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15 <book id=
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17 <title>Free Culture
</title>
19 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
21 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
22 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
24 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
26 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
30 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
31 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
35 <!-- <subjectset> and cover <mediaobject> Based on example from
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38 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
40 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
43 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
55 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
56 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
61 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
67 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.png" contentdepth=
"3em" width=
"100%" align=
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70 <imagedata fileref=
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"100%" align=
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73 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
79 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
80 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
81 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
82 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
83 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
88 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
91 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
92 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
93 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
94 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
95 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
96 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
97 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
98 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
99 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
100 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
101 twice listed in BusinessWeek's
<quote>e.biz
25,
</quote> and named one of Scientific
102 American's
<quote>50 visionaries.
</quote> A graduate of the University of
103 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
104 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
109 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
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127 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
130 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
132 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
136 <dedication id=
"salespoints">
139 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
141 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
142 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
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&N
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144 <listitem><para><ulink url=
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145 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
150 <dedication id=
"alsobylessig">
153 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
156 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
159 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
167 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
171 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
174 Excerpt from an editorial titled
<quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,
</quote>
175 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
176 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
179 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
180 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
183 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
184 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
187 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
191 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
192 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
201 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
205 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
208 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
214 343.7309'
9—dc22
217 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
220 Printed in the United States of America
226 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
234 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
235 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
236 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
237 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
238 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
239 the above publisher of this book.
242 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
243 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
244 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
245 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
246 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
247 author's rights is appreciated.
251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
252 <dedication><title></title>
254 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
262 <title>List of figures
</title>
269 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
270 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
271 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
272 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
277 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
281 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
282 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
283 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
284 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
285 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
286 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
290 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
291 2 Architecture and Law: Force
292 2 Market: Concentration
295 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
296 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
297 2 Constraining Creators
298 2 Constraining Innovators
299 2 Corrupting Citizens
301 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
302 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
306 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
307 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
309 2 1. More Formalities
310 3 Registration and Renewal
313 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
314 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
315 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
323 <preface id=
"preface">
324 <title>PREFACE
</title>
325 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
326 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
329 <emphasis role=
"bold">At the end
</emphasis> of his review of my first
330 book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David
331 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
332 computer-related texts, wrote this:
336 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
337 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
338 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
339 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
340 David Pogue,
<quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
345 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
346 software, or
<quote>code,
</quote> functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
347 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
348 could always
<quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome
</quote>-like simply flip a
349 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
350 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
351 <quote>affect
</quote> us anymore.
354 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
355 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
356 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
357 causes even after the modem is turned
359 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
360 on-line have fundamentally affected
<quote>people who aren't online.
</quote> There
361 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
363 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
365 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
366 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
367 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
368 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
372 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
373 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of
<quote>free culture
</quote>—not
374 <quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free beer
</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
375 free software movement
<footnote>
377 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
378 </para></footnote>), but
<quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free speech,
</quote> <quote>free markets,
</quote>
379 <quote>free trade,
</quote> <quote>free enterprise,
</quote> <quote>free will,
</quote> and
<quote>free elections.
</quote> A
380 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
381 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
382 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
383 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
384 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
385 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
386 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
387 <quote>permission culture
</quote>—a culture in which creators get to create
388 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
392 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not
<quote>we
</quote>
393 on the Left or
<quote>you
</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
394 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
395 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
396 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
397 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
398 culture deem fundamental.
400 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
401 <indexterm><primary>Stevens, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
403 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
404 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
405 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
406 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
407 As William Safire described marching
<quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
408 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
409 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,
</quote> he formulated perhaps
410 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
412 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
416 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
417 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
418 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
419 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
420 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
421 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
422 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
427 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
428 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
429 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
430 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
431 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
432 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
433 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
434 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
435 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
436 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
437 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
438 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
439 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
440 that this work is
<quote>merely
</quote> derivative.
443 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
444 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
445 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
446 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
447 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
448 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
449 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
450 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
453 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
454 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
455 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
456 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
457 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
461 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
462 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
463 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
464 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
465 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
466 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
467 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
475 <chapter label=
"0" id=
"c-introduction">
476 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
477 <indexterm id='idxairtraffic' class='startofrange'
>
478 <primary>air traffic, land ownership vs.
</primary>
480 <indexterm id='idxlandownership' class='startofrange'
>
481 <primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary>
483 <indexterm id='idxproprigtair' class='startofrange'
>
484 <primary>property rights
</primary>
485 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
487 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
489 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
490 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
491 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
492 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
493 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
494 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
497 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
498 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
499 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
500 and all the space above, to
<quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.
</quote><footnote><para>
501 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
502 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
505 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
506 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
507 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
510 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
511 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
512 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
513 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
514 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
515 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
516 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
518 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
519 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
521 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
522 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
523 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
524 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
525 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
526 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
527 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to
<quote>an indefinite
528 extent, upwards,
</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
529 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
532 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
534 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
535 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
536 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
537 <quote>taking
</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
538 that
<quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
539 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.
</quote> But Justice Douglas
540 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
541 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
545 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
546 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
547 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
548 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
549 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
550 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
551 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
552 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
554 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
555 that there could be a
<quote>taking
</quote> if the government's use of its land
556 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
557 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece,
<quote>(Intellectual)
558 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
559 Authorship,
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
560 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
562 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
563 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
568 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.
</quote>
571 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
572 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
573 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
575 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line:
<quote>Common sense revolts
576 at the idea.
</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
577 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
578 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
579 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
581 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
582 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
583 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
585 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
586 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
587 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
588 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
589 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
590 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
591 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
592 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
593 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by
<quote>what
594 seemed reasonable
</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
595 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
596 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
597 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
598 end, the force of what seems
<quote>obvious
</quote> to everyone else
—the power of
599 <quote>common sense
</quote>—would prevail. Their
<quote>private interest
</quote> would not be
600 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
602 <indexterm startref='idxproprigtair' class='endofrange'
/>
603 <indexterm startref='idxlandownership' class='endofrange'
/>
604 <indexterm startref='idxairtraffic' class='endofrange'
/>
605 <indexterm id='idxarmstrongedwin' class='startofrange'
>
606 <primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary>
609 <emphasis role='strong'
>Edwin Howard Armstrong
</emphasis> is one of America's forgotten inventor
610 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
611 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
612 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
613 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
614 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
615 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
616 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
617 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
618 understanding of radio.
619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
620 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
621 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
622 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
625 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
626 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
627 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
628 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
629 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
630 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
631 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
632 much less transmitter power and static.
635 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
636 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
637 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
638 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
639 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
640 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
641 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
642 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
643 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.
</quote>
646 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
650 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
651 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
652 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
653 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
654 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
655 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
<quote>music
656 box.
</quote><footnote><para>
657 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
658 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
663 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
664 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
665 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
666 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
667 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
668 a handful of networks.
672 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
673 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
674 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
675 that removed static from
<quote>radio.
</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
676 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
677 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
681 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
682 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
683 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
684 RCA.
<footnote><para> See
<quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
685 Electronic Era,
</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
686 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
688 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
692 <indexterm id='idxlessing' class='startofrange'
>
693 <primary>Lessing, Lawrence
</primary>
696 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
697 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
698 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
700 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
704 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
705 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
706 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
707 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
708 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
709 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
714 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
715 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
716 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
717 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
718 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
719 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
720 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
721 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
722 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
723 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
724 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
729 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
730 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
731 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
732 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
737 <indexterm startref='idxlessing' class='endofrange'
/>
738 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
740 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
741 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
742 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
743 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
744 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
745 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
746 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
750 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
751 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
752 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
753 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
754 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
755 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
756 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
757 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
758 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
759 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
761 <indexterm startref='idxarmstrongedwin' class='endofrange'
/>
763 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
764 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
765 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
766 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
767 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
768 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
769 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
770 course always public spirited; the reality is something
771 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
772 to themselves, would crumble in
774 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
775 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
776 effect of technological change.
779 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
780 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
781 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
782 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
783 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
784 before.
<footnote><para>
785 Amanda Lenhart,
<quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
786 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,
</quote> Pew Internet and American
787 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
788 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
790 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
794 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
795 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
796 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
797 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
798 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
799 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
800 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
801 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
802 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
805 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
806 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
807 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
808 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
809 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
810 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
814 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
815 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
816 regulation of each. By
<quote>commercial culture
</quote> I mean that part of our
817 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
818 <quote>noncommercial culture
</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
821 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
822 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his
<quote>Reader,
</quote> or
823 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
824 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
825 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
828 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
829 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
830 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
831 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
832 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
833 left this culture
<quote>free.
</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
834 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
835 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
836 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
839 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
840 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
841 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
842 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
843 marketplace.
<footnote>
845 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
846 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
847 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
848 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
849 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
850 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
851 D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote> Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
853 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
855 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
856 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
857 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
858 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
861 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
862 been erased.
<footnote><para>
863 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
865 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
867 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
868 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
869 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
870 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
871 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
872 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
873 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
874 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
875 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
876 culture, more and more a permission culture.
878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
880 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
881 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
882 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
883 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
884 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
885 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
886 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
887 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
888 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
889 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
893 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
894 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
895 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
896 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
897 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
898 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
899 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
900 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
901 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
902 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
903 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
904 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
905 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
906 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
907 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
908 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
909 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
912 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
913 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
914 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
915 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
916 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
917 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
921 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
923 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
924 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether
<quote>piracy
</quote> will
925 be permitted, and whether
<quote>property
</quote> will be protected. The
<quote>war
</quote> that
926 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
927 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
928 calls his
<quote>own terrorist war
</quote><footnote><para>
929 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
930 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,
</quote> <citetitle>New York
931 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
932 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
933 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
934 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
938 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
939 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
940 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
941 <quote>creative property.
</quote> I believe that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that the
942 law, properly tuned, should punish
<quote>piracy,
</quote> whether on or off the
946 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
947 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
948 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet
<quote>pirates
</quote> will also rid our
949 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
952 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
953 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
954 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
955 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
956 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
958 Neil W. Netanel,
<quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
959 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
960 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
962 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
963 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
964 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
965 could cultivate and extend our culture.
968 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
969 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
970 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
971 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
972 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
973 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
974 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
975 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
976 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
980 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
981 <quote>centrality of technology
</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
982 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
983 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
984 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
988 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
989 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
990 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
991 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
992 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
993 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
994 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
996 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
997 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
999 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about
<quote>property.
</quote> The
1000 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1001 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1002 this
<quote>property
</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1003 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1004 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1005 of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1006 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1007 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1008 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1009 <quote>trespassing
</quote> upon legitimate claims of
<quote>property.
</quote> It is as plain to
1010 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1013 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1015 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
1017 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1018 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1019 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1020 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1022 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1023 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1027 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1028 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1029 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1030 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1031 our
<quote>culture
</quote> was as
<quote>owned
</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1032 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1033 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1034 accepted as it is now.
1037 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1038 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1039 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1040 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1043 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1044 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1047 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1048 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1049 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1050 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1051 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1054 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1055 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1056 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1057 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1060 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1061 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1063 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1064 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1065 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1066 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of
<quote>intellectual
1067 property.
</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1068 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1069 this silliness will be much more profound.
1070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1073 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas:
<quote>piracy
</quote> and
1074 <quote>property.
</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1078 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1079 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1080 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1081 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1082 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1083 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1086 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1087 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1088 government, pushed by big media to respond to this
<quote>something new,
</quote> is
1089 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1090 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let
<quote>common
1091 sense
</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1092 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1093 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1094 fundamental about who we have always been.
1097 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1098 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1099 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1100 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1101 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1102 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1105 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1106 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1107 <title><quote>PIRACY
</quote></title>
1109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1110 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1111 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1114 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1115 been a war against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1116 <quote>piracy,
</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1117 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1118 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1122 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1123 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1124 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1126 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1129 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1132 Today we are in the middle of another
<quote>war
</quote> against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The
1133 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1134 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1135 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1136 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1137 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1141 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1142 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1143 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1144 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1145 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will
<quote>rob the author of the
1149 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1150 increasingly to technology to defend their
<quote>property
</quote> against this
1151 <quote>piracy.
</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1152 raised to believe that
<quote>property
</quote> should be
<quote>free.
</quote> Forget tattoos,
1153 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1154 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1157 There's no doubt that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1158 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1159 notion of
<quote>piracy
</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1160 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1163 The idea goes something like this:
1167 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1168 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1169 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1170 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1171 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1175 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1176 <indexterm id='idxifvalue' class='startofrange'
>
1177 <primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary>
1180 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1181 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1182 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1184 See Rochelle Dreyfuss,
<quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1185 in the Pepsi Generation,
</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1187 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1188 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1189 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1190 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1192 Lisa Bannon,
<quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1193 Up,
</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1194 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1195 Zittrain,
<quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1196 Speech, No One Wins,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1197 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1199 There was
<quote>value
</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1200 <quote>right
</quote>—even against the Girl Scouts.
1202 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1204 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1205 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1207 of law protecting creative property. But the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1208 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1209 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1211 <indexterm startref='idxifvalue' class='endofrange'
/>
1213 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1214 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1215 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1216 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1217 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1220 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1221 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1222 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1223 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1224 copyright law today regulates both.
1227 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1228 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1229 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1230 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1231 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1232 more expense of doing business.
1234 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1235 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1237 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1238 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1239 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1240 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1241 <quote>copying,
</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1242 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1243 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1244 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1245 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1246 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1247 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1248 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1249 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1250 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1251 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1253 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the
<quote>Rise of the Creative
1254 Class.
</quote><footnote>
1257 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York:
1258 Basic Books,
2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1259 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1260 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1261 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1262 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1263 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1265 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1266 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1268 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1269 this creative class.
1272 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1273 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1274 context the current battles about behavior labeled
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
1278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1279 <chapter label=
"1" id=
"creators">
1280 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1281 <indexterm id=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'
>
1282 <primary>animated cartoons
</primary>
1285 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1286 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1287 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1288 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1289 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1292 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1293 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1294 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1295 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1296 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1297 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1301 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1302 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1303 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1304 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1305 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1308 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1309 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1310 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1311 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1312 synchronization was pretty close.
1315 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1316 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1317 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1318 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1319 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1321 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1322 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1327 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1328 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly:
<quote>I have never been so thrilled
1329 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.
</quote>
1330 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1333 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1334 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1335 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1336 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1337 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1338 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1339 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1342 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1343 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1344 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1345 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1348 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1349 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1350 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1351 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1352 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1353 and among the best of its genre.
1356 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1359 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1360 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1362 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1363 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1364 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1365 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>:
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote> <quote>The
1366 Simpleton
</quote> (Delille),
<quote>Mischief Makers
</quote> (Carbonara),
<quote>Joyful Hurry No.
1</quote>
1367 (Baron), and
<quote>Gawky Rube
</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song,
<quote>The Turkey in the
1368 Straw,
</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1369 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1371 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1372 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1373 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1374 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote>
1375 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1379 This
<quote>borrowing
</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1380 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1381 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1383 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman,
<quote>The Mouse
1384 that Ate the Public Domain,
</quote> Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1385 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1387 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1388 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1389 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1390 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1391 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1392 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1393 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1394 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1398 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1399 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1400 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1401 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1402 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1403 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1404 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1407 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1408 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1409 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1410 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1411 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1412 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1413 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1414 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1415 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1416 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1417 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1419 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1420 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1421 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1422 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1423 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1424 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1425 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1426 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1428 <indexterm startref=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'
/>
1430 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1431 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1432 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1433 its importance. We could call this
<quote>Disney creativity,
</quote> though that
1434 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely,
<quote>Walt Disney
1435 creativity
</quote>—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1436 culture around us and makes it something different.
1438 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1439 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1440 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1441 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1442 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1444 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1445 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the
<quote>average
</quote> term by
1447 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1448 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1449 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1451 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1452 Web site associated with this book, available at
1453 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1455 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1456 copyright holders of a creative work had an
<quote>exclusive right
</quote> to control
1457 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1458 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1461 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1462 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1463 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a
<quote>lawyer-free
1464 zone.
</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1465 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1466 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1467 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1470 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1471 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1472 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1473 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1476 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1477 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1478 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1479 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1480 content from before the Great Depression.
1483 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on
<quote>Walt Disney creativity.
</quote>
1484 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1485 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1489 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1490 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1491 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1492 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1493 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1494 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1495 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1498 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1499 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1500 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1501 the stories that these
<quote>graphic novels
</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1502 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are
<quote>men in tights.
</quote>
1503 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1504 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1505 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1506 interestingly different way.
1509 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1510 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1511 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1514 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1515 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1516 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1517 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1518 transforming it either subtly or
1519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1520 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1521 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1522 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1523 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently
<quote>different.
</quote> But they
1524 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1525 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1526 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1529 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1530 huge. More than
33,
000 <quote>circles
</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1531 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1532 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1533 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1534 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1535 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1536 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1537 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1540 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1541 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1542 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1543 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1544 one. Doujinshi are plainly
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> There is no general
1545 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1546 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1547 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1548 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that
<quote>taking
</quote> without
1549 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1550 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1551 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1553 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1554 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1557 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1558 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1559 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me,
<quote>The
1560 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1561 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1563 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1564 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them
</quote>
1565 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1567 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1568 York: Perennial,
2000).
1571 <indexterm><primary>Superman comics
</primary></indexterm>
1573 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1574 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1575 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me,
<quote>there are these rules
1576 and you have to stick to them.
</quote> There are things Superman
<quote>cannot
</quote>
1577 do.
<quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1578 which are fifty years old.
</quote>
1580 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1582 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1583 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1584 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1585 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1586 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1587 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1588 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1590 See Salil K. Mehra,
<quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1591 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?
</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1592 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
<quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1593 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1594 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1595 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1596 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1597 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.
</quote>
1601 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1602 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1603 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1604 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1605 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1606 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1607 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1608 a more general pattern of blocking this
<quote>free taking
</quote> by the doujinshi
1612 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1613 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1614 a friend from a major Japanese law firm.
<quote>We don't have enough
1615 lawyers,
</quote> he told me one afternoon. There
<quote>just aren't enough resources
1616 to prosecute cases like this.
</quote>
1619 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1620 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1621 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1622 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1624 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1625 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1626 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1627 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1628 their clients or hurt them?
1629 Let's pause for a moment.
1632 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1633 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1634 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1637 We live in a world that celebrates
<quote>property.
</quote> I am one of those
1638 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1639 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1640 <quote>intellectual property.
</quote><footnote><para>
1642 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1643 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1644 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1645 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1646 describes a set of
<quote>property
</quote> rights
—copyright, patents,
1647 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1649 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1651 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1652 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1656 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1657 plenty of value out there that
<quote>property
</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1658 mean
<quote>money can't buy you love,
</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1659 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1660 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1661 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1662 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1663 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1664 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1665 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1666 Disney's use would have been considered
<quote>fair.
</quote> There was nothing
1667 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1671 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1672 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1673 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1676 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1680 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1681 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1682 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1683 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1684 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1685 form, whether large or small.
1688 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1689 say that the copycat comic artists are
<quote>stealing.
</quote> This form of Walt
1690 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1691 particular find it hard to say why.
1694 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1695 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1696 without asking or paying for the privilege. (
<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1697 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1698 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?
</quote>) Acting companies
1699 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1700 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1701 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1702 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1703 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1704 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1705 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1708 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1709 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1710 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1711 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1712 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1713 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1714 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1715 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1716 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1719 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1720 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1721 question instead is
<quote><emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?
</quote>
1722 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1723 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1724 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1725 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1726 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1727 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1731 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1732 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1733 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1738 <chapter label=
"2" id=
"mere-copyists">
1739 <title>CHAPTER TWO:
<quote>Mere Copyists
</quote></title>
1740 <indexterm id=
"idxphotography" class='startofrange'
>
1741 <primary>photography
</primary>
1744 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1745 producing what we would call
<quote>photographs.
</quote> Appropriately enough, they
1746 were called
<quote>daguerreotypes.
</quote> The process was complicated and
1747 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1748 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1749 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1750 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1751 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1754 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1755 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1756 <quote>automatic pictures.
</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1757 making
<quote>negatives.
</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1758 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1759 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1760 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1761 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1763 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1765 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1766 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1769 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1770 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1772 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1773 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1774 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1775 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1776 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1777 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1778 population of photographers.
1781 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1782 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1783 marketed on the basis of its simplicity.
<quote>You press the button and we
1784 do the rest.
</quote><footnote><para>
1786 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1787 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1788 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)
</primary></indexterm>
1792 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1793 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1794 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1795 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1796 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1797 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1798 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1799 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1800 chemicals.
<footnote>
1803 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1805 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1810 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1811 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1812 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1813 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1814 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1815 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1816 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1817 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1818 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1819 percent.
<footnote><para>
1822 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1823 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1825 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1828 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1832 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1833 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1834 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1835 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1836 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes,
<quote>For the
1837 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1838 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1839 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1840 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1841 interpretation or bias.
</quote><footnote><para>
1847 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1848 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1849 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1850 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1851 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1852 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its
<quote>quality
</quote>;
1853 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1854 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1855 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1856 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1860 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1861 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1862 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1863 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1864 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1865 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1866 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1867 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1869 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1870 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1871 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1872 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1877 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1878 familiar. The photographer was
<quote>taking
</quote> something from the person or
1879 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1880 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1881 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1884 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1885 that they thought valuable.
1887 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1889 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1890 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1891 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1892 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1893 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1896 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote>
1897 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1898 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1899 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1900 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1901 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1902 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1903 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1905 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
1907 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1908 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1909 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1910 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1911 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1912 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1913 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1914 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1915 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1917 See Melville B. Nimmer,
<quote>The Right of Publicity,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1918 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
<quote>Privacy,
</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1919 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1920 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1925 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1926 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1927 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1928 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1929 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1930 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1931 Kodak would be benefiting from the
<quote>theft
</quote> committed by the
1932 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1933 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1934 from the
<quote>image-right
</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1935 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1936 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1937 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1942 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1943 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1944 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1945 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1946 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1947 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1948 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1949 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1950 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1951 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1952 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1953 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1954 striking images, and the logo
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> in place of the name of a
1955 school. But there's little that's
<quote>just
</quote> cerebral in the projects that
1956 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1957 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1958 film of your VCR. Rather the
<quote>film
</quote> of digital cameras. Just Think!
1959 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1960 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1961 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1962 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1963 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1966 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1967 <indexterm startref=
"idxphotography" class='endofrange'
/>
1969 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1970 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1971 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it,
<quote>Five years ago, a good
1972 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1973 professional quality for $
595.
</quote><footnote><para>
1975 H. Edward Goldberg,
<quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1976 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,
</quote>
1977 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1978 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1980 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1981 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1982 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1983 learning more and more of something teachers call
<quote>media literacy.
</quote>
1986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1987 <quote>Media literacy,
</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1988 Think!, puts it,
<quote>is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
1989 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1990 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1991 the way people access it.
</quote>
1992 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
1995 This may seem like an odd way to think about
<quote>literacy.
</quote> For most
1996 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1997 and noticing split infinitives are the things that
<quote>literate
</quote> people know
2000 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
2002 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
2003 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
2004 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
2006 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2007 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990);
<quote>Findings on Family and TV
2008 Study,
</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
2010 it is increasingly important to understand the
<quote>grammar
</quote> of media. For
2011 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2012 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2013 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2014 (at least at first) terrible media.
2017 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2018 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2019 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
2020 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2021 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
2022 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2023 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2024 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2027 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2028 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2029 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2030 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2031 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2032 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2034 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2036 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2037 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2038 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2041 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2042 about
<quote>the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2043 texture.
</quote><footnote>
2046 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2048 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2049 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2051 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2052 <quote>played
</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2053 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2054 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2055 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2056 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2057 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2058 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2060 See Scott Steinberg,
<quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,
</quote> E!online,
4
2061 November
2000, available at
2062 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>;
<quote>Timeline,
</quote> 22 November
2000,
2064 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2067 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2069 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2070 describes,
<quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2071 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2072 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2073 led.
</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2076 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2077 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2078 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2079 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2083 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2084 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2085 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2086 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2091 <quote>Read-only.
</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2092 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2096 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2097 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2098 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2099 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2102 and this literacy in particular, is to
<quote>empower people to choose the
2103 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2104 express.
</quote><footnote>
2107 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2108 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2109 </para></footnote> It is to enable students
<quote>to communicate in the
2110 language of the twenty-first century.
</quote><footnote><para>
2115 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2117 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2118 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2119 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2120 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2121 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2122 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2123 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2124 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2125 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2126 students know something about
—gun violence.
2129 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2130 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2131 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2132 away. The
<quote>kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,
</quote>
2133 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2134 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2137 Using whatever
<quote>free web stuff they could find,
</quote> and relatively simple
2138 tools to enable the kids to mix
<quote>image, sound, and text,
</quote> Barish said
2139 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2140 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2141 close to the lives of these students. The project
<quote>gave them a tool
2142 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2143 it,
</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2144 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2145 been created using only text.
<quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2146 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2147 gone and done something else,
</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2148 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2149 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2150 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2151 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2156 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?
</quote> I asked. In part,
2157 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2158 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of
<quote>constructing
2159 meaning.
</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2160 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2161 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2162 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2167 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2168 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2169 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2170 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2171 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2172 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2173 you say,
<quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.
</quote>
2174 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2175 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2176 you. [But i]nstead, if you say,
<quote>Well, with all these things that you
2177 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2178 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2179 for me something that reflects that.
</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2180 camera and
… saying,
<quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2181 make a little movie.
</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2182 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2183 about the topic.
…
2186 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2187 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2188 bump up against the fact,
<quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2189 to write something.
</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2190 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2193 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2194 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2195 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2197 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2198 had a lot of power with this language.
2200 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2201 not match with any start quote. -->
2203 <indexterm><primary>World Trade Center
</primary></indexterm>
2205 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2206 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2207 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2208 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2209 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2210 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2211 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2212 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2213 world would be watching.
2216 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2217 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2218 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was
<quote>balance,
</quote>
2219 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2220 increasingly come to expect it,
<quote>news as entertainment,
</quote> even if the
2221 entertainment is tragedy.
2223 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2224 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2226 But in addition to this produced news about the
<quote>tragedy of September
2227 11,
</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2228 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2229 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2230 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2231 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2232 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2233 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2234 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2235 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2236 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2237 was also the Internet.
2240 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2241 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2242 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2243 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2246 by a student on the
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2250 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2251 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2252 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2253 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2254 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2255 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2256 spread practically instantaneously.
2259 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2260 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2261 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2262 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2263 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2264 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2265 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2268 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2269 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2270 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2271 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2272 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2273 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2274 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2275 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2276 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2277 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2278 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2279 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2282 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2283 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2284 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2285 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2286 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2289 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2290 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2292 <indexterm><primary>Tocqueville, Alexis de
</primary></indexterm>
2294 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2295 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2296 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2297 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2298 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2299 most important account of early
<quote>Democracy in America.
</quote> It wasn't
2300 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2301 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2302 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2303 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2304 deliberated. Members argued about the
<quote>right
</quote> result; they tried to
2305 persuade each other of the
<quote>right
</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2306 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2307 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2309 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2310 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2314 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2315 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2316 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2318 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin,
<quote>Deliberation Day,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2319 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2321 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2322 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2323 place for
<quote>democratic deliberation
</quote> to occur.
2326 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2327 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2328 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2329 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2330 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2331 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2333 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2334 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2335 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2336 little beyond what our friends say.
2339 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2340 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2341 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2342 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2343 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2346 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2350 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2351 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2352 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2353 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2354 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2355 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2358 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2359 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2360 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2361 is having an effect.
2362 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2364 <indexterm><primary>Thurmond, Strom
</primary></indexterm>
2366 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2367 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2368 <quote>misspoke
</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2369 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2370 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2371 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2372 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2373 more instances of the same
<quote>misspeaking
</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2374 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2375 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2377 Noah Shachtman,
<quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,
</quote> New
2378 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2380 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2383 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2384 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2385 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2386 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2390 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2391 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2392 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2393 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2394 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2395 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2396 peer-generated rankings.
2398 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2399 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2402 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2404 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2405 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2406 difference is the absence of a financial
<quote>conflict of interest.
</quote> <quote>I think you
2407 have to take the conflict of interest
</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2408 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2409 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2410 get it out of the way.
</quote>
2412 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2413 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2415 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2416 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2417 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2418 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2419 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2421 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2423 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2424 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2425 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2426 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2427 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2428 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2429 told her that
<emphasis>they
</emphasis> were writing
<quote>the story.
</quote>)
2431 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2432 debate
—<quote>amateur
</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2433 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2434 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2435 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2436 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2437 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2439 John Schwartz,
<quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2440 Information Online,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2441 D. Kramer,
<quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,
</quote>
2442 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2443 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2445 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2446 <quote>triangulate,
</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2447 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2448 out of it
</quote>—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2451 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2452 with blogs.
<quote>It's going to become an essential skill,
</quote> Winer predicts,
2453 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2454 not clear that
<quote>journalism
</quote> is happy about this
—some journalists
2455 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2458 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2459 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2460 <indexterm><primary>Olafson, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
2461 See Michael Falcone,
<quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?
</quote> <citetitle>New
2462 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. (
<quote>Not all news organizations have
2463 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2464 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2465 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2466 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2467 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2468 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.
</quote>)
2470 But it is clear that we are still in transition.
<quote>A
2472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2473 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,
</quote> Winer told me.
2474 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2475 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2476 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said,
<quote>we will
2477 be the last thing that gets shut down.
</quote>
2480 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
<quote>you
2481 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.
</quote>
2482 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2483 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2484 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2485 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2486 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2487 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2488 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2489 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2490 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2491 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2492 extraordinary to report.
2494 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2495 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2496 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2498 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'
>
2499 <primary>advertising
</primary>
2502 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2503 His work, as his Web site describes it, is
<quote>human learning and
… the
2504 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation.
</quote>
2507 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2508 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2509 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2510 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2514 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When
<quote>a lot of us grew up,
</quote>
2515 he explains, that tinkering was done
<quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2516 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.
</quote> But digital technologies
2517 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2518 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2519 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2521 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2522 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2523 or
<quote>free collage,
</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2524 the tinkering of many others.
2527 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2528 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2529 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2530 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2531 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2534 This opportunity creates a
<quote>completely new kind of learning platform,
</quote>
2535 as Brown describes.
<quote>As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2536 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2537 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2538 if they can improve it.
</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2539 apprenticeship.
<quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.
</quote>
2542 In this process,
<quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2543 They are code.
</quote> Kids are
<quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2544 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2545 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2546 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2547 you tinker the more you improve.
</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2551 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2552 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2553 it,
<quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2554 intelligence.
</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2555 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2556 text.
<quote>The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2557 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2558 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2559 these multiple forms of intelligence.
</quote>
2561 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'
/>
2562 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2564 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2565 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2568 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2569 kind of recognition.
2572 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2573 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2574 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2575 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2576 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2577 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2578 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2581 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2582 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2583 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2584 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the
<quote>right to
2585 tinker
</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2586 general.
<footnote><para>
2588 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel,
<quote>Technological Access
2589 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,
</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2590 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2592 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2593 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2596 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,
</quote> Brown
2597 explains. We need to
<quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2598 and want to learn.
</quote>
2601 <quote>Yet,
</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2602 evince,
<quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2603 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2604 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2605 system that closes down that part of the brain.
</quote>
2607 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2609 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2610 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2611 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2612 the law to close down that technology.
2615 <quote>No way to run a culture,
</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2616 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2617 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2621 <chapter label=
"3" id=
"catalogs">
2622 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2623 <indexterm><primary>RPI
</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</see></indexterm>
2624 <indexterm id=
"idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'
>
2625 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</primary>
2628 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2629 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2630 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2631 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2632 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2635 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2636 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2637 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2638 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2639 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2640 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2643 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2644 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2645 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2646 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2647 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2650 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2652 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2653 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2654 engines can do this even better. The idea of
<quote>intranet
</quote> search
2655 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2656 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2657 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2658 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2659 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2662 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2663 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2664 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2665 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2666 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2667 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2668 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2671 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2672 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2673 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2674 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2675 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2676 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2677 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2678 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2679 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2683 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2684 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2685 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2686 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2687 be on users' computers.
2690 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2691 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2692 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2693 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2695 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2699 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2700 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2701 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2702 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2703 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2704 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2705 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2706 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2707 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2708 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2709 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2710 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2714 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2715 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2716 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2717 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2718 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2719 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2720 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2723 <quote>It was absurd,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>I don't think I did anything
2724 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2725 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2726 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2727 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2728 easier to use
</quote>—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2729 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2730 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2731 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2732 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2735 <indexterm><primary>statutory damages
</primary></indexterm>
2737 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2738 network and had therefore
<quote>willfully
</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2740 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2741 <quote>willful infringement,
</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2742 call
<quote>statutory damages.
</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2743 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2744 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2745 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2747 <indexterm><primary>Princeton University
</primary></indexterm>
2748 <indexterm><primary>Michigan Technical University
</primary></indexterm>
2750 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2751 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2752 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2753 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2754 huge demands for
<quote>damages
</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2755 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2756 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2757 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2758 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2759 2001.
<footnote><para>
2762 Tim Goral,
<quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2763 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,
</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2764 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2767 <indexterm startref=
"idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'
/>
2769 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2770 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2771 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2772 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2773 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2775 <indexterm><primary>Oppenheimer, Matt
</primary></indexterm>
2777 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2778 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2779 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2780 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2781 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2782 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2783 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse,
<quote>You don't want to pay another
2784 visit to a dentist like me.
</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2785 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2788 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2789 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2790 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2791 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2792 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2793 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2794 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2795 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2798 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2799 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2802 <primary>artists
</primary>
2803 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
2806 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2807 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2808 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2809 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2810 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2811 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2812 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2814 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2815 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2816 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2818 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2819 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2820 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2822 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in
<quote>KaZaA and Punishment,
</quote>
2823 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2827 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2828 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2829 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2834 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2835 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2836 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2837 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2841 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2842 his father told me, Jesse
<quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2843 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2844 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2845 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.
</quote>
2847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2849 <chapter label=
"4" id=
"pirates">
2850 <title>CHAPTER FOUR:
<quote>Pirates
</quote></title>
2851 <indexterm><primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary></indexterm>
2853 <emphasis role=
"strong">If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means
</emphasis>
2854 using the creative property of others without their
2855 permission
—if
<quote>if value, then right
</quote> is
2856 true
—then the history of the content industry is a history of
2857 piracy. Every important sector of
<quote>big media
</quote>
2858 today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2859 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last
2860 generation's pirates join this generation's country club
—until
2866 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2868 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2869 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2870 which details Edison's
<quote>adventures
</quote> with copyright and patent.
2871 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2873 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2874 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2875 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2876 exercised through a monopoly
<quote>trust,
</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2877 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2878 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2879 this creative property
2880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2881 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2884 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2888 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2889 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2890 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2891 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2892 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2893 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2894 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2897 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2898 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2899 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2900 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2901 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2902 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2903 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2904 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2905 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2906 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2908 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2909 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2910 posted at
<quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2911 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,
</quote> available at
2912 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2913 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2914 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From
2915 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2916 the Propertization of Copyright
</quote> (September
2002), University of
2917 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2918 Working Paper No.
159.
2919 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
2921 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
2922 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2923 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2927 The Napsters of those days, the
<quote>independents,
</quote> were companies like
2928 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2929 resisted.
<quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2930 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2931 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.
</quote><footnote><para>
2933 Marc Wanamaker,
<quote>The First Studios,
</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2934 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2936 That led the independents to flee the East
2937 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2938 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2939 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2943 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2944 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2945 patent holder a truly
<quote>limited
</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2948 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2949 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2950 Edison's creative property.
2953 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
2954 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2956 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2957 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2959 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
>
2960 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary>
2962 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil
</primary></indexterm>
2964 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2965 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2966 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2967 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2968 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2969 1899 hit
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2970 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2971 right to perform it publicly.
2973 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2975 But what if I wanted to record
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> using Edison's phonograph
2976 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2977 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2978 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2979 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2980 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2981 <quote>public performance
</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2982 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2983 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2984 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2985 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2986 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2987 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2988 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2989 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2990 its composer anything.
2992 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
2994 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2996 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2998 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3002 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
3003 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
3004 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
3005 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
3006 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
3007 rights.
<footnote><para>
3009 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
3010 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
3011 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
3012 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
3013 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3014 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3015 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3019 <indexterm><primary>Sousa, John Philip
</primary></indexterm>
3021 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
3022 people's works were
<quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
3023 genius of American composers,
</quote><footnote><para>
3025 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
3026 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3028 and the
<quote>music publishing industry
</quote>
3029 was thereby
<quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.
</quote><footnote><para>
3031 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
3032 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3035 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible,
<quote>When they make money
3036 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3038 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
3039 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3043 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3044 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3045 player piano argued that
<quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3046 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3047 of anything he had before their introduction.
</quote> Rather, the machines
3048 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
3051 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
3052 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3053 Perforating Company of New York).
3054 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3055 Congress was
<quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3056 they represent, and whose servants they are.
</quote> <quote>All talk about
3057 `theft,'
</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3058 wrote,
<quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3059 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3060 statute.
</quote><footnote><para>
3062 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3063 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3064 Graphophone Company Association).
3066 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3069 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3070 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3071 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the
<quote>mechanical
3072 reproductions
</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3073 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3074 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3075 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3076 recorded once. This is the part of
3078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3079 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3080 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3081 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3084 American law ordinarily calls this a
<quote>compulsory license,
</quote> but I will
3085 refer to it as a
<quote>statutory license.
</quote> A statutory license is a license
3086 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3087 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3088 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3089 the fee set by the statute.
3092 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3093 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3094 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3095 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3096 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3097 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3099 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3102 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3103 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3104 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3105 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3106 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3107 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3108 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3109 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3110 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3111 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3112 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3113 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3116 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3117 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3118 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3119 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3120 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3122 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3125 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3126 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3127 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3132 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3134 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3135 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3136 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3137 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3138 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3139 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3140 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3141 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3142 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3143 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3144 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3145 choice.
<footnote><para>
3147 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3148 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3149 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3150 this report.
</para></footnote>
3154 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3155 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3158 <section id=
"radio">
3159 <title>Radio
</title>
3160 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments1' class='startofrange'
>
3161 <primary>artists
</primary>
3162 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
3165 Radio was also born of piracy.
3168 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3169 <quote>public performance
</quote> of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3171 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3172 record companies printed
<quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast
</quote> and other
3173 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3174 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3175 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3176 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3177 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3178 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3179 Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3180 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3181 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3183 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3184 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3185 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3188 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3189 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3190 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3191 work. It's one thing to have
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> sung on the radio by the
3192 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3193 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3194 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3195 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3196 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3198 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3203 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3204 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3205 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3206 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3207 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3208 of playing the song.
3210 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3211 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3214 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3215 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3216 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3217 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3220 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3221 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3222 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3223 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3224 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3225 <quote>protected
</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3226 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3229 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3231 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3232 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3233 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3234 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3235 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3236 to take something for nothing.
3238 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments1' class='endofrange'
/>
3240 <section id=
"cabletv">
3241 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3244 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3247 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3248 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3249 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3250 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3252 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3253 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3254 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3257 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3258 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3259 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3261 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3262 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3263 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.
</quote><footnote><para>
3265 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3266 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3267 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3268 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3270 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3272 There may have been a
<quote>public interest
</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3273 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3274 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony,
<quote>Does public
3275 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?
</quote><footnote><para>
3277 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3278 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3280 As another broadcaster put it,
3284 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3285 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3286 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3288 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3289 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3294 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3298 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3299 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3300 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3301 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3303 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3304 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3305 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3309 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3311 These were
<quote>free-ride[rs],
</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3312 Heston said, who were
<quote>depriving actors of
3313 compensation.
</quote><footnote><para>
3315 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3316 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3317 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3322 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3323 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3327 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3328 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3329 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3330 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3333 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3334 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3336 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3337 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3338 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3340 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3344 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3345 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3348 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3349 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they
<quote>pirated.
</quote>
3350 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3351 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3352 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3353 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3354 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3355 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3356 companies thus built their empire in part upon a
<quote>piracy
</quote> of the value
3357 created by broadcasters' content.
3360 These separate stories sing a common theme. If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means
3361 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3362 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3363 today
<footnote><para>
3365 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3366 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3367 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3368 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>.
<quote>The
3369 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3370 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet.
</quote>
3372 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3373 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3374 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3375 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3376 last. Every generation
—until now.
3378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3381 <chapter label=
"5" id=
"piracy">
3382 <title>CHAPTER FIVE:
<quote>Piracy
</quote></title>
3384 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3385 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3386 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3387 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3388 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3392 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of
<quote>taking
</quote>
3393 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3394 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3395 taking
<quote>piracy,
</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3396 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3397 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3398 has so often done in the past.
3399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3401 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3402 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3403 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3405 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3406 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3407 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3408 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3409 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3411 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3412 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3413 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3414 also Ben Hunt,
<quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3415 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3417 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3418 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3421 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3422 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3423 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3424 This piracy is wrong.
3427 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3428 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3429 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3430 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3431 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3432 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3433 of our existence, treated as right.
3436 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3437 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3438 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3439 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3440 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3441 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3442 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3443 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3444 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3447 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3448 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3449 <beginpage pagenum=
"77"/>
3450 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3451 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3455 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3456 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3457 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3458 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3460 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3461 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The
3462 New Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3463 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3464 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3465 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3466 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3467 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3468 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3469 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3470 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3471 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3472 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3473 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3475 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents
</primary></indexterm>
3476 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3477 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3478 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3479 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3482 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3484 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3485 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3486 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3487 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3488 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3490 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3491 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3492 144–90.
<quote>In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3493 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3494 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3495 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3496 pirating were not an option.
</quote> Ibid.,
149.
3497 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3501 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3502 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3503 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3504 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3505 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3506 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?
</quote>
3507 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3508 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3509 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3510 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3511 piracy of the tangible.
3514 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3515 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3516 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3517 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3518 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3519 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3520 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3521 give people the right to
<quote>take
</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3522 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3525 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3526 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3527 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3528 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3529 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what
<quote>property
</quote> means.
3531 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3533 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3534 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
<quote>steal
</quote>
3535 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3536 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3537 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3538 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3539 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3540 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3541 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3542 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3543 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3544 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3545 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3547 <primary>Microsoft
</primary>
3548 <secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary>
3550 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3553 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3554 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3555 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3556 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3557 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3558 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3561 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3562 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3563 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3564 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3565 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3566 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3567 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3568 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3569 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3570 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3571 violating the law is still wrong.
3572 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3573 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer
</primary></indexterm>
3574 <indexterm><primary>Netscape
</primary></indexterm>
3575 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3579 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3580 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3581 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3582 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3583 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3584 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3585 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3589 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3590 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is. Or
3591 at least, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3592 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of
<quote>piracy
</quote> are useful
3593 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3594 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3595 <quote>piracy
</quote> in that sense of the term.
3598 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3599 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3600 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3601 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3604 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3605 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3606 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3607 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3610 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3611 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3615 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3616 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3618 The key to the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that
<quote>rob[s]
3619 the author of [his] profit.
</quote><footnote><para>
3621 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3623 This means we must determine whether
3624 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3626 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3627 author of his profit.
3629 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3631 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3632 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3633 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3634 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3636 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3637 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3638 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3639 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3640 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3641 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3642 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3643 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3644 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3646 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3647 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3648 put together components that had been developed independently.
3649 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3652 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3653 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3654 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3655 system.
<footnote><para>
3657 See Carolyn Lochhead,
<quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,
</quote> <citetitle>San
3658 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1;
<quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,
</quote>
3659 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Napster Names CEO,
3660 Secures New Financing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3661 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3662 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet
</quote> (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3664 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3665 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3666 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3667 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3668 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3669 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3670 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3673 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3674 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3675 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3676 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3679 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3680 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3681 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3682 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3684 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3685 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3686 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3688 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,
</quote> <citetitle>New
3689 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3691 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3692 massive quantity of content is being
<quote>taken
</quote> on these networks. The
3693 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3694 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3697 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3698 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3699 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3700 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3701 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3702 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3707 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3708 different kinds into four types.
3710 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3713 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3714 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3715 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3716 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3717 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3718 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3719 users who download instead of purchasing.
3720 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3724 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3725 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3726 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3727 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3728 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3729 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3730 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3735 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3736 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3737 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3738 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3739 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3740 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3741 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend
<quote>recalling
</quote> old
3742 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3743 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3744 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3745 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3746 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3752 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3753 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3758 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3761 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3762 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3763 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3764 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3766 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3767 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3769 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3770 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3771 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3772 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3773 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3774 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3777 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3778 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3779 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3780 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3781 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of
<quote>theft
</quote> that is
3782 <quote>devastating
</quote> the industry.
3785 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3786 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3787 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3788 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3789 & Young put it,
<quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3790 technology, the labels fought it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3792 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3793 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3794 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3795 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3796 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption
<quote>Home taping
3797 is killing music.
</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3798 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3799 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3800 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3801 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3802 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3803 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3804 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3805 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3806 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3807 regulating technology was the answer.
3810 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3811 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3812 turnaround.
<quote>In the end,
</quote> Cap Gemini concludes,
<quote>the `crisis'
… was
3813 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3815 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3816 innovation at the major labels.
</quote><footnote><para>
3818 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3822 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3823 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3824 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3825 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3826 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3827 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3828 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3829 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3832 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3833 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3834 The
<quote>net harm
</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3835 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3836 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3837 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3838 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3843 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3844 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3845 actually suggest it might be close.
3848 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3849 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3850 percent.
<footnote><para>
3852 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3854 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3855 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3856 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3857 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3858 #
16</ulink>:
<quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3859 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3860 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3861 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3862 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3863 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3864 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3867 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3868 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3869 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3870 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3871 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3872 account for at least some of the loss.
<quote>From
1999 to
2001, the average
3873 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19.
</quote><footnote>
3876 Jane Black,
<quote>Big Music's Broken Record,
</quote> BusinessWeek online,
13
3877 February
2003, available at
3878 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3879 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3882 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3883 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes,
<quote>The
3884 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3885 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3886 $
19.99.
</quote><footnote><para>
3893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3894 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3895 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3896 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3897 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3898 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3899 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3902 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3903 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3904 The recording industry constantly asks,
<quote>What's the difference between
3905 downloading a song and stealing a CD?
</quote>—but their own numbers
3906 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3907 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3908 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3909 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3910 Kazaa
<quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit
</quote>—then the industry
3911 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3912 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3913 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3914 a huge difference between
<quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.
</quote>
3917 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3918 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3919 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3923 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3924 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3925 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3926 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3927 available.
<footnote><para>
3929 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3930 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3931 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3932 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3933 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3934 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3936 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3937 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3938 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3939 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3940 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3943 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3945 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3946 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3947 today.
<footnote><para>
3949 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3950 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3951 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet
3952 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
3953 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3955 Association of Recording Merchandisers,
<quote>2002 Annual Survey
3958 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3960 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3961 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3962 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
3963 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3964 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3965 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3966 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3967 the content they sell.
3969 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3971 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3972 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3973 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3974 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3975 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3976 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's
<quote>Two Love Songs,
</quote>
3977 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3978 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3979 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3980 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3981 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3984 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3985 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3986 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3987 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3988 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3992 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3993 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3994 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3995 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3996 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
3997 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
4000 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
4001 would be a great advertisement for the
<quote>real
</quote> book. People would read
4002 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
4003 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
4004 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
4005 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4009 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
4010 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4011 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4012 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4015 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4016 understandably says,
<quote>This is how much we've lost,
</quote> we must also ask,
4017 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
4018 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
4019 unavailable?
</quote>
4022 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
4023 chapter, much of the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
4024 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4025 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
4026 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
4027 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
4028 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
4029 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
4030 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
4031 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
4032 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
4033 found only with time.
4036 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4037 just what you call type A sharing?
</quote>
4040 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4042 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4043 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4045 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4047 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
4048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4049 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
4050 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4051 <quote>down to zero.
</quote><footnote><para>
4053 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
4054 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
4057 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
4058 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4059 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
4060 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
4064 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4065 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4066 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
4067 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
4068 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
4069 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4070 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4071 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4072 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4075 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4076 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4077 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4078 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4079 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4080 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4081 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4084 <primary>artists
</primary>
4085 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
4088 So, as we've seen, when
<quote>mechanical reproduction
</quote> threatened the
4089 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4090 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4091 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4092 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4093 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4094 complained to Congress that their
<quote>creative property
</quote> was not being
4095 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4096 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4100 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4101 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4102 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4103 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4104 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4110 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4111 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4112 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4113 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4114 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4115 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4116 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4117 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4118 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4119 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4120 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4121 Congress chose a path that would assure
4122 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4123 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4125 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4127 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4128 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4129 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4130 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4131 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4132 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4133 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4134 <quote>record
</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4135 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4136 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4137 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4140 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4141 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4142 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4143 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4144 machine to copy only if there were a special
<quote>copy me
</quote> signal on the
4145 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4146 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4147 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4149 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4150 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4151 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4152 for the architecture it chose.
4155 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4156 champion. Valenti called VCRs
<quote>tapeworms.
</quote> He warned,
<quote>When there are
4157 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4158 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4159 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4160 copyright.
</quote><footnote><para>
4162 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4163 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4164 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4165 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4167 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4168 creative judgment,
</quote> he told Congress,
<quote>to understand the devastation
4169 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4170 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4171 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4172 and plain common sense.
</quote><footnote><para>
4174 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4176 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4177 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4179 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4182 — a use the Court would later hold was not
<quote>fair.
</quote> By
4183 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4184 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4185 copyrightowners,
</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would
<quote>take from the
4186 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4187 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4188 profit from its reproduction.
</quote><footnote><para>
4190 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4195 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4196 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4197 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4198 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the
<quote>Hollywood
4199 Circuit
</quote>—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4200 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4201 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4202 called
<quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry
</quote> (worse
4203 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4204 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4205 technology.
<footnote><para>
4207 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4210 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4213 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4216 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4217 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4222 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4223 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4225 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4227 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4228 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4230 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4232 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4237 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4238 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4239 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4240 enough, this
<quote>taking
</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4241 together, a pattern is clear:
4244 <informaltable id=
"t1">
4245 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4249 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS
<quote>PIRATED
</quote></entry>
4250 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4251 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4256 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4257 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4258 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4259 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4262 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4263 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4265 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4268 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4269 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4270 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4271 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4275 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4276 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4277 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4284 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4285 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4287 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4288 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4289 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4290 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4291 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4292 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4293 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4294 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4295 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,
</quote>
4296 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4297 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
4298 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4300 In each case, throughout our history,
4301 that change meant that someone got a
<quote>free ride
</quote> on someone else's
4305 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4306 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4307 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4308 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4309 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
4310 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4311 the behavior of the
<quote>pirates.
</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4312 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4317 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4318 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4319 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4320 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4321 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4323 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4324 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4325 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4326 permission to record a song?
4329 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4330 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4331 copyright
<quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4332 over all possible uses of his work.
</quote><footnote><para>
4334 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4337 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4338 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4339 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4340 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4341 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4342 facilitate the distribution of content.
4345 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4346 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4347 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4348 should not become a tool for
<quote>stealing
</quote> from artists. But neither
4349 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4350 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4351 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4352 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4353 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4354 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4355 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4356 public interest that innovation continue.
4360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4361 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4362 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4363 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4364 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4365 efficient. Yet these
<quote>potential public benefits,
</quote> as John Schwartz
4366 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
<quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4367 fight.
</quote><footnote><para>
4369 John Schwartz,
<quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4370 Echoes Past Efforts,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4372 Yet when anyone begins to talk about
<quote>balance,
</quote> the copyright warriors
4373 raise a different argument.
<quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4374 incentives,
</quote> they say,
<quote>misses a fundamental point. Our content,
</quote> the
4375 warriors insist,
<quote>is our
<emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we
4376 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4377 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4378 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4379 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4383 <quote>It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>,
</quote> the warriors
4384 insist.
<quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4385 is protected.
</quote>
4387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4391 <part id=
"c-property">
4392 <title><quote>PROPERTY
</quote></title>
4396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4397 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4398 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4399 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4400 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4401 the price she can get.
4404 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a
<quote>property
</quote> right is a
4405 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4406 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4407 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4408 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4409 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4410 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4411 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4412 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4416 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4417 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4419 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4421 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4422 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4423 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4424 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4425 when I copy the way someone else dresses),
<quote>He who receives an idea
4426 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4427 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.
</quote><footnote><para>
4429 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4430 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4431 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4435 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4436 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4437 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4439 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4443 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4444 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4445 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4446 <quote>property
</quote> in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4448 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4449 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4450 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4451 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4452 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4453 Adam Mossoff,
<quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,
</quote>
4454 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4458 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4459 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4460 <quote>copyright material is property
</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4461 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4462 these stories, the significance of this true
4463 statement
—<quote>copyright material is property
</quote>— will be a bit
4464 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4465 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4470 <chapter label=
"6" id=
"founders">
4471 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4472 <indexterm><primary>Henry V
</primary></indexterm>
4473 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4475 William Shakespeare wrote
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play
4476 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4477 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4478 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4479 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4480 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4481 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4482 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V:
<quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare
4483 is so full of clichés.
</quote>
4486 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4487 <quote>copy-right
</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4488 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4490 <indexterm><primary>Jonson, Ben
</primary></indexterm>
4491 <indexterm><primary>Dryden, John
</primary></indexterm>
4492 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4493 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4494 handsome
<quote>definitive editions
</quote> of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4495 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4496 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4497 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker,
<quote>Jacob Tonson,
4498 Bookseller,
</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4500 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4501 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4503 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4504 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4506 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4507 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the
<quote>copy
</quote> of
4508 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4511 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4512 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4513 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4516 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4517 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4518 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4519 adopted the first
<quote>copyright
</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4520 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4521 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4522 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4523 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4525 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4526 <quote>copyright law.
</quote> See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4527 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4528 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4529 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4530 Tonson's control in
1774?
4533 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
<quote>copyright
</quote>
4534 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4535 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4536 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4537 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4538 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4539 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4540 that the publishers, or
<quote>Stationers,
</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4542 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4545 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4546 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4547 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4548 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4549 from legislatures
<quote>positive law.
</quote> We call the words from judges
4550 <quote>common law.
</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4551 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4552 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4553 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4554 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4557 This question was important to the publishers, or
<quote>booksellers,
</quote> as
4558 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4559 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4560 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4563 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4564 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4566 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4569 The Statute of Anne granted the author or
<quote>proprietor
</quote> of a book an
4570 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4571 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4572 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4573 copyright
<quote>expired,
</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4574 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4578 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4579 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4580 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4581 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4584 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4585 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4586 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4587 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4588 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4589 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4590 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4591 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4592 reason is there to allow someone else to
<quote>steal
</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4595 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4596 about the notion of
<quote>copyright
</quote> that existed at the time of the
4597 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4598 <quote>booksellers.
</quote>
4601 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4602 to apply the concept of
<quote>copyright
</quote> ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4603 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4604 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4605 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was a right
4606 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4607 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4610 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4611 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4612 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4613 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4615 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4617 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4618 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4619 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4620 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4621 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4622 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4623 allowed to make his films. The
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was only an exclusive
4624 right to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4626 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England
</primary></indexterm>
4627 <indexterm><primary>Statute of Monopolies (
1656)
</primary></indexterm>
4629 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4630 They had had a long and ugly experience with
<quote>exclusive rights,
</quote>
4631 especially
<quote>exclusive rights
</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4632 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4633 monopolies
—especially monopolies for works that already
4634 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4635 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4636 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the
4637 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4638 inventions. And by
1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4639 monopoly in publishing.
4642 Thus the
<quote>copy-right,
</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4643 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4644 claim that
<quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,
</quote> try
4645 sounding convincing when uttering,
<quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4646 have it forever.
</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4647 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4648 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4651 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4652 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4653 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4654 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4657 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4658 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4659 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4660 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as
<quote>old patentees
4661 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling
</quote>; they were
<quote>men who do
4662 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4663 indetted.
</quote><footnote><para>
4666 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4667 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4671 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4672 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4673 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4674 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4675 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4679 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4680 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4681 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4682 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4683 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4684 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4686 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4687 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4688 construction and spread of culture.
4691 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4692 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4693 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4694 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4695 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4696 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4697 they said; they needed more time.
4700 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4701 words that echo today,
4705 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4706 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4708 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4709 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4710 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4711 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4712 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4713 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4715 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4716 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4717 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4718 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4719 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4720 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4721 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4726 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4727 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4728 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4729 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4730 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4731 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4732 creative
<quote>property
</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4733 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4734 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4735 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4736 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4737 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4738 way to protect authors.
4741 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4742 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4743 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4744 <quote>The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4745 rancher has for cattle.
</quote><footnote><para>
4747 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,
</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4748 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4749 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4750 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4752 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4753 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4756 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4757 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4758 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4760 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4761 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4765 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4766 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4767 reprints
<quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,
</quote> at least
4768 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4770 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4772 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
4774 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4776 and became
<quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.
</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4777 them,
</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was
<quote>the young James Boswell
4778 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4779 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.
</quote><footnote><para>
4783 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James
</primary></indexterm>
4784 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4787 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4788 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4789 inexpensive editions
<quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4790 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4791 Property.
</quote><footnote><para>
4793 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4796 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4797 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4798 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4801 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block
<quote>piracy
</quote> like
4802 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the
<quote>pirates,
</quote>
4803 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4805 <indexterm><primary>Taylor, Robert
</primary></indexterm>
4807 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4808 Thomson's poem
<quote>The Seasons.
</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4809 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4810 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4811 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4812 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4814 Howard B. Abrams,
<quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4815 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4819 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4820 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4823 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4824 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4825 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4826 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4827 law would protect the author against subsequent
<quote>pirates.
</quote>
4828 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4829 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4830 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4831 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4834 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4835 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4836 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4837 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4838 with in
1710: How best to limit
4839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4840 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4841 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4842 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4843 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4844 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4845 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4847 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4849 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4850 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4852 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4854 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4855 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4856 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4860 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4861 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4862 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4863 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4864 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4865 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4868 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4869 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4870 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4871 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4872 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4873 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4874 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4875 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4878 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4879 presented to the House and voted upon first by the
<quote>law lords,
</quote>
4880 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4881 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4882 House of Lords generally voted.
4885 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4886 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4888 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4889 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4890 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4891 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4892 passed into the public domain.
4895 <quote>The public domain.
</quote> Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4896 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4897 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4898 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4899 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4900 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4901 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4902 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4903 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4904 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4905 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4906 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4907 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4910 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4911 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4912 where most of the
<quote>pirate publishers
</quote> did their work, people
4913 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
4914 reported,
<quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4915 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4916 decision of which so many individuals were interested.
</quote> <quote>Great
4917 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4918 and illuminations.
</quote><footnote><para>
4924 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4925 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
4930 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4931 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4932 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4933 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4934 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4935 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4936 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4937 successors.
<footnote><para>
4944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4945 <quote>Ruined
</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4946 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4947 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4948 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4949 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4950 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4951 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4952 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4953 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4954 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
4955 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4956 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4957 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4958 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4959 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4960 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
4961 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4962 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4963 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4966 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4967 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4968 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4971 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4973 <chapter label=
"7" id=
"recorders">
4974 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4976 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4977 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4978 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4979 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4983 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4984 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4988 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4989 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4990 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4991 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4992 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4994 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4997 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4998 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4999 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
5000 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
5001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
5002 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
5006 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
5007 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
5008 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5009 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5010 unless
<quote>fair use
</quote> or some other privilege applies.
5013 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
5014 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
5015 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
5016 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
5017 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5018 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5021 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5022 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5023 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5024 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5025 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5026 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5029 Then, as Else told me,
<quote>two things happened. First we discovered
5030 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
5031 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.
</quote>
5032 And second, Fox
<quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
5033 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
5034 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.
</quote>
5037 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
5038 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
5039 explained to her,
<quote>There must be some mistake here.
… We're
5040 asking for your educational rate on this.
</quote> That was the educational
5041 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5042 confirm what he had been told.
5045 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>Yes, you
5046 have your facts straight,
</quote> she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
5047 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5051 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else,
<quote>And
5052 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.
</quote> As an assistant
5053 to Herrera told Else later on,
<quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5057 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5058 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5059 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5060 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5061 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5062 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5063 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5064 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
5067 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5068 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5069 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5070 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5071 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5072 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5073 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5074 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5075 says the owner gets to control.
5078 For example,
<quote>public performance
</quote> is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
5079 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5080 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see
<quote>My
5081 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>,
</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5082 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5083 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5087 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5088 thought is
<quote>fair use.
</quote><footnote><para>
5090 For an excellent argument that such use is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> but that
5091 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> see Richard
5092 A. Posner with William F. Patry,
<quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5093 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5094 Law School,
5 August
2003.
5096 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>
5097 episode is clearly a fair use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>—and fair use does
5098 not require the permission of anyone.
5101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5102 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon
<quote>fair use.
</quote> Here's his reply:
5106 The
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5107 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5108 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5109 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was
<quote>clearly
5110 fair use
</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5111 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5113 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5116 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5117 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5118 <quote>visual cue sheet
</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5119 shot in the film. They take a dim view of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and a claim of
5120 <quote>fair use
</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5123 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle></primary></indexterm>
5126 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5127 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5128 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5129 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5130 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5131 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5132 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5133 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5135 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5139 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5140 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5141 that Fox would
<quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5142 life,
</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5143 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5144 pockets, me or them.
5145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5149 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5150 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5156 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5157 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5158 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5159 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5160 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5161 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5164 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5165 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5166 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5167 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5172 <chapter label=
"8" id=
"transformers">
5173 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5174 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5175 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex1' class='startofrange'
>
5176 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
5178 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary></indexterm>
5180 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5181 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5182 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5183 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5184 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5186 <indexterm id='idxartistsretrospective' class='startofrange'
>
5187 <primary>artists
</primary>
5188 <secondary>retrospective compilations on
</secondary>
5191 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5192 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5193 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5194 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5195 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5196 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5197 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5198 important to his career.
5201 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5202 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5203 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5204 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5208 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5209 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5210 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5211 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5212 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5215 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips.
<quote>Our
5216 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5217 Eastwood's films,
</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5218 arose.
<quote>No one had ever really done this before,
</quote> Alben explained.
<quote>No
5219 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5220 actor's career.
</quote>
5223 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5224 Slade asked,
<quote>Well, what will it take?
</quote>
5227 Alben replied,
<quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5228 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5229 else that we want to use in these film clips.
</quote> Slade said,
<quote>Great! Go
5230 for it.
</quote><footnote>
5233 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5234 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5235 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden
<quote>Rip, Mix,
5236 Burn
</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5238 <primary>artists
</primary>
5239 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5241 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5245 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5246 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5247 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5248 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5249 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5252 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5253 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5254 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5258 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5259 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5260 course we were going to use the
<quote>Make my day
</quote> clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5261 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5262 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5263 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5267 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5268 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5269 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5270 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5271 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5272 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5273 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5274 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5275 started calling people.
5278 <indexterm><primary>Sutherland, Donald
</primary></indexterm>
5280 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5281 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5282 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5283 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5284 know, $
1,
200?
</quote> And they would say,
<quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5285 to get $
1,
200.
</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5286 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5287 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5291 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—<quote>and even then we
5292 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.
</quote>
5295 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5296 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5297 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5301 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5302 hands and said,
<quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5303 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5304 actors.
</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5305 constituent parts and said,
<quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5306 directors,
… this many musicians,
</quote> and we just went at it very
5307 systematically and cleared the rights.
5312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5313 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5314 loved it, and it sold very well.
5316 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5318 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5319 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5320 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped,
<quote>There is
5321 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5322 at all.
</quote><footnote><para>
5324 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5325 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5326 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5328 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5332 For, as he acknowledged,
<quote>very few
… have the time and resources,
5333 and the will to do this,
</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5334 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5335 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5336 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5340 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5341 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5342 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5343 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5344 compensated for that.
5348 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5349 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5350 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5351 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5352 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5353 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5354 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5355 made to be more clean?
5359 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5360 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5361 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5362 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5364 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5365 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5366 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5367 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5368 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5369 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5370 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5371 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5372 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say,
<quote>Oh, I
5373 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5374 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5375 money,
</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5379 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5380 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5381 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5382 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5383 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5385 <indexterm startref='idxartistsretrospective' class='endofrange'
/>
5387 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5388 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5389 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5390 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5391 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5392 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5393 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5394 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5395 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5396 <quote>Does this still make sense?
</quote>
5398 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex1' class='endofrange'
/>
5400 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5401 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5402 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5403 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5406 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5407 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5410 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5411 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5412 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5413 judges loved every minute of it.
5415 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5417 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5418 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5419 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5420 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5421 began his talk with a question:
<quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5422 were just violated in this room?
</quote>
5424 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5425 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5427 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5428 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5429 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5430 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5431 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5432 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5433 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5434 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5435 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5436 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5437 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5438 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5439 couldn't easily do them legally.
5442 We live in a
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5443 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5444 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5445 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5446 planted in your presentation.
5448 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5450 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5452 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5453 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5454 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5455 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5456 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5457 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5458 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5461 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5462 wanted to be
<quote>legal,
</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5463 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5464 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5465 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5468 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5469 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5470 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5471 necessarily requiring that the
<quote>free
</quote> use be free as in
<quote>free beer.
</quote>
5472 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5473 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5474 along: a rule, for example, that says
<quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5475 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5476 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5477 copyright owner.
</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5478 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5479 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5483 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5484 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5485 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5486 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5489 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5490 Myers, the comic genius of
<citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5492 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5493 would work together to form a
<quote>unique filmmaking pact.
</quote> Under the
5494 agreement, DreamWorks
<quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5495 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5496 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5497 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5498 entertainment.
</quote>
5501 The announcement called this
<quote>film sampling.
</quote> As Myers explained,
5502 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5503 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5504 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5505 to take that same concept and apply it to film.
</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5506 quoted as saying,
<quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5507 new audiences, it is Mike.
</quote>
5510 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5511 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5512 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5513 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5514 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5515 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5516 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5517 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5520 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5521 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of
<quote>fair use.
</quote>
5522 Much of
<quote>sampling
</quote> should be considered
<quote>fair use.
</quote> But few would
5523 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5524 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5525 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5526 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5527 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5528 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5529 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5530 curse, reserved for the few.
5532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5534 <chapter label=
"9" id=
"collectors">
5535 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5536 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital1' class='startofrange'
>
5537 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
5540 In April
1996, millions of
<quote>bots
</quote>—computer codes designed to
5541 <quote>spider,
</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5542 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5543 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5544 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5545 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5546 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5549 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5550 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5551 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5552 the world. Using a technology called
<quote>the Way Back Machine,
</quote> you could
5553 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5554 well as when those pages changed.
5556 <indexterm id='idxorwellgeorge' class='startofrange'
>
5557 <primary>Orwell, George
</primary>
5560 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5561 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5562 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5563 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5568 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5569 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5570 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5573 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5574 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5575 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5576 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5577 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5579 <indexterm startref='idxorwellgeorge' class='endofrange'
/>
5581 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5582 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5583 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5584 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5585 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5587 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
5588 <indexterm><primary>White House press releases
</primary></indexterm>
5589 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5590 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5591 press release stated,
<quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.
</quote> That was
5592 later changed, without notice, to
<quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5593 Have Ended.
</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5597 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5598 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5599 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5600 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5601 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5602 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5603 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5604 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5608 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5609 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5610 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5611 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5612 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5613 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5614 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5617 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5618 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5619 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5620 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5622 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5623 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5624 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5625 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5628 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5629 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5630 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5631 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5632 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5633 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5634 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5635 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5637 <indexterm><primary>Vanderbilt University
</primary></indexterm>
5639 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5640 human history. At the end of
2002, it held
<quote>two hundred and thirty
5641 terabytes of material
</quote>—and was
<quote>ten times larger than the
5642 Library of Congress.
</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5643 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5644 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5645 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5646 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5647 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5648 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5649 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5650 is available to scholars for a very low fee.
<quote>But other than that,
5651 [television] is almost unavailable,
</quote> Kahle told me.
<quote>If you were
5652 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5653 just a graduate student?
</quote> As Kahle put it,
5656 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
5658 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5659 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5660 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5661 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5662 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5664 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5665 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5666 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5670 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5671 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5672 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5673 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5674 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5675 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5678 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5679 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5680 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5681 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5682 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5686 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5687 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5688 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5689 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5690 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and
<quote>borrowed
5691 back.
</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5692 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5693 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5695 Doug Herrick,
<quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5696 the Library of Congress,
</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5697 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5698 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5703 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5704 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5705 broadcasts, so there was no fear of
<quote>theft.
</quote> But as technology enabled
5706 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5707 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5708 <quote>copyrighted.
</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5709 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5710 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5711 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5714 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5716 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5717 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5718 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5719 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5720 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5721 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5724 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5726 <primary>archive.org
</primary>
5727 <seealso>Internet Archive
</seealso>
5730 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5731 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 <quote>ephemeral films
</quote> (meaning
5732 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5733 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5734 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5735 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5736 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5737 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5738 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5739 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5740 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5741 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5742 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the
<quote>Duck and Cover
</quote> film
5743 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5744 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5745 few minutes
—for free.
5748 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5749 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5750 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5751 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5752 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5756 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5757 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5758 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5759 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5760 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5761 has
—a noncommercial life.
5764 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5765 of creative property goes through different
<quote>lives.
</quote> In its first
5768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5769 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5770 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5771 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5772 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5773 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5776 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5777 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5778 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5779 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5780 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5781 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5785 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5786 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5788 Dave Barns,
<quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5789 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5790 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5791 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5792 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5793 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5794 </para></footnote>). After
5795 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5796 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5797 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5798 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5799 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5802 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5803 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5804 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5805 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5806 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5807 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5808 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5809 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5813 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5814 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5815 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5816 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5817 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5820 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5821 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5822 little practical effect.
5825 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5826 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5827 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5828 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5829 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5830 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5833 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5834 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5835 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5840 <primary>books
</primary>
5841 <secondary>total number of
</secondary>
5844 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5845 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5846 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5847 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5848 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5849 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5850 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5851 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5852 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5853 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5854 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5858 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5859 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5860 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5861 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5862 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5863 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5864 will draw upon it to understand it;
5865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5866 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5867 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5868 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5869 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5870 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5873 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5874 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5875 call these
<quote>archives,
</quote> as warm as the idea of a
<quote>library
</quote> might seem,
5876 the
<quote>content
</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5877 someone's
<quote>property.
</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5878 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5880 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital1' class='endofrange'
/>
5881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5883 <chapter label=
"10" id=
"property-i">
5884 <title>CHAPTER TEN:
<quote>Property
</quote></title>
5886 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5887 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5888 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5889 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5890 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5891 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5892 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5893 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5894 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
5897 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5898 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5899 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5900 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5901 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5902 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5903 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5904 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5905 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5907 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5908 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5909 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5910 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5911 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5912 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5913 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5917 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5918 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5919 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5920 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5921 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5922 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5923 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5924 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5925 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5929 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5930 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5931 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5932 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5933 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5934 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5935 redefine the meaning of
<quote>creative property.
</quote>
5938 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5943 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5944 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5945 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5946 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
5947 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5948 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5949 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5950 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5952 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5953 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5954 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5955 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5956 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5962 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5963 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5964 <quote>central theme
</quote> to which
<quote>reasonable men and women
</quote> will return is
5966 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5967 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5968 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.
</quote>
5969 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5970 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5973 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5974 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5975 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5976 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
5977 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5978 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5979 it comes to the nature and scope of
<quote>creative property.
</quote> His views
5980 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5981 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5982 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5985 While
<quote>creative property
</quote> is certainly
<quote>property
</quote> in a nerdy and
5986 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5988 Lawyers speak of
<quote>property
</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5989 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5990 object. Thus, my
<quote>property right
</quote> to my car gives me the right to
5991 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5992 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of
<quote>property
</quote> to
5993 <quote>lawyer talk,
</quote> see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
5994 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5995 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5996 <quote>creative property owners
</quote> have been
<quote>accorded the same rights and
5997 protection resident in all other property owners.
</quote> Indeed, if creative
5998 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5999 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
6003 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
6004 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
6005 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
6006 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
6007 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
6008 culture would develop.
6011 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
6012 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
6013 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
6014 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
6015 differently from the rights resident in all other property
6016 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
6017 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
6018 the same would be to
6020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6021 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6022 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
6026 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
6027 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6028 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
6029 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
6030 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
6031 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
6032 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
6033 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
6034 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
6035 Constitution itself.
6038 The framers of our Constitution loved
<quote>property.
</quote> Indeed, so strongly
6039 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6040 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
6041 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
6042 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's
<quote>Takings
6043 Clause,
</quote> to pay you
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for that taking. The
6044 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
6045 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
6046 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6049 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6050 Valenti calls
<quote>creative property.
</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
6051 power to create
<quote>creative property,
</quote> the Constitution
6052 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a
<quote>limited time,
</quote> Congress
6053 take back the rights that it has granted and set the
<quote>creative
6054 property
</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
6055 the expiration of a copyright term
<quote>takes
</quote> your copyright and turns it
6056 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
6057 pay
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for this
<quote>taking.
</quote> Instead, the same
6058 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6060 requires that you lose your
<quote>creative property
</quote> right without any
6061 compensation at all.
6064 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6065 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
6066 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
6067 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
6068 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
6069 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
6073 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6074 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6075 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6076 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6077 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6078 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
6079 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6080 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6081 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6082 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6085 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6086 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6087 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6088 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6089 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6093 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6094 history of these
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights, and the control that they
6095 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6096 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6097 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
6098 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6099 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6100 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6101 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6102 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6103 also control how culture develops.
6107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6108 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6109 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6110 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6111 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6112 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6113 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6114 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6116 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6117 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6118 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6121 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6122 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6123 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6124 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6125 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6126 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6127 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6128 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6129 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6130 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6131 Web, you can be punished
6132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6133 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6134 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6135 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6137 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6139 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6140 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6141 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6142 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6143 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6144 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6145 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6146 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6147 the source of the enforcement.
6149 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6151 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6152 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6153 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6154 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6155 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6156 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6157 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6158 individual or group might behave.
6160 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6162 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6163 <quote>architecture
</quote>—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6164 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6165 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6166 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6167 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6168 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6169 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6170 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6171 theft, but by nature, by
<quote>architecture.
</quote> If a
500-pound boulder
6172 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6173 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6174 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6179 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6180 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6181 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6182 undermined by another.
6185 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6186 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6187 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6188 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6189 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6190 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6191 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6193 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6194 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6196 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6197 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6198 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6200 So, for example, consider the
<quote>freedom
</quote> to drive a car at a high
6201 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6202 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6203 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6204 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6205 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6206 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6207 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6208 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6209 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6210 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6211 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6214 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6215 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6216 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6218 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6219 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6220 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6221 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6222 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6223 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6224 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>The New Chicago School,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6227 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6228 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6229 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6230 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6231 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6232 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6233 used to require that other laws be more
6234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6235 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6236 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6239 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6241 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6242 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6243 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6245 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6247 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6248 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6249 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6250 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6251 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6255 Some people object to this way of talking about
<quote>liberty.
</quote> They object
6256 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6257 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6258 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6259 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6260 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6261 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6262 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6263 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6264 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6265 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6266 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a
6267 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6268 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6269 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6270 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6271 <citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6272 1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6273 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons,
<quote>The
6274 Right to Work,
</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6275 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6276 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6277 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6278 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6279 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6280 12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6281 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6282 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6283 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6284 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (
1990)
</primary></indexterm>
6285 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6286 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6287 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6290 <section id=
"hollywood">
6291 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6293 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6294 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6295 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6296 rallying makes sense.
6299 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6302 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6303 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6304 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6306 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6307 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6310 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6311 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6312 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6313 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6314 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6315 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6316 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6317 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6318 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6319 this form of infringement.
6322 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6323 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6324 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6325 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6326 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6327 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6330 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6331 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6332 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6333 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6336 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6337 looting that results.
6339 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6340 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6341 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6344 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6345 warriors. Indeed, in a
<quote>White Paper
</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6346 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6347 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6348 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6349 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6350 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6351 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6352 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6353 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6355 <indexterm><primary>steel industry
</primary></indexterm>
6357 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6358 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6359 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6360 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6361 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6362 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6363 life. Homeowners living in a
6365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6366 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6367 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6368 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6369 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6370 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6371 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6374 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6375 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6376 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6377 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6378 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6379 Brown describes it, its
<quote>architecture of revenue.
</quote>
6381 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry
</primary></indexterm>
6382 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
6384 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6385 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6386 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6387 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6388 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6389 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6390 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6392 See Geoffrey Smith,
<quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?
</quote>
6393 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6394 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6395 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6396 R. Schoenberger,
<quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?
</quote> Forbes.com,
6
6397 October
2003, available at
6398 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6401 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6402 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6403 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6404 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6405 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6406 weakened the
<quote>stickiness
</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6407 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6408 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6409 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6410 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6411 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6413 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
6414 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6416 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6417 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6418 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6420 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6421 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6422 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6423 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents,
<quote>established companies
6424 have an interest in excluding future competitors.
</quote><footnote><para>
6426 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6429 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6430 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6431 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6432 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6433 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6437 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6438 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6439 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6440 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6441 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6442 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6443 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6444 opportunities for innovation and change.
6447 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6448 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6449 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6450 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6451 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6452 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6453 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6454 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution:
<quote>Congress
6455 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech.
</quote> So when
6456 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would
<quote>abridge
</quote> the freedom
6457 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6458 regulation is justified.
6461 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6463 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6464 <quote>justified.
</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6465 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6466 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6467 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6470 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6472 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6473 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6476 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6477 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6478 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6479 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6480 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6481 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6484 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6485 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6486 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6488 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6489 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6491 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6492 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6493 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6494 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6497 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6498 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6499 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6500 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6501 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6502 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6503 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6505 <indexterm><primary>Boyle, James
</primary></indexterm>
6507 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6508 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an
<quote>environmentalism
</quote> for
6509 culture.
<footnote><para>
6511 See, for example, James Boyle,
<quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6512 Environmentalism for the Net?
</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6514 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6515 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6516 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6517 <quote>for free.
</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6518 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6519 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6521 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6522 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6523 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6524 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6525 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6528 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6529 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6530 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6531 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6532 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6533 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6534 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6535 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6536 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6539 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6540 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6543 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6545 <section id=
"beginnings">
6546 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6548 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6549 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
<quote>creative
6550 property
</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6551 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6554 The power to establish
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights is granted to
6555 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6556 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6559 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6560 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6561 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6564 We can call this the
<quote>Progress Clause,
</quote> for notice what this clause
6565 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6566 <quote>creative property rights.
</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6567 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6568 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6569 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6572 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6573 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6574 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6575 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6576 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6577 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6578 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6579 copyrights extend
<quote>to Authors
</quote> only.
6582 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6583 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6584 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6585 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6586 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6587 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6588 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6589 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6590 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6591 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6592 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6593 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6594 concentrations of power.
6597 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
<quote>copyright
</quote>
6598 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6599 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6600 <quote>copyright
</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6601 years since they first struck its design.
6604 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6605 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6607 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6610 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6611 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6612 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6617 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6618 <title><quote>Copyright
</quote> today.
</title>
6619 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6626 <section id=
"lawduration">
6627 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6629 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6630 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6631 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6632 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6633 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6634 authorship.
<footnote>
6637 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6638 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6639 485–86:
<quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6640 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6641 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis></quote>
6643 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6645 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6646 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6647 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6648 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6649 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6650 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6653 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6654 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6655 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6656 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6657 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6658 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6661 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6662 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6663 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6664 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6665 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6668 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6669 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6670 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6671 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6672 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6673 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6674 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6676 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6677 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel,
<citetitle>A
6678 History of Book Publishing in the United States
</citetitle>, vol.
1,
<citetitle>The Creation
6679 of an Industry,
1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6680 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6681 1790 act; William J. Maher,
<citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6682 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context
</citetitle>,
7–10 (
2002),
6683 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6684 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6685 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6686 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6687 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6688 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6689 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6692 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6693 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6695 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6696 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6697 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6701 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6702 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6703 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6704 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6705 domain.
<footnote><para>
6707 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6708 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6709 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6710 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
<quote>Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
</quote>
6711 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright
</citetitle>, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6712 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6713 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote>
6714 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6715 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6718 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6719 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6720 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6722 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6723 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6724 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6725 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6726 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6727 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6730 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6731 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6732 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6733 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6734 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6735 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6738 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6739 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6740 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6741 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6742 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6743 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6744 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6745 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6748 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6749 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6750 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6751 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6754 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6755 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6756 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6759 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6760 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6761 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6762 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6763 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6764 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6765 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6769 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6770 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6771 maximum term. For
<quote>natural
</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6772 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6773 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6774 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6775 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6776 was ninety-five years.
6779 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6780 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6781 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6782 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6783 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6784 that terms be
<quote>limited,
</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6788 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6789 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6790 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6791 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6792 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6793 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6794 years.
<footnote><para>
6796 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6797 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6798 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6799 Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote> loc. cit.
6802 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6804 <section id=
"lawscope">
6805 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6807 The
<quote>scope
</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6808 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6809 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6810 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6813 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only
<quote>maps,
6814 charts, and books.
</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6815 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6816 the author the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> copyrighted works. That
6817 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6818 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6819 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6820 did not extend to what lawyers call
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> It would not,
6821 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6822 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6823 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6826 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6827 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6828 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6829 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6830 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6831 work not only the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> the work, but also the
6832 exclusive right of control over any
<quote>copies
</quote> of that work. And most
6833 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6834 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6835 <quote>derivative work
</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6836 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6837 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6838 on the initial creative work.
6841 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6842 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6843 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6845 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6846 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6847 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6848 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6849 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6850 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6851 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6855 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6856 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6857 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6858 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6859 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6860 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6861 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6862 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6863 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6864 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6865 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6869 All of these
<quote>formalities
</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6870 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6871 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6872 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6873 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6874 copy available for others to copy.
6877 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6881 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6882 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6883 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6884 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6885 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6886 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6888 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner,
<quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
6889 Creation of American Literature,
</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6890 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6891 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6894 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6895 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6896 the United States
—publishers.
6899 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6900 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6901 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6902 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6903 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6904 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6905 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6909 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6910 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6911 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
6912 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
6913 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6914 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6918 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6919 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6920 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6923 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6925 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6926 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of
<quote>derivative
6927 rights.
</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6928 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6929 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6930 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6931 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6933 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6934 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6937 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6938 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6940 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6942 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6943 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6944 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6945 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6949 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6950 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
6951 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6952 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6953 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6954 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6955 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6956 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6957 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6959 Jonathan Zittrain,
<quote>The Copyright Cage,
</quote> <citetitle>Legal
6960 Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
2003, available at
6961 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6962 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6964 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6965 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6966 the wrong of direct piracy.
6969 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6970 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6971 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6972 of my book.
<footnote><para>
6974 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6975 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6976 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere
<quote>copies
</quote> and
6977 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld,
<quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
6978 Copyright's Constitutionality,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
6979 Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially
6981 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb
</primary></indexterm>
6983 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6986 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6987 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6988 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6989 called
<quote>Mickey Mouse,
</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6990 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6994 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6995 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6996 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
6997 the rights originally granted.
7000 <section id=
"lawreach">
7001 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
7003 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
7004 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
7005 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
7006 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
7008 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
7009 certainly regulates more than
<quote>copies
</quote>—a public performance of a
7010 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
7011 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7012 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a
<quote>copy
</quote>;
17
7013 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
7014 existing law (which regulates
<quote>copies;
</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7015 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7020 <quote>Copies.
</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
7021 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
7022 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that
<quote>creative
7023 property
</quote> deserves the
<quote>same rights
</quote> as all other property, it is the
7024 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
7025 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
7026 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
7027 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
7028 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
7029 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
7030 the trigger for copyright law.
7033 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7034 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7035 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7036 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
7038 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
7039 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
7040 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
7041 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
7044 because it is clear that the
7045 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7046 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7049 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7052 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
7053 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
7054 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
7057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7058 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7059 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
7060 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
7061 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
7062 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
7063 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
7064 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
7065 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
7066 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
7067 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
7068 acts do not make a copy.
7070 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
7071 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
7072 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
7075 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7076 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7077 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7078 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7079 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7080 diagram on next page).
7083 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7084 that remain unregulated because the law considers these
<quote>fair uses.
</quote>
7086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7087 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
7088 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
7089 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
7092 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7093 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7094 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7095 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7096 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7097 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7098 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such
<quote>fair uses
</quote>
7099 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7101 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7102 <title>Unregulated copying considered
<quote>fair uses.
</quote></title>
7103 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
7106 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7107 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
7108 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7111 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7112 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7113 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7114 are nonetheless deemed
<quote>fair
</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7117 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7118 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7120 I don't mean
<quote>nature
</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7121 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7122 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7123 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7126 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7127 digital network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses
7128 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7129 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7130 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7131 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7132 a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into category
2. And those who
7133 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7134 exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7138 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7139 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7140 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7141 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7142 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7143 the book once, ten times, or every
7144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7145 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7146 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because
7147 none of those uses produced a copy.
7150 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7151 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7152 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7153 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7154 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7155 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7156 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7157 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7158 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7159 copyright owner's wish.
7162 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7163 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7164 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7165 points also become clear:
7168 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7169 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7170 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7171 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7172 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7173 part of free culture before the Internet.
7176 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7177 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7178 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7179 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7180 using a machine.
<quote>Copy and paste
</quote> and
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> become
7181 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7182 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7183 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7184 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7188 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7191 burden on category
3 (
<quote>fair use
</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7192 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7193 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7194 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7195 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7196 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7197 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7198 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7202 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7203 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7204 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7205 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7206 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7207 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7208 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7211 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'
>
7212 <primary>advertising
</primary>
7215 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7216 in the business of making
<quote>trailer
</quote> advertisements for movies available
7217 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7218 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7219 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7222 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began
7223 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7224 previews. The idea was to expand their
<quote>selling by sampling
</quote>
7225 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7226 <quote>browsing.
</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7227 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7228 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7231 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7232 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7233 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7234 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7236 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7237 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7238 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7239 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7240 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7241 <quote>fair use
</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7242 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7246 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7247 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had
<quote>willfully
7248 infringed
</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7249 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7250 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7251 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7252 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7253 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7256 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7257 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7258 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7259 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7260 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7261 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7262 Disney's permission.
7264 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'
/>
7266 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7267 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7268 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7269 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7270 was in the marketplace, the
<quote>first-sale doctrine
</quote> would free the
7271 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7272 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7273 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7274 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7275 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7276 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7277 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7279 <indexterm><primary>Barnes
& Noble
</primary></indexterm>
7281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7282 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7283 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7284 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7285 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7286 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7287 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7288 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7289 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7290 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7291 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7292 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7293 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7294 happening are quite slight.
7297 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7298 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7299 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7300 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7301 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7302 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7305 <section id=
"lawforce">
7306 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7308 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7309 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7310 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7311 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7314 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7315 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7316 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7317 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7318 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7321 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7322 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7323 <primary>Marx Brothers
</primary>
7325 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7326 <primary>Warner Brothers
</primary>
7329 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7330 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7332 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7333 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7334 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7335 plan.
<footnote><para>
7337 See David Lange,
<quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7338 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7342 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7343 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers
<quote>were brothers long before
7344 you were.
</quote><footnote><para>
7346 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7347 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7348 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7350 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7351 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7352 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7353 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7356 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7357 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7358 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7359 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7362 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7363 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7364 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7365 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7366 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7367 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7368 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7369 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7371 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7372 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7374 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
>
7375 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary>
7378 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7381 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7382 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7383 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7384 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7388 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7392 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7393 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7394 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7395 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7396 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7397 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7398 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7401 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7402 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7404 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7405 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7406 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7409 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7410 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7412 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7413 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7414 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7418 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7419 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7420 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7421 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7422 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7423 read aloud through the computer.
7426 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7427 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7428 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7429 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7431 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7432 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote></title>
7433 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7436 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7437 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7440 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7441 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote>.
</title>
7442 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7445 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7446 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7449 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7450 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7451 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>The Future of Ideas
</quote>.
</title>
7452 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7455 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7458 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7459 <quote>permissions
</quote>— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7460 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7461 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7462 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7463 power.
<footnote><para>
7465 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7466 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7467 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7468 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7469 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7470 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7471 subsequently acquired the book.
7473 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7474 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7475 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7476 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7477 control that the law would enable.
7480 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7481 within which the e-book
<quote>lives.
</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7482 permissions, they are not the sort of
<quote>permissions
</quote> that most of us
7483 deal with. When a teenager gets
<quote>permission
</quote> to stay out till
7484 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7485 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7486 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7487 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7488 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7489 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7490 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7491 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7492 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7493 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7498 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7499 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7500 you tried to type
<quote>Warner Brothers,
</quote> erased
<quote>Brothers
</quote> from the
7502 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7505 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7506 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7507 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7508 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7509 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7510 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7511 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7514 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7515 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7516 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7517 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7518 to defeat these protections as well?
7521 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7525 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7526 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7527 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7528 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7529 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7531 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7533 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7534 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>Alice's Adventures in
7535 Wonderland
</quote>.
</title>
7536 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7538 <beginpage pagenum=
"164"/>
7540 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7541 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7542 <quote>permissions
</quote> indicated, not allowed to
<quote>read aloud
</quote>!
7545 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7546 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7547 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7548 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7549 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7550 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7553 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7554 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7555 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7556 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7557 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7558 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7559 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7560 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7561 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7562 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7563 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7566 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7567 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7568 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7569 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7570 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7573 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7575 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7576 story of mine that makes the same point.
7578 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7579 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7581 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'
>
7582 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7584 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7585 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7586 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7589 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named
<quote>Aibo.
</quote> The Aibo
7590 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7591 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7594 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7595 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7596 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7597 <beginpage pagenum=
"165"/>
7598 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7599 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7600 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7603 <quote>Teach
</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7604 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7605 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7606 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7607 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7608 their computer
<quote>dog
</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7611 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7612 <citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7613 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7614 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7615 them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much more positive
7616 term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7617 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7618 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7619 old computer doesn't run, or
<quote>drive,
</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7620 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7621 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7625 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7626 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7627 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7628 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7632 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7633 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7634 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7635 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7636 than Sony had built.
7638 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7639 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'
/>
7640 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7642 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7643 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7644 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7645 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7648 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7649 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7650 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7651 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7652 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7653 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7654 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7655 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7658 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7659 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7660 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7661 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7662 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7663 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7664 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7665 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7666 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7669 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7671 See Pamela Samuelson,
<quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,
</quote>
7672 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
<quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7673 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,
</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7674 January
2002;
<quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7675 DMCA,
</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7676 Holland,
<quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,
</quote> <citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7677 May
2001; Janelle Brown,
<quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?
</quote> Salon.com,
7678 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<quote>Frequently Asked
7679 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case,
</quote> available at
7680 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7681 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7683 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7684 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7685 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7686 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7689 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7690 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7691 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7692 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7693 <quote>this music cannot be copied,
</quote> and have a computer respect that
7694 command. The technology was to be part of a
<quote>trusted system
</quote> of
7695 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7699 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7700 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7701 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7702 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7706 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7707 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7708 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7709 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7712 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7713 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7714 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7715 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7716 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7717 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7720 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7721 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7722 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7723 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7724 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7725 constituted, succeed.
7727 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7728 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7730 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'
>
7731 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7733 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7734 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7735 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7738 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7739 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7740 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7745 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7746 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7747 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7750 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7751 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'
/>
7752 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7754 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7755 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7756 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7760 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7762 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7763 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7764 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (
<quote>DMCA
</quote>).
7768 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7769 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7770 spreading such information an offense.
7773 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7774 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7775 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7776 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7777 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7778 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7779 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7780 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7781 protection for copyright owners.
7784 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7785 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7786 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7787 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7788 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7791 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7792 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7793 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7794 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7795 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7796 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7797 have been a copyright violation.
7799 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7800 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7802 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7803 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7806 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7807 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7808 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7809 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7810 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7811 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7812 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7813 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7814 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7815 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7818 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7819 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7820 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7821 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7822 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7823 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7825 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7827 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7828 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7829 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7830 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7831 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7832 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
<quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,
</quote>
7833 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7834 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7835 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7839 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7840 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7841 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7842 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7843 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7844 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the
<quote>Neighborhood
</quote>
7845 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7846 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7847 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7848 broadcasting has always been
<quote>You are an important person just the way
7849 you are. You can make healthy decisions.
</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7850 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7851 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7852 important.
<footnote><para>
7854 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
7855 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7856 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7857 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7858 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7864 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7865 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7866 the VCR responsible.
7869 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7871 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7874 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7877 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7878 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7879 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7880 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7881 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7882 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7885 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7887 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7888 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7889 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7892 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7893 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7894 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7897 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7898 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7899 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
7900 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7901 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7902 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7903 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7905 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7906 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7908 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7909 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7912 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7913 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7914 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7915 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7916 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7917 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7920 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
7921 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7922 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7923 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7924 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7925 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7926 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7927 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
7928 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7929 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7932 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7933 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7934 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7935 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7936 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7937 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7938 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7939 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7940 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7945 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
7946 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7947 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7948 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7949 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7951 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet,
<quote>Legal Fictions,
7952 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,
</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7953 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
7957 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7958 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7959 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7960 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7961 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7964 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7965 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7966 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7967 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7968 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7969 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7970 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7971 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7974 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7975 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7976 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7977 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7978 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7979 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7982 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
7983 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7985 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7986 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7987 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7988 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7989 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7992 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7993 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7994 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7995 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7996 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7997 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7998 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7999 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
8003 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
8004 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
8005 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
8006 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
8007 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
8010 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
8011 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
8012 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
8013 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
8014 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
8015 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
8016 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
8017 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
8021 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8025 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8026 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8027 ownership,
<quote>five companies control
85 percent of our media sources.
</quote><footnote><para>
8029 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8030 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
8031 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
8032 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8033 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
8034 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
8036 Lynette Holloway,
<quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8037 Slide,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
8039 The
<quote>five largest cable companies pipe
8040 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.
</quote><footnote><para>
8042 Molly Ivins,
<quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,
</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
8045 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
8046 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
8047 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
8048 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8049 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8052 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8053 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8055 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
8056 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
8057 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
8058 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
8059 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
8060 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8063 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8064 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8065 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8066 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8067 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
8068 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
8069 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8070 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8071 protected
— by the market.
8074 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8075 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8076 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8077 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8081 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8082 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
8083 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8084 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8085 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8086 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8087 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8088 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8089 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8090 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
8092 James Fallows,
<quote>The Age of Murdoch,
</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
8094 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8099 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8100 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8101 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8102 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8104 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
8105 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
8106 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
8109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8110 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8111 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8115 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8116 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8117 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8118 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8121 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8122 integration may matter.
8124 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
8125 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8126 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8128 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
8129 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8130 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8131 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8132 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8135 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8136 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8137 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8138 control.
<footnote><para>
8140 Leonard Hill,
<quote>The Axis of Access,
</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8141 Forum,
<quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,
</quote> St. Louis,
8142 Missouri,
3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8143 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8144 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8145 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8150 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8151 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8152 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8153 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8154 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
8155 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8156 television
—75 percent of it
—was
<quote>independent
</quote> of the
8160 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8161 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
8162 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8163 2002, only five independent television studios remained.
<quote>In
1992,
8164 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8165 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8166 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent.
</quote> <quote>In
1992,
16
8167 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8168 year there was one.
</quote><footnote><para>
8170 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8171 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8172 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8173 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8174 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8175 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8176 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8179 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8180 that ran it.
<quote>In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8181 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8182 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8183 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8184 63%.
</quote><footnote><para>
8189 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8191 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8192 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8193 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8194 owned by the network.
8197 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8198 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8199 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8200 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8201 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8205 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8206 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8207 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8208 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8210 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8211 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8212 handful.
<footnote><para>
8214 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,
</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8215 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8216 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8221 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8222 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8223 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8224 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8225 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8226 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8227 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8228 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8229 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8232 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8234 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8235 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the
<quote>Innovator's
8236 Dilemma
</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8237 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8238 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8239 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8241 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8242 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8243 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8244 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8245 Kim B. Clark,
<quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8246 Concepts in Technological Evolution,
</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8247 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8248 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8249 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8250 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8252 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8253 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8255 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8258 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8259 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8260 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8264 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8265 suggest the concern.
8268 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8269 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8270 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8273 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8274 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8275 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8278 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8279 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8280 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8281 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8282 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8283 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8284 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8285 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8286 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8287 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8288 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8289 outweigh these costs.
8292 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8293 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8294 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8297 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'
>
8298 <primary>advertising
</primary>
8301 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8302 a media campaign as part of the
<quote>war on drugs.
</quote> The campaign produced
8303 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8304 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8305 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8306 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8307 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8308 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8309 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8310 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8313 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8314 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8317 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8318 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8319 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8323 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8325 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8326 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8327 message will be heard then?
8330 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8331 <quote>controversial
</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8332 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8333 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8334 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8335 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8336 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8337 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8338 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8340 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8341 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8342 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as
<quote>against
8343 [their] policy.
</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8344 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8345 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8346 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8347 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8348 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives,
<quote>On the Issue of
8349 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>New
8350 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8351 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8352 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown,
<quote>Ad
8353 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8354 Radio,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8355 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8356 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8357 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8358 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8359 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8360 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross,
<quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8361 After Muni Rejects Ad,
</quote> SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8362 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8363 was that the criticism was
<quote>too controversial.
</quote>
8364 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8365 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8366 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8367 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8368 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8369 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8370 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
8374 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8375 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8376 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8377 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8378 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8379 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8380 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8381 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8382 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8384 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'
/>
8386 <section id=
"together">
8387 <title>Together
</title>
8389 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8390 copyright warriors that the government should
<quote>protect my property.
</quote>
8391 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8392 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8395 But when we see how dramatically this
<quote>property
</quote> has changed
—
8396 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8397 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8398 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8402 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8403 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8404 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8405 the massively expanded
<quote>property
</quote> rights granted by copyright
8406 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8407 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8411 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8412 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8413 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8417 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8418 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8419 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8420 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8421 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8422 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8423 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8424 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8425 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8426 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8429 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8430 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8431 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8432 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8433 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8434 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8435 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8436 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8437 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8438 in control that technology and the market enable.
8441 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8442 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8444 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8445 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8446 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8447 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8450 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8451 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8452 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8453 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8454 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8455 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8456 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8457 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8458 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8459 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8460 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8461 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8462 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8463 known.
<footnote><para>
8465 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his
<quote>four surrenders
</quote> of
8466 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8467 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8471 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8474 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8475 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8476 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8477 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8478 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8481 <informaltable id=
"t2">
8482 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8486 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8487 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8492 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8493 <entry>©</entry>
8497 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8506 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8507 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8508 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8511 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8512 noncommercial work was also free.
8515 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8518 <informaltable id=
"t3">
8519 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8523 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8524 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8529 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8530 <entry>©</entry>
8531 <entry>©</entry>
8534 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8543 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8544 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8545 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8546 transformation were still essentially free.
8549 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8550 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8551 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8552 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8553 we could say the law began to look like this:
8556 <informaltable id=
"t4">
8557 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8562 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8567 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8568 <entry>©</entry>
8569 <entry>©</entry>
8572 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8573 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8581 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8582 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8583 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8584 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8585 that the law now looks like this:
8588 <informaltable id=
"t5">
8589 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8594 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8599 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8600 <entry>©</entry>
8601 <entry>©</entry>
8604 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8605 <entry>©</entry>
8606 <entry>©</entry>
8613 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8614 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8617 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8618 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8621 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8622 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8623 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8624 these domains actually does any good.
8627 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8628 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8629 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8630 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8631 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8632 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8633 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8634 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8635 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8636 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8639 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8640 course copyright is a kind of
<quote>property,
</quote> and of course, as with any
8641 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8642 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8643 property rights
<footnote><para>
8645 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8646 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8647 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey,
<quote>The
8648 Disintegration of Property,
</quote> in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8649 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8651 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement
</primary></indexterm>
8653 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8654 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8655 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8656 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the
<quote>copyright
</quote>
8657 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8658 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8659 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8660 vibrant and rich free culture.
8662 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
8664 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8665 limits on the scope of the interests protected by
<quote>property.
</quote> The very
8666 birth of
<quote>copyright
</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8667 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8668 story of chapter
6). The tradition of
<quote>fair use
</quote> is animated by a
8669 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8670 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8673 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8674 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8675 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8676 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8677 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8678 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8679 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8680 dominates the debate today.
8683 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8684 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8685 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8686 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8687 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8688 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8689 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8690 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8691 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8692 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8699 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8700 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8702 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8703 <chapter label=
"11" id=
"chimera">
8704 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8705 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8706 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8708 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8709 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8711 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8712 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The
</quote> (Wells)
</primary>
8716 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8717 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8718 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8720 H. G. Wells,
<quote>The Country of the Blind
</quote> (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8721 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8722 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8724 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with
<quote>sweet water, pasture,
8725 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8726 that bore an excellent fruit.
</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8727 takes this as an opportunity.
<quote>In the Country of the Blind,
</quote> he tells
8728 himself,
<quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.
</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8729 villagers to explore life as a king.
8732 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8733 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8734 <quote>blind.
</quote> They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8735 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8736 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8737 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated.
<quote>`You
8738 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8739 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8744 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8745 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8746 affection, a young woman who to him seems
<quote>the most beautiful thing in
8747 the whole of creation,
</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8748 description of what he sees
<quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8749 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8750 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8751 indulgence.
</quote> <quote>She did not believe,
</quote> Wells tells us, and
<quote>she could
8752 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.
</quote>
8755 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his
<quote>mysteriously delighted
</quote>
8756 love, the father and the village object.
<quote>You see, my dear,
</quote> her
8757 father instructs,
<quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8758 anything right.
</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8761 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion.
<quote>His brain
8762 is affected,
</quote> he reports.
8765 <quote>What affects it?
</quote> the father asks.
<quote>Those queer things that are
8766 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8770 The doctor continues:
<quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8771 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8772 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8773 irritant bodies [the eyes].
</quote>
8776 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!
</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8777 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8778 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8779 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8780 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8781 womb. That fusion produces a
<quote>chimera.
</quote> A chimera is a single creature
8782 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8783 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8786 plot for murder mysteries.
<quote>But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8787 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8788 scene.
…</quote>
8790 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8791 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8793 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8794 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8795 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8796 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8797 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8798 understanding of a
<quote>person
</quote> should reflect this reality.
8801 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8802 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8803 unfairly enough,
<quote>the copyright wars,
</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8804 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question
<quote>What is
8805 p2p file sharing?
</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8806 wrong. One side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8807 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8808 thirty years without any question at all.
</quote> That's true, at least in
8809 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8810 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8811 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8812 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8815 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8816 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8817 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8818 <quote>friends
</quote> beyond recognition to say
<quote>my ten thousand best friends
</quote> can
8819 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8820 what
<quote>we have always been allowed to do,
</quote> we have not always been
8821 allowed to share music with
<quote>our ten thousand best friends.
</quote>
8824 Likewise, when the other side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like walking
8825 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8826 with it,
</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8827 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8828 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8830 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8835 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8836 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8837 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8838 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8839 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8840 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8841 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8842 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8845 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8846 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8847 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8848 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8849 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8852 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8853 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8854 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8855 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8856 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8857 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8858 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8859 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8861 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
8862 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8863 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8864 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
8866 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8867 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8868 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8869 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8870 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
<quote>House Bill Aims to Up
8871 Stakes on Piracy,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
8872 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8873 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8874 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8875 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8876 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8877 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8878 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8879 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8880 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8881 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8882 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8883 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8884 Elizabeth Young,
<quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,
</quote> redandblack.com,
8885 August
2003, available at
8886 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8887 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8888 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8889 identities, see James Collins,
<quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8890 Name Students,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8891 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8892 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
8893 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8897 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8899 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8900 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8901 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8902 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8903 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8906 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8907 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8908 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8909 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8910 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8911 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
8912 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8913 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8918 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8919 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8920 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8921 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8922 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8923 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8926 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to
<quote>steal
</quote> music. My
8927 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8928 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8929 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8930 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8931 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8932 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8933 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8934 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8935 protection for copyrighted material,
8939 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8940 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8943 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8944 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8945 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8946 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8947 produce a totally different industry model.
8950 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8951 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8952 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8953 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8954 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8955 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8956 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8957 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8958 interests.
<footnote><para>
8960 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8961 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8962 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8963 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
8964 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8965 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8966 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
8969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8971 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8972 one of
<quote>the major labels.
</quote> Its position on these matters has now
8974 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
8977 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8978 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8979 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8984 <chapter label=
"12" id=
"harms">
8985 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8987 To fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> to protect
<quote>property,
</quote> the content industry has
8988 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8989 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8990 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8991 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8994 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8995 particular, the consequences for
<quote>free culture.
</quote> But my aim now is to
8996 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
9000 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
9001 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
9002 power of the property called
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> is at its greatest in
9005 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
9006 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
9008 Yet
<quote>common sense
</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
9009 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
9010 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
9011 rejection of
<quote>piracy
</quote> still has play.
9013 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
9016 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9017 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9018 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9019 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9020 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9022 <section id=
"constrain">
9023 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
9025 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9026 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9027 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9028 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9029 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9030 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9031 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9032 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9033 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9034 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9035 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9036 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
9037 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9040 This digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> is in part an extension of the
9041 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9042 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9043 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9044 of digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
9045 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9046 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9047 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9048 the culture all around.
9051 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9052 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9056 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9057 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9058 storytelling extended across the globe.
9061 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9062 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9063 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9064 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9065 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9066 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9067 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9068 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9069 work is presumptively illegal.
9072 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9073 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9074 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9075 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9076 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9077 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
9078 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9079 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
9080 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9081 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
9082 million.
<footnote><para>
9084 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
9085 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
9086 the settlement, see MCI press release,
<quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9087 Approval for SEC Settlement
</quote> (
7 July
2003), available at
9088 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
9089 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9091 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9092 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9093 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
9094 suffering.
<footnote>
9096 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9097 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
9098 an overview, see Tanya Albert,
<quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9099 Say Tort Reformers,
</quote> amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
9100 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
9101 and
<quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,
</quote> CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
9103 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9105 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
9107 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9108 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9109 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9110 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9112 <indexterm><primary>art, underground
</primary></indexterm>
9114 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9115 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9116 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9117 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9118 Disneys
<quote>pirates.
</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9119 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9122 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9123 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9124 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9125 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9126 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
9127 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9128 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9129 fraught. Already, exhibits of
<quote>illegal art
</quote> tour the United
9130 States.
<footnote><para>
9133 See Danit Lidor,
<quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
9135 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9136 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9138 In what does their
<quote>illegality
</quote> consist?
9139 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9140 critical or reflective.
9142 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
9144 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9145 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9146 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
9147 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9148 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9149 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9150 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9151 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9152 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9153 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9155 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
9157 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9158 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9159 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9160 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9161 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9162 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9163 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9164 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9165 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9168 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9169 described in chapter
9170 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
9171 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9172 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9173 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9179 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9180 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9181 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9182 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9183 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9184 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9185 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9186 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9189 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9190 <quote>breathing room
</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9191 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9192 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9193 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9194 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9195 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9196 these rules have little relationship to the
<quote>law
</quote> with which judges
9200 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9201 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9202 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9203 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9204 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9205 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9206 <quote>copyright
</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9207 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9208 culture that is free.
9211 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9215 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9216 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9217 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9218 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9219 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9221 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying,
<quote>This has been
9222 cleared.
</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9223 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9227 <section id=
"innovators">
9228 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9230 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9231 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9232 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9233 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9234 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9235 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9238 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9239 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9240 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9241 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9242 other aspect by substituting
<quote>free market
</quote> every place I've spoken of
9243 <quote>free culture.
</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9244 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9246 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9248 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9249 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9250 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9251 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9252 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9253 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9254 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9255 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9256 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9257 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9258 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9260 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9262 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9264 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9265 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9266 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9267 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9268 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9269 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9270 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9271 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9272 <quote>nuclear pall
</quote> that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9275 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9276 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9277 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9279 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
9281 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9282 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9283 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9284 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9285 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9286 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9289 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9290 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9291 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9292 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9294 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9297 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9298 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9299 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9300 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9301 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9302 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9303 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9304 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9305 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9306 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9309 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9310 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9313 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9314 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9315 the kind of content the users liked.
9318 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9319 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9320 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9321 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9322 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9323 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9324 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9325 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9326 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9327 they had already bought.
9329 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9330 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9333 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9334 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9335 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9336 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9337 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9338 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9339 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9340 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9343 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9346 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9347 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9348 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9349 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9350 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9351 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9352 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9356 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9357 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9358 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9361 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9362 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9363 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9364 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9366 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9367 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9368 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9369 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad
</primary></indexterm>
9371 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9372 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9373 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9374 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9375 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9377 See Joseph Menn,
<quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9378 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9379 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown,
<quote>The Music
9380 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,
</quote> Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9381 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9382 See also Jon Healey,
<quote>Online Music Services Besieged,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9383 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9385 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9386 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9387 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9388 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9389 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9390 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9391 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9392 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9393 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9394 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9395 <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9396 discussion with BMW:
9397 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
9398 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
9401 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9403 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9404 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9405 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9406 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9407 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9408 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9409 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9412 Rafe Needleman,
<quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,
</quote> <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9414 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9415 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9416 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9421 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with
<quote>your money or your
9422 life
</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9423 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9424 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9425 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9426 constantly threatened by litigation.
9430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9431 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9432 enterprises. The point is the definition of
<quote>illegal.
</quote> The law is a
9433 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9434 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9435 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9436 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9437 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9438 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9439 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9440 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9441 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9442 much less creativity.
9444 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9446 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9447 use. Whatever the
<quote>real
</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9448 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9449 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9450 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9451 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9452 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9453 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9454 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9455 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9458 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9459 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9460 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9461 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9462 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9463 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9464 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9465 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9466 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9467 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9468 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9469 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9471 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9472 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9473 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9474 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9475 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9476 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9477 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9480 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9481 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9482 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9483 this feature is a
<quote>bug.
</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9484 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9485 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9486 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables
<quote>piracy,
</quote> then,
9487 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9489 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9491 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9492 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9493 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9494 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9495 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> GartnerG2 and
9496 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9497 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9498 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9500 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9501 <quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9502 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9503 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9504 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9505 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9506 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9508 GartnerG2,
26–27.
9512 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9513 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9514 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9515 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9518 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9522 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9523 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9524 would impose.
<footnote><para>
9526 See David McGuire,
<quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,
</quote> Newsbytes,
9527 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9529 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9530 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9532 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
9535 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9536 innovation
—again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9540 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9541 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9542 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9543 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9546 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9547 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9548 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9549 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9550 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9552 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9553 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9554 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9556 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10 details,
9557 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9558 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9559 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9560 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9563 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9564 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9565 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9566 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9567 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9570 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9572 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9573 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9574 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9575 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9576 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9577 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9578 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9579 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9580 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9581 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9582 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9583 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9586 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9587 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9588 here.
<footnote><para>
9590 <indexterm><primary>Tauzin, Billy
</primary></indexterm>
9591 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9592 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9593 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9594 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9595 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9596 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9597 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a
<quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that
9598 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9599 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9600 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9601 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2,
<quote>Copyright and
9602 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
33–34,
9604 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9605 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9606 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz
</primary></indexterm>
9607 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9609 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9610 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9613 <primary>artists
</primary>
9614 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9618 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9619 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9620 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9621 artist doesn't get paid for that
<quote>radio performance
</quote> unless he or she
9622 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9623 version of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote>—to memorialize her famous
9624 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9625 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9626 copyright owners of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> would get some money, whereas
9627 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9628 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9631 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9632 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9633 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9634 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9635 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9636 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9637 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9638 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9642 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9643 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9644 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9645 spectrum. Thus, I can
<quote>tune in
</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9646 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9647 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9651 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9652 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9653 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9654 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9655 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9656 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9657 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9658 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9659 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9660 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9661 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9663 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9666 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9667 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9668 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9669 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9670 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9671 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9672 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9677 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9678 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9679 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9680 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9681 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9682 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9683 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9684 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9685 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9686 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9687 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9688 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9689 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9696 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9697 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9698 underestimated the power of
<quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9699 legislation
</quote><footnote><para>
9703 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9706 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9707 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9708 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9709 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9710 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9713 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments2' class='startofrange'
>
9714 <primary>artists
</primary>
9715 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9718 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9719 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9722 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9723 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9724 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9725 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9726 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9727 of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9728 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9729 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9730 burdens terrestrial radio.
9733 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9734 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9735 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9736 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9737 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9740 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9741 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9742 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9743 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9744 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9745 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9746 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9747 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9748 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9749 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9750 C. Picker,
<quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9751 Distribution,
</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461:
<quote>This was
9752 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9753 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9754 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9755 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9756 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.
</quote>
9757 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9758 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9760 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9763 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments2' class='endofrange'
/>
9765 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9766 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9767 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9768 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9771 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9773 name of the service;
9776 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9779 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9782 date of transmission;
9785 time of transmission;
9788 time zone of origination of transmission;
9791 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9794 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9797 sound recording title;
9800 ISRC code of the recording;
9803 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9806 featured recording artist;
9815 UPC code of the retail album;
9821 copyright owner information;
9824 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9827 name of the service or entity;
9833 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9836 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9839 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9842 unique user identifier;
9845 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9850 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9851 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9852 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9853 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9854 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
9855 that terrestrial radio does not.
9858 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9859 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9860 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9862 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
9863 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex2' class='startofrange'
>
9864 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
9867 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9868 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9869 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9873 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9874 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9875 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9876 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9877 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9878 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… <quote>How do you come up with a
9880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9881 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9882 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9883 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9884 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9885 business.
…</quote>
9888 <primary>artists
</primary>
9889 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9892 And the RIAA experts said,
<quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
9893 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
9894 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9895 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>.
</quote> (Emphasis
9899 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex2' class='endofrange'
/>
9901 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9902 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9903 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9904 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9905 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9906 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9907 effective to prevent it.
9910 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9911 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9913 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9915 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9916 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9919 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9920 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9921 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9924 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9925 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9926 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
9927 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9928 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie,
<quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,
</quote> Pew
9929 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9930 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9931 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9932 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9934 According to the RIAA,
9935 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9936 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9939 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9940 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9942 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9943 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9944 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9946 response by the other.
9949 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9950 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9951 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9952 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9953 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9954 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9955 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9956 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9957 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9958 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9959 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9960 was.
<footnote><para>
9962 Alex Pham,
<quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,
</quote> <citetitle>Los
9963 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
9965 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9966 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9967 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9968 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9969 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9970 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9974 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9975 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9976 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9977 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9978 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9979 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9980 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9981 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9982 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9984 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel,
<quote>Alcohol Consumption During
9985 Prohibition,
</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9989 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9990 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9992 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9993 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9994 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9996 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9997 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9998 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9999 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
10000 cheat.
<footnote><para>
10002 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein,
<quote>Tax
10003 Compliance,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
10004 compliance literature).
10006 We pride ourselves on our
<quote>free society,
</quote> but an endless array of
10007 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
10008 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
10009 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
10012 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
10013 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
10014 students about the importance of
<quote>ethics.
</quote> As my colleague Charlie
10015 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
10016 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
10017 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
10018 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
10019 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
10020 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
10021 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
10022 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
10023 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
10024 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
10025 lives both normally and legally, since
<quote>normally
</quote> entails a certain
10026 degree of illegality.
10027 <indexterm><primary>law schools
</primary></indexterm>
10030 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10031 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
10032 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10033 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10034 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
10035 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
10036 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
10037 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
10038 to consider the alternative.
10042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10043 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10044 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10045 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10046 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10047 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10050 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
10051 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
10052 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
10053 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
10054 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10055 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
10056 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
10057 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
10058 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
10059 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10060 introduced this different idea of
<quote>sharing.
</quote> We need to be able to
10061 call these twenty million Americans
<quote>citizens,
</quote> not
<quote>felons.
</quote>
10064 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
10065 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10066 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10067 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
10068 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
10069 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
10070 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
10071 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
10072 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
10073 a nation of felons?
10076 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10079 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
10080 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
10081 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10082 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
10085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10086 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That
<quote>use
</quote> of the
10087 recordings is free.
10090 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10091 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10092 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am
<quote>free
</quote> to copy,
10093 or
<quote>rip,
</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10094 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that
<quote>freedom
</quote> was a
10095 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the
<quote>Rip, Mix, Burn
</quote>
10096 capacities of digital technologies.
10098 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
10100 This
<quote>use
</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10101 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10102 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10103 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10104 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10105 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10106 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10107 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10108 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10111 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
10112 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10113 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10114 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10115 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10116 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10117 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10118 on people's machines.
10121 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10122 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10123 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10124 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10125 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10126 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10129 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10130 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10131 plastic or were part of a massively complex
<quote>digital rights
10132 management
</quote> system.
10135 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10136 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10137 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10138 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10139 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10140 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10141 freedom to move content easily?
10144 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10145 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10146 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10147 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10148 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10149 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10150 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10151 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10152 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10155 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10156 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10157 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10158 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10159 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10160 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10161 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10164 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10165 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10166 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10167 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10170 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10171 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10175 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10176 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10178 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
10179 <indexterm id='idxisps' class='startofrange'
>
10180 <primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary>
10183 <emphasis role=
"strong">There's one
</emphasis> more aspect to this
10184 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and
10185 follows directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier
10186 Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the
10187 <quote>collateral damage
</quote> that
<quote>arises whenever you turn
10188 a very large percentage of the population into criminals.
</quote> This
10189 is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10192 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,
</quote> von Lohmann
10194 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10198 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10199 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
10200 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10201 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10202 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10203 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think,
<quote>Oh, well,
10204 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.
</quote> Well, what this campaign
10205 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10206 American Internet-using population into
<quote>lawbreakers.
</quote>
10210 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10211 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10212 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10215 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10216 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10217 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10218 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10219 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10220 an Internet user is revealed.
10223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10224 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10225 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10226 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10227 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10228 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10229 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10230 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10231 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10233 See Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10234 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,
</quote>
10235 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs,
<quote>Worried Parents
10236 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10237 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10238 Being Sued,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10239 Graham,
<quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10240 2003,
4D; John Schwartz,
<quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10241 Fan, Either,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi,
<quote>Is
10242 Brianna a Criminal?
</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10247 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10248 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10249 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10251 See
<quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10252 Some Methods Used,
</quote> CNN.com, available at
10253 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10255 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10256 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10257 one of those MP3s will have the same
<quote>fingerprint.
</quote>
10260 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10261 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10262 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10263 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10264 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10265 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10266 network is
<quote>cooperating
</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10267 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10268 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10269 as a
<quote>criminal.
</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10270 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10272 See Jeff Adler,
<quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,
</quote>
10273 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>Four
10274 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10275 Colleges,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10276 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10277 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas,
<quote>Music
10278 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10279 Lawsuit Possible,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox,
<quote>RIAA
10280 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10281 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10282 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Download Warning
101: Freshman
10283 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10284 Sharing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11;
<quote>Raid, Letters
10285 Are Weapons at Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10287 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10288 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10290 <indexterm startref='idxisps' class='endofrange'
/>
10292 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10293 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10294 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10295 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10296 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10297 this
<quote>contraband
</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10301 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10302 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10304 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10308 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10309 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10310 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10311 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10312 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10313 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10314 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10315 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10316 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10317 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10318 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10319 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10320 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10321 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10322 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10323 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10328 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered
<quote>criminals
</quote> under
10329 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10330 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10331 considered
<quote>criminals,
</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10332 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10333 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10340 <part id=
"c-balances">
10341 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10346 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10347 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10348 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10349 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10352 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10353 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10354 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10355 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10356 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10360 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10361 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10362 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10363 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10364 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10365 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10369 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10370 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10371 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10372 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10373 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10374 made that is happening all around.
10377 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10378 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10379 gasoline onto this fire.
10382 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10383 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10384 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10385 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10388 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10389 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10390 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10391 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10392 success will require.
10396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10397 <chapter label=
"13" id=
"eldred">
10398 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10399 <indexterm id=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'
>
10400 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel
</primary>
10403 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10404 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10405 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10406 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10407 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10408 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10412 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10413 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10414 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10415 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10416 them available for free.
10419 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10420 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10421 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10422 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10423 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10425 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10426 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10427 accessible
—today.
10430 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10431 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10432 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10433 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10434 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10435 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10436 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10437 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10438 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10439 commercial publications of public domain works.
10441 <indexterm startref=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'
/>
10443 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10444 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10445 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10446 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10447 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10448 call the
<quote>noncommercial publishing industry,
</quote> which before the
10449 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10450 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10451 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10452 generally.
<footnote><para>
10454 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10455 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10456 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10457 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10458 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10459 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10460 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10461 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10462 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10463 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10464 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10465 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10466 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10467 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10468 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10471 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10472 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10473 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10474 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10475 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10476 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10477 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10478 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10479 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10480 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10481 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10482 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10484 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10485 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10489 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10490 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10491 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10492 <quote>copyrights should be forever.
</quote><footnote><para>
10494 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10495 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10496 The full text is:
<quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10497 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10498 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10499 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10500 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10501 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10502 Congress,
</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10507 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10508 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10509 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10510 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10511 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10512 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10516 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10518 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10520 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10521 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10523 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10527 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10528 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10529 their
… Writings.
…
10533 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10534 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10535 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10536 something
—for example, to regulate
<quote>commerce among the several
10537 states
</quote> or
<quote>declare War.
</quote> But here, the
<quote>something
</quote> is something quite
10538 specific
—to
<quote>promote
… Progress
</quote>—through means that
10539 are also specific
— by
<quote>securing
</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights
</quote> (i.e.,
10540 copyrights)
<quote>for limited Times.
</quote>
10543 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10544 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10545 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10546 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be
<quote>limited
</quote> will have
10547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10548 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10549 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10550 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms
<quote>on the
10551 installment plan,
</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10552 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10555 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10556 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10557 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10558 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10559 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10560 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10561 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10562 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10563 this gravy train going.
10566 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10567 government.
<quote>Corruption
</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10568 bribed. Rather,
<quote>corruption
</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10569 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10570 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10571 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10572 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10575 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10576 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10577 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10578 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10579 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10580 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10581 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10582 published by anyone for free.
10585 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10586 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10587 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10588 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10592 <quote>Next year,
</quote> the adviser announces,
<quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10594 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10595 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10596 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10597 those works.
</quote>
10600 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,
</quote> she continues,
<quote>that
10601 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10602 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10603 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.
</quote>
10606 <quote>Hope?
</quote> a fellow board member says.
<quote>Can't we be doing something
10610 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>We could contribute
10611 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10612 they support the bill.
</quote>
10615 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10616 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it.
<quote>How much
10617 would we get if this extension were passed?
</quote> you ask the adviser.
<quote>How
10618 much is it worth?
</quote>
10621 <quote>Well,
</quote> the adviser says,
<quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10622 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10623 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10624 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate.
</quote>
10627 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10628 correct conclusion:
10631 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10632 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10634 would assure that the bill was passed?
</quote>
10637 <quote>Absolutely,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>It is worth it to you to
10639 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10640 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000.
</quote>
10643 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10644 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10645 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10646 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10648 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10650 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10651 the copyright term extended.
10654 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10655 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10656 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10659 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10661 Term Extension Act, this
<quote>theory
</quote> about incentives was proved
10662 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10663 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10664 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10665 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10666 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press,
<quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10667 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,
</quote>
10668 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10670 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10671 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10672 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10673 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown,
<quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10674 Age,
</quote> available at
10675 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10677 Disney is estimated to have
10678 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10679 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10681 Alan K. Ota,
<quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,
</quote>
10682 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10683 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10688 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10689 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10691 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10692 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10693 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10694 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10695 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10696 <quote>limited.
</quote>
10697 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10701 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10702 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10703 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10704 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10705 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10706 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10710 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10714 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10715 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10716 power to regulate only
<quote>commerce among the several states
</quote> (aka
10718 commerce
</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10719 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10724 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10725 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10726 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10727 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10728 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10730 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
10732 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10733 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10734 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10735 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10736 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10737 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10738 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10739 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10740 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10741 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10742 position to second-guess Congress.
10745 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,
</quote>
10746 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10747 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10749 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10750 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10751 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10752 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10754 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10758 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10759 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10761 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10762 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10763 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10764 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10765 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10766 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10767 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10768 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10769 limitation to
<quote>limited times
</quote> notwithstanding.
10771 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10772 yield the conclusion that Congress
10773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10774 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10775 term, then there would be no
<quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power over
10776 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10777 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10778 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10779 term of existing copyrights.
10782 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10783 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10784 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10785 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10786 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10787 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10788 demonstrating the
<quote>fidelity
</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10789 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10790 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10791 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10792 were going to be petty politicians.
10795 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10796 argument in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10797 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10798 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10799 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10800 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10801 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10802 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10803 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10804 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10805 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10806 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10807 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10808 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10809 piracy that affects us all.
10812 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10815 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10816 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than
<quote>legal piracy.
</quote><footnote><para>
10818 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10819 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10820 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10822 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10823 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10824 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10826 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
10829 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10831 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10833 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10834 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10835 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10836 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10837 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10838 bought to extend them again.
10841 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10843 Mickey Mouse and
<quote>Rhapsody in Blue.
</quote> These works are too
10844 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10846 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10848 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10849 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10850 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10851 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10853 and no longer available as a result.
10856 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10857 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10858 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10859 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10860 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10861 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10862 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10864 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10865 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
10866 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10871 Think practically about the consequence of this
10872 extension
—practically,
10873 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10876 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10877 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10878 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10880 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10882 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
10884 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10885 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10886 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10887 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10888 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10889 list of books still under copyright.
10892 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10893 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10896 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10898 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10899 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10900 being at least a list?
10903 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10904 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10906 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10908 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10909 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10912 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,
</quote> the
10913 apologists for the system respond.
<quote>Why should there be a list of
10914 copyright owners?
</quote>
10917 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
10918 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10919 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10920 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10921 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10922 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10923 what tangible property.
10926 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10927 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10928 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10931 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10932 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10934 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10935 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10936 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10937 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10938 know quite well who owns what property.
10941 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10942 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10944 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10945 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10946 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10947 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10948 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10949 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10950 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10953 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10954 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10956 for other creative works is much more dire.
10958 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'
>
10959 <primary>Agee, Michael
</primary>
10961 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
10962 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films
</primary></indexterm>
10964 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10965 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10966 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10967 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
10968 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10969 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10970 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10971 money. According to one estimate,
<quote>Roach has sold about
60,
000
10972 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10973 films.
</quote><footnote><para>
10975 See David G. Savage,
<quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,
</quote>
10976 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld,
<quote>Classic Movies,
10977 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10978 Down Copyright Extension,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
10981 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
10984 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10985 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10986 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10987 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10990 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10993 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10994 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10995 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10996 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10997 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10998 work available for distribution.
11001 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
11002 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
11003 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
11004 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11005 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
11006 mm film.
<footnote><para>
11008 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
11009 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11010 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
11011 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
11012 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
11013 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
11018 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
11020 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
11021 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
11022 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
11023 locate the copyright owner.
11026 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
11027 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
11028 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
11029 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
11030 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
11031 to these films is exceptionally high.
11034 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11035 copyright owner when she shows up?
</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
11036 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11037 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11038 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11039 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11040 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11041 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11042 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11045 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11048 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11050 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11051 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11052 the copyright expires.
11054 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'
/>
11056 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11057 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11058 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11060 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11064 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
11065 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
11066 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
11067 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
11069 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an
<quote>engine of
11070 free expression.
</quote>
11073 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11074 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11076 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11077 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11078 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11080 the commercial life ends.
11083 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11084 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
11085 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11087 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11089 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11090 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
11091 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11092 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11093 have, we need to have access to this history.
11096 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11099 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11100 this context do no good.
11103 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11104 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11105 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
11106 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
11107 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
11108 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
11109 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
11110 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
11111 was independent of copyright law.
11114 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11115 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
11116 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11117 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11118 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11119 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11120 market didn't have more to offer.
11123 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11124 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11125 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11126 would not have interfered with anything.
11129 But this situation has now changed.
11131 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital2' class='startofrange'
>
11132 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
11135 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11136 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11137 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11138 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11139 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11140 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11141 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11142 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11143 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11144 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11148 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11149 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11150 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11151 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11152 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11153 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11154 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11155 written for a radically different context.
11158 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11159 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11160 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11161 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11162 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11163 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11164 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
11165 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11166 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11169 You may well ask,
<quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11170 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11171 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11172 culture widely?
</quote>
11175 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11176 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11177 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11178 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11179 of a library is to serve what
<quote>the market
</quote> would demand. But if you
11180 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
11181 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11182 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
11183 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11185 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital2' class='endofrange'
/>
11187 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11188 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11189 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11190 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11192 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11193 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11194 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11195 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11196 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
11197 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11199 Jason Schultz,
<quote>The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,
</quote> 20
11200 December
2002, available at
11201 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11206 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11207 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11208 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11209 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
11210 violated the Constitution's
<quote>limited Times
</quote> requirement, and (
2) that
11211 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11214 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11215 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11216 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11217 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11218 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11221 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11222 copyrights be for
<quote>limited Times
</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11223 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11224 <quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11225 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11226 terms that are
<quote>limited.
</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11227 to interpret the term
<quote>limited Times
</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11228 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11229 power to extend existing terms.
11232 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11233 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11234 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11235 whole, where the court will sit
<quote>en banc
</quote> to hear the case.
11237 <indexterm><primary>Tatel, David
</primary></indexterm>
11239 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11240 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11243 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11244 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11245 overstepped its bounds.
11248 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11249 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11250 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11251 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11252 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11255 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11256 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11257 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11258 briefs and preparing for argument.
11261 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11262 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11263 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11264 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11265 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11266 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11267 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11268 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11271 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11272 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11273 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11276 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11278 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11279 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11280 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11281 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11283 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11284 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11285 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11286 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11288 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11289 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11290 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11292 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11293 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11294 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11295 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11296 told me, if we could make the issue seem
<quote>important
</quote> to the Supreme
11297 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11298 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against
<quote>the
11299 most powerful media companies in the world.
</quote>
11302 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11303 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11304 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11305 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11306 <quote>right
</quote> as in
<quote>true,
</quote> I thought, but it is
<quote>wrong
</quote> as in
<quote>it just shouldn't be
11307 that way.
</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11308 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11309 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11311 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11312 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11314 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11315 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11316 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11318 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11319 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11320 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11323 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11324 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11325 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11326 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11327 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11328 why it was unconstitutional.
11331 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11334 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11335 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11336 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11337 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11338 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11339 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11340 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11341 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11342 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11343 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11344 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11345 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11346 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11347 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11350 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11351 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11352 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11353 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11354 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11355 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11356 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11357 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11358 to get bogged down?
</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11359 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11360 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11361 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11362 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11363 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11366 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11367 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11368 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11369 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11370 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11371 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11374 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11375 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11378 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11379 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11380 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11381 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11382 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11383 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11384 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11385 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11386 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
11387 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11388 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11391 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11392 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11393 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11394 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11395 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11396 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11398 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11400 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11401 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11402 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11403 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11406 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11407 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11408 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11409 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11410 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11412 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11413 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11414 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11415 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11416 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11417 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11418 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11419 nothing more than
<quote>rent-seeking
</quote>—the fancy term economists use
11420 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11423 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11424 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11425 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11426 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11427 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11428 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11429 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11430 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11433 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11434 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11435 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11436 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan
</primary></indexterm>
11437 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen
</primary></indexterm>
11438 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11441 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11442 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11443 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11444 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11445 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11446 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11447 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11448 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11449 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11450 confidence in our argument.
11451 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11454 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11455 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these
<quote>friends
</quote> included
11456 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11457 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11461 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11462 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11463 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11464 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11465 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11466 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11470 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11471 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11472 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11473 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11474 domain, then people could use it to
<quote>glorify drugs or to create
11475 pornography.
</quote><footnote><para>
11477 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11478 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11480 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11481 <quote>protection
</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11482 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11483 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11485 Dinitia Smith,
<quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11486 Mouse Joins the Fray,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11490 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11491 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11492 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11495 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11496 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11497 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11498 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11499 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say,
<quote>Give us twenty years
11500 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11501 better with them than anyone else.
</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11502 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11503 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11504 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11507 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11508 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11509 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11510 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11511 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11512 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11513 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11515 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
11516 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11518 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11519 called
<quote>the Conservatives.
</quote> The other we called
<quote>the Rest.
</quote> The
11520 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11521 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11522 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11523 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line
11524 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11525 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11527 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11529 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11530 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11531 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11534 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11535 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11536 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11537 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11538 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11541 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11542 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11543 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11544 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11545 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11546 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11547 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11548 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11551 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11553 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11554 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11555 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11556 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11557 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11558 these retrospective extensions.
11561 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11562 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11563 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11564 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11565 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11566 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11569 This analysis of
<quote>the Rest
</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11570 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11571 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11572 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11573 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation
—the
11574 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11575 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11576 powers have limits.
11579 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11580 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11581 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11583 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11584 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11585 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11586 supposed to be
<quote>limited.
</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11587 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
11588 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11589 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11593 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11594 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11595 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11596 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11597 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11600 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11601 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
1831
11602 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11604 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11607 But this
<quote>consistency
</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11609 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11610 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11611 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11613 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11615 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11616 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11618 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11619 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11620 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11622 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11623 weeks, I was repeatedly
<quote>mooted
</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11626 help in the case. Such
<quote>moots
</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11627 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11630 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11631 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11632 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11633 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11635 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11636 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11639 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11640 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11642 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11643 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11644 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11645 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11646 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11649 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11650 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11651 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11652 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11653 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.
</quote>
11655 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11657 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11658 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11659 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11660 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11661 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11662 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11663 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11664 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11665 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11666 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11667 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11670 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11671 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11674 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11675 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11676 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11677 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11679 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11680 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11681 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11682 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11683 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11684 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11685 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11686 family of the Justices.
11689 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11690 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11691 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11692 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11694 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11696 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11697 The history was bothering her.
11701 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11702 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11703 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11704 practice that began with the very first act.
11708 She was quite willing to concede
<quote>that this flies directly in the face
11709 of what the framers had in mind.
</quote> But my response again and again
11710 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11714 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11715 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11716 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11717 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11722 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11723 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11724 Kennedy, who observed,
11728 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11729 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11730 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11731 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11732 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11736 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11742 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11743 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11744 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11745 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11746 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11749 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11751 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11752 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11753 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11754 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11755 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11758 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11759 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11760 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11763 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11764 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11770 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11771 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11774 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11775 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11777 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11778 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11779 into the Copyright Clause.
11782 <indexterm><primary>Olson, Theodore B.
</primary></indexterm>
11784 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11785 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11786 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11790 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11791 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11792 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11793 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11798 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11799 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11800 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11801 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11802 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11803 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11804 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11805 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11806 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11807 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11811 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11812 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11815 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11819 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11820 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11821 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11822 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11823 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11824 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11825 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11826 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11827 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11828 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11829 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11830 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11831 law that it had established elsewhere.
11834 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11835 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11836 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11837 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11838 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11841 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11842 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11843 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11846 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11847 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
11848 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11852 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11853 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11854 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11855 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11856 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11861 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11862 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11863 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11866 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11867 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11868 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11869 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11872 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11873 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11874 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11875 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11876 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
11877 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11878 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11879 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11880 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11883 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11884 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11885 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11886 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11887 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11888 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11889 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11890 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11891 the system we have.
11893 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11895 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11896 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11897 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11898 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11899 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11900 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11901 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11902 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11903 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11905 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11908 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11909 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11910 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11911 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11912 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11913 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11914 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11915 <quote>limited,
</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11916 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11919 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11920 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11921 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11922 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11923 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
11926 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11927 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11928 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11930 <indexterm><primary>originalism
</primary></indexterm>
11932 It was first anger with the five
<quote>Conservatives.
</quote> It would have been
11933 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
11934 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11935 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11936 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11937 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11938 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is
<quote>originalism
</quote>—to
11939 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11940 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11941 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other
<quote>originalist
</quote> rulings. Where was their
11942 <quote>originalism
</quote> now?
11945 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11946 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11947 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11948 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11951 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11952 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11953 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11954 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11955 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11956 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11960 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11962 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11965 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11967 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11968 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11969 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11970 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11971 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11972 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11973 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11974 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11975 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11978 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11979 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11980 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11981 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11982 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11983 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11984 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11985 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11986 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11987 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11988 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11989 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11990 effort to persuade; but I
11991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11992 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11993 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11994 should decide the issue.
11996 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11998 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11999 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12001 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
12004 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12005 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12006 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12007 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12010 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12011 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12012 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12013 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12017 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12018 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12019 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
12020 case was a mistake.
<quote>The Court is not ready,
</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
12021 issue should not be raised until it is.
12022 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12025 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12026 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12027 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12028 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12029 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12030 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12031 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
12032 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
12033 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
12034 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
12035 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
12037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12038 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12039 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
12040 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
12041 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
12042 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
12046 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12047 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12048 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
12049 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
12050 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
12051 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12055 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12056 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
12057 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
12058 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The
<quote>powerful and wealthy
</quote> line is a bit
12059 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
12060 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12062 <figure id=
"fig-18">
12063 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
12064 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
12065 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12068 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12069 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That
<quote>grand experiment
</quote> we call the
12070 <quote>public domain
</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think,
<quote>Honey,
12071 I shrunk the Constitution.
</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
12072 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12073 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12074 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12078 <chapter label=
"14" id=
"eldred-ii">
12079 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
12081 The day
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
12082 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was
12083 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
12084 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
12085 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
12086 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
12087 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
12089 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12091 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12092 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12093 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12094 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12095 Justice Kennedy:
<quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12096 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12097 that.
</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12098 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12101 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12102 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12104 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12105 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12106 the work passed into the public domain.
12109 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12110 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12111 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12114 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12115 is either the
<quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act
</quote> or the
<quote>Copyright
12116 Term Deregulation Act.
</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12117 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12118 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12119 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
12120 everything else, let the content go.
12122 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12124 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
12125 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12126 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
12127 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
12128 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
12129 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
12130 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
12131 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
12132 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
12133 the stupid harm of the present system.
12136 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12137 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12138 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12139 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12140 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12141 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12142 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12143 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12144 where copyright owners could be identified.
12146 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12147 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12150 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
12151 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12152 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12153 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
12155 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12156 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12157 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12158 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
12159 every text of the Convention has provided that
<quote>the enjoyment and the
12160 exercise
</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention
<quote>shall not be subject
12161 to any formality.
</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12162 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12163 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12164 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12165 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12166 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12167 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12168 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12169 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12170 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
12171 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12172 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
12173 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a
<quote>natural right.
</quote> Natural
12174 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12175 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12176 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12177 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12178 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12181 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12182 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12183 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12184 <quote>Walt Disney creativity
</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12185 know what's protected and what's not.
12187 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12189 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12190 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12191 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12192 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12193 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12194 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12195 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
12196 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12199 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12200 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12201 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12202 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12203 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12204 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12207 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12208 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12209 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12210 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12212 imposed upon creators.
12215 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12216 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12219 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12220 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12221 the government. He has a property right over the table
<quote>naturally,
</quote>
12222 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12223 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12227 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12228 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12229 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12230 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12231 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12232 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12236 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12237 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12238 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12239 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12240 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12241 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12242 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12243 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12244 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12245 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12246 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12247 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12248 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12249 system of protection for property generally.
12252 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12253 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12254 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12255 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12256 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12257 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12258 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12259 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12261 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12262 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12263 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12264 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12267 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12268 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12269 didn't
<quote>get.
</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12270 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12271 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be,
<quote>short,
</quote> then this
12272 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12273 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12274 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12277 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12278 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12279 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12280 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12281 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12282 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12283 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12286 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12287 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12288 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12289 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12290 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12293 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12294 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12295 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12296 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12297 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12300 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12301 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12302 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12306 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12307 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12308 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12311 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12312 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12313 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12314 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12315 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12316 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12317 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12318 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12319 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12320 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12322 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12324 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12325 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12326 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12327 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12330 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12331 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12332 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12333 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12334 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog,
<quote>we are
12335 close.
</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12336 something good might happen here.
12337 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12340 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12341 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12342 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12343 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12344 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12345 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12348 The MPAA argued first that Congress had
<quote>firmly rejected the central
12349 concept in the proposed bill
</quote>—that copyrights be renewed. That
12350 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's
<quote>firm rejection
</quote> had occurred
12351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12352 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12353 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12354 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12355 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12356 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12357 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12358 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12359 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12360 argued that the bill would impose
<quote>enormous
</quote> costs, since a
12361 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12362 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12363 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12364 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12365 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12366 film is a valid derivative use.
12369 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12370 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12371 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12372 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12373 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12374 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12377 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12378 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12379 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12380 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12381 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12382 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12383 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12387 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12388 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12389 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12390 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12395 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12396 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12397 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12398 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12399 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12400 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12401 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12402 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12403 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12404 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12406 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12408 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12409 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12410 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12411 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12412 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12413 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the
<quote>Dark
12414 Content
</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12415 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12418 What does this industry really want?
12421 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12422 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12423 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12424 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12425 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12426 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12427 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12428 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12432 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12433 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12434 its aim not the protection of
<quote>property
</quote> but the rejection of a
12435 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12436 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12440 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12441 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12444 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12445 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12446 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12447 and to share its own creation.
12449 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12450 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12452 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12453 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12454 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12455 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12456 block the progress of others.
12459 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12460 <quote>property
</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12461 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12462 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing
<quote>permission
12463 society.
</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12464 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12465 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12467 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12470 <chapter label=
"15" id=
"c-conclusion">
12471 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12472 <indexterm id=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'
>
12473 <primary>antiretroviral drugs
</primary>
12475 <indexterm id=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'
>
12476 <primary>HIV/AIDS therapies
</primary>
12478 <indexterm id=
"idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'
>
12479 <primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in
</primary>
12482 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12483 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12484 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12485 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12486 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12489 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12490 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12491 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12492 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12493 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12494 the disease almost invisible.
12497 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12498 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12499 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12500 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12502 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12503 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12504 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
<quote>Final Report: Integrating
12505 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy
</quote> (London,
2002),
12507 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12509 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12510 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12515 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12516 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12517 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12518 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12519 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12520 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12523 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12524 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12525 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12526 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12527 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12528 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12529 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12530 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12534 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12535 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12536 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12537 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12538 costs significantly below the market price.
12541 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12542 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12543 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12544 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12545 Africa from India. This is called
<quote>parallel importation,
</quote> and it is
12546 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12547 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12550 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12551 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12552 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12553 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12557 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12558 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12559 characterized it,
<quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12560 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12561 imports.
</quote><footnote><para>
12563 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12564 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12565 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12566 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12567 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12568 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12569 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12570 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12571 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12574 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12575 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12576 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12577 possible trade sanctions.
12578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12579 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12580 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12581 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12582 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12583 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12584 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12585 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12586 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12587 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12588 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12590 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12591 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12592 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12593 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12596 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12597 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12598 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12599 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12600 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12601 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12602 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12603 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12606 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12607 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12608 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12609 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12610 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12611 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12614 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12615 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12616 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12617 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12618 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12619 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12623 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12624 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12627 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12629 See Sabin Russell,
<quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12630 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12631 May
1999, A1, available at
12632 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12633 (
<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12634 system of intellectual property protection
</quote>); Robert Weissman,
<quote>AIDS
12635 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12636 Medicines,
</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12637 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12638 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson,
<quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12639 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12640 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,
</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12641 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12644 It was because
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> would be violated that these
12645 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12646 importance of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> that led these government actors
12647 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12650 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12651 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12652 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12653 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12654 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the
<quote>sanctity
</quote> of an
12655 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12656 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12657 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12660 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12661 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12662 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12663 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12664 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12665 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12668 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12669 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12670 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12671 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12672 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12673 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12676 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12677 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12678 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask,
<quote>How
12679 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12680 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?
</quote> Because there is no
<quote>sound
12681 bite
</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12682 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12683 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12685 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12686 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12687 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12688 idea called
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote>
12691 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12692 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12693 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12694 What is the argument?
12697 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12698 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12699 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12700 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12701 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12702 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12703 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12704 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12705 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12706 were balanced in just this sense.
12709 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12710 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12711 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12712 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12713 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12714 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12716 <indexterm startref=
"idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'
/>
12717 <indexterm startref=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'
/>
12718 <indexterm startref=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'
/>
12720 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12721 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12722 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12723 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12724 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12725 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12728 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12729 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12730 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12731 this common sense open its eyes.
12734 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12735 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12736 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12737 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12738 to fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12739 the idea of
<quote>creative property,
</quote> while transforming real creators into
12740 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12741 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12742 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12743 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12744 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12745 produce the
<quote>perfect storm
</quote> for free culture.
12747 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
12748 <indexterm id='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='startofrange'
>
12749 <primary>biomedical research
</primary>
12751 <indexterm><primary>Wellcome Trust
</primary></indexterm>
12753 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12754 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12755 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12756 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12757 August
2003, E1, available at
12758 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New,
<quote>Global Group's
12759 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12760 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12761 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New,
<quote>U.S. Official
12762 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12763 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12764 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12766 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12767 a meeting to discuss
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12768 goods.
</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12769 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12770 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12771 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12772 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12773 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12774 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12775 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12776 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12777 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12778 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12780 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12781 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12782 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12783 in the early
1980s. And it included
<quote>open source and free software.
</quote>
12784 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12785 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12786 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12788 <indexterm startref='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='endofrange'
/>
12790 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12791 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12792 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12793 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12794 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12797 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12798 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12801 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12802 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12803 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12804 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12808 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12809 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12810 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12811 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12812 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12813 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12814 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12815 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12816 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12817 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12818 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12819 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12820 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12821 talk about an
<quote>Information Society
</quote> unless one also talked about the
12822 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12823 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12824 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12827 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12828 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12829 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12832 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12833 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12834 thus the meeting about
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create
12835 public goods
</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12838 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12839 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is
<quote>open source
12840 and free software.
</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12841 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12842 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12843 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12844 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12845 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12846 rather than
<quote>proprietary software,
</quote> for their own internal uses.
12849 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12850 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12851 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12852 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12853 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12854 operating system, the most famous bit of
<quote>free software
</quote>—and IBM
12855 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support
<quote>open source and
12856 free software
</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12857 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12858 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12860 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12861 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12862 <quote>open source
</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12863 principal opposition is to
<quote>free software
</quote> licensed under a
<quote>copyleft
</quote>
12864 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12865 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith,
<quote>The Future
12866 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,
</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
12867 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12868 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12869 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12870 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12871 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
12872 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12873 May
2001), available at
12874 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12876 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12877 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft
</quote> licenses
</primary></indexterm>
12878 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12879 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12882 More important for our purposes, to support
<quote>open source and free
12883 software
</quote> is not to oppose copyright.
<quote>Open source and free software
</quote>
12884 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12885 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12886 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12889 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12890 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12891 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12892 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12893 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12894 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12895 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12896 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12897 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12900 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12901 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12902 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12903 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12904 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12905 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12906 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12908 Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> available at
<ulink
12909 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12911 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12912 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
12915 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12916 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12917 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12918 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12919 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12920 its lobbying efforts.
12923 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12924 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12925 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12926 Office, explained that
<quote>open-source software runs counter to the
12927 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.
</quote>
12928 She is quoted as saying,
<quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12929 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12930 goals of WIPO.
</quote>
12933 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12937 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12938 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12939 right called
<quote>copyright
</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12940 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it
<quote>runs counter
</quote> to the mission
12941 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12942 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12943 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12944 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12947 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to
<quote>promote
</quote>
12948 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12949 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12950 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12951 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12952 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12953 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12954 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12955 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12956 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12957 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12960 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12961 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12962 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12963 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12964 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to
<quote>waive
</quote> or
12965 <quote>disclaim
</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12966 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
12967 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12968 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12969 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12970 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
12971 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12974 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12975 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,
</quote> she's
12976 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12978 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12979 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from
<quote>waiving
</quote> or
12980 <quote>disclaiming
</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12981 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12982 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12986 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12987 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called
<quote>feudalism.
</quote> Under
12988 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12989 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12990 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12991 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12992 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12993 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12994 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12997 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12998 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
13000 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
13001 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
13003 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
13004 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13006 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
13007 choice now is whether that information society will be
13008 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
13012 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13013 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13014 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13015 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13019 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13020 it should be (
<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13021 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
13022 not simply to promote intellectual property rights
</quote>), not as it is. If
13023 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13024 say anything wrong. But in the world
13025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13026 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13027 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13031 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13032 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13033 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13034 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13035 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13036 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13037 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13038 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13041 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13042 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13043 <quote>goal
</quote> of a government should be
<quote>to promote the right balance
</quote> of
13044 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13045 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism.
<quote>Typical for
13046 an academic,
</quote> the poster might well have continued.
13049 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13050 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13051 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13052 our own country's history).
13055 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13056 government should be to
<quote>seek balance,
</quote> then count me with the silly,
13057 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13058 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13059 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13060 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13061 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13062 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
13063 democracy in the world, become?
13066 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13067 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13068 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13070 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13071 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
13073 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
13074 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
13075 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
13077 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
13078 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
13079 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
13080 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
13081 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
13082 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
13083 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
13084 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
13085 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
13086 hearings and a different result.
13089 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
13090 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
13091 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
13092 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
13093 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13094 concentration in the media.
13097 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13098 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13099 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13100 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
13101 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13104 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
13105 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13106 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13107 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
13108 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
13109 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
13110 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
13112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13114 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13115 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
13116 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
13117 Americans have a long history of fighting
<quote>big,
</quote> wisely or not. That
13118 we could be motivated to fight
<quote>big
</quote> again is not something new.
13121 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
13122 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
13123 the idea of
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote> Not because balance is alien to
13124 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13125 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
13126 called
<quote>property
</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13129 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13132 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
13134 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
13135 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
13137 John Borland,
<quote>RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers,
</quote> CNET News.com, September
13139 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
13140 R. La Monica,
<quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,
</quote> CNN/Money,
8 September
13142 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
13143 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty,
<quote>Sued for a Song,
13144 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
13145 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13146 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13147 Defendants,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13148 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
13150 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
13152 Eminem has just been sued for
<quote>sampling
</quote> someone else's
13153 music.
<footnote><para>
13155 Jon Wiederhorn,
<quote>Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,
</quote>
13156 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
13157 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
13159 The story about Bob Dylan
<quote>stealing
</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13160 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
13162 Kenji Hall, Associated Press,
<quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13163 Dylan Songs,
</quote> Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
13164 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
13165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13167 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
13168 anonymous
—reports
<quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13169 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13170 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13171 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13172 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.
</quote> Congressmen are
13173 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13174 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13175 kids who use a computer to share content.
13177 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
13178 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
13179 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
13180 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
13181 <indexterm><primary>BBC
</primary></indexterm>
13182 <indexterm><primary>Brazil, free culture in
</primary></indexterm>
13184 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13185 that it will build a
<quote>Creative Archive,
</quote> from which British citizens can
13186 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13187 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,
</quote> BBC press release,
13188 24 August
2003, available at
13189 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13191 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13192 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13193 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13194 country.
<footnote><para>
13196 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,
</quote> Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
13198 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13201 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13202 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13203 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13204 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13205 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13206 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13207 day into the Causbys.
13210 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13211 potential is ever to be realized.
13213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13217 <chapter label=
"16" id=
"c-afterword">
13218 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13222 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13223 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13224 maps what might be done.
13227 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13228 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13229 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13230 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13233 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13234 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13235 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
13236 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13240 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13241 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13242 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13243 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13244 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13248 <section id=
"usnow">
13249 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13251 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13252 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
13253 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13254 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13257 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13258 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13259 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—<quote>All Rights
13260 Reserved
</quote>— and those who reject copyright
—<quote>No Rights
13261 Reserved.
</quote> The
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13262 permission before you
<quote>use
</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The
<quote>No
13263 Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13264 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13267 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13268 tilted in the
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13269 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13270 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13274 original design of the Internet was
<quote>no rights reserved.
</quote> Content was
13275 <quote>taken
</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13279 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13280 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13281 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13282 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13283 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13284 architecture made the effective default
<quote>no rights reserved,
</quote> the
13285 future architecture will make the effective default
<quote>all rights
13286 reserved.
</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13287 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13288 content requires permission. The
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> world that defines
13289 the Internet today will become a
<quote>get permission to cut and paste
</quote>
13290 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13293 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13294 <quote>all rights reserved
</quote> nor
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> but
<quote>some rights
13295 reserved
</quote>— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13296 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13297 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13301 <section id=
"examples">
13302 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13304 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13305 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13306 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13307 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13308 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13309 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13310 to your neighbors or boss. The
<quote>privacy
</quote> of your browsing habits was
13314 What made it assured?
13316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13318 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13319 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13320 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13321 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13322 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13323 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13324 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13325 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13326 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13327 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13328 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13329 (there is no law protecting
<quote>privacy
</quote> in public places), and in many
13330 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13331 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13333 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13335 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13336 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13337 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13338 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13339 <quote>recently viewed
</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13340 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13341 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13342 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13343 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13346 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13347 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13348 people should have the
<quote>right
</quote> to browse in a library without the
13349 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13350 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13351 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13352 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13356 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13357 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13358 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13359 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13362 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg,
<quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13363 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13364 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13366 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13367 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13368 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13369 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13370 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13371 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13372 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13375 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13376 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13377 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13380 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13381 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13382 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13383 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13384 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13385 care much about controlling their software.
13386 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13388 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13390 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13391 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13392 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13393 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13394 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13398 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13399 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13400 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13401 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13402 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13403 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13404 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13405 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13406 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13410 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13411 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13412 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13413 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13414 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13415 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13416 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13419 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13420 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13422 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13423 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13424 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13425 fundamentally weakened.
13427 <indexterm><primary>Torvalds, Linus
</primary></indexterm>
13429 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13430 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13431 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's
<quote>Linux
</quote>
13432 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13433 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13434 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13437 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13438 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13439 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13440 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13441 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13442 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13443 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13444 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13448 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13449 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13450 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13451 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13452 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13453 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13456 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13457 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13458 scientific journals are produced.
13460 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
>
13461 <primary>academic journals
</primary>
13464 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13465 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13466 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13467 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13468 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13469 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13470 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13471 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13472 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13473 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13474 and Westlaw are also free
13475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13476 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13477 Court opinion through their respective services.
13480 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13481 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13482 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13483 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13484 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13485 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13486 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13489 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13490 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13491 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13494 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13495 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13496 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13497 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13498 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13499 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13500 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13501 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13502 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13503 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13506 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13507 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13508 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13509 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13510 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13514 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13515 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13516 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13517 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13519 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13520 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13521 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13522 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13523 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13524 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13525 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13528 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13529 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13530 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13531 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13532 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13533 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13536 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13539 <section id=
"oneidea">
13540 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13541 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13542 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13545 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13546 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13548 <indexterm><primary>Stanford University
</primary></indexterm>
13550 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13551 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13552 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13553 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13554 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13555 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13556 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13557 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13558 make this possible.
13561 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13562 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13563 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13564 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13565 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13566 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13567 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13568 human-readable description, and
13569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13570 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13571 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13572 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13573 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13574 different than the
<quote>All
</quote> or
<quote>No
</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13575 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13576 certain freedoms are given.
13579 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13580 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13581 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13582 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13583 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13584 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (
<quote>share and share
13585 alike
</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13586 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13587 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13590 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13591 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13592 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13593 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13594 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13595 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13596 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13597 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13601 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13602 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13603 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13604 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13605 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13606 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13608 of content (
<quote>content conducers,
</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13609 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13610 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13611 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13614 The aim is not to fight the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13615 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13616 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13617 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13618 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13619 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13620 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13621 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13622 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13623 to begin to build those rules.
13626 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13627 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13628 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13629 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13630 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13633 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13634 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13635 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13636 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13637 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13638 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13639 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13640 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13641 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13642 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13645 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13646 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13647 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13648 was a total success.
13651 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13652 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13654 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13655 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13656 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13657 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13658 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13660 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13661 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13663 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy
</primary></indexterm>
13664 <indexterm><primary>rap music
</primary></indexterm>
13665 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter
</primary></indexterm>
13667 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13668 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13669 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13670 reasons. Many who use the
<quote>sampling license
</quote> do so because anything
13671 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13672 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13673 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13674 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13675 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13676 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13677 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13678 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not
<quote>allow
</quote>
13679 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13680 high
<footnote><para>
13682 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13683 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13684 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13685 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13686 </para></footnote>),
13687 these artists release into the creative environment content
13688 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13691 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13692 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13693 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13694 you are effectively saying you believe in the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote>
13695 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13696 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13697 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13698 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13699 this notion of
<quote>Some Rights Reserved,
</quote> and gives many the chance to
13703 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13704 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13705 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13706 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13709 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13710 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13713 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13714 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13715 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13716 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13717 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13718 steps are possible.
13721 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13722 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13723 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13724 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13725 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13726 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13727 creativity to spread more easily.
13729 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13734 <section id=
"themsoon">
13735 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13737 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13738 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13739 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13740 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13741 changes that we need.
13744 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13745 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13746 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13750 <section id=
"formalities">
13751 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13753 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13754 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13755 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13756 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13760 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13761 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13765 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13766 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13767 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13768 default is control, and
<quote>formalities
</quote> are banished.
13774 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13775 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13776 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13777 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13778 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13779 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13780 formalities were getting in the way.
13783 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13784 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13785 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13786 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13787 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13788 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13789 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13790 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13791 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13792 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13795 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13797 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13798 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13799 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13800 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13801 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13802 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13805 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13806 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13807 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13808 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13809 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13810 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13811 developed by others.
13814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13816 <section id=
"registration">
13817 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13819 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13820 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13821 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13822 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13823 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13824 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13825 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13826 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13827 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13828 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13829 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13832 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13833 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13834 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13835 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13836 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13837 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13838 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13841 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13842 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13843 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13844 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13845 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13846 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13847 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13848 with which registration occurs up.
13851 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13852 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13853 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13854 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13855 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13856 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13857 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13858 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13859 formality
—while producing a database
13860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13861 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13865 <section id=
"marking">
13866 <title>MARKING
</title>
13868 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13869 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13870 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13871 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13872 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13873 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13874 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13875 uniformly across all media.
13878 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13879 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13880 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13884 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13885 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13886 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13887 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13888 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13889 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13890 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13891 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13894 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13895 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13896 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13897 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13898 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13899 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13901 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13902 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13903 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13905 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be
<quote>use unless someone
13906 complains.
</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13907 stop using the work in any new
13908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13909 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13910 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13914 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13915 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13916 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13917 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13918 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13921 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13922 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13923 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13924 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13925 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13926 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13927 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13928 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13929 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13930 other important functions.
13933 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13934 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13935 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13936 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13937 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13938 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13941 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13942 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13943 make things unclear.
13946 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13947 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13948 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13949 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13950 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13951 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13957 <section id=
"shortterms">
13958 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13960 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13961 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13965 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13966 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13967 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13968 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13969 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13970 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
13973 <quote>A Radical Rethink,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13975 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13977 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13980 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13981 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13982 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13985 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13988 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13989 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13990 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13991 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13992 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13993 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13997 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
13998 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13999 fuzziness of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and the distinction between
<quote>ideas
</quote> and
14000 <quote>expression.
</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14001 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
14002 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
14003 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
14004 <quote>lawyer-free zone
</quote> makes the complexities of
<quote>fair use
</quote> and
14005 <quote>idea/expression
</quote> less necessary to navigate.
14006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14010 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
14011 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14012 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
14013 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
14014 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
14015 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
14016 pension.
<footnote><para>
14018 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14019 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
14021 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
14023 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
14024 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
14026 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
14030 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
14031 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
14032 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
14033 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
14034 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
14035 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
14036 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
14037 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
14038 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
14039 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
14040 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
14041 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
14042 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
14043 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
14046 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
14047 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
14048 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
14052 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas
<quote>radical.
</quote> (After all, I
14053 call them
<quote>extremists.
</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
14054 than the term under Richard Nixon. How
<quote>radical
</quote> can it be to ask for
14055 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14061 <section id=
"freefairuse">
14062 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
14063 <indexterm><primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary></indexterm>
14065 <primary>property rights
</primary>
14066 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
14069 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14070 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14071 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14072 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14073 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14074 the emergence of that new technology.
14077 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
<quote>exclusive
14078 right
</quote> to
<quote>their writings.
</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
14079 right to
<quote>their writings
</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
14080 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
14081 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
14082 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
14083 though that movie is not
<quote>my writing.
</quote>
14086 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
14087 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
14088 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
14090 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
14091 University Press,
1967),
32.
14093 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
14094 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
14095 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
14096 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
14100 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14101 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14102 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14103 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
14104 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
14109 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14110 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14111 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14112 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14113 Consider each limitation in turn.
14116 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
14117 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
14118 sense to protect John
14120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14121 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14122 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14123 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14124 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14125 after the creative work is done.
14126 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
14129 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
14130 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
14131 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
14132 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
14133 material. When all
<quote>reuse
</quote> of creative material was within the control
14134 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
14135 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
14136 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
14137 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
14138 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
14139 the creative process. Smothers it.
14141 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
14143 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
14144 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
14145 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
14146 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
14147 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
14151 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14152 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14153 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14154 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
14157 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14158 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
14159 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
14161 His view is that the law should be written so that
14162 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14165 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14166 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14167 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14168 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14169 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14172 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14174 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14175 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14176 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14177 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14181 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
14182 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
14184 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14185 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14186 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
14187 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14188 battles around the sharing of music.
14191 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14192 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14193 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14194 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14195 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14196 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14197 innovation on the network.
14200 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14201 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14202 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14203 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14204 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14207 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14208 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14209 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14210 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
14211 four different kinds of sharing:
14213 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14216 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14217 for purchasing CDs.
14221 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14222 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14227 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14228 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14229 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14233 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14234 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14235 owner plainly endorses.
14239 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14240 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14241 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14242 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14243 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14244 significantly weakened.
14247 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
14248 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14249 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14250 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14251 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14255 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14256 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14260 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14261 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14262 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14263 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14264 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14265 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14266 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14267 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14268 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14269 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14272 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14273 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14274 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14276 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14277 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14278 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14279 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14280 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14281 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14282 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14283 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14284 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14286 <indexterm><primary>cell phones, music streamed over
</primary></indexterm>
14288 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14289 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14290 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14291 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14292 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14293 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14294 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14295 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14296 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14297 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14298 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14299 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14300 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14301 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14302 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14303 paying for this content even though
<quote>free
</quote> content is available in the
14304 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14306 See, for example,
<quote>Music Media Watch,
</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14307 April
2002, available at
14308 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14313 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14314 present: It is emphatically temporary. The
<quote>problem
</quote> with file
14315 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14316 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14317 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14318 makers today to be
<quote>solving
</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14319 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14320 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14321 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14322 artists get paid, during
14324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14325 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14326 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14329 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different
<quote>problems
</quote>
14330 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14331 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14332 <quote>problem
</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14333 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14334 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14335 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14336 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14337 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14340 Type C content raises a different
<quote>problem.
</quote> This is content that was,
14341 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14342 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14343 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14344 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14345 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14346 way that returns something to the artist.
14349 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14350 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14351 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14352 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14353 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14354 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14355 from the author's perspective, this
<quote>sharing
</quote> of his content without
14356 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14359 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14360 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14361 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14362 providers would be free, under this rule, to
<quote>share
</quote> that content,
14363 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14364 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14365 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14370 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14371 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14372 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14373 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14374 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14375 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14376 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14380 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14381 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14382 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14383 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14384 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14385 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14386 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14387 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14390 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14391 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14392 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14393 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14394 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14395 delivering and accessing content.
14398 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14399 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14402 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14403 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14404 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14405 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14406 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14407 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14408 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14409 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14413 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14414 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14415 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14416 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14417 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14418 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14421 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14422 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14425 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments3' class='startofrange'
>
14426 <primary>artists
</primary>
14427 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14429 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14430 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14431 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14432 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14433 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14434 2004), ch.
6, available at
14435 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14436 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14437 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14438 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel,
<quote>Impose a
14439 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,
</quote> available at
14440 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Who's Holding Back
14441 Broadband?
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14442 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14443 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14445 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14446 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14447 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14448 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14450 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry,
<quote>Getting Copyright Right,
</quote>
14451 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14452 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14453 McCullagh,
<quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,
</quote> CNET News.com,
27 August
14455 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14456 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14457 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14458 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14459 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14460 debate by about a decade. See
14461 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14462 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14463 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14464 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14465 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments3' class='endofrange'
/>
14467 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14468 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14469 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14470 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14471 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14472 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14473 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14474 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14477 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14479 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14480 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14481 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14482 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14483 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14484 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14485 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14486 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14487 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14488 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14489 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14490 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14491 controlling access.
14494 <primary>artists
</primary>
14495 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14498 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14499 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14500 the system supports the widest range of
<quote>semiotic democracy
</quote>
14501 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14502 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14503 limits on derivative
14505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14506 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14507 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14508 allowed to do with the content itself.
14510 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
14512 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14513 <quote>harm
</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14514 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14515 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14516 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14517 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat
<quote>free
</quote> by being
14518 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14519 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14520 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14521 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14522 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14523 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14526 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
14528 This competition has already occurred against the background of
<quote>free
</quote>
14529 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14530 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14531 that, there is nothing impossible at all about
<quote>competing with free.
</quote>
14532 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14533 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14534 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14535 theaters are often luxurious
—with
<quote>first class
</quote> seats, and meals
14536 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14537 finding ways to compete with
<quote>free.
</quote>
14540 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14541 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14542 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14543 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14544 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14545 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14549 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14554 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14555 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14556 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14557 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14561 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14564 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14567 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14571 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14572 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14577 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14578 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14582 But what if
<quote>piracy
</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14583 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14584 consumers continue to
<quote>take
</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14588 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14589 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14590 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14591 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14592 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14593 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14594 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14595 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14596 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14597 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14598 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14602 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14603 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14604 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14607 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14608 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14612 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14613 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14615 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14616 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14617 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14618 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14621 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14622 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14623 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14624 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14625 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14626 strong view queers the law.
14629 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14630 <quote>radical
</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14631 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14632 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14633 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14634 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14635 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14636 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14638 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Copyright's First Amendment
</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14639 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14644 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14645 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14646 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14649 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14650 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14651 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14652 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14654 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14655 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14656 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14657 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14658 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14659 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14660 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14661 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14662 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14663 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?
</quote> working paper, June
2003,
14665 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14666 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14667 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14668 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14669 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14670 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14672 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14673 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14678 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14679 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14680 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14681 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14682 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14683 practically never be done.
14686 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14687 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14688 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14689 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14690 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14691 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14692 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14693 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14696 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14697 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14698 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14699 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14700 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14701 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14704 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14705 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14706 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14709 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
14711 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14712 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14713 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14714 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14715 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14716 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14717 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14720 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14721 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14724 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14725 simple pragmatic question:
<quote>Will it do good?
</quote> When challenged about
14726 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers,
<quote>Why not?
</quote>
14729 We should ask,
<quote>Why?
</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14730 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14731 keep your lawyers away.
14733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14737 <chapter label=
"17" id=
"c-notes">
14738 <title>NOTES
</title>
14740 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14741 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14742 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14743 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14744 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14745 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14746 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14747 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14748 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14751 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14754 <chapter label=
"18" id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14755 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14757 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14758 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14759 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14760 to him that this book is dedicated.
14762 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
14764 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14765 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14766 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14767 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14768 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14769 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14770 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14771 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14772 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14773 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14774 critical eye on much of this.
14777 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14778 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14779 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14780 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14781 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14782 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14783 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14784 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14785 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14788 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14789 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14790 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14791 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14792 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14793 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14794 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14795 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14796 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14797 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14798 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14799 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14800 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14801 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14802 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams,
<quote>Wink,
</quote> Roger Wood,
<quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,
</quote>
14803 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14804 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14805 a bunch of great replies.)
14808 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14809 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14810 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14811 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14812 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14813 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14814 throughout this book.
14817 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14818 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14819 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14820 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14822 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->