minst tre anledninger, fant Armstrong opp
 307 svært viktig teknologier som brakte vår forståelse av radio et hopp videre.
 308 <a class="indexterm" name="id2722351"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2722360"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2722367"></a>
 309 </p><p>
 310 Dagen etter julaften i 1933, ble fire patenter utstedt til Armstrong for
 311 hans mest signifikante oppfinnelse&#8212;FM-radio.  Inntil da hadde
 312 forbrukerradioer vært amplitude-modulert (AM) radio.  Tidens teoretikere
 313 hadde sagt at frekvens-modulert (FM) radio.  De hadde rett når det gjelder
 314 et smalt bånd av spektrumet.  Men Armstrong oppdaget at frekvens-modulert
 315 radio i et vidt bånd i spektrumet leverte en forbløffende gjengivelse av
 316 lyd, med mye mindre senderstyrke og støy.
 317 </p><p>
 318 Den 5. november 1935 demonstrerte han teknologien på et møte hos institutt
 319 for radioingeniører ved Empire State-bygningen i New York City.  Han vred
 320 radiosøkeren over en rekke AM-stasjoner, inntil radioen låste seg mot en
 321 kringkasting som han hadde satt opp 27 kilometer unna.  Radioen ble helt
 322 stille, som om den var død, og så, med en klarhet ingen andre i rommet noen
 323 gang hadde hørt fra et elektrisk apparat, produserte det lyden av en
 324 opplesers stemme: "Dette er amatørstasjon W2AG ved Yonkers, New York, som
 325 opererer på frekvensmodulering ved to og en halv meter."
 326 </p><p>
 327 Publikum hørte noe ingen hadde trodd var mulig:
 328 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 329 Et glass vann ble fylt opp foran mikrofonen i Yonkers, og det hørtes ut som
 330 et plass som ble fylt opp. . . . Et papir ble krøllet og revet opp, og det
 331 hørtes ut som papir og ikke som en sprakende skogbrann. . . . Sousa-marsjer
 332 ble spilt av fra plater og en pianosolo og et gitarnummer ble
 333 utført. . . . Musikken ble presentert med en livaktighet som sjeldent om
 334 noen gang før hadde vært hørt fra en radio-"musikk-boks".<sup>[<a name="id2773536" href="#ftn.id2773536" class="footnote">6</a>]</sup>
 335 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 336
 337 Som vår egen sunn fornuft forteller oss, hadde Armstrong oppdaget en mye
 338 bedre radioteknologi.  Men på tidspunktet for hans oppfinnelse, jobbet
 339 Armstrong for RCA. RCA var den dominerende aktøren i det da dominerende
 340 AM-radiomarkedet. I 1935 var det tusen radiostasjoner over hele USA, men
 341 stasjonene i de store byene var alle eid av en liten håndfull selskaper.
 342
 343 </p><p>
 344 Presidenten i RCA, David Sarnoff, en venn av Armstrong, var ivrig etter å få
 345 Armstrong til å oppdage en måte å fjerne støyen fra AM-radio. Så Sarnoff var
 346 ganske spent da Armstrong fortalte ham at han hadde en enhet som fjernet
 347 støy fra "radio.".   Men da Armstrong demonstrerte sin oppfinnelse, var ikke
 348 Sarnoff fornøyd.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2773573"></a>
 349 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 350 Jeg trodde Armstrong ville finne opp et slags filter for å fjerne skurring
 351 fra AM-radioen vår. Jeg trodde ikke han skulle starte en revolusjon &#8212;
 352 starte en hel forbannet ny industri i konkurranse med RCA.<sup>[<a name="id2773484" href="#ftn.id2773484" class="footnote">7</a>]</sup>
 353 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 354 Armstrongs oppfinnelse truet RCAs AM-herredømme, så selskapet lanserte en
 355 kampanje for å knuse FM-radio. Mens FM kan ha vært en overlegen teknologi,
 356 var Sarnoff en overlegen taktiker. En forfatter beskrev det slik,
 357 <a class="indexterm" name="id2773613"></a>
 358 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 359 Kreftene til fordel for FM, i hovedsak ingeniørfaglige, kunne ikke overvinne
 360 tyngden til strategien utviklet av avdelingene for salg, patenter og juss
 361 for å undertrykke denne trusselen til selskapets posisjon.  For FM utgjorde,
 362 hvis det fikk utvikle seg uten begrensninger . . . en komplett endring i
 363 maktforholdene rundt radio . . . og muligens fjerningen av det nøye
 364 begrensede AM-systemet som var grunnlaget for RCA stigning til
 365 makt.<sup>[<a name="id2773636" href="#ftn.id2773636" class="footnote">8</a>]</sup>
 366 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 367 RCA holdt først teknologien innomhus, og insistere på at det var nødvendig
 368 med ytterligere tester. Da Armstrong, etter to år med testing, ble
 369 utålmodig, begynte RCA å bruke sin makt hos myndighetene til holde tilbake
 370 den generelle spredningen av FM-radio. I 1936, ansatte RCA den tidligere
 371 lederen av FCC og ga ham oppgaven med å sikre at FCC tilordnet
 372 radiospekteret på en måte som ville kastrere FM&#8212;hovedsakelig ved å
 373 flytte FM-radio til et annet band i spekteret. I første omgang lyktes ikke
 374 disse forsøkene.  Men mens Armstrong og nasjonen var distrahert av andre
 375 verdenskrig, begynte RCAs arbeid å bære frukter.  Like etter at krigen var
 376 over, annonserte FCC et sett med avgjørelser som ville ha en klar effekt:
 377 FM-radio ville bli forkrøplet.Lawrence lessing beskrevet det slik,
 378 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 379 Serien med slag mot kroppen som FM-radio mottok rett etter krigen, i en
 380 serie med avgjørelser manipulert gjennom FCC av de store radiointeressene,
 381 var nesten utrolige i deres kraft og underfundighet.<sup>[<a name="id2773652" href="#ftn.id2773652" class="footnote">9</a>]</sup>
 382 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2773691"></a><p>
 383 For å gjøre plass i spektrumet for RCAs nyeste satsingsområde, televisjon,
 384 skulle FM-radioens brukere flyttes til et helt nytt band i spektrumet.
 385 Sendestyrken til FM-radioene ble også redusert, og gjorde at FM ikke lenger
 386 kunne brukes for å sende programmer fra en del av landet til en annen.
 387 (Denne endringen ble sterkt støttet av AT&amp;T, på grunn av at fjerningen
 388 av FM-videresendingsstasjoner ville bety at radiostasjonene ville bli nødt
 389 til å kjøpe kablede linker fra AT&amp;T.)  Spredningen av FM-radio var
 390 dermed kvalt, i hvert fall midlertidig.
 391 </p><p>
 392 Armstrong sto imot RCAs innsats. Som svar motsto RCA Armstrongs patenter.
 393 Etter å ha bakt FM-teknologi inn i den nye standarden for TV, erklærte RCS
 394 patentene ugyldige&#8212;uten grunn og nesten femten år etter at de ble
 395 utstedet.  De nektet dermed å betale ham for bruken av patentene.  I seks år
 396 kjempet Armstrong en dyr søksmålskrig for å forsvare patentene sine.  Til
 397 slutt, samtidig som patentene utløp, tilbød RCA et forlik så lavt at det
 398 ikke engang dekket Armstrongs advokatregning.  Beseiret, knust og nå blakk,
 399 skrev Armstrong i 1954 en kort beskjed til sin kone, før han gikk ut av et
 400 vindu i trettende etasje og falt i døden.
 401 </p><p>
 402
 403 Dette er slik loven virker noen ganger.  Ikke ofte like tragisk, og sjelden
 404 med heltemodig drama, men noen ganger er det slik det virker. Fra starten
 405 har myndigheter og myndighetsorganer blitt tatt til fange. Det er mer
 406 sannsynlig at de blir fanget når en mektig interesse er truet av enten en
 407 juridisk eller teknologisk endring.  Denne mektige interessen utøver for
 408 ofte sin innflytelse hos myndighetene til å få myndighetene til å beskytte
 409 den.  Retorikken for denne beskyttelsen er naturligvis alltid med fokus på
 410 fellesskapets beste.  Realiteten er noe annet.  Idéer som kan være solide
 411 som fjell i en tidsalder, men som overlatt til seg selv, vil falle sammen i
 412 en annen, er videreført gjennom denne subtile korrupsjonen i vår politiske
 413 prosess.  RCA hadde hva Causby-ene ikke hadde: Makten til å undertrykke
 414 effekten av en teknologisk endring.
 415 </p><p>
 416 Det er ingen enkeltoppfinner av Internet.  Ei heller er det en god dato som
 417 kan brukes til å markere når det ble født.  Likevel har internettet i løpet
 418 av svært kort tid blitt en del av vanlige amerikaneres liv.  I følge the Pew
 419 Internet and American Life-prosjektet, har 58 prosent av amerikanerne hatt
 420 tilgang til internettet i 2002, opp fra 49 prosent to år
 421 tidligere.<sup>[<a name="id2773771" href="#ftn.id2773771" class="footnote">10</a>]</sup> Det tallet kan uten
 422 problemer passere to tredjedeler av nasjonen ved utgangen av 2004.
 423 </p><p>
 424 Etter hvert som internett er blitt integrert inn i det vanlige liv har ting
 425 blitt endret.  Noen av disse endringene er teknisk&#8212;internettet har
 426 gjort kommunikasjon raskere, det har redusert kostnaden med å samle inn
 427 data, og så videre.  Disse tekniske endringene er ikke fokus for denne
 428 boken.  De er viktige.  De er ikke godt forstått.  Men de er den type ting
 429 som ganske enkelt ville blir borte hvis vi alle bare slo av internettet.  De
 430 påvirker ikke folk som ikke bruker internettet, eller i det miste påvirker
 431 det ikke dem direkte.  De er et godt tema for en bok om internettet.  Men
 432 dette er ikke en bok om internettet.
 433 </p><p>
 434 I stedet er denne boken om effekten av internettet ut over internettet i seg
 435 selv.  En effekt på hvordan kultur blir skapt.  Min påstand er at
 436 internettet har ført til en viktig og ukjent endring i denne prosessen.
 437 Denne endringen vil forandre en tradisjon som er like gammel som republikken
 438 selv.  De fleste, hvis de la merke til denne endringen, ville avvise den.
 439 Men de fleste legger ikke engang merke til denne endringen som internettet
 440 har introdusert.
 441 </p><p>
 442
 443 Vi kan få en følelse av denne endringen ved å skille mellom kommersiell og
 444 ikke-kommersiell kultur, ved å knytte lovens reguleringer til hver av dem.
 445 Med "kommersiell kultur" mener jeg den delen av vår kultur som er produsert
 446 og solgt eller produsert for å bli solgt.  Med "ikke-kommersiell kultur"
 447 mener jeg alt det andre. Da gamle menn satt rundt i parker eller på
 448 gatehjørner og fortalte historier som unger og andre lyttet til, så var det
 449 ikke-kommersiell kultur.  Da Noah Webster publiserte sin "Reader", eller
 450 Joel Barlow sin poesi, så var det kommersiell kultur.
 451 </p><p>
 452 Fra historisk tid, og for omtrent hele vår tradisjon, har ikke-kommersiell
 453 kultur i hovedsak ikke vært regulert.  Selvfølgelig, hvis din historie var
 454 utuktig, eller hvis dine sanger forstyrret freden, kunne loven gripe inn.
 455 Men loven var aldri direkte interessert i skapingen eller spredningen av
 456 denne form for kultur, og lot denne kulturen være "fri".  Den vanlige måten
 457 som vanlige individer delte og formet deres kultur&#8212;historiefortelling,
 458 formidling av scener fra teater eller TV, delta i fan-klubber, deling av
 459 musikk, laging av kassetter&#8212;ble ikke styrt av lovverket.
 460 </p><p>
 461 Fokuset på loven var kommersiell kreativitet.  I starten forsiktig, etter
 462 hvert betraktelig, beskytter loven insentivet til skaperne ved å tildele dem
 463 en eksklusiv rett til deres kreative verker, slik at de kan selge disse
 464 eksklusive rettighetene på en kommersiell markedsplass.<sup>[<a name="id2773865" href="#ftn.id2773865" class="footnote">11</a>]</sup> Dette er også, naturligvis, en viktig del av
 465 kreativitet og kultur, og det har blitt en viktigere og viktigere del i
 466 USA.  Men det var på ingen måte dominerende i vår tradisjon.  Det var i
 467 stedet bare en del, en kontrollert del, balansert mot det frie.
 468 </p><p>
 469 Denne grove inndelingen mellom den frie og den kontrollerte har nå blitt
 470 fjernet.<sup>[<a name="id2773902" href="#ftn.id2773902" class="footnote">12</a>]</sup> Internettet har satt scenen
 471 for denne fjerningen, og pressen frem av store medieaktører har loven nå
 472 påvirket det.  For første gang i vår tradisjon, har de vanlige måtene som
 473 individer skaper og deler kultur havnet innen rekekvidde for reguleringene
 474 til loven, som har blitt utvidet til å dra inn i sitt kontrollområde den
 475 enorme mengden kultur og kreativitet som den aldri tidligere har nådd over.
 476 Teknologien som tok vare på den historiske balansen&#8212;mellom bruken av
 477 den delen av kulturen vår som var fri og bruken av vår kultur som krevde
 478 tillatelse&#8212;har blitt borte.  Konsekvensen er at vi er mindre og mindre
 479 en fri kultur, og mer og mer en tillatelseskultur.
 480 </p><p>
 481 Denne endringen blir rettferdiggjort som nødvendig for å beskytte
 482 kommersiell kreativitet.  Og ganske riktig, proteksjonisme er nøyaktig det
 483 som motiverer endringen.  Men proteksjonismen som rettferdiggjør endringene
 484 som jeg skal beskrive lenger ned er ikke den begrensede og balanserte typen
 485 som har definert loven tidligere.  Dette er ikke en proteksjonisme for å
 486 beskytte artister.  Det er i stedet en proteksjonisme for å beskytte
 487 bestemte forretningsformer.  Selskaper som er truet av potensialet til
 488 internettet for å endre måten både kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell kultur
 489 blir skapt og delt, har samlet seg for å få lovgiverne til å bruke loven for
 490 å beskytte selskapene.  Dette er historien om RCA og Armstrong, og det er
 491 drømmen til Causbyene.
 492 </p><p>
 493 For internettet har sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mulighet for mange til å
 494 delta i prosessen med å bygge og kultivere en kultur som rekker lagt utenfor
 495 lokale grenselinjer.  Den makten har endret markedsplassen for å lage og
 496 kultivere kultur generelt, og den endringen truer i neste omgang etablerte
 497 innholdsindustrier. Internettet er dermed for industriene som bygget og
 498 distribuerte innhold i det tjuende århundret hva FM-radio var for AM-radio,
 499 eller hva traileren var for jernbaneindustrien i det nittende århundret:
 500 begynnelsen på slutten, eller i hvert fall en markant endring. Digitale
 501 teknologier, knyttet til internettet, kunne produsere et mye mer
 502 konkurransedyktig og levende marked for å bygge og kultivere kultur.  Dette
 503 markedet kunne inneholde en mye videre og mer variert utvalg av skapere.
 504 Disse skaperne kunne produsere og distribuere et mye mer levende utvalg av
 505 kreativitet. Og avhengig av noen få viktige faktorer, så kunne disse
 506 skaperne tjenere mer i snitt fra dette systemet enn skaperne gjør i
 507 dag&#8212;så lenge RCA-ene av i dag ikke bruker loven til å beskytte dem
 508 selv mot denne konkurransen.
 509 </p><p>
 510 Likevel, som jeg argumenterer for i sidene som følger, er dette nøyaktig det
 511 som skjer i vår kultur i dag.  Dette som er dagens ekvivalenter til tidlig
 512 tjuende århundres radio og nittende århundres jernbaner bruker deres makt
 513 til å få loven til å beskytte dem mot dette nye, mer effektive, mer levende
 514 teknologi for å bygge kultur. De lykkes i deres plan om å gjøre om
 515 internettet før internettet gjør om på dem.
 516 </p><p>
 517 Det ser ikke slik ut for mange.  Kamphandlingene over opphavsrett og
 518 internettet er fjernt for de fleste.  For de få som følger dem, virker de i
 519 hovedsak å handle om et enklere sett med spørsmål&#8212;hvorvidt
 520 "piratvirksomhet" vil bli akseptert, og hvorvidt "eiendomsretten" vil bli
 521 beskyttet.  "Krigen" som har blitt erklært mot teknologiene til
 522 internettet&#8212;det presidenten for Motion Picture Association of America
 523 (MPAA) Jack Valenti kaller sin "egen terroristkrig"<sup>[<a name="id2774021" href="#ftn.id2774021" class="footnote">13</a>]</sup>&#8212;har blitt rammet inn som en kamp om å følge
 524 loven og respektere eiendomsretten.  For å vite hvilken side vi bør ta i
 525 denne krigen, de fleste tenker at vi kun trenger å bestemme om hvorvidt vi
 526 er for eiendomsrett eller mot den.
 527 </p><p>
 528 Hvis dette virkelig var alternativene, så ville jeg være enig med Jack
 529 Valenti og innholdsindustrien.  Jeg tror også på eiendomsretten, og spesielt
 530 på viktigheten av hva Mr. Valenti så pent kaller "kreativ eiendomsrett".
 531 Jeg tror at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at loven, riktig innstilt, bør
 532 straffe "piratvirksomhet", både på og utenfor internettet.
 533 </p><p>
 534 Men disse enkle trosoppfatninger maskerer et mye mer grunnleggende spørsmål
 535 og en mye mer dramatisk endring. Min frykt er at med mindre vi begynner å
 536 legge merke til denne endringen, så vil krigen for å befri verden fra
 537 internettets "pirater" også fjerne verdier fra vår kultur som har vært
 538 integrert til vår tradisjon helt fra starten.
 539 </p><p>
 540 Disse verdiene bygget en tradisjon som, for i hvert fall de første 180 årene
 541 av vår republikk, garanterte skaperne rettigheten til å bygge fritt på deres
 542 fortid, og beskyttet skaperne og innovatørene fra både statlig og privat
 543 kontroll.  Det første grunnlovstillegget beskyttet skaperne fra statlig
 544 kontroll.  Og som professor Neil Netanel kraftfylt argumenterer,<sup>[<a name="id2774084" href="#ftn.id2774084" class="footnote">14</a>]</sup> opphavsrettslov, skikkelig balansert, beskyttet
 545 skaperne mot privat kontroll.  Vår tradisjon var dermed hverken Sovjet eller
 546 tradisjonen til velgjørere.  I stedet skar det ut en bred manøvreringsrom
 547 hvor skapere kunne kultivere og utvide vår kultur.
 548 </p><p>
 549 Likevel har lovens respons til internettet, når det knyttes sammen til
 550 endringer i teknologien i internettet selv, ført til massiv økting av den
 551 effektive reguleringen av kreativitet i USA.  For å bygge på eller kritisere
 552 kulturen rundt oss må en spørre, som Oliver Twist, om tillatelse først.
 553 Tillatelse er, naturligvis, ofte innvilget&#8212;men det er ikke ofte
 554 innvilget til den kritiske eller den uavhengige.  Vi har bygget en slags
 555 kulturell adel.  De innen dette adelskapet har et enkelt liv, mens de på
 556 utsiden har det ikke.  Men det er adelskap i alle former som er fremmed for
 557 vår tradisjon.
 558 </p><p>
 559 Historien som følger er om denne krigen.  Er det ikke om "betydningen av
 560 teknologi" i vanlig liv.  Jeg tror ikke på guder, hverken digitale eller
 561 andre typer.  Det er heller ikke et forsøk på å demonisere noen individer
 562 eller gruppe, jeg tro heller ikke i en djevel, selskapsmessig eller på annen
 563 måte.  Det er ikke en moralsk historie.  Ei heller er det et rop om hellig
 564 krig mot en industri.
 565 </p><p>
 566 Det er i stedet et forsøk på å forstå en håpløst ødeleggende krig som er
 567 inspirert av teknologiene til internettet, men som rekker lang utenfor dens
 568 kode.  Og ved å forstå denne kampen er den en innsats for å finne veien til
 569 fred.  Det er ingen god grunn for å fortsette dagens batalje rundt
 570 internett-teknologiene.  Det vil være til stor skade for vår tradisjon og
 571 kultur hvis den får lov til å fortsette ukontrollert. Vi må forstå kilden
 572 til denne krigen.  Vi må finne en løsning snart.
 573 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2774164"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2774169"></a><p>
 574 Lik Causbyenes kamp er denne krigen, delvis, om "eiendomsrett". Eiendommen i
 575 denne krigen er ikke like håndfast som den til Causbyene, og ingen uskyldige
 576 kyllinger har så langt mistet livet.  Likevel er idéene rundt denne
 577 "eiendomsretten" like åpenbare for de fleste som Causbyenes krav om
 578 ukrenkeligheten til deres bondegård var for dem. De fleste av oss tar for
 579 gitt de uvanlig mektige krav som eierne av "immaterielle rettigheter" nå
 580 hevder.  De fleste av oss, som Causbyene, behandler disse kravene som
 581 åpenbare.  Og dermed protesterer vi, som Causbyene,, når ny teknologi griper
 582 inn i denne eiendomsretten.  Det er så klart for oss som det var fro dem at
 583 de nye teknologiene til internettet "tar seg til rette" mot legitime krav
 584 til "eiendomsrett".  Det er like klart for oss som det var for dem at loven
 585 skulle ta affære for å stoppe denne inntrengingen i annen manns eiendom.
 586 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2774212"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2774219"></a><p>
 587
 588 Og dermed, når nerder og teknologer forsvarer sin tids Armstrong og
 589 Wright-brødenes teknologi, får de lite sympati fra de fleste av oss. Sunn
 590 fornuft gjør ikke opprør.  I motsetning til saken til de uheldige Causbyene,
 591 er sunn fornuft på samme side som eiendomseierne i denne krigen.  I
 592 motsetning til hos de heldige Wright-brødrene, har internettet ikke
 593 inspirert en revolusjon til fordel for seg.
 594 </p><p>
 595 Mitt håp er å skyve denne sunne fornuften videre.  Jeg har blitt stadig mer
 596 overrasket over kraften til denne idéen om immaterielle rettigheter og, mer
 597 viktig, dets evne til å slå av kritisk tanke hos lovmakere og innbyggere.
 598 Det har aldri før i vår historie vært så mye av vår "kultur" som har vært
 599 "eid" enn det er nå.  Og likevel har aldri før konsentrasjonen av makt til å
 600 kontrollere bruken av kulturen vært mer akseptert uten spørsmål enn det er
 601 nå.
 602 </p><p>
 603 Gåten er, hvorfor det?  Er det fordi vi fått en innsikt i sannheten om
 604 verdien og betydningen av absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur? Er det
 605 fordi vi har oppdaget at vår tradisjon med å avvise slike absolutte krav var
 606 feil?
 607 </p><p>
 608 Eller er det på grunn av at idéer om absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur
 609 gir fordeler til RCA-ene i vår tid, og passer med vår ureflekterte
 610 intuisjon?
 611 </p><p>
 612 Er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår tradisjon om fri kultur en
 613 forekomst av USA som korrigerer en feil fra sin fortid, slik vi gjorde det
 614 etter en blodig krig mot slaveri, og slik vi sakte gjør det mot
 615 forskjellsbehandling?  Eller er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår
 616 tradisjon med fri kultur nok et eksempel på at vårt politiske system er
 617 fanget av noen få mektige særinteresser?
 618 </p><p>
 619 Fører sunn fornuft til det ekstreme i dette spørsmålet på grunn av at sunn
 620 fornuft faktisk tror på dette ekstreme?  Eller står sunn fornuft i stillhet
 621 i møtet med dette ekstreme fordi, som med Armstrong versus RCA, at den mer
 622 mektige siden har sikret seg at det har et mye mer mektig synspunkt?
 623 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2774302"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2774308"></a><p>
 624
 625 Jeg forsøker ikke å være mystisk.  Mine egne synspunkter er klare. Jeg mener
 626 det var riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør mot ekstremismen til
 627 Causbyene.  Jeg mener det ville være riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør
 628 mot de ekstreme krav som gjøres i dag på vegne av "immaterielle
 629 rettigheter".  Det som loven krever i dag er mer å mer like dumt som om
 630 lensmannen skulle arrestere en flymaskin for å trenge inn på annen manns
 631 eiendom.  Men konsekvensene av den nye dumskapen vil bli mye mer
 632 dyptgripende.
 633
 634 </p><p>
 635 Basketaket som pågår akkurat nå senterer seg rundt to idéer:
 636 "piratvirksomhet" og "eiendom".  Mitt mål med denne bokens neste to deler er
 637 å utforske disse to idéene.
 638 </p><p>
 639 Metoden min er ikke den vanlige metoden for en akademiker.  Jeg ønsker ikke
 640 å pløye deg inn i et komplisert argument, steinsatt med referanser til
 641 obskure franske teoretikere&#8212;uansett hvor naturlig det har blitt for
 642 den rare sorten vi akademikere har blitt.  Jeg vil i stedet begynne hver del
 643 med en samling historier som etablerer en sammenheng der disse
 644 tilsynelatende enkle idéene kan bli fullt ut forstått.
 645 </p><p>
 646 De to delene setter opp kjernen i påstanden til denne boken: at mens
 647 internettet faktisk har produsert noe fantastisk og nytt, bidrar våre
 648 myndigheter, presset av store medieaktører for å møte dette "noe nytt" til å
 649 ødelegge noe som er svært gammelt.  I stedet for å forstå endringene som
 650 internettet kan gjøre mulig, og i stedet for å ta den tiden som trengs for å
 651 la "sunn fornuft" finne ut hvordan best svare på utfordringen, så lar vi de
 652 som er mest truet av endringene bruke sin makt til å endre loven&#8212;og
 653 viktigere, å bruke sin makt til å endre noe fundamentalt om hvordan vi
 654 alltid har fungert.
 655 </p><p>
 656 Jeg tror vi tillater dette, ikke fordi det er riktig, og heller ikke fordi
 657 de fleste av oss tror på disse endringene.  Vi tillater det på grunn av at
 658 de interessene som er mest truet er blant de mest mektige aktørene i vår
 659 deprimerende kompromitterte prosess for å utforme lover. Denne boken er
 660 historien om nok en konsekvens for denne type korrupsjon&#8212;en konsekvens
 661 for de fleste av oss forblir ukjent med.
 662 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2722197" href="#id2722197" class="para">4</a>] </sup>
 663 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
 664 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
 665 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2722306" href="#id2722306" class="para">5</a>] </sup>
 666 USA mot Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. Domstolen fant at det kunne være
 667 å "ta" hvis regjeringens bruk av sitt land reelt sett hadde ødelagt verdien
 668 av eiendomen til Causby.  Dette eksemplet ble foreslått for meg i Keith
 669 Aokis flotte stykke, "(intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward
 670 a cultural Geography of Authorship", Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293,
 671 1333. Se også Paul Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press
 672 (1984)), 1112&#8211;13.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2722380"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2722386"></a>
 673 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773536" href="#id2773536" class="para">6</a>] </sup>
 674 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity:: Edwin Howard Armstrong
 675 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
 676 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773484" href="#id2773484" class="para">7</a>] </sup> Se "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," første
 677 elektroniske kirke i USA, hos www.webstationone.com/fecha, tilgjengelig fra
 678 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #1</a>.
 679 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773636" href="#id2773636" class="para">8</a>] </sup>Lessing, 226.
 680 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773652" href="#id2773652" class="para">9</a>] </sup>
 681 Lessing, 256.
 682 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773771" href="#id2773771" class="para">10</a>] </sup>
 683 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
 684 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American Life
 685 Project, 15. april 2003: 6, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #2</a>.
 686 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773865" href="#id2773865" class="para">11</a>] </sup>
 687 Dette er ikke det eneste formålet med opphavsrett, men det er helt klart
 688 hovedformålet med opphavsretten slik den er etablert i føderal grunnlov.
 689 Opphavsrettslovene i delstatene beskyttet historisk ikke bare kommersielle
 690 interesse når det gjalt publikasjoner, men også personverninteresser.  Ved å
 691 gi forfattere eneretten til å publisere først, ga delstatenes
 692 opphavsrettslovene forfatterne makt til å kontrollere spredningen av fakta
 693 om seg selv. Se Samuel D. Warren og Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy",
 694 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193, 198&#8211;200.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2722378"></a>
 695 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773902" href="#id2773902" class="para">12</a>] </sup>
 696 Se Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus bøker, 2001),
 697 kap. 13.
 698 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2774021" href="#id2774021" class="para">13</a>] </sup>
 699 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates Use New Tools
 700 to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York Times, 17. januar
 701 2002.
 702 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2774084" href="#id2774084" class="para">14</a>] </sup>
 703 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
 704 Journal 106 (1996): 283.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2774090"></a>
 705 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 2. "Piratvirksomhet"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-piracy"></a>Kapittel 2. "Piratvirksomhet"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#catalogs">Kapittel tre: Kataloger</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#pirates">Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#piracy">Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxmansfield1"></a><p>
 706 Helt siden loven begynte å regulere kreative eierrettigheter, har det vært
 707 en krig mot "piratvirksomhet".  De presise konturene av dette konseptet,
 708 "piratvirksomhet", har vært vanskelig å tegne opp, men bildet av
 709 urettferdighet er enkelt å beskrive.  Som Lord Mansfield skrev i en sak som
 710 utvidet rekkevidden for engelsk opphavsrettslov til å inkludere noteark,
 711 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 712 En person kan bruke kopien til å spille den, men han har ingen rett til å
 713 robbe forfatteren for profitten, ved å lage flere kopier og distribuere
 714 etter eget forgodtbefinnende.<sup>[<a name="id2774443" href="#ftn.id2774443" class="footnote">15</a>]</sup>
 715 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2774451"></a></blockquote></div><p>
 716
 717 I dag er vi midt inne i en annen "krig" mot "piratvirksomhet". Internettet
 718 har fremprovosert denne krigen.  Internettet gjør det mulig å effektivt spre
 719 innhold.  Peer-to-peer (p2p) fildeling er blant det mest effektive av de
 720 effektive teknologier internettet muliggjør. Ved å bruke distribuert
 721 intelligens, kan p2p-systemer muliggjøre enkel spredning av innhold på en
 722 måte som ingen forestilte seg for en generasjon siden.
 723
 724 </p><p>
 725 Denne effektiviteten respekterer ikke de tradisjonelle skillene i
 726 opphavsretten. Nettverket skiller ikke mellom deling av
 727 opphavsrettsbeskyttet og ikke opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold. Dermed har det
 728 vært deling av en enorm mengde opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold.  Denne
 729 delingen har i sin tur ansporet til krigen, på grunn av at eiere av
 730 opphavsretter frykter delingen vil "frata forfatteren overskuddet."
 731 </p><p>
 732 Krigerne har snudd seg til domstolene, til lovgiverne, og i stadig større
 733 grad til teknologi for å forsvare sin "eiendom" mot denne
 734 "piratvirksomheten".  En generasjon amerikanere, advarer krigerne, blir
 735 oppdratt til å tro at "eiendom" skal være "gratis".  Glem tatoveringer, ikke
 736 tenk på kroppspiercing&#8212;våre barn blir tyver!
 737 </p><p>
 738 Det er ingen tvil om at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at pirater bør
 739 straffes.  Men før vi roper på bødlene, bør vi sette dette
 740 "piratvirksomhets"-begrepet i en sammenheng.  For mens begrepet blir mer og
 741 mer brukt, har det i sin kjerne en ekstraordinær idé som nesten helt sikkert
 742 er feil.
 743 </p><p>
 744 Idéen høres omtrent slik ut:
 745 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 746 Kreativt arbeid har verdi.  Når jeg bruker, eller tar, eller bygger på det
 747 kreative arbeidet til andre, så tar jeg noe fra dem som har verdi.  Når jeg
 748 tar noe av verdi fra noen andre, bør jeg få tillatelse fra dem.  Å ta noe
 749 som har verdi fra andre uten tillatelse er galt.  Det er en form for
 750 piratvirksomhet.
 751 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2774547"></a><p>
 752 Dette synet går dypt i de pågående debattene.  Det er hva jussprofessor
 753 Rochelle Dreyfuss ved NYU kritiserer som "hvis verdi, så rettighet"-teorien
 754 for kreative eierrettigheter <sup>[<a name="id2774562" href="#ftn.id2774562" class="footnote">16</a>]</sup>&#8212;hvis det finnes verdi, så må noen ha rettigheten til denne
 755 verdien.  Det er perspektivet som fikk komponistenes rettighetsorganisasjon,
 756 ASCAP, til å saksøke jentespeiderne for å ikke betale for sangene som
 757 jentene sagt rundt jentespeidernes leirbål.<sup>[<a name="id2774579" href="#ftn.id2774579" class="footnote">17</a>]</sup> Det fantes "verdi" (sangene), så det måtte ha vært en
 758 "rettighet"&#8212;til og med mot jentespeiderne.
 759 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2774603"></a><p>
 760
 761 Denne idéen er helt klart en mulig forståelse om hvordan kreative
 762 eierrettigheter bør virke.  Det er helt klart et mulig design for et
 763 lovsystem som beskytter kreative eierrettigheter.  Men teorien om "hvis
 764 verdi, så rettighet" for kreative eierrettigheter har aldri vært USAs teori
 765 for kreative eierrettigheter.  It har aldri stått rot i vårt lovverk.
 766 </p><p>
 767 I vår tradisjon har immaterielle rettigheter i stedet vært et instrument.
 768 Det bygger fundamentet for et rikt kreativt samfunn, men er fortsatt servilt
 769 til verdien av kreativitet.  Dagens debatt har snudd dette helt rundt.  Vi
 770 har blitt så opptatt av å beskytte instrumentet at vi mister verdien av
 771 syne.
 772 </p><p>
 773 Kilden til denne forvirringen er et skille som loven ikke lenger bryr seg om
 774 å markere&#8212;skillet mellom å gjenpublisere noens verk på den ene siden,
 775 og bygge på og gjøre om verket på den andre.  Da opphavsretten kom var det
 776 kun publisering som ble berørt. Opphavsretten i dag regulerer begge.
 777 </p><p>
 778 Før teknologiene til internettet dukket opp, betød ikke denne begrepsmessige
 779 sammenblandingen mye.  Teknologiene for å publisere var kostbare, som betød
 780 at det meste av publisering var kommersiell. Kommersielle aktører kunne
 781 håndtere byrden pålagt av loven&#8212;til og med byrden som den bysantiske
 782 kompleksiteten som opphavsrettsloven har blitt.  Det var bare nok en kostnad
 783 ved å drive forretning.
 784 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2774657"></a><p>
 785 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of the
 786 law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of commercial
 787 creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that expansion would not
 788 matter much if copyright law regulated only "copying," when the law
 789 regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does, the extension matters a
 790 lot. The burden of this law now vastly outweighs any original
 791 benefit&#8212;certainly as it affects noncommercial creativity, and
 792 increasingly as it affects commercial creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see
 793 more clearly in the chapters below, the law's role is less and less to
 794 support creativity, and more and more to protect certain industries against
 795 competition. Just at the time digital technology could unleash an
 796 extraordinary range of commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law
 797 burdens this creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the
 798 threat of obscenely severe penalties. We may be seeing, as Richard Florida
 799 writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<sup>[<a name="id2774666" href="#ftn.id2774666" class="footnote">18</a>]</sup> Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of
 800 regulation of this creative class.
 801 </p><p>
 802 Disse byrdene gir ingen mening i vår tradisjon.  Vi bør begynne med å forstå
 803 den tradisjonen litt mer, og ved å plassere dagens slag om oppførsel med
 804 merkelappen "piratvirksomhet" i sin rette sammenheng.
 805 </p><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel en: Skaperne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="creators"></a>Kapittel en: Skaperne</h2></div></div></div><p>
 806 I 1928 ble en tegnefilmfigur født.  En tidlig Mikke Mus debuterte i mai
 807 dette året, i en stille flopp ved navn Plane Crazy.  I november, i Colony
 808 teateret i New York City, ble den første vidt distribuerte tegnefilmen med
 809 synkronisert lyd, Steamboat Willy, vist frem med figuren som skulle bli til
 810 Mikke Mus.
 811 </p><p>
 812 Film med sykronisert lyd hadde blitt introdusert et år tidligere i filmen
 813 The Jazz Singer.  Suksessen fikk Walt Disney til å kopiere teknikken og
 814 mikse lyd med tegnefilm.  Ingen visste hvorvidt det ville virke eller ikke,
 815 og om det fungere, hvorvidt publikum villa ha sans for det.  Men da Disney
 816 gjorde en test sommeren 1928, var resutlatet entydig.  Som Disney beskriver
 817 dette første eksperimentet,
 818 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 819
 820 Et par av guttene mine kunne lese noteark, og en av dem kunne spille
 821 munnspill.  Vi stappet dem inn i et rom hvor de ikke kunne se skjermen, og
 822 gjorde det slik at lyden de spilte ble sendt videre til et rom hvor våre
 823 koner og venner var plassert for å se på bildet.
 824
 825 </p><p>
 826 Guttene brukte et note- og lydeffekt-ark.  Etter noen dårlige oppstarter,
 827 kom endelig lyd og handlig i gang med et smell. Munnspilleren spilte
 828 melodien, og resten av oss i lydavdelingen slamret på tinnkasseroller og
 829 blåste på slide-fløyte til rytmen. Synkroniseringen var nesten helt riktig.
 830 </p><p>
 831 Effekten på vårt lille publikum var intet mindre enn elektrisk.  De reagerte
 832 nesten instiktivt til denne union av lyd og bevegelse.  Jeg trodde de tullet
 833 med meg.  Så de puttet meg i publikum og satte igang på nytt.  Det var
 834 grufult, men det var fantastisk.  Og det var noe nytt!<sup>[<a name="id2774821" href="#ftn.id2774821" class="footnote">19</a>]</sup>
 835 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 836 Disneys daværende partner, og en av animasjonsverdenens mest ekstraordinære
 837 talenter, Ub Iwerks, uttalte det sterkere: "Jeg har aldri vært så begeistret
 838 i hele mitt liv. Ingenting annet har noen sinne vært like bra." <a class="indexterm" name="id2774843"></a>
 839 </p><p>
 840 Disney hadde laget noe helt nyt, basert på noe relativt nytt. Synkronisert
 841 lyd ga liv til en form for kreativitet som sjeldent hadde&#8212;unntatt fra
 842 Disneys hender&#8212;vært noe annet en fyllstoff for andre filmer.  Gjennom
 843 animasjonens tidligere historie var det Disneys oppfinnelse som satte
 844 standarden som andre måtte sloss for å oppfylle.  Og ganske ofte var Disneys
 845 store geni, hans gnist av kreativitet, bygget på arbeidet til andre.
 846 </p><p>
 847 Dette er kjent stoff.  Det du kanskje ikke vet er at 1928 også markerer en
 848 annen viktig overgang.  I samme år laget et komedie-geni (i motsetning til
 849 tegnefilm-geni) sin siste uavhengig produserte stumfilm.  Dette geniet var
 850 Buster Keaton.  Filmen var Steamboat Bill, Jr.
 851 </p><p>
 852 Keaton ble født inn i en vauderville-familie i 1895.  I stumfilm-æraen hadde
 853 han mestret bruken av bredpenslet fysisk komedie på en måte som tente
 854 ukontrollerbar latter fra hans publikum. Steamboat Bill, Jr. var en klassier
 855 av denne typen, berømt blant film-elskere for sine utrolige stunts.  Filmen
 856 var en klassisk Keaton&#8212;fantastisk populær og blant de beste i sin
 857 sjanger.
 858 </p><p>
 859 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.  The
 860 coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a direct
 861 cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<sup>[<a name="id2774887" href="#ftn.id2774887" class="footnote">20</a>]</sup> and
 862 both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from the
 863 invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get Steamboat
 864 Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of Steamboat Bill, Jr.,
 865 itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill," that we get Steamboat Willie,
 866 and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey Mouse.
 867 </p><p>
 868 Denne "låningen" var ikke unik, hverken for Disney eller for industrien.
 869 Disney apet alltid etter full-lengde massemarkedsfilmene rundt
 870 ham.<sup>[<a name="id2774943" href="#ftn.id2774943" class="footnote">21</a>]</sup> Det samme gjorde mange andre.
 871 Tidlige tegnefilmer er stappfulle av etterapninger&#8212;små variasjoner
 872 over suksessfulle temaer, gamle historier fortalt på nytt.  Nøkkelen til
 873 suksess var brilliansen i forskjellene.  Med Disney var det lyden som ga
 874 gnisten til hans animasjoner.  Senere var det kvaliteten på hans arbeide
 875 relativt til de masseproduserte tegnefilmene som han konkurrerte med.
 876 Likevel var disse bidragene bygget på toppen av fundamentet som var lånt.
 877 Disney bygget på arbeidet til andre som kom før han, og skapte noe nytt ut
 878 av noe som bare var litt gammelt.
 879 </p><p>
 880 Noen ganger var låningen begrenset, og noen ganger var den betydelig. Tenkt
 881 på eventurene til brødrene Grimm.  Hvis du er like ubevisst som jeg var, så
 882 tror du sannsynlighvis at disse fortellingene er glade, søte historier som
 883 passer for ethvert barn ved leggetid.  Realiteten er at Grimm-eventyrene er,
 884 for oss, ganske dystre.  Det er noen sjeldne og kanskje spesielt ambisiøse
 885 foreldre som ville våge å lese disse blodige moralistiske historiene til
 886 sine barn, ved leggetid eller hvilken som helst annet tidspunkt.
 887 </p><p>
 888
 889 Disney tok disse historiene og fortalte dem på nytt på en måte som førte dem
 890 inn i en ny tidsalder. Han ga historiene liv, med både karakterer og
 891 lys. Uten å fjerne bitene av frykt og fare helt, gjorde han morsomt det som
 892 var mørkt og satte inn en ekte følelse av medfølelse der det før var
 893 frykt. Og ikke bare med verkene av brødrene Grimm.  Faktisk er katalogen
 894 over Disney-arbeid som baserer seg på arbeidet til andre ganske forbløffende
 895 når den blir samlet: Snøhvit (1937), Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940),
 896 Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of the South (1946), Askepott (1950), Alice
 897 in Wonderland (1951), Robin Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady og
 898 landstrykeren (1955), Mulan (1998), Tornerose (1959), 101 dalmatinere
 899 (1961), Sverdet i steinen (1963), og Jungelboken (1967)&#8212;for ikke å
 900 nevne et nylig eksempel som vi bør kanskje glemme raskt, Treasure Planet
 901 (2003). I alle disse tilfellene, har Disney (eller Disney, Inc.) hentet
 902 kreativitet fra kultur rundt ham, blandet med kreativiteten fra sitt eget
 903 ekstraordinære talent, og deretter brent denne blandingen inn i sjelen til
 904 sin kultur. Hente, blande og brenne.
 905 </p><p>
 906 Dette er en type kreativitet.  Det er en kreativitet som vi bør huske på og
 907 feire.  Det er noen som vil si at det finnes ingen kreativitet bortsett fra
 908 denne typen.  Vi trenger ikke gå så langt for å anerkjenne dens betydning.
 909 Vi kan kalle dette "Disney-kreativitet", selv om det vil være litt
 910 misvisende.  Det er mer presist "Walt Disney-kreativitet"&#8212;en
 911 uttrykksform og genialitet som bygger på kulturen rundt oss og omformer den
 912 til noe annet.
 913 </p><p> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was relatively
 914 fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was therefore quite
 915 vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around thirty
 916 years&#8212;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
 917 copyrighted.<sup>[<a name="id2775006" href="#ftn.id2775006" class="footnote">22</a>]</sup> That means that for thirty
 918 years, on average, the authors or copyright holders of a creative work had
 919 an "exclusive right" to control certain uses of the work. To use this
 920 copyrighted work in limited ways required the permission of the copyright
 921 owner.
 922 </p><p>
 923 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.  No
 924 permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No permission and,
 925 hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free zone." Thus, most of
 926 the content from the nineteenth century was free for Disney to use and build
 927 upon in 1928. It was free for anyone&#8212; whether connected or not,
 928 whether rich or not, whether approved or not&#8212;to use and build upon.
 929 </p><p>
 930
 931 This is the ways things always were&#8212;until quite recently. For most of
 932 our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From until 1978,
 933 the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two years, meaning
 934 that most culture just a generation and a half old was free for anyone to
 935 build upon without the permission of anyone else.  Today's equivalent would
 936 be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s to now be free for the next
 937 Walt Disney to build upon without permission. Yet today, the public domain
 938 is presumptive only for content from before the Great Depression.
 939 </p><p>
 940 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity." Nor does
 941 America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and except within
 942 totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite universal.
 943 </p><p>
 944 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
 945 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
 946 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
 947 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives from
 948 comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every magazine stand,
 949 carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's extraordinary system
 950 of public transportation.
 951 </p><p>
 952 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
 953 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand much
 954 about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to the stories
 955 that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga cover every aspect
 956 of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights." And anyway, it's not as
 957 if the New York subways are filled with readers of Joyce or even
 958 Hemingway. People of different cultures distract themselves in different
 959 ways, the Japanese in this interestingly different way.
 960 </p><p>
 961 Men mitt formål her er ikke å forstå manga.  Det er a beskrive en variant av
 962 manga som fra en avokats perspektiv er ganske merkelig, men som fra en
 963 Disneys perspektiv er ganske godt kjent.
 964 </p><p>
 965
 966 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but they are
 967 a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of doujinshi. It
 968 is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a contribution
 969 to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or significantly. A
 970 doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and develop it
 971 differently&#8212;with a different story line. Or the comic can keep the
 972 character in character but change its look slightly. There is no formula for
 973 what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they must be
 974 different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed, there are
 975 committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows and reject any
 976 copycat comic that is merely a copy.
 977 </p><p>
 978 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
 979 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce these
 980 bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come together
 981 twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country, to exchange
 982 and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the mainstream commercial
 983 manga market. In some ways, it obviously competes with that market, but
 984 there is no sustained effort by those who control the commercial manga
 985 market to shut the doujinshi market down. It flourishes, despite the
 986 competition and despite the law.
 987 </p><p>
 988 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained in the
 989 law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under Japanese
 990 copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors American copyright
 991 law, the doujinshi market is an illegal one. Doujinshi are plainly
 992 "derivative works." There is no general practice by doujinshi artists of
 993 securing the permission of the manga creators. Instead, the practice is
 994 simply to take and modify the creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
 995 Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking"
 996 without the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
 997 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work
 998 without the original copyright owner's permission.
 999 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxwinickjudd"></a><p>
1000 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in the
1001 view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1002 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The early
1003 days of comics in America are very much like what's going on in Japan
1004 now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each other. . . . That's
1005 how [the artists] learn to draw&#8212;by going into comic books and not
1006 tracing them, but looking at them and copying them" and building from
1007 them.<sup>[<a name="id2775161" href="#ftn.id2775161" class="footnote">23</a>]</sup>
1008 </p><p>
1009 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part because of
1010 the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1011 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules and
1012 you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot" do. "As a
1013 creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters which are fifty
1014 years old."
1015 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2775252"></a><p>
1016 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is precisely
1017 the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that explains the
1018 mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra, for example,
1019 hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these technical violations
1020 because they spur the manga market to be more wealthy and
1021 productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were banned, so the law
1022 does not ban doujinshi.<sup>[<a name="id2775270" href="#ftn.id2775270" class="footnote">24</a>]</sup>
1023 </p><p>
1024 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges, is that
1025 the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not clear. It may
1026 well be that the market as a whole is better off if doujinshi are permitted
1027 rather than banned, but that doesn't explain why individual copyright owners
1028 don't sue nonetheless. If the law has no general exception for doujinshi,
1029 and indeed in some cases individual manga artists have sued doujinshi
1030 artists, why is there not a more general pattern of blocking this "free
1031 taking" by the doujinshi culture?
1032 </p><p>
1033 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question as often
1034 as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by a friend from
1035 a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough lawyers," he told me one
1036 afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources to prosecute cases like
1037 this."
1038 </p><p>
1039
1040 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1041 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those words
1042 have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is begged: Would
1043 Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga be richer if doujinshi
1044 artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the Japanese gain something
1045 important if they could end this practice of uncompensated sharing? Does
1046 piracy here hurt the victims of the piracy, or does it help them? Would
1047 lawyers fighting this piracy help their clients or hurt them? Let's pause
1048 for a moment.
1049 </p><p>
1050 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they first
1051 start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should be puzzled
1052 about something you hadn't thought through before.
1053 </p><p>
1054 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1055 celebrants.  I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1056 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1057 "intellectual property."<sup>[<a name="id2775345" href="#ftn.id2775345" class="footnote">25</a>]</sup> A large,
1058 diverse society cannot survive without property; a large, diverse, and
1059 modern society cannot flourish without intellectual property.
1060 </p><p>
1061 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is plenty of
1062 value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't mean "money can't
1063 buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly part of a process of
1064 production, including commercial as well as noncommercial production.  If
1065 Disney animators had stolen a set of pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd
1066 have no hesitation in condemning that taking as wrong&#8212; even though
1067 trivial, even if unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the
1068 law of the day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1069 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because Disney's
1070 use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing wrong with the
1071 taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in the public domain.
1072 </p><p>
1073
1074 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&#8212;or more generally, the
1075 things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&#8212;are valuable,
1076 our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some things remain free
1077 for the taking within a free culture, and that freedom is good.
1078 </p><p>
1079 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into a
1080 publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1081 work&#8212;or even one copy&#8212;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1082 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would have
1083 stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever form,
1084 whether large or small.
1085 </p><p>
1086 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to say that
1087 the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt Disney
1088 creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in particular find it
1089 hard to say why.
1090 </p><p>
1091 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you begin
1092 to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists without asking
1093 or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor Einstein, but may I have
1094 permission to use your theory of relativity to show that you were wrong
1095 about quantum physics?") Acting companies perform adaptations of the works
1096 of Shakespeare without securing permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe
1097 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1098 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare
1099 must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind
1100 of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster films
1101 in 1997.
1102 </p><p>
1103
1104 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building upon the
1105 creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.  That building is
1106 always and everywhere at least partially done without permission and without
1107 compensating the original creator. No society, free or controlled, has ever
1108 demanded that every use be paid for or that permission for Walt Disney
1109 creativity must always be sought. Instead, every society has left a certain
1110 bit of its culture free for the taking&#8212;free societies more fully than
1111 unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1112
1113 </p><p>
1114 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All cultures
1115 are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How free is this
1116 culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take
1117 and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of the
1118 royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock Exchange? Or
1119 is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally, whether affiliated
1120 with the Met or not? To musicians generally, whether white or not? To
1121 filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1122 </p><p>
1123 Frie kulturer er kulturer som etterlater mye åpent for andre å bygge på.
1124 Ufrie, eller tillatelse-kulturer etterlater mye mindre.  Vår var en fri
1125 kultur. Den er på tur til å bli mindre fri.
1126 </p></div><div class="sect1" title='Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="mere-copyists"></a>Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2775481"></a><p>
1127 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1128 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they were
1129 called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and expensive, and the
1130 field was thus limited to professionals and a few zealous and wealthy
1131 amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre Association that helped
1132 regulate the industry, as do all such associations, by keeping competition
1133 down so as to keep prices up.)
1134 </p><p>
1135 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.  This
1136 pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make "automatic
1137 pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for making "negatives."
1138 But because the negatives were glass, and had to be kept wet, the process
1139 still remained expensive and cumbersome. In the 1870s, dry plates were
1140 developed, making it easier to separate the taking of a picture from its
1141 developing. These were still plates of glass, and thus it was still not a
1142 process within reach of most amateurs.
1143 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxeastmangeorge"></a><p>
1144
1145 The technological change that made mass photography possible didn't happen
1146 until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George Eastman, himself an
1147 amateur photographer, was frustrated by the technology of photographs made
1148 with plates. In a flash of insight (so to speak), Eastman saw that if the
1149 film could be made to be flexible, it could be held on a single
1150 spindle. That roll could then be sent to a developer, driving the costs of
1151 photography down substantially. By lowering the costs, Eastman expected he
1152 could dramatically broaden the population of photographers.
1153 </p><p>
1154 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed rolls of
1155 it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was marketed on the basis
1156 of its simplicity. "You press the button and we do the rest."<sup>[<a name="id2775544" href="#ftn.id2775544" class="footnote">26</a>]</sup> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1157 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1158 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that any
1159 person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work that only an
1160 expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or child, who has
1161 sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and press a button, with an
1162 instrument which altogether removes from the practice of photography the
1163 necessity for exceptional facilities or, in fact, any special knowledge of
1164 the art. It can be employed without preliminary study, without a darkroom
1165 and without chemicals.<sup>[<a name="id2775576" href="#ftn.id2775576" class="footnote">27</a>]</sup>
1166 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1167 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded with film,
1168 and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an Eastman factory,
1169 where the film was developed. Over time, of course, the cost of the camera
1170 and the ease with which it could be used both improved. Roll film thus
1171 became the basis for the explosive growth of popular photography. Eastman's
1172 camera first went on sale in 1888; one year later, Kodak was printing more
1173 than six thousand negatives a day.  From 1888 through 1909, while industrial
1174 production was rising by 4.7 percent, photographic equipment and material
1175 sales increased by percent.<sup>[<a name="id2775606" href="#ftn.id2775606" class="footnote">28</a>]</sup> Eastman
1176 Kodak's sales during the same period experienced an average annual increase
1177 of over 17 percent.<sup>[<a name="id2775614" href="#ftn.id2775614" class="footnote">29</a>]</sup>
1178 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2775623"></a><p>
1179
1180
1181 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not economic. It
1182 was social. Professional photography gave individuals a glimpse of places
1183 they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography gave them the ability to
1184 record their own lives in a way they had never been able to do before. As
1185 author Brian Coe notes, "For the first time the snapshot album provided the
1186 man on the street with a permanent record of his family and its
1187 activities. . . . For the first time in history there exists an authentic
1188 visual record of the appearance and activities of the common man made
1189 without [literary] interpretation or bias."<sup>[<a name="id2775642" href="#ftn.id2775642" class="footnote">30</a>]</sup>
1190 </p><p>
1191 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of expression.  The
1192 pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of expression, of course. But it
1193 took years of training before they could be deployed by amateurs in any
1194 useful or effective way. With the Kodak, expression was possible much sooner
1195 and more simply. The barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at
1196 its "quality"; professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a
1197 child study how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the
1198 experience of creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave
1199 ordinary people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1200 have before.
1201 </p><p>
1202 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously, Eastman's
1203 genius was an important part. But also important was the legal environment
1204 within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in the history of
1205 photography, there was a series of judicial decisions that could well have
1206 changed the course of photography substantially.  Courts were asked whether
1207 the photographer, amateur or professional, required permission before he
1208 could capture and print whatever image he wanted. Their answer was
1209 no.<sup>[<a name="id2775677" href="#ftn.id2775677" class="footnote">31</a>]</sup>
1210 </p><p>
1211
1212 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1213 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1214 building whose photograph he shot&#8212;pirating something of value. Some
1215 even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as Disney was not free to
1216 take the pencils that his animators used to draw Mickey, so, too, should
1217 these photographers not be free to take images that they thought valuable.
1218 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2775690"></a><p>
1219 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.  Sure,
1220 there may be something of value being used. But citizens should have the
1221 right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.  (Louis
1222 Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought the rule should
1223 be different for images from private spaces.<sup>[<a name="id2775713" href="#ftn.id2775713" class="footnote">32</a>]</sup>) It may be that this means that the photographer gets something for
1224 nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from Steamboat Bill, Jr. or
1225 the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be free to capture an image
1226 without compensating the source.
1227 </p><p>
1228 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these early
1229 decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no permission would be
1230 required before an image could be captured and shared with others. Instead,
1231 permission was presumed. Freedom was the default.  (The law would eventually
1232 craft an exception for famous people: commercial photographers who snap
1233 pictures of famous people for commercial purposes have more restrictions
1234 than the rest of us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured
1235 without clearing the rights to do the capturing.<sup>[<a name="id2775752" href="#ftn.id2775752" class="footnote">33</a>]</sup>)
1236 </p><p>
1237 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had the law
1238 gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the photographer,
1239 then the photographer would have had to demonstrate permission. Perhaps
1240 Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate permission, too, before it
1241 developed the film upon which images were captured. After all, if permission
1242 were not granted, then Eastman Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft"
1243 committed by the photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1244 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting from the
1245 "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could imagine the law
1246 then requiring that some form of permission be demonstrated before a company
1247 developed pictures. We could imagine a system developing to demonstrate that
1248 permission.
1249 </p><p>
1250
1251
1252
1253 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be very hard
1254 to see how photography could have flourished as it did if the requirement
1255 for permission had been built into the rules that govern it. Photography
1256 would have existed. It would have grown in importance over
1257 time. Professionals would have continued to use the technology as they
1258 did&#8212;since professionals could have more easily borne the burdens of
1259 the permission system. But the spread of photography to ordinary people
1260 would not have occurred. Nothing like that growth would have been
1261 realized. And certainly, nothing like that growth in a democratic technology
1262 of expression would have been realized.  If you drive through San
1263 Francisco's Presidio, you might see two gaudy yellow school buses painted
1264 over with colorful and striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place
1265 of the name of a school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the
1266 projects that these busses enable.  These buses are filled with technologies
1267 that teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1268 film of your VCR.  Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think! is a
1269 project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand and critique
1270 the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each year, these busses
1271 travel to more than thirty schools and enable three hundred to five hundred
1272 children to learn something about media by doing something with media.  By
1273 doing, they think. By tinkering, they learn.
1274 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2775786"></a><p>
1275 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is increasingly
1276 so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has fallen
1277 dramatically.  As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good real-time
1278 digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get professional
1279 quality for $595."<sup>[<a name="id2775855" href="#ftn.id2775855" class="footnote">34</a>]</sup> These buses are
1280 filled with technology that would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten
1281 years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but
1282 classrooms across the country where kids are learning more and more of
1283 something teachers call "media literacy."
1284 </p><p>
1285
1286 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just Think!,
1287 puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and deconstruct media
1288 images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the way media works, the
1289 way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and the way people access it."
1290 <a class="indexterm" name="id2775883"></a>
1291 </p><p>
1292 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most people,
1293 literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway and noticing
1294 split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know about.
1295 </p><p>
1296 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of television
1297 commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000 commercials
1298 generally,<sup>[<a name="id2775904" href="#ftn.id2775904" class="footnote">35</a>]</sup> it is increasingly important
1299 to understand the "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the
1300 written word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to
1301 write by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1302 constructing lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1303 </p><p>
1304 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy as
1305 crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has written
1306 understands how difficult writing is&#8212;how difficult it is to sequence
1307 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1308 understandable&#8212;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1309 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works, how it
1310 holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers emotion or
1311 builds suspense.
1312 </p><p>
1313 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.  But
1314 even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about the
1315 film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not from
1316 reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then reflecting
1317 upon what one has written. One learns to write with images by making them
1318 and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1319 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2775942"></a><p>
1320 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film, as
1321 Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1322 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the USC School
1323 of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was about "the placement
1324 of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and texture."<sup>[<a name="id2775957" href="#ftn.id2775957" class="footnote">36</a>]</sup> But as computers open up an interactive space where
1325 a story is "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1326 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1327 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.  But when he
1328 tried to design a computer game based on one of his works, it was a new
1329 craft he had to learn. How to lead people through a game without their
1330 feeling they have been led was not obvious, even to a wildly successful
1331 author.<sup>[<a name="id2775989" href="#ftn.id2775989" class="footnote">37</a>]</sup>
1332 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2776009"></a><p>
1333 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley describes,
1334 "people are very surprised about how they are led through a film. [I]t is
1335 perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you have no idea. If a
1336 filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were led." If you know you were
1337 led through a film, the film has failed.
1338 </p><p>
1339 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&#8212;one that goes beyond text to
1340 include audio and visual elements&#8212;is not about making better film
1341 directors.  The aim is not to improve the profession of filmmaking at all.
1342 Instead, as Daley explained,
1343 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1344 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide is not
1345 access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the language that
1346 that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people can write with this
1347 language, and all the rest of us are reduced to being read-only.
1348 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1349 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.  Couch
1350 potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the twentieth century.
1351 </p><p>
1352 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point: It
1353 could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better understanding
1354 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the tools that
1355 enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy, and this
1356 literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the appropriate
1357 language for what they need to create or express."<sup>[<a name="id2776058" href="#ftn.id2776058" class="footnote">38</a>]</sup> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
1358 language of the twenty-first century."<sup>[<a name="id2776076" href="#ftn.id2776076" class="footnote">39</a>]</sup>
1359 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2776083"></a><p>
1360 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1361 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1362 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the Institute for
1363 Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe one particularly
1364 poignant example of a project they ran in a high school.  The high school
1365 was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles school. In all the traditional
1366 measures of success, this school was a failure. But Daley and Barish ran a
1367 program that gave kids an opportunity to use film to express meaning about
1368 something the students know something about&#8212;gun violence.
1369 </p><p>
1370 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively new
1371 problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was getting the
1372 kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them away. The "kids
1373 were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night," said Barish. They were
1374 working harder than in any other class to do what education should be
1375 about&#8212;learning how to express themselves.
1376 </p><p>
1377 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple tools
1378 to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said this class
1379 produced a series of projects that showed something about gun violence that
1380 few would otherwise understand. This was an issue close to the lives of
1381 these students. The project "gave them a tool and empowered them to be able
1382 to both understand it and talk about it," Barish explained. That tool
1383 succeeded in creating expression&#8212;far more successfully and powerfully
1384 than could have been created using only text. "If you had said to these
1385 students, `you have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands
1386 up and gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
1387 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students can do
1388 well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be expressed
1389 well. The power of this message depended upon its connection to this form of
1390 expression.
1391 </p><p>
1392
1393
1394
1395 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part, of
1396 course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education, Daley
1397 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing meaning." To say
1398 that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing is only about
1399 teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&#8212;and increasingly, not the
1400 most powerful part&#8212;of constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the
1401 most moving part of our interview,
1402 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1403 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing meaning. If all
1404 you give them is text, they're not going to do it.  Because they can't. You
1405 know, you've got Johnny who can look at a video, he can play a video game,
1406 he can do graffiti all over your walls, he can take your car apart, and he
1407 can do all sorts of other things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny
1408 comes to school and you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do
1409 matters." Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
1410 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
1411 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you can
1412 do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think reflects
1413 that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw for me
1414 something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video camera and
1415 . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and make a little
1416 movie." But instead, really help you take these elements that you
1417 understand, that are your language, and construct meaning about the
1418 topic. . . .
1419 </p><p>
1420 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of course, is eventually,
1421 as it has happened in all these classes, they bump up against the fact, "I
1422 need to explain this and I really need to write something." And as one of
1423 the teachers told Stephanie, they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8
1424 times, till they got it right.
1425 </p><p>
1426
1427 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They needed to say
1428 something, as opposed to just jumping through your hoops. They actually
1429 needed to use a language that they didn't speak very well. But they had come
1430 to understand that they had a lot of power with this language."
1431 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1432 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
1433 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the world
1434 shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for that week,
1435 and for weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold
1436 the story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a retelling,
1437 because we had seen the events that were described. The genius of this awful
1438 act of terrorism was that the delayed second attack was perfectly timed to
1439 assure that the whole world would be watching.
1440 </p><p>
1441 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music scored
1442 for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across the
1443 screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance," and
1444 seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have increasingly
1445 come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the entertainment is
1446 tragedy.
1447 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2776215"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2776220"></a><p>
1448 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September 11,"
1449 those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different production as
1450 well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same events. Yet these
1451 Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some people constructed photo
1452 pages that captured images from around the world and presented them as slide
1453 shows with text. Some offered open letters. There were sound
1454 recordings. There was anger and frustration.  There were attempts to provide
1455 context. There was, in short, an extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in
1456 the sense Mike Godwin uses the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news
1457 event that had captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS,
1458 but there was also the Internet.
1459 </p><p>
1460
1461 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&#8212;though I do think the
1462 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean instead
1463 to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a Kodak, the
1464 Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a movie by a student
1465 on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed with sound or
1466 text.
1467 </p><p>
1468 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet allows
1469 these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of people,
1470 practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
1471 tradition&#8212;not just that culture can be captured mechanically, and
1472 obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but that this
1473 mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely spread
1474 practically instantaneously.
1475 </p><p>
1476 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the same
1477 time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was just beginning
1478 to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or blog. The blog is a kind
1479 of public diary, and within some cultures, such as in Japan, it functions
1480 very much like a diary. In those cultures, it records private facts in a
1481 public way&#8212;it's a kind of electronic Jerry Springer, available
1482 anywhere in the world.
1483 </p><p>
1484 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different character.
1485 There are some who use the space simply to talk about their private
1486 life. But there are many who use the space to engage in public
1487 discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing others who are
1488 mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about the decisions they
1489 make, offering solutions to problems we all see: blogs create the sense of a
1490 virtual public meeting, but one in which we don't all hope to be there at
1491 the same time and in which conversations are not necessarily linked. The
1492 best of the blog entries are relatively short; they point directly to words
1493 used by others, criticizing with or adding to them.  They are arguably the
1494 most important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
1495 </p><p>
1496
1497 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as it
1498 does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most difficult for
1499 those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy has atrophied.  Of
1500 course we have elections, and most of the time the courts allow those
1501 elections to count. A relatively small number of people vote in those
1502 elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally professionalized
1503 and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
1504 </p><p>
1505 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy means rule by
1506 the people, but rule means something more than mere elections. In our
1507 tradition, it also means control through reasoned discourse.  This was the
1508 idea that captured the imagination of Alexis de Tocqueville, the
1509 nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the most important account of
1510 early "Democracy in America." It wasn't popular elections that fascinated
1511 him&#8212;it was the jury, an institution that gave ordinary people the
1512 right to choose life or death for other citizens.  And most fascinating for
1513 him was that the jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would
1514 impose. They deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they
1515 tried to persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
1516 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to come to
1517 an end.<sup>[<a name="id2776258" href="#ftn.id2776258" class="footnote">40</a>]</sup>
1518 </p><p>
1519 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its place,
1520 there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some are
1521 pushing to create just such an institution.<sup>[<a name="id2776340" href="#ftn.id2776340" class="footnote">41</a>]</sup> And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
1522 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or place
1523 for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
1524 </p><p>
1525 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to occur.  We,
1526 the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a strong norm
1527 against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about politics with people
1528 you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics with people you
1529 disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated, and isolated discourse
1530 becomes more extreme.<sup>[<a name="id2776361" href="#ftn.id2776361" class="footnote">42</a>]</sup> We say what our
1531 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
1532 </p><p>
1533
1534 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
1535 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they want
1536 to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.  Technologies that
1537 enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail, increase the opportunity
1538 for communication. Blogs allow for public discourse without the public ever
1539 needing to gather in a single public place.
1540 </p><p>
1541 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
1542 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
1543 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and the
1544 left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian, but
1545 there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
1546 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
1547 </p><p>
1548 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The name
1549 Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race but for
1550 blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading is having an
1551 effect.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2776401"></a>
1552 </p><p>
1553 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
1554 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott "misspoke"
1555 at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising Thurmond's
1556 segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this story would
1557 disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight hours. It did. But he
1558 didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The bloggers kept researching
1559 the story. Over time, more and more instances of the same "misspeaking"
1560 emerged. Finally, the story broke back into the mainstream press. In the
1561 end, Lott was forced to resign as senate majority leader.<sup>[<a name="id2773170" href="#ftn.id2773170" class="footnote">43</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2773178"></a>
1562 </p><p>
1563 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures don't
1564 exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and newspapers are
1565 commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.  If they lose
1566 readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
1567 </p><p>
1568 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they can
1569 focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a particularly
1570 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as the
1571 number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks of
1572 stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been selected by a
1573 very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
1574 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxwinerdave"></a><p>
1575
1576 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle from
1577 the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this movement and
1578 a software author for many decades, told me, another difference is the
1579 absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you have to take the
1580 conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.  "An amateur
1581 journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the conflict of
1582 interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of get it out of
1583 the way."
1584 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2773234"></a><p>
1585 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more concentrated
1586 (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more from the public
1587 than an unconcentrated media can&#8212;as CNN admitted it did after the Iraq
1588 war because it was afraid of the consequences to its own
1589 employees.<sup>[<a name="id2776316" href="#ftn.id2776316" class="footnote">44</a>]</sup> It also needs to sustain a
1590 more coherent account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
1591 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink
1592 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
1593 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer
1594 a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
1595 told her that they were writing "the story.")
1596 </p><p> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate&#8212;"amateur" not in
1597 the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning
1598 not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much broader range
1599 of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when
1600 hundreds from across the southwest United States turned to the Internet to
1601 retell what they had seen.<sup>[<a name="id2773267" href="#ftn.id2773267" class="footnote">45</a>]</sup> And it
1602 drives readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as
1603 Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly
1604 with our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"&#8212;with all the
1605 benefits, and costs, that might entail.
1606 </p><p>
1607
1608 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
1609 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for public
1610 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
1611 "journalism" is happy about this&#8212;some journalists have been told to
1612 curtail their blogging.<sup>[<a name="id2773294" href="#ftn.id2773294" class="footnote">46</a>]</sup> But it is clear
1613 that we are still in transition. "A lot of what we are doing now is warm-up
1614 exercises," Winer told me.  There is a lot that must mature before this
1615 space has its mature effect.  And as the inclusion of content in this space
1616 is the least infringing use of the Internet (meaning infringing on
1617 copyright), Winer said, "we will be the last thing that gets shut down."
1618 </p><p>
1619 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you don't
1620 have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper." That is
1621 true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.  As more and more
1622 citizens express what they think, and defend it in writing, that will change
1623 the way people understand public issues. It is easy to be wrong and
1624 misguided in your head. It is harder when the product of your mind can be
1625 criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare human who admits that he has
1626 been persuaded that he is wrong. But it is even rarer for a human to ignore
1627 when he has been proven wrong.  The writing of ideas, arguments, and
1628 criticism improves democracy.  Today there are probably a couple of million
1629 blogs where such writing happens. When there are ten million, there will be
1630 something extraordinary to report.
1631 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2773355"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxbrownjohnseely"></a><p>
1632 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.  His work,
1633 as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the creation of
1634 knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
1635 </p><p>
1636 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
1637 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
1638 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his real
1639 excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
1640 </p><p>
1641
1642 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up," he
1643 explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower engines,
1644 automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies enable a different
1645 kind of tinkering&#8212;with abstract ideas though in concrete form. The
1646 kids at Just Think! not only think about how a commercial portrays a
1647 politician; using digital technology, they can take the commercial apart and
1648 manipulate it, tinker with it to see how it does what it does. Digital
1649 technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or "free collage," as Brown calls
1650 it. Many get to add to or transform the tinkering of many others.
1651 </p><p>
1652 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
1653 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose source
1654 code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a FS/OSS
1655 program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of FS/OSS
1656 technology works can tinker with the code.
1657 </p><p>
1658 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform," as
1659 Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .  unleash a free
1660 collage on the community, so that other people can start looking at your
1661 code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can improve it." Each
1662 effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major
1663 apprenticeship platform."
1664 </p><p>
1665 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.  They
1666 are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the abstract, and
1667 this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're doing in your
1668 garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .  You are
1669 tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the more you
1670 improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
1671 </p><p>
1672 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
1673 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts it,
1674 "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
1675 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
1676 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
1677 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if you
1678 are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot you
1679 can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor these
1680 multiple forms of intelligence."
1681 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2776980"></a><p>
1682
1683 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and Just
1684 Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well as
1685 creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind of
1686 recognition.
1687 </p><p>
1688 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.  Indeed, as
1689 we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is increasingly
1690 highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father had the right to
1691 tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that your child will have
1692 the right to tinker with the images she finds all around.  The law and,
1693 increasingly, technology interfere with a freedom that technology, and
1694 curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
1695 </p><p>
1696 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
1697 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter 10) has
1698 developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to tinker" as it
1699 applies to computer science and to knowledge in general.<sup>[<a name="id2777014" href="#ftn.id2777014" class="footnote">47</a>]</sup> But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more
1700 fundamental. It is about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because
1701 of the law.
1702 </p><p>
1703 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
1704 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think and want
1705 to learn."
1706 </p><p>
1707 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will evince, "we
1708 are building a legal system that completely suppresses the natural
1709 tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an architecture
1710 that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal system that closes down
1711 that part of the brain."
1712 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2777042"></a><p>
1713 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes moving
1714 images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an opportunity to
1715 spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building the law to close down
1716 that technology.
1717 </p><p>
1718 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in chapter 9,
1719 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
1720 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel tre: Kataloger"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="catalogs"></a>Kapittel tre: Kataloger</h2></div></div></div><p>
1721 Høsten 2001, ble Jesse Jordan fra Oceanside, New York, innrullert som
1722 førsteårsstudent ved Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, i Troy, New York.
1723 Hans studieprogram ved RPI var informasjonsteknologi.  Selv om han ikke var
1724 en programmerer, bestemte Jesse seg i oktober å begynne å fikle med en
1725 søkemotorteknologi som var tilgjengelig på RPI-nettverket.
1726 </p><p>
1727 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.  It
1728 offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering to
1729 information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
1730 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
1731 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to imagine
1732 and then build, a generation for the network age.
1733 </p><p>
1734 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to one
1735 another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything available on the
1736 RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network is designed to
1737 enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as more intimate
1738 access to other members of the RPI community.
1739 </p><p>
1740
1741 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google brought the
1742 Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving the quality of
1743 search on the network. Specialty search engines can do this even better. The
1744 idea of "intranet" search engines, search engines that search within the
1745 network of a particular institution, is to provide users of that institution
1746 with better access to material from that institution.  Businesses do this
1747 all the time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
1748 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
1749 </p><p>
1750 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.  Microsoft, for
1751 example, has a network file system that makes it very easy for search
1752 engines tuned to that network to query the system for information about the
1753 publicly (within that network) available content.  Jesse's search engine was
1754 built to take advantage of this technology. It used Microsoft's network file
1755 system to build an index of all the files available within the RPI network.
1756 </p><p>
1757 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.  Indeed,
1758 his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had built. His
1759 single most important improvement over those engines was to fix a bug within
1760 the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a user's computer to
1761 crash. With the engines that existed before, if you tried to access a file
1762 through a Windows browser that was on a computer that was off-line, your
1763 computer could crash. Jesse modified the system a bit to fix that problem,
1764 by adding a button that a user could click to see if the machine holding the
1765 file was still on-line.
1766 </p><p>
1767 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six months,
1768 he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By March, the system
1769 was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one million files in his
1770 directory, including every type of content that might be on users'
1771 computers.
1772 </p><p>
1773
1774 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which students
1775 could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or research; copies
1776 of information pamphlets; movie clips that students might have created;
1777 university brochures&#8212;basically anything that users of the RPI network
1778 made available in a public folder of their computer.
1779 </p><p>
1780 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the files
1781 that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that means, of
1782 course, that three quarters were not, and&#8212;so that this point is
1783 absolutely clear&#8212;Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files
1784 in their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
1785 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a university
1786 where he was studying information science, and hence, tinkering was the
1787 aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from
1788 this tinkering; he was not connected to any business that would make any
1789 money from this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
1790 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
1791 supposed to do.
1792 </p><p>
1793 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at RPI. The
1794 dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association of America, the
1795 RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three other students whom he
1796 didn't even know, two of them at other universities.  A few hours later,
1797 Jesse was served with papers from the suit.  As he read these papers and
1798 watched the news reports about them, he was increasingly astonished.
1799 </p><p>
1800 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything wrong. . . .  I
1801 don't think there's anything wrong with the search engine that I ran or
1802 . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't modified it in any way that
1803 promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the search engine
1804 in a way that would make it easier to use"&#8212;again, a search engine,
1805 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing system,
1806 which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to
1807 get access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
1808 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
1809 </p><p>
1810
1811 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a network and
1812 had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They demanded that he pay
1813 them the damages for his wrong. For cases of "willful infringement," the
1814 Copyright Act specifies something lawyers call "statutory damages." These
1815 damages permit a copyright owner to claim $150,000 per infringement. As the
1816 RIAA alleged more than one hundred specific copyright infringements, they
1817 therefore demanded that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
1818 </p><p>
1819 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
1820 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
1821 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case was
1822 different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same: huge
1823 demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.  If you
1824 added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in the United
1825 States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&#8212;six times the
1826 total profit of the film industry in 2001.<sup>[<a name="id2777200" href="#ftn.id2777200" class="footnote">48</a>]</sup>
1827 </p><p>
1828 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.  An
1829 uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They demanded to
1830 know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved $12,000 from summer jobs and
1831 other employment. They demanded $12,000 to dismiss the case.
1832 </p><p>
1833 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He refused. They
1834 wanted him to agree to an injunction that would essentially make it
1835 impossible for him to work in many fields of technology for the rest of his
1836 life. He refused. They made him understand that this process of being sued
1837 was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief
1838 lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay
1839 another visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
1840 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
1841 </p><p>
1842
1843 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.  But
1844 Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the American
1845 legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even win. But the cost of
1846 fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be at least $250,000. If
1847 he won, he would not recover that money. If he won, he would have a piece of
1848 paper saying he had won, and a piece of paper saying he and his family were
1849 bankrupt.
1850 </p><p>
1851 Så Jesse hadde et mafia-lignende valg: $250,000 og en sjanse til å vinne,
1852 eller $12.000 og et forlik.
1853 </p><p>
1854 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.  Let's
1855 put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.  Where is the
1856 morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in scapegoatism? The
1857 RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The president of the RIAA is
1858 reported to make more than $1 million a year.  Artists, on the other hand,
1859 are not well paid. The average recording artist makes $45,900.<sup>[<a name="id2777296" href="#ftn.id2777296" class="footnote">49</a>]</sup> There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect and
1860 direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a student for
1861 running a search engine?<sup>[<a name="id2777302" href="#ftn.id2777302" class="footnote">50</a>]</sup>
1862 </p><p>
1863 23. juni overførte Jesse alle sine oppsparte midler til advokaten som jobbet
1864 for RIA.  Saken mot ham ble trukket.  Og med dette, ble unggutten som hadde
1865 fiklet med en datamaskin og blitt saksøkt for 15 millioner dollar en
1866 aktivist:
1867 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1868 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be an
1869 activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I ever
1870 foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely absurd what the
1871 RIAA has done.
1872 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1873 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As his
1874 father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
1875 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
1876 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the wrong
1877 message. And he wants to correct the record."
1878 </p></div><div class="sect1" title='Kapittel fire: "Pirater"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="pirates"></a>Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</h2></div></div></div><p>
1879 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without their
1880 permission&#8212;if "if value, then right" is true&#8212;then the history of
1881 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of "big
1882 media" today&#8212;film, records, radio, and cable TV&#8212;was born of a
1883 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
1884 pirates join this generation's country club&#8212;until now.
1885 </p><div class="sect2" title="Film"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="film"></a>Film</h3></div></div></div><p>
1886
1887 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<sup>[<a name="id2777383" href="#ftn.id2777383" class="footnote">51</a>]</sup> Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast
1888 to California in the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that
1889 patents granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls
1890 were exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
1891 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative property&#8212;patents.
1892 Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property gave
1893 him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
1894 </p><p>
1895 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
1896 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1897 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with the
1898 license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to themselves as
1899 independents protested the trust and carried on business without submitting
1900 to the Edison monopoly. In the summer of 1909 the independent movement was
1901 in full-swing, with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
1902 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
1903 </p><p>
1904 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
1905 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement by
1906 forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company to block
1907 the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics that have
1908 become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment,
1909 discontinued product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
1910 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all U.S. film
1911 exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent William Fox who
1912 defied the Trust even after his license was revoked.<sup>[<a name="id2777439" href="#ftn.id2777439" class="footnote">52</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2777461"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2777467"></a>
1913 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1914 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like Fox. And
1915 no less than today, these independents were vigorously resisted.  "Shooting
1916 was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents' resulting in loss of
1917 negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life and limb frequently
1918 occurred."<sup>[<a name="id2777483" href="#ftn.id2777483" class="footnote">53</a>]</sup> That led the independents to
1919 flee the East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
1920 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And
1921 the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
1922 </p><p>
1923
1924 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement of federal
1925 law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the patent holder a
1926 truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that time), by the time
1927 enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had expired. A new industry
1928 had been born, in part from the piracy of Edison's creative property.
1929 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Innspilt musikk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="recordedmusic"></a>Innspilt musikk</h3></div></div></div><p>
1930 Plateindustrien ble født av en annen type piratvirksomhet, dog for å forstå
1931 hvordan krever at en setter seg inn i detaljer om hvordan loven regulerer
1932 musikk.
1933 </p><p>
1934 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines for
1935 reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player piano), the
1936 law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of their music and
1937 the exclusive right to control public performances of their music. In other
1938 words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's 1899 hit "Happy Mose,"
1939 the law said I would have to pay for the right to get a copy of the musical
1940 score, and I would also have to pay for the right to perform it publicly.
1941 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2777544"></a><p>
1942 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph or
1943 Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear enough that I
1944 would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I performed in making
1945 this recording. And it was clear enough that I would have to pay for any
1946 public performance of the work I was recording.  But it wasn't totally clear
1947 that I would have to pay for a "public performance" if I recorded the song
1948 in my own house (even today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing
1949 their songs in the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in
1950 your brain are not&#8212;yet&#8212; regulated by copyright law). So if I
1951 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own home,
1952 it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more importantly, it
1953 wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I then made copies of
1954 those recordings.  Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively
1955 pirate someone else's song without paying its composer anything.
1956 </p><p>
1957
1958 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about this capacity to
1959 pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge put it,
1960 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1961 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an opera. A
1962 publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and copyrights
1963 it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who cut music rolls
1964 and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the composer and publisher
1965 without any regard for [their] rights.<sup>[<a name="id2777590" href="#ftn.id2777590" class="footnote">54</a>]</sup>
1966 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1967 The innovators who developed the technology to record other people's works
1968 were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and genius of American
1969 composers,"<sup>[<a name="id2777610" href="#ftn.id2777610" class="footnote">55</a>]</sup> and the "music publishing
1970 industry" was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one
1971 pirate."<sup>[<a name="id2777620" href="#ftn.id2777620" class="footnote">56</a>]</sup> As John Philip Sousa put it,
1972 in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money out of my pieces, I
1973 want a share of it."<sup>[<a name="id2777632" href="#ftn.id2777632" class="footnote">57</a>]</sup>
1974 </p><p>
1975 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too, do the
1976 arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the player piano
1977 argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the introduction of automatic
1978 music players has not deprived any composer of anything he had before their
1979 introduction." Rather, the machines increased the sales of sheet
1980 music.<sup>[<a name="id2777649" href="#ftn.id2777649" class="footnote">58</a>]</sup> In any case, the innovators
1981 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
1982 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
1983 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company wrote, "is
1984 the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas musical, literary
1985 or artistic, except as defined by statute."<sup>[<a name="id2777655" href="#ftn.id2777655" class="footnote">59</a>]</sup>
1986 </p><p>
1987
1988 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and the recording
1989 artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that composers would be paid
1990 for the "mechanical reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply
1991 granting the composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
1992 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the music,
1993 at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be recorded
1994 once. This is the part of copyright law that makes cover songs
1995 possible. Once a composer authorizes a recording of his song, others are
1996 free to record the same song, so long as they pay the original composer a
1997 fee set by the law.
1998 </p><p>
1999 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will refer
2000 to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose key
2001 terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright Act in
2002 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of recordings so long
2003 as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)  the fee set by the statute.
2004 </p><p>
2005 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham writes a
2006 novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham gives the
2007 publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge whatever he wants
2008 for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is thus set by Grisham,
2009 and copyright law ordinarily says you have no permission to use Grisham's
2010 work except with permission of Grisham.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2777723"></a>
2011 </p><p>
2012 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And thus, in
2013 effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind of
2014 piracy&#8212;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2015 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2016 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are the
2017 recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets something of
2018 value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much
2019 wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about
2020 its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
2021 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2022 creativity.<sup>[<a name="id2777405" href="#ftn.id2777405" class="footnote">60</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2777756"></a>
2023 </p><p>
2024 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2025 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2026 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary relates,
2027 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2028 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory license system
2029 must be retained. They asserted that the record industry is a
2030 half-billion-dollar business of great economic importance in the United
2031 States and throughout the world; records today are the principal means of
2032 disseminating music, and this creates special problems, since performers
2033 need unhampered access to musical material on nondiscriminatory
2034 terms. Historically, the record producers pointed out, there were no
2035 recording rights before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory
2036 license as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2037 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of recorded music,
2038 with the public being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2039 choice.<sup>[<a name="id2777788" href="#ftn.id2777788" class="footnote">61</a>]</sup>
2040 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2041 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their creative
2042 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2043 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Radio"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="radio"></a>Radio</h3></div></div></div><p>
2044 Radio was also born of piracy.
2045 </p><p>
2046 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a "public
2047 performance" of the composer's work.<sup>[<a name="id2777824" href="#ftn.id2777824" class="footnote">62</a>]</sup> As
2048 I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)  an
2049 exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio station thus
2050 owes the composer money for that performance.
2051 </p><p>
2052
2053 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a copy
2054 of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a copy of the
2055 recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the
2056 radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by
2057 the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
2058 value of the composition performed on the radio station.  And if the law
2059 were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the recording
2060 artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the music for his
2061 work.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2777872"></a>
2062
2063
2064 </p><p>
2065 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
2066 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station need
2067 only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of something for
2068 nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for free, even if it
2069 must pay the composer something for the privilege of playing the song.
2070 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxmadonna"></a><p>
2071 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.  Imagine
2072 it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize public
2073 performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your song in public,
2074 she has to get your permission.
2075 </p><p>
2076 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She then
2077 decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top hit. Under
2078 our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get some money. But
2079 Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on the sale of her CDs. The
2080 public performance of her recording is not a "protected" right. The radio
2081 station thus gets to pirate the value of Madonna's work without paying her
2082 anything.
2083 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2777920"></a><p>
2084 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
2085 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
2086 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law ordinarily
2087 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the choice for
2088 him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take something for
2089 nothing.
2090 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Kabel-TV"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="cabletv"></a>Kabel-TV</h3></div></div></div><p>
2091
2092 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
2093 </p><p>
2094
2095 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
2096 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content that
2097 they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies started
2098 selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay for what they
2099 sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing broadcasters' content, but more
2100 egregiously than anything Napster ever did&#8212; Napster never charged for
2101 the content it enabled others to give away.
2102 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2777954"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2777971"></a><p>
2103 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.  Rosel
2104 Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of "unfair and
2105 potentially destructive competition."<sup>[<a name="id2777982" href="#ftn.id2777982" class="footnote">63</a>]</sup>
2106 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable TV,
2107 but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association of
2108 Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
2109 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<sup>[<a name="id2777998" href="#ftn.id2777998" class="footnote">64</a>]</sup> As another broadcaster put it,
2110 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2111 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the only
2112 business I know of where the product that is being sold is not paid
2113 for.<sup>[<a name="id2778015" href="#ftn.id2778015" class="footnote">65</a>]</sup>
2114 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2115 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
2116 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2117 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now take our
2118 property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop piracy and I don't
2119 think there is any lesser word to describe it. I think there are harsher
2120 words which would fit it.<sup>[<a name="id2778039" href="#ftn.id2778039" class="footnote">66</a>]</sup>
2121 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2122 Disse var "gratispassasjerer", sa presidenten Charlton Heston i Screen
2123 Actor's Guild, som "tok lønna fra skuespillerne"<sup>[<a name="id2778056" href="#ftn.id2778056" class="footnote">67</a>]</sup>
2124 </p><p>
2125 Men igjen, det er en annen side i debatten.  Som assisterende justisminister
2126 Edwin Zimmerman sa det,
2127 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2128 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any copyright
2129 protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright holders who are
2130 already compensated, who already have a monopoly, should be permitted to
2131 extend that monopoly. . . . The question here is how much compensation they
2132 should have and how far back they should carry their right to
2133 compensation.<sup>[<a name="id2778083" href="#ftn.id2778083" class="footnote">68</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2778102"></a>
2134 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2135 Opphavsrettinnehaverne tok kabelselskapene til retten. Høyesterett fant to
2136 ganger at kabelselskaper ikke skyldte opphavsrettinnehaverne noen ting.
2137 </p><p>
2138 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question of
2139 whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated." In the
2140 end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it resolved the
2141 question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable companies would
2142 have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but the price they would
2143 have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.  The price was set by law,
2144 so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto power over the emerging
2145 technologies of cable. Cable companies thus built their empire in part upon
2146 a "piracy" of the value created by broadcasters' content.
2147 </p><p>
2148 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means using value
2149 from someone else's creative property without permission from that
2150 creator&#8212;as it is increasingly described today<sup>[<a name="id2778089" href="#ftn.id2778089" class="footnote">69</a>]</sup> &#8212; then every industry affected by copyright
2151 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film,
2152 records, radio, cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be
2153 expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
2154 generation&#8212;until now.
2155 </p></div></div><div class="sect1" title='Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="piracy"></a>Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</h2></div></div></div><p>
2156 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in
2157 many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized
2158 taking of other people's content within a commercial context. Despite the
2159 many justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
2160 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
2161 </p><p>
2162
2163 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking" that is
2164 more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems wrong to
2165 many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this taking
2166 "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.  For the harm
2167 of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than outright copying, and
2168 the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has so often done in the
2169 past.
2170
2171 </p><div class="sect2" title="Piracy I"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="piracy-i"></a>Piracy I</h3></div></div></div><p>
2172 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there are
2173 businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted content,
2174 copy it, and sell it&#8212;all without the permission of a copyright
2175 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
2176 every year to physical piracy<sup>[<a name="id2778145" href="#ftn.id2778145" class="footnote">70</a>]</sup> (that
2177 works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it
2178 loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
2179 </p><p>
2180 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this book, nor
2181 in the argument that most people make when talking about the subject of this
2182 book, should draw into doubt this simple point: This piracy is wrong.
2183 </p><p>
2184 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made for
2185 it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one hundred
2186 years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign copyrights. We
2187 were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might therefore seem
2188 hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other developing nations
2189 treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our existence,
2190 treated as right.
2191 </p><p>
2192 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban the
2193 taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
2194 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works without the
2195 permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.  The copy shops
2196 in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law does protect
2197 foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops violate that law. So
2198 the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a moral wrong, but a
2199 legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal wrong, but a locally
2200 legal wrong as well.
2201 </p><p>
2202
2203 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
2204 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose not to
2205 protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a pirate nation,
2206 but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar childhood.
2207 </p><p>
2208 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are its
2209 laws regardless of their source. The international law under which these
2210 nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden of
2211 intellectual property law.<sup>[<a name="id2778279" href="#ftn.id2778279" class="footnote">71</a>]</sup> In my view,
2212 more developing nations should take advantage of that opportunity, but when
2213 they don't, then their laws should be respected. And under the laws of these
2214 nations, this piracy is wrong.
2215 </p><p>
2216 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in any
2217 case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access to
2218 American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have bought those
2219 American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any less money than they
2220 otherwise would have had.<sup>[<a name="id2778320" href="#ftn.id2778320" class="footnote">72</a>]</sup>
2221 </p><p>
2222 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many thousands
2223 of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay for the content they
2224 have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree the harm caused by such
2225 taking. Extremists in this debate love to say, "You wouldn't go into Barnes
2226 &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf without paying; why should it
2227 be any different with on-line music?" The difference is, of course, that
2228 when you take a book from Barnes &amp; Noble, it has one less book to
2229 sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3 from a computer network, there is
2230 not one less CD that can be sold.  The physics of piracy of the intangible
2231 are different from the physics of piracy of the tangible.
2232 </p><p>
2233
2234 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a property
2235 right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all property
2236 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms under
2237 which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she
2238 doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory licenses that
2239 apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the copyright
2240 owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take" copyrighted content
2241 whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But where the law does not
2242 give people the right to take content, it is wrong to take that content even
2243 if the wrong does no harm. If we have a property system, and that system is
2244 properly balanced to the technology of a time, then it is wrong to take
2245 property without the permission of a property owner. That is exactly what
2246 "property" means.
2247 </p><p>
2248 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
2249 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal" Windows,
2250 that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.  Microsoft loses the value of
2251 the software that was taken. But it gains users who are used to life in the
2252 Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation grows more wealthy, more and more
2253 people will buy software rather than steal it. And hence over time, because
2254 that buying will benefit Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If
2255 instead of pirating Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux
2256 operating system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
2257 Microsoft.  Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2778423"></a>
2258 </p><p>
2259 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
2260 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law students,
2261 for example, are given free access to the two largest legal databases. The
2262 companies marketing both hope the students will become so used to their
2263 service that they will want to use it and not the other when they become
2264 lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
2265 </p><p>
2266 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the alcoholic
2267 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will make it
2268 more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we ordinarily allow
2269 businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give their product
2270 away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can
2271 give its product away, as it did, for example, with Internet Explorer to
2272 fight Netscape. A property right means giving the property owner the right
2273 to say who gets access to what&#8212;at least ordinarily. And if the law
2274 properly balances the rights of the copyright owner with the rights of
2275 access, then violating the law is still wrong.
2276 </p><p>
2277
2278
2279 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy, and I
2280 certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts at
2281 justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy is
2282 rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it steals; it
2283 doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives someone access
2284 to something that the law says he should not have.  Nothing has changed to
2285 draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy is flat out wrong.
2286 </p><p>
2287 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
2288 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or at
2289 least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the way it is
2290 increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful and productive,
2291 to produce either new content or new ways of doing business.  Neither our
2292 tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all "piracy" in that sense of
2293 the term.
2294 </p><p>
2295 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest piracy
2296 concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we need to
2297 understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before we condemn it
2298 to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
2299 </p><p>
2300 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
2301 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
2302 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable TV, no
2303 one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
2304 </p><p>
2305 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They should push
2306 us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this sharing to survive.
2307 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Piracy II"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="piracy-ii"></a>Piracy II</h3></div></div></div><p>
2308
2309 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s] the
2310 author of [his] profit."<sup>[<a name="id2778518" href="#ftn.id2778518" class="footnote">73</a>]</sup> This means we
2311 must determine whether and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how
2312 strongly the law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to
2313 assure the author of his profit.
2314 </p><p>
2315 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of the
2316 Napster technology had not made any major technological innovations.  Like
2317 every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and, arguably, off the
2318 Internet as well<sup>[<a name="id2778536" href="#ftn.id2778536" class="footnote">74</a>]</sup>), Shawn Fanning and
2319 crew had simply put together components that had been developed
2320 independently.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2778560"></a>
2321 </p><p>
2322 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999, Napster
2323 amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After eighteen months,
2324 there were close to 80 million registered users of the system.<sup>[<a name="id2778573" href="#ftn.id2778573" class="footnote">75</a>]</sup> Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other
2325 services emerged to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p
2326 service. It boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are
2327 different architecturally, though not very different in function: Each
2328 enables users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
2329 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&#8212;
2330 or your 20,000 best friends.
2331 </p><p>
2332 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans have
2333 tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in September 2002
2334 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded music&#8212;28 percent of
2335 Americans older than 12.<sup>[<a name="id2778594" href="#ftn.id2778594" class="footnote">76</a>]</sup> A survey by
2336 the NPD group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million
2337 citizens used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May
2338 2003.<sup>[<a name="id2778616" href="#ftn.id2778616" class="footnote">77</a>]</sup> The vast majority of these are
2339 not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive quantity of content is being
2340 "taken" on these networks. The ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing
2341 networks have inspired millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't
2342 before.
2343 </p><p>
2344 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
2345 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright infringement,
2346 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more complicated than one
2347 might think. So consider&#8212;a bit more carefully than the polarized
2348 voices around this debate usually do&#8212;the kinds of sharing that file
2349 sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
2350 </p><p>
2351
2352
2353 Fildelerne deler ulike typer innhold.  Vi kan derel disse ulike typene inn i
2354 fire typer.
2355 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="A"><li class="listitem"><p>
2356
2357 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
2358 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying the CD,
2359 these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether everyone who
2360 takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't make it available
2361 for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who
2362 would.  The latter are the target of category A: users who download instead
2363 of purchasing.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2778667"></a>
2364 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2365
2366
2367 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before purchasing
2368 it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist he's not heard
2369 of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This is a kind of
2370 targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed.  If the friend recommending
2371 the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation, then one could expect
2372 that the recommendations will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
2373 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
2374 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2375
2376
2377 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted content
2378 that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased because the
2379 transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of sharing networks is
2380 among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were part of your childhood
2381 but have long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on the
2382 network. (One friend told me that when she discovered Napster, she spent a
2383 solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She was astonished at the range and mix
2384 of content that was available.)  For content not sold, this is still
2385 technically a violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is
2386 not selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&#8212;the same
2387 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to a
2388 local collector.
2389 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2390
2391
2392
2393
2394 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access to content
2395 that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner wants to give away.
2396 </p></li></ol></div><p>
2397 Hvordan balanserer disse ulike delingstypene?
2398 </p><p>
2399 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the perspective of
2400 the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the perspective of
2401 economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<sup>[<a name="id2778736" href="#ftn.id2778736" class="footnote">78</a>]</sup> Type B sharing is illegal but plainly
2402 beneficial. Type C sharing is illegal, yet good for society (since more
2403 exposure to music is good)  and harmless to the artist (since the work is
2404 not otherwise available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard
2405 question to answer&#8212;and certainly much more difficult than the current
2406 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
2407 </p><p>
2408 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how harmful
2409 type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood, composers
2410 complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained about radio, and
2411 broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music industry complains that
2412 type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is "devastating" the industry.
2413 </p><p>
2414 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how harmful is harder
2415 to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's practice to blame
2416 technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette recording is a
2417 good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young put it, "Rather
2418 than exploiting this new, popular technology, the labels fought
2419 it."<sup>[<a name="id2778778" href="#ftn.id2778778" class="footnote">79</a>]</sup> The labels claimed that every
2420 album taped was an album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent
2421 in 1981, the industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
2422 problem, and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
2423 </p><p>
2424 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity to enact
2425 regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record turnaround. "In
2426 the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was not the fault of the
2427 tapers&#8212;who did not [stop after MTV came into being]&#8212;but had to a
2428 large extent resulted from stagnation in musical innovation at the major
2429 labels."<sup>[<a name="id2778808" href="#ftn.id2778808" class="footnote">80</a>]</sup>
2430 </p><p>
2431 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is wrong
2432 today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to the industry
2433 in particular, and society in general&#8212;or at least the society that
2434 inherits the tradition that gave us the film industry, the record industry,
2435 the radio industry, cable TV, and the VCR&#8212;the question is not simply
2436 whether type A sharing is harmful. The question is also how harmful type A
2437 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
2438 </p><p>
2439 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
2440 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.  The
2441 "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type A sharing
2442 exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records through sampling
2443 than they lost through substitution, then sharing networks would actually
2444 benefit music companies on balance. They would therefore have little static
2445 reason to resist them.
2446 </p><p>
2447 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because of file
2448 sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales actually suggest
2449 it might be close.
2450 </p><p>
2451 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent, from 882
2452 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<sup>[<a name="id2778857" href="#ftn.id2778857" class="footnote">81</a>]</sup> This confirms a trend over the past few years. The
2453 RIAA blames Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other
2454 causes that could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a
2455 more than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
2456 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
2457 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average price
2458 of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<sup>[<a name="id2778902" href="#ftn.id2778902" class="footnote">82</a>]</sup> Competition from other forms of media could also
2459 account for some of the decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The
2460 soundtrack to the film High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could
2461 get the whole movie [on DVD] for $19.99."<sup>[<a name="id2778929" href="#ftn.id2778929" class="footnote">83</a>]</sup>
2462 </p><p>
2463
2464
2465
2466 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales is
2467 because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period that the
2468 RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA estimates that 2.1
2469 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus, although 2.6 times the total
2470 number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7
2471 percent.
2472 </p><p>
2473 There are too many different things happening at the same time to explain
2474 these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable: The recording
2475 industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between downloading a song
2476 and stealing a CD?"&#8212;but their own numbers reveal the difference. If I
2477 steal a CD, then there is one less CD to sell. Every taking is a lost
2478 sale. But on the basis of the numbers the RIAA provides, it is absolutely
2479 clear that the same is not true of downloads. If every download were a lost
2480 sale&#8212;if every use of Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his]
2481 profit"&#8212;then the industry would have suffered a 100 percent drop in
2482 sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold
2483 were downloaded for free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent,
2484 then there is a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a
2485 CD."
2486 </p><p>
2487 These are the harms&#8212;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's assume,
2488 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the recording
2489 industry. What value does it produce in addition to these costs?
2490 </p><p>
2491 One benefit is type C sharing&#8212;making available content that is
2492 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially available.
2493 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of tracks that
2494 are no longer commercially available.<sup>[<a name="id2778952" href="#ftn.id2778952" class="footnote">84</a>]</sup>
2495 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
2496 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
2497 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
2498 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic sense
2499 to the company to make it available.
2500 </p><p>
2501 In real space&#8212;long before the Internet&#8212;the market had a simple
2502 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are thousands
2503 of used book and used record stores in America today.<sup>[<a name="id2779007" href="#ftn.id2779007" class="footnote">85</a>]</sup> These stores buy content from owners, then sell the
2504 content they buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell
2505 this content, even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright
2506 owner doesn't get a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial
2507 entities; their owners make money from the content they sell; but as with
2508 cable companies before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the
2509 copyright owner for the content they sell.
2510 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2779047"></a><p>
2511 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used record
2512 stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the content
2513 available isn't making money from making the content available.  It is also
2514 different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a record, I don't
2515 have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone shares my 1949 recording
2516 of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs," I still have it. That difference would
2517 matter economically if the owner of the copyright were selling the record in
2518 competition to my sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that
2519 is not currently commercially available. The Internet is making it
2520 available, through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
2521 </p><p>
2522 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
2523 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may well
2524 be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
2525 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
2526 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be shut as
2527 well?
2528 </p><p>
2529
2530 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable type D
2531 sharing to occur&#8212;the sharing of content that copyright owners want to
2532 have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This sharing
2533 clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author Cory Doctorow,
2534 for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom,
2535 both free on-line and in bookstores on the same day. His (and his
2536 publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution would be a great
2537 advertisement for the "real" book. People would read part on-line, and then
2538 decide whether they liked the book or not. If they liked it, they would be
2539 more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is type D content. If sharing
2540 networks enable his work to be spread, then both he and society are better
2541 off. (Actually, much better off: It is a great book!)
2542 </p><p>
2543 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society with
2544 no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem of type A
2545 sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we lose something
2546 important in order to protect type A content.
2547 </p><p>
2548 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry understandably
2549 says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask, "How much has society
2550 gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies? What is the content that
2551 otherwise would be unavailable?"
2552 </p><p>
2553 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter, much
2554 of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good.  And
2555 like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of this piracy is motivated
2556 by a new way of spreading content caused by changes in the technology of
2557 distribution. Thus, consistent with the tradition that gave us Hollywood,
2558 radio, the recording industry, and cable TV, the question we should be
2559 asking about file sharing is how best to preserve its benefits while
2560 minimizing (to the extent possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The
2561 question is one of balance. The law should seek that balance, and that
2562 balance will be found only with time.
2563 </p><p>
2564 Men er ikke krigen bare en krig mot ulovlig deling?  Er ikke angrepsmålet
2565 bare det du kaller type A-deling?
2566 </p><p>
2567 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The effect of
2568 the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far beyond that
2569 one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the Napster case
2570 itself. When Napster told the district court that it had developed a
2571 technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified infringing
2572 material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4 percent was not
2573 good enough. Napster had to push the infringements "down to
2574 zero."<sup>[<a name="id2779159" href="#ftn.id2779159" class="footnote">86</a>]</sup>
2575 </p><p>
2576 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
2577 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to assure
2578 that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance with the
2579 law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of VCRs or 100
2580 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns are used in compliance
2581 with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.  The court's ruling means that
2582 we as a society must lose the benefits of p2p, even for the totally legal
2583 and beneficial uses they serve, simply to assure that there are zero
2584 copyright infringements caused by p2p.
2585 </p><p>
2586 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the content
2587 industry that we know today. The history of American law has been a process
2588 of balance. As new technologies changed the way content was distributed, the
2589 law adjusted, after some time, to the new technology.  In this adjustment,
2590 the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights of creators while protecting
2591 innovation. Sometimes this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes
2592 less.
2593 </p><p>
2594 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the interests
2595 of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers against the
2596 interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to composers, but
2597 also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but at a price set
2598 by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the recordings made by
2599 these recording artists, and they complained to Congress that their
2600 "creative property" was not being respected (since the radio station did not
2601 have to pay them for the creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their
2602 claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
2603 </p><p>
2604 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts rejected the
2605 claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content they rebroadcast,
2606 Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to compensation, but at a
2607 level set by the law. It likewise gave cable companies the right to the
2608 content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
2609 </p><p>
2610
2611
2612
2613 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player pianos,
2614 served two important goals&#8212;indeed, the two central goals of any
2615 copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators would have
2616 the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.  Second, the law assured
2617 that copyright holders would be paid for the content that was
2618 distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply required cable TV to pay
2619 copyright holders whatever they demanded for their content, then copyright
2620 holders associated with broadcasters would use their power to stifle this
2621 new technology, cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use
2622 broadcasters' content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized
2623 cable. Thus Congress chose a path that would assure compensation without
2624 giving the past (broadcasters)  control over the future (cable).
2625 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2779233"></a><p>
2626 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major producers and
2627 distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another technology, the
2628 video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today, VCRs) that Sony had
2629 produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's claim against Sony was
2630 relatively simple: Sony produced a device, Disney and Universal claimed,
2631 that enabled consumers to engage in copyright infringement. Because the
2632 device that Sony built had a "record" button, the device could be used to
2633 record copyrighted movies and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the
2634 copyright infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
2635 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
2636 </p><p>
2637
2638 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did decide to
2639 design its machine to make it very simple to record television shows. It
2640 could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct copying from a
2641 television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the machine to copy
2642 only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the line. It was clear that
2643 there were many television shows that did not grant anyone permission to
2644 copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no doubt the majority of shows would not
2645 have authorized copying. And in the face of this obvious preference, Sony
2646 could have designed its system to minimize the opportunity for copyright
2647 infringement. It did not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold
2648 it responsible for the architecture it chose.
2649 </p><p>
2650 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal champion. Valenti
2651 called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are 20, 30, 40 million of
2652 these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by millions of `tapeworms,'
2653 eating away at the very heart and essence of the most precious asset the
2654 copyright owner has, his copyright."<sup>[<a name="id2779296" href="#ftn.id2779296" class="footnote">87</a>]</sup>
2655 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and creative
2656 judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation on the
2657 after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of tapings that
2658 will adversely impact on the future of the creative community in this
2659 country. It is simply a question of basic economics and plain common
2660 sense."<sup>[<a name="id2779313" href="#ftn.id2779313" class="footnote">88</a>]</sup> Indeed, as surveys would later
2661 show, percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or
2662 more<sup>[<a name="id2779322" href="#ftn.id2779322" class="footnote">89</a>]</sup> &#8212; a use the Court would
2663 later hold was not "fair." By "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the
2664 means of an exemption from copyright infringementwithout creating a
2665 mechanism to compensate copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would
2666 "take from the owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive
2667 right to control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and
2668 thereby profit from its reproduction."<sup>[<a name="id2779234" href="#ftn.id2779234" class="footnote">90</a>]</sup>
2669 </p><p>
2670 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme Court. In
2671 the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Hollywood in
2672 its jurisdiction&#8212;leading Judge Alex Kozinski, who sits on that court,
2673 refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&#8212;held that Sony would be liable
2674 for the copyright infringement made possible by its machines. Under the
2675 Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar technology&#8212;which Jack
2676 Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry"
2677 (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler of the American film
2678 industry)&#8212;was an illegal technology.<sup>[<a name="id2779352" href="#ftn.id2779352" class="footnote">91</a>]</sup>
2679 </p><p>
2680
2681 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.  And in
2682 its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of when and
2683 whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the Court wrote,
2684 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2685 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
2686 Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
2687 copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the
2688 institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
2689 competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
2690 technology.<sup>[<a name="id2779389" href="#ftn.id2779389" class="footnote">92</a>]</sup>
2691 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2692 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.  But as with
2693 the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress ignored the
2694 request. Congress was convinced that American film got enough, this "taking"
2695 notwithstanding.  If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
2696 </p><div class="table"><a name="t1"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 2.1. Tabell</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Tabell" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char">CASE</th><th align="char">WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</th><th align="char">RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</th><th align="char">RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Innspillinger</td><td align="char">Komponister</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Statutory license</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Radio</td><td align="char">Innspillingsartister</td><td align="char">N/A</td><td align="char">Ingenting</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Kabel-TV</td><td align="char">Kringkastere</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Statutory license</td></tr><tr><td align="char">VCR</td><td align="char">Filmskapere</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Ingenting</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
2697 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the way
2698 content was distributed.<sup>[<a name="id2779513" href="#ftn.id2779513" class="footnote">93</a>]</sup> In each case,
2699 throughout our history, that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on
2700 someone else's work.
2701 </p><p>
2702
2703 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all free
2704 riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the
2705 law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
2706 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
2707 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy
2708 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
2709 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the interests at
2710 stake.
2711
2712 </p><p>
2713 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that make up
2714 the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes sense. Was Walt
2715 Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators had to ask
2716 permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and spread images as
2717 a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better regulated? Is it
2718 really right that building a search engine should expose you to $15 million
2719 in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had controlled film? Should
2720 every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get permission to record a song?
2721 </p><p>
2722 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition has
2723 answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated, copyright
2724 "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible
2725 uses of his work."<sup>[<a name="id2779575" href="#ftn.id2779575" class="footnote">94</a>]</sup> Instead, the
2726 particular uses that the law regulates have been defined by balancing the
2727 good that comes from granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an
2728 exclusive right creates. And this balancing has historically been done after
2729 a technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
2730 facilitate the distribution of content.
2731 </p><p>
2732 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the Internet is
2733 changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet (wires
2734 vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network should not
2735 become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should the law become
2736 a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists (or more accurately,
2737 distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail in the last chapter of
2738 this book, we should be securing income to artists while we allow the market
2739 to secure the most efficient way to promote and distribute content. This
2740 will require changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes
2741 should be designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
2742 public interest that innovation continue.
2743 </p><p>
2744
2745
2746 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly superior mode
2747 of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies can be ideally
2748 efficient in moving content across a widely diverse network.  Left to
2749 develop, they could make the network vastly more efficient.  Yet these
2750 "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in The New York Times,
2751 "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<sup>[<a name="id2779616" href="#ftn.id2779616" class="footnote">95</a>]</sup>
2752 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors raise
2753 a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and incentives,"
2754 they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the warriors insist,
2755 "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress to `rebalance' our
2756 property rights? Do you have to wait before calling the police when your car
2757 has been stolen? And why should Congress deliberate at all about the merits
2758 of this theft? Do we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car
2759 before we arrest him?"
2760 </p><p>
2761 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected just
2762 as any other property is protected."
2763 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2774443" href="#id2774443" class="para">15</a>] </sup>
2764
2765
2766 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
2767 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2774562" href="#id2774562" class="para">16</a>] </sup>
2768
2769
2770 Se Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
2771 Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
2772 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2774579" href="#id2774579" class="para">17</a>] </sup>
2773
2774 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay Up,"
2775 Wall Street Journal, 21. august 1996, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #3</a>; Jonathan Zittrain,
2776 "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free Speech, No
2777 One Wins," Boston Globe, 24. november 2002.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2774592"></a>
2778 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2774666" href="#id2774666" class="para">18</a>] </sup>
2779
2780 I The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002), dokumenterer
2781 Richard Florida en endring i arbeidsstokken mot kreativitetsarbeide.  Hans
2782 tekst omhandler derimot ikke direkte de juridiske vilkår som kreativiteten
2783 blir muliggjort eller hindret under.  Jeg er helt klart enig med ham i
2784 viktigheten og betydningen av denne endringen, men jeg tror også at
2785 vilkårene som disse endringene blir aktivert under er mye vanskeligere.
2786 <a class="indexterm" name="id2774719"></a>
2787 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2774821" href="#id2774821" class="para">19</a>] </sup>
2788
2789
2790 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated Cartoons
2791 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&#8211;35.
2792 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2774887" href="#id2774887" class="para">20</a>] </sup>
2793
2794
2795 Jeg er takknemlig overfor David Gerstein og hans nøyaktige historie,
2796 beskrevet på <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #4</a>.  I
2797 følge Dave Smith ved the Disney Archives, betalte Disney for å bruke
2798 musikken til fem sanger i Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
2799 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
2800 (Baron), og "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). En sjette sang, "The Turkey in the Straw,"
2801 var allerede allemannseie.  Brev fra David Smith til Harry Surden, 10. juli
2802 2003, tilgjenglig i arkivet til forfatteren.
2803 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2774943" href="#id2774943" class="para">21</a>] </sup>
2804
2805
2806 Han var også tilhenger av allmannseiet. Se Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse that
2807 Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5. mars 2002, fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #5</a>.
2808 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775006" href="#id2775006" class="para">22</a>] </sup>
2809
2810
2811 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
2812 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
2813 determining the weighted average of total registrations for any particular
2814 year, and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in
2815 year 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
2816 average term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data,
2817 see the Web site associated with this book, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #6</a>.
2818 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775161" href="#id2775161" class="para">23</a>] </sup>
2819
2820
2821 For en utmerket historie, se Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New York:
2822 Perennial, 2000).
2823 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775270" href="#id2775270" class="para">24</a>] </sup>
2824
2825
2826 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All
2827 the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law Review 55
2828 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic rationality that
2829 would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing legal actions for
2830 infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga artists may be better off
2831 collectively if they set aside their individual self-interest and decide not
2832 to press their legal rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma
2833 solved."
2834 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775345" href="#id2775345" class="para">25</a>] </sup>
2835
2836 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
2837 Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York University
2838 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
2839 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
2840 "property" rights&#8212;copyright, patents, trademark, and
2841 trade-secret&#8212;but the nature of those rights is very different.
2842 <a class="indexterm" name="id2775354"></a>
2843 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775544" href="#id2775544" class="para">26</a>] </sup>
2844
2845
2846 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
2847 Press, 1975), 112.
2848 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775576" href="#id2775576" class="para">27</a>] </sup>
2849
2850 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing, 1977),
2851 53.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2775581"></a>
2852 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775606" href="#id2775606" class="para">28</a>] </sup>
2853
2854
2855 Jenkins, 177.
2856 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775614" href="#id2775614" class="para">29</a>] </sup>
2857
2858
2859 Basert på et diagram i Jenkins, s. 178.
2860 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775642" href="#id2775642" class="para">30</a>] </sup>
2861
2862
2863 Coe, 58.
2864 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775677" href="#id2775677" class="para">31</a>] </sup>
2865
2866
2867 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50
2868 S.E.
2869 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775713" href="#id2775713" class="para">32</a>] </sup>
2870
2871 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law
2872 Review 4 (1890): 193.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2775719"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2775728"></a>
2873 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775752" href="#id2775752" class="para">33</a>] </sup>
2874
2875
2876 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
2877 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
2878 Review 48 (1960) 398&#8211;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
2879 971 F.  2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
2880 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775855" href="#id2775855" class="para">34</a>] </sup>
2881
2882
2883 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and Software You
2884 Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst, februar 2002,
2885 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #7</a>.
2886 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775904" href="#id2775904" class="para">35</a>] </sup>
2887
2888
2889 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence
2890 Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV Study," Denver Post,
2891 25 May 1997, B6.
2892 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775957" href="#id2775957" class="para">36</a>] </sup>
2893
2894 Intervju med Elizabeth Daley og Stephanie Barish, 13. desember 2002.
2895 <a class="indexterm" name="id2775964"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2775973"></a>
2896 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2775989" href="#id2775989" class="para">37</a>] </sup>
2897
2898
2899 Se Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4. november
2900 2000, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
2901 #8</a>; "Timeline," 22. november 2000, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #9</a>.
2902 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2776058" href="#id2776058" class="para">38</a>] </sup>
2903
2904 Intervju med Daley og Barish.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2776064"></a>
2905 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2776076" href="#id2776076" class="para">39</a>] </sup>
2906
2907
2908 Ibid.
2909 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2776258" href="#id2776258" class="para">40</a>] </sup>
2910
2911
2912 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1,
2913 trans.  Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2914 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2776340" href="#id2776340" class="para">41</a>] </sup>
2915
2916
2917 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of Political
2918 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2919 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2776361" href="#id2776361" class="para">42</a>] </sup>
2920
2921
2922 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2923 65&#8211;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2924 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773170" href="#id2773170" class="para">43</a>] </sup>
2925
2926
2927 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New York
2928 Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2929 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2776316" href="#id2776316" class="para">44</a>] </sup>
2930
2931
2932 Telefonintervju med David Winer, 16. april 2003.
2933 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773267" href="#id2773267" class="para">45</a>] </sup>
2934
2935
2936 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of Information
2937 Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer, "Shuttle
2938 Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online Journalism Review, 2
2939 February 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
2940 #10</a>.
2941 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773294" href="#id2773294" class="para">46</a>] </sup>
2942
2943 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New York
2944 Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have been as
2945 accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN correspondent in Iraq
2946 who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March 9, stopped
2947 posting 12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
2948 Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
2949 published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and people
2950 he was covering.")  <a class="indexterm" name="id2773304"></a>
2951 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777014" href="#id2777014" class="para">47</a>] </sup>
2952
2953
2954 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2955 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications of the
2956 Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2957 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777200" href="#id2777200" class="para">48</a>] </sup>
2958
2959
2960 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks: Suit
2961 Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6 (2003): 5,
2962 tilgjengelig fra 2003 WL 55179443.
2963 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777296" href="#id2777296" class="para">49</a>] </sup>
2964
2965
2966 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2967 (27&#8211;2042&#8212;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2968 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2969 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777302" href="#id2777302" class="para">50</a>] </sup>
2970
2971
2972 Douglas Lichtman kommer med et relatert poeng i "KaZaA and Punishment," Wall
2973 Street Journal, 10. september 2003, A24.
2974 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777383" href="#id2777383" class="para">51</a>] </sup>
2975
2976 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2977 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
2978 87&#8211;93, which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2979 <a class="indexterm" name="id2777303"></a>
2980 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777439" href="#id2777439" class="para">52</a>] </sup>
2981
2982
2983 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2984 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2985 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents Company
2986 vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #11</a>. For a discussion of
2987 the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits imposed by
2988 Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
2989 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright"
2990 (September 2002), University of Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in
2991 Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 159.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777483" href="#id2777483" class="para">53</a>] </sup>
2992
2993
2994 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, arkivert på
2995 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #12</a>.
2996 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777590" href="#id2777590" class="para">54</a>] </sup>
2997
2998
2999 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on S. 6330
3000 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th Cong. 59, 1st
3001 sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of South Dakota,
3002 chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the Copyright Act, E. Fulton
3003 Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
3004 1976).
3005 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777610" href="#id2777610" class="para">55</a>] </sup>
3006
3007
3008 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223 (statement of
3009 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3010 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777620" href="#id2777620" class="para">56</a>] </sup>
3011
3012
3013 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226 (statement of
3014 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3015 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777632" href="#id2777632" class="para">57</a>] </sup>
3016
3017
3018 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23 (statement of
3019 John Philip Sousa, composer).
3020 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777649" href="#id2777649" class="para">58</a>] </sup>
3021
3022
3023
3024 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&#8211;84
3025 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music Perforating
3026 Company of New York).
3027 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777655" href="#id2777655" class="para">59</a>] </sup>
3028
3029
3030 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
3031 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3032 Graphophone Company Association).
3033 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777405" href="#id2777405" class="para">60</a>] </sup>
3034
3035
3036 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3037 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st sess.,
3038 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted in
3039 Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe
3040 Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3041 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777788" href="#id2777788" class="para">61</a>] </sup>
3042
3043
3044 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee on
3045 the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8 March
3046 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to this report.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777824" href="#id2777824" class="para">62</a>] </sup>
3047
3048 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
3049 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other messages
3050 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3051 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a record
3052 might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA Manufacturing
3053 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.  Picker,
3054 "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
3055 the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review 70
3056 (2003): 281.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2777837"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2777846"></a>
3057 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777982" href="#id2777982" class="para">63</a>] </sup>
3058
3059
3060 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3061 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
3062 on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)  (statement of Rosel
3063 H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3064 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2777998" href="#id2777998" class="para">64</a>] </sup>
3065
3066
3067 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3068 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3069 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778015" href="#id2778015" class="para">65</a>] </sup>
3070
3071
3072 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3073 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3074 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778039" href="#id2778039" class="para">66</a>] </sup>
3075
3076
3077 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.  Krim,
3078 president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of United
3079 Artists Television, Inc.).
3080 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778056" href="#id2778056" class="para">67</a>] </sup>
3081
3082
3083 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 209 (vitnemål fra Charlton Heston,
3084 president i Screen Actors Guild).
3085 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778083" href="#id2778083" class="para">68</a>] </sup>
3086
3087 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.  Zimmerman,
3088 acting assistant attorney general).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2778062"></a>
3089 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778089" href="#id2778089" class="para">69</a>] </sup>
3090
3091
3092 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine of Free
3093 Expression: Copyright on the Internet&#8212;The Myth of Free Information,
3094 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3095 #13</a>. "The threat of piracy&#8212;the use of someone else's creative
3096 work without permission or compensation&#8212;has grown with the Internet."
3097 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778145" href="#id2778145" class="para">70</a>] </sup>
3098
3099
3100 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3101 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3102 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #14</a>. See also Ben
3103 Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," Financial Times, 14 February
3104 2003, 11.
3105 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778279" href="#id2778279" class="para">71</a>] </sup>
3106
3107 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the
3108 Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&#8211;13, 209.  The
3109 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement
3110 obligates member nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms
3111 for intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3112 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for staple
3113 industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity
3114 between burdens imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3115 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents for
3116 public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent holder's
3117 permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to gain the benefits
3118 of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a promising strategy for
3119 developing nations within the TRIPS framework.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2777656"></a>
3120 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778320" href="#id2778320" class="para">72</a>] </sup>
3121
3122 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3123 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3124 144&#8211;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright
3125 holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will be
3126 negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual engaging
3127 in pirating would not have purchased an original even if pirating were not
3128 an option." Ibid., 149.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2778284"></a>
3129 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778518" href="#id2778518" class="para">73</a>] </sup>
3130
3131
3132 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3133 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778536" href="#id2778536" class="para">74</a>] </sup>
3134
3135 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3136 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3137 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies that
3138 give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come up
3139 with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.  This
3140 job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing technology
3141 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence
3142 Lessig, Future, 89&#8211;92, 139.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2778325"></a>
3143 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778573" href="#id2778573" class="para">75</a>] </sup>
3144
3145
3146 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3147 Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide," New
3148 Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO, Secures
3149 New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1; "Napster's Wake-Up
3150 Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton, "Hollywood at War with
3151 the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3152 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778594" href="#id2778594" class="para">76</a>] </sup>
3153
3154
3155
3156 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3157 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve and
3158 older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have listened
3159 to digital music files stored on their computers.
3160 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778616" href="#id2778616" class="para">77</a>] </sup>
3161
3162
3163 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New York
3164 Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3165 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778736" href="#id2778736" class="para">78</a>] </sup>
3166
3167 Se Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&#8211;49.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2778548"></a>
3168 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778778" href="#id2778778" class="para">79</a>] </sup>
3169
3170
3171 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3172 Industry's Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3173 industry's effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in
3174 the 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape
3175 skull and the caption "Home taping is killing music." At the time digital
3176 audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a
3177 survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten
3178 had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.  Congress, Office of Technology
3179 Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law,
3180 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.  Government Printing Office, October
3181 1989), 145&#8211;56.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778808" href="#id2778808" class="para">80</a>] </sup>
3182
3183
3184 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3185 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778857" href="#id2778857" class="para">81</a>] </sup>
3186
3187
3188 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3189 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #15</a>. A
3190 later report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3191 Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy, 25 June 2003,
3192 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #16</a>:
3193 "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music have fallen by 26
3194 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million units in 2002 in the
3195 United States (based on units shipped).  In terms of sales, revenues are
3196 down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6 billion last year (based on
3197 U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music industry worldwide has gone from
3198 a $39 billion industry in 2000 down to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based
3199 on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3200 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778902" href="#id2778902" class="para">82</a>] </sup>
3201 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13. februar
3202 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3203 #17</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2778916"></a>
3204 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778929" href="#id2778929" class="para">83</a>] </sup>
3205
3206
3207 Ibid.
3208 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2778952" href="#id2778952" class="para">84</a>] </sup>
3209
3210
3211 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3212 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&#8212;Coming
3213 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
3214 the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared statement of
3215 the Future of Music Coalition), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #18</a>.
3216 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779007" href="#id2779007" class="para">85</a>] </sup>
3217
3218
3219 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3220 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3221 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3222 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3223 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #19</a>. Used records
3224 accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See National Association of
3225 Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey Results," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #20</a>.
3226 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779159" href="#id2779159" class="para">86</a>] </sup>
3227
3228
3229 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34- 35
3230 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183 MHP, available at
3231 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #21</a>. For an account
3232 of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave:
3233 The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster (New York: Crown Business,
3234 2003), 269&#8211;82.
3235 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779296" href="#id2779296" class="para">87</a>] </sup>
3236
3237
3238 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on S. 1758
3239 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess.,
3240 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion Picture Association
3241 of America, Inc.).
3242 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779313" href="#id2779313" class="para">88</a>] </sup>
3243
3244
3245 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
3246 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779322" href="#id2779322" class="para">89</a>] </sup>
3247
3248
3249 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
3250 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
3251 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779234" href="#id2779234" class="para">90</a>] </sup>
3252
3253
3254 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony of Jack
3255 Valenti).
3256 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779352" href="#id2779352" class="para">91</a>] </sup>
3257
3258
3259 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th
3260 Cir.  1981).
3261 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779389" href="#id2779389" class="para">92</a>] </sup>
3262
3263
3264 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431
3265 (1984).
3266 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779513" href="#id2779513" class="para">93</a>] </sup>
3267
3268 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
3269 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example, was
3270 regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy Congress
3271 imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and controlling the
3272 technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (Title 17 of the
3273 United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.  4237, codified at 17
3274 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not eliminate the
3275 opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See Lessig, Future,
3276 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag," University of
3277 Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&#8211;96.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2779177"></a>
3278 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779575" href="#id2779575" class="para">94</a>] </sup>
3279
3280
3281 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, (1984).
3282 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779616" href="#id2779616" class="para">95</a>] </sup>
3283
3284
3285 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software Echoes Past
3286 Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
3287 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 3. "Eiendom"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-property"></a>Kapittel 3. "Eiendom"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><p>
3288
3289
3290
3291 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of property. It can
3292 be owned and sold, and the law protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the
3293 copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the
3294 supply and demand that partially determine the price she can get.
3295 </p><p>
3296 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a bit
3297 misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
3298 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
3299 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you put in
3300 your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I take it,
3301 you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good idea you had to
3302 put a picnic table in the backyard&#8212;by, for example, going to Sears,
3303 buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
3304 then?
3305 </p><p>
3306 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus ideas,
3307 though that's an important difference. The point instead is that in the
3308 ordinary case&#8212;indeed, in practically every case except for a narrow
3309 range of exceptions&#8212;ideas released to the world are free. I don't take
3310 anything from you when I copy the way you dress&#8212;though I might seem
3311 weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
3312 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true when I
3313 copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea from me,
3314 receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
3315 taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<sup>[<a name="id2779675" href="#ftn.id2779675" class="footnote">96</a>]</sup>
3316 </p><p>
3317 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the reach of the
3318 law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that I won't discuss
3319 here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or expression without my
3320 permission: The law turns the intangible into property.
3321 </p><p>
3322 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&#8212;the details, in other
3323 words&#8212;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of turning the
3324 intangible into property emerged, we need to place this "property" in its
3325 proper context.<sup>[<a name="id2779718" href="#ftn.id2779718" class="footnote">97</a>]</sup>
3326 </p><p>
3327 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the preceding
3328 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright material is
3329 property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are its limits? How
3330 does it function in practice? After these stories, the significance of this
3331 true statement&#8212;"copyright material is property"&#8212; will be a bit
3332 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different from
3333 the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
3334 </p><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="founders"></a>Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</h2></div></div></div><p>
3335 William Shakespeare skrev "Romeo og Julie" i 1595. Skuespillet ble først
3336 utgitt i 1597. Det var det ellevte store skuespillet Shakespeare hadde
3337 skrevet. Han fortsatte å skrive skuespill helt til 1613, og stykkene han
3338 skrevhar fortsatt å definere angloamerikansk kultur siden. Så dypt har
3339 verkene av en 1500-talls forfatter sunket inn i vår kultur at vi ofte ikke
3340 engang kjenner kilden. Jeg overhørte en gang noen som kommentere Kenneth
3341 Branaghs utgave av Henry V: "Jeg likte det, men Shakespeare er så full av
3342 klisjeer."
3343 </p><p>
3344
3345 I 1774, nesten 180 år etter at Romeo og Julie ble skrevet, mente mange at
3346 "opphavsretten" kun tilhørte én eneste utgiver i London, John
3347 Tonson. <sup>[<a name="id2779784" href="#ftn.id2779784" class="footnote">98</a>]</sup> Tonson var den mest
3348 fremstående av en liten gruppe utgivere kalt "the Conger"<sup>[<a name="id2779806" href="#ftn.id2779806" class="footnote">99</a>]</sup>, som kontrollerte boksalget i England gjennom hele
3349 1700-tallet. The Conger hevdet at de hadde en evigvarende rett over "kopier"
3350 av bøker de hadde fått av forfatterne. Denne evigvarende retten innebar at
3351 ingen andre kunne publisere kopier av disse bøkene. Slik ble prisen på
3352 klassiske bøker holdt oppe; alle konkurrenter som lagde bedre eller
3353 billigere utgaver, ble fjernet.
3354 </p><p>
3355 Men altså, det er noe spennende med året 1774 for alle som vet litt om
3356 opphavsretts-lovgivning. Det mest kjente året for opphavsrett er 1710, da
3357 det britiske parlamentet vedtok den første loven. Denne loven er kjent som
3358 "Statute of Anne" og sa at alle publiserte verk skulle være beskyttet i
3359 fjorten år, en periode som kunne fornyes én gang dersom forfatteren ennå
3360 levde, og at alle verk publisert i eller før 1710 skulle ha en ekstraperiode
3361 på 22 tillegsår.<sup>[<a name="id2779841" href="#ftn.id2779841" class="footnote">100</a>]</sup> På grunn av denne
3362 loven, så skulle "Rome og Julie" ha falt i det fri i 1731. Hvordan kunne da
3363 Tonson fortsatt ha kontroll over verket i 1774?
3364 </p><p>
3365 Årsaken var ganske enkelt at engelskmennene ikke hadde bestemt hva
3366 opphavsrett innebar -- faktisk hadde ingen i verden det. På den tiden da
3367 engelskmennene vedtok "Statute of Anne", var det ingen annen lovgivning om
3368 opphavsrett. Den siste loven som regulerte utgivere var lisensieringsloven
3369 av 1662, utløpt i 1695. At loven ga utgiverne monopol over publiseringen,
3370 noe som gjorde det enklere for kronen å kontrollere hva ble publisert. Men
3371 etter at det har utløpt, var det ingen positiv lov som sa at utgiverne hadde
3372 en eksklusiv rett til å trykke bøker.
3373 </p><p>
3374 At det ikke fantes noen positiv lov, betydde ikke at det ikke fantes noen
3375 lov. Den anglo-amerikanske juridiske tradisjon ser både til lover skapt av
3376 politikere (det lovgivende statsorgen)og til lover (prejudikater) skapt av
3377 domstolene for å bestemme hvordan folket skal leve. Vi kaller politikernes
3378 lover for positiv lov og vi kaller lovene fra dommerne sedvanerett."Common
3379 law" angir bakgrunnen for de lovgivendes lovgivning; retten til lovgiving,
3380 vanligvis kan trumfe at bakgrunnen bare hvis det går gjennom en lov til å
3381 forskyve den. Og så var det virkelige spørsmålet etter lisensiering lover
3382 hadde utløpt om felles lov beskyttet opphavsretten, uavhengig av lovverket
3383 positiv.
3384 </p><p>
3385
3386 Dette spørsmålet var viktig for utgiverne eller "bokselgere," som de ble
3387 kalt, fordi det var økende konkurranse fra utenlandske utgivere, Særlig fra
3388 Skottland hvor publiseringen og eksporten av bøker til England hadde økt
3389 veldig. Denne konkurransen reduserte fortjenesten til "The Conger", som
3390 derfor krevde at parlamentet igjen skulle vedta en lov for å gi dem
3391 eksklusiv kontroll over publisering. Dette kravet resulterte i "Statute of
3392 Anne".
3393 </p><p>
3394 "Statute of Anne" ga forfatteren eller "eieren" av en bok en eksklusiv rett
3395 til å publisere denne boken. Men det var, til bokhandernes forferdelse en
3396 viktig begrensning, nemlig hvor lenge denne retten skulle vare. Etter dette
3397 gikk trykkeretten bort og verket falt i det fri og kunne trykkes av hvem som
3398 helst. Det var ihvertfall det lovgiverne hadde tenkt.
3399 </p><p>
3400 Men nå det mest interessante med dette: Hvorfor ville parlamentet begrense
3401 trykkeretten? Sprøsmålet er ikke hvorfor de bestemte seg for denne perioden,
3402 men hvorfor ville de begrense den i det hele tatt?
3403 </p><p>
3404 Bokhandlerne, og forfatterne som de representerte, hadde et veldig sterkt
3405 krav. Ta romeo og Julie som et eksempel: Skuespillet ble skrevet av
3406 Shakespeare. Det var hans kreativitet som brakte det til verden. Han krenket
3407 ikke noens rett da han skrev dette verket (det er en kontroversiell
3408 påstanden, men det er urelevant), og med sin egen rett skapte han verket,
3409 han gjorde det ikke noe vanskeligere for andre til å lage skuespill. Så
3410 hvorfor skulle loven tillate at noen annen kunne komme og ta Shakespeares
3411 verkuten hans, eller hans arvingers, tillatelse? Hvilke grunner finnes for å
3412 tillate at noen "stjeler" Shakespeares verk?
3413 </p><p>
3414 Svaret er todel. Først må vi se på noe spesielt med oppfatningen av
3415 opphavsrett som fantes på tidspunktet da "Statute of Anne" ble
3416 vedtatt. Deretter må vi se på noe spesielt med bokhandlerne.
3417 </p><p>
3418
3419 Først om opphavsretten. I de siste tre hundre år har vi kommet til å bruke
3420 begrepet "copyright" i stadig videre forstand. Men i 1710 var det ikke så
3421 mye et konsept som det var en bestemt rett. Opphavsretten ble født som et
3422 svært spesifikt sett med begrensninger: den forbød andre å reprodusere en
3423 bok. I 1710 var "kopi-rett" en rett til å bruke en bestemt maskin til å
3424 replikere en bestemt arbeid. Den gikk ikke utover dette svært smale
3425 formålet. Denkontrollerte ikke mer generelt hvordan et verk kunne
3426 brukes. Idag inkluderer retten en stor samling av restriksjoner på andres
3427 frihet: den gir forfatteren eksklusiv rett til å kopiere, eksklusiv rett til
3428 å distribuere, eksklusiv rett til å fremføre, og så videre.
3429 </p><p>
3430 Så selv om f. eks. opphavsretten til Shakespeares verker var evigvarende,
3431 betydde det under den opprinnelige betydningen av begrepet at ingen kunne
3432 trykke Shakespeares arbeid uten tillatelse fra Shakespeares arvinger. Den
3433 ville ikke ha kontrollert noe mer, for eksempel om hvordan verket kunne
3434 fremføres, om verket kunne oversettes eller om Kenneth Branagh ville hatt
3435 lov til å lage filmer. "Kopi-retten" var bare en eksklusiv rett til å
3436 trykke--ikke noe mindre, selvfølgelig, men heller ikke mer.
3437 </p><p>
3438 Selv dnne begrensede retten ble møtt med skepsis av britene. De hadde hatt
3439 en lang og stygg erfaring med "eksklusive rettigheter," spesielt "enerett"
3440 gitt av kronen. Engelskmennene hadde utkjempet en borgerkrig delvis mot
3441 kronens praksis med å dele ut monopoler--spesielt monopoler for verk som
3442 allerede eksisterte. Kong Henrik VIII hadde gitt patent til å trykke Bibelen
3443 og monopol til Darcy for å lage spillkort. Det engelske parlamentet begynte
3444 å kjempe tilbake mot denne makten hos kronen. I 1656 ble "Statute of
3445 Monopolis" vedtatt for å begrense monopolene på patenter for nye
3446 oppfinnelser. Og i 1710 var parlamentet ivrig etter å håndtere det voksende
3447 monopolet på publisering.
3448 </p><p>
3449 Dermed ble "kopi-retten", når den sees på som en monopolrett, en rettighet
3450 som bør være begrenset. (Uansett hvor overbevisende påstanden om at "det er
3451 min eiendom, og jeg skal ha for alltid," prøv hvor overbevisende det er når
3452 men sier "det er mitt monopol, og jeg skal ha det for alltid.") Staten ville
3453 beskytte eneretten, men bare så lenge det gavnet samfunnet. Britene så
3454 skadene særinteresserte kunne skape; de vedtok en lov for å stoppe dem.
3455 </p><p>
3456 Dernest, om bokhandlerne. Det var ikke bare at kopiretten var et
3457 monopol. Det var også et monopol holdt av bokhandlerne. En bokhandler høres
3458 greie og ufarlige ut for oss, men slik var det ikke i syttenhundretallets
3459 England. Medlemmene i "the Conger" ble av en voksende mengde sett på som
3460 monopolister av verste sort - et verktøy for kronens undertrykkelse, de
3461 solgte Englands frihet mot å være garantert en monopolskinntekt. Men
3462 monopolistene ble kvast kritisert: Milton beskrev dem som "gamle
3463 patentholdere og monopolister i bokhandlerkunsten"; de var "menn som derfor
3464 ikke hadde  et ærlig arbeide hvor utdanning er nødvendig."<sup>[<a name="id2780070" href="#ftn.id2780070" class="footnote">101</a>]</sup>
3465 </p><p>
3466 Mange trodde at den makten bokhandlerne utøvde over spredning av kunnskap,
3467 var til skade for selve spredningen, men på dette tidspunktet viste
3468 Opplysningen viktigheten av utdannelse og kunnskap for alle. idéen om at
3469 kunnskap burde være gratis er et kjennetegn for tiden, og disse kraftige
3470 kommersielle interesser forstyrret denne idéen.
3471 </p><p>
3472 For å balansere denne makten, besluttet Parlamentet å øke konkurransen blant
3473 bokhandlerne, og den enkleste måten å gjøre det på, var å spre mengden av
3474 verdifulle bøker. Parlamentet begrenset derfor begrepet om opphavsrett, og
3475 garantert slik at verdifulle bøker ville bli frie for alle utgiver å
3476 publisere etter en begrenset periode. Slik ble det å gi eksisterende verk en
3477 periode på tjueen år et kompromiss for å bekjempe bokhandlernes
3478 makt. Begrensninger med dato var en indirekte måte å skape konkurranse
3479 mellom utgivere, og slik en skapelse og spredning av kultur.
3480 </p><p>
3481 Når 1731 (1710+21) kom, ble bokhandlerne engstelige. De så konsekvensene av
3482 mer konkurranse, og som alle konkurrenter, likte de det ikke. Først
3483 ignorerte bokhandlere ganske enkelt "Statute of Anne", og fortsatte å kreve
3484 en evigvarende rett til å kontrollere publiseringen. Men i 1735 og 1737 de
3485 prøvde å tvinge Parlamentet til å utvide periodene. Tjueen år var ikke nok,
3486 sa de; de trengte mer tid.
3487 </p><p>
3488 Parlamentet avslo kravene, Som en pamflett sa, i en vending som levere ennå
3489 idag,
3490 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3491 Jeg ser ingen grunn til å gi en utvidet perioden nå som ikke ville kunne gi
3492 utvidelser om igjen og om igjen, så fort de gamle utgår; så dersom dette
3493 lovforslaget blir vedtatt, vil effekten være: at et evig monopol blir skapt,
3494 et stort nederlag for handelen, et angrep mot kunnskapen, ingen fordel for
3495 forfatterne, men en stor avgift for folket; og alt dette kun for å øke
3496 bokhandlernes personlige rikdom.<sup>[<a name="id2780145" href="#ftn.id2780145" class="footnote">102</a>]</sup>
3497 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3498 Etter å ha mislyktes i Parlamentet gikk utgiverne til rettssalen i en rekke
3499 saker. Deres argument var enkelt og direkte: "Statute of Anne" ga
3500 forfatterne en viss beskyttelse gjennom positiv loven, men denne
3501 beskyttelsenvar ikke ment som en erstatning for felles lov. Istedet var de
3502 ment å supplere felles lov. Ifølge sedvanerett var det galt å ta en annen
3503 persons kreative eiendom og bruke den uten hans tillatelse. "Statute of
3504 Anne", hevdet bokhandlere, endret ikke dette faktum. Derfor betydde ikke det
3505 at beskyttelsen gitt av "Statute of Anne" utløp, at beskyttelsen fra
3506 sedvaneretten utløp: Ifølge sedvaneretten hadde de rett til å fordømme
3507 publiseringen av en bok, selv følgelig om "Statute of Anne" sa at de var
3508 falt i det fri. Dette, mente de, var den eneste måten å beskytte
3509 forfatterne.
3510 </p><p>
3511 Dette var et godt argument, og hadde støtte fra flere av den tidens ledende
3512 jurister. Det viste også en ekstraordinær chutzpah. Inntail da, som
3513 jusprofessor Raymond Pattetson har sagt, "var utgiverne ... like bekymret
3514 for forfatterne som en gjeter for sine lam."<sup>[<a name="id2780205" href="#ftn.id2780205" class="footnote">103</a>]</sup> Bokselgerne brydde seg ikke det spor om forfatternes
3515 rettigheter. Deres bekymring var den monopolske inntekten forfatterens verk
3516 ga.
3517 </p><p>
3518 Men bokhandlernes argument ble ikke godtatt uten kamp. Helten fra denne
3519 kampen var den skotske bokselgeren Alexander Donaldson.<sup>[<a name="id2780230" href="#ftn.id2780230" class="footnote">104</a>]</sup>
3520 </p><p>
3521 Donaldson var en fremmed for Londons "the Conger". Han startet in karriere i
3522 Edinburgh i 1750. Hans forretningsidé var billige kopier av standardverk
3523 falt i det fri, ihvertfall fri ifølge "Statute of Anne".<sup>[<a name="id2780249" href="#ftn.id2780249" class="footnote">105</a>]</sup> Donaldsons forlag vokste og ble "et sentrum for
3524 litterære skotter." "Blant dem," skriver professor Mark Rose, var "den unge
3525 James Boswell som, sammen med sin venn Andrew Erskine, publiserte en hel
3526 antologi av skotsk samtidspoesi sammen med Donaldson."<sup>[<a name="id2780266" href="#ftn.id2780266" class="footnote">106</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2780274"></a>
3527 </p><p>
3528 Da Londons bokselgere prøvde å få stengt Donaldsons butikk i Skottland, så
3529 flyttet han butikken til London. Her solgte han billige utgaver av "de mest
3530 populære, engelske bøker, i kamp mot sedvanerettens rett til litterær
3531 eiendom." <sup>[<a name="id2780291" href="#ftn.id2780291" class="footnote">107</a>]</sup> Bøkene hans var mellom 30%
3532 og 50% billigere enn "the Conger"s, og han baserte sin rett til denne
3533 konkurransen på at bøkene, takket være "Statute of Anne", var falt i det
3534 fri.
3535 </p><p>
3536 Londons bokselgere begynte straks å slå ned mot "pirater" som
3537 Donaldson. Flere tiltak var vellykkede, den viktigste var den tidlig seieren
3538 i kampen mellom Millar og Taylor.
3539 </p><p>
3540 Millar var en bokhandler som i 1729 hadde kjøpt opp rettighetene til James
3541 Thomsons dikt "The Seasons". Millar hadde da full beskyttelse gjennom
3542 "Statute of Anne", men etter at denne beskyttelsen var uløpt, begynte Robert
3543 Taylor å trykke et konkurrerende bind. Millar gikk til sak, og hevdet han
3544 hadde en evig rett gjennom sedvaneretten, uansett hva "Statute of Anne"
3545 sa.<sup>[<a name="id2780329" href="#ftn.id2780329" class="footnote">108</a>]</sup>
3546 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxmansfield2"></a><p>
3547 Til moderne juristers forbløffelse, var en av, ikke bare datidens, men en av
3548 de største dommere i engelsk historie, Lord Mansfield, enig med
3549 bokhandlerne. Uansett hvilken beskyttelse "Statute of Anne" gav
3550 bokhandlerne, så sa han at den ikke fortrengte noe fra
3551 sedvaneretten. Spørsmålet var hvorvidt sedvaneretten beskyttet forfatterne
3552 mot pirater. Mansfield svar var ja: Sedvaneretten nektet Taylor å
3553 reprodusere Thomsons dikt uten Millars tillatelse. Slik gav sedvaneretten
3554 bokselgerne en evig publiseringsrett til bøker solgt til dem.
3555 </p><p>
3556
3557 Ser man på det som et spørsmål innen abstrakt jus - dersom man resonnere som
3558 om rettferdighet bare var logisk deduksjon fra de første bud - kunne
3559 Mansfields konklusjon gitt mening. Men den overså det Parlamentet hadde
3560 kjempet for i 1710: Hvordan man på best mulig vis kunne innskrenke
3561 utgivernes monopolmakt. Parlamentets strategi hadde vært å kjøpe fred
3562 gjennom å tilby en beskyttelsesperiode også for eksisterende verk, men
3563 perioden måtte være så kort at kulturen ble utsatt for konkurranse innen
3564 rimelig tid. Storbritannia skulle vokse fra den kontrollerte kulturen under
3565 kronen, inn i en fri og åpen kultur.
3566 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2780392"></a><p>
3567 Kampen for å forsvare "Statute of Anne"s begrensninger sluttet uansett ikke
3568 der, for nå kommer Donaldson.
3569 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2780408"></a><p>
3570 Millar døde kort tid etter sin seier. Boet hans solgte rettighetene over
3571 Thomsons dikt til et syndikat av utgivere, deriblant Thomas
3572 Beckett.<sup>[<a name="id2780421" href="#ftn.id2780421" class="footnote">109</a>]</sup> Da ga Donaldson ut en
3573 uautorisert utgave av Thomsons verk. Etter avgjørelsen i Millar-saken, gikk
3574 Beckett til sak mot Donaldson. Donaldson tok saken inn for Overhuset, som da
3575 fungerte som en slags høyesterett. I februar 1774 hadde dette organet
3576 muligheten til å tolke Parlamentets mening med utøpsdatoen fra seksti år
3577 før.
3578 </p><p>
3579 Rettssaken Donaldson mot Beckett fikk en enorm oppmerksomhet i hele
3580 Storbritannia. Donaldsons advokater mente at selv om det før fantes en del
3581 rettigheter i sedvaneretten, så var disse fortrengt av "Statute of
3582 Anne". Etter at "Statute of Anne" var blitt vedtatt, skulle den eneste
3583 lovlige beskyttelse for trykkerett kom derfra. Og derfor, mente de, i tråd
3584 med vilkårene i "Statute of Anne", falle i det fri så fort
3585 beskyttelsesperioden var over.
3586 </p><p>
3587 Overhuset var en merkelig institusjon. Juridiske spørsmål ble presentert for
3588 huset, og ble først stemt over av "juslorder", medlemmer av enspesiell
3589 rettslig gruppe som fungerte nesten slik som justiariusene i vår
3590 Høyesterett. Deretter, etter at "juslordene" hadde stemt, stemte resten av
3591 Overhuset.
3592 </p><p>
3593
3594 Rapportene om juslordene stemmer er uenige. På enkelte punkter ser det ut
3595 som om evigvarende beskyttelse fikk flertall. Men det er ingen tvil om
3596 hvordan resten av Overhuset stemte. Med en majoritet på to mot en (22 mot
3597 11) stemte de ned forslaget om en evig beskyttelse. Uansett hvordan man
3598 hadde tolket sedvaneretten, var nå kopiretten begrenset til en periode, og
3599 etter denne ville verket falle i det fri.
3600 </p><p>
3601 "Å falle i det fri". Før rettssaken Donaldson mot Beckett var det ingen klar
3602 oppfatning om hva å falle i det fri innebar. Før 1774 var det jo en allmenn
3603 oppfatning om at kopiretten var evigvarende. Men etter 1774 ble Public
3604 Domain født.For første gang i angloamerikansk historie var den lovlige
3605 beskyttelsen av et verk utgått, og de største verk i engelsk historie -
3606 inkludert Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson og Bunyan - var frie.
3607 <a class="indexterm" name="id2780500"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2780506"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2780513"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2780519"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2780525"></a>
3608 </p><p>
3609 Vi kan knapt forestille oss det, men denne avgjørelsen fra Overhuset fyrte
3610 opp under en svært populær og politisk reaksjon. I Skottland, hvor de fleste
3611 piratugiverne hadde holdt til, ble avgjørelsen feiret i gatene. Som
3612 Edinburgh Advertiser skrev "Ingen privatsak har noen gang fått slik
3613 oppmerksomhet fra folket, og ingen sak som har blitt prøvet i Overhuset har
3614 interessert så mange enkeltmennesker." "Stor glede i Edinburgh etter seieren
3615 over litterær eiendom: bål og *illuminations*.<sup>[<a name="id2780546" href="#ftn.id2780546" class="footnote">110</a>]</sup>
3616 </p><p>
3617 I London, ihvertfall blant utgiverne, var reaksjonen like sterk, men i
3618 motsatt retning. Morning Chronicle skrev:
3619 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3620 Gjennom denne avgjørelsen ... er verdier til nesten 200 000 pund, som er
3621 blitt ærlig kjøpt gjennom allment salg, og som i går var eiendom, er nå
3622 redusert til ingenting. Bokselgerne i London og Westminster, mange av dem
3623 har solgt hus og eiendom for å kjøpe kopirettigheter, er med ett ruinerte,
3624 og mange som gjennom mange år har opparbeidet kompetanse for å brødfø
3625 familien, sitter nå uten en shilling til sine.<sup>[<a name="id2780574" href="#ftn.id2780574" class="footnote">111</a>]</sup>
3626 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3627
3628
3629 Ruinert er en overdrivelse. Men det er ingen overdrivelse å si at endringen
3630 var stor. Vedtaket fra Overhuset betydde at bokhandlerne ikke lenger kunnen
3631 kontrollere hvordan kulturen i England ville vokse og utvikle seg. Kulturen
3632 i England var etter dette fri. Ikke i den betydning at kopiretten ble
3633 ignorert, for utgiverne hadde i en begrenset periode rett over
3634 trykkingen. Og heller ikke i den betydningen at bøker kunne stjeles, for
3635 selv etter at boken var falt i det fri, så måtte den kjøpes. Men i den
3636 betydningen at kulturen og dens vekst ikke lenger var kontrollert av en
3637 liten gruppe utgivere. Som alle frie markeder, ville dette markedet vokse og
3638 utvikle seg etter tilbud og etterspørsel. Den engelske kulturen ble nå
3639 formet slik flertallet Englands lesere ville at det skulle formes - gjennom
3640 valget av hva de kjøpte og skrev, gjennom valget av *memes* de gjentok og
3641 beundret. Valg i en konkurrerende sammenheng, ikke der hvor valgene var om
3642 hvilken kultur som skulle være tilgjengelig for folket og hvor deres tilgang
3643 til den ble styrt av noen få, på tros av flertallets ønsker.
3644 </p><p>
3645 Til sist, dette var en verden hvor Parlamentet var antimonopolistisk, og
3646 holdt stand mot utgivernes krav. I en verden hvor parlamentet er lett å
3647 påvirke, vil den frie kultur være mindre beskyttet.
3648 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel sju: Innspillerne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="recorders"></a>Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</h2></div></div></div><p>
3649 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and has been
3650 very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and as a teacher
3651 myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students feel for him. (I
3652 met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.  He was their god.)
3653 </p><p>
3654 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break, he told me
3655 a story about the freedom to create with film in America today.
3656 </p><p>
3657 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring Cycle. The
3658 focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.  Stagehands are a
3659 particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.  During a show, they
3660 hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in the lighting loft. They
3661 make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2780665"></a>
3662 </p><p>
3663
3664 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands playing
3665 checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.  Playing on the
3666 television set, while the stagehands played checkers and the opera company
3667 played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged it, this touch of cartoon
3668 helped capture the flavor of what was special about the scene.
3669 </p><p>
3670 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
3671 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.  For of
3672 course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use copyrighted
3673 material you need the permission of the copyright owner, unless "fair use"
3674 or some other privilege applies.
3675 </p><p>
3676 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
3677 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image on a
3678 tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt? Groening
3679 was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact Gracie Films,
3680 the company that produces the program.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2780700"></a>
3681 </p><p>
3682 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted to be
3683 careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.  Else
3684 called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one room shot
3685 of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission, Else said. He was
3686 just confirming the permission with Fox.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2780716"></a>
3687 </p><p>
3688 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered . . . that
3689 Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&#8212;or at least that someone
3690 [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And second, Fox "wanted
3691 ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use this four-point-five
3692 seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which was in the corner of
3693 the shot."
3694 </p><p>
3695 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone he
3696 thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera.  He explained
3697 to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .  We're asking for your
3698 educational rate on this." That was the educational rate, Herrera told
3699 Else. A day or so later, Else called again to confirm what he had been told.
3700 </p><p>
3701
3702 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you have
3703 your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the clip of The
3704 Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about Wagner's Ring
3705 Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And if you quote me,
3706 I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to Herrera told Else
3707 later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the money."
3708 </p><p>
3709 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing on
3710 the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce this
3711 reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very last
3712 minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the shot
3713 with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After Trinity,
3714 from ten years before.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2780764"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2780770"></a>
3715 </p><p>
3716 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
3717 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.  To use that
3718 copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of the copyright
3719 owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the Simpsons copyright were
3720 one of the uses restricted by the law, then he would need to get the
3721 permission of the copyright owner before he could use the work in that
3722 way. And in a free market, it is the owner of the copyright who gets to set
3723 the price for any use that the law says the owner gets to control.
3724 </p><p>
3725 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
3726 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
3727 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
3728 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
3729 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge whatever she
3730 wants&#8212;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set by the law.
3731 </p><p>
3732 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first thought
3733 is "fair use."<sup>[<a name="id2780796" href="#ftn.id2780796" class="footnote">112</a>]</sup> Else's use of just 4.5
3734 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of
3735 The Simpsons&#8212;and fair use does not require the permission of anyone.
3736 </p><p>
3737
3738
3739 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
3740 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3741 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
3742 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
3743 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and broadcast
3744 documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an
3745 absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete
3746 way. Here's why:
3747 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
3748
3749
3750 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy Errors
3751 and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed "visual cue sheet"
3752 listing the source and licensing status of each shot in the film. They take
3753 a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the
3754 application process to a halt.
3755 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3756
3757 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first place. But I
3758 knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of tracking down and
3759 stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George Lucas had a very high
3760 profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book,
3761 thinking that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds of
3762 Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to exhaustion on a shoestring,
3763 the last thing I wanted was to risk legal trouble, even nuisance legal
3764 trouble, and even to defend a principle.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2780872"></a>
3765 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3766
3767
3768
3769 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law School
3770 . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed that Fox would
3771 "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your life," regardless of the
3772 merits of my claim. He made clear that it would boil down to who had the
3773 bigger legal department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
3774
3775 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3776
3777
3778 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the project, when we
3779 are up against a release deadline and out of money.
3780 </p></li></ol></div></blockquote></div><p>
3781 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
3782 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.  But in
3783 practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of the law,
3784 tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means that the
3785 effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law has the
3786 right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
3787 </p><p>
3788 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
3789 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
3790 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
3791 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
3792 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel åtte: Omformere"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="transformers"></a>Kapittel åtte: Omformere</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2780936"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2780942"></a><p>
3793 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc.  Starwave was an
3794 innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop
3795 digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave
3796 began investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
3797 anticipation of the power of networks.
3798 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2780957"></a><p>
3799 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by the
3800 emerging market for CD-ROM technology&#8212;not to distribute film, but to
3801 do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.  In 1993, he
3802 launched an initiative to develop a product to build retrospectives on the
3803 work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was Clint Eastwood. The
3804 idea was to showcase all of the work of Eastwood, with clips from his films
3805 and interviews with figures important to his career.
3806 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2780966"></a><p>
3807 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and as a
3808 director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood, asking him
3809 about his career. Because Starwave produced those interviews, it was free to
3810 include them on the CD.
3811 </p><p>
3812
3813
3814 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so Starwave
3815 wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career: posters,
3816 scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood made. Most of his
3817 career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was relatively easy to get
3818 permission for that content.
3819 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2781000"></a><p>
3820 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our goal was
3821 that we were going to have a clip from every one of Eastwood's films," Alben
3822 told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No one had ever really done
3823 this before," Alben explained. "No one had ever tried to do this in the
3824 context of an artistic look at an actor's career."
3825 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2781015"></a><p>
3826 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.  Slade asked,
3827 "Well, what will it take?"
3828 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2781027"></a><p>
3829 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from everyone who
3830 appears in these films, and the music and everything else that we want to
3831 use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go for it."<sup>[<a name="id2781039" href="#ftn.id2781039" class="footnote">113</a>]</sup>
3832 </p><p>
3833 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what clearing
3834 those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films could have a claim
3835 to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD- ROMs had not been specified
3836 in the contracts for the actors, so there was no clear way to know just what
3837 Starwave was to do.
3838 </p><p>
3839 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious pride in his
3840 resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his tale, Alben
3841 recounted just what they did:
3842 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3843 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.  We made some
3844 artistic decisions about what film clips to include&#8212;of course we were
3845 going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty Harry. But you then need to
3846 get the guy on the ground who's wiggling under the gun and you need to get
3847 his permission.  And then you have to decide what you are going to pay him.
3848 </p><p>
3849
3850
3851 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate for
3852 the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of less than
3853 a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the rate at the time
3854 was about $600.  So we had to identify the people&#8212;some of them were
3855 hard to identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
3856 crashing through the glass&#8212;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And
3857 then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we
3858 just started calling people.
3859 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2781096"></a><p>
3860 Some actors were glad to help&#8212;Donald Sutherland, for example, followed
3861 up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.  Others were
3862 dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask, "Hey, can I pay you $600
3863 or maybe if you were in two films, you know, $1,200?" And they would say,
3864 "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love to get $1,200." And some of course were a
3865 bit difficult (estranged ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and
3866 his team had cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint
3867 Eastwood's career.
3868 </p><p>
3869 It was one year later&#8212;"and even then we weren't sure whether we were
3870 totally in the clear."
3871 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2781130"></a><p>
3872 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and the
3873 only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive project for
3874 the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
3875 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3876 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their hands
3877 and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's the music,
3878 there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the actors." But we
3879 just broke it down. We just put it into its constituent parts and said,
3880 "Okay, there's this many actors, this many directors, . . . this many
3881 musicians," and we just went at it very systematically and cleared the
3882 rights.
3883 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3884
3885
3886
3887 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood loved it,
3888 and it sold very well.
3889 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2781164"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2781170"></a><p>
3890 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to take a
3891 year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
3892 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is nothing so
3893 useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
3894 all."<sup>[<a name="id2781184" href="#ftn.id2781184" class="footnote">114</a>]</sup> Did it make sense, I asked Alben,
3895 that this is the way a new work has to be made?
3896 </p><p>
3897 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources, and
3898 the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be made. Does
3899 it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what anybody really
3900 thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that you would have to
3901 go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
3902 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3903 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie, he or she
3904 gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of that performance is
3905 used in a new product that is a retrospective of somebody's career, I don't
3906 think that that person . . . should be compensated for that.
3907 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3908 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it make
3909 sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that someone
3910 could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this? Did it
3911 really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track down every
3912 artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission from each?
3913 Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process
3914 could be made to be more clean?
3915 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3916
3917 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
3918 mechanism&#8212;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
3919 subject to estranged former spouses&#8212;you'd see a lot more of this work,
3920 because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a retrospective of
3921 someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with lots of media from that
3922 person's career. You'd build in a cost as the producer of one of these
3923 things. You'd build in a cost of paying X dollars to the talent that
3924 performed. But it would be a known cost. That's the thing that trips
3925 everybody up and makes this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If
3926 you knew I have a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to
3927 cost me X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get investments
3928 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I want
3929 a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going to cost
3930 me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for money," then
3931 it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
3932 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2781277"></a><p>
3933 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
3934 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access that
3935 the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a year, how long
3936 would it take someone else? And how much creativity is never made just
3937 because the costs of clearing the rights are so high? These costs are the
3938 burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a Republican hat for a moment, and
3939 get angry for a bit. The government defines the scope of these rights, and
3940 the scope defined determines how much it's going to cost to negotiate
3941 them. (Remember the idea that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the
3942 pilot purchasing flythrough rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles
3943 to San Francisco.)  These rights might well have once made sense; but as
3944 circumstances change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a
3945 well-trained, regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and
3946 ask, "Does this still make sense?"
3947 </p><p>
3948
3949 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only a
3950 few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
3951 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I was
3952 asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer from an
3953 L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a friend, Robert
3954 Fairbank, had produced.
3955 </p><p>
3956 Videoen var en glimrende sammenstilling av filmer fra hver periode i det
3957 tjuende århundret, rammet inn rundt idéen om en episode i TV-serien 60
3958 Minutes. Utførelsen var perfekt, ned til seksti minutter
3959 stoppeklokken. Dommerne elsket enhver minutt av den.
3960 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2781327"></a><p>
3961 Da lysene kom på, kikket jeg over til min medpaneldeltager, David Nimmer,
3962 kanskje den ledende opphavsrettakademiker og utøver i nasjonen. Han hadde en
3963 forbauset uttrykk i ansiktet sitt, mens han tittet ut over rommet med over
3964 250 godt underholdte dommere. Med en en illevarslende tone, begynte han sin
3965 tale med et spørsmål: "Vet dere hvor mange føderale lover som nettopp brutt
3966 i dette rommet?"
3967 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2781347"></a><p>
3968 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this film
3969 hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the rights to
3970 these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law.  Of course,
3971 it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for this
3972 violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle of federal marshals
3973 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point: A year before
3974 anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two years before another
3975 member of our panel, David Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth
3976 Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that
3977 the law would not be friendly to the capacities that this technology would
3978 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
3979 couldn't easily do them legally.
3980 </p><p>
3981 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone building
3982 a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut and paste
3983 architecture of the Internet created&#8212;in a second you can find just
3984 about any image you want; in another second, you can have it planted in your
3985 presentation.
3986 </p><p>
3987 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and its
3988 archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never before
3989 imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on computers
3990 around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes images of
3991 politicians and blends them with music to create biting political
3992 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of the most biting
3993 criticism of the record industry that there is through the mixing of Flash!
3994 and music.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2781375"></a>
3995 </p><p>
3996 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators wanted
3997 to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
3998 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is never
3999 made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the clearance
4000 rules, it doesn't get released.
4001 </p><p>
4002 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of rights so
4003 that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or mix as they
4004 see fit. We could even make this change without necessarily requiring that
4005 the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the system could simply
4006 make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate artists without requiring
4007 an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for example, that says "the
4008 royalty owed the copyright owner of an unregistered work for the derivative
4009 reuse of his work will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in
4010 escrow for the copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could
4011 benefit from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
4012 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he registers
4013 the work.
4014 </p><p>
4015 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be for
4016 objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made; which if
4017 made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.  What reason
4018 would anyone have to oppose it?
4019 </p><p>
4020
4021 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers,
4022 the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and Austin Powers. According to the
4023 announcement, Myers and Dream-Works would work together to form a "unique
4024 filmmaking pact." Under the agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights
4025 to existing motion picture hits and classics, write new storylines
4026 and&#8212;with the use of stateof-the-art digital technology&#8212;insert
4027 Myers and other actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece
4028 of entertainment."
4029 </p><p>
4030 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained, "Film
4031 Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing films and
4032 allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap artists have been
4033 doing this for years with music and now we are able to take that same
4034 concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is quoted as saying, "If
4035 anyone can create a way to bring old films to new audiences, it is Mike."
4036 </p><p>
4037 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if you
4038 don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point about this
4039 announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage remains under
4040 copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks announcement is just this: It
4041 is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is free to sample. Any general freedom
4042 to build upon the film archive of our culture, a freedom in other contexts
4043 presumed for us all, is now a privilege reserved for the funny and
4044 famous&#8212;and presumably rich.
4045 </p><p>
4046 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
4047 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use." Much
4048 of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would rely upon so
4049 weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason that the
4050 privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the legal rights
4051 for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.  These costs
4052 mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to defend your fair
4053 use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions so you don't have to
4054 rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative process is a process of
4055 paying lawyers&#8212;again a privilege, or perhaps a curse, reserved for the
4056 few.
4057 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel ni: Samlere"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="collectors"></a>Kapittel ni: Samlere</h2></div></div></div><p>
4058 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&#8212;computer codes designed to "spider,"
4059 or automatically search the Internet and copy content&#8212;began running
4060 across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based information
4061 onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San Francisco's
4062 Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet, they started
4063 again. Over and over again, once every two months, these bits of code took
4064 copies of the Internet and stored them.
4065 </p><p>
4066 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of copies. And
4067 at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive that these
4068 copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the world. Using a
4069 technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could enter a Web page, and
4070 see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well as when those pages
4071 changed.
4072 </p><p>
4073 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have appreciated.  In
4074 the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were constantly updated to
4075 assure that the current view of the world, approved of by the government,
4076 was not contradicted by previous news reports.
4077 </p><p>
4078
4079
4080 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was no way
4081 ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the story that was
4082 printed on the date published on the paper.
4083 </p><p>
4084 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today, there's no
4085 way for you to know whether the content you are reading is the same as the
4086 content you read before. The page may seem the same, but the content could
4087 easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's library&#8212;constantly
4088 updated, without any reliable memory.
4089 </p><p>
4090 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and the
4091 Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet was. You have
4092 the power to see what you remember. More importantly, perhaps, you also have
4093 the power to find what you don't remember and what others might prefer you
4094 forget.<sup>[<a name="id2781548" href="#ftn.id2781548" class="footnote">115</a>]</sup>
4095 </p><p>
4096 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
4097 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction of your
4098 hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to Bull Connor's
4099 water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public library and look at the
4100 newspapers. Those papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they
4101 exist in paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back
4102 and remember&#8212;not just what it is convenient to remember, but remember
4103 something close to the truth.
4104 </p><p>
4105 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to repeat
4106 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether we
4107 have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key
4108 is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
4109 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for researchers, for
4110 grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
4111 </p><p>
4112
4113 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
4114 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the quintessentially
4115 transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more important in forming and
4116 reforming society, it becomes more and more important to maintain in some
4117 historical form. It's just bizarre to think that we have scads of archives
4118 of newspapers from tiny towns around the world, yet there is but one copy of
4119 the Internet&#8212;the one kept by the Internet Archive.
4120 </p><p>
4121 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
4122 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
4123 researcher.  In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
4124 success.  It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
4125 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The Internet
4126 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie of the
4127 Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion pages, and it
4128 was growing at about a billion pages a month.
4129 </p><p>
4130 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in human
4131 history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty terabytes of
4132 material"&#8212;and was "ten times larger than the Library of Congress." And
4133 this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set out to build. In
4134 addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been constructing the Television
4135 Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more ephemeral than the
4136 Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture was constructed through
4137 television, only a tiny proportion of that culture is available for anyone
4138 to see today. Three hours of news are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt
4139 University&#8212;thanks to a specific exemption in the copyright law. That
4140 content is indexed, and is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But
4141 other than that, [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you
4142 were Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
4143 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
4144 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4145
4146 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown? Remember
4147 that back and forth surreal experience of a politician interacting with a
4148 fictional television character? If you were a graduate student wanting to
4149 study that, and you wanted to get those original back and forth exchanges
4150 between the two, the 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it
4151 would be almost impossible. . . . Those materials are almost
4152 unfindable. . . .
4153 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4154 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded in
4155 newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is recorded
4156 on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world where researchers
4157 trying to understand the effect of media on nineteenthcentury America will
4158 have an easier time than researchers trying to understand the effect of
4159 media on twentieth-century America?
4160 </p><p>
4161 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
4162 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
4163 libraries.  These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
4164 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once the
4165 copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
4166 </p><p>
4167 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of Congress
4168 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long as such
4169 deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to borrow back the
4170 deposits&#8212;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915 alone, there were
4171 more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back." Thus, when the
4172 copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any library. The copy
4173 exists&#8212;if it exists at all&#8212;in the library archive of the film
4174 company.<sup>[<a name="id2781610" href="#ftn.id2781610" class="footnote">116</a>]</sup>
4175 </p><p>
4176 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts were
4177 originally not copyrighted&#8212;there was no way to capture the broadcasts,
4178 so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled capturing,
4179 broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law required they make a
4180 copy of each broadcast for the work to be "copyrighted." But those copies
4181 were simply kept by the broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the
4182 government didn't demand them.  The content of this part of American culture
4183 is practically invisible to anyone who would look.
4184 </p><p>
4185
4186 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and his
4187 allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty stations from
4188 around the world and hit the Record button. After September 11, Kahle,
4189 working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations from around the
4190 world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their coverage during the week
4191 of September 11 available free on-line.  Anyone could see how news reports
4192 from around the world covered the events of that day.
4193 </p><p>
4194 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
4195 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning films
4196 other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted), Kahle
4197 established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize 1,300 films in
4198 this archive and post those films on the Internet to be downloaded for
4199 free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells copies of these films as
4200 stock footage. What he has discovered is that after he made a significant
4201 chunk available for free, his stock footage sales went up
4202 dramatically. People could easily find the material they wanted to use. Some
4203 downloaded that material and made films on their own. Others purchased
4204 copies to enable other films to be made.  Either way, the archive enabled
4205 access to this important part of our culture.  Want to see a copy of the
4206 "Duck and Cover" film that instructed children how to save themselves in the
4207 middle of nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film
4208 in a few minutes&#8212;for free.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2781712"></a>
4209 </p><p>
4210 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
4211 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
4212 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law doesn't
4213 require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in an archive
4214 by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
4215 </p><p>
4216 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to this
4217 content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His aim is
4218 to ensure competition in access to this important part of our culture.  Not
4219 during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but during a
4220 second life that all creative property has&#8212;a noncommercial life.
4221 </p><p>
4222
4223 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit of
4224 creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
4225 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial market
4226 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
4227 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
4228 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial market,
4229 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
4230 </p><p>
4231 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our tradition has
4232 always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers the news every
4233 day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is used to wrap fish
4234 or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive of knowledge
4235 about our history. In this second life, the content can continue to inform
4236 even if that information is no longer sold.
4237 </p><p>
4238 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print very
4239 quickly (the average today is after about a year<sup>[<a name="id2781812" href="#ftn.id2781812" class="footnote">117</a>]</sup>). After it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores
4240 without the copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where
4241 many get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are
4242 thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely important to
4243 the spread and stability of culture.
4244 </p><p>
4245 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for creative
4246 property does not hold true with the most important components of popular
4247 culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
4248 these&#8212;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&#8212;there is no
4249 guarantee of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've
4250 replaced libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture,
4251 what's accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
4252 Beyond that, culture disappears.
4253 </p><p>
4254
4255 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this so. It
4256 would have been insanely expensive to collect and make accessible all
4257 television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily
4258 high. So even though the law in principle would have restricted the ability
4259 of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the real restriction was
4260 economics. The market made it impossibly difficult to do anything about this
4261 ephemeral culture; the law had little practical effect.
4262 </p><p>
4263 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is that
4264 for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
4265 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or distributed
4266 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all books
4267 published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
4268 moving images and sound.
4269 </p><p>
4270 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
4271 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but we are
4272 for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As Kahle
4273 describes,
4274 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4275 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
4276 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of movies,
4277 . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during the twentieth
4278 century. There are about twenty-six million different titles of books. All
4279 of these would fit on computers that would fit in this room and be able to
4280 be afforded by a small company.  So we're at a turning point in our
4281 history. Universal access is the goal. And the opportunity of leading a
4282 different life, based on this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the
4283 things humankind would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of
4284 Alexandria, putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
4285 press.
4286 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4287
4288 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
4289 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
4290 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
4291 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle and
4292 his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture, remains
4293 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it; some to
4294 criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create the past
4295 for the future. These technologies promise something that had become
4296 unimaginable for much of our past&#8212;a future for our past. The
4297 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria
4298 real again.
4299 </p><p>
4300 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
4301 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to call
4302 these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem, the
4303 "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also someone's
4304 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that Kahle and
4305 others would exercise.
4306 </p></div><div class="sect1" title='Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="property-i"></a>Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</h2></div></div></div><p>
4307 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association of
4308 America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
4309 administration&#8212;literally. The famous picture of Johnson's swearing-in
4310 on Air Force One after the assassination of President Kennedy has Valenti in
4311 the background. In his almost forty years of running the MPAA, Valenti has
4312 established himself as perhaps the most prominent and effective lobbyist in
4313 Washington.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2781912"></a>
4314 </p><p>
4315 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
4316 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal was to
4317 defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.  The
4318 organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
4319 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its board is
4320 made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major producers and
4321 distributors of motion picture and television programs in the United States:
4322 Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth
4323 Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Warner Brothers.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2781966"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2781971"></a>
4324 <a class="indexterm" name="id2781978"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2781984"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2781990"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2781996"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2782003"></a>
4325 </p><p>
4326
4327
4328 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before him has
4329 had as much influence over that organization, or over Washington. As a
4330 Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important political skill of a
4331 Southerner&#8212;the ability to appear simple and slow while hiding a
4332 lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays the simple, humble
4333 man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four books, who finished high
4334 school at the age of fifteen and flew more than fifty combat missions in
4335 World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When Valenti went to Washington, he mastered
4336 the city in a quintessentially Washingtonian way.
4337 </p><p>
4338 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our culture
4339 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting the MPAA rating
4340 system, it has probably avoided a great deal of speech-regulating harm. But
4341 there is an aspect to the organization's mission that is both the most
4342 radical and the most important. This is the organization's effort,
4343 epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine the meaning of "creative
4344 property."
4345 </p><p>
4346 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy perfectly:
4347 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4348 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
4349 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men and
4350 women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central theme which
4351 animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must be accorded the
4352 same rights and protection resident in all other property owners in the
4353 nation. That is the issue.  That is the question. And that is the rostrum on
4354 which this entire hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<sup>[<a name="id2782055" href="#ftn.id2782055" class="footnote">118</a>]</sup>
4355 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4356
4357 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
4358 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The "central
4359 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this: "Creative
4360 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protections resident in
4361 all other property owners in the nation." There are no second-class
4362 citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should be no second-class
4363 property owners.
4364 </p><p>
4365 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated with
4366 such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we use
4367 elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a claim
4368 made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
4369 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps the
4370 nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope of
4371 "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our actual
4372 legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
4373 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
4374 </p><p>
4375 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and precise
4376 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<sup>[<a name="id2782100" href="#ftn.id2782100" class="footnote">119</a>]</sup> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that "creative
4377 property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and protection resident
4378 in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were
4379 given the same rights as all other property owners, that would effect a
4380 radical, and radically undesirable, change in our tradition.
4381 </p><p>
4382 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for our
4383 tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry that is
4384 instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British overturned in
4385 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a powerful few would
4386 exercise powerful control over how our creative culture would develop.
4387 </p><p>
4388
4389 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you that,
4390 historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to convince
4391 you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our history.  We have
4392 always treated rights in creative property differently from the rights
4393 resident in all other property owners. They have never been the same. And
4394 they should never be the same, because, however counterintuitive this may
4395 seem, to make them the same would be to fundamentally weaken the opportunity
4396 for new creators to create.  Creativity depends upon the owners of
4397 creativity having less than perfect control.
4398 </p><p>
4399 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful of
4400 the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric notwithstanding, in
4401 assuring that the new can displace them. No organization does. No person
4402 does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)  But what's good for the MPAA is
4403 not necessarily good for America. A society that defends the ideals of free
4404 culture must preserve precisely the opportunity for new creativity to
4405 threaten the old.  To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally
4406 wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
4407 Constitution itself.
4408 </p><p>
4409 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly did
4410 they love property that they built into the Constitution an important
4411 requirement. If the government takes your property&#8212;if it condemns your
4412 house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&#8212;it is required,
4413 under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you "just compensation"
4414 for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a
4415 certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner
4416 unless the government pays for the privilege.
4417 </p><p>
4418
4419 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what Valenti
4420 calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the power to
4421 create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after a "limited
4422 time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and set the
4423 "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this,
4424 when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
4425 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to pay
4426 "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that
4427 requires compensation for your land requires that you lose your "creative
4428 property" right without any compensation at all.
4429 </p><p>
4430 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of property
4431 are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be treated
4432 differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in our
4433 tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be accorded
4434 the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is effectively
4435 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
4436 </p><p>
4437 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.  There
4438 was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.  The
4439 Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be appointed
4440 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college to
4441 produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it did in
4442 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be the first to
4443 admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected some of those
4444 mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should reject as well. So
4445 my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
4446 </p><p>
4447 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at least
4448 try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property types that
4449 they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the same rights
4450 as all other property? Why did they require that for creative property there
4451 must be a public domain?
4452 </p><p>
4453 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the history of
4454 these "creative property" rights, and the control that they enabled.  Once
4455 we see clearly how differently these rights have been defined, we will be in
4456 a better position to ask the question that should be at the core of this
4457 war: Not whether creative property should be protected, but how. Not whether
4458 we will enforce the rights the law gives to creative-property owners, but
4459 what the particular mix of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be
4460 paid, but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
4461 also control how culture develops.
4462 </p><p>
4463
4464
4465
4466 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about how
4467 property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way than the
4468 narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, I
4469 used a simple model to capture this more general perspective. For any
4470 particular right or regulation, this model asks how four different
4471 modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or
4472 regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
4473 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1331"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.1. How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
4474 the right or regulation.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4475 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or group
4476 that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each case
4477 throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.  For
4478 simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)  The ovals represent
4479 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&#8212; either
4480 constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious constraint
4481 (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening punishments after the
4482 fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for example, you
4483 willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song from her latest CD
4484 and posting it on the Web, you can be punished with a $150,000 fine. The
4485 fine is an ex post punishment for violating an ex ante rule. It is imposed
4486 by the state.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2782018"></a>
4487 </p><p>
4488 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an individual
4489 for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is imposed by a
4490 community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be no law against
4491 spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished if you spit on the
4492 ground while standing in line at a movie. The punishment might not be harsh,
4493 though depending upon the community, it could easily be more harsh than many
4494 of the punishments imposed by the state. The mark of the difference is not
4495 the severity of the rule, but the source of the enforcement.
4496 </p><p>
4497 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected through
4498 conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you do N. These
4499 constraints are obviously not independent of law or norms&#8212;it is
4500 property law that defines what must be bought if it is to be taken legally;
4501 it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But given a set of norms,
4502 and a background of property and contract law, the market imposes a
4503 simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or group might behave.
4504 </p><p>
4505 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
4506 "architecture"&#8212;the physical world as one finds it&#8212;is a
4507 constraint on behavior.  A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get
4508 across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community
4509 to integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
4510 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with the
4511 market, architecture effects its constraint through simultaneous
4512 conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing contracts,
4513 or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
4514 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces
4515 this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
4516 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
4517 </p><p>
4518
4519
4520
4521 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is obvious:
4522 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by
4523 another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.
4524 </p><p>
4525 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the effective
4526 freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any particular thing, we
4527 have to consider how these four modalities interact.  Whether or not there
4528 are other constraints (there may well be; my claim is not about
4529 comprehensiveness), these four are among the most significant, and any
4530 regulator (whether controlling or freeing)  must consider how these four in
4531 particular interact.
4532 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxdrivespeed"></a><p>
4533 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high speed. That
4534 freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say how fast you
4535 can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in part restricted
4536 by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most rational drivers;
4537 governors in buses, as another example, set the maximum rate at which the
4538 driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel
4539 efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly
4540 constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not
4541 constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
4542 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The same
4543 norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
4544 </p><p>
4545
4546 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear: While
4547 these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a special role
4548 in affecting the three.<sup>[<a name="id2782394" href="#ftn.id2782394" class="footnote">120</a>]</sup> The law, in
4549 other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a
4550 particular modality.  Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on
4551 gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to drive more slowly. The law
4552 might be used to mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty
4553 of driving rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize
4554 reckless driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be
4555 more strict&#8212;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
4556 limit, for example&#8212;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
4557 driving.
4558 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2782400"></a><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1361"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.2. Law has a special role in affecting the three.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1361.png" alt="Law has a special role in affecting the three."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4559 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To understand
4560 the effective protection of liberty or protection of property at any
4561 particular moment, we must track these changes over time. A restriction
4562 imposed by one modality might be erased by another. A freedom enabled by one
4563 modality might be displaced by another.<sup>[<a name="id2782452" href="#ftn.id2782452" class="footnote">121</a>]</sup>
4564 </p><div class="sect2" title="Hvorfor Hollywood har rett"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="hollywood"></a>Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</h3></div></div></div><p>
4565 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just how,
4566 Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress and the
4567 courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that rallying makes
4568 sense.
4569 </p><p>
4570 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the Internet:
4571 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1371"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.3. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4572
4573
4574 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
4575 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on those
4576 who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by technologies
4577 that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture) and expensive to
4578 copy and share content (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by
4579 norms we all recognize&#8212;kids, for example, taping other kids'
4580 records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but
4581 the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
4582 this form of infringement.
4583 </p><p>
4584 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and p2p
4585 sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically, as does
4586 the constraint of the market. And as both the market and architecture relax
4587 the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The happy balance (for the
4588 warriors, at least) of life before the Internet becomes an effective state
4589 of anarchy after the Internet.
4590 </p><p>
4591
4592 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
4593 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
4594 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of protection
4595 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq after the fall
4596 of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the looting that
4597 results.
4598 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1381"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.4. effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1381.png" alt="effective state of anarchy after the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4599 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
4600 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce Department
4601 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995, this mix of
4602 regulatory modalities had already been identified and the strategy to
4603 respond already mapped. In response to the changes the Internet had
4604 effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should strengthen intellectual
4605 property law, (2) businesses should adopt innovative marketing techniques,
4606 (3) technologists should push to develop code to protect copyrighted
4607 material, and (4) educators should educate kids to better protect copyright.
4608 </p><p>
4609
4610 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&#8212;if it was to
4611 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
4612 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry to
4613 push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life you have
4614 as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if something comes
4615 along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a flood plain have no
4616 hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild (and rebuild again) when a
4617 flood (architecture) wipes away their property (law). Farmers have no
4618 hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when a virus
4619 (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to
4620 the government to bail them out when imports (market) wipe out the
4621 U.S. steel industry.
4622 </p><p>
4623 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's campaign
4624 to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a technological
4625 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the changing
4626 technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the content
4627 industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown describes it, its
4628 "architecture of revenue."
4629 </p><p>
4630 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
4631 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because technology
4632 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't follow that the
4633 government should intervene to support that old way of doing
4634 business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20 percent of
4635 their traditional film market to the emerging technologies of digital
4636 cameras.<sup>[<a name="id2782681" href="#ftn.id2782681" class="footnote">122</a>]</sup> Does anyone believe the
4637 government should ban digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have
4638 weakened the freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban
4639 trucks from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the
4640 subject of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness"
4641 of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
4642 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change has
4643 weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone believe we
4644 should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by
4645 limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch to only ten
4646 channels within an hour?)
4647 </p><p>
4648 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.  In a free
4649 society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and free trade,
4650 the government's role is not to support one way of doing business against
4651 others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect them against loss. If
4652 the government did this generally, then we would never have any progress. As
4653 Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in 1991, in a memo criticizing software
4654 patents, "established companies have an interest in excluding future
4655 competitors."<sup>[<a name="id2782726" href="#ftn.id2782726" class="footnote">123</a>]</sup> And relative to a
4656 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and FM
4657 radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight not only the
4658 market but also the government is a world in which competitors with new
4659 ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and increasingly
4660 concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under Brezhnev.
4661 <a class="indexterm" name="id2782734"></a>
4662 </p><p>
4663 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
4664 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the government
4665 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to guarantee that
4666 that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the duty of policy
4667 makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they create, in response
4668 to the request of those hurt by changing technology, are changes that
4669 preserve the incentives and opportunities for innovation and change.
4670 </p><p>
4671 In the context of laws regulating speech&#8212;which include, obviously,
4672 copyright law&#8212;that duty is even stronger. When the industry
4673 complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in a
4674 way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be especially
4675 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government to get into
4676 the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and dangers of that
4677 game are precisely why our framers created the First Amendment to our
4678 Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of
4679 speech." So when Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge"
4680 the freedom of speech, it should ask&#8212; carefully&#8212;whether such
4681 regulation is justified.
4682 </p><p>
4683
4684 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether the changes
4685 that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are "justified." My argument
4686 is about their effect. For before we get to the question of justification, a
4687 hard question that depends a great deal upon your values, we should first
4688 ask whether we understand the effect of the changes the content industry
4689 wants.
4690 </p><p>
4691 Her kommer metaforen som vil forklare argumentet.
4692 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxddt"></a><p>
4693 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss chemist Paul
4694 Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work demonstrating the
4695 insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the insecticide was widely
4696 used around the world to kill disease-carrying pests. It was also used to
4697 increase farm production.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2782819"></a>
4698 </p><p>
4699 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
4700 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
4701 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
4702 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2782836"></a><p>
4703 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that DDT,
4704 whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended environmental
4705 consequences. Birds were losing the ability to reproduce.  Whole chains of
4706 the ecology were being destroyed.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2782849"></a>
4707 <a class="indexterm" name="id2782855"></a>
4708 </p><p>
4709 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did not aim
4710 to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems produced
4711 another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than the problems that
4712 were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the problems DDT caused were
4713 worse than the problems it solved, at least when considering the other, more
4714 environmentally friendly ways to solve the problems that DDT was meant to
4715 solve.
4716 </p><p>
4717
4718 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James Boyle
4719 appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
4720 culture.<sup>[<a name="id2782885" href="#ftn.id2782885" class="footnote">124</a>]</sup> His point, and the point I
4721 want to develop in the balance of this chapter, is not that the aims of
4722 copyright are flawed. Or that authors should not be paid for their work. Or
4723 that music should be given away "for free." The point is that some of the
4724 ways in which we might protect authors will have unintended consequences for
4725 the cultural environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And
4726 just as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
4727 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
4728 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
4729 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware of
4730 our actions' effects on the environment.
4731 </p><p>
4732 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly this
4733 effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic effect on
4734 the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But there should
4735 also be little doubt that when you add together the changes in copyright law
4736 over time, plus the change in technology that the Internet is undergoing
4737 just now, the net effect of these changes will not be only that copyrighted
4738 work is effectively protected. Also, and generally missed, the net effect of
4739 this massive increase in protection will be devastating to the environment
4740 for creativity.
4741 </p><p>
4742 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences for free
4743 culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will be lost.
4744 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2782926"></a></div><div class="sect2" title="Opphav"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="beginnings"></a>Opphav</h3></div></div></div><p>
4745 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
4746 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
4747 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English aim to
4748 avoid overly powerful publishers.
4749 </p><p>
4750 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to Congress in
4751 a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I, section
4752 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
4753 </p><p>
4754
4755 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
4756 by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
4757 to their respective Writings and Discoveries.  We can call this the
4758 "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does not say. It does not say
4759 Congress has the power to grant "creative property rights." It says that
4760 Congress has the power to promote progress. The grant of power is its
4761 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
4762 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
4763 </p><p>
4764 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw in
4765 chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a
4766 few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
4767 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers followed
4768 the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the English, the framers
4769 reinforced that objective, by requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors"
4770 only.
4771 </p><p>
4772 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
4773 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
4774 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built a
4775 structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them short. To
4776 prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the federal
4777 government from establishing a church. To prevent concentrating power in the
4778 federal government, they built structures to reinforce the power of the
4779 states&#8212;including the Senate, whose members were at the time selected
4780 by the states, and an electoral college, also selected by the states, to
4781 select the president. In each case, a structure built checks and balances
4782 into the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
4783 concentrations of power.
4784 </p><p>
4785 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
4786 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
4787 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
4788 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210 years
4789 since they first struck its design.
4790 </p><p>
4791
4792 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes in
4793 technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a particular
4794 concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we started here:
4795 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1441"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.5. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4796 Vi kommer til å ende opp her:
4797 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1442"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.6. "Opphavsrett" i dag.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1442.png" alt='"Opphavsrett" i dag.'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4798
4799 La meg forklare hvordan.
4800
4801 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Loven: Varighet"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="lawduration"></a>Loven: Varighet</h3></div></div></div><p>
4802 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it faced
4803 the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that the English
4804 had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws protecting creative
4805 property, and some believed that these laws simply supplemented common law
4806 rights that already protected creative authorship.<sup>[<a name="id2783072" href="#ftn.id2783072" class="footnote">125</a>]</sup> This meant that there was no guaranteed public
4807 domain in the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
4808 common law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work published in
4809 the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
4810 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public domain
4811 to reprint and distribute works.
4812 </p><p>
4813 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
4814 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
4815 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.  Just
4816 as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the copyrights for
4817 all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any state copyrights
4818 expired as well.
4819 </p><p>
4820 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a federal
4821 copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If the author was
4822 alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could opt to renew the
4823 copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not renew the copyright, his
4824 work passed into the public domain.
4825 </p><p>
4826 Selv om det ble skapt mange verker i USA i de første 10 årene til
4827 republikken, så ble kun 5 prosent av verkene registrert under det føderale
4828 opphavsrettsregimet.  Av alle verker skapt i USA både før 1790 og fra 1790
4829 fram til 1800, så ble 95 prosent øyeblikkelig allemannseie (public
4830 domain). Resten ble allemannseie etter maksimalt 20 år, og som oftest etter
4831 14 år.<sup>[<a name="id2783132" href="#ftn.id2783132" class="footnote">126</a>]</sup>
4832 </p><p>
4833
4834 Dette fornyelsessystemet var en avgjørende del av det amerikanske systemet
4835 for opphavsrett.  Det sikret at maksimal vernetid i opphavsretten bare ble
4836 gitt til verker der det var ønsket. Etter den første perioden på fjorten år,
4837 hvis forfatteren ikke så verdien av å fornye sin opphavsrett, var det heller
4838 ikke verdt det for samfunnet å håndheve opphavsretten.
4839 </p><p>
4840 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
4841 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small minority of
4842 them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the balance allowed their
4843 work to pass into the public domain.<sup>[<a name="id2783190" href="#ftn.id2783190" class="footnote">127</a>]</sup>
4844 </p><p>
4845 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work has an
4846 actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall out of
4847 print after one year.<sup>[<a name="id2783201" href="#ftn.id2783201" class="footnote">128</a>]</sup> When that
4848 happens, the used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the
4849 books are no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
4850 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used books;
4851 that use&#8212;because it does not involve publication&#8212;is effectively
4852 free.
4853 </p><p>
4854 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
4855 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28 years to
4856 a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright from 14 years to
4857 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic, the term increased once
4858 again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal term of 14 years to 28 years,
4859 setting a maximum term of 56 years.
4860 </p><p>
4861 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
4862 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress has
4863 extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty years,
4864 Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the extensions
4865 of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.  In 1976,
4866 Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.  And in 1998,
4867 in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress extended the term
4868 of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
4869 </p><p>
4870
4871 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing of
4872 works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the public
4873 domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five years, or 70
4874 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years after the Sonny
4875 Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the public domain, zero
4876 copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue of the expiration of a
4877 copyright term.
4878 </p><p>
4879 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
4880 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the framers
4881 established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright owner to
4882 renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of renewal meant
4883 that works that no longer needed copyright protection would pass more
4884 quickly into the public domain. The works remaining under protection would
4885 be those that had some continuing commercial value.
4886 </p><p>
4887 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For all works
4888 created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&#8212;the maximum
4889 term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty years. For
4890 corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992, Congress
4891 abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created before 1978. All
4892 works still under copyright would be accorded the maximum term then
4893 available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term was ninety-five years.
4894 </p><p>
4895 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to assure
4896 that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public domain. And
4897 indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is even possible to
4898 put works into the public domain. The public domain is orphaned by these
4899 changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement that terms be "limited,"
4900 we have no evidence that anything will limit them.
4901 </p><p>
4902 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
4903 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to renew
4904 their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright in 1973 was
4905 just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal requirement, the
4906 average term of copyright is now the maximum term.  In thirty years, then,
4907 the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95 years.<sup>[<a name="id2783304" href="#ftn.id2783304" class="footnote">129</a>]</sup>
4908 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Loven: Virkeområde"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="lawscope"></a>Loven: Virkeområde</h3></div></div></div><p>
4909 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.  The
4910 scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those changes are not
4911 necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent of the changes if we're
4912 to keep this debate in context.
4913 </p><p>
4914 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps, charts,
4915 and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
4916 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave the
4917 author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That means
4918 someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the work without
4919 the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted by a copyright
4920 was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right did not extend to
4921 what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not, therefore, interfere
4922 with the right of someone other than the author to translate a copyrighted
4923 book, or to adapt the story to a different form (such as a drama based on a
4924 published book).
4925 </p><p>
4926 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright today
4927 are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the right covers
4928 practically any creative work that is reduced to a tangible form. It covers
4929 music as well as architecture, drama as well as computer programs. It gives
4930 the copyright owner of that creative work not only the exclusive right to
4931 "publish" the work, but also the exclusive right of control over any
4932 "copies" of that work. And most significant for our purposes here, the right
4933 gives the copyright owner control over not only his or her particular work,
4934 but also any "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In
4935 this way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
4936 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way on the
4937 initial creative work.
4938 </p><p>
4939
4940 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
4941 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
4942 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition to the
4943 renewal requirement, for most of the history of American copyright law,
4944 there was a requirement that a work be registered before it could receive
4945 the protection of a copyright. There was also a requirement that any
4946 copyrighted work be marked either with that famous © or the word
4947 copyright. And for most of the history of American copyright law, there was
4948 a requirement that works be deposited with the government before a copyright
4949 could be secured.
4950 </p><p>
4951 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible understanding
4952 that for most works, no copyright was required. Again, in the first ten
4953 years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible for copyright were never
4954 copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the norm: Most works apparently didn't
4955 need copyright, so registration narrowed the regulation of the law to the
4956 few that did. The same reasoning justified the requirement that a work be
4957 marked as copyrighted&#8212;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright
4958 was being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
4959 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
4960 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the original
4961 author.
4962 </p><p>
4963 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when we
4964 decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement that you
4965 register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is automatic; the
4966 copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with a ©; and the
4967 copyright exists whether or not you actually make a copy available for
4968 others to copy.
4969 </p><p>
4970 Vurder et praktisk eksempel for å forstå omfanget av disse forskjellene.
4971 </p><p>
4972 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who actually
4973 copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you against another
4974 publisher's taking your book and republishing it without your
4975 permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers so as to prevent
4976 that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were 174 publishers in the
4977 United States.<sup>[<a name="id2783426" href="#ftn.id2783426" class="footnote">130</a>]</sup> The Copyright Act was
4978 thus a tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative
4979 market in the United States&#8212;publishers.
4980 </p><p>
4981
4982
4983 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem by
4984 hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act was totally
4985 unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made a play based upon
4986 it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of those activities were
4987 regulated by the original copyright act. These creative activities remained
4988 free, while the activities of publishers were restrained.
4989 </p><p>
4990 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
4991 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail, every
4992 note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's reduced to a
4993 tangible form&#8212;all of this is automatically copyrighted.  There is no
4994 need to register or mark your work. The protection follows the creation, not
4995 the steps you take to protect it.
4996 </p><p>
4997 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of fair use
4998 exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they copy it to
4999 republish it or to share an excerpt.
5000 </p><p>
5001 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would control
5002 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of today
5003 that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative rights."
5004 If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your book without
5005 permission. No one can translate it without permission.  CliffsNotes can't
5006 make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All of these derivative
5007 uses of your original work are controlled by the copyright holder. The
5008 copyright, in other words, is now not just an exclusive right to your
5009 writings, but an exclusive right to your writings and a large proportion of
5010 the writings inspired by them.
5011 </p><p>
5012 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our framers,
5013 though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this expansion was
5014 created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower copyright.  If I write a
5015 book, can you change one word and then claim a copyright in a new and
5016 different book? Obviously that would make a joke of the copyright, so the
5017 law was properly expanded to include those slight modifications as well as
5018 the verbatim original work.
5019 </p><p>
5020
5021
5022 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within a free
5023 culture&#8212;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the law
5024 applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
5025 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone else's
5026 work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's work is a
5027 different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at all&#8212;they
5028 believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not protect
5029 derivative rights at all.<sup>[<a name="id2783509" href="#ftn.id2783509" class="footnote">131</a>]</sup> Whether or
5030 not you go that far, it seems plain that whatever wrong is involved is
5031 fundamentally different from the wrong of direct piracy.
5032 </p><p>
5033 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I can
5034 go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I can go to
5035 court and get an injunction against your transformative use of my
5036 book.<sup>[<a name="id2783548" href="#ftn.id2783548" class="footnote">132</a>]</sup> These two different uses of my
5037 creative work are treated the same.
5038 </p><p>
5039 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should you be
5040 able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from it without
5041 paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature called "Mickey
5042 Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to
5043 trade on the value that Disney originally created?
5044 </p><p>
5045 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
5046 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower: simply to
5047 make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the rights
5048 originally granted.
5049 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="lawreach"></a>Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</h3></div></div></div><p>
5050 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
5051 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users, and
5052 authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making copies,
5053 and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<sup>[<a name="id2783595" href="#ftn.id2783595" class="footnote">133</a>]</sup>
5054 </p><p>
5055
5056
5057 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright law to
5058 regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter,
5059 that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property,
5060 it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For while it may be
5061 obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies were the obvious
5062 trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be obvious that in the
5063 world with the Internet, copies should not be the trigger for copyright
5064 law. More precisely, they should not always be the trigger for copyright
5065 law.
5066 </p><p>
5067 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this very
5068 slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the Internet
5069 should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which the law of
5070 copyright automatically applies,<sup>[<a name="id2783644" href="#ftn.id2783644" class="footnote">134</a>]</sup>
5071 because it is clear that the current reach of copyright was never
5072 contemplated, much less chosen, by the legislators who enacted copyright
5073 law.
5074 </p><p>
5075 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely empty
5076 circle.
5077 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1521"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.7. Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1521.png" alt="Alle potensielle bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5078
5079
5080 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent all
5081 its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by copyright law,
5082 because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a book, that act is not
5083 regulated by copyright law. If you give someone the book, that act is not
5084 regulated by copyright law. If you resell a book, that act is not regulated
5085 (copyright law expressly states that after the first sale of a book, the
5086 copyright owner can impose no further conditions on the disposition of the
5087 book). If you sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your
5088 puppy chew it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because
5089 those acts do not make a copy.
5090 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1531"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.8. Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1531.png" alt="Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5091 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated by
5092 copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It is
5093 therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands at
5094 the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
5095 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
5096 diagram on next page).
5097 </p><p>
5098 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses that
5099 remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
5100 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1541"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.9. Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
5101 copyrighted work.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1541.png" alt="Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5102 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats as
5103 unregulated because public policy demands that they remain unregulated.  You
5104 are free to quote from this book, even in a review that is quite negative,
5105 without my permission, even though that quoting makes a copy. That copy
5106 would ordinarily give the copyright owner the exclusive right to say whether
5107 the copy is allowed or not, but the law denies the owner any exclusive right
5108 over such "fair uses" for public policy (and possibly First Amendment)
5109 reasons.
5110 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1542"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.10. Unregulated copying considered "fair uses."</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1542.png" alt='Unregulated copying considered "fair uses."'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p> </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1551"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.11. Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
5111 regulated.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1551.png" alt="Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5112
5113
5114 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
5115 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
5116 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
5117 </p><p>
5118 Enter the Internet&#8212;a distributed, digital network where every use of a
5119 copyrighted work produces a copy.<sup>[<a name="id2783602" href="#ftn.id2783602" class="footnote">135</a>]</sup> And
5120 because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a digital
5121 network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were
5122 presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated. No longer is
5123 there a set of presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom
5124 associated with a copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the
5125 copyright, because each use also makes a copy&#8212;category 1 gets sucked
5126 into category 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
5127 copyrighted work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
5128 burden of this shift.
5129 </p><p>
5130
5131 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
5132 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be no
5133 plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could make to
5134 control that use of her book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about
5135 whether you read the book once, ten times, or every night before you went to
5136 bed. None of those instances of use&#8212;reading&#8212; could be regulated
5137 by copyright law because none of those uses produced a copy.
5138 </p><p>
5139 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different set of
5140 rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book only once or
5141 only once a month, then copyright law would aid the copyright owner in
5142 exercising this degree of control, because of the accidental feature of
5143 copyright law that triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if
5144 you read the book ten times and the license says you may read it only five
5145 times, then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
5146 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the copyright
5147 owner's wish.
5148 </p><p>
5149 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim just now is
5150 not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim is only to make
5151 clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other points also become
5152 clear:
5153 </p><p>
5154 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker ever
5155 intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the presumptively
5156 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no evidence at all that
5157 policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed our policy here to
5158 shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of free culture before the
5159 Internet.
5160 </p><p>
5161 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of transformative
5162 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong in
5163 commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any transformation
5164 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and
5165 paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others
5166 exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification.  However
5167 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it is
5168 extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of creative
5169 work.
5170 </p><p>
5171
5172 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary burden
5173 on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.  If a
5174 copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read a book
5175 on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a violation of
5176 my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation about whether I
5177 have a fair use right to read, because before the Internet, reading did not
5178 trigger the application of copyright law and hence the need for a fair use
5179 defense. The right to read was effectively protected before because reading
5180 was not regulated.
5181 </p><p>
5182 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for free
5183 culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights depend upon fair
5184 use&#8212;never even addressing the earlier question about the expansion in
5185 effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in fair use makes sense
5186 when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But when everything becomes
5187 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not enough.
5188 </p><p>
5189 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was in the
5190 business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available to video
5191 stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
5192 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put the
5193 trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
5194 </p><p>
5195 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began to
5196 think about the Internet as another way to distribute these previews.  The
5197 idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by giving on-line
5198 stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can
5199 read a few pages of a book before you buy the book, so, too, you would be
5200 able to sample a bit from the movie on-line before you bought it.
5201 </p><p>
5202
5203 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors that it
5204 intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet (rather than
5205 sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two years later, Disney
5206 told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video Pipeline asked Disney to
5207 talk about the matter&#8212;he had built a business on distributing this
5208 content as a way to help sell Disney films; he had customers who depended
5209 upon his delivering this content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video
5210 Pipeline stopped the distribution immediately.  Video Pipeline thought it
5211 was within their "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So
5212 they filed a lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in
5213 fact their rights.
5214 </p><p>
5215 Disney countersued&#8212;for $100 million in damages. Those damages were
5216 predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully infringed" on
5217 Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of willful infringement, it
5218 can award damages not on the basis of the actual harm to the copyright
5219 owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the statute. Because Video
5220 Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of Disney movies to enable
5221 video stores to sell copies of those movies, Disney was now suing Video
5222 Pipeline for $100 million.
5223 </p><p>
5224 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
5225 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
5226 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim in
5227 court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
5228 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
5229 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
5230 Disney's permission.
5231 </p><p>
5232 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
5233 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
5234 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control how
5235 people got access to their content. Once a video was in the marketplace, the
5236 "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he wished,
5237 including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the entire
5238 movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to
5239 centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
5240 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
5241 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
5242 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
5243 </p><p>
5244
5245
5246 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for control
5247 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say you
5248 can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.  But
5249 the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble
5250 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.  Competition
5251 protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does
5252 not even question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger
5253 when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
5254 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you read
5255 a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But in a
5256 competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this happening
5257 are quite slight.
5258 </p><p>
5259 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
5260 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
5261 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
5262 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private owners
5263 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
5264 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
5265 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Arkitektur og lov: Makt"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="lawforce"></a>Arkitektur og lov: Makt</h3></div></div></div><p>
5266 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a second
5267 important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
5268 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
5269 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
5270 </p><p>
5271 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
5272 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.  The law,
5273 meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human, trained in the
5274 tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that tradition embraced,
5275 who said whether and how the law would restrict your freedom.
5276 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2784073"></a><p>
5277 Det er en berømt historie om en kamp mellom Marx-brødrene (the Marx
5278 Brothers) og Warner Brothers.  Marx-brødrene planla å lage en parodi av
5279 Casablanca. Warner Brothers protesterte.  De skrev et ufint brev til
5280 Marx-brødrene og advarte dem om at det ville få seriøse juridiske
5281 konsekvenser hvis de gikk videre med sin plan.<sup>[<a name="id2784092" href="#ftn.id2784092" class="footnote">136</a>]</sup>
5282 </p><p>
5283 Dette fikk Marx-brødrene til å svare tilbake med samme mynt.  De advarte
5284 Warner Brothers om at Marx-brødrene "var brødre lenge før dere var
5285 det".<sup>[<a name="id2784112" href="#ftn.id2784112" class="footnote">137</a>]</sup> Marx-brødrene eide derfor ordet
5286 Brothers, og hvis Warner Brothers insisterte på å forsøke å kontrollere
5287 Casablanca, så ville Marx-brødrene insistere på kontroll over Brothers.
5288 </p><p>
5289 Det var en absurd og hul trussel, selvfølgelig, fordi Warner Brothers, på
5290 samme måte som Marx-brødrene, visste at ingen domstol noensinne ville
5291 håndheve et slikt dumt krav. Denne ekstremismen var irrelevant for de ekte
5292 friheter som alle (inkludert Warner Brothers) nøt godt av.
5293 </p><p>
5294 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on the
5295 Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a machine:
5296 Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by the copyright
5297 owner, get built into the technology that delivers copyrighted content. It
5298 is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem with code regulations
5299 is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code would not get the humor of the
5300 Marx Brothers. The consequence of that is not at all funny.
5301 </p><p>
5302 La oss se på livet til min Adobe eBook Reader.
5303 </p><p>
5304 En ebok er en bok levert i elektronisk form.  En Adobe eBook er ikke en bok
5305 som Adobe har publisert.  Adobe produserer kun programvaren som utgivere
5306 bruker å levere e-bøker.  Den bidrar med teknologien, og utgiveren leverer
5307 innholdet ved hjelp av teknologien.
5308 </p><p>
5309 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook Reader.
5310 </p><p>
5311
5312 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this e-book
5313 library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the public domain:
5314 Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.  Some of them reproduce
5315 content that is not in the public domain: My own book The Future of Ideas is
5316 not yet within the public domain.  Consider Middlemarch first. If you click
5317 on my e-book copy of Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a
5318 button at the bottom called Permissions.
5319 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1611"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.12. Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1611.png" alt="Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5320 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the permissions
5321 that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
5322 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1612"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.13. List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1612.png" alt="List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5323
5324
5325 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the clipboard
5326 of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far, I've copied no
5327 text to the clipboard.)  I also have the permission to print ten pages from
5328 the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the permission to use the Read Aloud
5329 button to hear Middlemarch read aloud through the computer.
5330 </p><p>
5331 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
5332 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
5333 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1621"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.14. E-book of Aristotle;s "Politics"</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1621.png" alt='E-book of Aristotle;s "Politics"'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5334 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted at
5335 all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear the book.
5336 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1622"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.15. Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politics".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1622.png" alt='Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politics".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5337 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the original
5338 e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
5339 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1631"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.16. List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1631.png" alt='List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5340 Ingen kopiering, ingen utskrift, og våg ikke å prøve å lytte til denne
5341 boken!
5342 </p><p>
5343 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&#8212; as if
5344 the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.  For works
5345 under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have the power&#8212;up
5346 to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not under copyright, there
5347 is no such copyright power.<sup>[<a name="id2784311" href="#ftn.id2784311" class="footnote">138</a>]</sup> When my
5348 e-book of Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text
5349 selections into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that
5350 the eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book on
5351 my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
5352 </p><p>
5353 The control comes instead from the code&#8212;from the technology within
5354 which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are permissions,
5355 they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal with. When a
5356 teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she knows (unless
5357 she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but will suffer a
5358 punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the
5359 permission to make ten copies of the text into the computer's memory, that
5360 means that after I've made ten copies, the computer will not make any
5361 more. The same with the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook
5362 Reader will not print any more pages.  It's the same with the silly
5363 restriction that says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my
5364 book aloud&#8212;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
5365 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply won't
5366 read aloud.
5367 </p><p>
5368
5369
5370 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the Marx Brothers
5371 sold word processing software that, when you tried to type "Warner
5372 Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
5373 </p><p>
5374 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as copyright
5375 code. The controls over access to content will not be controls that are
5376 ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls
5377 that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
5378 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are built
5379 into the technology have no similar built-in check.
5380 </p><p>
5381 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the controls
5382 built into the technology? Software used to be sold with technologies that
5383 limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those were trivial
5384 protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these protections
5385 as well?
5386 </p><p>
5387 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe eBook
5388 Reader.
5389 </p><p>
5390 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
5391 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free on the
5392 Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.  This wonderful
5393 book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that
5394 book, you got the following report:
5395 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1641"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.17. List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1641.png" alt="List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in Wonderland&quot;."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5396
5397
5398 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to copy,
5399 not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the "permissions"
5400 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
5401 </p><p>
5402 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.  For the
5403 text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read Aloud button;
5404 it said you did not have the permission to read the book aloud. That led
5405 some people to think that Adobe was restricting the right of parents, for
5406 example, to read the book to their children, which seemed, to say the least,
5407 absurd.
5408 </p><p>
5409 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying to
5410 restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only restricting
5411 the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book read aloud. But
5412 the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would Adobe thus agree that a
5413 consumer was free to use software to hack around the restrictions built into
5414 the eBook Reader? If some company (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to
5415 disable the technological protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a
5416 blind person, say, could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe
5417 agree that such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer
5418 because the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
5419 </p><p>
5420 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most innovative
5421 companies developing strategies to balance open access to content with
5422 incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's technology enables
5423 control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this control.  That incentive
5424 is understandable, yet what it creates is often crazy.
5425 </p><p>
5426 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite story
5427 of mine that makes the same point.
5428 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxaibo"></a><p>
5429 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo learns tricks,
5430 cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity and that doesn't
5431 leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
5432 </p><p>
5433
5434 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world have set up
5435 clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web site to enable
5436 information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set up aibopet.com
5437 (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site), and on that site he
5438 provided information about how to teach an Aibo to do tricks in addition to
5439 the ones Sony had taught it.
5440 </p><p>
5441 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.  You
5442 teach a computer how to do something by programming it differently.  So to
5443 say that aibopet.com was giving information about how to teach the dog to do
5444 new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com was giving information to users
5445 of the Aibo pet about how to hack their computer "dog" to make it do new
5446 tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
5447 </p><p>
5448 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word hack has
5449 a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or
5450 weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or
5451 coders, as I call them, hack is a much more positive term. Hack just means
5452 code that enables the program to do something it wasn't originally intended
5453 or enabled to do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might
5454 find the old computer doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you
5455 discovered that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by
5456 someone who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
5457 you just bought.
5458 </p><p>
5459 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a community like
5460 to challenge themselves and others with increasingly difficult
5461 tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
5462 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
5463 ethically.
5464 </p><p>
5465 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program and
5466 offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to dance
5467 jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever bit of
5468 tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature than Sony had
5469 built.
5470 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2784533"></a><p>
5471
5472 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the United
5473 States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience, is it
5474 permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We forget that
5475 stories about the backcountry still flow across much of the world. So let's
5476 just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime anywhere (anymore) to
5477 dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog to dance jazz. Nor should it
5478 be a crime (though we don't have a lot to go on here) to teach your robot
5479 dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a completely legal activity. One imagines
5480 that the owner of aibopet.com thought, What possible problem could there be
5481 with teaching a robot dog to dance?
5482 </p><p>
5483 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&#8212; not
5484 literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic named Ed
5485 Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic is well known and
5486 respected. He was hired by the government in the Microsoft case to test
5487 Microsoft's claims about what could and could not be done with its own
5488 code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his brilliance and his
5489 coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft lawyers, Ed Felten stood his
5490 ground. He was not about to be bullied into being silent about something he
5491 knew very well.
5492 </p><p>
5493 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<sup>[<a name="id2784585" href="#ftn.id2784585" class="footnote">139</a>]</sup> He and a group of colleagues were working on a
5494 paper to be submitted at conference.  The paper was intended to describe the
5495 weakness in an encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
5496 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
5497 </p><p>
5498 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content owners to
5499 exercise much better control over their content than the Internet, as it
5500 originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI hoped to develop a
5501 standard that would allow the content owner to say "this music cannot be
5502 copied," and have a computer respect that command.  The technology was to be
5503 part of a "trusted system" of control that would get content owners to trust
5504 the system of the Internet much more.
5505 </p><p>
5506 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.  In
5507 exchange for providing contestants with the code to an SDMI-encrypted bit of
5508 content, contestants were to try to crack it and, if they did, report the
5509 problems to the consortium.
5510 </p><p>
5511
5512
5513 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and the
5514 team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption systems
5515 would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team thought it
5516 worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
5517 </p><p>
5518 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
5519 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not just
5520 because it is the law, but also because it is a really great idea. A
5521 strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to encourage a wide
5522 range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in turn, to improve the
5523 systems or people or ideas criticized.
5524 </p><p>
5525 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper describing
5526 the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free music, or
5527 building and deploying this technology. The paper was an academic essay,
5528 unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the weakness in the
5529 SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently constituted, succeed.
5530 </p><p>
5531 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they then
5532 received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the aibopet.com
5533 hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony wrote:
5534 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5535 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent AIBO-ware's
5536 copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the anti-circumvention
5537 provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
5538 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5539 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system of
5540 encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter from an
5541 RIAA lawyer that read:
5542 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5543
5544 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the Public
5545 Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by the
5546 Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions under the
5547 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
5548 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5549 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the spread
5550 of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made spreading such
5551 information an offense.
5552 </p><p>
5553 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear about
5554 cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively dead; the
5555 response was to find technologies that might compensate.  These new
5556 technologies would be copyright protection technologies&#8212; technologies
5557 to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted material. They
5558 were designed as code to modify the original code of the Internet, to
5559 reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
5560 </p><p>
5561 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this code
5562 designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say, legal code
5563 intended to buttress software code which itself was intended to support the
5564 legal code of copyright.
5565 </p><p>
5566 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to the
5567 extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did not end at
5568 the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated devices that were
5569 designed to circumvent copyright protection measures. It was designed to ban
5570 those devices, whether or not the use of the copyrighted material made
5571 possible by that circumvention would have been a copyright violation.
5572 </p><p>
5573
5574 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
5575 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to dance
5576 jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted material. But
5577 as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did not enable
5578 subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that aibopet.com's hack
5579 was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet fair use is not a defense
5580 to the DMCA. The question is not whether the use of the copyrighted material
5581 was a copyright violation. The question is whether a copyright protection
5582 system was circumvented.
5583 </p><p>
5584 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the same line
5585 of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a copyright protection
5586 system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer suggested, Felten himself was
5587 distributing a circumvention technology.  Thus, even though he was not
5588 himself infringing anyone's copyright, his academic paper was enabling
5589 others to infringe others' copyright.
5590 </p><p>
5591 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in 1981 by
5592 Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that the VCR could
5593 be banned because it was a copyright-infringing technology: It enabled
5594 consumers to copy films without the permission of the copyright owner. No
5595 doubt there were uses of the technology that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
5596 "Mr. Rogers," for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people
5597 to feel free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
5598 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5599 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
5600 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that it's
5601 a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show them
5602 at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all of this
5603 new technology that allows people to tape the "Neighborhood" off-the-air,
5604 and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood" because that's what I produce, that
5605 they then become much more active in the programming of their family's
5606 television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by
5607 others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always been "You are an
5608 important person just the way you are. You can make healthy decisions."
5609 Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a
5610 person to be more active in the control of his or her life, in a healthy
5611 way, is important.<sup>[<a name="id2784796" href="#ftn.id2784796" class="footnote">140</a>]</sup>
5612 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5613
5614
5615 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were some uses
5616 that were illegal, the court held the companies producing the VCR
5617 responsible.
5618 </p><p>
5619 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to the DMCA.
5620 </p><p>
5621 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
5622 </p><p>
5623 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright circumvention
5624 technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for different
5625 ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive pirating of
5626 copyrighted material&#8212;a bad end. Or they can be used to enable the use
5627 of particular copyrighted materials in ways that would be considered fair
5628 use&#8212;a good end.
5629 </p><p>
5630
5631 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most would agree
5632 such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target practice or to
5633 protect against an intruder. At least some would say that such a use would
5634 be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good and bad uses.
5635 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1711"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1711.png" alt="VCR/handgun cartoon."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5636 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world where guns
5637 are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and circumvention
5638 technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from copyright
5639 circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies absolutely,
5640 despite the potential that they might do some good, but permits guns,
5641 despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
5642 </p><p>
5643 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are changing the
5644 balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright owners restrict
5645 fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would attempt to evade the
5646 restrictions on fair use that they impose through code. Technology becomes a
5647 means by which fair use can be erased; the law of the DMCA backs up that
5648 erasing.
5649 </p><p>
5650 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology of copy
5651 and access protection become rules the violation of which is also a
5652 violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&#8212;increasing
5653 its regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would
5654 otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code
5655 becomes law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that
5656 copyright owners effect&#8212;at least for those copyright holders with the
5657 lawyers who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com
5658 received.
5659 </p><p>
5660 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and law
5661 that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is the ease
5662 with which infringements of the law can be detected. For contrary to the
5663 rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the Internet, no one
5664 knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing technologies deployed on
5665 the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who committed a legal wrong. The
5666 technologies of the Internet are open to snoops as well as sharers, and the
5667 snoops are increasingly good at tracking down the identity of those who
5668 violate the rules.
5669 </p><p>
5670
5671
5672 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You gathered
5673 every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan fiction about
5674 the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain Kirk. The characters
5675 would begin with a plot from a real story, then simply continue
5676 it.<sup>[<a name="id2784914" href="#ftn.id2784914" class="footnote">141</a>]</sup>
5677 </p><p>
5678 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated activity.
5679 No matter what happened inside your club room, you would never be interfered
5680 with by the copyright police. You were free in that space to do as you
5681 wished with this part of our culture. You were allowed to build on it as you
5682 wished without fear of legal control.
5683 </p><p>
5684 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
5685 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
5686 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would quickly find
5687 your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon the ownership of the
5688 series that you're depicting, could well inspire a lawyer's threat. And
5689 ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely costly indeed.  The law of
5690 copyright is extremely efficient. The penalties are severe, and the process
5691 is quick.
5692 </p><p>
5693 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change in the
5694 ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts the law's
5695 balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at which you
5696 traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just one step before
5697 the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you transmitted. That
5698 is, in effect, what is happening here.
5699 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Marked: Konsentrasjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="marketconcentration"></a>Marked: Konsentrasjon</h3></div></div></div><p>
5700
5701 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&#8212;tripled in the past
5702 thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as well&#8212;from
5703 regulating only publishers to now regulating just about everyone. And
5704 copyright's reach has changed, as every action becomes a copy and hence
5705 presumptively regulated. And as technologists find better ways to control
5706 the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly enforced through
5707 technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is easier to find and
5708 easier to control. This regulation of the creative process, which began as a
5709 tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the market for creative work, has
5710 become the single most important regulator of creativity there is. It is a
5711 massive expansion in the scope of the government's control over innovation
5712 and creativity; it would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth
5713 to copyright's control.
5714 </p><p>
5715 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it weren't
5716 for one more change that we must also consider. This is a change that is in
5717 some sense the most familiar, though its significance and scope are not well
5718 understood. It is the one that creates precisely the reason to be concerned
5719 about all the other changes I have described.
5720 </p><p>
5721 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.  In
5722 the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone a radical
5723 alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the media.  Before
5724 this change happened, the different forms of media were owned by separate
5725 media companies. Now, the media is increasingly owned by only a few
5726 companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC announced in June 2003,
5727 most expect that within a few years, we will live in a world where just
5728 three companies control more than percent of the media.
5729 </p><p>
5730 Det er her to sorter endringer: omfanget av konsentrasjon, og dens natur.
5731 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2785015"></a><p>
5732 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John McCain
5733 summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media ownership, "five
5734 companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<sup>[<a name="id2785026" href="#ftn.id2785026" class="footnote">142</a>]</sup> The five recording labels of Universal Music Group,
5735 BMG, Sony Music Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8
5736 percent of the U.S. music market.<sup>[<a name="id2785038" href="#ftn.id2785038" class="footnote">143</a>]</sup> The
5737 "five largest cable companies pipe programming to 74 percent of the cable
5738 subscribers nationwide."<sup>[<a name="id2785048" href="#ftn.id2785048" class="footnote">144</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2785056"></a>
5739 </p><p>
5740
5741 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation, the
5742 nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
5743 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200 stations.
5744 During that period of consolidation, the total number of radio owners
5745 dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two largest broadcasters
5746 control 74 percent of that market's revenues. Overall, just four companies
5747 control 90 percent of the nation's radio advertising revenues.
5748 </p><p>
5749 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well.  Today, there are
5750 six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than there were
5751 eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the nation's
5752 circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in the United
5753 States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all film revenue. The
5754 ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent of all cable
5755 revenue. This is a market far from the free press the framers sought to
5756 protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well protected&#8212; by the
5757 market.
5758 </p><p>
5759 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious change is in
5760 the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows put it in a recent
5761 article about Rupert Murdoch, <a class="indexterm" name="id2785085"></a>
5762 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5763 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system unmatched in its
5764 integration. They supply content&#8212;Fox movies . . .  Fox TV shows
5765 . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus newspapers and books. They sell
5766 the content to the public and to advertisers&#8212;in newspapers, on the
5767 broadcast network, on the cable channels. And they operate the physical
5768 distribution system through which the content reaches the
5769 customers. Murdoch's satellite systems now distribute News Corp. content in
5770 Europe and Asia; if Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that
5771 system will serve the same function in the United States.<sup>[<a name="id2785109" href="#ftn.id2785109" class="footnote">145</a>]</sup>
5772 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5773 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not just large
5774 companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies owning as many
5775 outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this pattern better than a
5776 thousand words could do:
5777 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1761"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1761.png" alt="Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5778
5779
5780 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or what is
5781 distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and distribute
5782 content?
5783 </p><p>
5784 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was nothing
5785 more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after reading and
5786 listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the contrary, I am
5787 beginning to change my mind.
5788 </p><p>
5789 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this integration
5790 may matter.
5791 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2785178"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2785184"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2785190"></a><p>
5792 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took the
5793 pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
5794 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the first. ABC
5795 was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.  We wanted less
5796 edgy, not more.
5797 </p><p>
5798 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS was happy to
5799 have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.  The copyrights that
5800 Lear held assured an independence from network control.<sup>[<a name="id2785211" href="#ftn.id2785211" class="footnote">146</a>]</sup>
5801 </p><p>
5802
5803
5804
5805 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade the
5806 networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law required a
5807 separation between the networks and the content producers; that separation
5808 would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992, because of these rules,
5809 the vast majority of prime time television&#8212;75 percent of it&#8212;was
5810 "independent" of the networks.
5811 </p><p>
5812 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.  After
5813 that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.  In 1985, there were
5814 twenty-five independent television production studios; in 2002, only five
5815 independent television studios remained. "In 1992, only 15 percent of new
5816 series were produced for a network by a company it controlled. Last year,
5817 the percentage of shows produced by controlled companies more than
5818 quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16 new series were produced
5819 independently of conglomerate control, last year there was one."<sup>[<a name="id2785240" href="#ftn.id2785240" class="footnote">147</a>]</sup> In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was
5820 owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and
5821 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week produced by network
5822 studios increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television
5823 hours per week produced by independent studios decreased 63%."<sup>[<a name="id2785282" href="#ftn.id2785282" class="footnote">148</a>]</sup>
5824 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2785290"></a><p>
5825 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would find that he
5826 had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be fired: The content
5827 of any show developed for a network is increasingly owned by the network.
5828 </p><p>
5829 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership of
5830 those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As Barry
5831 Diller said to Bill Moyers, <a class="indexterm" name="id2785308"></a>
5832 <a class="indexterm" name="id2785315"></a>
5833 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5834 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on their
5835 channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes through their
5836 controlled distribution system, then what you get is fewer and fewer actual
5837 voices participating in the process. [We u]sed to have dozens and dozens of
5838 thriving independent production companies producing television programs. Now
5839 you have less than a handful.<sup>[<a name="id2785333" href="#ftn.id2785333" class="footnote">149</a>]</sup>
5840 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5841 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such large
5842 and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.  Increasingly
5843 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from networks like
5844 this is increasingly tailored to the message the network wants to
5845 convey. This is not the communist party, though from the inside, it must
5846 feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question without risk of
5847 consequence&#8212;not necessarily banishment to Siberia, but punishment
5848 nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are quashed. This is not
5849 the environment for a democracy.
5850 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2785354"></a><p>
5851 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
5852 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
5853 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
5854 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.  The
5855 same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media companies
5856 would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<sup>[<a name="id2785382" href="#ftn.id2785382" class="footnote">150</a>]</sup> Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not,
5857 sprint. Yet if the field is only open to the giants, there will be far too
5858 little sprinting.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2785390"></a>
5859 </p><p>
5860 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media market to say
5861 with certainty what concentration and integration will do. The efficiencies
5862 are important, and the effect on culture is hard to measure.
5863 </p><p>
5864 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly suggest
5865 the concern.
5866 </p><p>
5867 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
5868 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
5869 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
5870 </p><p>
5871
5872 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to any
5873 position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound mistake. I
5874 am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once wrecked by
5875 drugs&#8212;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all quite legal. I
5876 believe this war is a profound mistake because the collateral damage from it
5877 is so great as to make waging the war insane.  When you add together the
5878 burdens on the criminal justice system, the desperation of generations of
5879 kids whose only real economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the
5880 queering of constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance
5881 this war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
5882 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the local
5883 drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal benefit in
5884 reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
5885 </p><p>
5886 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it is
5887 through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we depend
5888 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about these issues.
5889 </p><p>
5890 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched a
5891 media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced scores
5892 of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In one series
5893 (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing the idea of
5894 legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral damage from the
5895 war. One advances an argument in favor of drug legalization. The other
5896 responds in a powerful and effective way against the argument of the
5897 first. In the end, the first guy changes his mind (hey, it's
5898 television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on the pro-legalization
5899 campaign.
5900 </p><p>
5901 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
5902 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
5903 </p><p>
5904 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
5905 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
5906 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
5907 war. Can you do it?
5908 </p><p>
5909
5910 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
5911 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in the
5912 world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your message will be
5913 heard then?
5914 </p><p>
5915 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
5916 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
5917 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
5918 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First Amendment, but
5919 the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to choose what they
5920 run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media will refuse one side of a
5921 crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.  And the courts will
5922 defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<sup>[<a name="id2785504" href="#ftn.id2785504" class="footnote">151</a>]</sup>
5923 </p><p>
5924 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&#8212;if we lived in a
5925 media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media throws
5926 that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control access to the
5927 media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which political
5928 positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in an obvious
5929 and important way, concentration matters. You might like the positions the
5930 handful of companies selects. But you should not like a world in which a
5931 mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
5932 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Sammen"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="together"></a>Sammen</h3></div></div></div><p>
5933 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the copyright
5934 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In the abstract,
5935 it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No sane sort who is
5936 not an anarchist could disagree.
5937 </p><p>
5938
5939 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&#8212; when we
5940 recognize how it might now interact with both technology and markets to mean
5941 that the effective constraint on the liberty to cultivate our culture is
5942 dramatically different&#8212;the claim begins to seem less innocent and
5943 obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to supplement the law's control,
5944 and (2) the power of concentrated markets to weaken the opportunity for
5945 dissent, if strictly enforcing the massively expanded "property" rights
5946 granted by copyright fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture
5947 to cultivate and build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this
5948 property should be redefined.
5949 </p><p>
5950 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish copyright
5951 or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total mistake,
5952 disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within our culture
5953 today.
5954 </p><p>
5955 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
5956 notwithstanding.  And these massive shifts in the effective power of
5957 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
5958 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
5959 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether
5960 another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that increases
5961 copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
5962 adjustment to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
5963 regulation&#8212;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
5964 </p><p>
5965 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of constant
5966 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and geeks now
5967 flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a short period of
5968 time, as the technologies of distribution and creation have changed and as
5969 lobbyists have pushed for more control by copyright holders. Changes in the
5970 past in response to changes in technology suggest that we may well need
5971 similar changes in the future. And these changes have to be reductions in
5972 the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control
5973 that technology and the market enable.
5974 </p><p>
5975
5976 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that we
5977 see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add together
5978 the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and changing technology,
5979 together they produce an astonishing conclusion: Never in our history have
5980 fewer had a legal right to control more of the development of our culture
5981 than now.
5982 </p><p>
5983 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were perpetual, they
5984 affected only that precise creative work. Not when only publishers had the
5985 tools to publish, for the market then was much more diverse. Not when there
5986 were only three television networks, for even then, newspapers, film
5987 studios, radio stations, and publishers were independent of the
5988 networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against
5989 as broad a range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form
5990 of regulation&#8212;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy
5991 of a nation at the founding&#8212;is now a massive regulation of the overall
5992 creative process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn
5993 this historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
5994 culture that our free society has known.<sup>[<a name="id2785679" href="#ftn.id2785679" class="footnote">152</a>]</sup>
5995 </p><p>
5996 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
5997 </p><p>
5998 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
5999 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have distinguished
6000 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now combine these two
6001 distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes that copyright law has
6002 undergone.  In 1790, the law looked like this:
6003 </p><div class="table"><a name="t2"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 3.1. </b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Publiser</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6004
6005 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by copyright
6006 law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as copyright attached
6007 only with registration, and only those who intended to benefit commercially
6008 would register, copying through publishing of noncommercial work was also
6009 free.
6010 </p><p>
6011 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
6012 </p><div class="table"><a name="t3"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 3.2. </b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Publiser</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6013 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&#8212;if published,
6014 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time, means if offered
6015 commercially. But noncommercial publishing and transformation were still
6016 essentially free.
6017 </p><p>
6018 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after this
6019 change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the technology of
6020 copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law expanded.  Thus by 1975,
6021 as photocopying machines became more common, we could say the law began to
6022 look like this:
6023 </p><div class="table"><a name="t4"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 3.3. </b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Kopier</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">©/Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6024 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say, copy
6025 machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial market
6026 remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital technologies,
6027 especially in the context of a digital network, means that the law now looks
6028 like this:
6029 </p><div class="table"><a name="t5"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 3.4. </b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Kopier</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6030
6031 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most creativity was
6032 not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&#8212; commercial or
6033 not, transformative or not&#8212;with the same rules designed to regulate
6034 commercial publishers.
6035 </p><p>
6036 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation that does
6037 no good. So the question that we should be asking just now is whether
6038 extending the regulations of copyright law into each of these domains
6039 actually does any good.
6040 </p><p>
6041 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.  But I
6042 also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when regulating (as it
6043 regulates just now) noncommercial copying and, especially, noncommercial
6044 transformation. And increasingly, for the reasons sketched especially in
6045 chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder whether it does more harm than good
6046 for commercial transformation.  More commercial transformative work would be
6047 created if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
6048 </p><p>
6049 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of course
6050 copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any property, the
6051 state ought to protect it. But first impressions notwithstanding,
6052 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<sup>[<a name="id2786024" href="#ftn.id2786024" class="footnote">153</a>]</sup>)  has been crafted to balance the important need to
6053 give authors and artists incentives with the equally important need to
6054 assure access to creative work. This balance has always been struck in light
6055 of new technologies.  And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
6056 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a
6057 creative work. American culture was born free, and for almost 180 years our
6058 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
6059 </p><p>
6060
6061 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important limits on
6062 the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very birth of
6063 "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by granting
6064 copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story of chapter
6065 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar concern that is
6066 increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair use right
6067 become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding statutory rights
6068 where markets might stifle innovation is another familiar limit on the
6069 property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And granting archives and
6070 libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property notwithstanding, is
6071 a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free
6072 cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But the nature of the
6073 property that builds a free culture is very different from the extremist
6074 vision that dominates the debate today.
6075 </p><p>
6076 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In response
6077 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
6078 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing and
6079 distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed in a way
6080 that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property right that
6081 is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or was intended to
6082 be. The property right that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted
6083 toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened
6084 in a world in which creation requires permission and creativity must check
6085 with a lawyer.
6086 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779675" href="#id2779675" class="para">96</a>] </sup>
6087
6088
6089 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in The
6090 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery
6091 Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&#8211;34.
6092 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779718" href="#id2779718" class="para">97</a>] </sup>
6093
6094
6095 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
6096 intangible.  A property right is simply a right that an individual has
6097 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach
6098 to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to
6099 which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What
6100 Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45
6101 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
6102 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779784" href="#id2779784" class="para">98</a>] </sup>
6103
6104
6105 Jacob Tonson er vanligvis husket for sin omgang med 1700-tallets litterære
6106 storheter, spesielt John Dryden, og for hans kjekke"ferdige versjoner" av
6107 klassiske verk. I tillegg til Romeo og Julie, utga han en utrolig rekke
6108 liste av verk som ennå er hjertet av den engelske kanon, inkludert de
6109 samlede verk av Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, John Milton, og John Dryden. Se
6110 Keith Walker: "Jacob Tonson, Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992):
6111 424-31.
6112 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779806" href="#id2779806" class="para">99</a>] </sup>
6113
6114
6115 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
6116 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&#8211;52.
6117 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2779841" href="#id2779841" class="para">100</a>] </sup>
6118
6119 Som Siva Vaidhyanathan så pent argumenterer, er det feilaktige å kalle dette
6120 en "opphavsrettslov." Se Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
6121 <a class="indexterm" name="id2779850"></a>
6122 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780070" href="#id2780070" class="para">101</a>] </sup>
6123
6124
6125 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
6126 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
6127 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780145" href="#id2780145" class="para">102</a>] </sup>
6128
6129
6130 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending in the
6131 House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the Eighth Year of the
6132 Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
6133 Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
6134 Copies, during the Times therein mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici
6135 Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
6136 (No. 01-618).
6137 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780205" href="#id2780205" class="para">103</a>] </sup>
6138
6139 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt Law
6140 Review 40 (1987): 28. For en fantastisk overbevisende fortelling, se
6141 Vaidhyanathan, 37&#8211;48.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2779813"></a>
6142 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780230" href="#id2780230" class="para">104</a>] </sup>
6143
6144
6145 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
6146 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&#8211;69.
6147 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780249" href="#id2780249" class="para">105</a>] </sup>
6148
6149
6150 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993),
6151 92.
6152 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780266" href="#id2780266" class="para">106</a>] </sup>
6153
6154
6155 Ibid., 93.
6156 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780291" href="#id2780291" class="para">107</a>] </sup>
6157
6158
6159 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
6160 Borwell).
6161 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780329" href="#id2780329" class="para">108</a>] </sup>
6162
6163
6164 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
6165 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29 (1983):
6166 1152.
6167 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780421" href="#id2780421" class="para">109</a>] </sup>
6168
6169
6170 Ibid., 1156.
6171 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780546" href="#id2780546" class="para">110</a>] </sup>
6172
6173
6174 Rose, 97.
6175 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780574" href="#id2780574" class="para">111</a>] </sup>
6176
6177
6178 Ibid.
6179 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2780796" href="#id2780796" class="para">112</a>] </sup>
6180
6181
6182 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers
6183 don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with
6184 William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred "
6185 (draft on file with author), University of Chicago Law School, 5 August
6186 2003.
6187 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2781039" href="#id2781039" class="para">113</a>] </sup>
6188
6189 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
6190 publicity&#8212;rights an artist has to control the commercial exploitation
6191 of his image.  But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix, Burn" creativity, as
6192 this chapter evinces.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2780968"></a>
6193 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2781184" href="#id2781184" class="para">114</a>] </sup>
6194
6195
6196 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven Steps to
6197 Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #22</a>.
6198 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2781548" href="#id2781548" class="para">115</a>] </sup>
6199
6200
6201 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White House
6202 changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press release
6203 stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later changed,
6204 without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." E-mail from
6205 Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
6206 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2781610" href="#id2781610" class="para">116</a>] </sup>
6207
6208
6209 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
6210 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&#8211;3 (1980): 5;
6211 Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the
6212 United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
6213 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2781812" href="#id2781812" class="para">117</a>] </sup>
6214
6215
6216 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord, Bar
6217 Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune, 5
6218 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927 and 1946,
6219 only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The First Sale
6220 Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law Review 44
6221 (2003): 593 n. 51.
6222 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2782055" href="#id2782055" class="para">118</a>] </sup>
6223
6224
6225 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.  4794,
6226 H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcommittee on
6227 Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee
6228 on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd
6229 sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
6230 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2782100" href="#id2782100" class="para">119</a>] </sup>
6231
6232
6233 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
6234 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
6235 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
6236 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
6237 ordinary meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
6238 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
6239 26&#8211;27.
6240 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2782394" href="#id2782394" class="para">120</a>] </sup>
6241
6242
6243 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6244 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6245 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right
6246 self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the other three is
6247 more timidly expressed.  See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of
6248 Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&#8211;95; Lawrence Lessig, "The
6249 New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
6250 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2782452" href="#id2782452" class="para">121</a>] </sup>
6251
6252 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6253 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6254 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6255 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6256 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6257 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss
6258 of freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries
6259 of ordinary life.  I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view,
6260 which depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6261 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of
6262 liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of political
6263 thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of what the government
6264 did when.  John Stuart Mill defended freedom of speech, for example, from
6265 the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of government prosecution;
6266 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.
6267 John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of labor from
6268 constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in
6269 Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds., John R.  Commons: Selected
6270 Essays (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act
6271 increases the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6272 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those places
6273 easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000).  Each of these
6274 interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty of a
6275 particular group. The effect of those interventions should be accounted for
6276 in order to understand the effective liberty that each of these groups might
6277 face.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2782518"></a>
6278 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2782681" href="#id2782681" class="para">122</a>] </sup>
6279
6280
6281 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6282 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #23</a>. For a more recent
6283 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6284 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6 October 2003, available at
6285 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #24</a>.
6286 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2782726" href="#id2782726" class="para">123</a>] </sup>
6287
6288
6289 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&#8211;71.
6290 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2782885" href="#id2782885" class="para">124</a>] </sup>
6291
6292
6293 Se, for eksempel, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6294 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6295 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783072" href="#id2783072" class="para">125</a>] </sup>
6296
6297 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6298 United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6299 485&#8211;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of
6300 the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some
6301 to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2782735"></a>
6302 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783132" href="#id2783132" class="para">126</a>] </sup>
6303
6304
6305 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790 to
6306 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A History of
6307 Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation of an Industry,
6308 1630&#8211;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000 imprints
6309 recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the 1790 act;
6310 William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension and the Copyright
6311 Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&#8211;10 (2002), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #25</a>.  Thus, the
6312 overwhelming majority of works fell immediately into the public domain. Even
6313 those works that were copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly,
6314 because the term of copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was
6315 fourteen years, with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen
6316 years. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783190" href="#id2783190" class="para">127</a>] </sup>
6317
6318
6319 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For instance, of
6320 the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were renewed in 1910. For
6321 a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
6322 "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright," Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New
6323 York: Practicing Law Institute, 1963), 618. For a more recent and
6324 comprehensive analysis, see William M. Landes and Richard A.  Posner,
6325 "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review 70
6326 (2003): 471, 498&#8211;501, and accompanying figures.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783201" href="#id2783201" class="para">128</a>] </sup>
6327
6328
6329 Se Ringer, kap. 9, n. 2.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783304" href="#id2783304" class="para">129</a>] </sup>
6330
6331
6332 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the first
6333 year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never more than
6334 thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and Posner,
6335 "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6336 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783426" href="#id2783426" class="para">130</a>] </sup>
6337
6338
6339 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of
6340 American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of International Law
6341 and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal Copyright Records,
6342 1790&#8211;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6343 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783509" href="#id2783509" class="para">131</a>] </sup>
6344
6345 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, juli/august 2003,
6346 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
6347 #26</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2783529"></a>
6348 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783548" href="#id2783548" class="para">132</a>] </sup>
6349
6350
6351 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument about
6352 the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective of the
6353 First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See Jed
6354 Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality," Yale
6355 Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&#8211;60 (see especially pp. 53&#8211;59).
6356 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783595" href="#id2783595" class="para">133</a>] </sup>
6357
6358
6359 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6360 regulates more than "copies"&#8212;a public performance of a copyrighted
6361 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't make
6362 a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly sometimes
6363 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But the
6364 presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17 United
6365 States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6366 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783644" href="#id2783644" class="para">134</a>] </sup>
6367
6368
6369 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends, we
6370 should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for its
6371 extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the basis of
6372 arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6373 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2783602" href="#id2783602" class="para">135</a>] </sup>
6374
6375
6376 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather
6377 that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not
6378 make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be
6379 designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies
6380 remain.
6381 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2784092" href="#id2784092" class="para">136</a>] </sup>
6382
6383
6384 Se David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and Contemporary
6385 Problems 44 (1981): 172&#8211;73.
6386 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2784112" href="#id2784112" class="para">137</a>] </sup>
6387
6388 Ibid. Se også Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&#8211;3.
6389 <a class="indexterm" name="id2784101"></a>
6390 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2784311" href="#id2784311" class="para">138</a>] </sup>
6391
6392
6393 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
6394 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
6395 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
6396 obligation (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
6397 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would not
6398 necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
6399 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2784585" href="#id2784585" class="para">139</a>] </sup>
6400
6401 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science," Science
6402 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles the Techies
6403 Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect, January 2002; "Court
6404 Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to DMCA," Intellectual Property
6405 Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill Holland, "Copyright Act Raising
6406 Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard, May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA
6407 Running Scared?" Salon.com, April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation,
6408 "Frequently Asked Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case,"
6409 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #27</a>.
6410 <a class="indexterm" name="id2784603"></a>
6411 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2784796" href="#id2784796" class="para">140</a>] </sup>
6412
6413
6414 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
6415 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See James
6416 Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of the VCR
6417 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&#8211;71.
6418 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2784914" href="#id2784914" class="para">141</a>] </sup>
6419
6420
6421 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
6422 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
6423 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
6424 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785026" href="#id2785026" class="para">142</a>] </sup>
6425
6426
6427 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
6428 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)  (statement
6429 of Senator John McCain).  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785038" href="#id2785038" class="para">143</a>] </sup>
6430
6431
6432 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to Slide,"
6433 New York Times, 23 December 2002.
6434 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785048" href="#id2785048" class="para">144</a>] </sup>
6435
6436
6437 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette, 31
6438 May 2003.
6439 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785109" href="#id2785109" class="para">145</a>] </sup>
6440
6441 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (september 2003): 89.
6442 <a class="indexterm" name="id2785123"></a>
6443 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785211" href="#id2785211" class="para">146</a>] </sup>
6444
6445
6446 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center Forum,
6447 "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis, Missouri, 3 April
6448 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #28</a>; for the Lear story,
6449 not included in the prepared remarks, see <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #29</a>).
6450 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785240" href="#id2785240" class="para">147</a>] </sup>
6451
6452
6453 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
6454 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
6455 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union and
6456 the Consumer Federation of America), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #30</a>. Kimmelman quotes
6457 Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West, in her Remarks
6458 at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February 2003.
6459 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785282" href="#id2785282" class="para">148</a>] </sup>
6460
6461
6462 Ibid.
6463 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785333" href="#id2785333" class="para">149</a>] </sup>
6464
6465
6466 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
6467 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #31</a>.
6468 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785382" href="#id2785382" class="para">150</a>] </sup>
6469
6470
6471 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary National
6472 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard Business
6473 School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was first
6474 suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design
6475 Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy
6476 14 (1985): 235&#8211;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and
6477 Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
6478 Underperform the Market&#8212;and How to Successfully Transform Them (New
6479 York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785504" href="#id2785504" class="para">151</a>] </sup>
6480
6481 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
6482 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
6483 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
6484 policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
6485 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
6486 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and returned
6487 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.  These
6488 restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for example,
6489 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection
6490 from TV Networks," New York Times, 13 March 2003, C4.  Outside of
6491 election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the courts
6492 are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview, see
6493 Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on
6494 Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&#8211;79,
6495 and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
6496 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
6497 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as the
6498 networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco transit
6499 authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
6500 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects Ad,"
6501 SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #32</a>. The ground was that
6502 the criticism was "too controversial." <a class="indexterm" name="id2785513"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2785522"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2785555"></a>
6503 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2785679" href="#id2785679" class="para">152</a>] </sup>
6504
6505 Siva Vaidhyanathan fanger et lignende poeng i hans "fire kapitulasjoner" for
6506 opphavsrettsloven i den digitale tidsalder. Se Vaidhyanathan, 159&#8211;60.
6507 <a class="indexterm" name="id2785524"></a>
6508 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2786024" href="#id2786024" class="para">153</a>] </sup>
6509
6510
6511 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist movement
6512 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance public
6513 and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of Property,"
6514 in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.  Chapman, eds. (New
6515 York: New York University Press, 1980).
6516 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 4. Nøtter"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-puzzles"></a>Kapittel 4. Nøtter</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><p></p><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel elleve: Chimera"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="chimera"></a>Kapittel elleve: Chimera</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxchimera"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxwells"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxtcotb"></a><p>
6517 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez
6518 trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in
6519 the Peruvian Andes.<sup>[<a name="id2786150" href="#ftn.id2786150" class="footnote">154</a>]</sup> The valley is
6520 extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate,
6521 slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent
6522 fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an
6523 opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed
6524 Man is King." So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a
6525 king.
6526 </p><p>
6527 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of sight
6528 to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are "blind."
6529 They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.  Indeed, as they
6530 increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound of grass being
6531 stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control him. He, in turn,
6532 becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't understand,' he cried, in a
6533 voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and which broke. `You are
6534 blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
6535 </p><p>
6536
6537
6538 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
6539 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his affection,
6540 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in the whole of
6541 creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's description of what he
6542 sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies, and she listened to his
6543 description of the stars and the mountains and her own sweet white-lit
6544 beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells
6545 tells us, and "she could only half understand, but she was mysteriously
6546 delighted."
6547 </p><p>
6548 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted" love,
6549 the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her father instructs,
6550 "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything right." They take
6551 Nunez to the village doctor.
6552 </p><p>
6553 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain is
6554 affected," he reports.
6555 </p><p>
6556 "What affects it?" the father asks.  "Those queer things that are called the
6557 eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect his brain."
6558 </p><p>
6559 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty that in
6560 order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple and easy
6561 surgical operation&#8212;namely, to remove these irritant bodies [the
6562 eyes]."
6563 </p><p>
6564
6565 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform Nunez
6566 of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.  (You'll have
6567 to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I believe in free
6568 culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)  It sometimes happens
6569 that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
6570 "chimera." A chimera is a single creature with two sets of DNA. The DNA in
6571 the blood, for example, might be different from the DNA of the skin. This
6572 possibility is an underused plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows
6573 with 100 percent certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at
6574 the scene. . . ."
6575 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2786238"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2786246"></a><p>
6576 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were impossible.  A
6577 single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of DNA is that it is
6578 the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two individuals have
6579 the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person can have two different
6580 sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of a "person" should reflect this
6581 reality.
6582 </p><p>
6583 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
6584 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not unfairly
6585 enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing with a
6586 chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is p2p file
6587 sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.  One side
6588 says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
6589 records&#8212;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
6590 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
6591 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just send
6592 the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant respects,
6593 just like what every executive in every recording company no doubt did as a
6594 kid: sharing music.
6595 </p><p>
6596 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is on a
6597 p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then sure, my
6598 friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of "friends" beyond
6599 recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can get access. Whether or
6600 not sharing my music with my best friend is what "we have always been
6601 allowed to do," we have not always been allowed to share music with "our ten
6602 thousand best friends."
6603 </p><p>
6604 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking into
6605 a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out with it,"
6606 that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally) releases a
6607 new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free copy to
6608 take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2786272"></a>
6609 </p><p>
6610
6611
6612
6613 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD from
6614 Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a CD from
6615 Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and something to show on
6616 my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note that when I take a
6617 CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that might be imposed on me, under
6618 California law, at least, is $1,000.  According to the RIAA, by contrast, if
6619 I download a ten-song CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
6620 </p><p>
6621 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that it
6622 is both&#8212;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It is
6623 a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side asserts, we
6624 need to begin to think about how we should respond to this chimera. What
6625 rules should govern it?
6626 </p><p>
6627 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We could,
6628 with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a felony. We
6629 could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages just because
6630 file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get universities to
6631 monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no computer is used to commit
6632 this crime. These responses might be extreme, but each of them has either
6633 been proposed or actually implemented.<sup>[<a name="id2786341" href="#ftn.id2786341" class="footnote">155</a>]</sup>
6634
6635 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2786405"></a><p>
6636 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act as
6637 though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be no
6638 copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making copyrighted
6639 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip: regulated, if
6640 at all, by social norms but not by law.
6641 </p><p>
6642 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.  Rather than
6643 embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace something that
6644 recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book with a sketch of a
6645 system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter is to show just how
6646 awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
6647 either extreme would be worse than a reasonable alternative.  But I believe
6648 the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
6649 </p><p>
6650
6651
6652
6653 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the middle of
6654 the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land grab is
6655 occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give content holders
6656 a kind of control over our culture that they have never had before. And in
6657 this extremism, many an opportunity for new innovation and new creativity
6658 will be lost.
6659 </p><p>
6660 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My focus
6661 instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war will also
6662 kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so broadly among our
6663 citizens, and we have just begun to see the innovation that this power will
6664 unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the passing of one cycle of
6665 innovation around technologies to distribute content. The law is responsible
6666 for this passing. As the vice president for global public policy at one of
6667 these new innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
6668 protection for copyrighted material,
6669 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
6670 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted material,
6671 and we want to protect those rights.
6672 </p><p>
6673 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the major
6674 labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright interests, nor is it
6675 necessarily the best. It is simply too early to answer that question. Market
6676 forces operating naturally may very well produce a totally different
6677 industry model.
6678 </p><p>
6679 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make with
6680 respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the market for
6681 digital media and the manner in which digital media are distributed. This in
6682 turn will directly influence the options that are available to consumers,
6683 both in terms of the ease with which they will be able to access digital
6684 media and the equipment that they will require to do so. Poor choices made
6685 this early in the game will retard the growth of this market, hurting
6686 everyone's interests.<sup>[<a name="id2786487" href="#ftn.id2786487" class="footnote">156</a>]</sup>
6687 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6688 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal, one of "the
6689 major labels." Its position on these matters has now changed.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2786510"></a>
6690 </p><p>
6691 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash piracy. It
6692 will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will kill
6693 opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
6694 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel tolv: Skader"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="harms"></a>Kapittel tolv: Skader</h2></div></div></div><p>
6695
6696 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has launched
6697 a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
6698 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both direct
6699 and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these damages will be
6700 suffered most by our own people.
6701 </p><p>
6702 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
6703 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to extend
6704 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war justified?
6705 </p><p>
6706 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the first
6707 time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the power of
6708 the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in our
6709 history.
6710 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2786558"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2786564"></a><p>
6711 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on the
6712 side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims of control
6713 in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical rejection of "piracy"
6714 still has play.
6715 </p><p>
6716
6717
6718 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to describe
6719 just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite confident
6720 the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The first two
6721 protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in the wings to fight
6722 today's monopolists of culture.
6723 </p><div class="sect2" title="Constraining Creators"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="constrain"></a>Constraining Creators</h3></div></div></div><p>
6724 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital technologies.
6725 These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture and share
6726 content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what humans have done
6727 since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and communicate. But capturing and
6728 sharing through digital technology is different. The fidelity and power are
6729 different. You could send an e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on
6730 Comedy Central, or you could send the clip. You could write an essay about
6731 the inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
6732 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
6733 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could weave
6734 together a string&#8212;a mash-up&#8212; of songs from your favorite artists
6735 in a collage and make it available on the Net.
6736 </p><p>
6737 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
6738 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture, and in
6739 part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but it explodes
6740 the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology of digital
6741 "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily diverse
6742 creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that creativity is
6743 applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of citizens to use
6744 technology to express and criticize and contribute to the culture all
6745 around.
6746 </p><p>
6747
6748 Teknologien har dermed gitt oss en mulighet til å gjøre noe med kultur som
6749 bare har vært mulig for enkeltpersoner i små grupper, isolert fra andre
6750 grupper. Forestill deg en gammel mann som forteller en historie til en
6751 samling med naboer i en liten landsby.  Forestill deg så den samme
6752 historiefortellingen utvidet til å nå over hele verden.
6753 </p><p>
6754 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In the
6755 current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for a
6756 moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web sites that
6757 offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites that catalog
6758 cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound to criticize
6759 politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles on remote
6760 topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative work spread
6761 across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this work is
6762 presumptively illegal.
6763 </p><p>
6764 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the examples of
6765 extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to proliferate. It is
6766 impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed and what's not, and at the
6767 same time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly harsh.  The
6768 four students who were threatened by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3
6769 was just one) were threatened with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search
6770 engines that permitted songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&#8212;which
6771 defrauded investors of $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in
6772 market capitalization of over $200 billion&#8212;received a fine of a mere
6773 $750 million.<sup>[<a name="id2786668" href="#ftn.id2786668" class="footnote">157</a>]</sup> And under legislation
6774 being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who negligently removes the
6775 wrong leg in an operation would be liable for no more than $250,000 in
6776 damages for pain and suffering.<sup>[<a name="id2786705" href="#ftn.id2786705" class="footnote">158</a>]</sup> Can
6777 common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where the maximum fine for
6778 downloading two songs off the Internet is more than the fine for a doctor's
6779 negligently butchering a patient? <a class="indexterm" name="id2786742"></a>
6780 </p><p>
6781 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely high
6782 penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either never
6783 be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this creative
6784 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys "pirates." We
6785 make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public domain, because the
6786 boundaries of the public domain are designed to be unclear. It never pays to
6787 do anything except pay for the right to create, and hence only those who can
6788 pay are allowed to create. As was the case in the Soviet Union, though for
6789 very different reasons, we will begin to see a world of underground
6790 art&#8212;not because the message is necessarily political, or because the
6791 subject is controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is
6792 legally fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
6793 States.<sup>[<a name="id2786325" href="#ftn.id2786325" class="footnote">159</a>]</sup> In what does their "illegality"
6794 consist? In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that
6795 is critical or reflective.
6796 </p><p>
6797 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the changing
6798 law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an even bigger
6799 part has to do with the increasing ease with which infractions can be
6800 tracked. As users of file-sharing systems discovered in 2002, it is a
6801 trivial matter for copyright owners to get courts to order Internet service
6802 providers to reveal who has what content. It is as if your cassette tape
6803 player transmitted a list of the songs that you played in the privacy of
6804 your own home that anyone could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
6805 </p><p>
6806 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether his painting
6807 infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day painter, using the
6808 tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web, must worry all the
6809 time. Images are all around, but the only safe images to use in the act of
6810 creation are those purchased from Corbis or another image farm. And in
6811 purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free market in pencils; we needn't
6812 worry about its effect on creativity. But there is a highly regulated,
6813 monopolized market in cultural icons; the right to cultivate and transform
6814 them is not similarly free.
6815 </p><p>
6816 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I described
6817 in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else,
6818 I have been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
6819 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a use.
6820 </p><p>
6821
6822
6823
6824 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend
6825 your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system for
6826 defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&#8212;in practically
6827 every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers too
6828 slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the justice
6829 underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich.
6830 For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides itself
6831 on the rule of law.
6832 </p><p>
6833 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
6834 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law should
6835 allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system has become
6836 that anyone actually believes this. The rules that publishers impose upon
6837 writers, the rules that film distributors impose upon filmmakers, the rules
6838 that newspapers impose upon journalists&#8212; these are the real laws
6839 governing creativity. And these rules have little relationship to the "law"
6840 with which judges comfort themselves.
6841 </p><p>
6842 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful infringement of
6843 a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of dollars to even defend
6844 against a copyright infringement claim, and which would never return to the
6845 wrongfully accused defendant anything of the costs she suffered to defend
6846 her right to speak&#8212;in that world, the astonishingly broad regulations
6847 that pass under the name "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in
6848 that world, it takes a studied blindness for people to continue to believe
6849 they live in a culture that is free.
6850 </p><p>
6851 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
6852 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
6853
6854 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people are
6855 being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
6856 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still won't
6857 get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not going to get
6858 it distributed in the mainstream media unless you've got a little note from
6859 a lawyer saying, "This has been cleared." You're not even going to get it on
6860 PBS without that kind of permission. That's the point at which they control
6861 it.
6862 </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="sect2" title="Constraining Innovators"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="innovators"></a>Constraining Innovators</h3></div></div></div><p>
6863 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty story&#8212;creativity
6864 quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada yada. Maybe that doesn't get you
6865 going. Maybe you think there's enough weird art out there, and enough
6866 expression that is critical of what seems to be just about everything.  And
6867 if you think that, you might think there's little in this story to worry
6868 you.
6869 </p><p>
6870 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.  Indeed,
6871 it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme promarket
6872 ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special one at that, 188
6873 pages into a book like this), then you can see this other aspect by
6874 substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of "free culture." The
6875 point is the same, even if the interests affecting culture are more
6876 fundamental.
6877 </p><p>
6878 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the same
6879 charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of course,
6880 concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&#8212;at a minimum, we
6881 need rules of property and contract, and courts to enforce both. Likewise,
6882 in this culture debate, everyone concedes that at least some framework of
6883 copyright is also required. But both perspectives vehemently insist that
6884 just because some regulation is good, it doesn't follow that more regulation
6885 is better. And both perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which
6886 regulation simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect
6887 themselves against the competitors of tomorrow.
6888 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2786921"></a><p>
6889
6890 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory strategy
6891 that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this massive threat of
6892 liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is that innovators
6893 who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate only if they have the
6894 sign-off from last generation's dominant industries.  That lesson has been
6895 taught through a series of cases that were designed and executed to teach
6896 venture capitalists a lesson. That lesson&#8212;what former Napster CEO Hank
6897 Barry calls a "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&#8212;has been
6898 learned.
6899 </p><p>
6900 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning I told in
6901 The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that even I (pessimist
6902 extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
6903 </p><p>
6904 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com.  MP3.com was
6905 keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to facilitate new
6906 ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to facilitate new ways to
6907 create content. Unlike the major labels, MP3.com offered creators a venue to
6908 distribute their creativity, without demanding an exclusive engagement from
6909 the creators.
6910 </p><p>
6911 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
6912 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
6913 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
6914 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie Raitt. And
6915 so on.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2786980"></a>
6916 </p><p>
6917 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
6918 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this preference
6919 data. In January 2000, the company launched a service called
6920 my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would sign into an
6921 account and then insert into her computer a CD. The software would identify
6922 the CD, and then give the user access to that content.  So, for example, if
6923 you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then wherever you were&#8212;at work or at
6924 home&#8212;you could get access to that music once you signed into your
6925 account. The system was therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
6926 </p><p>
6927
6928 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But that
6929 opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the my.mp3.com
6930 service was to give users access to their own content, and as a by-product,
6931 by seeing the content they already owned, to discover the kind of content
6932 the users liked.
6933 </p><p>
6934 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000 CDs to
6935 a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who uploaded the music,
6936 but that would have taken a great deal of time, and would have produced a
6937 product of questionable quality.) It therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a
6938 store, and started the process of making copies of those CDs. Again, it
6939 would not serve the content from those copies to anyone except those who
6940 authenticated that they had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while
6941 this was 50,000 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers
6942 something they had already bought.
6943 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxvivendiuniversal"></a><p>
6944 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels, headed
6945 by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled with four of
6946 the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found MP3.com to have been
6947 guilty of willful infringement with respect to the fifth. Applying the law
6948 as it is, the judge imposed a fine against MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com
6949 then settled with the remaining plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over
6950 $54 million. Vivendi purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
6951 </p><p>
6952 Den delen av historien har jeg fortalt før.  Nå kommer konklusjonen.
6953 </p><p>
6954 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
6955 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they had a
6956 good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be considered
6957 legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it should have been
6958 obvious that the courts would find this behavior illegal; therefore, this
6959 lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had dared to suggest that the law
6960 was less restrictive than the labels demanded.
6961 </p><p>
6962
6963 Den åpenbare hensikten med dette søksmålet (som ble avsluttet med et forlik
6964 for et uspesifisert beløp like etter at saken ikke lenger fikk
6965 pressedekning), var å sende en melding som ikke kan misforstås til advokater
6966 som gir råd til klienter på dette området: Det er ikke bare dine klienter
6967 som får lide hvis innholdsindustrien retter sine våpen mot dem.  Det får
6968 også du.  Så de av dere som tror loven burde være mindre restriktiv bør
6969 innse at et slikt syn på loven vil koste deg og ditt firma dyrt.
6970 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2787084"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2787092"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2787099"></a><p>
6971 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003, Universal
6972 and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the venture capital firm
6973 (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of its development, its
6974 cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner (Hank Barry).<sup>[<a name="id2787112" href="#ftn.id2787112" class="footnote">160</a>]</sup> The claim here, as well, was that the VC should
6975 have recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
6976 industry should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
6977 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim
6978 of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
6979 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at risk
6980 not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.  Your investment
6981 buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.  So extreme has the
6982 environment become that even car manufacturers are afraid of technologies
6983 that touch content. In an article in Business 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes
6984 a discussion with BMW:
6985 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><a class="indexterm" name="id2787146"></a><p>
6986 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in the car,
6987 there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW engineers in Germany
6988 had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via the car's built-in sound system,
6989 but that the company's marketing and legal departments weren't comfortable
6990 with pushing this forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are
6991 sold in the United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <sup>[<a name="id2787161" href="#ftn.id2787161" class="footnote">161</a>]</sup>
6992 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6993 Dette er verden til mafiaen&#8212;fylt med "penger eller livet"-trusler, som
6994 ikke er regulert av domstolene men av trusler som loven gir
6995 rettighetsinnehaver mulighet til å komme med. Det er et system som åpenbart
6996 og nødvendigvis vil kvele ny innovasjon. Det er vanskelig nok å starte et
6997 selskap. Det blir helt umulig hvis selskapet er stadig truet av søksmål.
6998 </p><p>
6999
7000
7001
7002 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
7003 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
7004 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
7005 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and by
7006 embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law imposes, that
7007 uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more conservative than is
7008 right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking tickets, we'd not
7009 only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much less driving. The same
7010 principle applies to innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this
7011 uncertain and unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation
7012 and much less creativity.
7013 </p><p>
7014 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
7015 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
7016 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
7017 systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
7018 industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
7019 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant competition.
7020 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of competition.
7021 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect of too
7022 much control in the market is to produce an overregulatedregulated market.
7023 </p><p>
7024
7025 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is the
7026 first important way in which the changes I have described will burden
7027 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&#8212;a culture in
7028 which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again, I am not
7029 antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I am certainly
7030 not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its limits. And
7031 leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the high costs that
7032 our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an
7033 embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our profession should
7034 therefore do everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at
7035 least do everything it can to limit the reach of the law where the law is
7036 not doing any good. The transaction costs buried within a permission culture
7037 are enough to bury a wide range of creativity.  Someone needs to do a lot of
7038 justifying to justify that result.  The uncertainty of the law is one burden
7039 on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more directly. This is
7040 the effort by many in the content industry to use the law to directly
7041 regulate the technology of the Internet so that it better protects their
7042 content.
7043 </p><p>
7044 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
7045 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the Internet's
7046 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this feature is a
7047 "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content distributors have
7048 a harder time controlling the distribution of content.  One obvious response
7049 to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet less efficient. If the
7050 Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says, we should break the
7051 kneecaps of the Internet.
7052 </p><p>
7053 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of the
7054 content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that would
7055 require computers to determine whether the content they access is protected
7056 or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<sup>[<a name="id2787292" href="#ftn.id2787292" class="footnote">162</a>]</sup> Congress has already launched proceedings to
7057 explore a mandatory "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device
7058 capable of transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would
7059 disable the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast
7060 flag. Other members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers
7061 from liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
7062 copyright violators and disable their machines.<sup>[<a name="id2787315" href="#ftn.id2787315" class="footnote">163</a>]</sup>
7063
7064 </p><p>
7065
7066 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the code, why
7067 not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any regulation of technical
7068 infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular technology of the
7069 day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on the technology, but
7070 will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly those requirements.
7071 </p><p>
7072 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by Intel,
7073 tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
7074 impose.<sup>[<a name="id2787338" href="#ftn.id2787338" class="footnote">164</a>]</sup> Their argument was obviously
7075 not that copyright should not be protected. Instead, they argued, any
7076 protection should not do more harm than good.
7077 </p><p>
7078 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
7079 innovation&#8212;again, a story that will be quite familiar to the free
7080 market crowd.
7081 </p><p>
7082 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form of
7083 regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.  When
7084 done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done wrong, it is
7085 regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
7086 </p><p>
7087 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
7088 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
7089 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<sup>[<a name="id2787369" href="#ftn.id2787369" class="footnote">165</a>]</sup>
7090 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when
7091 new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance to assure
7092 that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses
7093 have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR)
7094 has been another.
7095 </p><p>
7096 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed with the
7097 rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between the claims of a
7098 new technology and the legitimate rights of content creators, both the
7099 courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions that will have the
7100 effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
7101 </p><p>
7102 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<sup>[<a name="id2787396" href="#ftn.id2787396" class="footnote">166</a>]</sup> It has been mirrored in the responses threatened
7103 and actually implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
7104 here.<sup>[<a name="id2787419" href="#ftn.id2787419" class="footnote">167</a>]</sup> But there is one example that
7105 captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the demise of Internet
7106 radio.
7107 </p><p>
7108
7109
7110
7111 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
7112 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or
7113 she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
7114 version of "Happy Birthday"&#8212;to memorialize her famous performance
7115 before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&#8212; then whenever that
7116 recording was played on the radio, the current copyright owners of "Happy
7117 Birthday" would get some money, whereas Marilyn Monroe would not.
7118 </p><p>
7119 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some sense. The
7120 justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The recording artist
7121 thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio station was making it
7122 more likely that her records would be purchased.  Thus, the recording artist
7123 got something, even if only indirectly.  Probably this reasoning had less to
7124 do with the result than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists
7125 were quite good at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require
7126 compensation to the recording artists.
7127 </p><p>
7128 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a technology to
7129 stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast travels
7130 across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.  Thus, I can
7131 "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting in San
7132 Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a regular radio
7133 station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
7134 </p><p>
7135 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there are
7136 potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could tune in
7137 to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture for broadcast
7138 radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of broadcasters and clear
7139 broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore be more competitive
7140 than regular radio; it could provide a wider range of selections. And
7141 because the potential audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche
7142 stations could easily develop and market their content to a relatively large
7143 number of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
7144 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
7145 </p><p>
7146
7147
7148
7149 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an improvement
7150 potentially vastly more significant than the FM improvement over AM, since
7151 not only is the technology better, so, too, is the competition. Indeed,
7152 there is a direct parallel between the fight to establish FM radio and the
7153 fight to protect Internet radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's
7154 struggle to enable FM radio,
7155 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7156 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the shortwaves,
7157 thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in the crowded
7158 longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of stations would be
7159 limited only by economics and competition rather than by technical
7160 restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation that had grown up in
7161 radio to that following the invention of the printing press, when
7162 governments and ruling interests attempted to control this new instrument of
7163 mass communications by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was
7164 broken only when it became possible for men freely to acquire printing
7165 presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention
7166 as the printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
7167 shackles.<sup>[<a name="id2787538" href="#ftn.id2787538" class="footnote">168</a>]</sup>
7168 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7169 This potential for FM radio was never realized&#8212;not because Armstrong
7170 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated the power of
7171 "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<sup>[<a name="id2787354" href="#ftn.id2787354" class="footnote">169</a>]</sup> to retard the growth of this competing technology.
7172 </p><p>
7173 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For again, there
7174 is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of Internet radio
7175 stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are those imposed by the
7176 law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first question we should ask is,
7177 what copyright rules would govern Internet radio?
7178 </p><p>
7179
7180 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a new
7181 industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very powerful
7182 lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon of Internet
7183 radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt a different rule
7184 for Internet radio than the rule that applies to terrestrial radio. While
7185 terrestrial radio does not have to pay our hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when
7186 it plays her hypothetical recording of "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet
7187 radio does. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet radio&#8212;the
7188 law actually burdens Internet radio more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
7189 </p><p>
7190 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor William Fisher
7191 estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree popular music to
7192 (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four hours a day, the total
7193 artist fees that radio station would owe would be over $1 million a
7194 year.<sup>[<a name="id2787589" href="#ftn.id2787589" class="footnote">170</a>]</sup> A regular radio station
7195 broadcasting the same content would pay no equivalent fee.
7196 </p><p>
7197 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
7198 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
7199 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
7200 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
7201 name of the service;
7202 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7203 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
7204 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7205 type of program (archived/looped/live);
7206 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7207 date of transmission;
7208 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7209 time of transmission;
7210 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7211 time zone of origination of transmission;
7212 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7213 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
7214 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7215 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
7216 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7217 sound recording title;
7218 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7219 ISRC code of the recording;
7220 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7221 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of
7222 compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of
7223 the track;
7224 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7225 featured recording artist;
7226 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7227 retail album title;
7228 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7229 recording label;
7230 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7231 UPC code of the retail album;
7232 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7233 catalog number;
7234 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7235 copyright owner information;
7236 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7237 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
7238 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7239 name of the service or entity;
7240 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7241 channel or program;
7242 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7243 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
7244 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7245 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
7246 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7247 time zone where the signal was received (user);
7248 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7249 Unique User identifier;
7250 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7251 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
7252 </p></li></ol></div><p>
7253 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting requirements,
7254 pending further study. And he also changed the original rates set by the
7255 arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the basic difference
7256 between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains: Internet radio has to
7257 pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio does not.
7258 </p><p>
7259 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the economic
7260 consequences from Internet radio that would justify these differences? Was
7261 the motive to protect artists against piracy?
7262 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2787804"></a><p>
7263 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious to
7264 everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public Policy at
7265 Real Networks, told me,
7266 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7267
7268 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented some testimony
7269 about what they thought a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, and
7270 it was much higher. It was ten times higher than what radio stations pay to
7271 perform the same songs for the same period of time. And so the attorneys
7272 representing the webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
7273 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because here we
7274 have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and that should
7275 establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so high, you're going to
7276 drive the small webcasters out of business. . . ."
7277 </p><p>
7278 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an industry
7279 with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be an industry with, you
7280 know, five or seven big players who can pay a high rate and it's a stable,
7281 predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
7282 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7283 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so that
7284 this platform of potentially immense competition, which would cause the
7285 diversity and range of content available to explode, would not cause pain to
7286 the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right or the left, who
7287 should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is practically no one, on
7288 either the right or the left, who is doing anything effective to prevent it.
7289 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Corrupting Citizens"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="corruptingcitizens"></a>Corrupting Citizens</h3></div></div></div><p>
7290 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
7291 dinosaurs a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
7292 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
7293 </p><p>
7294 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was important
7295 to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation corrupts
7296 citizens and weakens the rule of law.
7297 </p><p>
7298
7299 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with every war
7300 of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very large number
7301 of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million Americans
7302 downloaded music in May 2002.<sup>[<a name="id2787884" href="#ftn.id2787884" class="footnote">171</a>]</sup> According
7303 to the RIAA, the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus
7304 have a set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As
7305 the RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of the
7306 world, but against students building search engines, and increasingly
7307 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for sharing
7308 will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms race or
7309 a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more extreme response
7310 by the other.
7311 </p><p>
7312 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American legal
7313 system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it knew that in
7314 Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The threat of having to
7315 pay either all the money in the world in damages ($15,000,000) or almost all
7316 the money in the world to defend against paying all the money in the world
7317 in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)  led Jordan to choose to pay all the
7318 money he had in the world ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same
7319 strategy animates the RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
7320 2003, the RIAA sued 261 individuals&#8212;including a twelve-year-old girl
7321 living in public housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what
7322 file sharing was.<sup>[<a name="id2787592" href="#ftn.id2787592" class="footnote">172</a>]</sup> As these scapegoats
7323 discovered, it will always cost more to defend against these suits than it
7324 would cost to simply settle. (The twelve year old, for example, like Jesse
7325 Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000 to settle the case.) Our law is an
7326 awful system for defending rights. It is an embarrassment to our
7327 tradition. And the consequence of our law as it is, is that those with the
7328 power can use the law to quash any rights they oppose.
7329 </p><p>
7330 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just something
7331 more extreme than anything we've seen before. We experimented with alcohol
7332 prohibition, at a time when the per capita consumption of alcohol was 1.5
7333 gallons per capita per year. The war against drinking initially reduced that
7334 consumption to just 30 percent of its preprohibition levels, but by the end
7335 of prohibition, consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
7336 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast number
7337 were criminals.<sup>[<a name="id2787956" href="#ftn.id2787956" class="footnote">173</a>]</sup> We have launched a war
7338 on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated narcotics that 7
7339 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<sup>[<a name="id2787967" href="#ftn.id2787967" class="footnote">174</a>]</sup> That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
7340 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast majority
7341 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex tax system
7342 that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.<sup>[<a name="id2787984" href="#ftn.id2787984" class="footnote">175</a>]</sup> We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an
7343 endless array of ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a
7344 result, a huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
7345 </p><p>
7346 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
7347 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
7348 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told a
7349 class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students who
7350 have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and sometimes
7351 drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven cars. These
7352 are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the norm. And then we,
7353 as law professors, are supposed to teach them how to behave
7354 ethically&#8212;how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds separate, or
7355 honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that your case is
7356 over. Generations of Americans&#8212;more significantly in some parts of
7357 America than in others, but still, everywhere in America today&#8212;can't
7358 live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a
7359 certain degree of illegality.
7360 </p><p>
7361 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law more
7362 severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how to make
7363 that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense depends, in part, at
7364 least, upon whether the costs of the law, both intended and collateral,
7365 outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and collateral, do outweigh
7366 the benefits, then the law ought to be changed.  Alternatively, if the costs
7367 of the existing system are much greater than the costs of an alternative,
7368 then we have a good reason to consider the alternative.
7369 </p><p>
7370
7371
7372
7373 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
7374 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
7375 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But that
7376 wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the week. A
7377 society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
7378 </p><p>
7379 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations, but
7380 that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends upon people
7381 obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we as citizens
7382 experience violating the law, the less we respect the law. Obviously, in
7383 most cases, the important issue is the law, not respect for the law. I don't
7384 care whether the rapist respects the law or not; I want to catch and
7385 incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether my students respect the
7386 law. And I do care if the rules of law sow increasing disrespect because of
7387 the extreme of regulation they impose.  Twenty million Americans have come
7388 of age since the Internet introduced this different idea of "sharing." We
7389 need to be able to call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not
7390 "felons."
7391 </p><p>
7392 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
7393 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
7394 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be asking is
7395 not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be whether this
7396 particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve the proper
7397 ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to assure that artists
7398 get paid without transforming forty-three million Americans into felons?
7399 Does it make sense if there are other ways to assure that artists get paid
7400 without transforming America into a nation of felons?
7401 </p><p>
7402 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
7403 </p><p>
7404
7405 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces of
7406 plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought.  The law
7407 protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a copyright
7408 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used record store
7409 and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the recordings is free.
7410 </p><p>
7411 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of phonograph
7412 records that is effectively free. Because these recordings were made without
7413 copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy, or "rip," music from my
7414 records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed, Apple Corporation went so far as
7415 to suggest that "freedom" was a right: In a series of commercials, Apple
7416 endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn" capacities of digital technologies.
7417 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2788100"></a><p>
7418 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large process
7419 at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing them in one
7420 archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful program called
7421 Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music: Bach, Baroque,
7422 Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others&#8212;the potential is
7423 endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists, these technologies
7424 help build a creativity with play lists that is itself independently
7425 valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and meaningful in their own
7426 right.
7427 </p><p>
7428 This use is enabled by unprotected media&#8212;either CDs or records.  But
7429 unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens (or so
7430 the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair return
7431 from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to experiment with
7432 technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These technologies, for
7433 example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or they might enable spy
7434 programs to identify ripped content on people's machines.
7435 </p><p>
7436
7437 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of your
7438 own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker circles,
7439 and get technology to disable the technologies that protect the
7440 content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that doesn't
7441 bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people, these
7442 protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving use of
7443 CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to the world
7444 where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of plastic or were
7445 part of a massively complex "digital rights management" system.
7446 </p><p>
7447 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination of the
7448 ability to freely move content, then these technologies to interfere with
7449 the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what if there were
7450 another way to assure that artists are paid, without locking down any
7451 content? What if, in other words, a different system could assure
7452 compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom to move content
7453 easily?
7454 </p><p>
7455 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer a
7456 version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now, the only
7457 point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system achieved
7458 the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright system achieved,
7459 but left consumers and creators much more free, then we'd have a very good
7460 reason to pursue this alternative&#8212;namely, freedom.  The choice, in
7461 other words, would not be between property and piracy; the choice would be
7462 between different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
7463 </p><p>
7464 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without turning
7465 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature of this
7466 alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for producing
7467 and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today control the vast
7468 majority of the distribution of content in the world, would no longer
7469 exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go the way of the
7470 horse-drawn buggy.
7471 </p><p>
7472 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
7473 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this new form
7474 of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree million Americans
7475 as criminals and their own survival.
7476 </p><p>
7477 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not understandable
7478 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack Valenti is charming;
7479 but not so charming as to justify giving up a tradition as deep and
7480 important as our tradition of free culture.  There's one more aspect to this
7481 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and follows
7482 directly from any war of prohibition.  As Electronic Frontier Foundation
7483 attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that
7484 "arises whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
7485 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
7486 <a class="indexterm" name="id2788205"></a>
7487 </p><p>
7488 "Hvis du kan behandle noen som en antatt lovbryter," forklarer von Lohmann,
7489 <a class="indexterm" name="id2788218"></a>
7490 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7491 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections evaporate to
7492 one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright infringer, how can you
7493 hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright infringer, how can
7494 you hope to be secure against seizures of your computer? How can you hope to
7495 continue to receive Internet access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon
7496 as we think, "Oh, well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well,
7497 what this campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
7498 percentage of the American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
7499 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7500 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public into
7501 criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
7502 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
7503 </p><p>
7504 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
7505 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over the
7506 names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
7507 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a judge,
7508 and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of an Internet
7509 user is revealed.
7510 </p><p>
7511
7512 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy to
7513 sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have downloaded
7514 copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've seen, the
7515 potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a family's computer
7516 is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the family could be liable
7517 for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop the RIAA from suing a number of
7518 these families, just as they had sued Jesse Jordan.<sup>[<a name="id2788269" href="#ftn.id2788269" class="footnote">176</a>]</sup>
7519
7520 </p><p>
7521 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the RIAA. A
7522 report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the RIAA had adopted
7523 to track Napster users.<sup>[<a name="id2788295" href="#ftn.id2788295" class="footnote">177</a>]</sup> Using a
7524 sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a
7525 fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those
7526 MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
7527 </p><p>
7528 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a friend gives a
7529 CD to your daughter&#8212;a collection of songs just like the cassettes you
7530 used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does your daughter, where
7531 these songs came from. But she copies these songs onto her computer. She
7532 then takes her computer to college and connects it to a college network, and
7533 if the college network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she
7534 hasn't properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to
7535 do that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as
7536 a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning to
7537 deploy,<sup>[<a name="id2788168" href="#ftn.id2788168" class="footnote">178</a>]</sup> your daughter can lose the
7538 right to use the university's computer network.  She can, in some cases, be
7539 expelled.
7540 </p><p>
7541 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire a
7542 lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead that
7543 she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that they came
7544 from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes her. But the
7545 university might not believe her. It might treat this "contraband" as
7546 presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students have already
7547 learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in the middle of wars of
7548 prohibition. This war is no different.  Says von Lohmann, <a class="indexterm" name="id2788368"></a>
7549 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7550 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million Americans
7551 that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a situation where the
7552 civil liberties of those people are very much in peril in a general
7553 matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where you could randomly
7554 choose any person off the street and be confident that they were committing
7555 an unlawful act that could put them on the hook for potential felony
7556 liability or hundreds of millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly
7557 we all speed, but speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely
7558 forfeit civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
7559 closest analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has eroded
7560 all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many Americans as
7561 criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of
7562 magnitude larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
7563 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a slippery
7564 slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty million of
7565 them.
7566 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7567 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under the
7568 law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&#8212; securing
7569 rights to authors&#8212;without these millions being considered "criminals,"
7570 who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is American, a constant war
7571 on our own people or a concerted effort through our democracy to change our
7572 law?
7573 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2786150" href="#id2786150" class="para">154</a>] </sup>
7574
7575
7576 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells, The
7577 Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New York:
7578 Oxford University Press, 1996).
7579 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2786341" href="#id2786341" class="para">155</a>] </sup>
7580
7581 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
7582 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, "Copyright
7583 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available at
7584 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #33</a>. Reps. John
7585 Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill
7586 that would treat unauthorized on-line copying as a felony offense with
7587 punishments ranging as high as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
7588 "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy," Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003,
7589 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7590 #34</a>. Civil penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied
7591 song. For a recent (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand
7592 that an ISP reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600
7593 songs through a family computer, see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In
7594 re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.  Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a
7595 user could face liability ranging as high as $90 million. Such astronomical
7596 figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file
7597 sharers. Settlements ranging from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students
7598 accused of heavy file sharing on university networks must have seemed a mere
7599 pittance next to the $98 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter
7600 proceed to court. See Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines,"
7601 redandblack.com, August 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #35</a>. For an example of the
7602 RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to
7603 universities to reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins,
7604 "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8
7605 August 2003, D3, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #36</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2786395"></a>
7606 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2786487" href="#id2786487" class="para">156</a>] </sup>
7607
7608
7609 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
7610 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
7611 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, House
7612 Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter Harter,
7613 vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards, EMusic.com), available
7614 in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony File.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2786668" href="#id2786668" class="para">157</a>] </sup>
7615
7616 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom (Hoboken,
7617 N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of the settlement,
7618 see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court Approval for SEC
7619 Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #37</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2786693"></a>
7620 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2786705" href="#id2786705" class="para">158</a>] </sup>
7621  The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
7622 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For an
7623 overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,' Say
7624 Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #38</a>, and "Senate Turns Back
7625 Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #39</a>. President Bush has
7626 continued to urge tort reform in recent months.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2786729"></a>
7627 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2786325" href="#id2786325" class="para">159</a>] </sup>
7628
7629 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003, available
7630 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #40</a>. For an
7631 overview of the exhibition, see <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #41</a>.
7632 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787112" href="#id2787112" class="para">160</a>] </sup>
7633
7634
7635 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles Times,
7636 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on innovation in
7637 the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music Revolution Will Not
7638 Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #42</a>.  See also Jon Healey,
7639 "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles Times, 28 May 2001.
7640 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787161" href="#id2787161" class="para">161</a>] </sup>
7641
7642 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16. juni 2003,
7643 tilgjengelig via <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7644 #43</a>. Jeg er Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli takknemlig mot for dette
7645 eksemplet.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2787175"></a>
7646 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787292" href="#id2787292" class="para">162</a>] </sup>
7647
7648 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and the
7649 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School (2003),
7650 33&#8211;35, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7651 #44</a>.
7652 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787315" href="#id2787315" class="para">163</a>] </sup>
7653
7654 GartnerG2, 26&#8211;27.
7655 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787338" href="#id2787338" class="para">164</a>] </sup>
7656
7657 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes, February
7658 2002 (Entertainment).
7659 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787369" href="#id2787369" class="para">165</a>] </sup>
7660
7661 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
7662 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787396" href="#id2787396" class="para">166</a>] </sup>
7663
7664 The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
7665 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
7666 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
7667 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory copyright
7668 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute music (a
7669 device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
7670 already stored on a user's hard drive).  At the district court level, the
7671 only exception is found in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
7672 Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.  Cal., 2003), where the court found the
7673 link between the distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to
7674 make the distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
7675 liability.
7676 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787419" href="#id2787419" class="para">167</a>] </sup>
7677
7678 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
7679 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
7680 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
7681 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In August
7682 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
7683 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
7684 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
7685 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
7686 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act,
7687 which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
7688 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
7689 World," 27 June 2003, 33&#8211;34, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #44</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2787427"></a>
7690 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787538" href="#id2787538" class="para">168</a>] </sup>
7691
7692
7693 Lessing, 239.
7694 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787354" href="#id2787354" class="para">169</a>] </sup>
7695
7696
7697 Ibid., 229.
7698 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787589" href="#id2787589" class="para">170</a>] </sup>
7699
7700 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright Arbitration
7701 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example offered by
7702 Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw (Stanford), 3 July
7703 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain submitted
7704 testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.  See Jonathan
7705 Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
7706 Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #45</a>.  For an excellent
7707 analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry
7708 Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall
7709 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry
7710 barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from digital entrants,
7711 reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of
7712 getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
7713 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way." <a class="indexterm" name="id2787628"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2787637"></a>
7714 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787884" href="#id2787884" class="para">171</a>] </sup>
7715
7716 Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew Internet
7717 and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #46</a>.  The Pew Internet and
7718 American Life Project reported that 37 million Americans had downloaded
7719 music files from the Internet by early 2001.
7720 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787592" href="#id2787592" class="para">172</a>] </sup>
7721
7722
7723 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
7724 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
7725 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787956" href="#id2787956" class="para">173</a>] </sup>
7726
7727
7728 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
7729 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
7730 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787967" href="#id2787967" class="para">174</a>] </sup>
7731
7732
7733 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government Reform
7734 Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of John
7735 P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
7736 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2787984" href="#id2787984" class="para">175</a>] </sup>
7737
7738
7739 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax Compliance,"
7740 Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of compliance
7741 literature).
7742 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788269" href="#id2788269" class="para">176</a>] </sup>
7743
7744
7745 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single Mother in
7746 Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants," Washington Post, 10
7747 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull Plug on File
7748 `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File Swapping, Parents
7749 are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel
7750 Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson Graham, "Recording Industry Sues
7751 Parents," USA Today, 15 September 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's
7752 No Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003,
7753 C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003,
7754 P7.
7755 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788295" href="#id2788295" class="para">177</a>] </sup>
7756
7757
7758 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses Some
7759 Methods Used," CNN.com, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #47</a>.
7760 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788168" href="#id2788168" class="para">178</a>] </sup>
7761
7762
7763 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent," Boston
7764 Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four Students Sued over
7765 Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at Colleges," Washington
7766 Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at
7767 Their Own Risk," Christian Science Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert
7768 Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students
7769 Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C;
7770 Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30
7771 January 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7772 #48</a>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman Orientation
7773 This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing," San
7774 Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters Are Weapons at
7775 Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
7776 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 5. Maktfordeling"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-balances"></a>Kapittel 5. Maktfordeling</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
7777 Så her er bildet: Du står på siden av veien. Bilen din er på brann. Du er
7778 sint og opprørt fordi du delvis bidro til å starte brannen. Nå vet du ikke
7779 hvordan du slokker den.  Ved siden av deg er en bøtte, fylt med
7780 bensin. Bensin vil åpenbart ikke slukke brannen.
7781 </p><p>
7782 Mens du tenker over situasjonen, kommer noen andre forbi.  I panikk griper
7783 hun bøtta, og før du har hatt sjansen til å be henne stoppe&#8212;eller før
7784 hun forstår hvorfor hun bør stoppe&#8212;er bøtten i svevet.  Bensinen er på
7785 tur mot den brennende bilen.  Og brannen som bensinen kommer til å fyre opp
7786 vil straks sette fyr på alt i omgivelsene.
7787 </p><p>
7788 A war about copyright rages all around&#8212;and we're all focusing on the
7789 wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing businesses.
7790 No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies change.  The industry
7791 and technologists have plenty of ways to use technology to protect
7792 themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This is a fire that
7793 if let alone would burn itself out.
7794 </p><p>
7795
7796
7797 Likevel er ikke besluttningstagere villig til å la denne brannen i fred.
7798 Ladet med masse penger fra lobbyister er de lystne på å gå i mellom for å
7799 fjerne problemet slik de oppfatter det.  Men problemet slik de oppfatter det
7800 er ikke den reelle trusselen som denne kulturen står med ansiktet mot.  For
7801 mens vi ser på denne lille brannen i hjørnet er det en massiv endring i
7802 hvordan kultur blir skapt som pågår over alt.
7803 </p><p>
7804 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important and
7805 fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring gasoline
7806 onto this fire.
7807 </p><p>
7808 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
7809 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
7810 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to look
7811 at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
7812 </p><p>
7813 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been my
7814 failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small brace of
7815 efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this debate. We must
7816 understand these failures if we're to understand what success will require.
7817 </p><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel tretten: Eldred"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="eldred"></a>Kapittel tretten: Eldred</h2></div></div></div><p>
7818 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
7819 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least one
7820 did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in
7821 New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
7822 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would make this
7823 nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
7824 </p><p>
7825 It didn't work&#8212;at least for his daughters. They didn't find Hawthorne
7826 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave birth to a
7827 hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a library of public
7828 domain works by scanning these works and making them available for free.
7829 </p><p>
7830
7831 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain works,
7832 though even a copy would have been of great value to people across the world
7833 who can't get access to printed versions of these works. Instead, Eldred was
7834 producing derivative works from these public domain works. Just as Disney
7835 turned Grimm into stories more accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred
7836 transformed Hawthorne, and many others, into a form more
7837 accessible&#8212;technically accessible&#8212;today.
7838 </p><p>
7839 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same source
7840 as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the public domain in
7841 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the permission of the Hawthorne
7842 estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover Press and Penguin Classics, take
7843 works from the public domain and produce printed editions, which they sell
7844 in bookstores across the country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories
7845 and turn them into animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella),
7846 sometimes not (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
7847 commercial publications of public domain works.
7848 </p><p>
7849 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of public
7850 domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally thousands of
7851 others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have discovered this
7852 platform of expression and now use it to share works that are, by law, free
7853 for the taking. This has produced what we might call the "noncommercial
7854 publishing industry," which before the Internet was limited to people with
7855 large egos or with political or social causes. But with the Internet, it
7856 includes a wide range of individuals and groups dedicated to spreading
7857 culture generally.<sup>[<a name="id2788544" href="#ftn.id2788544" class="footnote">179</a>]</sup>
7858 </p><p>
7859 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's collection
7860 of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public domain. Eldred
7861 wanted to post that collection in his free public library.  But Congress got
7862 in the way. As I described in chapter 10, in 1998, for the eleventh time in
7863 forty years, Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&#8212;this
7864 time by twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
7865 than 1923 to his collection until 2019.  Indeed, no copyrighted work would
7866 pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
7867 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
7868 million patents will pass into the public domain.
7869 </p><p>
7870
7871
7872 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), enacted in
7873 memory of the congressman and former musician Sonny Bono, who, his widow,
7874 Mary Bono, says, believed that "copyrights should be forever."<sup>[<a name="id2788630" href="#ftn.id2788630" class="footnote">180</a>]</sup>
7875
7876 </p><p>
7877 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
7878 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
7879 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a second law
7880 passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act of publishing
7881 would make Eldred a felon&#8212;whether or not anyone complained. This was a
7882 dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer to undertake.
7883 </p><p>
7884 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
7885 constitutional scholar whose first passion was constitutional
7886 interpretation.  And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
7887 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as importantly
7888 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
7889 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7890 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .  by securing
7891 for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to their
7892 . . . Writings. . . .
7893 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7894 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting clause of
7895 Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause granting power
7896 to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do something&#8212;for
7897 example, to regulate "commerce among the several states" or "declare War."
7898 But here, the "something" is something quite specific&#8212;to "promote
7899 . . . Progress"&#8212;through means that are also specific&#8212; by
7900 "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
7901 </p><p>
7902 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of extending
7903 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me about this was, if
7904 Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then the Constitution's
7905 requirement that terms be "limited" will have no practical effect. If every
7906 time a copyright is about to expire, Congress has the power to extend its
7907 term, then Congress can achieve what the Constitution plainly
7908 forbids&#8212;perpetual terms "on the installment plan," as Professor Peter
7909 Jaszi so nicely put it.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2788656"></a>
7910 </p><p>
7911 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember sitting
7912 late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious consideration
7913 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's practice of extending
7914 existing terms. That failure may in part be why Congress seemed so
7915 untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the practice had become so
7916 lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that copyright owners will be willing
7917 to pay a great deal of money to see their copyright terms extended. And so
7918 Congress is quite happy to keep this gravy train going.
7919 </p><p>
7920 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
7921 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
7922 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the beneficiaries
7923 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce it to
7924 act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can do. Why
7925 not limit its actions to those things it must do&#8212;and those things that
7926 pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
7927 </p><p>
7928 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one of the
7929 very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to make money one
7930 hundred years after it was created. The Estate of Robert Frost is a good
7931 example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry continues to be extraordinarily
7932 valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate benefits greatly from any extension
7933 of copyright, since no publisher would pay the estate any money if the poems
7934 Frost wrote could be published by anyone for free.
7935 </p><p>
7936 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from three of
7937 Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems is about to
7938 expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.  Your financial
7939 adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim report:
7940 </p><p>
7941
7942 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B, and C
7943 will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be receiving
7944 the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of those works.
7945 </p><p>
7946 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that could change
7947 this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the terms of copyright
7948 by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily valuable to us. So we
7949 should hope this bill passes."
7950 </p><p>
7951 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something about it?"
7952 </p><p>
7953 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute to the
7954 campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that they support
7955 the bill."
7956 </p><p>
7957 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want to know
7958 whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much would we get if this
7959 extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How much is it worth?"
7960 </p><p>
7961 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue to get
7962 at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the `discount
7963 rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent), then this law
7964 would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
7965 </p><p>
7966 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the correct
7967 conclusion:
7968 </p><p>
7969 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than $1,000,000 in
7970 campaign contributions if we were confident those contributions would assure
7971 that the bill was passed?"
7972 </p><p>
7973 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to contribute up
7974 to the `present value' of the income you expect from these copyrights. Which
7975 for us means over $1,000,000."
7976 </p><p>
7977
7978 You quickly get the point&#8212;you as the member of the board and, I trust,
7979 you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every beneficiary
7980 in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same choice: If they
7981 can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights, they will benefit
7982 greatly from that extension. And so each time copyrights are about to
7983 expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get the copyright term
7984 extended.
7985 </p><p>
7986 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation can be
7987 bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in the world to
7988 buy further extensions of copyright.
7989 </p><p>
7990 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
7991 Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved real. Ten of the
7992 thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House received the maximum
7993 contribution from Disney's political action committee; in the Senate, eight
7994 of the twelve sponsors received contributions.<sup>[<a name="id2788841" href="#ftn.id2788841" class="footnote">181</a>]</sup> The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over $1.5 million
7995 lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more than $200,000 in
7996 campaign contributions.<sup>[<a name="id2788854" href="#ftn.id2788854" class="footnote">182</a>]</sup> Disney is
7997 estimated to have contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in
7998 the cycle.<sup>[<a name="id2788869" href="#ftn.id2788869" class="footnote">183</a>]</sup>
7999
8000 </p><p>
8001 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least, it need not
8002 be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this reality about the
8003 never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term was central to my
8004 thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed to interpreting and
8005 applying the Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the
8006 power to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
8007 constitutional requirement that terms be "limited." If they could extend it
8008 once, they would extend it again and again and again.
8009 </p><p>
8010
8011 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow Congress to
8012 extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme Court's work knows,
8013 this Court has increasingly restricted the power of Congress when it has
8014 viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the power granted to it by the
8015 Constitution. Among constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this
8016 trend was the Supreme Court's decision in 1995 to strike down a law that
8017 banned the possession of guns near schools.
8018 </p><p>
8019 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted powers very
8020 broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
8021 only "commerce among the several states" (aka "interstate commerce"), the
8022 Supreme Court had interpreted that power to include the power to regulate
8023 any activity that merely affected interstate commerce.
8024 </p><p>
8025 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was no
8026 limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every activity, when
8027 considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.  A Constitution
8028 designed to limit Congress's power was instead interpreted to impose no
8029 limit.
8030 </p><p>
8031 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed that in
8032 United States v. Lopez. The government had argued that possessing guns near
8033 schools affected interstate commerce. Guns near schools increase crime,
8034 crime lowers property values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief
8035 Justice asked the government whether there was any activity that would not
8036 affect interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
8037 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
8038 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate commerce. The
8039 Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the position to second-guess
8040 Congress.
8041 </p><p>
8042 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments," the
8043 Chief Justice wrote.<sup>[<a name="id2788948" href="#ftn.id2788948" class="footnote">184</a>]</sup> If anything
8044 Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be considered interstate
8045 commerce, then there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in
8046 Lopez was reaffirmed five years later in United States
8047 v. Morrison.<sup>[<a name="id2788959" href="#ftn.id2788959" class="footnote">185</a>]</sup>
8048
8049 </p><p>
8050
8051 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
8052 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<sup>[<a name="id2788974" href="#ftn.id2788974" class="footnote">186</a>]</sup>
8053 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should yield the
8054 conclusion that Congress can't extend an existing term. If Congress could
8055 extend an existing term, then there would be no "stopping point" to
8056 Congress's power over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that
8057 there is such a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to
8058 grant copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
8059 term of existing copyrights.
8060 </p><p>
8061 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.  Many
8062 believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&#8212;a conservative
8063 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
8064 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I rejected
8065 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after the
8066 decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
8067 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides
8068 cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring.  I was
8069 not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine
8070 Justices were going to be petty politicians.
8071 </p><p>
8072 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the argument in
8073 Eldred was not about. By insisting on the Constitution's limits to
8074 copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.  Indeed, in an obvious
8075 sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&#8212;piracy of the public
8076 domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt Disney created Mickey
8077 Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just fifty-six years. Because of
8078 interim changes, Frost and Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year
8079 monopoly for their work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the
8080 Constitution envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six
8081 years, they created new work. But now these entities were using their
8082 power&#8212;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&#8212;to get
8083 another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be
8084 taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects
8085 us all.
8086 </p><p>
8087 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief before the
8088 Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association wrote that the public
8089 domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<sup>[<a name="id2789018" href="#ftn.id2789018" class="footnote">187</a>]</sup> But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our
8090 constitutional system, our law requires it. Some may not like the
8091 Constitution's requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a
8092 pirate's charter.
8093 </p><p>
8094 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on copyright as a
8095 way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily influence the
8096 development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric Eldred discovered,
8097 we have set up a system that assures that copyright terms will be repeatedly
8098 extended, and extended, and extended. We have created the perfect storm for
8099 the public domain. Copyrights have not expired, and will not expire, so long
8100 as Congress is free to be bought to extend them again.
8101 </p><p>
8102 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being extended.
8103 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too valuable for
8104 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from copyright
8105 extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's.  Forget Mickey
8106 Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from the 1920s and 1930s
8107 that have continuing commercial value. The real harm of term extension comes
8108 not from these famous works. The real harm is to the works that are not
8109 famous, not commercially exploited, and no longer available as a result.
8110 </p><p>
8111 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to 1942)
8112 affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 2 percent of that
8113 work has any continuing commercial value. It was the copyright holders for
8114 that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.  But the law and its effect were
8115 not limited to that 2 percent. The law extended the terms of copyright
8116 generally.<sup>[<a name="id2789093" href="#ftn.id2789093" class="footnote">188</a>]</sup>
8117
8118 </p><p>
8119
8120 Think practically about the consequence of this extension&#8212;practically,
8121 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal work. In 1930,
8122 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those books were still in
8123 print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you wanted to make available
8124 to the world in your iArchive project the remaining 9,873. What would you
8125 have to do?
8126 </p><p>
8127 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were still
8128 under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are not
8129 on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the titles and
8130 authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration and renewal
8131 records for works published in 1930. That will produce a list of books still
8132 under copyright.
8133 </p><p>
8134 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate the
8135 current copyright owners. How would you do that?
8136 </p><p>
8137 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright owners
8138 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be thousands and
8139 thousands of government monopolies without there being at least a list?
8140 </p><p>
8141 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in 1959, of
8142 the person who registered the copyright. But just think practically about
8143 how impossibly difficult it would be to track down thousands of such
8144 records&#8212;especially since the person who registered is not necessarily
8145 the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
8146 </p><p>
8147 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the apologists for
8148 the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright owners?"
8149 </p><p>
8150 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who owns
8151 what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.  And where
8152 there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at suggesting who
8153 the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably
8154 yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who
8155 owns what tangible property.
8156 </p><p>
8157
8158 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who owns the house
8159 by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see a car, there is
8160 ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the car. If you see a
8161 bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a house, it's fairly
8162 easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you happen to see a baseball
8163 lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look around for a second for some
8164 kids playing ball. If you don't see any kids, then okay: Here's a bit of
8165 property whose owner we can't easily determine. It is the exception that
8166 proves the rule: that we ordinarily know quite well who owns what property.
8167 </p><p>
8168 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.  The
8169 library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've already
8170 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors' names, of
8171 course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or passed down in an
8172 estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who owns what, you would have to
8173 hire a private detective. The bottom line: The owner cannot easily be
8174 located. And in a regime like ours, in which it is a felony to use such
8175 property without the property owner's permission, the property isn't going
8176 to be used.
8177 </p><p>
8178 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be digitized,
8179 and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the consequence for other
8180 creative works is much more dire.
8181 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2789206"></a><p>
8182 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios, which
8183 owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a direct
8184 beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were made between
8185 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is currently out of
8186 copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923 would have begun entering
8187 the public domain. Because Agee controls the exclusive rights for these
8188 popular films, he makes a great deal of money. According to one estimate,
8189 "Roach has sold about 60,000 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's
8190 silent films."<sup>[<a name="id2789234" href="#ftn.id2789234" class="footnote">189</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2789245"></a>
8191 </p><p>
8192 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in this
8193 culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme Court that
8194 the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left standing, destroy
8195 a whole generation of American film.
8196 </p><p>
8197
8198 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has any
8199 continuing commercial value. The rest&#8212;to the extent it survives at
8200 all&#8212;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that some of this work
8201 not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be valuable by the owners of
8202 the vaults. For this to occur, however, the commercial benefit from the work
8203 must exceed the costs of making the work available for distribution.
8204 </p><p>
8205 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.  For most
8206 of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very high; digital
8207 technology has lowered these costs substantially. While it cost more than
8208 $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white film in 1993, it can now
8209 cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of mm film.<sup>[<a name="id2789282" href="#ftn.id2789282" class="footnote">190</a>]</sup>
8210
8211 </p><p>
8212 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most important.
8213 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
8214 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
8215 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
8216 locate the copyright owner.
8217 </p><p>
8218 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
8219 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
8220 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as many as can
8221 hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large number. Thus the
8222 costs of clearing the rights to these films is exceptionally high.
8223 </p><p>
8224 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
8225 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
8226 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when she
8227 does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you have
8228 made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
8229 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
8230 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way, you
8231 have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have to
8232 talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
8233 </p><p>
8234
8235 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed these
8236 costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the benefit would
8237 outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old films, Agee
8238 argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until the copyright
8239 expires.
8240 </p><p>
8241 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will have
8242 expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and nitrate stock
8243 dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal canisters in which
8244 they are now stored will be filled with nothing more than dust.
8245 </p><p>
8246 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has
8247 continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a
8248 crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright
8249 creates incentives to produce and distribute the creative work. For that
8250 tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of free expression."
8251 </p><p>
8252 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the creative
8253 work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've indicated, most books
8254 go out of print within one year. The same is true of music and
8255 film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.  And when a
8256 creative work falls out of favor with the commercial distributors, the
8257 commercial life ends.
8258 </p><p>
8259 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't keep
8260 libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and we don't
8261 have archives of films because we expect people to choose between spending
8262 Friday night watching new movies and spending Friday night watching a 1930
8263 news documentary. The noncommercial life of culture is important and
8264 valuable&#8212;for entertainment but also, and more importantly, for
8265 knowledge. To understand who we are, and where we came from, and how we have
8266 made the mistakes that we have, we need to have access to this history.
8267 </p><p>
8268
8269 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.  In
8270 this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in this
8271 context do no good.
8272 </p><p>
8273 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of our
8274 history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
8275 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.  When a
8276 book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.  But you
8277 could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used book store sells
8278 it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the copyright owner
8279 anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended
8280 was a use that was independent of copyright law.
8281 </p><p>
8282 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring a
8283 film&#8212;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&#8212;were so high,
8284 it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains
8285 of a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
8286 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the end
8287 of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
8288 </p><p>
8289 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most of our
8290 history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works that lost
8291 their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works would not have
8292 interfered with anything.
8293 </p><p>
8294 But this situation has now changed.
8295 </p><p>
8296 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital technologies
8297 is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.  Digital
8298 technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access to all sorts
8299 of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now imagine digitizing
8300 it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once a film goes out of
8301 distribution, we could digitize it and make it available to everyone,
8302 forever. Digital technologies give new life to copyrighted material after it
8303 passes out of its commercial life. It is now possible to preserve and assure
8304 universal access to this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
8305 </p><p>
8306
8307
8308 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing this
8309 digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
8310 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires permission
8311 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other aspect of
8312 our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these things
8313 available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want to
8314 explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
8315 radically different context.
8316 </p><p>
8317 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
8318 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law gets in
8319 the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful copyright purpose, for
8320 the purpose of copyright is to enable the commercial market that spreads
8321 culture. No, we are talking about culture after it has lived its commercial
8322 life. In this context, copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the
8323 spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
8324 expression. Copyright is a brake.
8325 </p><p>
8326 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for Brewster
8327 Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.  So won't
8328 Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading culture widely?"
8329 </p><p>
8330 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
8331 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble offered
8332 to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that eliminate the need
8333 for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a library is to serve
8334 what "the market" would demand. But if you think the role of a library is
8335 bigger than this&#8212;if you think its role is to archive culture, whether
8336 there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture or not&#8212;then we
8337 can't count on the commercial market to do our library work for us.
8338 </p><p>
8339 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We should
8340 rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable culture. My
8341 message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the market is not
8342 doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the freedom to fill the
8343 gaps. As one researcher calculated for American culture, 94 percent of the
8344 films, books, and music produced between and 1946 is not commercially
8345 available. However much you love the commercial market, if access is a
8346 value, then 6 percent is a failure to provide that value.<sup>[<a name="id2789497" href="#ftn.id2789497" class="footnote">191</a>]</sup>
8347
8348 </p><p>
8349 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
8350 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the Sonny
8351 Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two central claims
8352 that we made were (1) that extending existing terms violated the
8353 Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that extending terms by
8354 another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
8355 </p><p>
8356 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an argument.  A
8357 panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also dismissed our
8358 claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But that decision at
8359 least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative judges on that
8360 court. That dissent gave our claims life.
8361 </p><p>
8362 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that copyrights
8363 be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as it was simple:
8364 If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no "stopping point" to
8365 Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The power to extend existing
8366 terms means Congress is not required to grant terms that are "limited."
8367 Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to interpret the term "limited
8368 Times" to give it meaning. And the best interpretation, Judge Sentelle
8369 argued, would be to deny Congress the power to extend existing terms.
8370 </p><p>
8371 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to hear the
8372 case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for important
8373 cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a whole, where
8374 the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
8375 </p><p>
8376
8377 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.  This
8378 time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
8379 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the most
8380 liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had overstepped its
8381 bounds.
8382 </p><p>
8383 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the Supreme
8384 Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It hears about one
8385 hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand appeals.) And it
8386 practically never reviews a decision that upholds a statute when no other
8387 court has yet reviewed the statute.
8388 </p><p>
8389 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by granting our
8390 petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument was set for October of
8391 2002. The summer would be spent writing briefs and preparing for argument.
8392 </p><p>
8393 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
8394 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we lost
8395 the appeal. And if you know something more than just the minimum, you
8396 probably think there was no way this case could have been won. After our
8397 defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and
8398 supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed
8399 cause. And none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail
8400 from my client, Eric Eldred.
8401 </p><p>
8402 Men min klient og disse vennene tok feil. Denne saken kunne vært vunnet. Det
8403 burde ha vært vunnet.  Og uansett hvor hardt jeg prøver å fortelle den
8404 historien til meg selv, kan jeg aldri unnslippe troen på at det er min feil
8405 at vi ikke vant.
8406 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2789616"></a><p>
8407
8408 Feil ble gjort tidlig, skjønt den ble først åpenbart på slutten. Vår sak
8409 hadde støtte hos en ekstraordinær advokat, Geoffrey Stewart, helt fra
8410 starten, og hos advokatfirmaet hadde han flyttet til, Jones, Day, Reavis og
8411 Pogue. Jones Day mottok mye press fra sine opphavsrettsbeskyttende klienter
8412 på grunn av sin støtte til oss.  De ignorert dette presset (noe veldig få
8413 advokatfirmaer noen sinne ville gjøre), og ga alt de hadde gjennom hele
8414 saken.
8415 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2789639"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2789645"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2789651"></a><p>
8416 Det var tre viktige advokater på saken fra Jones DaY. Geoff Stewart var den
8417 først, men siden ble Dan Bromberg og Don Ayer ganske involvert. Bromberg og
8418 Ayer spesielt hadde en felles oppfatning om hvordan denne saken ville bli
8419 vunnet: vi ville bare vinne, fortalte de gjentatte ganger til meg, hvis vi
8420 få problemet til å virke "viktig" for Høyesterett. Det måtte synes som om
8421 dramatisk skade ble gjort til ytringsfriheten og fri kultur, ellers ville de
8422 aldri stemt mot "de mektigste mediaselskapene i verden".
8423 </p><p>
8424 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act was a
8425 dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still think it
8426 is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based on how
8427 important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be "right" as
8428 in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be that
8429 way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the framers of
8430 our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the CTEA was
8431 unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful interpretation of what
8432 the First Amendment means would yield the conclusion that the power to
8433 extend existing copyright terms is unconstitutional, I was not persuaded
8434 that we had to sell our case like soap.  Just as a law that bans the
8435 swastika is unconstitutional not because the Court likes Nazis but because
8436 such a law would violate the Constitution, so too, in my view, would the
8437 Court decide whether Congress's law was constitutional based on the
8438 Constitution, not based on whether they liked the values that the framers
8439 put in the Constitution.
8440 </p><p>
8441 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and the harm
8442 caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review? There was no
8443 reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they weren't convinced that
8444 this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we didn't need to persuade them
8445 that this law was bad, we needed to show why it was unconstitutional.
8446 </p><p>
8447
8448 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter and in
8449 which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced that the Court
8450 would not hear our arguments if it thought these were just the arguments of
8451 a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was not about to launch into a
8452 new field of judicial review if it seemed that this field of review was
8453 simply the preference of a small political minority.  Although my focus in
8454 the case was not to demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to
8455 demonstrate that it was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument
8456 against a background of briefs that covered the full range of political
8457 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in law and not
8458 politics, then, we tried to gather the widest range of credible
8459 critics&#8212;credible not because they were rich and famous, but because
8460 they, in the aggregate, demonstrated that this law was unconstitutional
8461 regardless of one's politics.
8462 </p><p>
8463 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
8464 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very beginning.
8465 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In November 1998,
8466 she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the Republican Congress for
8467 allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you sometimes wonder why bills
8468 that create a financial windfall to narrow special interests slide easily
8469 through the intricate legislative process, while bills that benefit the
8470 general public seem to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial
8471 documented, was the power of money.  Schlafly enumerated Disney's
8472 contributions to the key players on the committees. It was money, not
8473 justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control,
8474 Schlafly argued.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2789729"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2789735"></a>
8475 </p><p>
8476 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief supporting
8477 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the core claim in
8478 the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of existing copyrights,
8479 there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.  That strong
8480 conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
8481 </p><p>
8482 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as it
8483 gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free Software
8484 Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux possible). They
8485 included a powerful brief about the costs of uncertainty by Intel. There
8486 were two law professors' briefs, one by copyright scholars and one by First
8487 Amendment scholars. There was an exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the
8488 world's experts in the history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there
8489 was a new brief by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
8490 <a class="indexterm" name="id2789796"></a>
8491 </p><p>
8492 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal argument,
8493 there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and archives, including
8494 the Internet Archive, the American Association of Law Libraries, and the
8495 National Writers Union.
8496 </p><p>
8497 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the argument I've
8498 already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that unless the law
8499 was struck, a whole generation of American film would disappear. The other
8500 made the economic argument absolutely clear.
8501 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2789821"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2789827"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2789833"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2789840"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2789846"></a><p>
8502 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including five
8503 Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Milton
8504 Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as the list of
8505 Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political spectrum. Their
8506 conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible claim that extending the
8507 terms of existing copyrights would do anything to increase incentives to
8508 create. Such extensions were nothing more than "rent-seeking"&#8212;the
8509 fancy term economists use to describe special-interest legislation gone
8510 wild.
8511 </p><p>
8512 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered to
8513 write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with us from
8514 the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we added three
8515 lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan Morrison, a
8516 lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had made constitutional
8517 history with a series of seminal victories in the Supreme Court defending
8518 individual rights; my colleague and dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued
8519 many cases in the Court, and who had advised us early on about a First
8520 Amendment strategy; and finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
8521 <a class="indexterm" name="id2789856"></a>
8522 </p><p>
8523 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
8524 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give media
8525 companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried was the only
8526 one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up for something he
8527 believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer in the Supreme
8528 Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that limited Congress's power
8529 in the context of the Commerce Clause. And while he had argued many
8530 positions in the Supreme Court that I personally disagreed with, his joining
8531 the cause was a vote of confidence in our argument.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2789902"></a>
8532 </p><p>
8533 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of friends, as
8534 well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included historians or
8535 economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were written
8536 exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and copyright holders.
8537 </p><p>
8538 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain from the
8539 law. The congressmen were not surprising either&#8212;they were defending
8540 their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of contributions such power
8541 induced. And of course it was not surprising that the copyright holders
8542 would defend the idea that they should continue to have the right to control
8543 who did what with content they wanted to control.
8544 </p><p>
8545 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was better for the
8546 Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to Dr. Seuss's work&#8212; better
8547 than allowing it to fall into the public domain&#8212;because if this
8548 creativity were in the public domain, then people could use it to "glorify
8549 drugs or to create pornography."<sup>[<a name="id2789932" href="#ftn.id2789932" class="footnote">192</a>]</sup> That
8550 was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection"
8551 of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy
8552 and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the
8553 cast.<sup>[<a name="id2789948" href="#ftn.id2789948" class="footnote">193</a>]</sup> That's their view of how this
8554 part of American culture should be controlled, and they wanted this law to
8555 help them effect that control.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2789959"></a>
8556 </p><p>
8557 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this debate.
8558 When Congress decides to extend the term of existing copyrights, Congress is
8559 making a choice about which speakers it will favor.  Famous and beloved
8560 copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate and Dr. Seuss, come to
8561 Congress and say, "Give us twenty years to control the speech about these
8562 icons of American culture. We'll do better with them than anyone else."
8563 Congress of course likes to reward the popular and famous by giving them
8564 what they want. But when Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak
8565 in a certain way, that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally
8566 meant to block.
8567 </p><p>
8568 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA mean
8569 that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
8570 copyrights&#8212;extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
8571 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
8572 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.  Between
8573 February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing for this
8574 case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
8575 </p><p>
8576 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we called
8577 "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest." The Conservatives
8578 included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice
8579 Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had been the most consistent in
8580 limiting Congress's power. They were the five who had supported the
8581 Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be
8582 interpreted to assure that Congress's powers had limits.
8583 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790006"></a><p>
8584
8585 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
8586 Congress's power. These four&#8212;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
8587 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&#8212;had repeatedly argued that the
8588 Constitution gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement
8589 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
8590 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four justices
8591 were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed with, they
8592 were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
8593 </p><p>
8594 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to her
8595 general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of gender are
8596 involved), she had been particularly deferential in the context of
8597 intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an excellent and
8598 well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from the same
8599 intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with the writings
8600 of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this context to do as it
8601 wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
8602 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790040"></a><p>
8603 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
8604 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly favored
8605 deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were also very
8606 sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly believed, there was a
8607 very important free speech argument against these retrospective extensions.
8608 </p><p>
8609 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
8610 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest judges
8611 on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just means that no
8612 simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he had consistently argued
8613 for limits in the context of intellectual property generally. We were fairly
8614 confident he would recognize limits here.
8615 </p><p>
8616 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus had to be:
8617 on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these five and
8618 get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single overriding argument
8619 that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives' most important
8620 jurisprudential innovation&#8212;the argument that Judge Sentelle had relied
8621 upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power must be interpreted so
8622 that its enumerated powers have limits.
8623 </p><p>
8624
8625 This then was the core of our strategy&#8212;a strategy for which I am
8626 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez case,
8627 under the government's argument here, Congress would always have unlimited
8628 power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about Congress's power
8629 under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was supposed to be
8630 "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez:
8631 If Congress's power to regulate commerce was limited, then so, too, must
8632 Congress's power to regulate copyright be limited.
8633 </p><p>
8634 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has done
8635 it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government claimed that
8636 from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
8637 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say that
8638 practice is unconstitutional.
8639 </p><p>
8640 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We certainly
8641 agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in and in 1909. And of
8642 course, in 1962, Congress began extending existing terms
8643 regularly&#8212;eleven times in forty years.
8644 </p><p>
8645
8646 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress extended
8647 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.  It then
8648 extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare extensions
8649 are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending existing
8650 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that restraint was
8651 now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there was no reason to
8652 expect that cycle would end. This Court had not hesitated to intervene where
8653 Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.  There was no reason it
8654 couldn't intervene here.  Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in
8655 October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
8656 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to help in
8657 the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where wannabe justices
8658 fire questions at wannabe winners.
8659 </p><p>
8660 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a single
8661 point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to the
8662 power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that terms would be
8663 effectively unlimited; going with us would give Congress a clear line to
8664 follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots were an effective practice; I
8665 found ways to take every question back to this central idea.
8666 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790142"></a><p>
8667 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the skeptic. He
8668 had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor General Charles
8669 Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme Court. And in his review
8670 of the moot, he let his concern speak: <a class="indexterm" name="id2790155"></a>
8671 </p><p>
8672 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be willing
8673 to upset this practice that the government says has been a consistent
8674 practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see the
8675 harm&#8212;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they don't see
8676 that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
8677 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790164"></a><p>
8678
8679 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but he didn't
8680 understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the right
8681 thing&#8212;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
8682 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court does the
8683 right thing&#8212;not because of politics but because it is right. As I
8684 listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood his
8685 point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.  Let the
8686 politicians learn to see that it was also good.  The night before the
8687 argument, a line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The
8688 case had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
8689 culture. Hundreds stood in line for the chance to see the
8690 proceedings. Scores spent the night on the Supreme Court steps so that they
8691 would be assured a seat.
8692 </p><p>
8693 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can ask for
8694 seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for my
8695 parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get a seat in a
8696 special section reserved for them. And senators and congressmen have a
8697 special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of course, the press
8698 has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on the Court. As we
8699 entered that morning, there was no place that was not taken. This was an
8700 argument about intellectual property law, yet the halls were filled. As I
8701 walked in to take my seat at the front of the Court, I saw my parents
8702 sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table, I saw Jack Valenti sitting
8703 in the special section ordinarily reserved for family of the Justices.
8704 </p><p>
8705 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began where I
8706 intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's power. This
8707 was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether those enumerated
8708 powers had any limit.
8709 </p><p>
8710 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.  The history
8711 was bothering her.
8712 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8713 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often through the years,
8714 and if you are right, don't we run the risk of upsetting previous extensions
8715 of time? I mean, this seems to be a practice that began with the very first
8716 act.
8717 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8718 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face of
8719 what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again was to
8720 emphasize limits on Congress's power.
8721 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8722
8723 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in mind,
8724 then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their words that gives
8725 effect to what they had in mind, and the answer is yes.
8726 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8727 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen where the
8728 Court was going. The first was a question by Justice Kennedy, who observed,
8729 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8730 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that the '76 act,
8731 too, should have been declared void, and that we might leave it alone
8732 because of the disruption, is that for all these years the act has impeded
8733 progress in science and the useful arts.  I just don't see any empirical
8734 evidence for that.
8735 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8736 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a student, I
8737 answered,
8738 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8739 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.  Nothing
8740 in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical assertion about
8741 impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a structural limit necessary
8742 to assure that what would be an effectively perpetual term not be permitted
8743 under the copyright laws.
8744 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2790291"></a><p>
8745 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right answer
8746 was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any number of
8747 briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And here was the
8748 place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a softball; my answer
8749 was a swing and a miss.
8750 </p><p>
8751 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
8752 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we hoped
8753 that he would see this case as its second cousin.
8754 </p><p>
8755
8756 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all sympathetic.
8757 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
8758
8759
8760 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8761 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the right to copy
8762 verbatim other people's books, don't you?
8763 </p><p>
8764 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that should be in the
8765 public domain and would be in the public domain but for a statute that
8766 cannot be justified under ordinary First Amendment analysis or under a
8767 proper reading of the limits built into the Copyright Clause.
8768 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8769 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument; for now the
8770 Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia asked Solicitor
8771 General Olson,
8772 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8773 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited time
8774 would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely the
8775 argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited time which is
8776 extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited time.
8777 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8778 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.  Olson's
8779 flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed to the
8780 academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if this were the
8781 first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright and Patent Clause
8782 power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I closed by pointing out the
8783 long history of the Court imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of
8784 the Copyright and Patent Clause&#8212; indeed, the very first case striking
8785 a law of Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon
8786 the Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
8787 Court to my side.
8788 </p><p>
8789
8790 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I wished I
8791 could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had answered
8792 differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me optimistic.
8793 </p><p>
8794 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit? Over
8795 and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was precisely the
8796 answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not imagine how the Court
8797 could understand that the government believed Congress's power was unlimited
8798 under the terms of the Copyright Clause, and sustain the government's
8799 argument. The solicitor general had made my argument for me. No matter how
8800 often I tried, I could not understand how the Court could find that
8801 Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
8802 Copyright Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe
8803 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&#8212;in
8804 particular, the Conservatives&#8212;would feel itself constrained by the
8805 rule of law that it had established elsewhere.
8806 </p><p>
8807 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office and
8808 missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the
8809 message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
8810 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
8811 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
8812 </p><p>
8813 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the phone off
8814 the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat down to see where I
8815 had been wrong in my reasoning.
8816 </p><p>
8817 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the world against
8818 reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages,
8819 looking for reasoning.
8820 </p><p>
8821 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would distinguish the
8822 principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The argument was nowhere
8823 to be found. The case was not even cited. The argument that was the core
8824 argument of our case did not even appear in the Court's opinion.
8825 </p><p>
8826
8827
8828
8829 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.  Consistent
8830 with her view that Congress's power was not limited generally, she had found
8831 Congress's power not limited here.
8832 </p><p>
8833 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&#8212;for her, and for Justice
8834 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them to
8835 write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine they had
8836 worked so hard to defeat.
8837 </p><p>
8838 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I was
8839 reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile limited
8840 powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the Progress
8841 Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could reconcile the two
8842 simply by not addressing the argument. There was no inconsistency because
8843 they would not talk about the two together.  There was therefore no
8844 principle that followed from the Lopez case: In that context, Congress's
8845 power would be limited, but in this context it would not.
8846 </p><p>
8847 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values they
8848 would respect? By what right did they&#8212;the silent five&#8212;get to
8849 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the values
8850 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that I said I
8851 hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue here was
8852 important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I might hate a
8853 system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional values that it
8854 will respect, that is the system we have.
8855 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790461"></a><p>
8856 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's opinion
8857 was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
8858 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension of
8859 terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had governed in the
8860 context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court discounted the
8861 parallel&#8212;without explaining how the very same words in the Progress
8862 Clause could come to mean totally different things depending upon whether
8863 the words were about patents or copyrights.  The Court let Justice Stevens's
8864 charge go unanswered.
8865 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790480"></a><p>
8866
8867
8868 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever written, was
8869 external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of copyrights has
8870 become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said that under the
8871 current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8 percent of the value of a
8872 perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the actual number was
8873 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the point was clear: If the
8874 Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and the existing term was so
8875 long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
8876 </p><p>
8877 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But because
8878 neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push it as a
8879 reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without anyone having
8880 addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge Sentelle. It was
8881 Hamlet without the Prince.
8882 </p><p>
8883 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when depression
8884 gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure the
8885 depression. This anger was of two sorts.
8886 </p><p>
8887 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been one
8888 thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't apply in
8889 this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing argument, I don't
8890 believe, having read it made by others, and having tried to make it
8891 myself. But it at least would have been an act of integrity.  These justices
8892 in particular have repeatedly said that the proper mode of interpreting the
8893 Constitution is "originalism"&#8212;to first understand the framers' text,
8894 interpreted in their context, in light of the structure of the
8895 Constitution. That method had produced Lopez and many other "originalist"
8896 rulings. Where was their "originalism" now?
8897 </p><p>
8898
8899 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain what the
8900 framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they did; they joined
8901 an opinion that never once tried to explain how the structure of that clause
8902 would affect the interpretation of Congress's power. And they joined an
8903 opinion that didn't even try to explain why this grant of power could be
8904 unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause would be limited. In short, they had
8905 joined an opinion that did not apply to, and was inconsistent with, their
8906 own method for interpreting the Constitution. This opinion may well have
8907 yielded a result that they liked. It did not produce a reason that was
8908 consistent with their own principles.
8909 </p><p>
8910 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with myself.  For I
8911 had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of the law as
8912 it is.
8913 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790568"></a><p>
8914 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for idealism
8915 about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.  Most have a
8916 much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this case would be won
8917 based on whether I could convince the Justices that the framers' values were
8918 important, I fought the idea, because I didn't want to believe that that is
8919 how this Court decides. I insisted on arguing this case as if it were a
8920 simple application of a set of principles.  I had an argument that followed
8921 in logic. I didn't need to waste my time showing it should also follow in
8922 popularity.
8923 </p><p>
8924
8925 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I can see
8926 a hundred places where the answers could have taken the conversation in
8927 different directions, where the truth about the harm that this unchecked
8928 power will cause could have been made clear to this Court. Justice Kennedy
8929 in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically, corrected his
8930 question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown the First
8931 Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the question to make the
8932 logical point. I had shown them how they could strike this law of Congress
8933 if they wanted to. There were a hundred places where I could have helped
8934 them want to, yet my stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have
8935 stood before hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion
8936 in that effort to persuade; but I refused to stand before this audience and
8937 try to persuade with the passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis
8938 on which a court should decide the issue.
8939 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790610"></a><p>
8940 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it have
8941 been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or Kathleen
8942 Sullivan? <a class="indexterm" name="id2790622"></a>
8943 </p><p>
8944 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court was not
8945 ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It would take
8946 a great deal more to show our society why our framers were right. And when
8947 we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
8948 </p><p>
8949 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in doing
8950 anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have little
8951 reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had stepped
8952 down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could have
8953 persuaded.
8954 </p><p>
8955 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
8956 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
8957 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case
8958 was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
8959 not be raised until it is.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2790653"></a>
8960 </p><p>
8961
8962 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and publicly,
8963 that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have been persuaded,
8964 then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that here again Peter
8965 was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in a way that would do
8966 some good or they were not ready to hear this case in a way that would do
8967 some good. Either way, the decision to bring this case&#8212;a decision I
8968 had made four years before&#8212;was wrong.  While the reaction to the Sonny
8969 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's
8970 decision was mixed.  No one, at least in the press, tried to say that
8971 extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over
8972 ideas. Where the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had
8973 been skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
8974 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was
8975 attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful
8976 law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
8977 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8978 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are seeing
8979 the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of copyright
8980 perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment, one that should
8981 not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on the entire creative
8982 output of humanity is one of the reasons we live in a time of such fruitful
8983 creative ferment.
8984 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8985 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of hilarious
8986 images&#8212;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view of the
8987 case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page. The "powerful and
8988 wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like
8989 that.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2790539"></a>
8990 </p><p>
8991 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the quote from
8992 The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the "public domain" is
8993 over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey, I shrunk the
8994 Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in our Constitution
8995 a commitment to free culture. In the case that I fathered, the Supreme Court
8996 effectively renounced that commitment. A better lawyer would have made them
8997 see differently.
8998 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="eldred-ii"></a>Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</h2></div></div></div><p>
8999 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
9000 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
9001 denied&#8212;meaning the case was really finally over&#8212;fate would have
9002 it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)  This was a
9003 particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The drive into the city
9004 from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I opened up my computer and
9005 wrote an op-ed piece.
9006 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790735"></a><p>
9007 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
9008 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head the same
9009 advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is important. And
9010 alternating with that command was the question of Justice Kennedy: "For all
9011 these years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts. I
9012 just don't see any empirical evidence for that." And so, having failed in
9013 the argument of constitutional principle, finally, I turned to an argument
9014 of politics.
9015 </p><p>
9016
9017 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple fix:
9018 Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner would be
9019 required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid the fee, he
9020 got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not, the work
9021 passed into the public domain.
9022 </p><p>
9023 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.  Eric
9024 Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as he said
9025 early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
9026 </p><p>
9027 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this is either
9028 the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright Term Deregulation
9029 Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear and obvious: Remove
9030 copyright where it is doing nothing except blocking access and the spread of
9031 knowledge. Leave it for as long as Congress allows for those works where its
9032 worth is at least $1. But for everything else, let the content go.
9033 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790800"></a><p>
9034 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed it in
9035 an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters expressing
9036 support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people can see the
9037 copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican might say, here
9038 government regulation is simply getting in the way of innovation and
9039 creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the government is
9040 blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no good reason. Indeed,
9041 there is no real difference between Democrats and Republicans on this
9042 issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm of the present system.
9043 </p><p>
9044 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
9045 requirement.  For one of the hardest things about the current system for
9046 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to look
9047 for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not required, since
9048 marking content is not required, since no formality at all is required, it
9049 is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask permission to use
9050 or license their work. This system would lower these costs, by establishing
9051 at least one registry where copyright owners could be identified.
9052 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790833"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2790840"></a><p>
9053
9054 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were removed in
9055 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning any formal
9056 requirement before a copyright is granted.<sup>[<a name="id2790851" href="#ftn.id2790851" class="footnote">194</a>]</sup> The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right."
9057 Natural rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the
9058 Anglo-American tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if
9059 their rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
9060 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
9061 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
9062 </p><p>
9063 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is absurd
9064 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a world
9065 without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread "Walt Disney
9066 creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to know what's
9067 protected and what's not.
9068 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2790895"></a><p>
9069 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin in
9070 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne Convention in 1908,
9071 to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as the
9072 abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated because the
9073 stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was as if a Charles
9074 Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or
9075 cross a t resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
9076 </p><p>
9077 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
9078 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
9079 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
9080 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities totally,
9081 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more equitable system
9082 of registration.
9083 </p><p>
9084 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration in the
9085 nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was also a
9086 hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save the
9087 starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory burden
9088 imposed upon creators.
9089 </p><p>
9090
9091 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was a moral
9092 claim as well. There was no reason that creative property should be a
9093 second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table, his rights
9094 over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the government.  He has
9095 a property right over the table "naturally," and he can assert that right
9096 against anyone who would steal the table, whether or not he has informed the
9097 government of his ownership of the table.
9098 </p><p>
9099 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
9100 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative property
9101 being second-class property. The argument in favor of formalities turns upon
9102 the special problems that creative property presents.  The law of
9103 formalities responds to the special physics of creative property, to assure
9104 that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
9105 </p><p>
9106 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just because
9107 you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is to be
9108 effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just because
9109 you must register the car with the state and tag it with a license.  In both
9110 of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important reason to secure
9111 registration&#8212;both because it makes the markets more efficient and
9112 because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without a registration
9113 system for land, landowners would perpetually have to guard their
9114 property. With registration, they can simply point the police to a
9115 deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would be much
9116 easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden to sell a
9117 stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but those
9118 burdens produce a much better system of protection for property generally.
9119 </p><p>
9120 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
9121 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
9122 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
9123 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
9124 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
9125 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property with
9126 confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is the author
9127 and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in a world without
9128 formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions take their place.
9129 <a class="indexterm" name="id2790961"></a>
9130 </p><p>
9131 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono Act that we
9132 tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it didn't "get."
9133 Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no way easily to
9134 build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright terms were, as Justice
9135 Story said they would be, "short," then this wouldn't matter much. For
9136 fourteen years, under the framers' system, a work would be presumptively
9137 controlled. After fourteen years, it would be presumptively uncontrolled.
9138 </p><p>
9139 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the inability to
9140 know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a huge and obvious
9141 burden on the creative process. If the only way a library can offer an
9142 Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a lawyer to clear the rights
9143 to every image and sound, then the copyright system is burdening creativity
9144 in a way that has never been seen before because there are no formalities.
9145 </p><p>
9146 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If it is
9147 worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the longer
9148 term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how to get your
9149 permission if they want to use your work. And you will get the benefit of an
9150 extended copyright term.
9151 </p><p>
9152 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
9153 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
9154 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public domain
9155 where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a movie based
9156 on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
9157 </p><p>
9158 Noen bekymrer seg over byrden på forfattere. Gjør ikke byrden med å
9159 registrere verket at beløpet $1 egentlig er misvisende?  Er ikke
9160 ekstraarbeidet verdt mer enn $1? Er ikke dette det virkelige problemet med
9161 registrering?
9162 </p><p>
9163
9164 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
9165 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no doubt
9166 because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
9167 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must address
9168 the real problem of governments standing at the core of any system of
9169 formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That solution
9170 essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it was Amazon that
9171 ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click registration.  The
9172 Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click registration fifty years after
9173 a work was published. Based upon historical data, that system would move up
9174 to 98 percent of commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a
9175 commercial life, into the public domain within fifty years. What do you
9176 think?
9177 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2791087"></a><p>
9178 Da Steve Forbes støttet idéen, begynte enkelte i Washington å følge
9179 med. Mange kontaktet meg med tips til representanter som kan være villig til
9180 å introdusere en Eldred-lov. og jeg hadde noen få som foreslo direkte at de
9181 kan være villige til å ta det første skrittet.
9182 </p><p>
9183 En representant, Zoe Lofgren fra California, gikk så langt som å få
9184 lovforslaget utarbeidet. Utkastet løste noen problemer med internasjonal
9185 lov. Det påla de enklest mulige forutsetninger på innehaverne av
9186 opphavsretter. I mai 2003 så det ut som om loven skulle være introdusert.
9187 16. mai, postet jeg på Eldred Act-bloggen, "vi er nære".  Det oppstod en
9188 generell reaksjon i blogg-samfunnet om at noe godt kunne skje her.
9189 <a class="indexterm" name="id2791119"></a>
9190 </p><p>
9191 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and the
9192 MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give the view of
9193 the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti informed the
9194 congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred Act. The reasons are
9195 embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their thinness shows something clear
9196 about what this debate is really about.
9197 </p><p>
9198
9199 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central concept
9200 in the proposed bill"&#8212;that copyrights be renewed. That was true, but
9201 irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred long before the
9202 Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.  Second, they argued that
9203 the proposal would harm poor copyright owners&#8212;apparently those who
9204 could not afford the $1 fee. Third, they argued that Congress had determined
9205 that extending a copyright term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in
9206 the case of the small percentage of work covered by copyright law that is
9207 still commercially valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal
9208 would not cut off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth,
9209 the MPAA argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
9210 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are certainly
9211 less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright whose owner is
9212 not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the copyright to a story
9213 underlying a film were to pass into the public domain. But what risk is
9214 that? If it is in the public domain, then the film is a valid derivative
9215 use.
9216 </p><p>
9217 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to do
9218 this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are thousands of
9219 copyright owners who don't even know they have a copyright to give. Whether
9220 they are free to give away their copyright or not&#8212;a controversial
9221 claim in any case&#8212;unless they know about a copyright, they're not
9222 likely to.
9223 </p><p>
9224 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law reacting to
9225 changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.  In the other,
9226 common sense was delayed. The difference between the two stories was the
9227 power of the opposition&#8212;the power of the side that fought to defend
9228 the status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
9229 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
9230 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
9231 </p><p>
9232 Jeg brukte disse to tilfellene som en måte å ramme inn krigen som denne
9233 boken har handlet om.  For her er det også en ny teknologi som tvinger loven
9234 til å reagere.  Og her bør vi også spørre, er loven i tråd med eller i strid
9235 med sunn fornuft.  Hvis sunn fornuft støtter loven, hva forklarer denne
9236 sunne fornuften?
9237 </p><p>
9238
9239
9240
9241 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the copyright
9242 owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and harmful, and the
9243 law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is p2p sharing, it is easy
9244 to understand why the law backs the owners still: Much of this sharing is
9245 wrong, even if much is harmless. When the issue is copyright terms for the
9246 Mickey Mouses of the world, it is possible still to understand why the law
9247 favors Hollywood: Most people don't recognize the reasons for limiting
9248 copyright terms; it is thus still possible to see good faith within the
9249 resistance.
9250 </p><p>
9251 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred Act,
9252 then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked selfinterest
9253 driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary range of content that
9254 is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with any copyright owner's desire
9255 to exercise continued control over his content. It would simply liberate
9256 what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark Content" that fills archives around the
9257 world. So when the warriors oppose a change like this, we should ask one
9258 simple question:
9259 </p><p>
9260 Hva ønsker denne industrien egentlig?
9261 </p><p>
9262 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So the
9263 effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about protecting
9264 their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort to assure
9265 that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another step to
9266 assure that the public domain will never compete, that there will be no use
9267 of content that is not commercially controlled, and that there will be no
9268 commercial use of content that doesn't require their permission first.
9269 </p><p>
9270 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side is. The
9271 most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as its aim not
9272 the protection of "property" but the rejection of a tradition.  Their aim is
9273 not simply to protect what is theirs. Their aim is to assure that all there
9274 is is what is theirs.
9275 </p><p>
9276
9277 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not hard
9278 to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public domain
9279 tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA feared the
9280 competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public domain connected to
9281 a public that now has the means to create with it and to share its own
9282 creation.
9283 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2791273"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2791279"></a><p>
9284 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is as if
9285 the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the Causbys and
9286 demands that their remote and useless property rights be respected, so that
9287 these remote and forgotten copyright holders might block the progress of
9288 others.
9289 </p><p>
9290 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
9291 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so long
9292 as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of the
9293 Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission society." The
9294 past can be cultivated only if you can identify the owner and gain
9295 permission to build upon his work. The future will be controlled by this
9296 dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
9297 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788544" href="#id2788544" class="para">179</a>] </sup>
9298
9299
9300 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
9301 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world of
9302 noncommercial pornographers&#8212;people who were distributing porn but were
9303 not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution.  Such a
9304 class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the costs of
9305 distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got
9306 special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the
9307 Communications Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
9308 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
9309 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial publishers
9310 after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the world before the
9311 Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at least as important to
9312 protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect noncommercial pornographers.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788630" href="#id2788630" class="para">180</a>] </sup>
9313
9314
9315 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to
9316 last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
9317 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
9318 copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is
9319 also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one
9320 day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress," 144
9321 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
9322 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788841" href="#id2788841" class="para">181</a>] </sup>
9323
9324 Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse
9325 Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years," Chicago Tribune,
9326 17. oktober 1998, 22.
9327 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788854" href="#id2788854" class="para">182</a>] </sup>
9328
9329 Se Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information Age,"
9330 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9331 #49</a>.
9332 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788869" href="#id2788869" class="para">183</a>] </sup>
9333
9334 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars," Congressional
9335 Quarterly This Week, 8. august 1990, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #50</a>.
9336 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788948" href="#id2788948" class="para">184</a>] </sup>
9337
9338 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
9339 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788959" href="#id2788959" class="para">185</a>] </sup>
9340
9341 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
9342 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2788974" href="#id2788974" class="para">186</a>] </sup>
9343
9344 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
9345 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the context of
9346 the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the government
9347 would allow the government unending power to regulate commerce&#8212;the
9348 limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The same point is true in
9349 the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's
9350 interpretation would allow the government unending power to regulate
9351 copyrights&#8212;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
9352 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2789018" href="#id2789018" class="para">187</a>] </sup>
9353
9354 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
9355 U.S.  186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #51</a>.
9356 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2789093" href="#id2789093" class="para">188</a>] </sup>
9357
9358 The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
9359 Congressional Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal
9360 ranges. See Brief of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #52</a>.
9361 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2789234" href="#id2789234" class="para">189</a>] </sup>
9362
9363
9364 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law," Los
9365 Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies, Songs,
9366 Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking Down
9367 Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
9368 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2789282" href="#id2789282" class="para">190</a>] </sup>
9369
9370 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
9371 Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See
9372 also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet
9373 Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #53</a>.
9374 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2789497" href="#id2789497" class="para">191</a>] </sup>
9375
9376
9377 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20 December
9378 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9379 #54</a>.
9380 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2789932" href="#id2789932" class="para">192</a>] </sup>
9381
9382
9383 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
9384 (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
9385 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2789948" href="#id2789948" class="para">193</a>] </sup>
9386
9387
9388 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins
9389 the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
9390 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2790851" href="#id2790851" class="para">194</a>] </sup>
9391
9392
9393 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
9394 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
9395 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
9396 author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act, every text
9397 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
9398 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any formality."
9399 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article 5(2) of
9400 the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue to impose
9401 some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as a condition
9402 of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
9403 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.  Copies of
9404 books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in the British
9405 Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar of Authors where
9406 the author's true name can be filed in the case of anonymous or pseudonymous
9407 works. Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual Property Law, Cases and
9408 Materials (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), 153&#8211;54.  </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 6. Konklusjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-conclusion"></a>Kapittel 6. Konklusjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
9409 Det er mer enn trettifem millioner mennesker over hele verden med
9410 AIDS-viruset. Tjuefem millioner av dem bor i Afrika sør for Sahara.  Sytten
9411 millioner har allerede dødd.  Sytten millioner afrikanere er prosentvis
9412 proporsjonalt med syv millioner amerikanere.  Viktigere er det at dette er
9413 17 millioner afrikanere.
9414 </p><p>
9415 Det finnes ingen kur for AIDS, men det finnes medisiner som kan hemme
9416 sykdommens utvikling.  Disse antiretrovirale terapiene er fortsatt
9417 eksperimentelle, men de har hatt en dramatisk effekt allerede.  I USA øker
9418 AIDS-pasienter som regelmessig tar en cocktail av disse medisinene sin
9419 levealder med ti til tjue år. For noen gjøre medisinene sykdommen nesten
9420 usynlig.
9421 </p><p>
9422 Disse medisinene er dyre.  Da de ble først introdusert i USA, kostet de
9423 mellom $10 000 og $15 000 pr. person hvert år.  I dag koster noen av dem $25
9424 000 pr. år.  Med disse prisene har, selvfølgelig, ingen afrikansk stat  råd
9425 til medisinen for det store flertall av sine innbyggere: $15 000 er tredve
9426 ganger brutto nasjonalprodukt pr. innbygger i Zimbabwe.  Med slike priser er
9427 disse medisinene fullstendig utilgjengelig.<sup>[<a name="id2791360" href="#ftn.id2791360" class="footnote">195</a>]</sup>
9428 </p><p>
9429
9430
9431 Disse prisene er ikke høye fordi ingrediensene til medisinene er dyre.
9432 Disse prisene er høye fordi medisinene er beskyttet av patenter.
9433 Farmasiselskapene som produserer disse livreddende blandingene nyter minst
9434 tjue års monopol på sine oppfinnelser.  De bruker denne monopolmakten til å
9435 hente ut så mye de kan fra markedet.  Ved hjelp av denne makten holder de
9436 prisene høye.
9437 </p><p>
9438 Det er mange som er skeptiske til patenter, spesielt patenter på
9439 medisiner. Det er ikke jeg. Faktisk av alle forskningsområder som kan være
9440 støttet av patenter, er forskning på medisiner, etter min mening, det
9441 klareste tilfelle der patenter er nødvendig. Patenter gir et farmasøytiske
9442 firma en viss forsikring om at hvis det lykkes i å finne opp et nytt
9443 medikament som kan behandle en sykdom, vil det kunne tjene tilbake
9444 investeringen og mer til. Dette ber sosialt et ekstremt verdifullt
9445 insentiv. Jeg er den siste personen som vil argumentere for at loven skal
9446 avskaffe dette, i det minste uten andre endringer.
9447 </p><p>
9448 Men det er én ting å støtte patenter, selv patenter på medisiner. Det er en
9449 annen ting å avgjøre hvordan en best skal håndtere en krise. Og i det
9450 afrikanske ledere begynte å erkjenne ødeleggelsen AIDS brakte, begynte de å
9451 se etter måter å importere HIV-medisiner til kostnader betydelig under
9452 markedspris.
9453 </p><p>
9454 I 1997 forsøkte Sør-Afrika seg på en tilnærming.  Landet vedtok en lov som
9455 tillot import av patenterte medisiner som hadde blitt produsert og solgt i
9456 en annen nasjons marked med godkjenning fra patenteieren.  For eksempel,
9457 hvis medisinen var solgt i India, så kunne den bli importert inn til Afrika
9458 fra India.  Dette kalles "parallellimport" og er generelt tillatt i
9459 internasjonal handelslovgivning, og spesifikt tillatt i den europeiske
9460 union.<sup>[<a name="id2791437" href="#ftn.id2791437" class="footnote">196</a>]</sup>
9461 </p><p>
9462 Men USA var imot lovendringen.  Og de nøyde seg ikke med å være imot. Som
9463 International Intellectual Property Association karakteriserte det,
9464 "Myndighetene i USA presset Sør-Afrika . . . til å ikke tillate tvungen
9465 lisensiering eller parallellimport"<sup>[<a name="id2791471" href="#ftn.id2791471" class="footnote">197</a>]</sup>
9466 Gjennom kontoret til USAs handelsrepresentant (USTR), ba myndighetene
9467 Sør-Afrika om å endre loven&#8212;og for å legge press bak den
9468 forespørselen, listet USTR i 1998 opp Sør-Afrika som et land som burde
9469 vurderes for handelsrestriksjoner.  Samme år gikk mer enn førti
9470 farmasiselskaper til retten for å utfordre myndighetenes handlinger. USA
9471 fikk selskap av andre myndigheter fra EU.  Deres påstand, og påstanden til
9472 farmasiselskapene, var at Sør-Afrika brøt sine internasjonale forpliktelser
9473 ved å distriminere mot en bestemt type patenter&#8212;farmasøytiske
9474 patenter.  Kravet fra disse myndighetene, med USA i spissen, var at
9475 Sør-Afrika skulle respektere disse patentene på samme måte som alle andre
9476 patenter, uavhengig av eventuell effekt på behandlingen av AIDS i
9477 Sør-Afrika.<sup>[<a name="id2791496" href="#ftn.id2791496" class="footnote">198</a>]</sup>
9478 </p><p>
9479 Vi bør sette intervensjonen til USA i sammenheng.  Det er ingen tvil om at
9480 patenter ikke er den viktigste årsaken til at Afrikanere ikke har tilgang
9481 til medisiner.  Fattigdom og den totale mangel på effektivt helsevesen betyr
9482 mer. Men uansett om patenter er en viktigste grunnen eller ikke, så har
9483 prisen på medisiner en effekt på etterspørselen, og patenter påvirker
9484 prisen. Så uansett, massiv eller marginal, så var det en effekt av våre
9485 myndigheters intervensjon for å stoppe flyten av medisiner inn til Afrika.
9486 </p><p>
9487 Ved å stoppe flyten av HIV-behandling til Afrika, sikret ikke myndighetene i
9488 USA medisiner til USA borgere. Dette er ikke som hvete (hvis de spise det så
9489 kan ikke vi spise det). Det som USA i effekt intervenerte for å stoppe, var
9490 flyten av kunnskap: Informasjon om hvordan en kan ta kjemikalier som finnes
9491 i Afrika og gjøre disse kjemikaliene om til medisiner som kan redde 15 til
9492 30 millioner liv.
9493 </p><p>
9494 Intervensjonen fra USA ville heller ikke beskytte fortjenesten til
9495 medisinselskapene i USA&#8212; i hvert fall ikke betydelig.  Det var jo ikke
9496 slik at disse landene hadde mulighet til å kjøpe medisinene til de prisene
9497 som medisinselskapene forlangte.  Igjen var afrikanerne for fattige til å ha
9498 råd til disse medisinene til de tilbudte prisene.  Å blokkere for
9499 parallellimport av disse medisinene ville ikke øke salget til de amerikanske
9500 selskapene betydelig.
9501 </p><p>
9502 I stedet var argumentet til fordel for restriksjoner på denne flyten av
9503 informasjon, som var nødvendig for å redde millioner av liv, et argument om
9504 eiendoms ukrenkelighet.<sup>[<a name="id2791588" href="#ftn.id2791588" class="footnote">199</a>]</sup>  Det var på
9505 grunn av at "intellektuell eiendom" ville bli krenket at disse medisinene
9506 ikke skulle flomme inn til Afrika.  Det var prinsippet om viktigheten av
9507 "intellektuell eiendom" som fikk disse myndighetsaktørene til å intervenere
9508 mot Sør-Afrikas mottiltak mot AIDS.
9509 </p><p>
9510 La oss ta et skritt tilbake for et øyeblikk.  En gang om tredve år vil våre
9511 barn se tilbake på oss og spørre, hvordan kunne vi la dette skje?  Hvordan
9512 kunne vi tillate å gjennomføre en politikk hvis direkte kostnad var få 15
9513 til 30 millioner afrikanere til å dø raskere, og hvis eneste virkelige
9514 fordel var å opprettholde "ukrenkeligheten" til en idé?  Hva slags
9515 berettigelse kan noen sinne eksistere for en politikk som resulterer i så
9516 mange døde?  Hva slags galskap er det egentlig som tillater at så mange dør
9517 for slik en abstraksjon?
9518 </p><p>
9519 Noen skylder på farmasiselskapene.  Det gjør ikke jeg.  De er selskaper, og
9520 deres ledere er lovpålagt å tjene penger for selskapene.  De presser på for
9521 en bestemt patentpolitikk, ikke på grunn av idealer, men fordi det er dette
9522 som gjør at de tjener mest penger.  Og dette gjør kun at de tjener mest
9523 penger på grunn av en slags korrupsjon i vårt politiske system&#8212; en
9524 korrupsjon som farmasiselskapene helt klart ikke er ansvarlige for.
9525 </p><p>
9526 Denne korrupsjonen er våre egne politikeres manglende integritet.  For
9527 medisinprodusentene ville elske&#8212;sier de selv, og jeg tror dem &#8212;
9528 å selge sine medisiner så billig som de kan til land i Afrika og andre
9529 steder. Det er utfordringer de må løse å sikre at medisinene ikke kommer
9530 tilbake til USA, men dette er bare teknologiske utfordring. De kan bli
9531 overvunnet.
9532 </p><p>
9533
9534 Et annet problem kan derimot ikke løses. Det er frykten for at en politiker
9535 som skal vise seg og kaller inn lederne hos medisinprodusentene til høring i
9536 senatet eller representantenes hus og spør, "hvordan har det seg at du kan
9537 selge HIV-medisinen i Afrika for bare $1 pr. pille, mens samme pille koster
9538 en amerikansker $1500?" Da det ikke finnes et "kjapt svar" på det
9539 spørsmålet, ville effekten bli regulering av priser i Amerika.
9540 Medisinprodusentene unngård dermed denne spiralen ved å sikre at det første
9541 steget ikke tas.  De forsterker idéen om at eierrettigheter skal være
9542 ukrenkelige.  De legger seg på en rasjonell strategi i en irrasjonell
9543 omgivelse, med den utilsiktede konsekvens at kanskje millioner dør.  Og den
9544 rasjonelle strategien rammes dermed inn ved hjel av dette
9545 ideal&#8212;helligheten til en idé som kalles "immaterielle rettigheter".
9546 </p><p>
9547 Så når du konfronteres av ditt barns sunne fornuft, hva vil du si?  Når den
9548 sunne fornuften hos en generasjon endelig gjør opprør mot hva vi har gjort,
9549 hvordan vil vi rettferdiggjøre det?  Hva er argumentet?
9550 </p><p>
9551 En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk støtte til
9552 patentsystemet uten å måtte nå alle overalt på nøyaktig samme måte. På samme
9553 måte som en fornuftig opphavsrettspolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk
9554 støtte til et opphavsretts-system uten å måtte regulere spredningen av
9555 kultur perfekt og for alltid.  En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for
9556 og gi sterk støtte til et patentsystem uten å måtte blokkere spredning av
9557 medisiner til et land som uansett ikke er rikt nok til å ha råd til
9558 markedsprisen.  En fornuftig politikk kan en dermed si kunne være en
9559 balansert politikk.  For det meste av vår historie har både opphavsrett- og
9560 patentpolitikken i denne forstand vært balansert.
9561 </p><p>
9562
9563 Men vi som kultur har mistet denne følelsen for balanse.  Vi har mistet det
9564 kritiske blikket som hjelper oss til å se forkjellen mellom sannhet og
9565 ekstremisme.  En slags eiendomsfundamentalisme, uten grunnlag i vår
9566 tradisjon, hersker nå i vår kultur&#8212;sært, og med konsekvenser mer
9567 alvorlig for spredningen av idéer og kultur enn nesten enhver annen politisk
9568 enkeltavgjørelse vi som demokrati kan fatte.  En enkel idé blender oss, og
9569 under dekke av mørket skjer mye som de fleste av oss ville avvist hvis vi
9570 hadde fulgt med.  Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om eierskap til idéer at
9571 vi ikke engang legger merke til hvor uhyrlig det er å nekte tilgang til
9572 idéer for et folk som dør uten dem.  Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om
9573 eiendom til kulturen at vi ikke engang stiller spørsmål ved når kontrollen
9574 over denne eiendommen fjerner vår evne, som folk, til å utvikle vår kultur
9575 demokratisk.  Blindhet blir vår sunne fornuft, og utfordringen for enhver
9576 som vil gjenvinne retten til å dyrke vår kultur er å finne en måte å få
9577 denne sunne fornuften til å åpne sine øyne.
9578 </p><p>
9579 Så langt sover sunn fornuft.  Det er intet opprør.  Sunn fornuft ser ennå
9580 ikke hva det er å gjøre opprør mot.  Ekstremismen som nå domunerer denne
9581 debatten resonerer med idéer som virker naturlige, og resonansen er
9582 forsterket av våre moderne RCA-ene.  De fører en frenetisk krig for å
9583 bekjempe "piratvirksomhet" og knuser kreativitetskultur.  De forsvarer idéen
9584 om "kreativt eierskap", mens de endrer ekte skapere til moderne
9585 leilendinger.  De blir fornermet av idéen om at rettigheter skulle være
9586 balanserte, selv om hver av hovedaktørene i denne innholdskrigen selv hadde
9587 fordeler av et mer balansert ideal.  Hykleriet rår.  Men i en by som
9588 Washington blir ikke hykleriet en gang lakt merke til.  Mektige lobbyister,
9589 kompliserte problemer og MTV-oppmerksomhetsspenn gir en "perfekt storm" for
9590 fri kultur.
9591 </p><p>
9592 I august 2003 brøt en kamp ut i USA om en avgjørelse fra World Intellectual
9593 Property Organiation om å avlyse et møte.<sup>[<a name="id2791702" href="#ftn.id2791702" class="footnote">200</a>]</sup> På forespørsel fra en lang rekke med interresenter hadde WIPO
9594 bestemt å avholde et møte for å diskutere "åpne og sammarbeidende prosjekter
9595 for å skape goder for felleskapet".  Disse prosjektene som hadde lyktes i å
9596 produsere goder for fellesskapet uten å basere seg eksklusivt på bruken av
9597 proprietære immaterielle rettigheter.  Eksempler inkluderer internettet og
9598 verdensveven, begge som ble utviklet på grunnlag av protokoller i
9599 allemannseie.  Det hadde med en begynnende trend for å støtte åpne
9600 akademiske tidsskrifter, og inkluderte Public Library of Science-prosjektet
9601 som jeg beskriver i etterordet.  Det inkluderte et prosjekt for a utvikle
9602 enkeltnukleotidforskjeller (SNPs), som er antatt å få stor betydning i
9603 biomedisinsk forskning.  (Dette ideelle prosjektet besto av et konsortium av
9604 Wellcome Trust og farmasøytiske og teknologiske selskaper, inkludert
9605 Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
9606 Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, og
9607 Searle.)  Det inkluderte Globalt posisjonssystem (GPS) som Ronald Reagen
9608 frigjorde tidlig på 1980-tallet.  Og det inkluderte "åpen kildekode og fri
9609 programvare". <a class="indexterm" name="id2791868"></a>
9610 </p><p>
9611 Formålet med møtet var å vurdere denne rekken av prosjekter fra et felles
9612 perspektiv: at ingen av disse prosjektene hadde som grunnlag immateriell
9613 ekstremisme. I stedet, hos alle disse, ble immaterielle rettigheter
9614 balansert med avtaler om å holde tilgang åpen, eller for å legge
9615 begrensninger på hvordan proprietære krav kan bli brukt.
9616 </p><p>
9617 Dermed var, fra perspektivet i denne boken, denne konferansen
9618 ideell.<sup>[<a name="id2791894" href="#ftn.id2791894" class="footnote">201</a>]</sup> Prosjektene innenfor temaet var
9619 både kommersielle og ikkekommersielle verker.  De involverte i hovedsak
9620 vitenskapet, men fra mange perspektiver.  Og WIPO var et ideelt sted for
9621 denne diskusjonen, siden WIPO var den fremstående internasjonale aktør som
9622 drev med immaterielle rettighetsspørsmål.
9623 </p><p>
9624
9625 Faktisk fikk jeg en gang offentlig kjeft for å ikke anerkjenne dette faktum
9626 om WIPO.  I februar 2003 leverte jeg et hovedinnlegg på en forberedende
9627 konferanse for World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).  På en
9628 pressekonferanse før innlegget, ble jeg spurt hva jeg skulle snakke om.  Jeg
9629 svarte at jeg skulle snakke litt om viktigheten av balanse rundt
9630 immaterielle verdier for utviklingen av informasjonssamfunnet.  Ordstyreren
9631 på arrangementet avbrøt meg da brått for å informere meg og journalistene
9632 tilstede at ingen spørsmål rundt immaterielle verdier ville bli diskutert av
9633 WSIS, da slike spørsmål kun skulle diskuteres i WIPO.  I innlegget jeg hadde
9634 forberedt var temaet om immaterielle verdier en forholdvis liten del av det
9635 hele.  Men etter denne forbløffende uttalelsen, gjorde jeg immaterielle
9636 verdier til hovedfokus for mitt innlegg.  Det var ikke mulig å snakke om et
9637 "informasjonssamfunn" uten at en også snakket om andelen av informasjon og
9638 kultur som ikke er vernet av opphavsretten.  Mitt innlegg gjorde ikke min
9639 overivrige moderator veldig glad.  Og hun hadde uten tvil rett i at omfanget
9640 til vern av immaterielle rettigheter normalt hørte inn under WIPO.  Men
9641 etter mitt syn, kunne det ikke bli for mye diskusjon om hvor mye
9642 immaterielle rettigheter som trengs, siden etter mitt syn, hadde selve ideen
9643 om en balanse rundt immaterielle rettigheter hadde gått tapt.
9644 </p><p>
9645 Så uansett om WSIS kan diskutere balanse i intellektuell eiendom eller ikke,
9646 så hadde jeg trodd det var tatt for gitt at WIPO kunne og burde.  Og dermed
9647 møtet om "åpne og samarbeidende prosjekter for å skape fellesgoder" virker å
9648 passe perfekt for WIPOs agenda.
9649 </p><p>
9650 Men det er ett prosjekt i listen som er svært kontroversielt, i hvert fall
9651 blant lobbyister. Dette prosjektet er "åpen kildekode og fri
9652 programvare". Microsoft spesielt er skeptisk til diskusjon om emnet. Fra
9653 deres perspektiv, ville en konferanse for å diskutere åpen kildekode og fri
9654 programvare være som en konferanse for å diskutere Apples operativsystem.
9655 Både åpen kildekode og fri programvare konkurrerer med Microsofts
9656 programvare.  Og internasjonalt har mange myndigheter begynt å utforske krav
9657 om at de skal bruke åpen kildekode eller fri programvare, i stedet for
9658 "proprietær programvare," til sine egne interne behov.
9659 </p><p>
9660 Jeg mener ikke å gå inn i den debatten her.  Det er viktig kun for å gjøre
9661 det klart at skillet ikke er mellom kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell
9662 programvare.  Det er mange viktige selskaper som er fundamentalt avhengig av
9663 fri programvare, der IBM er den mest fremtredende.  IBM har i stadig større
9664 grad skiftet sitt fokus til GNU/Linux-operativsystemet, det mest berømte
9665 biten av "fri programvare"&#8212;og IBM er helt klart en kommernsiell
9666 aktør. Dermed er det å støtte "fri programvare" ikke å motsette seg
9667 kommersielle aktører.  Det er i stedet å støtte en måte å drive
9668 programvareutvikling som er forskjellig fra Microsofts.<sup>[<a name="id2791761" href="#ftn.id2791761" class="footnote">202</a>]</sup>
9669 </p><p>
9670
9671 Mer viktig for våre formål, er at å støtte "åpen kildekode og fri
9672 programvare" ikke er å motsette seg opphasvrett. "Åpen kildekode og fri
9673 programvare" er ikke programvare uten opphavsrettslig vern. Istedet, på
9674 samme måte som programvare fra Microsoft, insisterer opphavsrettsinnehaverne
9675 av fri programvare ganske sterkt at vilkårene i deres programvarelisens blir
9676 respektert av de som tar i bruk fri programvare.  Vilkårene i den lisensen
9677 er uten tvil forskjellig fra vilkårene i en proprietær programvarelisens.
9678 For eksempel krever fri programvare lisensiert med den generelle offentlige
9679 lisensen (GPL), at kildekoden for programvare gjøres tilgjengelig for alle
9680 som endrer og redistribuerer programvaren.  Men dette kravet er kun
9681 effektivt hvis opphavsrett råder over programvare.  Hvis opphavsretten ikke
9682 råder over programvare, så kunne ikke fri programvare pålegge slike krav på
9683 de som tar i bruk programvaren.  Den er dermed like avhengig av
9684 opphavsrettsloven som Microsoft.
9685 </p><p>
9686 Det er dermed forståelig at Microsoft, som utviklere av proprietær
9687 programvare, gikk imot et slikt WIPO-møte, og like fullt forståelig at de
9688 bruker sine lobbyister til å få USAs myndigheter til å gå imot møtet.  Og
9689 ganske riktig, det er akkurat dette som i følge rapporter hadde skjedd.  I
9690 følge Jonathan Krim i Washington Post, lyktes Microsofts lobbyister i å få
9691 USAs myndigheter til å legge ned veto mot et slikt møte.<sup>[<a name="id2792103" href="#ftn.id2792103" class="footnote">203</a>]</sup> Og uten støtte fra USA ble møtet avlyst.
9692 </p><p>
9693 Jeg klandrer ikke Microsoft for å gjøre det de kan for å fremme sine egne
9694 interesser i samsvar med loven. Og lobbyvirksomhet mot myndighetene er
9695 åpenbart i samsvar med loven. Det er ikke noe overraskende her med deres
9696 lobbyvirksomhet, og ikke veldig overraskende at den mektigste
9697 programvareprodusenten i USA har lyktes med sin lobbyvirksomhet.
9698 </p><p>
9699 Det som var overraskende var USAs regjerings begrunnelse for å være imot
9700 møtet.  Igjen, siterert av krim, forklarte Lois Boland, direktør for
9701 internasjonale forbindelser ved USAs patent og varemerkekontor, at
9702 "programvare med åpen kildekode går imot til formålet til WIPO, som er å
9703 fremme immatterielle rettigheter.".  Hun skal i følge sitatet ha sagt, "Å
9704 holde et møte som har som formål å fraskrive seg eller frafalle slike
9705 rettigheter synes for oss å være i strid med formålene til WIPO."
9706 </p><p>
9707 Disse utsagnene er forbløffende på flere nivåer.
9708 </p><p>
9709 For det første er de ganske enkelt enkelt ikke riktige.  Som jeg beskrev, er
9710 det meste av åpen kildekode og fri programvare fundamentalt avhengig av den
9711 immaterielle retten kalt "opphavsrett".  Uten den vil begresningene definert
9712 av disse lisensene ikke fungere. Dermed er det å si at de "går imot"
9713 formålet om å fremme immaterielle rettigheter å avsløre en ekstraordinær
9714 mangel på forståelse&#8212;den type feil som er tilgivelig hos en førsteårs
9715 jusstudent, men pinlig fra en høyt plassert statstjenestemann som håndterer
9716 utfordringer rundt immaterielle rettigheter.
9717 </p><p>
9718 For det andre, hvem har noen gang hevdet at WIPOs eksklusive mål var å
9719 "fremme" immaterielle rettigheter maksimalt?  Som jeg fikk kjeft om på den
9720 forberedende konferansen til WSIS, skal WIPO vurdere ikke bare hvordan best
9721 beskytte immaterielle rettigheter, men også hva som er den beste balansen
9722 rundt immaterielle rettigheter.  Som enhver økonom og advokat vet, er det
9723 vanskelige spørsmålet i immaterielle rettighetsjuss å finne den balansen.
9724 Men at det skulle være en grense, trodde jeg, var ubestridt.  Man ønsker å
9725 spørre Ms. boland om generelle medisiner (medisiner basert på medisiner med
9726 patenter som er utløpt) i strid med WIPOs oppdrag?  Svekker allemannseie
9727 immaterielle rettigheter?  Ville det vært bedre om internettets protokoller
9728 hadde vært patentert?
9729 </p><p>
9730 For det tredje, selv om en tror at formålet med WIPO var å maksimere
9731 immaterielle rettigheter, så innehas immaterielle rettigheter, i vår
9732 tradisjon, av individer og selskaper.  De får bestemme hva som skal gjøres
9733 med disse rettighetene, igjen fordi det er de som eier rettigetene. Hvis de
9734 ønsker å "frafalle" eller "frasi" seg sine rettigheter, så er det helt etter
9735 boka i vår tradisjon.  Når Bill Gates gir bort mer enn $20 milliarder til
9736 gode formål, så er ikke det uforenelig med målene til eiendomssystemet.  Det
9737 er heller tvert i mot, akkurat hva eiendomssysstemet er ment å oppnå, at
9738 individer har retten til å bestemme hva de vil gjøre med sin eiendom.
9739 <a class="indexterm" name="id2792164"></a>
9740 </p><p>
9741
9742 Når Ms. Boland sier at det er noe galt med et møte "som har som sitt formål
9743 å fraskrive eller frafalle slike rettigheter", så sier hun at WIPO har en
9744 interesse i å påvirke valgene til enkeltpersoner som eier immaterielle
9745 rettigheter.  At på en eller annen WIPOs oppdrag bør være å stoppe individer
9746 fra å "frakrive" eller "frafalle" seg sine immaterielle rettigheter.  At
9747 interessen til WIPO ikke bare er  maksimale immaterielle rettigheter, men
9748 også at de skal utøves på den mest ekstreme og restriktive mulig måten.
9749 </p><p>
9750 Det er en historie om akkurat et slikt eierskapssystem som er velkjent i den
9751 anglo-amerikansk tradisjon.  Det kalles "føydalisme". Under føydalismen var
9752 eiendommer ikke bare kontrollert av et relativt lite antall individer og
9753 aktører.  Men det føydale systemet hadde en sterk interesse i å sikre at
9754 landeier i systemet ikke svekke føydalismen ved å frigjøre folkene og
9755 eiendomene som de kontrollerte til det frie markedet.  Føydalismen var
9756 avhengig av maksimal kontroll og konsentrasjon.  Det sloss mot enhver frihet
9757 som kunne forstyrre denne kontrollen.
9758 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2792265"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2792271"></a><p>
9759 Som Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite beskriver, dette er nøyaktig det valget
9760 vi nå gjør om immaterielle rettigheter.<sup>[<a name="id2792284" href="#ftn.id2792284" class="footnote">204</a>]</sup>
9761 Vi kommer til å få et informasjonssamfunn.  Så mye er sikkert.  Vårt eneste
9762 valg nå er hvorvidt dette informasjonssamfunnet skal være fritt eller
9763 føydalt.  Trenden er mot det føydale.
9764 </p><p>
9765 Da denne bataljen brøt ut, blogget jeg om dette.  En heftig debatt brøt ut i
9766 kommentarfeltet.  Ms. Boland hadde en rekke støttespillere som forsøkte å
9767 vise hvorfor hennes kommentarer ga mening.  Men det var spesielt en
9768 kommentar som gjorde meg trist.  En anonym kommentator skrev,
9769 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
9770
9771 George, du misforstår Lessig: Han snakker bare om verden slik den burde være
9772 ("målet til WIPO, og målet til enhver regjering, bør være å fremme den
9773 riktige balansen for immaterielle rettigheter, ikke bare å fremme
9774 immaterielle rettigheter"), ikke som den er.  Hvis vi snakket om verden slik
9775 den er, så har naturligvis Boland ikke sagt noe galt.  Men i verden slik
9776 Lessig vil at den skal være, er det åpenbart at hun har sagt noe galt.  En
9777 må alltid være oppmerksom på forskjellen mellom Lessigs og vår verden.
9778 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9779 Jeg gikk glipp av ironien først gangen jeg leste den. Jeg lese den raskt og
9780 trodde forfatteren støttet idéen om at det våre myndigheter burde gjøre var
9781 å søke balanse. (Min kritikk av Ms Boland, selvfølgelig, var ikke om
9782 hvorvidt hun søkte balanse eller ikke; min kritikk var at hennes kommentarer
9783 avslørte en feil kun en førsteårs jussstudent burde kunne gjøre. Jeg har
9784 noen illusjon om ekstremismen hos våre myndigheter, uansett om de er
9785 republikanere eller demokrater. Min eneste tilsynelatende illusjon er
9786 hvorvidt våre myndigheter bør snakke sant eller ikke.)
9787 </p><p>
9788 Det var dermot åpenbart at den som postet meldingen ikke støttet idéen.  I
9789 stedet latterliggjorde forfatteren selve idéen om at i den virkelig verden
9790 skulle "målet" til myndighetene være "å fremme den riktige balanse" for
9791 immaterielle rettigheter.  Det var åpenbart tåpelig for ham.  Og det
9792 avslørte åpenbart, trodde han, min egen tåpelige utopisme.  "Typisk for en
9793 akademiker", kunne forfatteren like gjerne ha fortsatt.
9794 </p><p>
9795 Jeg forstår kritikken av akademisk utopisme.  Jeg mener også at utopisme er
9796 tåpelig, og jeg vil være blant de første til å gjøre narr av de aburde
9797 urealisistiske idealer til akademikere gjennom historien (og ikke bare i
9798 vårt eget lands historie).
9799 </p><p>
9800 Men når det har blitt dumt å anta at rollen til våre myndigheter bør være å
9801 "oppnå balanse", da kan du regne meg blant de dumme, for det betyr at dette
9802 faktisk har blitt ganske seriøst.  Hvis det bør være åpenbart for alle at
9803 myndighetene ikke søker å oppnå balanse, at myndighetene ganske enkelt et
9804 verktøy for de mektigste lobbyistene, at ideen om å forvente bedre av
9805 myndighetene er absurd, at ideen om å kreve at myndighetene snakker sant og
9806 ikke lyver bare er naiv, hva har da vi, det mektigste demokratiet i verden,
9807 blitt?
9808 </p><p>
9809
9810 Det kan være galskap å forvente at en mektig myndigshetsperson skal si
9811 sannheten. Det kan være galskap å tro at myndighetenes politikk skal gjøre
9812 mer enn å tjene de mektigste interesser. Det kan være galskap å argumentere
9813 for å bevare en tradisjon som har vært en del av vår tradisjon for
9814 mesteparten av vår historie&#8212;fri kultur.
9815 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2792401"></a><p>
9816 Hvis dette er galskap, så la det være mer gærninger.  Snart. Det finnes
9817 øyeblikk av håp i denne kampen. Og øyeblikk som overrasker. Da FCC vurderte
9818 mindre strenge eierskapregler, som ville ytterligere konsentrere
9819 mediaeierskap, dannet det seg en en ekstraordinær koalisjon på tvers av
9820 partiene for å bekjempe endringen. For kanskje første gang i historien
9821 organiserte interesser så forskjellige som NRA, ACLU, moveon.org, William
9822 Safire, Ted Turner og Codepink Women for Piece seg for å protestere på denne
9823 endringen i FCC-reglene.  Så mange som 700 000 brev ble sendt til FCC med
9824 krav om flere høringer og et annet resultat.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2792422"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2792428"></a>
9825 </p><p>
9826 Disse protestene stoppet ikke FCC, men like etter stemte en bred koalisjon i
9827 senatet for å reversere avgjørelsen i FCC. De fientlige høringene som ledet
9828 til avstemmingen avslørte hvor mektig denne bevegelsen hadde blitt.  Det var
9829 ingen betydnigsfull støtte for FCCs avgjørelse, mens det var bred og
9830 vedvarende støtte for å bekjempe ytterligere konsentrasjon i media.
9831 </p><p>
9832 Men selv denne bevegelsen går glipp av en viktig brikke i puslespillet.  Å
9833 være stor er ikke ille i seg selv. Frihet er ikke truet bare på grunn av at
9834 noen blir veldig rik, eller på grunn av at det bare er en håndfull store
9835 aktører.  Den dårlige kvaliteten til Big Macs eller Quartar Punders betyr
9836 ikke at du ikke kan få en god hamburger andre steder.
9837 </p><p>
9838 Faren med mediakonsentrasjon kommer ikke fra selve konsentrasjonen, men
9839 kommer fra føydalismen som denne konsentrasjonen fører til når den kobles
9840 til endringer i opphavsretten. Det er ikke kun at det er noen mektige
9841 selskaper som styrer en stadig voksende andel av mediene. Det er at denne
9842 konsentrasjonen kan påkalle en like oppsvulmet rekke
9843 rettigheter&#8212;eiendomsrettigheter i en historisk ekstrem form&#8212;som
9844 gjør størrelsen ille.
9845 </p><p>
9846 Det er derfor betydningsfullt at så mange vil kjempe for å kreve konkurranse
9847 og økt mangfold. Likevel, hvis kampanjen blir forstått til å kun gjelde
9848 størrelse, så er ikke det veldig overraskende. Vi amerikanere har en lang
9849 historie med å slåss mot "stort", klokt eller ikke. At vi kan være motivert
9850 til å slåss mot "store" igjen ikke noe nytt.
9851 </p><p>
9852 Det ville vært noe nytt, og noe veldig viktig, hvis like mange kan være med
9853 på en kampanje for å bekjempe økende ekstremisme bygget inn i idéen om
9854 "intellektuell eiendom".  Ikke fordi balanse er fremmed for vår
9855 tradisjon. Jeg agumenterer for at balanse er vår tradisjon.  Men fordi evnen
9856 til å tenke kritisk på omfanget av alt som kalles "eiendom" ikke er lenger
9857 er godt trent i denne tradisjonen.
9858 </p><p>
9859 Hvis vi var Akilles, så ville dette være vår hæl. Dette ville være stedet
9860 for våre tragedie.
9861 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2792521"></a><p>
9862 Mens jeg skriver disse avsluttende ordene, er nyhetene fylt med historier om
9863 at RIAA saksøker nesten tre hundre individer.<sup>[<a name="id2792534" href="#ftn.id2792534" class="footnote">205</a>]</sup>  Eminem har nettopp blitt saksøkt for å ha "samplet" noen andres
9864 musikk.<sup>[<a name="id2792570" href="#ftn.id2792570" class="footnote">206</a>]</sup>  Historien om hvordan Bob Dylan
9865 har "stjålet" fra en japansk forfatter har nettopp gått verden
9866 over.<sup>[<a name="id2792588" href="#ftn.id2792588" class="footnote">207</a>]</sup>  En på innsiden i
9867 Hollywood&#8212;som insisterer på at han må forbli anonym&#8212;rapporterer
9868 "en utrolig samtale med disse studiofolkene.  De har fantastisk [gammelt]
9869 innhold som de ville elske å bruke, men det kan de ikke på grunn av at de
9870 først må klarere rettighetene.  De har hauger med ungdommer som kunne gjøre
9871 fantastiske ting med innholdet, men det vil først kreve hauger med advokater
9872 for å klarere det først".  Kongressrepresentanter snakker om å gi datavirus
9873 politimyndighet for å ta ned datamaskiner som antas å bryte loven.
9874 Universiteter truer med å utvise ungdommer som bruker en datamaskin for å
9875 dele innhold.
9876 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2792605"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2792629"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2792635"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2792641"></a><p>
9877
9878 I mens på andre siden av atlanteren har BBC nettopp annonsert at de vil
9879 bygge opp et "kreativt arkiv" som britiske borgere kan laste ned BBC-innhold
9880 fra, og rippe, mikse og brenne det ut.<sup>[<a name="id2792658" href="#ftn.id2792658" class="footnote">208</a>]</sup>
9881 Og i Brasil har kulturministeren, Gilberto Gil, i seg selv en folkehelt i
9882 brasiliansk musikk, slått seg sammen med Creative Commons for å gi ut
9883 innhold og frie lisenser i dette latinamerikanske landet.<sup>[<a name="id2792679" href="#ftn.id2792679" class="footnote">209</a>]</sup>  Jeg har fortalt en mørk historie.  Sannheten mer
9884 mer blandet.  En teknologi har gitt oss mer frihet.  Sakte begynner noen å
9885 forstå at denne friheten trenger ikke å bety anarki.  Vi kan få med oss fri
9886 kultur inn i det tjueførste århundre, uten at artister taper og uten at
9887 potensialet for digital teknologi blir knust.  Det vil kreve omtanke, og
9888 viktigere, det vil kreve at noen omforme RCAene av i dag til Causbyere.
9889 </p><p>
9890
9891 Sunn fornuft må gjøre opprør. Den må handle for å frigjøre kulturen. Og
9892 snart, hvis dette potensialet skal noen gang bli realisert.
9893
9894
9895
9896 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2791360" href="#id2791360" class="para">195</a>] </sup>
9897
9898 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
9899 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
9900 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9901 #55</a>. I følge en pressemelding fra verdens helseorganisasjon sendt ut
9902 9. juli 2002, mottar kun 320 000 av de 6 millioner som trenger medisiner i
9903 utviklingsland dem de trenger&#8212;og halvparten av dem er i Brasil.
9904 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2791437" href="#id2791437" class="para">196</a>] </sup>
9905
9906 Se Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the
9907 Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2791444"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2791452"></a>
9908 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2791471" href="#id2791471" class="para">197</a>] </sup>
9909
9910 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
9911 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report Prepared
9912 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C., 2000),
9913 14, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9914 #56</a>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see
9915 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
9916 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
9917 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&#8211;57 (statement of James Love).
9918 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2791496" href="#id2791496" class="para">198</a>] </sup>
9919
9920
9921 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
9922 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, en rapport
9923 forberedt for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington,
9924 D.C., 2000), 15.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2791588" href="#id2791588" class="para">199</a>] </sup>
9925
9926
9927
9928 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's Needs at
9929 Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24 May 1999, A1,
9930 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #57</a>
9931 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire system of
9932 intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing
9933 Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in
9934 Focus 4:23 (August 1999), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #58</a> (describing
9935 U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the
9936 HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property
9937 Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring
9938 2001): 175.
9939
9940 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2791702" href="#id2791702" class="para">200</a>] </sup>
9941
9942 Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post, august
9943 2003, E1, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9944 #59</a>; William New, "Global Group's Shift on `Open Source' Meeting
9945 Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology Daily, 19. august 2003,
9946 tilgjengelig  fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9947 #60</a>; William New, "U.S. Official Opposes `Open Source' Talks at
9948 WIPO," National Journal's Technology Daily, 19. august 2003, tilgjengelig
9949 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #61</a>.
9950 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2791894" href="#id2791894" class="para">201</a>] </sup>
9951
9952 Jeg bør nevne at jeg var en av folkene som ba WIPO om dette møtet.
9953 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2791761" href="#id2791761" class="para">202</a>] </sup>
9954
9955
9956 Microsofts posisjon om åpen kildekode og fri programvare er mer
9957 sofistikert.  De har flere ganger forklart at de har ikke noe problem med
9958 programvare som er "åpen kildekode" eller programvare som er allemannseie.
9959 Microsofts prinsipielle motstand er mot "fri programvare" lisensiert med en
9960 "copyleft"-lisens, som betyr at lisensen krever at de som lisensierer skal
9961 adoptere same vilkår for ethvert avledet verk.  Se Bradford L. Smith, "The
9962 Future of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," Government Policy
9963 Toward Open Source Software (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center
9964 for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
9965 Research, 2002), 69, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #62</a>. Se også Craig Mundie,
9966 Microsoft senior vice president, The Commercial Software Model, diskusjon
9967 ved New York University Stern School of Business (3. mai 2001), tilgjengelig
9968 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #63</a>.
9969 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2792103" href="#id2792103" class="para">203</a>] </sup>
9970
9971
9972 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #64</a>.
9973 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2792284" href="#id2792284" class="para">204</a>] </sup>
9974
9975 Se Drahos og Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&#8211;20.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2792287"></a>
9976 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2792534" href="#id2792534" class="para">205</a>] </sup>
9977
9978
9979 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, september 2003,
9980 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9981 #65</a>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8
9982 september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #66</a>; Soni Sangha og Phyllis
9983 Furman sammen med Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song, N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among
9984 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9. september 2003, 3; Frank
9985 Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
9986 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants," Washington Post, 10. september
9987 2003, E1; Katie Dean, "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
9988 10. september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #67</a>.
9989 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2792570" href="#id2792570" class="para">206</a>] </sup>
9990
9991
9992 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
9993 17. september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #68</a>.
9994 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2792588" href="#id2792588" class="para">207</a>] </sup>
9995
9996
9997
9998 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for Dylan
9999 Songs," Kansascity.com, 9. juli 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #69</a>.
10000
10001 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2792658" href="#id2792658" class="para">208</a>] </sup>
10002
10003 "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," pressemelding fra BBC,
10004 24. august 2003, tilgjengelig  fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #70</a>.
10005 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2792679" href="#id2792679" class="para">209</a>] </sup>
10006
10007
10008 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6. august 2003,
10009 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10010 #71</a>.
10011 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 7. Etterord"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-afterword"></a>Kapittel 7. Etterord</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#usnow">Oss, nå</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbyggeing av fri kultur: En idé</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#themsoon">Dem, snart</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><p>
10012
10013
10014
10015 I hvert fall noen av de som har lest helt hit vil være enig med meg om at
10016 noe må gjøres for å endre retningen vi holder.  Balansen i denne boken
10017 kartlegger hva som kan gjøres.
10018 </p><p>
10019 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now, and that
10020 which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson that we can
10021 draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that it requires
10022 remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
10023 </p><p>
10024 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
10025 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators, authors,
10026 musicians, filmmakers, scientists&#8212;all to tell this story in their own
10027 words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
10028 </p><p>
10029 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of having
10030 an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people think
10031 matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands opposed, but
10032 still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I sketch changes that
10033 Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
10034 </p><div class="sect1" title="Oss, nå"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="usnow"></a>Oss, nå</h2></div></div></div><p>
10035 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far has
10036 been framed at the extremes&#8212;as a grand either/or: either property or
10037 anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is
10038 the choice, then the warriors should win.
10039 </p><p>
10040 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are extremes in
10041 this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There are those who
10042 believe in maximal copyright&#8212;"All Rights Reserved"&#8212; and those
10043 who reject copyright&#8212;"No Rights Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved"
10044 sorts believe that you should ask permission before you "use" a copyrighted
10045 work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able
10046 to do with content as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or
10047 not.
10048 </p><p>
10049
10050 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
10051 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
10052 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
10053 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
10054 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
10055 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively unprotected.
10056 </p><p>
10057 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite equal)
10058 by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this book. Through
10059 legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's design, copyright
10060 holders have been able to change the essential character of the environment
10061 of the original Internet. If the original architecture made the effective
10062 default "no rights reserved," the future architecture will make the
10063 effective default "all rights reserved." The architecture and law that
10064 surround the Internet's design will increasingly produce an environment
10065 where all use of content requires permission.  The "cut and paste" world
10066 that defines the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and
10067 paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
10068 </p><p>
10069 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&#8212;neither "all
10070 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&#8212;
10071 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content as
10072 they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of freedoms
10073 that we could just take for granted before.
10074 </p><div class="sect2" title="Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="examples"></a>Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</h3></div></div></div><p>
10075 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
10076 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before the
10077 Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about our lives
10078 that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore and browsed
10079 through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need to worry about
10080 explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of
10081 your browsing habits was assured.
10082 </p><p>
10083 Hva gjorde at det var sikret?
10084 </p><p>
10085 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter 10, your
10086 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for gathering
10087 data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who wanted to gather
10088 that data. If you were a suspected spy for North Korea, working for the CIA,
10089 no doubt your privacy would not be assured.  But that's because the CIA
10090 would (we hope) find it valuable enough to spend the thousands required to
10091 track you. But for most of us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The
10092 highly inefficient architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly
10093 robust amount of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not
10094 by law (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
10095 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the
10096 costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
10097 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2792885"></a><p>
10098 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular has
10099 become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you browse the
10100 pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked at. You know this
10101 because at the side of the page, there's a list of "recently viewed"
10102 pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net and the function of
10103 cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the data than not. The friction
10104 has disappeared, and hence any "privacy" protected by the friction
10105 disappears, too.
10106 </p><p>
10107 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry about
10108 libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that people
10109 should have the "right" to browse in a library without the government
10110 knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties, too), then this
10111 change in the technology of monitoring might concern you. If it becomes
10112 simple to gather and sort who does what in electronic spaces, then the
10113 friction-induced privacy of yesterday disappears.
10114 </p><p>
10115
10116 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy" on the
10117 Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what friction
10118 before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what friction
10119 did.<sup>[<a name="id2792923" href="#ftn.id2792923" class="footnote">210</a>]</sup> And whether you're in favor of
10120 those laws or not, it is the pattern that is important here. We must take
10121 affirmative steps to secure a kind of freedom that was passively provided
10122 before. A change in technology now forces those who believe in privacy to
10123 affirmatively act where, before, privacy was given by default.
10124 </p><p>
10125 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
10126 movement. When computers with software were first made available
10127 commercially, the software&#8212;both the source code and the
10128 binaries&#8212; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data
10129 General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
10130 about controlling their software.
10131 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2792951"></a><p>
10132 Dette var verden Richard Stallman ble født inn i, og mens han var forsker
10133 ved MIT, lærte han til å elske samfunnet som utviklet seg når en var fri til
10134 å utforske og fikle med programvaren som kjørte på datamaskiner. Av den
10135 smarte sorten selv, og en talentfull programmerer, begynte Stallman å basere
10136 seg frihet til å legge til eller endre på andre personers arbeid.
10137 </p><p>
10138 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In a
10139 math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that someone
10140 offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a theorem, you could
10141 take what someone else did and change it. In a classics department, if you
10142 believed a colleague's translation of a recently discovered text was flawed,
10143 you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you
10144 should be free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
10145 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like anything
10146 else?
10147 </p><p>
10148 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue for
10149 computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from one system
10150 to another, it became economically attractive (at least in the view of some)
10151 to hide the code of your program. So, too, as companies started selling
10152 peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just take your printer driver
10153 and copy it, then that would make it easier for me to sell a printer to the
10154 market than it was for you.
10155 </p><p>
10156
10157 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the early
10158 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.  The world of
10159 free software had been erased by a change in the economics of computing. And
10160 as he believed, if he did nothing about it, then the freedom to change and
10161 share software would be fundamentally weakened.
10162 </p><p>
10163 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
10164 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That was
10165 the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux" kernel was
10166 added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
10167 </p><p>
10168 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of software
10169 that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free Software
10170 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the source code
10171 for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone building upon
10172 GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free as well. This would
10173 assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code would develop that
10174 remained free for others to build upon. His fundamental goal was freedom;
10175 innovative creative code was a byproduct.
10176 </p><p>
10177 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now do for
10178 privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that was taken
10179 for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses that bind
10180 copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a space where free
10181 software would survive. He was actively protecting what before had been
10182 passively guaranteed.
10183 </p><p>
10184 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates with
10185 the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and scientific
10186 journals are produced.
10187 </p><p>
10188
10189 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
10190 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them to
10191 libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
10192 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
10193 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
10194 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
10195 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
10196 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
10197 service.  Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and anyone is
10198 free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free to
10199 charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme Court
10200 opinion through their respective services.
10201 </p><p>
10202 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
10203 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive for
10204 people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.  The law has
10205 agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed to flourish. And if
10206 there's nothing wrong with selling the public domain, then there could be
10207 nothing wrong, in principle, with selling access to material that is not in
10208 the public domain.
10209 </p><p>
10210 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data was
10211 through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to browse this
10212 data except by paying for a subscription?
10213 </p><p>
10214 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
10215 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
10216 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to the
10217 library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts because the
10218 library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand the risks of a
10219 certain treatment could research those risks by reading all available
10220 articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a function of the
10221 institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of paper journals
10222 (architecture)&#8212;namely, that it was very hard to control access to a
10223 paper journal.
10224 </p><p>
10225 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding that
10226 libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This means
10227 that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries begin to
10228 disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing technology
10229 and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
10230 </p><p>
10231 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to restore the
10232 freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science (PLoS), for
10233 example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making scientific research
10234 available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors of scientific work submit
10235 that work to the Public Library of Science.  That work is then subject to
10236 peer review. If accepted, the work is then deposited in a public, electronic
10237 archive and made permanently available for free. PLoS also sells a print
10238 version of its work, but the copyright for the print journal does not
10239 inhibit the right of anyone to redistribute the work for free.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2793128"></a>
10240 </p><p>
10241 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for granted
10242 before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.  There's no
10243 doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional publishers and
10244 their efforts to make money from the exclusive distribution of content. But
10245 competition in our tradition is presumptively a good&#8212;especially when
10246 it helps spread knowledge and science.
10247 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Gjenoppbyggeing av fri kultur: En idé"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="oneidea"></a>Gjenoppbyggeing av fri kultur: En idé</h3></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxcc"></a><p>
10248 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
10249 increasing control effected through law and technology.
10250 </p><p>
10251 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation
10252 established in Massachusetts, but with its home at Stanford University. Its
10253 aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright on top of the extremes that
10254 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon other
10255 people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the freedom for
10256 others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to
10257 human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this
10258 possible.
10259 </p><p>
10260
10261 Simple&#8212;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer.  By
10262 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their content,
10263 Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can easily, and
10264 reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to machine-readable
10265 versions of the license that enable computers automatically to identify
10266 content that can easily be shared. These three expressions together&#8212;a
10267 legal license, a human-readable description, and machine-readable
10268 tags&#8212;constitute a Creative Commons license. A Creative Commons license
10269 constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who accesses the license, and more
10270 importantly, an expression of the ideal that the person associated with the
10271 license believes in something different than the "All" or "No"
10272 extremes. Content is marked with the CC mark, which does not mean that
10273 copyright is waived, but that certain freedoms are given.
10274 </p><p>
10275 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their precise
10276 contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The creator can choose a
10277 license that permits any use, so long as attribution is given. She can
10278 choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.  She can choose a
10279 license that permits any use so long as the same freedoms are given to other
10280 uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is
10281 made. Or any use at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so
10282 long as full copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
10283 </p><p>
10284 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
10285 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional fair
10286 use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way that
10287 subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
10288 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content, governed by
10289 a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build upon. Voluntary
10290 choice of individuals and creators will make this content available. And
10291 that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a public domain.
10292 </p><p>
10293 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons.  And of
10294 course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
10295 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from many is
10296 that we are not interested only in talking about a public domain or in
10297 getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our aim is to build a
10298 movement of consumers and producers of content ("content conducers," as
10299 attorney Mia Garlick calls them)  who help build the public domain and, by
10300 their work, demonstrate the importance of the public domain to other
10301 creativity.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2793246"></a>
10302 </p><p>
10303 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
10304 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture are
10305 produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written centuries
10306 ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have imagined. The
10307 rules may well have made sense against a background of technologies from
10308 centuries ago, but they do not make sense against the background of digital
10309 technologies. New rules&#8212;with different freedoms, expressed in ways so
10310 that humans without lawyers can use them&#8212;are needed. Creative Commons
10311 gives people a way effectively to begin to build those rules.
10312 </p><p>
10313 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some participate
10314 to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example, is a science
10315 fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom, was
10316 released on-line and for free, under a Creative Commons license, on the same
10317 day that it went on sale in bookstores.
10318 </p><p>
10319 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher reasoned
10320 like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)  those who will buy
10321 Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2) those who may never
10322 hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for free on the
10323 Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book instead of buying
10324 it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)  will download Cory's book, like
10325 it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.  If there are more
10326 (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line
10327 will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
10328 </p><p>
10329 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that conclusion.
10330 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the publisher had
10331 expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was a total success.
10332 </p><p>
10333
10334 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content was
10335 confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner, who wrote a
10336 book about the free software movement titled Free for All, made an
10337 electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative Commons license
10338 after the book went out of print. He then monitored used book store prices
10339 for the book. As predicted, as the number of downloads increased, the used
10340 book price for his book increased, as well.
10341 </p><p>
10342 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
10343 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the Commons. There
10344 are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other reasons. Many who use
10345 the "sampling license" do so because anything else would be
10346 hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are free, for commercial
10347 or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from the licensed work; they
10348 are just not free to make full copies of the licensed work available to
10349 others. This is consistent with their own art&#8212;they, too, sample from
10350 others. Because the legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart,
10351 manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of
10352 others, has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
10353 because the legal costs are so high<sup>[<a name="id2793191" href="#ftn.id2793191" class="footnote">211</a>]</sup>),
10354 these artists release into the creative environment content that others can
10355 build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
10356 </p><p>
10357 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
10358 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
10359 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is, you
10360 are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved" model. Good
10361 for you, but many do not. Many believe that however appropriate that rule is
10362 for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate description of how most
10363 creators view the rights associated with their content. The Creative Commons
10364 license expresses this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the
10365 chance to say it to others.
10366 </p><p>
10367
10368 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over 1 million
10369 objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next step is
10370 partnerships with middleware content providers to help them build into their
10371 technologies simple ways for users to mark their content with Creative
10372 Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and celebrate creators who
10373 build content based upon content set free.
10374 </p><p>
10375 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not mere
10376 arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first step to
10377 showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
10378 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve this
10379 rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary steps are
10380 possible.
10381 </p><p>
10382 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by individuals and
10383 creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the creative field. The
10384 project does not compete with copyright; it complements it. Its aim is not
10385 to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it easier for authors and
10386 creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and cheaply. That
10387 difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread more easily.
10388 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2793395"></a></div></div><div class="sect1" title="Dem, snart"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="themsoon"></a>Dem, snart</h2></div></div></div><p>
10389 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will also
10390 take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before the
10391 politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.  But
10392 that also means that we have time to build awareness around the changes that
10393 we need.
10394 </p><p>
10395 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general, and
10396 one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each is a
10397 step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way to our
10398 end.
10399 </p><div class="sect2" title="1. Flere formaliteter"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="formalities"></a>1. Flere formaliteter</h3></div></div></div><p>
10400 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
10401 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.  If
10402 you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
10403 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
10404 </p><p>
10405
10406
10407 These are all formalities associated with property. They are requirements
10408 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
10409 </p><p>
10410 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a copyright,
10411 regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You don't have to
10412 register. You don't even have to mark your content. The default is control,
10413 and "formalities" are banished.
10414 </p><p>
10415 Why?
10416 </p><p>
10417 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
10418 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities imposed a
10419 burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it was progress when
10420 the law relaxed the formal requirements that a copyright owner must bear to
10421 protect and secure his work. Those formalities were getting in the way.
10422 </p><p>
10423 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
10424 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that burdens
10425 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with
10426 whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the creative work of
10427 others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&#8212; there is no
10428 simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the massive increase in
10429 the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is a necessary step for
10430 any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces
10431 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
10432 </p><p>
10433 The law should therefore change this requirement<sup>[<a name="id2793479" href="#ftn.id2793479" class="footnote">212</a>]</sup>&#8212;but it should not change it by going back to the old, broken
10434 system. We should require formalities, but we should establish a system that
10435 will create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
10436 </p><p>
10437 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work, registering
10438 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally, the first of
10439 these three was something the copyright owner did; the second two were
10440 something the government did. But a revised system of formalities would
10441 banish the government from the process, except for the sole purpose of
10442 approving standards developed by others.
10443 </p><div class="sect3" title="Registrering og fornying"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="registration"></a>Registrering og fornying</h4></div></div></div><p>
10444 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with the
10445 Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
10446 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
10447 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the burden
10448 of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.  And as
10449 the Copyright Office is not a main target of government policymaking, the
10450 office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus, when people who
10451 know something about the process hear this idea about formalities, their
10452 first reaction is panic&#8212;nothing could be worse than forcing people to
10453 deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
10454 </p><p>
10455 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition of
10456 extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer think
10457 innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.  Just because
10458 there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't follow that the
10459 government must actually administer the role. Instead, we should be creating
10460 incentives for private parties to serve the public, subject to standards
10461 that the government sets.
10462 </p><p>
10463 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.  There
10464 are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.  Domain name
10465 owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their registration
10466 alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net), there is a central
10467 registry. The actual registrations are, however, performed by many competing
10468 registrars. That competition drives the cost of registering down, and more
10469 importantly, it drives the ease with which registration occurs up.
10470 </p><p>
10471
10472 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
10473 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry, but
10474 it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should establish a
10475 database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
10476 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete with
10477 one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for registering and
10478 renewing copyrights. That competition would substantially lower the burden
10479 of this formality&#8212;while producing a database of registrations that
10480 would facilitate the licensing of content.
10481 </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Merking"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="marking"></a>Merking</h4></div></div></div><p>
10482 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
10483 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh punishment for
10484 failing to comply with a regulatory rule&#8212;akin to imposing the death
10485 penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.  Here again,
10486 there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be enforced in this
10487 way. And more importantly, there is no reason a marking requirement needs to
10488 be enforced uniformly across all media.
10489 </p><p>
10490 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is copyrighted
10491 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also makes it easy
10492 to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use the work.
10493 </p><p>
10494 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was that
10495 different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't clear
10496 how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A new
10497 marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing the
10498 differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to evolve as
10499 technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special signal from the
10500 failure to mark&#8212;not the loss of the copyright, but the loss of the
10501 right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
10502 </p><p>
10503
10504 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work to be
10505 published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that failure need
10506 not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could instead be that
10507 anyone has the right to use this work, until the copyright owner complains
10508 and demonstrates that it is his work and he doesn't give
10509 permission.<sup>[<a name="id2793616" href="#ftn.id2793616" class="footnote">213</a>]</sup> The meaning of an unmarked
10510 work would therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
10511 complain, then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
10512 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.  This
10513 would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark their work.
10514 </p><p>
10515 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be marked. Here
10516 again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies evolve. The best way
10517 to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the Copyright Office's role to
10518 that of approving standards for marking content that have been crafted
10519 elsewhere.
10520 </p><p>
10521 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
10522 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The Copyright
10523 Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could be made. The
10524 Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it judged preferable,
10525 and it would base that choice solely upon the consideration of which method
10526 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We would
10527 not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on the
10528 government to keep the product of innovation in line with its other
10529 important functions.
10530 </p><p>
10531 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration requirements.
10532 If photographs were marked by author and year, there would be little reason
10533 not to allow a photographer to reregister, for example, all photographs
10534 taken in a particular year in one quick step. The aim of the formality is
10535 not to burden the creator; the system itself should be kept as simple as
10536 possible.
10537 </p><p>
10538 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing system
10539 does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to make things
10540 unclear.
10541 </p><p>
10542 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
10543 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.  It
10544 would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it would be
10545 simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular kind of content;
10546 it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew that assertion at
10547 the appropriate time.
10548 </p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="2. Kortere vernetid"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="shortterms"></a>2. Kortere vernetid</h3></div></div></div><p>
10549 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five years for
10550 corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for natural
10551 authors.
10552 </p><p>
10553 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted in
10554 five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.  That
10555 seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.  Ashcroft,
10556 the proposals became even more radical. The Economist endorsed a proposal
10557 for a fourteen-year copyright term.<sup>[<a name="id2793722" href="#ftn.id2793722" class="footnote">214</a>]</sup>
10558 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
10559 </p><p>
10560 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in copyright's
10561 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four principles
10562 that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
10563 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
10564
10565
10566 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give incentives to
10567 create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong protections for
10568 authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from publishers), rights to
10569 the same work (not derivative works) might be extended further. The key is
10570 not to tie the work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
10571 author.  </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10572
10573
10574
10575 Gjør det enkelt: Skillelinjen mellom verker uten opphavsrettslig vern og
10576 innhold som er beskyttet må forbli klart.  Advokater liker uklarheten som
10577 "rimelig bruk" og forskjellen mellom "idéer" og "uttrykk" har.  Denne type
10578 lovverk gir dem en masse arbeid.  Men de som skrev grunnloven hadde en
10579 enklere idé: vernet versus ikke vernet. Verdien av korte vernetider er at
10580 det er lite behov for å bygge inn unntak i opphavsretten når vernetiden
10581 holdes kort.  En klar og aktiv "advokat-fri sone" gjør komplesiteten av
10582 "rimelig bruk" og "idé/uttrykk" mindre nødvendig å håndtere.
10583
10584 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10585
10586 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.  Especially if the
10587 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
10588 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be an
10589 onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
10590 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply
10591 for a pension.<sup>[<a name="id2793794" href="#ftn.id2793794" class="footnote">215</a>]</sup> If we make veterans
10592 suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend ten
10593 minutes every fifty years to file a single form.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2793813"></a>
10594 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10595
10596
10597 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the clearest
10598 lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should not be
10599 extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to offer authors
10600 only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a
10601 mistake, then the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
10602 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today
10603 by increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase the
10604 number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward
10605 that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright
10606 burden that smothers many works that are today invisible). But increasing
10607 their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.  What's not done is
10608 not done, and there's nothing we can do about that now.  </p></li></ol></div><p>
10609 Disse endringene vil sammen gi en gjennomsnittlig opphavsrettslig vernetid
10610 som er mye kortere enn den gjeldende vernetiden.  Frem til 1976 var
10611 gjennomsnittelig vernetid kun 32.2 år.  Vårt mål bør være det samme.
10612 </p><p>
10613 Uten tvil vil ekstremistene kalle disse idéene "radikale". (Tross alt, så
10614 kaller jeg dem "ekstremister".) Men igjen, vernetiden jeg anbefalte var
10615 lengre enn vernetiden under Richard Nixon. hvor "radikalt" kan det være å be
10616 om en mer sjenerøs opphavsrettighet enn da Richard Nixon var president?
10617 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="freefairuse"></a>3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</h3></div></div></div><p>
10618 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally granted
10619 property owners the right to control their property from the ground to the
10620 heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property rights quickly
10621 changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional challenge.  It made no sense
10622 anymore to grant that much control, given the emergence of that new
10623 technology.
10624 </p><p>
10625 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive right"
10626 to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive right to "their
10627 writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that are
10628 sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
10629 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the right to
10630 release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
10631 </p><p>
10632 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it expanded the
10633 exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control translations and
10634 dramatizations of a work.<sup>[<a name="id2793903" href="#ftn.id2793903" class="footnote">216</a>]</sup> The courts
10635 have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This
10636 expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
10637 Benjamin Kaplan.
10638 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
10639 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a large range
10640 of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense the oddity of
10641 accepting such an enlargement of copyright while yet intoning the
10642 abracadabra of idea and expression.<sup>[<a name="id2793924" href="#ftn.id2793924" class="footnote">217</a>]</sup>
10643 </p></blockquote></div><p>
10644 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
10645 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
10646 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that a
10647 copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.  Consider
10648 each limitation in turn.
10649 </p><p>
10650 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right should
10651 be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John Grisham's right
10652 to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least I'm willing to
10653 assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right to run for the
10654 same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative right could be
10655 important in inducing creativity; it is not important long after the
10656 creative work is done.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2793951"></a>
10657 </p><p>
10658 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.  Again,
10659 there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.  Those should
10660 be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around regulated and
10661 unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all "reuse" of creative
10662 material was within the control of businesses, perhaps it made sense to
10663 require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers
10664 to negotiate the lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that
10665 digital technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
10666 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to the
10667 creative process. Smothers it.
10668 </p><p>
10669 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the Clint
10670 Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for foreseeable
10671 derivative rights&#8212;turning a book into a movie, or a poem into a
10672 musical score&#8212;it doesn't make sense to require negotiation for the
10673 unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much more sense.
10674 </p><p>
10675 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are protected, and
10676 the presumption should be that other uses are not protected.  This is the
10677 reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul Goldstein.<sup>[<a name="id2793991" href="#ftn.id2793991" class="footnote">218</a>]</sup> His view is that the law should be written so that
10678 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
10679 </p><p>
10680 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
10681 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of the
10682 Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the incentives
10683 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a strong
10684 copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
10685 </p><p>
10686
10687 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection beyond the
10688 part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon certain statutory
10689 conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great deal of culture
10690 to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights regime, that reuse
10691 would earn artists more income.
10692 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="liberatemusic"></a>4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</h3></div></div></div><p>
10693 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't be
10694 fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most people,
10695 most pressing&#8212;music. There is no other policy issue that better
10696 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing of
10697 music.
10698 </p><p>
10699 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the Internet's
10700 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more powerfully than any
10701 other single application. It was the Internet's killer app&#8212;possibly in
10702 two senses of that word. It no doubt was the application that drove demand
10703 for bandwidth. It may well be the application that drives demand for
10704 regulations that in the end kill innovation on the network.
10705 </p><p>
10706 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
10707 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed, performed,
10708 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving an exclusive
10709 right to a composer to control public performances of his work, and to a
10710 performing artist to control copies of her performance.
10711 </p><p>
10712 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
10713 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course, that's not
10714 all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter 5, they enable
10715 four different kinds of sharing:
10716 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="A"><li class="listitem"><p>
10717
10718
10719 Det er noen som bruker delingsnettverk som erstatninger for å kjøpe CDer.
10720 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10721
10722
10723 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample, on the way to
10724 purchasing CDs.
10725 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10726
10727
10728
10729
10730 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk til å få tilgang til innhold som
10731 ikke lenger er i salg, men fortsatt er vernet av opphavsrett eller som ville
10732 ha vært altfor vanskelig å få kjøpt via nettet.
10733 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10734
10735
10736 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk for å få tilgang til innhold som
10737 ikke er opphavsrettsbeskyttet, eller for å få tilgang som
10738 opphavsrettsinnehaveren åpenbart går god for.
10739 </p></li></ol></div><p>
10740 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It must
10741 avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The eagerness
10742 with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover, should depend upon
10743 the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net effect of sharing is
10744 actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is significantly
10745 weakened.
10746 </p><p>
10747 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is controversial.
10748 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is real. I
10749 assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly greater than
10750 type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
10751 </p><p>
10752 Uansett, det er et avgjørende faktum om den gjeldende teknologiske
10753 omgivelsen som vi må huske på hvis vi skal forstå hvordan loven bør reagere.
10754 </p><p>
10755 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
10756 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
10757 content.  It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of
10758 content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and
10759 slow&#8212;we in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at
10760 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and
10761 down. Although wireless access is growing, most of us still get access
10762 across wires. Most only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The
10763 idea of the always on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
10764 </p><p>
10765
10766 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to the
10767 Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should not make
10768 policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should make policy on
10769 the basis of where the technology is going. The question should not be, how
10770 should the law regulate sharing in this world? The question should be, what
10771 law will we require when the network becomes the network it is clearly
10772 becoming? That network is one in which every machine with electricity is
10773 essentially on the Net; where everywhere you are&#8212;except maybe the
10774 desert or the Rockies&#8212;you can instantaneously be connected to the
10775 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service,
10776 where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
10777 </p><p>
10778 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that give
10779 you access to content on the fly&#8212;such as Internet radio, content that
10780 is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the critical
10781 point: When it is extremely easy to connect to services that give access to
10782 content, it will be easier to connect to services that give you access to
10783 content than it will be to download and store content on the many devices
10784 you will have for playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to
10785 subscribe than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
10786 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially is. Content
10787 services will compete with content sharing, even if the services charge
10788 money for the content they give access to. Already cell-phone services in
10789 Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell phones (enhanced with plugs
10790 for headphones). The Japanese are paying for this content even though "free"
10791 content is available in the form of MP3s across the Web.<sup>[<a name="id2794168" href="#ftn.id2794168" class="footnote">219</a>]</sup>
10792
10793 </p><p>
10794
10795 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
10796 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
10797 sharing&#8212;to the extent there is a real problem&#8212;is a problem that
10798 will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to the
10799 Internet.  And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy makers today
10800 to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology that will be gone
10801 tomorrow.  The question should not be how to regulate the Internet to
10802 eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve that problem away). The question
10803 instead should be how to assure that artists get paid, during this
10804 transition between twentieth-century models for doing business and
10805 twenty-first-century technologies.
10806 </p><p>
10807 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems" here
10808 to solve. Let's start with type D content&#8212;uncopyrighted content or
10809 copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The "problem" with this
10810 content is to make sure that the technology that would enable this kind of
10811 sharing is not rendered illegal. You can think of it this way: Pay phones
10812 are used to deliver ransom demands, no doubt.  But there are many who need
10813 to use pay phones who have nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to
10814 ban pay phones in order to eliminate kidnapping.
10815 </p><p>
10816 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was, at
10817 one time, published and is no longer available. It may be unavailable
10818 because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the record label he
10819 signed with to carry his work. Or it may be unavailable because the work is
10820 forgotten. Either way, the aim of the law should be to facilitate the access
10821 to this content, ideally in a way that returns something to the artist.
10822 </p><p>
10823 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of print,
10824 it may still be available in libraries and used book stores. But libraries
10825 and used book stores don't pay the copyright owner when someone reads or
10826 buys an out-of-print book. That makes total sense, of course, since any
10827 other system would be so burdensome as to eliminate the possibility of used
10828 book stores' existing. But from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of
10829 his content without his being compensated is less than ideal.
10830 </p><p>
10831 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
10832 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of the
10833 music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial providers would
10834 be free, under this rule, to "share" that content, even though the sharing
10835 involved making a copy. The copy here would be incidental to the trade; in a
10836 context where commercial publishing has ended, trading music should be as
10837 free as trading books.
10838 </p><p>
10839
10840
10841
10842 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would ensure
10843 that artists get something from the trade of their work. For example, if the
10844 law set a low statutory rate for the commercial sharing of content that was
10845 not offered for sale by a commercial publisher, and if that rate were
10846 automatically transferred to a trust for the benefit of the artist, then
10847 businesses could develop around the idea of trading this content, and
10848 artists would benefit from this trade.
10849 </p><p>
10850 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep works
10851 available commercially. Works that are available commercially would not be
10852 subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect the right to charge
10853 whatever they want for content if they kept the work commercially
10854 available. But if they don't keep it available, and instead, the computer
10855 hard disks of fans around the world keep it alive, then any royalty owed for
10856 such copying should be much less than the amount owed a commercial
10857 publisher.
10858 </p><p>
10859 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is hard only
10860 because the extent of the problem will change over time, as the technologies
10861 for gaining access to content change. The law's solution should be as
10862 flexible as the problem is, understanding that we are in the middle of a
10863 radical transformation in the technology for delivering and accessing
10864 content.
10865 </p><p>
10866 Så her er en løsning som i første omgang kan virke veldig undelig for begge
10867 sider i denne krigen, men som jeg tror vil gi mer mening når en får tenkt
10868 seg om.
10869 </p><p>
10870 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic claim of
10871 the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)  has harmed a
10872 set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to be protected,
10873 then the content industry should be compensated for that harm. Just as the
10874 technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions of Americans, or the
10875 technology of asbestos caused grave illness to thousands of miners, so, too,
10876 has the technology of digital networks harmed the interests of the content
10877 industry.
10878 </p><p>
10879
10880
10881 Jeg elsker internett, så jeg liker ikke å sammenligne det med tobakk eller
10882 asbest.  Men analogien er rimelig når en ser det fra lovens perspektiv. Og
10883 det foreslår en rimelig respons: I stedet for å forsøke å ødelegge internett
10884 eller p2p-teknologien som i dag skader innholdsleverandører på internett, så
10885 bør vi finne en relativt enkel måte å kompensere de som blir skadelidende.
10886 </p><p>
10887 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been floated by
10888 Harvard law professor William Fisher.<sup>[<a name="id2794371" href="#ftn.id2794371" class="footnote">220</a>]</sup>
10889 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
10890 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission would
10891 (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to
10892 evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once
10893 the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
10894 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the basis of
10895 those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The compensation would
10896 be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
10897 </p><p>
10898 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
10899 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book, Promises to
10900 Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively simple: Fisher
10901 imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright system.  I imagine it
10902 complementing the existing system. The aim of the proposal would be to
10903 facilitate compensation to the extent that harm could be shown. This
10904 compensation would be temporary, aimed at facilitating a transition between
10905 regimes. And it would require renewal after a period of years. If it
10906 continues to make sense to facilitate free exchange of content, supported
10907 through a taxation system, then it can be continued. If this form of
10908 protection is no longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old
10909 system of controlling access.
10910 </p><p>
10911
10912 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim is
10913 not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the system
10914 supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But the aims of
10915 semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes I described were
10916 accomplished&#8212;in particular, the limits on derivative uses. A system
10917 that simply charges for access would not greatly burden semiotic democracy
10918 if there were few limitations on what one was allowed to do with the content
10919 itself.
10920 </p><p>
10921 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of "harm" to
10922 an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation would be
10923 outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This background system
10924 to compensate would also not need to interfere with innovative proposals
10925 such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted when Apple launched the
10926 MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being easier than free is. This has
10927 proven correct: Apple has sold millions of songs at even the very high price
10928 of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents, the cost is the equivalent of a per-song
10929 CD price, though the labels have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's
10930 move was countered by Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a
10931 song. And no doubt there will be a great deal of competition to offer and
10932 sell music on-line.
10933 </p><p>
10934 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free" music
10935 from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known for thirty
10936 years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than that, there is
10937 nothing impossible at all about "competing with free." Indeed, if anything,
10938 the competition spurs the competitors to offer new and better products. This
10939 is precisely what the competitive market was to be about. Thus in Singapore,
10940 though piracy is rampant, movie theaters are often luxurious&#8212;with
10941 "first class" seats, and meals served while you watch a movie&#8212;as they
10942 struggle and succeed in finding ways to compete with "free."
10943 </p><p>
10944 Dette konkurranseregimet, med en sikringsmekanisme å sikre at kunstnere ikke
10945 taper, ville bidra mye til nyskapning innen levering av
10946 innhold. Konkurransen ville fortsette å redusere type-A-deling.  Det ville
10947 inspirere en ekstraordinær rekke av nye innovatører&#8212;som ville ha
10948 retten til a bruke innhold, og ikke lenger frykte usikre og barbarisk
10949 strenge straffer fra loven.
10950 </p><p>
10951 Oppsummert, så er dette mitt forslag:
10952 </p><p>
10953
10954
10955
10956 Internett er i endring. Vi bør ikke regulere en teknologi i endring. Vi bør
10957 i stedet regulere for å minimere skaden påført interesser som er berørt av
10958 denne teknologiske endringen, samtidig vi muliggjør, og oppmuntrer, den mest
10959 effektive teknologien vi kan lage.
10960 </p><p>
10961 Vi kan minimere skaden og samtidig maksimere fordelen med innovasjon ved å
10962 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
10963
10964
10965 garantere retten til å engasjere seg i type-D-deling;
10966 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10967
10968
10969 tillate ikke-kommersiell type-C-deling uten erstatningsansvar, og
10970 kommersiell type-C-deling med en lav og fast rate fastsatt ved lov.
10971 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10972
10973
10974 mens denne overgangen pågår, skattlegge og kompensere for type-A-deling, i
10975 den grad faktiske skade kan påvises.
10976 </p></li></ol></div><p>
10977 Men hva om "piratvirksomheten" ikke forsvinner?  Hva om det finnes et
10978 konkurranseutsatt marked som tilbyr innhold til en lav kostnad, men et
10979 signifikant antall av forbrukere fortsetter å "ta" innhold uten å betale?
10980 Burde loven gjøre noe da?
10981 </p><p>
10982 Ja, det bør den.  Men, nok en gang, hva den bør gjøre avhenger hvordan
10983 realitetene utvikler seg. Disse endringene fjerner kanskje ikke all
10984 type-A-deling. Men det virkelige spørmålet er ikke om de eliminerer deling i
10985 abstrakt betydning.  Det virkelige spørsmålet er hvilken effekt det har på
10986 markedet.  Er det bedre (a) å ha en teknologi som er 95 prosent sikker og
10987 gir et marked av størrelse x, eller (b) å ha en teknologi som er 50 prosent
10988 sikker, og som gir et marked som er fem ganger større enn x?  Mindre sikker
10989 kan gi mer uautorisert deling, men det vil sannsynligvis også gi et mye
10990 større marked for autorisert deling. Det viktigste er å sikre kunstneres
10991 kompensasjon uten å ødelegge internettet.  Når det er på plass, kan det
10992 hende det er riktig å finne måter å spore opp de smålige piratene.
10993 </p><p>
10994
10995 Men vi er langt unna å spikke problemet ned til dette delsettet av
10996 type-A-delere.  Og vårt fokus inntil er der bør ikke være å finne måter å
10997 ødelegge internettet.  Var fokus inntil vi er der bør være hvordan sikre at
10998 artister får betalt, mens vi beskytter rommet for nyskapning og kreativitet
10999 som internettet er.
11000 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="5. Spark en masse advokater"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="firelawyers"></a>5. Spark en masse advokater</h3></div></div></div><p>
11001 Jeg er en advokat. Jeg lever av å utdanne advokater. Jeg tror på loven. Jeg
11002 tror på opphavsrettsloven. Jeg har faktisk viet livet til å jobbe med loven,
11003 ikke fordi det er mye penger å tjene, men fordi det innebærer idealer som
11004 jeg elsker å leve opp til.
11005 </p><p>
11006 Likevel har mye av denne boken vært kritikk av advokater, eller rollen
11007 advokater har spilt i denne debatten.  Loven taler om idealer, mens det er
11008 min oppfatning av vår yrkesgruppe er blitt for knyttet til klienten.  Og i
11009 en verden der rike klienter har sterke synspunkter vil uviljen hos vår
11010 yrkesgruppe til å stille spørsmål med eller protestere mot dette sterke
11011 synet ødelegge loven.
11012 </p><p>
11013 Indisiene for slik bøyning er overbevisene.  Jeg er angrepet som en
11014 "radikal" av mange innenfor yrket, og likevel er meningene jeg argumenterer
11015 for nøyaktig de meningene til mange av de mest moderate og betydningsfulle
11016 personene i historien til denne delen av loven. Mange trodde for eksempel at
11017 vår utfordring til lovforslaget om å utvide opphavsrettens vernetid var
11018 galskap.  Mens bare tredve år siden mente den dominerende foreleser og
11019 utøver i opphavsrettsfeltet, Melville Nimmer, at den var
11020 åpenbar.<sup>[<a name="id2794737" href="#ftn.id2794737" class="footnote">221</a>]</sup>
11021
11022 </p><p>
11023 Min kritikk av rollen som advokater har spilt i denne debatten handler
11024 imidlertid ikke bare om en profesjonell skjevhet. Det handler enda viktigere
11025 om vår manglende evne til å faktisk ta inn over oss hva loven koster.
11026 </p><p>
11027 Økonomer er forventet å være gode til å forstå utgifter og inntekter.  Men
11028 som oftest antar økonomene uten peiling på hvordan det juridiske systemet
11029 egentlig fungerer, at transaksjonskostnaden i det juridiske systemet er
11030 lav.<sup>[<a name="id2794768" href="#ftn.id2794768" class="footnote">222</a>]</sup>  De ser et system som har
11031 eksistert i hundrevis av år, og de antar at det fungerer slik grunnskolens
11032 samfunnsfagsundervisning lærte dem at det fungerer.
11033 </p><p>
11034
11035
11036 Men det juridiske systemet fungerer ikke. Eller for å være mer nøyaktig, det
11037 fungerer kun for de med mest ressurser.  Det er ikke fordi systemet er
11038 korrupt. Jeg tror overhodet ikke vårt juridisk system (på føderalt nivå, i
11039 hvert fall) er korrupt. Jeg mener ganske enkelt at på grunn av at kostnadene
11040 med vårt juridiske systemet er så hårreisende høyt vil en praktisk talt
11041 aldri oppnå rettferdighet.
11042 </p><p>
11043 Disse kostnadene forstyrrer fri kultur på mange vis.  En advokats tid
11044 faktureres hos de største firmaene for mer enn $400 pr. time. Hvor mye tid
11045 bør en slik advokat bruke på å lese sakene nøye, eller undersøke obskure
11046 rettskilder.  Svaret er i økende grad: svært lite. Jussen er avhengig av
11047 nøye formulering og utvikling av doktrine, men nøye formulering og utvikling
11048 av doktrine er avhengig av nøyaktig arbeid.  Men nøyaktig arbeid koster for
11049 mye, bortsett fra i de mest høyprofilerte og kostbare sakene.
11050 </p><p>
11051 Kostbarheten, klomsetheten og tilfeldigheten til dette systemet håner vår
11052 tradisjon. Og advokater, såvel som akademikere, bør se det som sin plikt å
11053 endre hvordan loven praktiseres&#8212; eller bedre, endre loven slik at den
11054 fungerer. Det er galt at systemet fungerer godt bare for den øverste
11055 1-prosenten av klientene.  Det kan gjøres radikalt mer effektivt, og billig,
11056 og dermed radikalt mer rettferdig.
11057 </p><p>
11058 Men inntil en slik reform er gjennomført, bør vi som samfunn holde lover
11059 unna områder der vi vet den bare vil skade.  Og det er nettopp det loven
11060 altfor ofte vil gjøre hvis for mye av vår kultur er lovregulert.
11061 </p><p>
11062 Tenk på de fantastiske tingene ditt barn kan gjøre eller lage med digital
11063 teknologi&#8212;filmen, musikken, web-siden, bloggen. Eller tenk på de
11064 fantastiske tingene ditt fellesskap kunne få til med digital
11065 teknologi&#8212;en wiki, oppsetting av låve, kampanje til å endre noe. Tenk
11066 på alle de kreative tingene, og tenk deretter på kald sirup helt inn i
11067 maskinene. Dette er hva et hvert regime som krever tillatelser fører
11068 til. Dette er virkeligheten slik den var i Brezhnevs Russland.
11069 </p><p>
11070
11071 Loven bør regulere i visse områder av kulturen&#8212;men det bør regulere
11072 kultur bare der reguleringen bidrar positivt. Likevel tester advokater
11073 sjeldent sin kraft, eller kraften som de fremmer, mot dette enkle pragmatisk
11074 spørsmålet: "vil det bidra positivt?".  Når de blir utfordret om det
11075 utvidede rekkevidden til loven, er advokat-svaret, "Hvorfor ikke?"
11076 </p><p>
11077 Vi burde spørre: "Hvorfor?". Vis meg hvorfor din regulering av kultur er
11078 nødvendig og vis meg hvordan reguleringen bidrar positivt.  Før du kan vise
11079 meg begge, holde advokatene din unna.
11080 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2792923" href="#id2792923" class="para">210</a>] </sup>
11081
11082
11083
11084 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
11085 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology Law
11086 Review 1 (2001): par. 6&#8211;18, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #72</a> (describing examples in
11087 which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked
11088 Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (New York: Random
11089 House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs between technology and privacy).</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2793191" href="#id2793191" class="para">211</a>] </sup>
11090
11091
11092
11093 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
11094 (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre
11095 production, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11096 #72</a>.
11097 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2793479" href="#id2793479" class="para">212</a>] </sup>
11098
11099
11100 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
11101 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
11102 by other countries as well.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2793616" href="#id2793616" class="para">213</a>] </sup>
11103
11104
11105 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not solved
11106 here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated system
11107 than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
11108 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2793722" href="#id2793722" class="para">214</a>] </sup>
11109
11110
11111 "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25. januar 2003): 15, tilgjengelig
11112 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #74</a>.
11113 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2793794" href="#id2793794" class="para">215</a>] </sup>
11114
11115
11116 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
11117 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001), tilgjengelig
11118 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #75</a>.
11119 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2793903" href="#id2793903" class="para">216</a>] </sup>
11120
11121
11122 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
11123 University Press, 1967), 32.
11124 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2793924" href="#id2793924" class="para">217</a>] </sup>
11125
11126 Ibid., 56.
11127 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2793991" href="#id2793991" class="para">218</a>] </sup>
11128
11129 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox
11130 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&#8211;216.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2792931"></a>
11131 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2794168" href="#id2794168" class="para">219</a>] </sup>
11132
11133
11134 For eksempel, se, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3 April
11135 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11136 #76</a>.
11137 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2794371" href="#id2794371" class="para">220</a>] </sup>
11138  William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised: 10
11139 October 2000), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11140 #77</a>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the
11141 Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
11142 2004), ch. 6, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11143 #78</a>. Professor Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt
11144 noncommercial sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish
11145 compensation to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel,
11146 "Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available
11147 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #79</a>. For other
11148 proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back Broadband?" Washington
11149 Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on behalf of Sharman Networks, A
11150 Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Foreign
11151 Relations Committee, 26 February 2002, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #80</a>; Serguei Osokine, A
11152 Quick Case for Intellectual Property Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available
11153 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #81</a>; Jefferson
11154 Graham, "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
11155 2002, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11156 #82</a>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right," IEEE Spectrum
11157 Online, 1 July 2002, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #83</a>; Declan McCullagh,
11158 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August 2002, available at
11159 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #84</a>.  Fisher's
11160 proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for DAT. Unlike
11161 Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly proportionally,
11162 though more popular artists would get more than the less popular. As is
11163 typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current debate by about a
11164 decade. See <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #85</a>.
11165 <a class="indexterm" name="id2794455"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2794463"></a>
11166 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2794737" href="#id2794737" class="para">221</a>] </sup>
11167
11168
11169 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer Memorial
11170 Lecture), UCLA law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&#8211;70.
11171 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2794768" href="#id2794768" class="para">222</a>] </sup>
11172
11173 Et godt eksempel er arbeidet til professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz bør få
11174 ros for sin nøye gjennomgang av data om opphavsrettsbrudd, som fikk ham til
11175 å stille spørsmål med sin egen uttalte posisjon&#8212;to ganger.  I starten
11176 predicated han at nedlasting ville påføre industrien vesentlig skade.  Han
11177 endret så sitt syn etter i lys av dataene, og han har siden endret sitt syn
11178 på nytt.  Sammenlign Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The
11179 True Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
11180 (gikk igjennom hans originale syn men uttrykte skepsis) med Stan J.
11181 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" artikkelutkast, juni
11182 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11183 #86</a>.  Den nøye analysen til Liebowitz er ekstremt verdifull i sin
11184 estimering av effekten av fildelingsteknologi.  Etter mitt syn
11185 underestimerer han forøvrig kostnaden til det juridiske system.  Se, for
11186 eksempel, Rethinking, 174&#8211;76.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2794745"></a>
11187 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 8. Notater"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-notes"></a>Kapittel 8. Notater</h2></div></div></div><p>
11188 I denne teksten er det referanser til lenker på verdensveven.  Og som alle
11189 som har forsøkt å bruke nettet vet, så vil disse lenkene være svært
11190 ustabile.  Jeg har forsøkt å motvirke denne ustabiliteten ved å omdirigere
11191 lesere til den originale kilden gjennom en nettside som hører til denne
11192 boken.  For hver lenke under, så kan du gå til http://free-culture.cc/notes
11193 og finne den originale kilden ved å klikke på nummeret etter #-tegnet.  Hvis
11194 den originale lenken fortsatt er i live, så vil du bli omdirigert til den
11195 lenken.  Hvis den originale lenken har forsvunnet, så vil du bli omdirigert
11196 til en passende referanse til materialet.
11197 </p></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 9. Takk til"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-acknowledgments"></a>Kapittel 9. Takk til</h2></div></div></div><p>
11198 Denne boken er produktet av en lang og så langt mislykket kamp som begynte
11199 da jeg leste om Eric Eldreds krig for å sørge for at bøker forble
11200 frie. Eldreds innsats bidro til å lansere en bevegelse, fri
11201 kultur-bevegelsen, og denne boken er tilegnet ham.
11202 </p><p>
11203 Jeg fikk veiledning på ulike steder fra venner og akademikere, inkludert
11204 Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner, Mark Rose og
11205 Kathleen Sullivan. Og jeg fikk korreksjoner og veiledning fra mange
11206 fantastiske studenter ved Stanford Law School og Stanford University. Det
11207 inkluderer Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James P. Fellers, Christopher
11208 Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman, Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn,
11209 Brian-Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng og Erica Platt. Jeg er særlig takknemlig
11210 overfor Catherine Crump og Harry Surden, som hjalp til med å styre deres
11211 forskning og til Laura Lynch, som briljant håndterte hæren de samlet, samt
11212 bidro med sitt egen kritisk blikk på mye av dette.
11213 </p><p>
11214
11215 Yuko Noguchi hjalp meg å forstå lovene i Japan, så vel som Japans
11216 kultur. Jeg er henne takknemlig, og til de mange i Japan som hjalp meg med
11217 forundersøkelsene til denne boken: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto
11218 Misaki, Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata og Yoshihiro
11219 Yonezawa.  Jeg er også takknemlig til professor Nobuhiro Nakayama og Tokyo
11220 University Business Law Center, som ga meg muligheten til å bruke tid i
11221 Japan, og Tadashi Shiraishi og Kiyokazu Yamagami for deres generøse hjelp
11222 mens jeg var der.
11223 </p><p>
11224 Dette er de tradisjonelle former for hjelp som akademikere regelmessig
11225 trekker på. Men i tillegg til dem, har Internett gjort det mulig å motta råd
11226 og korrigering fra mange som jeg har aldri møtt.  Blant de som har svart med
11227 svært nyttig råd etter forespørsler om boken på bloggen min er Dr. Muhammed
11228 Al-Ubaydli, David Gerstein og Peter Dimauro, I tillegg en lang liste med de
11229 som hadde spesifikke ideer om måter å utvikle mine argumenter på.  De
11230 inkluderte Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
11231 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
11232 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
11233 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred
11234 Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.  Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer,
11235 Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg,
11236 Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink,"
11237 Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," og Richard Yanco. (jeg beklager hvis jeg gikk
11238 glipp av noen, med datamaskiner kommer feil og en krasj i e-postsystemet
11239 mitt gjorde at jeg mistet en haug med flotte svar.)
11240 </p><p>
11241 Richard Stallman og Michael Carroll har begge lest hele boken i utkast, og
11242 hver av dem har bidratt med svært nyttige korreksjoner og råd. Michael hjalp
11243 meg å se mer tydelig betydningen av regulering for avledede verker . Og
11244 Richard korrigerte en pinlig stor mengde feil.  Selv om mitt arbeid er
11245 delvis inspirert av Stallmans, er han ikke enig med meg på vesentlige steder
11246 i denne boken.
11247 </p><p>
11248 Til slutt, og for evig, er jeg Bettina takknemlig, som alltid har insistert
11249 på at det ville være endeløs lykke utenfor disse kampene, og som alltid har
11250 hatt rett.  Denne trege eleven er som alltid takknemlig for hennes
11251 evigvarende tålmodighet og kjærlighet.
11252 </p></div></div></body></html>