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19 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
21 <title>Free Culture
</title>
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
25 <subtitle>Version
2004-
02-
10</subtitle>
29 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
37 Lawrence Lessig. This version of Free Culture is licensed under a
38 Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
39 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
40 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
41 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
46 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
49 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
50 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
51 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
52 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
53 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
54 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
55 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
56 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
57 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
58 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
59 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
60 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
61 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
62 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
72 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
74 <itemizedlist mark=
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75 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
76 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
77 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
78 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
84 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
87 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
90 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
107 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
108 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
109 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
121 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
125 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig,
131 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
132 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright
© 2003 by The New York Times Co.
133 Reprinted with permission.
136 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page
159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
139 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
142 Diagram on page
164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
145 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
149 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
150 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
159 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
162 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
165 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
171 343.7309'
9—dc22
174 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
177 Printed in the United States of America
183 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
191 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
192 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
193 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
194 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
195 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
196 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
197 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
198 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
199 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
200 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
201 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
208 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
213 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
214 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
215 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
223 <title>List of figures
</title>
230 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
231 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
232 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
233 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
238 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
242 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
243 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
244 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
245 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
246 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
247 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
251 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
252 2 Architecture and Law: Force
253 2 Market: Concentration
256 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
257 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
258 2 Constraining Creators
259 2 Constraining Innovators
260 2 Corrupting Citizens
262 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
263 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
267 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
268 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
270 2 1. More Formalities
271 3 Registration and Renewal
274 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
275 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
276 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
284 <preface id=
"preface">
285 <title>PREFACE
</title>
286 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
287 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
290 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
291 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
292 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
296 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
297 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
298 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
299 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
300 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
305 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
306 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
307 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
308 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
309 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
310 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
313 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
314 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
315 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
317 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
318 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
319 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
321 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
323 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
324 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
325 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
326 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
329 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
330 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
331 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
332 free software movement
<footnote>
334 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
335 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
336 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
337 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
338 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
339 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
340 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
341 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
342 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
343 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"
—a culture in
344 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
345 or of creators from the past.
348 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
349 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
350 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
351 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
352 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
353 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
354 culture deem fundamental.
356 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
358 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
359 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
360 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
361 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
362 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
363 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
364 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
365 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
367 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
371 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
372 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
373 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
374 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
375 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
376 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
377 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
382 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
383 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
384 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
385 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
386 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
387 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
388 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
389 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
390 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
391 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
392 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
393 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
394 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
395 that this work is "merely" derivative.
398 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
399 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
400 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
401 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
402 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
403 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
404 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
405 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
408 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
409 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
410 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
411 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
412 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
416 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
417 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
418 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
419 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
420 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
421 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
422 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
430 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
431 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
433 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
434 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
435 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
436 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
437 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
438 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
441 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
442 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
443 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
444 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
445 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
446 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
449 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
450 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
451 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
454 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
455 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
456 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
457 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
458 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
459 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
460 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
462 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
463 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
465 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
466 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
467 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
468 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
469 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
470 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
471 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
472 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
473 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
475 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
476 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
478 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
479 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
480 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
481 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
482 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
483 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
484 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
485 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
489 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
490 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
491 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
492 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
493 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
494 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
495 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
496 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
498 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
499 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
500 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
501 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
502 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
503 Authorship," Stanford Law Review
48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
504 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
506 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
507 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
512 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
515 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
516 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
517 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
519 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
520 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
521 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
522 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
523 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
525 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
526 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
528 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
529 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
530 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
531 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
532 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
533 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
534 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
535 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
536 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
537 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
538 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
539 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
540 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
541 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
542 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
543 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
546 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
547 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
548 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
549 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
550 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
551 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
552 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
553 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
554 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
555 understanding of radio.
556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
557 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
560 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
561 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
562 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
563 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
564 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
565 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
566 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
567 much less transmitter power and static.
570 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
571 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
572 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
573 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
574 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
575 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
576 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
577 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
578 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
581 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
585 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
586 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
587 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
588 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
589 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
590 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
591 box."
<footnote><para>
592 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
593 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
598 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
599 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
600 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
601 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
602 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
603 a handful of networks.
604 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
607 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
608 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
609 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
610 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
611 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
612 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
616 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
617 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
618 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
619 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
620 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
621 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
623 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
628 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
629 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
630 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
632 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
636 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
637 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
638 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
639 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
640 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
641 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
646 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
647 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
648 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
649 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
650 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
651 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
652 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
653 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
654 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
655 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
656 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
661 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
662 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
663 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
664 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
669 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
671 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
672 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
673 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
674 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
675 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
676 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
677 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
681 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
682 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
683 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
684 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
685 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
686 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
687 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
688 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
689 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
690 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
693 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
694 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
695 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
696 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
697 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
698 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
699 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
700 course always public spirited; the reality is something
701 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
702 to themselves, would crumble in
703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
704 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
705 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
706 effect of technological change.
709 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
710 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
711 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
712 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
713 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
714 before.
<footnote><para>
715 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
716 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
717 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
718 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
720 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
724 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
725 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
726 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
727 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
728 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
729 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
730 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
731 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
732 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
735 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
736 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
737 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
738 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
739 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
740 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
744 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
745 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
746 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
747 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
748 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
751 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
752 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
753 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
756 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
757 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
758 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
759 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
760 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
761 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
762 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
763 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
764 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
767 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
768 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
769 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
770 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
771 marketplace.
<footnote>
773 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
774 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
775 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
776 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
777 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
778 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
779 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
781 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
783 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
784 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
785 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
786 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
789 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
790 been erased.
<footnote><para>
791 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
794 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
795 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
796 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
797 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
798 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
799 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
800 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
801 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
802 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
803 culture, more and more a permission culture.
805 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
807 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
808 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
809 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
810 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
811 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
812 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
813 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
814 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
815 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
816 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
820 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
821 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
822 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
823 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
824 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
825 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
826 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
827 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
828 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
829 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
830 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
831 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
832 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
833 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
834 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
835 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
836 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
839 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
840 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
841 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
842 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
843 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
844 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
848 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
850 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
851 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
852 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
853 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
854 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
855 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
856 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
857 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
858 Times,
17 January
2002.
859 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
860 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
861 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
865 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
866 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
867 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
868 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
869 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
873 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
874 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
875 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
876 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
879 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
880 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
881 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
882 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
883 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
885 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
886 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
887 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
889 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
890 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
891 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
892 could cultivate and extend our culture.
895 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
896 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
897 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
898 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
899 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
900 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
901 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
902 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
903 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
907 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
908 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
909 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
910 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
911 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
915 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
916 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
917 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
918 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
919 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
920 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
921 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
923 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
924 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
926 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
927 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
928 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
929 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
930 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
931 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
932 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
933 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
934 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
935 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
936 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
937 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
940 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
941 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
943 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
944 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
945 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
946 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
949 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
953 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
955 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
956 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
957 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
958 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
959 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
960 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
964 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
965 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
967 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
972 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
973 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
976 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
977 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
978 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
979 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
980 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
983 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
984 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
985 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
987 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
990 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
991 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
993 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
994 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
995 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
996 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
997 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
998 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
999 this silliness will be much more profound.
1000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1003 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1004 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1008 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1009 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1011 French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird sort we
1012 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
1013 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
1014 can be more fully understood.
1017 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1018 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1020 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1021 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1022 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1023 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1025 by the changes to use their power to change the law
—and more
1026 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
1027 who we have always been.
1030 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1031 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1032 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1033 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1034 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1035 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1039 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
1040 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1043 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1044 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1047 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1048 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1049 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1050 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1051 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1055 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1056 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1057 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1059 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1062 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1065 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1066 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1067 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1068 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1069 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1070 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1074 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1075 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1076 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1078 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1079 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1082 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1084 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1085 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1087 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1088 piercing
—our kids are becoming thieves!
1091 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1092 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1093 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1094 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1097 The idea goes something like this:
1101 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1102 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1103 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1104 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1105 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1109 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1111 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1112 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1113 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1115 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1116 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1118 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1119 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1120 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1121 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1123 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1124 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1125 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1126 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1127 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1129 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1130 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1132 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1134 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1135 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1137 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1138 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1140 It has never taken hold within our law.
1143 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1144 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1145 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1146 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1147 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1150 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1151 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1152 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1153 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1154 copyright law today regulates both.
1157 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1158 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1159 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1160 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1161 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1162 more expense of doing business.
1164 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1166 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1167 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1168 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1169 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1170 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1171 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1172 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1173 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1174 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1175 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1176 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1177 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1178 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1179 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1180 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1182 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1185 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1186 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1187 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1188 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1189 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1190 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1191 enabled are much more tenuous.
1192 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1194 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1195 this creative class.
1198 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1199 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1200 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1204 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1205 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1207 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1208 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1209 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1210 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1211 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1214 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1215 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1216 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1217 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1218 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1219 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1223 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1224 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1225 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1226 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1230 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1231 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1232 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1233 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1234 synchronization was pretty close.
1237 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1239 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1240 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1241 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1242 wonderful! And it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1244 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1246 (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1251 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1252 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1253 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1254 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1257 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1258 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1259 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1260 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1261 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1262 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1263 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1266 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1267 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1268 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1269 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1272 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1273 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1274 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1275 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1276 The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular and among the best of its
1280 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1282 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1283 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1285 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1286 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1287 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1288 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1289 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1290 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1291 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1292 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1294 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1295 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1296 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1297 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1298 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1302 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1303 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1304 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1306 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1307 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1308 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1310 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1311 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1312 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1313 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1314 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1315 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1316 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1317 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1321 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1322 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1323 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1324 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1325 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1326 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1327 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1330 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1331 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1332 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1333 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1334 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1335 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1336 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (
1937),
1337 Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi (
1942), Song of
1338 the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland (
1951), Robin
1339 Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1341 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1342 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)
—not to
1343 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1344 Treasure Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1345 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1346 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1347 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1350 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1351 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1352 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1353 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1354 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1355 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1356 culture around us and makes it something different.
1358 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1359 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1360 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1361 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1362 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1364 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1365 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1367 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1368 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1369 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1371 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1372 Web site associated with this book, available at
1373 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1375 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1376 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1377 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1378 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1381 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1382 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1383 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1384 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1385 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1386 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1387 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1390 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1391 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1392 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1393 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1395 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1396 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1397 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1398 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1399 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1400 content from before the Great Depression.
1403 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1404 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1405 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1409 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1410 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1411 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1412 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1413 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1414 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1415 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1418 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1419 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1420 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1421 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1422 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1423 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1424 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1425 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1426 interestingly different way.
1429 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1430 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1431 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1434 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1435 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1436 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1437 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1439 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1440 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1441 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1442 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1443 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1444 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1445 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1448 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1449 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1450 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1451 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1452 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1453 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1454 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1455 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1456 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1459 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1460 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1461 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1462 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1463 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1464 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1465 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1466 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1467 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1468 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1469 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1470 original copyright owner's permission.
1473 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1474 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1475 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1476 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1477 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1480 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1481 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1482 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1484 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1485 York: Perennial,
2000).
1489 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1490 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1491 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1492 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1493 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1494 which are fifty years old."
1497 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1498 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1499 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1500 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1501 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1502 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1503 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1505 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1506 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1507 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1508 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1509 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1510 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1511 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1512 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1516 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1517 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1518 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1519 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1520 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1521 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1522 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1523 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1527 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1528 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1529 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1530 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1531 to prosecute cases like this."
1534 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1535 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1536 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1537 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1538 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1539 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1540 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1541 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1542 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1543 their clients or hurt them?
1544 Let's pause for a moment.
1547 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1548 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1549 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1552 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1553 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1554 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1555 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1557 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1559 Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1561 Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1562 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately describes a set of
1563 "property" rights
—copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret
—but the
1564 nature of those rights is very different.
1566 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1568 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1569 intellectual property.
1572 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1573 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1574 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1575 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1576 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1577 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1578 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1579 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1580 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1581 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1582 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1583 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1587 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1588 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1589 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1591 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1592 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1596 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1597 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1598 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1599 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1600 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1601 form, whether large or small.
1604 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1605 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1606 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1607 particular find it hard to say why.
1610 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1611 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1612 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1613 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1614 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1615 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1616 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1617 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1618 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1619 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1620 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster
1624 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1625 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1626 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1627 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1628 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1629 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1630 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1631 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1635 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1636 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1637 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1638 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1639 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1640 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1641 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1642 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1643 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1646 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1647 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1648 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1653 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1654 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1655 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1657 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1658 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1659 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1660 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1661 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1662 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1663 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1666 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1667 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1668 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1669 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1670 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1671 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1672 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1673 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1677 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1678 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1680 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1681 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1682 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1683 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1684 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1685 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1686 population of photographers.
1689 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1690 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1691 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1692 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1694 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1695 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1699 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1700 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1701 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1702 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1703 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1704 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1705 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1706 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1707 chemicals.
<footnote>
1710 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1712 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1717 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1718 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1719 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1720 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1721 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1722 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1723 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1724 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1725 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1726 percent.
<footnote><para>
1729 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1730 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1732 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1735 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1739 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1740 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1741 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1742 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1743 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1744 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1745 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1746 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1747 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1748 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1754 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1755 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1756 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1757 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1758 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1759 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1760 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1761 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1762 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1763 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1767 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1768 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1769 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1770 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1771 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1772 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1773 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1774 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1776 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1780 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1781 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1782 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1783 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1784 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1787 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1788 that they thought valuable.
1790 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1792 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1793 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1794 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1795 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1796 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1799 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1800 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1801 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1802 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1803 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1804 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1805 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1806 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1809 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1810 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1811 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1812 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1813 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1814 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1815 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1816 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1817 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1819 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1820 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1821 Review
48 (
1960)
398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1822 Inc.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1827 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1828 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1829 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1830 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1831 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1832 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1833 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1834 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1835 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1836 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1837 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1838 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1839 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1844 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1845 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1846 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1847 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1848 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1849 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1850 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1851 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1852 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1853 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1854 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1855 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1856 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1857 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1858 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1859 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1860 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1861 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1862 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1863 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1864 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1865 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1869 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1870 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1871 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1872 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1873 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1875 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1877 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1878 February
2002, available at
1879 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1881 These buses are filled with technology that
1882 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1883 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1884 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1885 teachers call "media literacy."
1888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1889 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1890 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1891 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1892 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1893 the way people access it."
1896 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1897 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1898 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1902 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1903 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1904 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1906 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1907 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1908 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1910 it is increasingly important to understand the
1911 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1912 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1913 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1915 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1918 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1919 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1920 written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult it is to
1922 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1923 understandable
—few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1924 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1925 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1926 emotion or builds suspense.
1929 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1930 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1931 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1932 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1933 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1934 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1936 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
1938 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1939 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1940 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1943 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1944 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1948 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1950 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1951 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
1953 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1954 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1955 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1956 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1957 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1958 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1959 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1960 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1962 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1963 November
2000, available at
1964 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1966 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1969 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1971 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1972 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1973 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1974 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1975 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1978 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
1979 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
1980 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1981 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1985 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1986 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1987 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1988 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1993 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1994 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1998 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1999 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2001 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
2002 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
2003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2004 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2006 language for what they need to create or express."
<footnote>
2009 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2010 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2011 </para></footnote> It is to enable
2012 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2017 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2019 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2020 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2021 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2022 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2023 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2024 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2025 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2026 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2027 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2028 students know something about
—gun violence.
2031 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2032 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2033 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2034 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2035 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2036 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2039 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2040 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2041 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2042 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2043 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2044 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2045 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2046 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2047 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2048 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2049 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2050 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2051 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2052 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2053 to this form of expression.
2057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2058 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2059 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2061 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2063 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2064 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part
—and
2066 not the most powerful part
—of constructing meaning. As Daley
2067 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2071 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2072 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2073 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2074 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2075 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2076 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2077 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2078 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2079 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2080 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2081 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2082 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2083 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2084 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2085 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2086 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2087 about the topic. . . .
2090 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2091 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2092 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2093 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2094 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2097 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2098 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2099 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2101 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2102 had a lot of power with this language."
2106 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2107 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2108 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2109 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2110 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2111 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2112 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2113 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2114 world would be watching.
2117 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2118 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2119 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2120 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2121 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2122 entertainment is tragedy.
2124 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2125 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2127 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2128 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2129 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2130 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2131 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2132 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2133 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2134 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2135 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2136 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2137 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2138 was also the Internet.
2141 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2142 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2143 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2144 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2147 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2151 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2152 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2153 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2154 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2155 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2156 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2157 spread practically instantaneously.
2160 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2161 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2162 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2163 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2164 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2165 records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2166 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2169 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2170 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2171 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2172 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2173 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2174 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2175 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2176 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2177 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2178 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2179 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2180 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2183 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2184 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2185 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2186 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2187 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2190 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2191 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2194 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2195 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2196 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2197 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2198 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2199 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2200 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2201 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2202 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2203 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2204 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2205 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2206 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2207 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2209 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2210 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2214 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2215 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2216 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2218 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2220 Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2222 And in some towns in
2223 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2224 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2229 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2231 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2232 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2234 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2235 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2236 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2238 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2239 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2240 </para></footnote> We say what our
2241 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2244 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2245 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2246 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2248 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2249 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2252 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2256 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2257 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2258 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2259 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2260 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2261 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2264 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2265 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential
2266 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2268 is having an effect.
2271 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2272 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2273 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2275 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2276 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2277 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2278 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2280 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2281 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2282 as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2284 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2285 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2289 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2290 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2291 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2292 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2296 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2297 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2298 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2299 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2300 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2301 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2302 peer-generated rankings.
2305 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2307 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2308 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2309 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2310 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2311 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2312 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2313 get it out of the way."
2315 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2317 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2318 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2319 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2320 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2321 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2323 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2325 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2326 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2327 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2328 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2329 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2330 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2331 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2333 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2334 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2335 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2336 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2337 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2338 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2339 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2341 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2342 Information Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2343 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2344 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2345 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2347 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2348 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2349 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2350 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2353 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2354 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2355 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2356 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2357 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2360 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2361 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2362 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2363 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2364 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2365 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2366 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2367 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2368 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2370 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2373 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2374 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2375 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2376 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2377 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2380 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2381 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2383 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2384 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2385 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2386 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2387 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2388 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2389 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2390 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2391 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2392 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2397 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2398 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2399 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2402 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2404 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2405 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2406 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2409 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2410 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2412 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2414 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2415 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2416 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2418 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2419 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2420 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2421 tinkering of many others.
2424 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2425 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2426 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2427 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2428 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2431 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2433 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2434 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2435 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2436 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2438 a major apprenticeship platform."
2441 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2442 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2444 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2446 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2447 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2448 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2451 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2452 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2453 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2455 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2456 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2457 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2459 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2460 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2461 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2463 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2465 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2466 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2469 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2473 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2474 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2475 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2476 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2477 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2478 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2479 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2482 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2483 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2484 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2485 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2486 general.
<footnote><para>
2488 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2489 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2490 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2492 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2493 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2496 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2497 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2501 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2502 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2503 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2504 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2505 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2508 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2509 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2510 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2511 the law to close down that technology.
2514 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2515 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2519 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2520 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2522 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2523 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2524 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2525 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2526 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2529 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2530 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2531 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2532 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2533 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2534 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2537 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2538 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2539 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2540 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2541 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2544 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2545 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2546 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2547 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2548 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2549 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2550 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2551 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2552 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2553 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2556 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2557 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2558 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2559 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2560 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2561 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2562 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2565 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2566 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2567 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2568 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2569 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2570 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2571 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2572 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2573 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2577 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2578 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2579 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2580 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2581 be on users' computers.
2584 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2585 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2586 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2588 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2590 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2594 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2595 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2596 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2597 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2598 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2599 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2600 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2601 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2602 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2603 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2604 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2605 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2609 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2610 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2611 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2612 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2613 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2614 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2615 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2618 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2619 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2620 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2621 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2622 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2623 easier to use"
—again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2624 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2625 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2626 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2627 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2630 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2631 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2633 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2634 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2635 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2636 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2637 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2638 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2641 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2642 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2643 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2644 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2645 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2646 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2647 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion
—six
2648 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2650 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2651 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2652 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2656 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2657 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2658 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2659 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2660 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2663 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2664 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2665 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2666 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2667 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2668 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2669 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2670 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2671 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2674 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2675 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2676 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2677 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2678 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2680 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2681 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2684 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2685 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2688 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2689 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2690 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2691 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2692 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2693 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2694 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2696 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2697 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2698 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2700 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2701 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2702 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2704 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2705 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2709 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2710 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2711 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2716 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2717 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2718 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2719 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2723 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2724 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2725 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2726 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2727 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2731 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2732 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2734 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2735 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2736 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2737 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2738 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2739 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2744 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2746 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2747 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87–93,
2748 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2750 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2751 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2752 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2753 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2754 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2755 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2756 this creative property
2757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2758 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2761 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2765 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2766 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2767 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2768 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2769 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2770 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2771 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2774 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2775 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2776 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2777 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2778 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2779 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2780 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2781 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2782 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2783 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2785 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2786 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2787 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2788 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2789 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2790 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2791 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2792 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2793 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2794 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2795 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2796 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2797 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2801 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2802 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2803 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2804 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2805 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2807 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2808 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2810 That led the independents to flee the East
2811 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2812 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2813 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2817 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2818 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2819 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2822 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2823 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2824 Edison's creative property.
2827 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2828 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2830 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2831 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2834 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2835 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2836 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2837 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2838 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2839 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2840 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2841 right to perform it publicly.
2843 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2845 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2846 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2847 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2848 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2849 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2850 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2851 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2852 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2853 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2854 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2855 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2856 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2857 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2858 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2859 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2860 its composer anything.
2863 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2865 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2870 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2871 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2872 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2873 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2874 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2875 rights.
<footnote><para>
2877 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2878 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2879 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2880 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2881 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2882 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2887 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2888 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2889 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2891 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2892 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2894 and the "music publishing industry"
2895 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2897 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2898 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2901 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2902 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2904 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2905 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2909 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2910 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2911 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2912 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2913 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2914 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2916 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2917 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2919 Company of New York).
2920 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2921 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2922 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2923 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2924 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2925 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<footnote><para>
2927 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376
2929 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2931 Graphophone Company Association).
2935 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2936 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2937 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2938 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2940 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2941 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2942 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2945 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2947 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2948 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2951 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2952 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2953 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2954 Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2956 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2960 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2961 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2962 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2963 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2964 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2965 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2967 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
2970 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2971 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2972 kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2973 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2974 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2975 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2976 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2977 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2978 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2979 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2980 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2981 creativity.
<footnote><para>
2983 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2984 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2985 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2986 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2987 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2989 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2992 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2993 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2994 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2999 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3001 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3003 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3005 in the United States and throughout the world; records
3006 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
3007 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3009 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3010 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3011 before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3012 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3013 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3014 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3016 quality, and a greater choice.
<footnote><para>
3018 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3019 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3020 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3021 this report.
</para></footnote>
3025 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3027 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3031 <title>Radio
</title>
3033 Radio was also born of piracy.
3036 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3037 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3039 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3040 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3041 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3042 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3043 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3044 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3045 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3046 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3047 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3048 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3049 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3051 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3052 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3053 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3056 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3057 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3058 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3059 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3060 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3061 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3062 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3063 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3064 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3066 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3069 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3071 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3072 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3074 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3075 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3079 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3081 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3082 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3083 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3086 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3087 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3088 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3089 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3090 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3091 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3092 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3095 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3096 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3097 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3099 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3100 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3101 something for nothing.
3104 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3105 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3108 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3111 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3112 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3113 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3114 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3116 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3117 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3118 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3121 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3122 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3124 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3125 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3126 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3128 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3129 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3130 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3131 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3134 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3135 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3136 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3137 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3139 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3140 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3142 As another broadcaster put it,
3146 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3147 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3148 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3150 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3151 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3156 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3160 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3161 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3162 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3163 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3165 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3166 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3167 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3172 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3173 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3174 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3176 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3177 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3181 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3182 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3186 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3187 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3188 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3189 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3192 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3193 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3195 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3196 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3201 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3202 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3205 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3206 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3207 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3208 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3209 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3210 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3211 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3212 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3213 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3214 created by broadcasters' content.
3217 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3218 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3219 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3220 today
<footnote><para>
3222 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3223 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3224 Information, available at
3225 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3226 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3227 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3229 — then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3230 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3231 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3232 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3233 generation
—until now.
3235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3239 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3241 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3242 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3243 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3244 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3245 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3249 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3250 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3251 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3252 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3253 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3254 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3255 has so often done in the past.
3256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3258 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3259 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3261 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3262 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3263 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3264 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3265 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3267 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3268 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available at
3270 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3271 Financial Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3273 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3274 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually
3275 worldwide to piracy.
3278 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3279 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3280 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3281 This piracy is wrong.
3284 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3285 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3286 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3288 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3289 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3291 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3292 existence, treated as right.
3295 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3296 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3297 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3298 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3299 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3300 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3302 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3303 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3304 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3307 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3308 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3310 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3312 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3316 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3317 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3318 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3319 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3321 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3322 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3323 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3324 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3325 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3326 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3327 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3328 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3329 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3330 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3331 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3332 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3333 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3334 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3335 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3336 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3337 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3338 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3342 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3343 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3344 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3345 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3346 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3348 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3349 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3350 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3351 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3353 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3354 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3358 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3359 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3360 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3361 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3362 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3363 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3364 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3365 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3366 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3367 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3368 piracy of the tangible.
3371 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3372 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3374 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3375 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3376 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3378 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3379 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3381 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3384 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3385 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3386 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3388 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3389 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3392 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3393 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3394 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3395 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3396 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3398 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3399 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3401 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3402 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3403 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3405 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3408 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3409 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3410 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3411 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3413 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3414 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3417 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3419 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3420 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3422 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3423 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3424 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3425 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3427 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what
—at
3428 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3430 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3435 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3436 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3437 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3438 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3439 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3440 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3441 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3445 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3446 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3447 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3448 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3449 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3450 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3451 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3454 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3455 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3456 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3457 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3460 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3461 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3462 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3463 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3466 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3467 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3472 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3473 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3475 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3476 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3478 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3480 This means we must determine whether
3481 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3483 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3484 author of his profit.
3487 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3488 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3489 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3490 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3492 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3493 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3494 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3495 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3496 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3497 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3498 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3499 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89–92,
139.
3500 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3501 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3502 put together components that had been developed independently.
3503 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3506 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3507 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3508 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3509 system.
<footnote><para>
3511 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3512 Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3513 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3514 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3515 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3516 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3518 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3519 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3520 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3521 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3522 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3523 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3524 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3527 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3529 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3530 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3531 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3533 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3534 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3535 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3536 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3539 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
43 million citizens
3540 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3542 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3543 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3546 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3547 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3548 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3550 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3553 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3554 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3556 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3557 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more carefully
3558 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do
—the kinds of
3559 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3563 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3564 different kinds into four types.
3566 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3569 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3571 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3572 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3573 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3574 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3575 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3576 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3582 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3583 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3584 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3585 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3587 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3588 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3590 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3591 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3595 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3597 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3598 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3599 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3601 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3602 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3603 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3604 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3605 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3607 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3608 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3609 content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same harm
3610 that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3616 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3617 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3622 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3625 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3627 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3628 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<footnote><para>
3630 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148–49.
3632 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3634 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3635 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3636 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer
—and
3638 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3642 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3643 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3645 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3646 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3647 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3648 that is "devastating" the industry.
3651 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3653 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3655 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3656 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
&
3657 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3658 labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3660 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3662 Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report describes the music
3664 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3665 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3666 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3667 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3668 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent
3669 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3670 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3671 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3672 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145–56.
3674 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3675 album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the
3676 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3678 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3681 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3682 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3683 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3684 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3686 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3687 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3689 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3693 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3694 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3695 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3696 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3697 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3698 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3699 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3700 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3703 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3704 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3705 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3706 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3707 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3708 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3709 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3712 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3714 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3715 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3718 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3720 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3722 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3724 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3725 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3726 25 June
2003, available at
3727 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3728 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3729 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3730 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3731 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3733 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3734 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3736 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3738 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3739 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3740 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3741 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3742 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3743 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3746 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3747 February
2003, available at
3748 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3749 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3752 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3753 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3754 High Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie
3755 [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3763 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3764 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3765 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3766 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3768 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3769 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3772 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3773 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3774 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3776 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own
3778 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3779 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3780 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3781 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of Kazaa
3782 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry would have
3783 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3784 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3785 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3787 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3790 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3792 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3793 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3797 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
3798 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3800 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3801 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3803 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3804 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3805 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3807 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3809 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3810 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3814 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3815 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3816 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3818 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3822 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3824 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3826 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3828 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3829 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3830 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3831 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3832 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3834 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3837 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3840 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3841 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3842 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3843 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3844 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3846 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3847 owner for the content they sell.
3849 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3851 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3852 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3853 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3854 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3855 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3856 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3857 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3858 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3859 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3860 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3861 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3864 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3865 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3866 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3867 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3868 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3872 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3873 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3874 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3875 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3876 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3877 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3880 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3881 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3882 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3883 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3884 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3885 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3889 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3890 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3891 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3892 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3895 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3896 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3897 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3898 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3902 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3903 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3904 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of
3905 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3906 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3907 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3908 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3909 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3910 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3911 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3912 found only with time.
3915 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3916 just what you call type A sharing?"
3919 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3921 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3922 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3924 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3926 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3928 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3929 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3930 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3932 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3933 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3935 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3936 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3938 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3942 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3943 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3944 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3945 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3946 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3947 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3948 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3949 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3950 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3953 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3954 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3955 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3957 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3959 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3960 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3961 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3964 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3965 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3966 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3968 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3969 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3970 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3971 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3972 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3974 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3977 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3978 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3979 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3980 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3982 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3987 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3988 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of
3989 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3990 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3992 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3994 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3995 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3996 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3997 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3999 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
4000 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
4001 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
4003 over the future (cable).
4005 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4007 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4008 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4009 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4010 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4011 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4012 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4013 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4014 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4015 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4016 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4017 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4020 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4021 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4022 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4023 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4024 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4025 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4026 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4027 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4029 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4030 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4031 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4032 for the architecture it chose.
4035 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4036 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4037 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4038 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4039 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4040 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4042 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4043 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4044 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4045 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4047 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4048 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4049 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4050 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4051 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4052 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4054 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4056 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4057 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4059 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4062 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4063 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4064 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4065 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4066 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4067 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4068 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4070 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4075 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4076 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4077 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4078 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held
4079 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4080 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4081 technology
—which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4082 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4083 of the American film industry)
—was an illegal
4084 technology.
<footnote><para>
4086 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4091 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4094 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4095 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4100 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4101 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4103 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4105 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4106 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4108 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4110 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4115 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4116 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4118 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4119 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4120 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4124 <title>Table
</title>
4125 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4129 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4130 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4131 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4136 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4137 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4138 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4139 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4142 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4143 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4145 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4148 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4149 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4150 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4151 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4155 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4156 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4157 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4164 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4165 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4167 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4168 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4169 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4170 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4171 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4172 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4173 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4174 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4175 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4176 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293–96.
4177 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4179 In each case, throughout our history,
4180 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4184 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4185 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4186 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4187 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4188 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4190 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4191 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4192 the interests at stake.
4193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4196 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4197 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4198 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4199 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4200 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4202 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4203 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4204 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4205 permission to record a song?
4208 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4209 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4210 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4211 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4213 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4216 Instead, the particular uses that the
4217 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4218 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4219 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4221 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4222 the distribution of content.
4225 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4226 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4227 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4228 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4229 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4230 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4231 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4232 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4233 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4234 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4236 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4242 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4244 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4245 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4247 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4249 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4250 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4252 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4253 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4255 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4257 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4258 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4259 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4260 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4261 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4262 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4263 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4266 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4267 just as any other property is protected."
4269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4273 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4274 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4278 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4279 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4280 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4281 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4282 the price she can get.
4285 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4286 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4287 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4288 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4289 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4290 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4291 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard
—by, for example,
4293 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4294 thing I am taking then?
4297 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4298 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4300 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4302 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4303 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4304 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4305 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4306 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4307 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4308 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4310 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4311 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4312 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4316 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4317 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4318 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4320 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4324 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in
4325 other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4327 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4329 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4331 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4333 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4334 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4336 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4337 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4339 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4344 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4346 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4348 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4349 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4350 significance of this true statement
—"copyright material is property"
—
4351 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4352 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4357 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4358 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4360 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4361 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4363 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4364 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4365 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4366 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4367 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4369 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4372 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4373 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4374 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4376 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4377 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4378 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4379 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4380 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4381 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4382 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4385 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger
<footnote><para>
4387 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4389 University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4392 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4393 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4394 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4395 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4396 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4398 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4400 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4403 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4404 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4405 of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4406 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4407 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4409 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4411 by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.
<footnote><para>
4413 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4415 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4417 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in
1731. So why
4418 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in
1774?
4421 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4423 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4424 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4425 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4427 in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4428 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4429 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4431 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4434 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4435 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4436 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4438 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4440 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4441 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4443 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4444 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4446 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4448 of any positive law.
4451 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4452 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4453 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4454 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4457 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4458 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4460 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4463 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4464 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4466 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4467 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4469 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4470 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4473 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4474 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4475 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4478 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4479 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4480 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4481 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4482 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4483 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4484 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4485 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4487 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4490 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4492 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4493 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4497 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4498 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4499 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4500 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4502 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4503 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4505 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4507 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4509 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4510 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4514 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4515 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4516 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4518 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4520 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4521 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4522 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4523 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4526 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4527 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4529 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4530 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4531 monopolies
—especially
4532 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4533 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4534 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4535 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4537 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4538 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4542 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4544 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4545 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4546 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4547 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4548 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4550 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4553 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4554 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4555 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4556 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4558 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind
—tools of the
4559 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4561 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4562 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4563 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4564 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4566 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4567 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4571 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4572 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4574 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4575 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4576 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4580 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4581 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4582 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4583 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4584 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4585 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4587 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4588 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4589 construction and spread of culture.
4592 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4593 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4594 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4595 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4596 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4597 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4598 they said; they needed more time.
4601 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4602 words that echo today,
4606 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4607 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4608 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4609 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4610 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4611 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4612 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4613 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4614 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4616 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4617 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4618 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4619 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4620 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4621 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4622 al.,
8, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4627 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4628 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4629 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4630 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4631 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4632 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4633 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4634 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4635 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4636 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4637 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4638 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4639 way to protect authors.
4642 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4643 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4644 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4645 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4646 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4648 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4649 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4650 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4652 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4653 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4656 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4657 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4658 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4660 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4661 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4665 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4666 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4667 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4668 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4670 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4673 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4675 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4676 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4677 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4678 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4682 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4685 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4686 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4687 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4688 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4689 Property."
<footnote><para>
4691 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4694 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4695 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4696 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4699 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4700 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4701 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4704 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4705 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4706 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4707 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4708 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4709 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4711 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4712 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review
29
4716 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4717 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4720 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4721 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4722 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4723 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4724 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4725 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4726 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4727 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4728 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4731 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4732 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4733 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4734 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4735 with in
1710: How best to limit
4736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4737 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4738 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4739 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4740 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4741 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4742 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4744 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4746 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4747 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4749 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4751 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4752 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4753 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4757 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4758 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4759 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4760 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4761 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4762 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4765 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4766 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4767 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4768 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4769 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4770 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4771 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4772 statute were no longer protected.
4775 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4776 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4777 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4778 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4779 House of Lords generally voted.
4782 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4783 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4785 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4786 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4787 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4788 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4789 passed into the public domain.
4792 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4793 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4794 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4795 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4796 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4797 and the greatest works in English history
—including those of
4798 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan
—were free of
4800 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4801 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4802 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4803 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4804 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4807 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4808 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4809 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4810 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4811 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4812 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4813 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4814 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4815 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4821 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4822 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4827 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4828 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4829 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4830 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4831 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4832 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4833 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4834 successors.
<footnote><para>
4841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4842 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4843 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4844 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4845 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4846 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4847 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4848 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4849 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4850 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4851 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4852 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4853 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4854 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4855 readers chose to let it develop
— chose in the books they bought
4856 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4857 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4858 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4859 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4862 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4863 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4864 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4869 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4870 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4872 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4873 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4874 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4875 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4879 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4880 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4884 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4885 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4886 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4887 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4888 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4890 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4893 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4894 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4895 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4896 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4898 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4902 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4903 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4904 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4905 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4906 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4909 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4910 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4911 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4912 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4913 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4914 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4917 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4918 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4919 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4920 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4921 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4922 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4925 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4926 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4927 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4928 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4929 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4930 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4933 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4934 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4935 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4936 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4937 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4938 confirm what he had been told.
4941 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4942 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4943 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4946 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4947 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4948 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4949 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4953 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4954 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4955 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4956 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4957 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4958 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4959 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4962 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4963 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4964 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4965 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4966 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4967 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4968 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4969 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4970 says the owner gets to control.
4973 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4974 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4975 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4976 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4977 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4978 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
4982 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4983 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
4985 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4986 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4987 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4988 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4989 Law School,
5 August
2003.
4991 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4992 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons
—and fair use does
4993 not require the permission of anyone.
4996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4997 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
5001 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5002 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5003 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5004 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
5005 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5006 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5008 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5011 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5012 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5013 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5014 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5015 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5019 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5020 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5021 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
5022 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
5023 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5024 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
5025 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5026 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5031 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5032 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5033 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5034 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5035 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5036 pockets, me or them.
5037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5041 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5042 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5048 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5049 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5050 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5051 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5052 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5053 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5056 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5057 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5058 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5059 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5062 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5064 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5065 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5066 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5067 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5069 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5070 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5071 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5072 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5073 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5075 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5077 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5078 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5079 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5080 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5081 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5082 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5083 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5084 important to his career.
5086 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5088 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5089 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5090 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5091 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5095 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5096 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5097 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5098 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5099 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5101 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5103 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5104 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5105 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5106 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5107 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5110 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5112 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5113 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5115 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5117 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5118 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5119 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5123 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5124 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5125 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5126 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5128 <primary>artists
</primary>
5129 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5134 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5135 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5136 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5137 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5138 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5141 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5142 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5143 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5147 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5148 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5149 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5150 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5151 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5152 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5156 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5157 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5158 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5159 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5160 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5161 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5162 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5163 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5164 started calling people.
5167 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5169 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5170 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5171 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5172 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5173 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5174 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5175 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5176 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5180 It was one year later
—"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5181 were totally in the clear."
5183 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5185 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5186 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5187 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5191 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5192 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5193 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5194 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5195 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5196 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5197 systematically and cleared the rights.
5202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5203 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5204 loved it, and it sold very well.
5206 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5207 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5209 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5210 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5211 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5212 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5213 at all."
<footnote><para>
5215 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5216 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5217 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5219 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5223 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5224 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5225 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5226 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5227 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5231 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5232 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5233 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5234 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5235 compensated for that.
5239 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5240 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5241 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5242 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5243 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5244 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5245 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5249 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5250 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5251 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5252 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5253 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5254 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5255 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5256 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5257 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5258 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5259 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5260 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5261 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5262 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5263 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5264 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5265 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5268 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5270 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5271 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5272 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5273 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5274 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5275 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5276 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5277 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5278 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5279 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5280 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5281 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5282 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5283 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5284 "Does this still make sense?"
5287 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5288 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5289 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5290 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5293 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5294 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5297 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5298 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5299 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5300 judges loved every minute of it.
5302 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5304 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5305 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5306 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5307 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5308 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5309 were just violated in this room?"
5311 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5313 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5314 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5315 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5316 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5317 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5318 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5319 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5320 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5321 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5322 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5323 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5324 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5325 couldn't easily do them legally.
5328 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5329 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5330 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5331 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5332 planted in your presentation.
5335 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5337 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5338 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5339 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5340 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5341 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5342 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5343 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5344 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5347 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5348 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5349 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5350 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5351 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5354 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5355 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5356 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5357 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5358 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5359 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5360 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5361 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5362 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5363 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5364 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5365 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5369 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5370 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5371 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5372 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5375 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5376 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5378 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5379 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5380 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5381 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5382 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5383 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5387 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5388 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5389 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5390 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5391 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5392 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5393 new audiences, it is Mike."
5396 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5397 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5398 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5399 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5400 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5401 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5402 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5403 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5406 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5407 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5408 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5409 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5410 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5411 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5412 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5413 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5414 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5415 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5416 curse, reserved for the few.
5418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5420 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5421 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5423 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5424 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5425 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5426 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5427 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5428 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5429 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5432 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5433 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5434 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5435 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5436 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5437 well as when those pages changed.
5440 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5441 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5442 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5443 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5448 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5449 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5450 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5453 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5454 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5455 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5456 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5457 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5460 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5461 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5462 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5463 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5464 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5466 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5467 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5468 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5469 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5470 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5474 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5475 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5476 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5477 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5478 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5479 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5480 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5481 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5485 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5486 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5487 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5488 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5489 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5490 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5491 presumes this knowedge.
5494 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5495 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5496 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5497 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5499 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5500 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5501 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5502 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5505 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5506 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5507 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5508 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5509 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5510 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5511 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5512 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5515 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5516 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5517 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5518 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5519 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5520 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5521 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5522 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5523 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5524 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5525 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5526 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5527 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5528 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5529 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5533 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5534 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5535 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5536 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5537 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5540 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5541 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5545 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5546 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5547 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5548 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5549 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5550 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5553 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5554 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5555 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5556 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5557 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5561 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5562 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5563 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5564 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5565 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5566 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5567 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5568 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5570 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5571 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2–3
5572 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5573 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5578 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5579 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5580 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5581 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5582 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5583 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5584 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5585 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5586 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5589 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5591 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5592 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5593 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5594 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5595 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5596 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5600 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5601 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5602 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5603 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5604 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5605 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5606 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5607 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5608 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5609 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5610 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5611 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5612 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5613 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5614 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5615 few minutes
—for free.
5618 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5619 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5620 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5621 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5622 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5626 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5627 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5628 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5629 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5630 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5631 has
—a noncommercial life.
5634 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5635 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5639 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5640 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5641 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5642 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5643 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5646 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5647 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5648 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5649 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5650 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5651 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5655 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5656 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5658 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5659 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5660 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5661 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5662 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5663 College Law Review
44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5664 </para></footnote>). After
5665 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5666 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5667 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5668 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5669 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5672 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5673 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5674 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5675 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5676 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5677 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5678 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5679 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5683 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5684 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5685 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5686 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5687 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5690 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5691 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5692 little practical effect.
5695 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5696 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5697 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5698 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5699 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5700 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5703 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5704 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5705 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5710 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5711 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5712 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5713 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5714 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5715 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5716 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5717 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5718 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5719 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5720 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5724 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5725 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5726 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5727 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5728 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5729 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5732 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5733 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5734 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5735 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5736 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5739 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5740 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5741 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5742 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5743 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5744 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5748 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5749 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5751 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5752 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5753 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5754 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5755 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5756 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5757 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5758 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5761 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5762 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5763 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5764 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5765 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5766 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5767 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5768 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5769 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5771 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5772 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5773 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5774 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5775 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5776 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5777 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5781 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5782 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5783 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5784 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5785 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5786 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5787 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5788 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5789 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5793 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5794 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5795 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5796 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5797 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5798 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5799 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5802 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5807 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5808 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5809 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5810 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5811 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5812 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5813 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5814 debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5816 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5817 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5818 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5819 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5820 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5826 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5827 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5828 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5831 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5832 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5833 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5834 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5837 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5838 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5839 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5840 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5841 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5842 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5843 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5844 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5845 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5849 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5850 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5852 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5853 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5854 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5855 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5856 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5857 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5858 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5859 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5860 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5861 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5862 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5863 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5867 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5868 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5869 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5870 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5871 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5872 culture would develop.
5875 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5876 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5877 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5878 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5879 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5880 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5881 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5882 the same would be to
5884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5885 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5886 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5890 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5891 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5892 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5893 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5894 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5895 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5896 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5897 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5898 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5899 Constitution itself.
5902 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5903 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5904 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5905 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5906 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5907 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5908 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5909 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5910 government pays for the privilege.
5913 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5914 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5915 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5916 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5917 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5918 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5919 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5920 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5921 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5922 compensation for your land
5923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5924 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5925 compensation at all.
5928 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5929 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5930 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5931 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5932 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5933 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5937 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5938 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5939 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5940 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5941 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5942 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5943 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5944 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5945 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5946 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5949 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5950 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5951 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5952 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5953 creative property there must be a public domain?
5956 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5957 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5958 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5959 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5960 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5961 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5962 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5963 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5964 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5965 control how culture develops.
5969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5970 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5971 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5972 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5973 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5974 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5975 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5976 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5978 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
5979 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
5980 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
5983 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5984 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5985 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5986 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5987 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5988 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5989 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5990 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5991 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5992 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5993 Web, you can be punished
5994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5995 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5996 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5999 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6000 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6001 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6002 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6003 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6004 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6005 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6006 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6007 the source of the enforcement.
6010 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6011 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6012 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6013 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6014 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6015 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6016 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6017 individual or group might behave.
6020 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6021 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6022 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6023 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6024 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6025 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6026 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6027 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6028 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6029 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
6030 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6031 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6032 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6037 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6038 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6039 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6040 undermined by another.
6043 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6044 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6045 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6046 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6047 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6048 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6049 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6051 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6052 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6055 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6056 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6057 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6058 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6059 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6060 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6061 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6062 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6063 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6064 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6065 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6066 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6069 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6070 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6071 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6073 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6074 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6075 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6076 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6077 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6078 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6079 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6082 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6083 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6084 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6085 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6086 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6087 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6088 used to require that other laws be more
6089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6090 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6091 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6094 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6096 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6097 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6098 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6101 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6102 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6103 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6104 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6105 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6109 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6110 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6111 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6112 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6113 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6114 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6115 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6116 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6117 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6118 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6119 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6120 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6121 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6122 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6123 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6124 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6125 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6126 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6127 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6128 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6129 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6130 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6131 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6132 places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6133 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6134 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6135 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6136 of these groups might face.
6137 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6140 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6141 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6143 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6144 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6145 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6146 rallying makes sense.
6149 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6152 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6153 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6154 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6158 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6159 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6160 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6161 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6162 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6163 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6164 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6165 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6166 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6167 this form of infringement.
6170 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6171 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6172 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6173 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6174 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6175 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6178 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6179 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6180 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6181 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6183 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6184 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6185 looting that results.
6187 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6188 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6189 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6192 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6193 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6194 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6195 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6196 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6197 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6198 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6199 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6200 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6201 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6204 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6205 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6206 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6207 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6208 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6209 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6210 life. Homeowners living in a
6212 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6213 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6214 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6215 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6216 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6217 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6218 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6221 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6222 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6223 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6224 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6225 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6226 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6229 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6230 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6231 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6232 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6233 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6234 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6235 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6237 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6238 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6239 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6240 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6241 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6242 October
2003, available at
6243 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6246 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6247 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6248 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6249 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6250 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6251 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6252 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6253 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6254 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6255 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6256 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6259 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6260 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6261 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6263 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6264 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6265 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6266 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6267 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6269 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6272 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6273 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6274 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6275 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6276 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6278 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6281 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6282 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6283 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6284 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6285 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6286 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6287 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6288 opportunities for innovation and change.
6291 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6292 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6293 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6294 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6295 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6296 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6297 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6298 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6299 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6300 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6301 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6302 regulation is justified.
6305 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6307 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6308 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6309 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6310 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6311 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6314 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6317 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6318 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6319 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6320 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6321 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6324 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6325 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6326 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6328 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6330 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6331 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6332 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6333 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6334 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6335 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6338 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6339 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6340 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6341 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6342 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6343 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6344 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6347 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6348 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6349 culture.
<footnote><para>
6351 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6352 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6354 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6355 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6356 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6357 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6358 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6359 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6361 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6362 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6363 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6364 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6365 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6368 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6369 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6370 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6371 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6372 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6373 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6374 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6375 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6376 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6379 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6380 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6384 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6385 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6387 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6388 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6389 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6390 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6393 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6394 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6395 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6398 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6399 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6400 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6403 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6404 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6405 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6406 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6407 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6408 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6411 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6412 in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6413 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6414 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6415 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6416 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6417 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6420 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6421 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6422 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6423 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6424 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6425 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6426 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6427 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6428 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6429 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6430 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6431 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6435 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6436 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6437 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6438 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6439 years since they first struck its design.
6442 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6443 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6445 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6448 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6449 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6450 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6455 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6456 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6457 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6461 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6464 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6465 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6467 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6468 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6469 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6470 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6471 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6472 authorship.
<footnote>
6475 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6476 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6477 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6478 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6479 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6480 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6482 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6483 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6484 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6485 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6486 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6487 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6490 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6491 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6492 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6493 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6494 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6495 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6498 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6499 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6500 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6501 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6502 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6505 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6506 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6507 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6508 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6509 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6510 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6511 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6513 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6514 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6515 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation
6516 of an Industry,
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6517 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6518 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6519 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7–10 (
2002),
6520 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6521 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6522 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6523 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6524 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6525 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6526 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6529 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6530 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6532 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6533 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6534 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6538 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6539 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6540 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6541 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6542 domain.
<footnote><para>
6544 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6545 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6546 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6547 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6548 Studies on Copyright, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6549 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6550 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6551 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6552 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6555 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6556 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6557 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6559 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6560 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6561 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6562 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6563 books; that use
—because it does not involve publication
—is
6567 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6568 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6569 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6570 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6571 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6572 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6575 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6576 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6577 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6578 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6579 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6580 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6581 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6582 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6585 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6586 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6587 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6588 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6591 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6592 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6593 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6596 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6597 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6598 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6599 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6600 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6601 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6602 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6606 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6607 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6608 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6609 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6610 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6611 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6612 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6613 was ninety-five years.
6616 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6617 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6618 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6619 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6620 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6621 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6625 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6626 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6627 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6628 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6629 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6630 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6631 years.
<footnote><para>
6633 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6634 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6635 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6636 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6641 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6642 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6644 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6645 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6646 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6647 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6650 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6651 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6652 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6653 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6654 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6655 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6656 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6657 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6658 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6659 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6660 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6663 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6664 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6665 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6666 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6667 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6668 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6669 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6670 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6671 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6672 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6673 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6674 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6675 on the initial creative work.
6678 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6679 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6680 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6681 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6682 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6683 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6684 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6685 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6686 famous
© or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6687 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6688 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6691 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6692 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6693 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6694 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6695 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6696 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6697 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6698 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6699 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6700 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6701 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6705 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6706 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6707 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6708 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6709 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6710 copy available for others to copy.
6713 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6717 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6718 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6719 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6720 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6721 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6722 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6724 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6726 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
6728 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6729 Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6731 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6732 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6733 the United States
—publishers.
6736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6737 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6738 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6739 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
6740 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6741 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6743 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6747 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6748 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6749 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6751 to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6752 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6753 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6756 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6757 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6758 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6761 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6763 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6764 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6765 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6766 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6767 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6768 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6769 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6771 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6772 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6775 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6776 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6778 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6780 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6781 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6782 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6783 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6788 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6789 a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6790 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6791 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6792 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6793 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6794 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6796 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6798 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6800 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6802 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6803 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6804 the wrong of direct piracy.
6807 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6808 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6809 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6811 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
6813 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6814 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6815 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6816 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6818 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6820 These two different uses of my creative work are
6824 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6825 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6826 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6828 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6829 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6833 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6834 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6836 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6837 rights originally granted.
6840 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6841 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6843 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6844 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6845 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6846 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6848 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6849 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6850 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6851 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
6853 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
6854 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
6855 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6860 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6861 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6862 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6863 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6864 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6865 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6866 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6867 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6868 trigger for copyright law.
6871 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6872 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6873 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6874 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6876 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6877 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6878 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6880 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6882 because it is clear that the
6883 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6884 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6887 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6890 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6891 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6892 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6896 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6897 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6898 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6899 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6900 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6901 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6902 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6903 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6904 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6905 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6908 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6909 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6910 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6913 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6914 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6915 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6916 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6917 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6918 diagram on next page).
6921 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6922 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6925 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6926 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6927 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6930 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6931 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6933 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6934 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6935 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6936 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6937 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6938 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6940 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6941 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6942 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6945 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6946 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6947 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6951 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6952 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6953 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6956 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6957 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6959 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6960 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6961 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6962 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6964 And because of this single,
6965 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6967 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6969 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6970 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6971 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6972 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
6974 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6976 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
6977 burden of this shift.
6980 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6981 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6982 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6983 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6985 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6987 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
6988 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6993 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6995 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6996 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6998 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7000 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7001 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7002 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7003 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7004 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7007 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7008 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7009 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7010 points also become clear:
7013 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7014 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7016 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7018 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7019 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7020 free culture before the Internet.
7023 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7025 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7026 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7028 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7029 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7031 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7033 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7034 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7036 uses of creative work.
7039 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7042 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7043 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7044 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7045 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7046 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7048 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7049 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7051 before because reading was not regulated.
7054 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7055 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7057 upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question about
7058 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7059 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7060 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7062 of fair use are not enough.
7065 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7066 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7067 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7068 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7069 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7072 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7074 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7076 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7077 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7078 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7079 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7084 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7086 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7087 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7088 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7090 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7092 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7093 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7094 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7096 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7097 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7098 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7101 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7102 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7104 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7106 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7107 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7108 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7109 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7110 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7113 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7114 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7115 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7116 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7117 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7118 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7119 Disney's permission.
7122 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7123 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7124 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7125 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7127 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7128 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7129 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7130 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7131 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7132 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7133 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7137 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7139 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say
7140 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7141 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
&
7143 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7144 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7146 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7147 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7149 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7150 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7151 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7152 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7155 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7156 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7157 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7158 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7160 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7161 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7164 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7165 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7167 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7168 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7169 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7170 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7173 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7174 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7175 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7176 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7177 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7180 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7182 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7183 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7185 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7186 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7187 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7189 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7191 Problems
44 (
1981):
172–73.
7195 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7196 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7197 you were."
<footnote><para>
7199 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1–3.
7201 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7202 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7203 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7206 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7207 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7208 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7209 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7212 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7213 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7214 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7215 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7217 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7218 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7219 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7220 that is not at all funny.
7223 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7226 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7227 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7228 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7230 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7233 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7237 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7238 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7239 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7240 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7241 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7242 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7244 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7247 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7248 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7249 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7252 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7253 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7255 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7256 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7257 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7261 According to my eBook
7262 Reader, I have the permission
7263 to copy to the clipboard of the
7264 computer ten text selections
7265 every ten days. (So far, I've
7266 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7267 I also have the permission to
7268 print ten pages from the book
7269 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7270 the permission to use the Read
7271 Aloud button to hear
7273 read aloud through the
7277 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7278 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7280 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7281 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7282 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7285 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7286 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7289 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7290 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7291 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7294 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7295 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7298 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7299 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7300 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7303 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7306 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7307 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7308 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7309 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7311 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7313 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7314 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7315 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7317 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7318 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7319 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7322 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7323 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7324 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7325 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7328 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7329 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7330 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7331 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7332 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7333 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7334 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7335 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7336 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7338 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7339 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7340 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud
—it's not that the company
7341 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7342 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7346 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7347 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7348 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7351 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7352 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7353 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7354 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7355 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7356 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7359 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7360 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7362 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7363 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7364 protections as well?
7367 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7371 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7373 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7374 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7375 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7376 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7378 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7379 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7380 Wonderland
".
</title>
7381 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7385 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7387 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7389 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7392 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7393 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7394 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7395 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7396 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7397 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7400 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7401 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7402 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7403 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7404 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7405 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7406 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7407 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7408 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7409 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7410 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7413 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7414 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7415 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7416 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7417 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7421 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7422 story of mine that makes the same point.
7424 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7426 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7427 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7428 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7431 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7432 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7433 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7435 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7436 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7437 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7440 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7441 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7442 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7443 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7444 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7445 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7448 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7449 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7450 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7451 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7452 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7453 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7454 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7455 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7456 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7457 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7460 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7461 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7462 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7463 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7466 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7468 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7469 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7470 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7471 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7472 than Sony had built.
7475 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7476 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7477 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7478 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7482 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7483 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7484 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7485 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7486 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7487 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7491 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7492 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7493 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7494 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7495 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7496 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7497 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7498 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7499 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7502 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7504 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7505 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7506 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7507 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7508 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7509 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7510 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7511 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7512 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7513 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7514 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7516 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7517 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7518 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7519 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7522 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7523 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7524 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7525 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7526 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7527 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7528 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7532 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7533 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7534 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7535 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7538 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7539 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7540 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7541 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7542 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7545 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7546 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7547 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7548 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7549 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7550 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7553 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7554 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7555 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7556 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7557 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7558 constituted, succeed.
7561 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7562 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7563 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7568 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7569 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7570 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7574 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7575 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7576 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7580 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7582 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7583 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7584 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7588 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7589 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7590 spreading such information an offense.
7593 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7594 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7595 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7596 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies
—
7597 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7598 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7599 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7602 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7603 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7604 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7605 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7608 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7609 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7610 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7611 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7612 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7613 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7614 have been a copyright violation.
7617 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7618 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7619 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7620 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7621 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7622 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7623 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7625 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7626 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7629 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7630 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7631 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7632 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7633 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7634 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7637 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7638 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7639 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7640 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7641 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7642 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7643 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7644 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7648 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7649 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7650 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7651 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7652 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7653 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7654 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7655 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7656 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7657 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7658 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7659 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7660 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7661 important.
<footnote><para>
7663 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7664 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7665 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7666 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7672 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7673 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7674 the VCR responsible.
7677 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7681 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7684 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7685 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7686 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7687 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7688 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7689 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7692 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7694 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7695 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7696 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7699 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7700 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7701 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7704 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7705 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7706 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7707 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7708 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7709 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7712 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7713 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7714 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7715 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7716 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7717 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7720 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7721 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7722 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law
—increasing its
7723 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7724 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7725 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7726 owners effect
—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7727 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7730 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7731 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7732 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7733 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7734 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7735 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7736 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7737 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7738 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7743 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7744 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7745 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7746 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7747 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7749 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7750 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7751 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
7755 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7756 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7757 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7758 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7759 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7762 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7763 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7764 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7765 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7766 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7767 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7768 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7769 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7772 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7773 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7774 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7775 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7776 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7777 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7780 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7781 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7783 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7784 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7785 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7786 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7787 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7789 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7790 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7791 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7792 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7793 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7794 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7795 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7796 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7797 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7801 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7802 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7803 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7804 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7805 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7808 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7809 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7810 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7811 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7812 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7813 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7814 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7815 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7819 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7822 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7824 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7825 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7826 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7828 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7829 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7830 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7831 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7832 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7833 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7835 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7836 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
7838 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7839 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7841 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7846 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7847 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7849 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200
7850 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7851 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7852 largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's
7853 revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of the
7854 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7857 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7858 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7859 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7860 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7861 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7862 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7863 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7864 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7865 protected
— by the market.
7868 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7869 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7870 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7871 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7875 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7876 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7877 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7878 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7879 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7880 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7881 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7882 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7883 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7884 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7886 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7888 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7893 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7894 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7895 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7896 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7898 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7899 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7900 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7904 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7905 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7909 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7910 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7911 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7912 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7915 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7916 integration may matter.
7918 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7919 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7920 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7922 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7923 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7924 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7925 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7926 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7929 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7930 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7931 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7932 control.
<footnote><para>
7934 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7935 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7937 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7938 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7939 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7940 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7946 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7947 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7948 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7949 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
7950 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7951 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
7955 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7956 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
7957 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7958 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
7959 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7960 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7961 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
7962 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7963 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
7965 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7966 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
7967 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7968 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7969 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7970 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7971 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
7974 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7975 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
7976 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7977 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7978 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7979 63%."
<footnote><para>
7984 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7986 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7987 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7988 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7989 owned by the network.
7992 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7993 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7994 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7998 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7999 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8000 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8001 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8003 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8004 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8005 handful.
<footnote><para>
8007 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8008 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8009 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8014 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8015 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8016 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8017 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8018 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8019 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8020 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8021 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8022 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8025 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8027 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8028 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8029 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8030 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8031 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8032 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8034 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8035 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
8036 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8037 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8038 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8039 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy
14 (
1985):
8040 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8041 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8042 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
8043 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8045 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8046 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8048 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8051 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8052 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8053 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8057 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8058 suggest the concern.
8061 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8062 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8063 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8066 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8067 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8068 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8071 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8072 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8073 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8074 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8075 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8076 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8077 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8078 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8079 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8080 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8081 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8082 outweigh these costs.
8085 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8086 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8087 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8091 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8092 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8093 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8094 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8095 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8096 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8097 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8098 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8099 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8100 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8103 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8104 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8107 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8108 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8109 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8113 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8115 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8116 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8117 message will be heard then?
8120 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8121 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8122 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8123 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8124 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8125 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8126 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8127 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8128 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8130 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8131 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8132 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8133 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8134 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8135 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8136 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8137 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8138 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8139 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8140 York Times,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8141 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8142 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8143 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8144 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8145 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8146 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
872
8147 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8148 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8149 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8150 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8151 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8152 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8153 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8154 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8158 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8159 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8160 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8161 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8162 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8163 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8164 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8165 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8166 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8169 <sect2 id=
"together">
8170 <title>Together
</title>
8172 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8173 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8174 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8175 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8178 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8179 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8180 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8181 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8185 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8186 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8187 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8188 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8189 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8190 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8194 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8195 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8196 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8200 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8201 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8202 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8203 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8204 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8205 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8206 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8207 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8208 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8209 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8212 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8213 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8214 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8215 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8216 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8217 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8218 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8219 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8220 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8221 technology and the market enable.
8224 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8225 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8227 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8228 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8229 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8230 the development of our culture than now.
8232 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8233 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8234 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8235 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8236 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8237 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8238 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8239 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny
8240 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8241 founding
—is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8242 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8243 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8244 culture that our free society has known.
<footnote><para>
8246 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8247 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8251 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8254 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8255 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8256 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8257 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8258 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8263 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8267 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8268 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8273 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8274 <entry>©</entry>
8278 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8287 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8288 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8289 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8292 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8293 noncommercial work was also free.
8296 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8301 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8305 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8306 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8311 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8312 <entry>©</entry>
8313 <entry>©</entry>
8316 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8325 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8326 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8327 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8328 transformation were still essentially free.
8331 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8332 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8333 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8334 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8335 we could say the law began to look like this:
8340 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8345 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8350 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8351 <entry>©</entry>
8352 <entry>©</entry>
8355 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8356 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8364 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8365 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8366 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8367 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8368 that the law now looks like this:
8373 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8378 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8383 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8384 <entry>©</entry>
8385 <entry>©</entry>
8388 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8389 <entry>©</entry>
8390 <entry>©</entry>
8397 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8398 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8401 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8402 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8405 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8406 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8407 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8408 these domains actually does any good.
8411 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8412 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8413 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8414 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8415 reasons sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8416 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8417 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8418 rights were more sharply restricted.
8421 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8422 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8423 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8424 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8425 property rights
<footnote><para>
8427 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8428 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8429 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8430 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8431 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8434 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8435 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8436 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8437 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8438 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8439 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8440 almost
180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8444 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8445 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8446 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8447 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8448 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8449 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8450 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8453 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8454 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8455 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8456 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8457 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8458 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8459 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8460 dominates the debate today.
8463 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8464 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8465 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8466 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8467 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8468 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8469 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8470 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8471 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8472 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8479 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8480 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8483 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8484 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8485 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8486 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8488 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8489 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8491 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8492 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8496 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8497 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8498 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8500 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8501 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8502 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8504 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8505 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8506 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8507 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8508 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8509 villagers to explore life as a king.
8512 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8513 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8514 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8515 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8516 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8517 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8518 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8519 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8524 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8525 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8526 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8527 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8528 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8529 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8530 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8531 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8532 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8535 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8536 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8537 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8538 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8541 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8542 is affected," he reports.
8545 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8546 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8550 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8551 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8552 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8553 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8556 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8557 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8558 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8559 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8560 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8561 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8562 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8563 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8566 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8567 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8570 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8571 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8573 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8574 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8575 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8576 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8577 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8578 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8581 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8582 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8583 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8584 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8585 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8586 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8587 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8588 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8589 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8590 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8591 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8592 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8595 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8596 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8597 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8598 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8599 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8600 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8601 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8604 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8605 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8606 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8607 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8608 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8614 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8615 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8616 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8617 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8618 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8619 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8620 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8621 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8624 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8625 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8626 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8627 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8628 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8631 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8632 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8633 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8634 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8635 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8636 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8637 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8638 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8639 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8640 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8642 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available
8644 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8645 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8646 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8647 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8648 Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
8649 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8650 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8651 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8652 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer,
8653 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F.
8654 Supp.
2d
24 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8655 high as $
90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8656 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8657 from $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8658 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8660 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8662 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8663 August
2003, available at
8664 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8666 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8667 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8668 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003,
8670 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8674 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8676 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8677 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8678 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8679 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8680 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8683 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8684 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8685 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8686 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8687 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8688 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8689 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8690 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8695 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8696 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8697 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8698 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8699 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8700 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8703 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8704 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8705 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8706 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8707 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8708 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8709 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8710 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8711 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8712 protection for copyrighted material,
8716 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8717 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8720 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8721 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8722 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8724 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8725 well produce a totally different industry model.
8728 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8729 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8730 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8731 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8732 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8733 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8734 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8735 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8736 interests.
<footnote><para>
8737 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8738 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8739 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8741 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement
8742 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8744 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8752 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8753 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8757 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8758 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8759 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8765 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8768 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8769 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8770 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8771 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8773 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8776 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8777 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8779 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8783 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8784 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8785 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8788 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8789 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8791 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8792 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8793 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8794 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8798 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8799 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8800 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8801 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8802 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8804 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8805 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8807 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8808 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8809 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8810 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8811 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8812 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8813 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8814 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8815 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8816 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8817 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8818 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8819 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8822 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8823 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8824 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8825 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8826 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8827 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8828 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8829 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8830 the culture all around.
8833 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8834 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8838 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8839 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8840 storytelling extended across the globe.
8843 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8844 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8845 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8846 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8847 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8848 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8849 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8850 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8851 work is presumptively illegal.
8854 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8855 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8856 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8857 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8858 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8859 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8860 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8861 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8862 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8863 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8864 million.
<footnote><para>
8866 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8867 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8868 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8869 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8870 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8872 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8873 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8874 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8875 suffering.
<footnote>
8877 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8878 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8879 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8880 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8881 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8882 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8884 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8886 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8888 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8889 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8890 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8893 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8894 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8895 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8897 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8898 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8899 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8902 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8904 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8905 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8907 to see a world of underground art
—not because the message is
8909 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8910 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8912 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
8913 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
8916 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8917 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8919 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8920 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8921 critical or reflective.
8924 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8925 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
8926 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8927 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8928 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8929 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8930 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8931 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8932 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8935 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8936 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8937 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8938 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8939 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8940 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8941 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8942 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8943 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8946 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8947 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
8948 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8949 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8950 law regulates such a use.
8954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8955 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8956 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8957 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
8958 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8959 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8960 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8961 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8962 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8965 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8966 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8967 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8968 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8969 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8970 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8971 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8972 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8976 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
8977 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8978 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8979 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8980 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
8981 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8982 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8983 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8984 culture that is free.
8987 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8991 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8992 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8993 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8994 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8995 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8997 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8998 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8999 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9003 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
9004 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9006 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9007 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9008 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9009 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9010 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9011 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9014 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9015 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9016 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9017 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9018 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9019 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9020 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9023 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9024 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9025 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9026 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9027 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9028 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9029 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9030 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9031 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9032 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9033 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9035 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9037 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9039 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
9040 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9041 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9042 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9043 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9044 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9045 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9046 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9049 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9050 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9051 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9054 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9055 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9056 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9057 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9058 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9059 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9062 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9063 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9064 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9065 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9069 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9070 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9071 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9072 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9073 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9074 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9075 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9076 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9077 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9078 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9081 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9082 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9085 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9086 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9087 the kind of content the users liked.
9090 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9091 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9092 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9093 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9094 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9095 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9096 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9097 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9098 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9099 they had already bought.
9102 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9103 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9104 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9105 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9106 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9107 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9108 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9109 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9112 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9115 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9116 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9117 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9118 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9119 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9120 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9121 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9125 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9126 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9127 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9130 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9131 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9132 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9133 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9135 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9136 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9138 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9139 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9140 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9141 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9142 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9143 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9144 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9146 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9148 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available at
9149 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9150 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9153 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9154 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9156 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9157 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9158 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9159 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9160 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9161 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9162 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9163 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9164 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9167 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9169 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9170 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9171 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9172 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9173 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9174 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9175 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote>
9178 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9180 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9181 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9182 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9187 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9188 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9189 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9190 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9191 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9192 constantly threatened by litigation.
9196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9197 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9198 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9199 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9200 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9201 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9203 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9205 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9206 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9207 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9208 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9209 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9212 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9213 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9214 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9215 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9216 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9217 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9218 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9219 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9220 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9221 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9224 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9225 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9226 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9227 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9228 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9229 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9230 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9231 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9232 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9233 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9234 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9235 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9237 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9238 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9239 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9240 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9241 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9242 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9243 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9246 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9247 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9248 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9249 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9250 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9251 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9252 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9253 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9256 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9257 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9258 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9259 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9260 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9261 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9262 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9263 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9267 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9269 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9270 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9271 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9272 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9273 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9275 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9276 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9281 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9282 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9284 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9285 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9288 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9292 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9293 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9294 impose.
<footnote><para>
9295 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9296 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9298 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9299 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9303 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9304 innovation
—again,
9305 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9309 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9310 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9311 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9312 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9315 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9316 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9317 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9318 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9321 overall this history of copyright
9322 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9323 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9324 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9325 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9328 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9329 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9330 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9331 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9332 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9335 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9336 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9337 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9338 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9339 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9341 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9343 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9344 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9345 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9347 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9348 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9349 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9350 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9353 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9354 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9355 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9356 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9357 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9358 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9360 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9361 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9362 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9363 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9364 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9365 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9366 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9367 World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34, available at
9368 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9371 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9378 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9379 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9380 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9381 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9382 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9383 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9385 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9386 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9389 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9390 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9391 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9392 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9393 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9394 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9395 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9396 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9400 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9401 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9402 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9403 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9404 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9405 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9409 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9410 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9411 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9412 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9413 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9414 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9415 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9416 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9417 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9418 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9419 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9424 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9426 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9428 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9429 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9431 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9432 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9436 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9437 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9439 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9440 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9442 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9443 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9444 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9445 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9447 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9448 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9450 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9451 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9452 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.
<footnote><para>
9453 <!-- f12. --> Lessing,
239.
9458 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not because
9460 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9461 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<footnote><para>
9462 <!-- f13. --> Ibid.,
229.
9466 the growth of this competing technology.
9469 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9470 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9471 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9472 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9473 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9477 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9478 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9481 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9483 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9484 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9485 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9487 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9488 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9489 neutral toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio
9490 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9493 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9494 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9495 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9496 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9497 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9500 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9501 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9502 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9503 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9504 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9505 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9506 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9507 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9508 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9509 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9510 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9511 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9512 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9513 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9514 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9515 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9516 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9517 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9518 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9520 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9524 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9525 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9526 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9529 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9531 name of the service;
9534 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9537 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9540 date of transmission;
9543 time of transmission;
9546 time zone of origination of transmission;
9549 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9552 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9555 sound recording title;
9558 ISRC code of the recording;
9561 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9564 featured recording artist;
9573 UPC code of the retail album;
9579 copyright owner information;
9582 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9585 name of the service or entity;
9591 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9594 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9597 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9600 Unique User identifier;
9603 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9608 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9609 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9610 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9611 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9612 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9616 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9617 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9618 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9620 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9622 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9623 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9624 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9628 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9629 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9630 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9631 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9632 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9633 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9635 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9636 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9638 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9639 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9640 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9644 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9645 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9646 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9647 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9651 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9652 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9653 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9654 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9655 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9656 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9657 effective to prevent it.
9660 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9661 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9663 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9665 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9666 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9669 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9670 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9671 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9674 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9675 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9676 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
9677 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9678 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9679 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9680 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9681 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9682 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9684 According to the RIAA,
9685 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9686 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9688 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9689 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9690 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9692 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9693 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9694 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9696 response by the other.
9699 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9700 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9701 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9702 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9703 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9704 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9705 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9706 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9707 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9708 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9709 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9710 was.
<footnote><para>
9712 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9713 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
9715 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9716 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9717 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9718 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9719 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9720 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9724 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9725 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9726 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9727 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9728 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9729 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9730 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9731 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9732 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9734 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9735 Prohibition," American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9739 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9740 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9742 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9743 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9744 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9746 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9747 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9748 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9749 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9750 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9752 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9753 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9754 compliance literature).
9756 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9757 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9758 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9761 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9762 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9763 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9764 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9765 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9766 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9767 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9768 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9769 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9770 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9771 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9772 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9773 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9774 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9775 degree of illegality.
9778 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9779 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9780 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9781 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9782 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9783 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9784 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9785 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9786 to consider the alternative.
9790 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9791 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9792 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9793 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9794 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9795 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9798 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9799 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9800 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9801 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9802 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9803 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9804 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9805 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9806 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9807 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9808 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9809 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9812 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9813 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9814 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9815 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9816 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9817 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9818 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9819 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9820 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9824 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9827 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9828 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9829 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9830 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9834 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9838 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9839 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9840 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9841 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9842 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9843 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9844 capacities of digital technologies.
9846 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9848 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9849 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9850 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9851 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9852 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9853 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9854 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9855 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9856 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9859 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9860 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9861 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9862 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9863 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9864 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9865 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9866 on people's machines.
9869 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9870 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9871 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9872 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9873 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9874 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9877 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9878 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9879 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9883 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9884 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9885 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9886 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9887 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9888 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9889 freedom to move content easily?
9892 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9893 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9894 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9895 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9896 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9897 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9898 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9899 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9900 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9903 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9904 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9905 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9906 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9907 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9908 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9909 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9912 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9913 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9914 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9915 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9918 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9919 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9923 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9924 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9925 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9926 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9927 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9928 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9929 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9930 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9932 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
9935 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9940 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9941 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9942 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9943 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9944 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9945 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9946 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9947 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9948 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9952 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9953 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9954 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9957 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
9958 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9959 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9960 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9961 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9962 an Internet user is revealed.
9965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9966 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9967 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9968 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9969 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9970 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9971 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9972 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9973 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
9975 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9976 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9977 Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9978 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9979 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9980 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
9981 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
9982 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9983 Fan, Either," New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9984 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
9989 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9990 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9991 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
9993 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9994 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9995 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
9997 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9998 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9999 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10002 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10003 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10004 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10005 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10006 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10007 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10008 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10009 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10010 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10011 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10012 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10014 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10015 Boston Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10016 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10017 Colleges," Washington Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10018 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10019 Monitor,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10020 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10021 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10022 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News,
30 January
10023 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10024 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
10025 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10026 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10027 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10029 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10030 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10033 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10034 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10035 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10036 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10037 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10038 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10042 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10043 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10048 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10049 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10050 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10051 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10052 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10053 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10054 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10055 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10056 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10057 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10058 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10059 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10060 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10061 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10062 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10063 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10068 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10069 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10070 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10071 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10072 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10073 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10080 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10081 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10083 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10085 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10086 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10087 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10088 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10091 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10092 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10093 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10094 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10095 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10099 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10100 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10101 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10102 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10103 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10104 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10108 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10109 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10110 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10111 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10112 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10113 made that is happening all around.
10116 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10117 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10118 gasoline onto this fire.
10121 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10122 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10123 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10124 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10127 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10128 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10129 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10130 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10131 success will require.
10134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10135 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10136 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10138 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10139 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10140 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10141 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10142 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10143 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10147 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10148 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10149 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10150 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10151 them available for free.
10154 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10155 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10156 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10157 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10158 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10160 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10161 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10162 accessible
—today.
10165 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10166 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10167 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10168 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10169 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10170 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10171 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10172 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10173 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10174 commercial publications of public domain works.
10177 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10178 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10179 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10180 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10181 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10182 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10183 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10184 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10185 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10186 generally.
<footnote><para>
10188 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10189 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10190 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10191 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10192 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10193 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10194 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10195 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10196 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10197 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10198 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10199 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10200 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10201 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10202 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10205 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10206 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10207 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10208 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10,
10209 in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10210 terms of existing copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred
10211 would not be free to add any works more recent than
1923 to his
10212 collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10213 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10214 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than
1
10215 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10220 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10221 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10222 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10223 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10225 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10226 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10227 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10228 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10229 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10230 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10231 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10236 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10237 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10238 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10239 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10240 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10241 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10245 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10247 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10249 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10250 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10252 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10256 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10257 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10258 their . . . Writings. . . .
10262 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10263 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10264 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10265 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10266 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10267 specific
—to "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that
10268 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10269 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10272 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10273 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10274 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10275 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10277 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10278 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10279 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10280 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10281 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10284 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10285 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10286 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10287 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10288 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10289 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10290 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10291 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10292 this gravy train going.
10295 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10296 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10297 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10298 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10299 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10300 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10301 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10304 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10305 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10306 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10307 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10308 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10309 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10310 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10311 published by anyone for free.
10314 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10315 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10316 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10317 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10321 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10324 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10325 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10329 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10330 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10331 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10332 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10335 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10339 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10340 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10341 they support the bill."
10344 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10345 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10346 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10350 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10351 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10352 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10353 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10356 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10357 correct conclusion:
10360 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10361 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10363 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10366 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10368 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10369 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10372 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10373 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10374 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10375 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10377 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10379 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10380 the copyright term extended.
10383 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10385 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10386 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10389 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10391 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10392 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10393 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10394 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10395 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10396 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10397 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10398 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10400 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10401 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10402 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10403 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10405 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10407 Disney is estimated to have
10408 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10409 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10410 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10412 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10413 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10418 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10419 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10421 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10422 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10423 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10424 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10425 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10427 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10431 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10432 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10433 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10434 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10435 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10437 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10440 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10444 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10445 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10446 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10448 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10449 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10454 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10455 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10457 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10458 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10460 to impose no limit.
10463 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10464 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10465 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10466 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10467 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10468 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10469 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10470 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10471 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10473 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10476 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10478 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10479 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10481 If anything Congress says is interstate
10482 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10483 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10484 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10485 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10490 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10491 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10492 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10493 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10495 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10496 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10497 commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10498 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10499 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10500 to regulate copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10502 And if it is applied to the
10503 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10506 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10508 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10509 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10510 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10512 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10513 existing copyrights.
10516 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10517 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics
—a conservative
10518 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10519 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10521 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10522 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10523 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10524 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10526 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10527 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10530 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10531 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10533 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10534 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy
—piracy of
10535 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10536 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10537 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10539 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10540 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10541 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10542 work. But now these entities were using their power
—expressed
10543 through the power of lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year
10544 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10545 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10548 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10550 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10551 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10552 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10553 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
10554 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
10555 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10558 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10559 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10560 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10563 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10565 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10567 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10568 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10569 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10570 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10571 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10572 bought to extend them again.
10575 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10577 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10578 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10580 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10582 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10583 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10584 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10585 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10587 and no longer available as a result.
10590 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10591 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10592 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10593 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10594 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10595 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10596 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10598 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10599 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
10600 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10605 Think practically about the consequence of this
10606 extension
—practically,
10607 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10610 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10611 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10612 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10614 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10617 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10618 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10619 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10620 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10621 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10622 list of books still under copyright.
10625 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10626 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10629 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10631 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10632 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10633 being at least a list?
10636 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10637 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10639 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10641 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10642 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10645 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10647 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10651 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10652 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10653 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10655 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10656 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10657 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10660 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10661 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10662 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10664 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10665 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10666 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10668 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10669 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10670 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10671 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10672 know quite well who owns what property.
10675 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10676 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10678 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10679 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10680 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10681 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10682 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10683 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10684 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10687 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10688 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10690 for other creative works is much more dire.
10692 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10694 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10695 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10696 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10697 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10698 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10699 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10700 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10701 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10702 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10703 films."
<footnote><para>
10705 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10706 Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10707 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10708 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9 October
2002.
10713 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10714 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10715 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10716 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10719 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10722 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10723 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10724 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10725 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10726 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10727 work available for distribution.
10730 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10731 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10732 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10733 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10734 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10735 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10736 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10738 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
10739 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10740 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10741 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10746 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10748 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10749 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10750 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10751 locate the copyright owner.
10754 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10755 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10756 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10757 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10758 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10763 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10764 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10765 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10766 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10767 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10768 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10769 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10770 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10771 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10774 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10777 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10779 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10780 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10781 the copyright expires.
10784 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10785 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10786 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10788 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10792 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10793 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10794 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10795 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10797 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10801 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10802 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10804 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10805 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10806 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10808 the commercial life ends.
10811 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10812 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10813 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10815 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10817 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10818 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10819 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10820 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10821 have, we need to have access to this history.
10824 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10827 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10828 this context do no good.
10831 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10832 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10833 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10834 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10835 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10836 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10837 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10838 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10841 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10842 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10843 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10844 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10845 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10846 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10847 market didn't have more to offer.
10850 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10851 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10852 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10853 would not have interfered with anything.
10856 But this situation has now changed.
10859 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10860 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10861 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10862 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10863 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10864 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10865 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10866 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10867 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10868 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10871 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10872 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10873 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10874 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10875 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10876 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10877 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10878 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10879 written for a radically different context.
10882 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10883 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10884 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10885 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10886 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10887 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10888 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10889 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10890 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10893 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10894 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10895 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10899 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10900 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10901 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10902 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10903 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10904 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10905 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10906 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10907 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10910 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10911 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10912 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10913 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10915 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10916 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10917 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10918 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10919 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10920 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10922 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10923 December
2002, available at
10924 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10929 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10930 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10931 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10932 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10933 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10934 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10937 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10938 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10939 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10940 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10941 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10944 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10945 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10946 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10947 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10948 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10949 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10950 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10951 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10952 power to extend existing terms.
10955 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10956 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10957 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10958 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10961 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10962 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10965 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10966 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10967 overstepped its bounds.
10970 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10971 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10972 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10973 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10974 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10977 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10978 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10979 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
10980 briefs and preparing for argument.
10983 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10984 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10985 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10986 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10987 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10988 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10989 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10990 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10993 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10994 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10995 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10998 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11000 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11001 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11002 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11003 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11006 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11007 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11008 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11010 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11011 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11012 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11014 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11015 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11016 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11017 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11018 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11019 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11020 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11021 most powerful media companies in the world."
11024 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11025 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11026 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11027 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11028 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11029 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11030 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11031 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11033 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11034 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11036 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11037 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11038 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11040 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11041 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11042 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11045 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11046 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11047 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11048 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11049 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11050 why it was unconstitutional.
11053 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11056 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11057 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11058 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11059 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11060 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11062 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11063 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11064 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11065 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11066 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11067 gather the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11068 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11069 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11072 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11073 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11074 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11075 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11076 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11077 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11078 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11079 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11080 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11081 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11082 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11083 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11084 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11085 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11088 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11089 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11090 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11091 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11092 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11093 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11096 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11097 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11100 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11101 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11102 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11103 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11104 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11105 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11106 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11107 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11110 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11111 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11112 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11113 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11116 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11117 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11118 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11119 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11122 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11123 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11124 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11125 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11126 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11128 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11129 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11130 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11131 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11132 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11133 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11134 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11135 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11136 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11139 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11140 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11141 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11142 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11143 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11144 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11145 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11146 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11149 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11150 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11151 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11154 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11155 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11156 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11157 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11158 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11159 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11160 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11161 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11162 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11163 confidence in our argument.
11164 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11167 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11168 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11169 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11170 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11174 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11175 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11176 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11177 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11178 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11179 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11183 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11184 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11185 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11186 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11187 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11188 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11190 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537
11191 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11193 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11194 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11195 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11196 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11198 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11199 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11203 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11204 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11205 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11208 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11209 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11210 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11211 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11212 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11213 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11214 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11215 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11216 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11217 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11220 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11221 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11222 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11223 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11224 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11225 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11226 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11229 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11230 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11231 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11232 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11233 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11234 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11235 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11238 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11240 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11241 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11242 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11245 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11246 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11247 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11248 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11249 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11252 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11253 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11254 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11255 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11256 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11257 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11258 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11259 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11262 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11264 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11265 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11266 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11267 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11268 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11269 these retrospective extensions.
11272 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11273 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11274 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11275 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11276 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11277 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11280 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11281 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11282 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11284 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11285 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11286 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11287 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11290 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11291 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11294 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11295 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11296 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11297 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11298 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11299 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11300 copyright be limited.
11303 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11305 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11307 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11308 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11309 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11312 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11313 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11314 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11316 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11319 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11321 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11322 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11323 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11325 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11327 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11328 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11330 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11331 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11332 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11334 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11335 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11338 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11339 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11342 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11343 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11344 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11345 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11347 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11348 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11351 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11353 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11354 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11355 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11356 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11357 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11360 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11361 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11362 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11363 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11364 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11366 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11368 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11369 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11370 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11371 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11372 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11373 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11374 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11375 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11376 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11377 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11378 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11381 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11382 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11385 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11386 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11387 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11388 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11390 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11391 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11392 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11393 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11394 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11395 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11396 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11397 family of the Justices.
11400 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11401 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11402 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11403 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11406 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11407 The history was bothering her.
11411 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11412 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11413 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11414 practice that began with the very first act.
11418 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11419 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11420 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11424 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11425 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11427 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11432 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11433 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11434 Kennedy, who observed,
11438 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11439 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11440 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11441 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11442 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11446 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11452 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11453 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11454 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11455 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11457 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11460 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11462 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11463 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11464 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11465 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11466 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11469 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11470 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11471 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11474 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11476 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11482 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11483 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11486 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11487 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11489 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11490 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11491 into the Copyright Clause.
11495 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11496 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11497 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11501 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11503 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11504 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11505 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11510 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11511 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11512 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11513 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11514 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11515 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11516 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause
—
11517 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11519 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11520 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11523 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11524 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11527 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11531 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11532 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11533 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11534 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11536 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11538 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11539 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11540 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11541 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11543 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11545 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in
11546 particular, the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule
11547 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11550 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11551 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11552 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11553 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11554 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11557 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11558 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11559 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11562 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11563 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11564 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11567 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11569 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11571 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11572 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11573 in the Court's opinion.
11577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11578 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11579 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11581 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11584 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11585 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11586 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11587 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11590 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11591 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11592 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11593 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11594 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11595 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11596 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11597 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11601 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11602 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11603 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11604 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11605 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11606 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11607 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11608 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11609 the system we have.
11611 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11613 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11614 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11615 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11616 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11617 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11618 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11619 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11620 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11621 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11623 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11626 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11627 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11628 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11629 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11630 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11631 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11632 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11633 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11634 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11637 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11638 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11639 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11640 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11641 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11644 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11645 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11646 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11649 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11650 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11651 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11652 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11653 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11654 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11655 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11656 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11657 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11658 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11662 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11663 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11664 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11665 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11668 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11669 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11670 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11671 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11672 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11673 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11677 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11679 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11682 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11684 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11685 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11686 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11687 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11688 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11689 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11690 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11691 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11692 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11695 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11696 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11697 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11698 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11699 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11700 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11701 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11702 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11703 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11704 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11705 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11706 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11707 effort to persuade; but I
11708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11709 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11710 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11711 should decide the issue.
11713 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11715 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11716 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11718 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11721 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11722 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11723 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11724 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11727 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11728 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11729 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11730 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11734 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11735 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11736 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11737 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11738 issue should not be raised until it is.
11739 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11742 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11743 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11744 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11745 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11746 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11747 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11748 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11749 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11750 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11751 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11752 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11755 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11756 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11757 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11758 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11759 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11763 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11764 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11765 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11766 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11767 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11768 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11772 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11773 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11774 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11775 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11776 in the face felt exactly like that.
11779 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11780 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11781 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11782 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11783 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11784 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11785 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11789 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
11790 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11792 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11793 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11794 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11795 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11796 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11797 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11798 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11800 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11802 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11803 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11804 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11805 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11806 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11807 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11808 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11809 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11812 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11813 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11815 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11816 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11817 the work passed into the public domain.
11820 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11821 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11822 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11825 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11826 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11827 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11828 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11829 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11830 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11831 everything else, let the content go.
11833 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11835 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11836 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11837 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11838 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11839 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11840 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11841 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11842 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11843 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11844 the stupid harm of the present system.
11847 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11848 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11849 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11850 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11851 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11852 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11853 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11854 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11855 where copyright owners could be identified.
11857 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11858 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11861 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
11862 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11863 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11865 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11866 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11867 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11868 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11869 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11870 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11871 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11872 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11873 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11874 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11875 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11876 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11877 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11878 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11879 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11880 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11881 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11882 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11883 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11884 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11885 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11886 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11887 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11888 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11891 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11892 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11893 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11894 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11895 know what's protected and what's not.
11897 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11899 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11900 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11901 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11902 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11903 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11904 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11905 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11906 in the loss of widows' only income.
11909 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11910 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11911 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11912 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11913 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11914 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11917 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11918 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11919 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11920 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11922 imposed upon creators.
11925 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11926 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11929 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11930 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11931 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11932 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11933 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11937 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11938 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11939 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11940 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11941 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11942 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11946 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11947 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11948 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11949 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11950 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11951 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
11952 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11953 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11954 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11955 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11956 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11957 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11958 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11959 system of protection for property generally.
11962 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11963 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11964 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11965 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11966 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11967 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11968 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11969 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11971 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11972 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11976 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11977 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11978 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11979 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11980 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11981 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11982 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11983 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11986 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11987 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11988 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11989 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11990 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11991 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11992 seen before because there are no formalities.
11995 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11996 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11997 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11998 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11999 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12002 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12003 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12004 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12005 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12006 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12009 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12010 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12011 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12015 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12016 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12017 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12020 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12021 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12022 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12023 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12024 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12025 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12026 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12027 historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial
12028 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12029 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12031 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12033 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12034 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12035 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12036 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12039 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12040 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12041 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12042 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12043 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12044 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12045 something good might happen here.
12048 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12049 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12050 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12051 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12052 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12053 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12056 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12057 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12058 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12060 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12061 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12062 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12063 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12064 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12065 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12066 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12067 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12068 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12069 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12070 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12071 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12072 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12073 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12074 film is a valid derivative use.
12077 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12078 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12079 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12080 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12081 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12082 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12085 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12086 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12087 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12088 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12089 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12090 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12091 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12095 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12096 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12097 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12098 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12104 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12105 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12106 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12107 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12108 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12109 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12110 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12111 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12112 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12115 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12116 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12117 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12118 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12119 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12120 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12121 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12122 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12125 What does this industry really want?
12128 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12129 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12130 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12131 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12132 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12133 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12134 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12138 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12139 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12140 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12141 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12142 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12145 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12146 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12149 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12150 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12151 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12152 and to share its own creation.
12154 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12155 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12157 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12158 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12159 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12160 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12161 block the progress of others.
12164 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12165 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12166 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12167 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12168 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12169 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12170 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12175 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12176 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12178 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12179 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12180 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12181 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12182 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12185 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12186 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12187 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12188 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12189 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12190 the disease almost invisible.
12193 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12194 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12195 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12196 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12198 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12199 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12200 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12201 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12203 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12205 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12206 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12211 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12212 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12213 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12214 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12215 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12216 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12219 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12220 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12221 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12222 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12223 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12224 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12225 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12226 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12230 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12231 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12232 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12233 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12234 costs significantly below the market price.
12237 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12238 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12239 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12240 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12241 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12242 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12243 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12246 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12247 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12248 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12249 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12253 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12254 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12256 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12257 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12258 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12259 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12261 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12262 2000),
14, available at
12263 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12264 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12265 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12266 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57
12267 (statement of James Love).
12270 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12271 asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add pressure to that
12273 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12275 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12277 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12279 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12280 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12282 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12284 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent
—
12285 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12286 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12287 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12288 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12290 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12291 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12292 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12293 Organization (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12296 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12297 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12298 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12299 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12300 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12301 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12302 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12303 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12306 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12307 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12308 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12309 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12310 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12311 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12314 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12315 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12316 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12317 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12318 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12319 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12323 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12324 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12326 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12327 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12329 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12330 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12331 May
1999, A1, available at
12332 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12333 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12334 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12335 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12336 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12337 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12338 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12339 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12340 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12341 Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12344 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12345 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12346 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12347 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12350 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12351 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12352 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12353 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12354 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12355 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12356 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12357 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12360 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12361 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12362 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12363 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12364 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12365 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12368 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12369 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12370 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12371 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12372 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12373 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12376 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12377 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12378 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12379 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12380 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12381 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12382 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12383 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12385 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12386 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12387 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12388 idea called "intellectual property."
12391 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12392 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12393 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12394 What is the argument?
12397 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12398 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12399 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12400 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12401 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12402 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12403 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12404 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12405 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12406 were balanced in just this sense.
12409 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12410 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12411 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12412 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12413 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12414 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12415 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12416 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12417 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12418 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12419 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12420 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12423 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12424 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12425 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12426 this common sense open its eyes.
12429 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12430 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12431 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12432 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12433 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12434 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12435 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12436 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12437 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12438 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12439 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12440 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12443 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12444 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12445 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12446 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12447 August
2003, E1, available at
12448 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12449 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12450 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12451 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12452 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12453 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12454 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12456 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12457 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12458 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12459 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12460 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12461 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12462 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12463 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12464 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12465 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12466 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12467 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12468 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12470 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12471 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12472 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12473 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12474 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12477 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12478 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12479 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12480 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12481 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12484 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12485 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12488 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12489 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12490 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12491 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12495 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12496 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12497 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12498 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12499 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12500 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12501 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12502 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12503 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12504 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12505 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12506 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12507 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12508 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12509 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12510 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12511 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12514 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12515 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12516 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12519 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12520 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12521 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12522 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12525 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12526 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12527 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12528 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12529 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12530 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12531 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12532 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12533 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12536 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12537 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12538 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12539 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12540 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12541 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM
12542 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12543 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12544 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12545 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12547 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12548 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12549 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12550 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12551 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12552 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12553 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," Government Policy
12554 Toward Open Source Software (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12555 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12556 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12557 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12558 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, The Commercial Software
12559 Model, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12560 May
2001), available at
12561 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12565 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12566 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12567 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12568 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12569 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12572 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12573 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12574 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12575 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12576 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12577 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12578 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12579 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12580 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12583 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12584 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12585 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12586 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12587 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12588 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12589 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12591 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12592 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12594 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12597 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12598 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12599 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12600 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12601 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12602 its lobbying efforts.
12605 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12606 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12607 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12608 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12609 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12610 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12611 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12615 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12619 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12620 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12621 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12622 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12623 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12624 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12625 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12626 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12629 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12630 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12631 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12632 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12633 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12634 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12635 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12636 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12637 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12638 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12639 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12642 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12643 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12644 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12645 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12646 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12647 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12648 $
20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12649 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12650 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12651 right to decide what to do with their property.
12652 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12655 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12656 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12657 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12659 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12660 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12661 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12662 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12663 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12667 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12668 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12669 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12670 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12671 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12672 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12673 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12674 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12675 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12678 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12679 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12681 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12682 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12684 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210–20.
12685 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12687 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12688 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12689 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12692 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12693 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12694 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12695 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12699 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12700 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12701 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12702 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12703 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12704 say anything wrong. But in the world
12705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12706 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12707 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12711 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12712 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12713 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12714 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12715 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12716 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12717 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12718 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12721 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12722 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12723 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12724 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12725 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12726 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12729 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12730 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12731 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12732 our own country's history).
12735 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12736 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12737 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12738 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12739 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12740 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12741 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12742 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12743 democracy in the world, become?
12746 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12747 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12748 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12750 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12751 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12753 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12755 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12756 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12757 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12758 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12759 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12760 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12761 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12762 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12763 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12764 hearings and a different result.
12765 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
12766 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
12769 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12770 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12771 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12772 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12773 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12774 concentration in the media.
12777 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12778 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12779 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12780 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12781 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12784 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12785 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12786 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12787 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12788 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12789 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12790 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12794 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12795 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12796 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12797 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12798 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12801 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12802 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12803 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12804 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12805 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12806 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12809 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12812 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12814 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12815 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12817 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12819 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12820 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12822 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12823 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12824 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News,
9
12825 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12826 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12827 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12828 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
12830 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12832 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12833 music.
<footnote><para>
12835 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12836 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12837 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12839 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12840 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12842 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12843 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12844 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12845 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12847 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12848 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12849 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12850 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12851 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12852 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12853 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12854 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12855 kids who use a computer to share content.
12857 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12858 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12859 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12860 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12862 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12863 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12864 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12865 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12866 24 August
2003, available at
12867 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12869 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12870 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12871 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12872 country.
<footnote><para>
12874 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12876 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12879 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12880 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12881 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12882 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12883 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12884 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12885 day into the Causbys.
12888 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12889 potential is ever to be realized.
12891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12895 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12896 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12899 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12900 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12901 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12902 maps what might be done.
12905 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12906 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12907 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12908 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12911 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12912 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12913 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12914 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12918 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12919 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12920 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12921 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12922 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12927 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12929 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12930 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
12931 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12932 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12935 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12936 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12937 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
12938 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
12939 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12940 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12941 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12942 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12945 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12946 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12947 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12948 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12952 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12953 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12957 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12958 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12959 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12960 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12961 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12962 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12963 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12964 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12965 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12966 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12967 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12968 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12971 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
12972 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12973 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12974 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12975 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12979 <sect2 id=
"examples">
12980 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
12982 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12983 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12984 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12985 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12986 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12987 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12988 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12992 What made it assured?
12994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12996 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12997 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12998 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12999 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13000 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13001 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13002 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13003 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13004 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13005 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13006 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13007 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13008 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13010 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13012 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13013 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13014 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13015 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13016 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13017 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13018 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13019 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13022 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13023 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13024 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13025 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13026 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13027 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13028 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13032 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13033 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13034 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13035 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13038 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13039 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13040 Law Review
1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13042 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13043 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13044 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13045 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13046 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13047 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13048 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13051 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13052 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13053 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13056 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13057 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13058 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13059 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13060 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13061 care much about controlling their software.
13063 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13065 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13066 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13067 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13068 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13069 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13073 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13074 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13075 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13076 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13077 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13078 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13079 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13080 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13081 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13085 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13086 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13087 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13088 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13089 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13090 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13091 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13094 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13095 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13097 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13098 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13099 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13100 fundamentally weakened.
13103 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13104 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13105 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13106 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13109 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13110 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13111 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13112 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13113 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13114 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13115 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13116 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13120 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13121 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13122 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13123 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13124 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13125 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13128 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13129 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13130 scientific journals are produced.
13133 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13134 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13135 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13136 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13137 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13138 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13139 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13140 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13141 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13142 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13143 and Westlaw are also free
13144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13145 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13146 Court opinion through their respective services.
13149 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13150 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13151 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13152 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13153 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13154 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13155 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13158 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13159 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13160 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13163 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13164 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13165 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13166 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13167 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13168 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13169 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13170 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13171 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13172 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13175 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13176 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13177 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13178 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13179 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13183 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13184 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13185 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13186 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13187 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13188 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13189 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13190 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13191 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13192 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13193 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13194 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13197 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13198 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13199 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13200 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13201 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13202 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13207 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13208 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13209 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13210 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13213 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13214 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13217 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13218 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13219 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13220 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13221 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13222 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13223 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13224 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13227 Simple
—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13228 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13229 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13230 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13231 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13232 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13233 three expressions together
—a legal license, a human-readable
13235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13236 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13237 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13238 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13239 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13240 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13241 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13242 certain freedoms are given.
13245 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13246 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13247 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13248 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13249 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13250 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13251 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13252 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13253 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13256 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13257 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13258 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13259 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13260 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13261 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13262 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13263 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13267 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13268 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13269 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13270 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13271 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13272 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13274 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13275 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13276 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13277 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13280 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13281 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13282 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13283 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13284 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13285 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13286 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13287 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13288 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13289 to begin to build those rules.
13292 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13293 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13294 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13295 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13296 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13299 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13300 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13301 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13302 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13303 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13304 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13305 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13306 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13307 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13308 sales of Cory's book.
13311 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13312 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13313 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13314 was a total success.
13317 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13318 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13320 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13321 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13322 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13323 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13324 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13328 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13329 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13330 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13331 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13332 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13333 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13334 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13335 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13336 with their own art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13337 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13338 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13339 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13340 because the legal costs are so high
<footnote><para>
13343 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13344 Culture Wars (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13345 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13346 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13347 </para></footnote>),
13348 these artists release into the creative environment content
13349 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13352 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13353 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13354 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13355 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13356 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13357 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13358 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13359 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13360 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13364 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13365 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13366 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13367 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13370 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13371 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13374 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13375 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13376 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13377 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13378 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13379 steps are possible.
13382 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13383 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13384 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13385 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13386 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13387 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13388 creativity to spread more easily.
13390 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13395 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13396 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13398 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13399 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13400 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13401 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13402 changes that we need.
13405 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13406 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13407 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13411 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13412 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13414 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13415 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13416 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13417 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13421 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13422 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13426 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13427 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13428 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13429 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13435 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13436 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13437 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13438 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13439 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13440 formalities were getting in the way.
13443 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13444 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13445 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13446 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13447 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13448 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13449 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13450 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13451 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13452 they otherwise could speak.
13455 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13457 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13458 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13459 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13460 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13461 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13462 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13465 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13466 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13467 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13468 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13469 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13470 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13471 developed by others.
13474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13476 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13477 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13479 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13480 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13481 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13482 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13483 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13484 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13485 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13486 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13487 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13488 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13489 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13492 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13493 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13494 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13495 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13496 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13497 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13498 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13501 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13502 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13503 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13504 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13505 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13506 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13507 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13508 with which registration occurs up.
13511 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13512 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13513 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13514 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13515 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13516 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13517 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13518 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13519 formality
—while producing a database
13520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13521 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13525 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13526 <title>MARKING
</title>
13528 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13529 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13530 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13531 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13532 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13533 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13534 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13535 uniformly across all media.
13538 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13539 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13540 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13544 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13545 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13546 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13547 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13548 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13549 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13550 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13551 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13554 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13555 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13556 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13557 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13558 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13559 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13561 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13562 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13563 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13565 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13566 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13567 stop using the work in any new
13568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13569 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13570 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13574 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13575 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13576 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13577 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13578 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13581 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13582 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13583 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13584 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13585 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13586 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13587 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13588 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13589 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13592 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13593 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13594 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13595 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13596 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13597 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13600 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13601 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13602 make things unclear.
13605 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13606 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13607 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13608 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13609 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13610 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13616 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13617 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13619 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13620 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13624 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13625 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13626 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13627 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13628 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13629 term.
<footnote><para>
13631 "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13633 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13635 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13638 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13639 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13640 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13643 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13646 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13647 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13648 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13649 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13650 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13651 regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
</para></listitem>
13654 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13655 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13656 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13657 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13658 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13659 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13660 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13661 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13667 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13668 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13669 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13670 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13671 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13672 veteran to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
13674 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13675 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13677 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13679 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13680 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13685 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13686 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13687 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in
1923 for the law to
13688 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13689 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13690 fewer authors to create in
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13691 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13692 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13693 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13694 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13695 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13696 not increase their creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done,
13697 and there's nothing we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13700 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13701 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
13702 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13705 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13706 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13707 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13708 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13714 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
13715 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13717 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13718 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13719 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13720 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13721 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13722 the emergence of that new technology.
13725 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13726 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13727 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13728 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13729 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13730 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13731 though that movie is not "my writing."
13734 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13735 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13736 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13738 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13739 University Press,
1967),
32.
13741 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13742 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13743 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13747 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13748 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13749 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13750 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13751 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13756 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13757 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13758 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13759 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13760 Consider each limitation in turn.
13763 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13764 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13767 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13768 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13769 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13770 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13771 after the creative work is done.
13772 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
13775 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13776 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13777 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13778 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13779 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13780 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13781 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13782 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13783 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13784 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13787 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13788 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13789 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13790 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13791 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13795 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13796 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13797 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13798 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13801 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13802 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13803 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13805 His view is that the law should be written so that
13806 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13809 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13810 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13811 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13812 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13813 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13816 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13818 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13819 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13820 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13821 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13825 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
13826 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13828 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13829 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13830 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13831 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13832 battles around the sharing of music.
13835 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13836 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13837 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13838 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13839 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13840 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13841 innovation on the network.
13844 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13845 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13846 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13847 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13848 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13851 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13852 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13853 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13854 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13856 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13859 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13860 for purchasing CDs.
13864 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13865 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13870 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13871 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13872 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13876 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13877 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13878 owner plainly endorses.
13882 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13883 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13884 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13885 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13886 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13887 significantly weakened.
13890 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13891 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13892 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13893 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13897 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13898 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13902 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13903 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13904 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13905 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13906 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
13907 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13908 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13909 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13910 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13911 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13914 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13915 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13916 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13918 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13919 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13920 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13921 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13922 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13923 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
13924 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
13925 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13926 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13929 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13930 that give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet
13931 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13932 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13933 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13934 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13935 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13936 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13937 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13938 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13939 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13940 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13941 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13942 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13943 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13944 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
13946 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
13947 April
2002, available at
13948 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
13953 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13954 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13955 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
13956 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13957 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13958 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13959 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13960 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13961 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13962 artists get paid, during
13964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13965 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13966 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13969 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13970 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
13971 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13972 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13973 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13974 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13975 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13976 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13977 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13980 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13981 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13982 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13983 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13984 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13985 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13986 way that returns something to the artist.
13989 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13990 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13991 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13992 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13993 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13994 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13995 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13996 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13999 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14000 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14001 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14002 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14003 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14004 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14005 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14010 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14011 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14012 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14013 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14014 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14015 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14016 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14020 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14021 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14022 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14023 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14024 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14025 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14026 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14027 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14030 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14031 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14032 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14033 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14034 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14035 delivering and accessing content.
14038 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14039 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14042 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14043 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14044 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14045 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14046 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14047 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14048 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14049 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14053 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14054 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14055 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14056 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14057 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14058 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14061 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14062 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14064 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14065 10 October
2000), available at
14066 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14067 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14068 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14069 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14070 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14071 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14072 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14073 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14074 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14075 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14076 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14077 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14079 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14080 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14081 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14082 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14084 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14085 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14086 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14087 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14089 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14090 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14091 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14092 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14093 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14094 debate by about a decade. See
14095 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14096 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14097 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14099 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14100 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14101 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14102 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14103 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14104 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14105 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14106 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14110 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14111 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14112 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14113 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14114 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14115 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14116 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14117 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14118 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14119 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14120 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14121 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14122 controlling access.
14125 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14126 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14127 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14128 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14129 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14130 limits on derivative
14132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14133 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14134 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14135 allowed to do with the content itself.
14138 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14139 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14140 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14141 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14142 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14143 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14144 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14145 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14146 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14147 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14148 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14149 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14153 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14154 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14155 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14156 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14157 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14158 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14159 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14160 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14161 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14162 finding ways to compete with "free."
14165 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14166 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14167 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14168 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14169 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14170 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14174 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14179 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14180 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14181 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14182 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14186 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14189 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14192 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14196 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14197 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14202 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14203 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14207 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14208 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14209 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14213 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14214 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14215 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14216 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14217 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14218 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14219 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14220 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14221 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14222 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14223 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14227 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14228 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14229 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14232 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14233 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14237 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14238 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14240 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14241 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14242 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14243 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14246 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14247 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14248 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14249 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14250 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14251 strong view queers the law.
14254 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14255 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14256 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14257 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14258 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14259 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14260 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14261 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14263 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14264 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14269 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14270 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14271 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14274 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14275 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14276 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14277 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14279 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14280 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14281 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14282 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14283 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14284 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14285 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14286 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14287 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14288 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14290 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14291 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14292 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14293 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14294 Rethinking,
174–76.
14296 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14297 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14302 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14303 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14304 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14305 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14306 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14307 practically never be done.
14310 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14311 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14312 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14313 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14314 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14315 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14316 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14317 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14320 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14321 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14322 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14323 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14324 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14325 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14328 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14329 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14330 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14334 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14335 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14336 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14337 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14338 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14339 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14340 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14343 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14344 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14347 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14348 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14349 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14352 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14353 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14354 keep your lawyers away.
14356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14360 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14361 <title>NOTES
</title>
14363 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14364 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14365 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14366 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14367 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14368 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14369 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14370 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14371 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14377 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14378 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14380 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14381 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14382 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14383 to him that this book is dedicated.
14386 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14387 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14388 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14389 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14390 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14391 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14392 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14393 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14394 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14395 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14396 critical eye on much of this.
14399 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14400 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14401 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14402 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14404 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14405 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14406 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14407 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14410 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14411 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14412 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14413 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14414 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14415 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14416 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14417 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14418 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14419 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14420 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14421 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14422 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14423 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14424 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14425 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14426 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14427 a bunch of great replies.)
14430 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14431 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14432 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14433 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14434 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14435 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14436 throughout this book.
14439 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14440 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14441 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14442 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->