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19 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
21 <title>Free Culture
</title>
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
25 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
26 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
28 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
30 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
34 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
35 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
41 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
46 This version of Free Culture is licensed under a Creative Commons
47 license. This license permits non-commercial use of this work, so long
48 as attribution is given. For more information about the license,
49 click the icon above, or visit
50 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
55 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
58 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
59 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
60 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
61 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
62 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
63 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
64 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
65 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
66 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
67 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
68 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
69 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
70 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
71 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
81 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
83 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
84 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
85 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
86 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
87 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
93 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
96 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
99 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
116 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
117 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
118 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
130 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
134 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig,
140 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
141 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright
© 2003 by The New York Times Co.
142 Reprinted with permission.
145 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page
159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
148 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
151 Diagram on page
164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
154 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
158 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
159 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
168 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
171 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
174 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
180 343.7309'
9—dc22
183 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
186 Printed in the United States of America
192 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
200 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
201 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
202 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
203 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
204 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
205 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
206 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
207 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
208 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
209 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
210 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
217 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
222 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
223 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
224 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
232 <title>List of figures
</title>
239 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
240 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
241 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
242 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
247 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
251 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
252 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
253 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
254 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
255 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
256 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
260 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
261 2 Architecture and Law: Force
262 2 Market: Concentration
265 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
266 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
267 2 Constraining Creators
268 2 Constraining Innovators
269 2 Corrupting Citizens
271 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
272 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
276 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
277 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
279 2 1. More Formalities
280 3 Registration and Renewal
283 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
284 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
285 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
293 <preface id=
"preface">
294 <title>PREFACE
</title>
295 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
296 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
299 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
300 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
301 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
305 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
306 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
307 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
308 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
309 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
314 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
315 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
316 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
317 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
318 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
319 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
322 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
323 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
324 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
325 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
326 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
327 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
328 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
330 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
332 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
333 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
334 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
335 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
338 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
339 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
340 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
341 free software movement
<footnote>
343 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
344 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
345 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
346 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
347 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
348 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
349 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
350 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
351 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
352 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"
—a culture in
353 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
354 or of creators from the past.
357 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
358 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
359 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
360 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
361 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
362 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
363 culture deem fundamental.
365 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
367 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
368 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
369 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
370 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
371 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
372 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
373 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
374 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
376 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
380 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
381 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
382 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
383 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
384 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
385 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
386 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
391 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
392 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
393 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
394 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
395 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
396 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
397 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
398 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
399 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
400 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
401 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
402 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
403 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
404 that this work is "merely" derivative.
407 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
408 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
409 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
410 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
411 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
412 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
413 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
414 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
417 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
418 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
419 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
420 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
421 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
425 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
426 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
427 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
428 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
429 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
430 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
431 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
439 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
440 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
442 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
443 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
444 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
445 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
446 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
447 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
450 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
451 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
452 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
453 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
454 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
455 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
458 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
459 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
460 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
463 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
464 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
465 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
466 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
467 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
468 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
469 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
471 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
472 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
474 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
475 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
476 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
477 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
478 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
479 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
480 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
481 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
482 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
484 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
485 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
487 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
488 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
489 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
490 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
491 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
492 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
493 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
494 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
498 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
499 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
500 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
501 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
502 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
503 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
504 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
505 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
507 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
508 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
509 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
510 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
511 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
512 Authorship," Stanford Law Review
48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
513 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
515 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
516 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
521 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
524 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
525 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
526 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
528 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
529 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
530 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
531 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
532 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
534 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
537 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
538 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
539 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
540 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
541 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
542 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
543 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
544 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
545 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
546 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
547 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
548 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
549 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
550 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
551 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
552 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
555 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
556 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
557 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
558 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
559 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
560 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
561 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
562 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
563 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
564 understanding of radio.
565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
566 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
567 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
568 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
571 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
572 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
573 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
574 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
575 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
576 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
577 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
578 much less transmitter power and static.
581 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
582 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
583 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
584 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
585 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
586 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
587 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
588 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
589 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
592 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
596 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
597 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
598 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
599 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
600 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
601 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
602 box."
<footnote><para>
603 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
604 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
609 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
610 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
611 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
612 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
613 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
614 a handful of networks.
615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
618 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
619 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
620 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
621 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
622 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
623 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
627 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
628 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
629 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
630 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
631 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
632 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
634 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
639 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
640 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
641 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
643 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
647 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
648 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
649 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
650 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
651 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
652 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
657 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
658 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
659 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
660 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
661 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
662 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
663 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
664 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
665 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
666 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
667 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
672 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
673 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
674 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
675 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
680 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
682 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
683 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
684 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
685 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
686 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
687 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
688 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
692 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
693 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
694 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
695 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
696 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
697 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
698 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
699 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
700 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
701 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
704 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
705 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
706 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
707 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
708 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
709 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
710 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
711 course always public spirited; the reality is something
712 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
713 to themselves, would crumble in
714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
715 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
716 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
717 effect of technological change.
720 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
721 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
722 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
723 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
724 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
725 before.
<footnote><para>
726 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
727 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
728 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
729 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
731 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
735 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
736 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
737 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
738 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
739 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
740 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
741 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
742 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
743 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
746 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
747 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
748 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
749 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
750 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
751 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
755 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
756 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
757 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
758 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
759 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
762 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
763 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
764 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
767 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
768 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
769 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
770 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
771 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
772 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
773 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
774 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
775 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
778 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
779 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
780 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
781 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
782 marketplace.
<footnote>
784 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
785 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
786 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
787 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
788 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
789 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
790 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
792 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
794 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
795 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
796 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
797 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
800 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
801 been erased.
<footnote><para>
802 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
805 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
806 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
807 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
808 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
809 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
810 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
811 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
812 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
813 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
814 culture, more and more a permission culture.
816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
818 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
819 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
820 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
821 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
822 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
823 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
824 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
825 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
826 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
827 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
831 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
832 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
833 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
834 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
835 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
836 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
837 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
838 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
839 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
840 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
841 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
842 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
843 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
844 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
845 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
846 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
847 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
850 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
851 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
852 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
853 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
854 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
855 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
859 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
861 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
862 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
863 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
864 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
865 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
866 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
867 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
868 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
869 Times,
17 January
2002.
870 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
871 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
872 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
876 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
877 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
878 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
879 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
880 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
884 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
885 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
886 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
887 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
890 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
891 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
892 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
893 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
894 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
896 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
897 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
898 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
900 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
901 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
902 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
903 could cultivate and extend our culture.
906 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
907 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
908 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
909 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
910 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
911 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
912 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
913 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
914 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
918 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
919 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
920 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
921 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
922 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
926 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
927 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
928 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
929 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
930 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
931 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
932 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
934 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
935 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
937 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
938 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
939 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
940 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
941 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
942 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
943 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
944 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
945 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
946 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
947 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
948 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
951 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
952 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
954 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
955 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
956 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
957 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
959 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
960 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
964 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
965 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
966 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
967 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
968 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
969 been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses of
970 culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
973 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
974 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
975 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
976 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
979 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
980 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
983 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
984 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
985 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
986 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
987 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
990 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
991 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
992 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
993 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
996 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
997 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
999 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1000 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1001 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1002 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1003 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1004 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1005 this silliness will be much more profound.
1006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1009 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1010 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1014 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1015 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1016 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1017 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1018 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1019 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1022 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1023 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1024 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1025 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1026 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1027 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1028 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1029 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1030 fundamental about who we have always been.
1033 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1034 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1035 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1036 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1037 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1038 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1042 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
1043 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1046 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1047 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1050 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1051 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1052 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1053 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1054 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1058 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1059 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1060 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1062 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1065 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1068 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1069 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1070 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1071 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1072 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1073 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1074 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1077 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1078 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1079 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1080 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1081 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1085 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1086 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1087 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1088 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1089 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming thieves!
1092 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1093 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1094 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1095 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1098 The idea goes something like this:
1102 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1103 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1104 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1105 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1106 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1110 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1112 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1113 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1114 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1116 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1117 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1119 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1120 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1121 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1122 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1124 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1125 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1126 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1127 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1128 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1129 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1131 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1132 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1134 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1136 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1137 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1139 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1140 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1141 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1144 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1145 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1146 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1147 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1148 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1151 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1152 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1153 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1154 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1155 copyright law today regulates both.
1158 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1159 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1160 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1161 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1162 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1163 more expense of doing business.
1165 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1167 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1168 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1169 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1170 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1171 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1172 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1173 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1174 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1175 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1176 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1177 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1178 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1179 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1180 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1181 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1183 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1186 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1187 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1188 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1189 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1190 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1191 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1192 enabled are much more tenuous.
1193 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1195 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1196 this creative class.
1199 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1200 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1201 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1205 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1206 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1208 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1209 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1210 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1211 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1212 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1215 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1216 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1217 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1218 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1219 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1220 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1224 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1225 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1226 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1227 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1231 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1232 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1233 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1234 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1235 synchronization was pretty close.
1238 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1239 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1240 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1241 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1242 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1244 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1245 Cartoons (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1250 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1251 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1252 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1253 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1256 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1257 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1258 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1259 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1260 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1261 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1262 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1265 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1266 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1267 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1268 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1271 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1272 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1273 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1274 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1275 The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular and among the best of its
1279 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1281 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1282 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1284 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1285 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1286 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1287 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1288 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1289 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1290 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1291 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1293 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1294 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1295 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1296 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1297 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1301 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1302 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1303 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1305 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1306 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1307 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1309 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1310 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1311 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1312 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1313 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1314 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1315 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1316 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1320 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1321 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1322 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1323 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1324 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1325 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1326 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1329 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1330 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1331 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1332 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1333 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1334 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1335 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (
1937),
1336 Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi (
1942), Song of
1337 the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland (
1951), Robin
1338 Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1340 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1341 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)
—not to
1342 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1343 Treasure Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1344 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1345 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1346 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1349 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1350 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1351 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1352 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1353 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1354 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1355 culture around us and makes it something different.
1357 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1358 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1359 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1360 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1361 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1363 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1364 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1366 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1367 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1368 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1370 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1371 Web site associated with this book, available at
1372 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1374 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1375 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1376 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1377 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1380 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1381 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1382 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1383 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1384 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1385 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1386 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1389 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1390 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1391 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1392 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1395 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1396 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1397 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1398 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1399 content from before the Great Depression.
1402 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1403 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1404 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1408 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1409 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1410 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1411 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1412 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1413 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1414 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1417 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1418 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1419 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1420 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1421 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1422 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1423 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1424 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1425 interestingly different way.
1428 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1429 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1430 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1433 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1434 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1435 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1436 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1437 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1438 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1439 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1440 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1441 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1442 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1443 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1444 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1447 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1448 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1449 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1450 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1451 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1452 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1453 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1454 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1455 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1458 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1459 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1460 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1461 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1462 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1463 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1464 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1465 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1466 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1467 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1468 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1469 original copyright owner's permission.
1471 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1472 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1475 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1476 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1477 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1478 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1479 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1481 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1482 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1483 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1485 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1486 York: Perennial,
2000).
1490 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1491 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1492 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1493 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1494 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1495 which are fifty years old."
1497 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1499 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1500 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1501 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1502 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1503 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1504 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1505 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1507 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1508 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1509 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1510 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1511 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1512 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1513 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1514 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1518 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1519 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1520 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1521 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1522 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1523 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1524 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1525 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1529 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1530 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1531 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1532 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1533 to prosecute cases like this."
1536 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1537 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1538 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1539 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1541 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1542 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1543 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1544 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1545 their clients or hurt them?
1546 Let's pause for a moment.
1549 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1550 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1551 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1554 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1555 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1556 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1557 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1559 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See
1560 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1561 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas
1562 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1563 describes a set of "property" rights
—copyright, patents,
1564 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1567 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1568 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1572 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1573 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1574 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1575 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1576 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1577 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1578 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1579 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1580 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1581 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1582 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1583 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1587 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1588 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1589 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1591 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1592 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1596 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1597 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1598 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1599 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1600 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1601 form, whether large or small.
1604 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1605 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1606 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1607 particular find it hard to say why.
1610 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1611 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1612 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1613 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1614 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1615 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1616 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1617 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1618 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1619 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1620 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster
1624 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1625 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1626 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1627 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1628 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1629 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1630 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1631 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1635 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1636 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1637 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1638 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1639 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1640 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1641 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1642 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1643 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1646 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1647 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1648 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1653 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1654 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1655 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1657 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1658 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1659 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1660 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1661 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1662 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1663 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1666 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1667 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1668 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1669 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1670 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1671 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1672 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1673 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1676 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1677 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1680 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1681 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1683 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1684 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1685 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1686 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1687 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1688 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1689 population of photographers.
1692 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1693 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1694 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1695 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1697 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1698 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1702 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1703 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1704 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1705 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1706 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1707 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1708 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1709 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1710 chemicals.
<footnote>
1713 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1715 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1720 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1721 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1722 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1723 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1724 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1725 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1726 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1727 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1728 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1729 percent.
<footnote><para>
1732 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1733 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1735 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1738 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1742 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1743 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1744 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1745 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1746 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1747 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1748 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1749 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1750 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1751 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1757 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1758 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1759 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1760 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1761 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1762 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1763 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1764 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1765 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1766 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1770 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1771 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1772 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1773 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1774 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1775 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1776 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1777 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1779 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1783 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1784 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1785 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1786 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1787 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1789 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1790 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1791 that they thought valuable.
1793 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1795 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1796 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1797 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1798 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1799 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1802 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1803 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1804 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1805 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1806 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1807 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1808 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1809 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1812 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1813 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1814 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1815 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1816 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1817 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1818 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1819 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1820 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1822 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1823 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1824 Review
48 (
1960)
398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1825 Inc.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1830 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1831 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1832 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1833 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1834 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1835 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1836 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1837 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1838 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1839 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1840 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1841 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1842 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1847 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1848 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1849 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1850 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1851 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1852 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1853 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1854 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1855 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1856 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1857 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1858 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1859 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1860 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1861 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1862 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1863 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1864 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1865 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1866 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1867 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1868 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1871 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1873 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1874 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1875 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1876 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1877 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1879 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1880 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1881 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1882 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1884 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1885 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1886 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1887 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1891 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1892 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1893 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1894 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1895 the way people access it."
1896 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
1899 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1900 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1901 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1905 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1906 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1907 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1909 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1910 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1911 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1913 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1914 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1915 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1916 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1917 (at least at first) terrible media.
1920 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1921 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1922 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
1923 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1924 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
1925 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1926 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1927 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1930 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1931 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1932 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1933 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1934 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1935 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1937 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
1939 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1940 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1941 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1944 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1945 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1949 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1951 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1952 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
1954 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1955 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1956 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1957 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1958 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1959 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1960 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1961 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1963 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1964 November
2000, available at
1965 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1967 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1970 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1972 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1973 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1974 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1975 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1976 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1979 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
1980 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
1981 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1982 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1986 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1987 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1988 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1989 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1994 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1995 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1999 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2000 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2001 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2002 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2005 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2006 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2010 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2011 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2012 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2013 language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2018 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2020 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2021 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2022 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2023 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2024 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2025 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2026 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2027 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2028 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2029 students know something about
—gun violence.
2032 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2033 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2034 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2035 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2036 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2037 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2040 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2041 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2042 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2043 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2044 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2045 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2046 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2047 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2048 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2049 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2050 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2051 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2052 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2053 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2054 to this form of expression.
2058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2059 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2060 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2061 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2062 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2063 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2064 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2065 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2070 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2071 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2072 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2073 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2074 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2075 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2076 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2077 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2078 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2079 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2080 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2081 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2082 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2083 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2084 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2085 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2086 about the topic. . . .
2089 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2090 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2091 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2092 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2093 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2096 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2097 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2098 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2100 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2101 had a lot of power with this language."
2105 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2106 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2107 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2108 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2109 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2110 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2111 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2112 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2113 world would be watching.
2116 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2117 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2118 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2119 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2120 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2121 entertainment is tragedy.
2123 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2124 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2126 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2127 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2128 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2129 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2130 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2131 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2132 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2133 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2134 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2135 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2136 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2137 was also the Internet.
2140 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2141 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2142 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2143 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2146 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2150 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2151 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2152 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2153 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2154 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2155 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2156 spread practically instantaneously.
2159 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2160 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2161 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2162 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2163 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2164 records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2165 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2168 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2169 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2170 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2171 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2172 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2173 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2174 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2175 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2176 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2177 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2178 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2179 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2182 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2183 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2184 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2185 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2186 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2189 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2190 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2193 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2194 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2195 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2196 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2197 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2198 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2199 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2200 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2201 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2202 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2203 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2204 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2205 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2206 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2208 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2209 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2213 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2214 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2215 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2217 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2218 Political Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2220 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2221 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2222 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2225 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2226 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2227 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2228 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2229 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2230 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2232 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2233 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2234 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2235 little beyond what our friends say.
2238 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2239 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2240 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2241 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2242 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2245 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2249 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2250 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2251 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2252 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2253 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2254 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2257 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2258 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2259 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2260 is having an effect.
2263 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2264 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2265 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2266 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2267 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2268 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2269 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2270 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2271 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2272 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2274 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2275 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2279 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2280 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2281 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2282 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2286 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2287 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2288 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2289 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2290 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2291 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2292 peer-generated rankings.
2294 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2295 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2298 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2300 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2301 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2302 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2303 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2304 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2305 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2306 get it out of the way."
2308 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2310 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2311 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2312 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2313 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2314 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2316 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2318 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2319 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2320 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2321 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2322 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2323 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2324 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2326 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2327 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2328 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2329 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2330 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2331 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2332 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2334 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2335 Information Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2336 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2337 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2338 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2340 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2341 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2342 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2343 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2346 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2347 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2348 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2349 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2350 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2353 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2354 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2355 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2356 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2357 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2358 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2359 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2360 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2361 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2363 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2366 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2367 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2368 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2369 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2370 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2373 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2374 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2375 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2376 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2377 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2378 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2379 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2380 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2381 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2382 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2383 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2384 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2385 extraordinary to report.
2387 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2388 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2389 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2392 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2393 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2394 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2397 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2398 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2399 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2400 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2404 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2405 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2406 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2407 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2408 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2409 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2411 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2412 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2413 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2414 the tinkering of many others.
2417 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2418 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2419 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2420 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2421 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2424 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2425 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2426 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2427 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2428 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2429 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2432 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2433 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2434 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2435 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2436 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2437 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2441 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2442 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2443 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2444 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2445 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2446 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2447 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2448 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2449 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2451 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2453 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2454 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2457 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2458 kind of recognition.
2461 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2462 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2463 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2464 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2465 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2466 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2467 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2470 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2471 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2472 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2473 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2474 general.
<footnote><para>
2476 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2477 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2478 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2480 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2481 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2484 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2485 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2489 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2490 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2491 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2492 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2493 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2495 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2497 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2498 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2499 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2500 the law to close down that technology.
2503 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2504 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2508 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2509 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2511 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2512 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2513 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2514 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2515 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2518 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2519 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2520 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2521 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2522 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2523 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2526 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2527 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2528 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2529 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2530 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2533 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2535 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2536 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2537 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2538 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2539 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2540 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2541 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2542 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2545 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2546 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2547 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2548 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2549 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2550 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2551 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2554 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2555 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2556 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2557 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2558 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2559 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2560 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2561 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2562 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2566 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2567 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2568 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2569 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2570 be on users' computers.
2573 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2574 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2575 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2576 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2578 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2582 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2583 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2584 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2585 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2586 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2587 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2588 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2589 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2590 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2591 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2592 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2593 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2597 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2598 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2599 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2600 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2601 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2602 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2603 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2606 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2607 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2608 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2609 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2610 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2611 easier to use"
—again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2612 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2613 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2614 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2615 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2618 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2619 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2621 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2622 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2623 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2624 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2625 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2626 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2629 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2630 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2631 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2632 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2633 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2634 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2635 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion
—six
2636 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2638 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2639 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2640 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2644 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2645 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2646 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2647 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2648 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2651 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2652 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2653 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2654 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2655 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2656 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2657 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2658 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2659 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2662 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2663 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2664 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2665 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2666 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2668 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2669 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2672 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2673 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2676 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2677 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2678 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2679 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2680 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2681 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2682 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2684 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2685 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2686 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2688 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2689 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2690 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2692 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2693 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2697 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2698 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2699 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2704 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2705 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2706 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2707 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2711 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2712 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2713 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2714 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2715 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2719 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2720 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2722 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2723 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2724 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2725 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2726 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2727 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2732 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2734 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2735 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87–93,
2736 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2738 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2739 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2740 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2741 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2742 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2743 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2744 this creative property
2745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2746 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2749 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2753 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2754 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2755 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2756 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2757 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2758 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2759 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2762 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2763 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2764 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2765 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2766 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2767 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2768 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2769 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2770 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2771 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2773 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2774 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2775 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2776 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2777 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2778 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2779 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2780 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2781 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2782 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2783 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2784 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2785 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2789 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2790 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2791 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2792 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2793 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2795 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2796 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2798 That led the independents to flee the East
2799 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2800 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2801 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2805 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2806 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2807 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2810 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2811 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2812 Edison's creative property.
2815 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2816 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2818 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2819 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2822 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2823 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2824 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2825 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2826 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2827 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2828 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2829 right to perform it publicly.
2831 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2833 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2834 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2835 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2836 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2837 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2838 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2839 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2840 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2841 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2842 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2843 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2844 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2845 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2846 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2847 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2848 its composer anything.
2851 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2853 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2858 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2859 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2860 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2861 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2862 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2863 rights.
<footnote><para>
2865 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2866 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2867 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2868 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2869 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2870 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2875 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2876 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2877 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2879 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2880 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2882 and the "music publishing industry"
2883 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2885 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2886 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2889 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2890 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2892 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2893 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2897 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2898 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2899 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2900 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2901 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2902 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2905 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2906 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2907 Perforating Company of New York).
2908 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2909 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2910 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2911 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2912 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2913 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2914 statute."
<footnote><para>
2916 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
2917 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2918 Graphophone Company Association).
2922 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and the
2923 recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that composers
2924 would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their music. But
2925 rather than simply granting the composer complete control over the
2926 right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2927 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once
2928 the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2931 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2932 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2933 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2936 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2937 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2938 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2939 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2940 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2941 the fee set by the statute.
2944 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2945 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2946 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2947 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2948 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2949 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2951 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
2954 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2955 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2956 kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2957 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2958 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2959 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2960 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2961 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2962 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2963 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2964 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2965 creativity.
<footnote><para>
2967 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2968 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2969 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2970 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2971 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2973 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2976 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2977 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2978 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2983 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2985 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2986 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2987 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
2988 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
2989 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
2990 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
2991 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
2992 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
2993 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
2994 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
2995 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2996 choice.
<footnote><para>
2998 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
2999 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3000 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3001 this report.
</para></footnote>
3005 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3006 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3010 <title>Radio
</title>
3012 Radio was also born of piracy.
3015 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3016 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3018 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3019 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3020 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3021 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3022 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3023 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3024 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3025 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3026 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3027 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3028 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3030 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3031 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3032 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3035 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3036 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3037 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3038 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3039 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3040 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3041 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3042 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3043 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3048 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3049 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3050 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3051 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3052 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3053 of playing the song.
3056 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3057 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3058 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3059 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3062 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3063 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3064 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3065 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3066 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3067 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3068 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3071 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3072 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3073 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3074 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3075 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3076 to take something for nothing.
3079 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3080 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3083 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3086 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3087 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3088 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3089 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3091 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3092 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3093 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3096 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3097 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3099 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3100 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3101 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3103 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3104 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3105 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3106 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3109 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3110 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3111 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3112 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3114 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3115 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3117 As another broadcaster put it,
3121 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3122 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3123 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3125 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3126 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3131 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3135 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3136 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3137 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3138 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3140 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3141 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3142 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3147 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3148 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3149 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3151 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3152 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3156 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3157 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3161 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3162 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3163 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3164 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3167 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3168 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3170 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3171 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3172 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3174 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3178 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3179 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3182 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3183 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3184 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3185 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3186 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3187 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3188 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3189 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3190 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3191 created by broadcasters' content.
3194 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3195 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3196 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3197 today
<footnote><para>
3199 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3200 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3201 Information, available at
3202 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3203 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3204 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3206 — then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3207 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3208 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3209 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3210 generation
—until now.
3212 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3216 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3218 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3219 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3220 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3221 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3222 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3226 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3227 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3228 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3229 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3230 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3231 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3232 has so often done in the past.
3233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3235 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3236 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3238 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3239 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3240 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3241 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3242 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3244 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3245 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available
3246 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3247 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," Financial
3248 Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3250 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3251 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3254 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3255 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3256 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3257 This piracy is wrong.
3260 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3261 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3262 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3263 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3264 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3265 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3266 of our existence, treated as right.
3269 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3270 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3271 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3272 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3273 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3274 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3275 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3276 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3277 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3280 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3281 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3283 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3284 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3288 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3289 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3290 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3291 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3293 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3294 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3295 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3296 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3297 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3298 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3299 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3300 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3301 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3302 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3303 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3304 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3305 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3306 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3307 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3308 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3309 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3310 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3314 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3315 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3316 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3317 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3318 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3320 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3321 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3322 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the
3323 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3324 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3325 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3326 pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3327 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3331 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3332 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3333 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3334 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3335 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3336 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3337 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3338 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3339 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3340 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3341 piracy of the tangible.
3344 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3345 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like
3346 all property rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide
3347 the terms under which content is shared. If the copyright owner
3348 doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions:
3349 important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted content
3350 regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses give
3351 people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3352 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3355 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3356 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3357 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3358 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3359 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3362 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3363 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3364 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3365 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3366 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3367 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3368 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3369 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3370 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3371 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3372 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3373 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3376 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3377 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3378 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3379 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3380 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3381 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3384 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3385 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3386 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3387 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3388 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3389 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3390 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3391 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3392 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3393 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3394 violating the law is still wrong.
3397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3398 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3399 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3400 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3401 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3402 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3403 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3404 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3408 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3409 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3410 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3411 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3412 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3413 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3414 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3417 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3418 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3419 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3420 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3423 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3424 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3425 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3426 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3429 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3430 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3434 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3435 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3437 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3438 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3440 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3442 This means we must determine whether
3443 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3445 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3446 author of his profit.
3449 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3450 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3451 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3452 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3454 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3455 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3456 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3457 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3458 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3459 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3460 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3461 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89–92,
139.
3462 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3463 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3464 put together components that had been developed independently.
3465 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3468 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3469 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3470 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3471 system.
<footnote><para>
3473 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3474 Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3475 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3476 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3477 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3478 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3480 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3481 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3482 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3483 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3484 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3485 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3486 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3489 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3490 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3491 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3492 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3495 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3496 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3497 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3498 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3500 A survey by the NPD group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
3501 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to exchange content in
3502 May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3504 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3505 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3507 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3508 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3509 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3510 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3513 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3514 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3515 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3516 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3517 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3518 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3523 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3524 different kinds into four types.
3526 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3529 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3530 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3531 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3532 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3533 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3534 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3535 users who download instead of purchasing.
3539 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3540 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3541 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3542 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3543 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3544 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3545 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3550 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3551 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3552 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3553 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3554 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3555 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3556 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3557 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3558 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3559 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3560 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3561 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3567 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3568 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3573 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3576 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3577 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3578 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3579 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3581 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148–49.
3582 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3584 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3585 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3586 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3587 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3588 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3589 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3592 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3593 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3594 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3595 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3596 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3597 "devastating" the industry.
3600 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3601 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3602 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3603 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3604 & Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3605 technology, the labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3607 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the
3608 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report
3609 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3610 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3611 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3612 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3613 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3614 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3615 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3616 Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law,
3617 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3618 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3619 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3620 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3621 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3622 regulating technology was the answer.
3625 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3626 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3627 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3628 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3630 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3631 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3633 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3637 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3638 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3639 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3640 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3641 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3642 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3643 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3644 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3647 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3648 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3649 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3650 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3651 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3652 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3653 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3656 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3658 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3659 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3662 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3664 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3666 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3668 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3669 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3670 25 June
2003, available at
3671 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3672 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3673 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3674 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3675 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3677 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3678 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3680 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3682 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3683 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3684 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3685 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3686 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3687 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3690 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3691 February
2003, available at
3692 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3693 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3696 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3697 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3698 High Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie
3699 [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3707 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3708 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3709 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3710 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3712 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3713 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3716 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3717 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3718 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3720 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own
3722 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3723 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3724 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3725 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of Kazaa
3726 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry would have
3727 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3728 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3729 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3731 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3734 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3736 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3737 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3741 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
3742 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3744 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3745 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3747 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3748 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3749 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3751 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3753 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3754 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3758 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3759 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3760 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3762 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3766 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3768 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3770 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3772 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3773 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3774 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3775 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3776 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3778 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3781 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3784 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3785 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3786 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3787 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3788 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3790 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3791 owner for the content they sell.
3793 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3795 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3796 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3797 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3798 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3799 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3800 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3801 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3802 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3803 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3804 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3805 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3808 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3809 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3810 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3811 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3812 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3816 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3817 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3818 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3819 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3820 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3821 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3824 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3825 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3826 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3827 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3828 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3829 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3833 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3834 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3835 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3836 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3839 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3840 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3841 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3842 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3846 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3847 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3848 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of
3849 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3850 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3851 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3852 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3853 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3854 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3855 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3856 found only with time.
3859 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3860 just what you call type A sharing?"
3863 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3865 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3866 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3868 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3870 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3871 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3872 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3873 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3874 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3876 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3877 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3879 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3880 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3882 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3886 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3887 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3888 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3889 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3890 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3891 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3892 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3893 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3894 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3897 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3898 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3899 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3901 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3903 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3904 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3905 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3908 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3909 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3910 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3912 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3913 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3914 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3915 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3916 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3918 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3921 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3922 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3923 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3924 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3926 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3931 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3932 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of
3933 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3934 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3936 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3938 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3939 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3940 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3941 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3943 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3944 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3945 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3947 over the future (cable).
3949 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
3951 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3952 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3953 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3954 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3955 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3956 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3957 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3958 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3959 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3960 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3961 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3964 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3965 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3966 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3967 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3968 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3969 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3970 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3971 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3973 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3974 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
3975 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
3976 for the architecture it chose.
3979 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
3980 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
3981 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
3982 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
3983 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
3984 copyright."
<footnote><para>
3986 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
3987 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
3988 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
3989 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
3991 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
3992 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
3993 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
3994 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
3995 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
3996 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
3998 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4000 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4001 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4003 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4006 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4007 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4008 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4009 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4010 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4011 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4012 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4014 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4019 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4020 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4021 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4022 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held
4023 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4024 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4025 technology
—which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4026 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4027 of the American film industry)
—was an illegal
4028 technology.
<footnote><para>
4030 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4035 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4038 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4039 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4044 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4045 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4047 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4049 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4050 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4052 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4054 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4059 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4060 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4062 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4063 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4064 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4068 <title>Table
</title>
4069 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4073 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4074 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4075 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4080 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4081 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4082 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4083 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4086 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4087 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4089 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4092 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4093 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4094 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4095 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4099 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4100 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4101 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4108 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4109 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4111 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4112 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4113 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4114 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4115 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4116 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4117 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4118 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4119 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4120 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293–96.
4121 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4123 In each case, throughout our history,
4124 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4128 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4129 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4130 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4131 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4132 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4134 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4135 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4136 the interests at stake.
4137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4140 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4141 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4142 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4143 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4144 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4146 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4147 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4148 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4149 permission to record a song?
4152 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4153 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4154 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4155 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4157 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4160 Instead, the particular uses that the
4161 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4162 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4163 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4165 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4166 the distribution of content.
4169 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4170 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4171 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4172 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4173 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4174 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4175 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4176 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4177 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4178 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4180 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4186 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4188 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4189 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4191 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4193 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4194 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4196 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4197 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4199 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4201 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4202 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4203 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4204 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4205 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4206 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4207 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4210 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4211 just as any other property is protected."
4213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4217 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4218 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4222 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4223 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4224 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4225 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4226 the price she can get.
4229 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4230 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4231 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4232 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4233 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4234 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4235 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard
—by, for example,
4237 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4238 thing I am taking then?
4241 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4242 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4244 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4246 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4247 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4248 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4249 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4250 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4251 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4252 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4254 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4255 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4256 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4260 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4261 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4262 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4264 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4268 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in
4269 other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4271 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4273 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4275 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4277 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4278 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4280 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4281 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4283 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4288 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4290 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4292 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4293 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4294 significance of this true statement
—"copyright material is property"
—
4295 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4296 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4301 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4302 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4304 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4305 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4307 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4308 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4309 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4310 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4311 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4313 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4316 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4317 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4318 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4320 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4321 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4322 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4323 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4324 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4325 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4326 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4329 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger
<footnote><para>
4331 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4333 University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4336 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4337 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4338 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4340 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4342 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4344 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4347 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4348 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4349 of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4350 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4351 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4353 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4355 by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.
<footnote><para>
4357 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4359 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4361 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in
1731. So why
4362 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in
1774?
4365 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4367 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4368 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4369 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4371 in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4372 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4373 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4375 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4378 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4379 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4380 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4382 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4384 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4385 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4387 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4388 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4390 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4392 of any positive law.
4395 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4396 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4397 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4398 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4401 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4402 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4404 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4407 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4408 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4410 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4411 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4413 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4414 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4417 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4418 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4419 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4422 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4423 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4424 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4425 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4426 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4427 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4428 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4429 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4431 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4434 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4436 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4437 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4441 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4442 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4443 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4444 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4446 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4447 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4449 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4451 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4453 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4454 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4458 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4459 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4460 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4462 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4464 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4465 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4466 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4467 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4470 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4471 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4473 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4474 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4475 monopolies
—especially
4476 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4477 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4478 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4479 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4481 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4482 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4486 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4488 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4489 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4490 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4491 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4492 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4494 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4497 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4498 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4499 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4500 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4502 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind
—tools of the
4503 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4505 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4506 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4507 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4508 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4510 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4511 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4515 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4516 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4518 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4519 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4520 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4524 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4525 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4526 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4527 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4528 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4529 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4531 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4532 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4533 construction and spread of culture.
4536 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4537 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4538 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4539 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4540 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4541 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4542 they said; they needed more time.
4545 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4546 words that echo today,
4550 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4551 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4552 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4553 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4554 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4555 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4556 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4557 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4558 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4560 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4561 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4562 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4563 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4564 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4565 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4566 al.,
8, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4571 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4572 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4573 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4574 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4575 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4576 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4577 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4578 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4579 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4580 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4581 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4582 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4583 way to protect authors.
4586 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4587 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4588 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4589 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4590 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4592 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4593 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4594 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4596 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4597 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4600 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4601 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4602 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4604 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4605 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4609 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4610 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4611 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4612 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4614 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4617 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4618 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4619 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4620 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4621 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4622 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4626 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4629 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4630 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4631 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4632 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4633 Property."
<footnote><para>
4635 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4638 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4639 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4640 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4643 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4644 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4645 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4648 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4649 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4650 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4651 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4652 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4653 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4655 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4656 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review
29
4660 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4661 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4664 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4665 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4666 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4667 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4668 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4669 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4670 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4671 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4672 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4675 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4676 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4677 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4678 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4679 with in
1710: How best to limit
4680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4681 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4682 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4683 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4684 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4685 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4686 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4688 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4690 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4691 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4693 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4695 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4696 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4697 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4701 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4702 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4703 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4704 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4705 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4706 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4709 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4710 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4711 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4712 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4713 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4714 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4715 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4716 statute were no longer protected.
4719 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4720 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4721 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4722 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4723 House of Lords generally voted.
4726 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4727 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4729 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4730 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4731 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4732 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4733 passed into the public domain.
4736 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4737 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4738 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4739 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4740 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4741 and the greatest works in English history
—including those of
4742 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan
—were free of
4744 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4745 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4746 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4747 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4748 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4751 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4752 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4753 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4754 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4755 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4756 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4757 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4758 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4759 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4765 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4766 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4771 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4772 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4773 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4774 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4775 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4776 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4777 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4778 successors.
<footnote><para>
4785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4786 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4787 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4788 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4789 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4790 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4791 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4792 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4793 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4794 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4795 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4796 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4797 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4798 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4799 readers chose to let it develop
— chose in the books they bought
4800 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4801 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4802 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4803 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4806 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4807 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4808 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4813 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4814 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4816 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4817 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4818 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4819 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4823 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4824 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4828 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4829 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4830 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4831 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4832 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4834 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4837 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4838 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4839 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4840 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4842 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4846 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4847 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4848 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4849 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4850 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4853 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4854 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4855 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4856 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4857 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4858 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4861 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4862 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4863 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4864 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4865 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4866 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4869 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4870 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4871 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4872 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4873 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4874 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4877 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4878 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4879 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4880 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4881 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4882 confirm what he had been told.
4885 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4886 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4887 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4891 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4892 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4893 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4897 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4898 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4899 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4900 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4901 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4902 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4903 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4906 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4907 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4908 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4909 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4910 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4911 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4912 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4913 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4914 says the owner gets to control.
4917 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4918 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4919 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4920 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4921 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4922 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
4926 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4927 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
4929 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4930 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4931 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4932 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4933 Law School,
5 August
2003.
4935 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4936 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons
—and fair use does
4937 not require the permission of anyone.
4940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4941 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4945 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4946 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4947 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4948 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4949 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4950 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4952 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
4955 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4956 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4957 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4958 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4959 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4963 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4964 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4965 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
4966 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
4967 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4968 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
4969 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4970 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4975 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4976 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4977 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4978 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4979 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4980 pockets, me or them.
4981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4985 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
4986 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
4992 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
4993 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
4994 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
4995 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
4996 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
4997 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5000 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5001 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5002 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5003 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5008 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5009 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5010 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5011 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5013 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5014 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5015 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5016 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5017 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5019 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5021 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5022 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5023 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5024 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5025 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5026 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5027 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5028 important to his career.
5030 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5032 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5033 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5034 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5035 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5039 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5040 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5041 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5042 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5043 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5045 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5047 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5048 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5049 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5050 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5051 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5054 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5056 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5057 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5059 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5061 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5062 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5063 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5067 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5068 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5069 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5070 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5072 <primary>artists
</primary>
5073 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5078 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5079 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5080 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5081 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5082 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5085 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5086 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5087 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5091 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5092 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5093 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5094 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5095 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5096 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5100 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5101 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5102 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5103 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5104 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5105 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5106 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5107 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5108 started calling people.
5111 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5113 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5114 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5115 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5116 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5117 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5118 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5119 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5120 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5124 It was one year later
—"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5125 were totally in the clear."
5127 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5129 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5130 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5131 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5135 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5136 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5137 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5138 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5139 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5140 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5141 systematically and cleared the rights.
5146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5147 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5148 loved it, and it sold very well.
5150 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5151 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5153 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5154 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5155 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5156 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5157 at all."
<footnote><para>
5159 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5160 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5161 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5163 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5167 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5168 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5169 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5170 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5171 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5175 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5176 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5177 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5178 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5179 compensated for that.
5183 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5184 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5185 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5186 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5187 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5188 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5189 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5193 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5194 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5195 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5196 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5198 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5199 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5200 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5201 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5202 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5203 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5204 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5205 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5206 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5207 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5208 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5209 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5212 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5214 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5215 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5216 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5217 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5218 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5219 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5220 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5221 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5222 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5223 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5224 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5225 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5226 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5227 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5228 "Does this still make sense?"
5231 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5232 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5233 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5234 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5237 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5238 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5241 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5242 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5243 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5244 judges loved every minute of it.
5246 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5248 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5249 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5250 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5251 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5252 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5253 were just violated in this room?"
5255 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5257 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5258 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5259 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5260 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5261 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5262 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5263 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5264 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5265 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5266 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5267 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5268 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5269 couldn't easily do them legally.
5272 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5273 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5274 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5275 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5276 planted in your presentation.
5279 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5281 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5282 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5283 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5284 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5285 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5286 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5287 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5288 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5291 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5292 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5293 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5294 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5295 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5298 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5299 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5300 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5301 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5302 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5303 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5304 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5305 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5306 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5307 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5308 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5309 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5313 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5314 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5315 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5316 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5319 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5320 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5322 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5323 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5324 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5325 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5326 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5327 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5331 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5332 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5333 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5334 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5335 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5336 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5337 new audiences, it is Mike."
5340 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5341 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5342 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5343 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5344 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5345 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5346 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5347 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5350 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5351 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5352 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5353 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5354 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5355 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5356 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5357 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5358 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5359 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5360 curse, reserved for the few.
5362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5364 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5365 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5367 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5368 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5369 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5370 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5371 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5372 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5373 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5376 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5377 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5378 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5379 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5380 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5381 well as when those pages changed.
5384 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5385 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5386 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5387 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5392 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5393 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5394 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5397 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5398 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5399 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5400 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5401 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5404 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5405 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5406 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5407 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5408 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5410 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5411 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5412 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5413 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5414 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5418 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5419 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5420 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5421 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5422 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5423 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5424 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5425 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5429 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5430 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5431 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5432 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5433 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5434 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5435 presumes this knowedge.
5438 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5439 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5440 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5441 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5443 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5444 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5445 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5446 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5449 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5450 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5451 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5452 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5453 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5454 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5455 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5456 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5459 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5460 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5461 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5462 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5463 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5464 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5465 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5466 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5467 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5468 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5469 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5470 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5471 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5472 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5473 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5477 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5478 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5479 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5480 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5481 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5484 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5485 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5489 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5490 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5491 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5492 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5493 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5494 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5497 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5498 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5499 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5500 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5501 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5505 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5506 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5507 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5508 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5509 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5510 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5511 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5512 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5514 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5515 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2–3
5516 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5517 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5522 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5523 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5524 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5525 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5526 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5527 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5528 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5529 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5530 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5533 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5535 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5536 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5537 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5538 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5539 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5540 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5544 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5545 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5546 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5547 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5548 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5549 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5550 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5551 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5552 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5553 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5554 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5555 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5556 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5557 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5558 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5559 few minutes
—for free.
5560 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5563 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5564 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5565 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5566 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5567 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5571 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5572 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5573 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5574 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5575 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5576 has
—a noncommercial life.
5579 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5580 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5584 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5585 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5586 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5587 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5588 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5591 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5592 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5593 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5594 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5595 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5596 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5600 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5601 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5603 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5604 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5605 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5606 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5607 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5608 College Law Review
44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5609 </para></footnote>). After
5610 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5611 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5612 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5613 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5614 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5617 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5618 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5619 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5620 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5621 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5622 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5623 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5624 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5628 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5629 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5630 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5631 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5632 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5635 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5636 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5637 little practical effect.
5640 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5641 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5642 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5643 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5644 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5645 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5648 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5649 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5650 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5655 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5656 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5657 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5658 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5659 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5660 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5661 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5662 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5663 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5664 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5665 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5669 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5670 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5671 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5672 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5673 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5674 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5677 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5678 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5679 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5680 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5681 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5684 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5685 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5686 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5687 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5688 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5689 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5693 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5694 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5696 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5697 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5698 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5699 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5700 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5701 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5702 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5703 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5706 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5707 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5708 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5709 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5710 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5711 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5712 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5713 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5714 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5716 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5717 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5718 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5719 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5720 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5721 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5722 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5726 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5727 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5728 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5729 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5730 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5731 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5732 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5733 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5734 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5738 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5739 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5740 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5741 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5742 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5743 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5744 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5747 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5752 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5753 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5754 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5755 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5756 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5757 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5758 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5759 debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5761 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5762 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5763 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5764 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5765 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5771 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5772 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5773 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5776 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5777 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5778 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5779 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5782 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5783 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5784 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5785 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5786 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5787 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5788 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5789 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5790 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5794 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5795 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5797 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5798 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5799 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5800 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5801 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5802 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5803 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5804 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5805 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5806 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5807 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5808 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5812 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5813 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5814 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5815 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5816 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5817 culture would develop.
5820 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5821 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5822 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5823 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5824 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5825 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5826 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5827 the same would be to
5829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5830 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5831 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5835 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5836 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5837 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5838 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5839 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5840 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5841 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5842 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5843 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5844 Constitution itself.
5847 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5848 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5849 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5850 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5851 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5852 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5853 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5854 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5855 government pays for the privilege.
5858 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5859 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5860 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5861 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5862 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5863 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5864 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5865 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5866 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5867 compensation for your land
5868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5869 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5870 compensation at all.
5873 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5874 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5875 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5876 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5877 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5878 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5882 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5883 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5884 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5885 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5886 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5887 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5888 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5889 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5890 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5891 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5894 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5895 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5896 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5897 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5898 creative property there must be a public domain?
5901 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5902 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5903 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5904 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5905 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5906 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5907 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5908 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5909 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5910 control how culture develops.
5914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5915 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5916 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5917 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5918 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5919 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5920 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5921 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5923 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
5924 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
5925 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
5928 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5929 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5930 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5931 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5932 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5933 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5934 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5935 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5936 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5937 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5938 Web, you can be punished
5939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5940 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5941 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5944 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5945 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5946 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5947 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5948 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5949 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5950 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5951 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5952 the source of the enforcement.
5955 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5956 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5957 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5958 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5959 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5960 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5961 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5962 individual or group might behave.
5965 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5966 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
5967 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5968 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5969 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5970 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5971 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5972 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5973 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5974 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
5975 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5976 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5977 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
5982 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
5983 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
5984 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
5985 undermined by another.
5988 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
5989 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
5990 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
5991 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
5992 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
5993 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
5994 must consider how these four in particular interact.
5996 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
5997 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6000 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6001 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6002 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6003 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6004 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6005 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6006 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6007 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6008 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6009 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6010 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6011 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6014 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6015 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6016 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6018 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6019 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6020 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6021 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6022 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6023 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6024 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6027 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6028 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6029 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6030 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6031 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6032 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6033 used to require that other laws be more
6034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6035 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6036 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6039 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6041 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6042 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6043 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6046 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6047 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6048 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6049 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6050 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6054 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6055 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6056 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6057 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6058 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6059 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6060 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6061 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6062 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6063 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6064 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6065 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6066 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6067 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6068 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6069 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6070 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6071 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6072 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6073 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6074 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6075 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6076 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6077 places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6078 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6079 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6080 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6081 of these groups might face.
6082 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6085 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6086 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6088 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6089 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6090 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6091 rallying makes sense.
6094 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6097 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6098 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6099 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6103 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6104 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6105 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6106 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6107 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6108 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6109 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6110 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6111 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6112 this form of infringement.
6115 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6116 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6117 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6118 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6119 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6120 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6123 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6124 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6125 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6126 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6129 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6130 looting that results.
6132 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6133 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6134 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6137 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6138 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6139 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6140 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6141 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6142 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6143 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6144 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6145 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6146 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6149 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6150 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6151 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6152 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6153 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6154 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6155 life. Homeowners living in a
6157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6158 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6159 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6160 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6161 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6162 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6163 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6166 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6167 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6168 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6169 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6170 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6171 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6174 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6175 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6176 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6177 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6178 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6179 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6180 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6182 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6183 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6184 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6185 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6186 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6187 October
2003, available at
6188 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6191 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6192 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6193 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6194 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6195 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6196 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6197 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6198 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6199 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6200 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6201 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6204 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6205 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6206 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6208 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6209 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6210 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6211 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6212 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6214 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6217 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6218 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6219 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6220 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6221 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6223 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6226 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6227 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6228 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6229 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6230 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6231 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6232 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6233 opportunities for innovation and change.
6236 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6237 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6238 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6239 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6240 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6241 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6242 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6243 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6244 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6245 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6246 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6247 regulation is justified.
6250 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6252 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6253 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6254 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6255 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6256 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6259 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6261 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6262 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6265 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6266 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6267 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6268 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6269 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6270 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6273 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6274 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6275 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6277 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6279 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6280 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6281 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6282 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6283 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6284 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6287 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6288 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6289 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6290 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6291 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6292 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6293 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6296 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6297 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6298 culture.
<footnote><para>
6300 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6301 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6303 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6304 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6305 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6306 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6307 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6308 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6310 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6311 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6312 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6313 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6314 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6317 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6318 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6319 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6320 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6321 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6322 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6323 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6324 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6325 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6328 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6329 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6332 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6334 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6335 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6337 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6338 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6339 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6340 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6343 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6344 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6345 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6348 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6349 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6350 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6353 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6354 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6355 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6356 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6357 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6358 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6361 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6362 in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6363 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6364 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6365 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6366 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6367 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6370 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6371 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6372 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6373 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6374 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6375 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6376 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6377 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6378 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6379 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6380 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6381 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6385 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6386 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6387 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6388 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6389 years since they first struck its design.
6392 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6393 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6395 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6398 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6399 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6400 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6405 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6406 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6407 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6414 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6415 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6417 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6418 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6419 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6420 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6421 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6422 authorship.
<footnote>
6425 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6426 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6427 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6428 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6429 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6430 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6432 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6433 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6434 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6435 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6436 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6437 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6440 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6441 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6442 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6443 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6444 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6445 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6448 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6449 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6450 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6451 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6452 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6455 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6456 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6457 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6458 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6459 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6460 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6461 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6463 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6464 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6465 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation
6466 of an Industry,
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6467 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6468 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6469 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7–10 (
2002),
6470 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6471 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6472 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6473 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6474 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6475 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6476 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6479 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6480 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6482 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6483 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6484 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6488 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6489 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6490 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6491 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6492 domain.
<footnote><para>
6494 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6495 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6496 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6497 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6498 Studies on Copyright, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6499 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6500 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6501 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6502 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6505 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6506 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6507 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6509 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6510 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6511 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6512 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6513 books; that use
—because it does not involve publication
—is
6517 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6518 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6519 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6520 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6521 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6522 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6525 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6526 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6527 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6528 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6529 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6530 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6531 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6532 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6535 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6536 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6537 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6538 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6541 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6542 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6543 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6546 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6547 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6548 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6549 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6550 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6551 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6552 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6556 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6557 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6558 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6559 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6560 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6561 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6562 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6563 was ninety-five years.
6566 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6567 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6568 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6569 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6570 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6571 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6575 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6576 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6577 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6578 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6579 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6580 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6581 years.
<footnote><para>
6583 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6584 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6585 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6586 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6591 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6592 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6594 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6595 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6596 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6597 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6600 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6601 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6602 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6603 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6604 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6605 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6606 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6607 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6608 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6609 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6610 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6613 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6614 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6615 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6616 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6617 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6618 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6619 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6620 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6621 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6622 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6623 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6624 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6625 on the initial creative work.
6628 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6629 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6630 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6632 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6633 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6634 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6635 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6636 famous
© or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6637 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6638 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6641 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6642 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6643 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6644 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6645 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6646 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6647 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6648 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6649 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6650 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6651 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6655 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6656 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6657 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6658 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6659 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6660 copy available for others to copy.
6663 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6667 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6668 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6669 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6670 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6671 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6672 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6674 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6676 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
6678 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6679 Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6681 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6682 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6683 the United States
—publishers.
6686 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6687 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6688 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6689 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
6690 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6691 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6693 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6697 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6698 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6699 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6701 to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6702 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6703 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6706 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6707 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6708 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6711 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6713 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6714 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6715 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6716 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6717 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6718 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6719 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6721 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6722 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6725 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6726 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6728 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6730 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6731 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6732 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6733 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6738 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6739 a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6740 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6741 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6742 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6743 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6744 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6746 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6748 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6750 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6751 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6753 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6754 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6755 the wrong of direct piracy.
6758 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6759 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6760 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6762 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
6764 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6765 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6766 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6767 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6769 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6771 These two different uses of my creative work are
6775 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6776 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6777 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6779 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6780 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6784 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6785 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6787 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6788 rights originally granted.
6791 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6792 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6794 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6795 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6796 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6797 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6799 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6800 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6801 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6802 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
6804 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
6805 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
6806 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6811 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6812 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6813 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6814 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6815 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6816 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6817 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6818 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6819 trigger for copyright law.
6822 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6823 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6824 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6825 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6827 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6828 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6829 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6831 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6833 because it is clear that the
6834 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6835 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6838 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6841 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6842 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6843 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6847 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6848 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6849 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6850 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6851 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6852 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6853 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6854 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6855 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6856 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6859 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6860 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6861 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6864 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6865 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6866 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6867 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6868 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6869 diagram on next page).
6872 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6873 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6876 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6877 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6878 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6881 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6882 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6884 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6885 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6886 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6887 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6888 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6889 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6891 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6892 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6893 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6896 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6897 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6898 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6902 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6903 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6904 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6907 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6908 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6910 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6911 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6912 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6913 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6915 And because of this single,
6916 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6918 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6920 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6921 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6922 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6923 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
6925 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6927 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
6928 burden of this shift.
6931 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6932 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6933 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6934 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6936 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6938 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
6939 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6944 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6946 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6947 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6949 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6951 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6952 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6953 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6954 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6955 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6958 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6959 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6960 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6961 points also become clear:
6964 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6965 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6967 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6969 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6970 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
6971 free culture before the Internet.
6974 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6976 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
6977 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
6979 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
6980 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
6982 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
6984 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
6985 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
6987 uses of creative work.
6990 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
6992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
6993 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
6994 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
6995 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
6996 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
6997 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
6999 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7000 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7002 before because reading was not regulated.
7005 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7006 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7008 upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question about
7009 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7010 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7011 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7013 of fair use are not enough.
7016 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7017 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7018 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7019 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7020 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7023 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7025 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7027 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7028 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7029 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7030 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7035 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7037 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7038 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7039 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7041 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7043 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7044 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7045 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7047 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7048 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7049 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7052 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7053 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7055 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7057 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7058 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7059 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7060 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7061 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7064 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7065 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7066 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7067 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7068 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7069 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7070 Disney's permission.
7073 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7074 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7075 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7076 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7077 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7078 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7079 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7080 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7081 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7082 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7083 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7084 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7088 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7089 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7090 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7091 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7092 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7093 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7094 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7095 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7096 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7097 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7098 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7099 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7100 happening are quite slight.
7103 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7104 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7105 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7106 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7107 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7108 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7111 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7112 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7114 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7115 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7116 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7117 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7120 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7121 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7122 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7123 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7124 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7127 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7129 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7130 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7132 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7133 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7134 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7136 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7137 Contemporary Problems
44 (
1981):
172–73.
7141 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7142 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7143 you were."
<footnote><para>
7145 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1–3.
7147 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7148 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7149 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7152 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7153 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7154 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7155 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7158 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7159 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7160 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7161 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7163 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7164 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7165 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7166 that is not at all funny.
7169 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7172 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7173 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7174 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7176 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7179 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7183 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7184 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7185 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7186 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7187 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7188 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7190 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7193 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7194 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7195 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7198 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7199 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7201 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7202 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7203 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7207 According to my eBook
7208 Reader, I have the permission
7209 to copy to the clipboard of the
7210 computer ten text selections
7211 every ten days. (So far, I've
7212 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7213 I also have the permission to
7214 print ten pages from the book
7215 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7216 the permission to use the Read
7217 Aloud button to hear
7219 read aloud through the
7223 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7224 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7226 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7227 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7228 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7231 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7232 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7235 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7236 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7237 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7240 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7241 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7244 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7245 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7246 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7249 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7252 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7253 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7254 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7255 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7257 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7259 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7260 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7261 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7263 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7264 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7265 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7268 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7269 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7270 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7271 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7274 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7275 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7276 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7277 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7278 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7279 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7280 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7281 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7282 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7284 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7285 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7286 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud
—it's not that the company
7287 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7288 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7292 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7293 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7294 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7297 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7298 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7299 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7300 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7301 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7302 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7305 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7306 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7308 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7309 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7310 protections as well?
7313 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7317 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7319 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7320 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7321 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7322 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7324 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7325 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7326 Wonderland
".
</title>
7327 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7331 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7333 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7335 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7338 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7339 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7340 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7341 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7342 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7343 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7346 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7347 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7348 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7349 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7350 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7351 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7352 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7353 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7354 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7355 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7356 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7359 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7360 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7361 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7362 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7363 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7367 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7368 story of mine that makes the same point.
7370 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo" class='startofrange'
>
7371 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7374 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7375 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7376 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7379 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7380 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7381 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7383 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7384 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7385 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7388 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7389 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7390 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7391 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7392 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7393 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7396 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7397 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7398 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7399 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7400 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7401 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7402 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7403 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7404 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7405 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7408 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7409 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7410 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7411 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7415 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7416 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7417 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7418 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7419 than Sony had built.
7421 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo" class='endofrange'
/>
7423 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7424 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7425 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7426 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7430 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7431 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7432 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7433 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7434 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7435 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7439 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7440 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7441 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7442 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7443 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7444 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7445 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7446 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7447 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7450 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7452 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7453 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7454 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7455 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7456 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7457 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7458 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7459 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7460 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7461 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7462 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7464 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7465 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7466 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7467 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7470 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7471 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7472 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7473 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7474 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7475 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7476 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7480 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7481 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7482 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7483 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7486 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7487 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7488 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7489 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7490 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7493 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7494 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7495 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7496 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7497 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7498 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7501 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7502 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7503 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7504 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7505 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7506 constituted, succeed.
7509 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7510 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7511 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7516 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7517 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7518 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7522 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7523 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7524 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7528 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7530 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7531 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7532 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7536 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7537 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7538 spreading such information an offense.
7541 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7542 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7543 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7544 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies
—
7545 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7546 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7547 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7550 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7551 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7552 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7553 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7556 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7557 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7558 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7559 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7560 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7561 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7562 have been a copyright violation.
7565 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7566 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7567 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7568 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7569 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7570 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7571 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7572 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7573 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7574 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7577 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7578 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7579 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7580 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7581 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7582 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7585 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7586 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7587 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7588 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7589 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7590 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7591 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7592 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7596 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7597 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7598 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7599 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7600 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7601 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7602 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7603 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7604 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7605 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7606 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7607 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7608 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7609 important.
<footnote><para>
7611 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7612 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7613 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7614 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7620 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7621 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7622 the VCR responsible.
7625 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7629 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7632 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7633 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7634 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7635 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7636 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7637 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7640 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7642 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7643 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7644 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7647 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7648 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7649 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7652 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7653 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7654 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7655 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7656 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7657 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7660 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7661 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7662 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7663 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7664 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7665 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7668 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7669 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7670 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law
—increasing its
7671 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7672 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7673 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7674 owners effect
—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7675 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7678 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7679 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7680 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7681 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7682 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7683 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7684 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7685 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7686 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7691 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7692 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7693 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7694 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7695 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7697 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7698 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7699 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
7703 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7704 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7705 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7706 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7707 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7710 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7711 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7712 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7713 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7714 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7715 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7716 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7717 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7720 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7721 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7722 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7723 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7724 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7725 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7728 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7729 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7731 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7732 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7733 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7734 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7735 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7738 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7739 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7740 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7741 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7742 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7743 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7744 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7745 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7749 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7750 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7751 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7752 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7753 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7756 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7757 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7758 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7759 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7760 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7761 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7762 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7763 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7767 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7770 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7772 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7773 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7774 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7776 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7777 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7778 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7779 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7780 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7781 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7783 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7784 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
7786 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7787 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7789 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7794 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7795 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7797 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200
7798 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7799 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7800 largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's
7801 revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of the
7802 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7805 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7806 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7807 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7808 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7809 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7810 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7811 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7812 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7813 protected
— by the market.
7816 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7817 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7818 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7819 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7823 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7824 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7825 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7826 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7827 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7828 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7829 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7830 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7831 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7832 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7834 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7836 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7841 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7842 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7843 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7844 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7846 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7847 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7848 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7852 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7853 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7857 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7858 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7859 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7860 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7863 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7864 integration may matter.
7866 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7867 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7868 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7870 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7871 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7872 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7873 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7874 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7877 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7878 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7879 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7880 control.
<footnote><para>
7882 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7883 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7885 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7886 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7887 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7888 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7894 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7895 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7896 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7897 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
7898 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7899 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
7903 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7904 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
7905 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7906 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
7907 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7908 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7909 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
7910 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7911 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
7913 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7914 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
7915 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7916 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7917 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7918 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7919 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
7922 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7923 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
7924 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7925 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7926 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7927 63%."
<footnote><para>
7932 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7934 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7935 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7936 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7937 owned by the network.
7940 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7941 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7942 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7943 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
7944 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
7948 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7949 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7950 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7951 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7953 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7954 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7955 handful.
<footnote><para>
7957 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7958 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
7959 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
7964 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7965 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7966 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7967 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7968 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7969 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
7970 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
7971 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
7972 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
7975 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
7977 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
7978 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
7979 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
7980 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
7981 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
7982 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
7984 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
7985 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
7986 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
7987 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
7988 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
7989 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy
14 (
1985):
7990 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
7991 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
7992 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
7993 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
7995 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
7996 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
7998 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8001 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8002 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8003 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8007 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8008 suggest the concern.
8011 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8012 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8013 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8016 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8017 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8018 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8021 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8022 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8023 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8024 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8025 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8026 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8027 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8028 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8029 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8030 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8031 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8032 outweigh these costs.
8035 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8036 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8037 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8041 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8042 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8043 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8044 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8045 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8046 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8047 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8048 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8049 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8050 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8053 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8054 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8057 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8058 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8059 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8063 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8064 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8065 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8066 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8067 message will be heard then?
8070 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8071 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8072 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8073 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8074 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8075 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8076 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8077 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8078 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8080 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8081 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8082 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8083 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8084 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8085 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8086 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8087 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8088 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8089 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8090 York Times,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8091 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8092 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8093 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8094 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8095 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8096 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
872
8097 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8098 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8099 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8100 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8101 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8102 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8103 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8104 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8105 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8106 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8110 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8111 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8112 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8113 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8114 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8115 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8116 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8117 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8118 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8121 <sect2 id=
"together">
8122 <title>Together
</title>
8124 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8125 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8126 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8127 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8130 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8131 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8132 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8133 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8137 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8138 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8139 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8140 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8141 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8142 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8146 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8147 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8148 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8152 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8153 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8154 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8155 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8156 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8157 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8158 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8159 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8160 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8161 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8164 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8165 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8166 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8167 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8168 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8169 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8170 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8171 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8172 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8173 technology and the market enable.
8176 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8177 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8179 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8180 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8181 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8182 the development of our culture than now.
8184 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8185 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8186 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8187 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8188 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8189 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8190 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8191 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny
8192 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8193 founding
—is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8194 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8195 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8196 culture that our free society has known.
<footnote><para>
8198 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8199 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8203 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8206 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8207 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8208 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8209 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8210 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8215 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8219 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8220 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8225 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8226 <entry>©</entry>
8230 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8239 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8240 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8241 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8244 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8245 noncommercial work was also free.
8248 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8253 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8257 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8258 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8263 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8264 <entry>©</entry>
8265 <entry>©</entry>
8268 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8277 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8278 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8279 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8280 transformation were still essentially free.
8283 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8284 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8285 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8286 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8287 we could say the law began to look like this:
8292 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8297 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8302 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8303 <entry>©</entry>
8304 <entry>©</entry>
8307 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8308 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8316 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8317 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8318 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8319 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8320 that the law now looks like this:
8325 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8330 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8335 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8336 <entry>©</entry>
8337 <entry>©</entry>
8340 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8341 <entry>©</entry>
8342 <entry>©</entry>
8349 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8350 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8353 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8354 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8357 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8358 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8359 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8360 these domains actually does any good.
8363 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8364 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8365 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8366 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8367 reasons sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8368 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8369 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8370 rights were more sharply restricted.
8373 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8374 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8375 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8376 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8377 property rights
<footnote><para>
8379 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8380 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8381 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8382 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8383 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8386 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8387 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8388 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8389 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8390 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8391 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8392 almost
180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8396 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8397 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8398 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8399 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8400 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8401 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8402 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8405 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8406 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8407 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8408 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8409 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8410 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8411 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8412 dominates the debate today.
8415 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8416 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8417 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8418 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8419 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8420 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8421 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8422 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8423 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8424 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8431 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8432 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8435 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8436 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8437 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8438 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8440 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8441 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8443 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8444 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8448 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8449 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8450 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8452 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8453 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8454 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8456 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8457 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8458 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8459 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8460 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8461 villagers to explore life as a king.
8464 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8465 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8466 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8467 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8468 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8469 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8470 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8471 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8476 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8477 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8478 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8479 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8480 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8481 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8482 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8483 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8484 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8487 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8488 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8489 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8490 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8493 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8494 is affected," he reports.
8497 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8498 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8502 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8503 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8504 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8505 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8508 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8509 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8510 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8511 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8512 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8513 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8514 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8515 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8518 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8519 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8522 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8523 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8525 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8526 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8527 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8528 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8529 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8530 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8533 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8534 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8535 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8536 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8537 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8538 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8539 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8540 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8541 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8542 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8543 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8544 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8547 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8548 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8549 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8550 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8551 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8552 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8553 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8556 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8557 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8558 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8559 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8560 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8566 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8567 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8568 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8569 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8570 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8571 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8572 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8573 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8576 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8577 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8578 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8579 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8580 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8583 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8584 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8585 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8586 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8587 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8588 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8589 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8590 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8592 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8593 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8594 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
8596 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8597 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8598 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8599 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8600 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8601 Stakes on Piracy," Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
8602 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8603 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8604 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8605 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8606 through a family computer, see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In
8607 re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8608 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8609 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8610 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8611 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8612 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8613 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8614 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8615 August
2003, available at
8616 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8617 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8618 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8619 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8620 Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8621 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8622 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8626 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8628 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8629 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8630 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8631 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8632 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8635 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8636 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8637 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8638 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8639 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8640 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8641 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8642 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8647 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8648 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8649 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8650 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8651 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8652 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8655 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8656 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8657 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8658 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8659 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8660 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8661 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8662 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8663 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8664 protection for copyrighted material,
8668 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8669 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8672 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8673 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8674 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8676 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8677 well produce a totally different industry model.
8680 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8681 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8682 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8683 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8684 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8685 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8686 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8687 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8688 interests.
<footnote><para>
8689 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8690 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8691 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8693 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement
8694 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8696 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8702 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8704 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8705 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8709 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8710 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8711 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8717 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8720 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8721 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8722 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8723 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8725 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8728 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8729 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8731 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8735 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8736 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8737 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8740 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8741 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8743 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8744 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8745 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8746 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8750 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8751 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8752 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8753 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8754 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8756 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8757 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8759 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8760 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8761 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8762 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8763 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8764 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8765 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8766 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8767 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8768 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8769 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8770 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8771 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8774 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8775 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8776 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8777 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8778 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8779 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8780 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8781 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8782 the culture all around.
8785 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8786 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8788 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8790 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8791 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8792 storytelling extended across the globe.
8795 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8796 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8797 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8798 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8799 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8800 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8801 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8802 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8803 work is presumptively illegal.
8806 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8807 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8808 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8809 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8810 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8811 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8812 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8813 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8814 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8815 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8816 million.
<footnote><para>
8818 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8819 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8820 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8821 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8822 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8823 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8825 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8826 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8827 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8828 suffering.
<footnote>
8830 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8831 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8832 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8833 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8834 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8835 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8837 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8839 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8841 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8842 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8843 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8844 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8847 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8848 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8849 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8851 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8852 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8853 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8856 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8858 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8859 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8861 to see a world of underground art
—not because the message is
8863 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8864 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8866 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
8867 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
8870 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8871 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8873 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8874 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8875 critical or reflective.
8878 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8879 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
8880 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8881 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8882 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8883 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8884 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8885 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8886 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8889 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8890 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8891 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8892 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8893 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8894 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8895 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8896 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8897 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8900 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8901 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
8902 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8903 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8904 law regulates such a use.
8908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8909 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8910 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8911 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
8912 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8913 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8914 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8915 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8916 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8919 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8920 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8921 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8922 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8923 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8924 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8925 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8926 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8930 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
8931 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8932 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8933 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8934 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
8935 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8936 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8937 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8938 culture that is free.
8941 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8945 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8946 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8947 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8948 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8949 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8951 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8952 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8953 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8957 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
8958 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
8960 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8961 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8962 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8963 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8964 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8965 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8968 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8969 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8970 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8971 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8972 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8973 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8974 affecting culture are more fundamental.
8977 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
8978 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
8979 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
8980 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
8981 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
8982 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
8983 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
8984 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
8985 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
8986 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
8987 against the competitors of tomorrow.
8989 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
8991 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
8992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
8993 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
8994 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
8995 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
8996 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
8997 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
8998 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
8999 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9000 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9003 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9004 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9005 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9008 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9009 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9010 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9011 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9012 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9013 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9016 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9017 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9018 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9019 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9023 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9024 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9025 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9026 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9027 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9028 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9029 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9030 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9031 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9032 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9035 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9036 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9039 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9040 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9041 the kind of content the users liked.
9044 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9045 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9046 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9047 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9048 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9049 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9050 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9051 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9052 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9053 they had already bought.
9056 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9057 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9058 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9059 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9060 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9061 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9062 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9063 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9066 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9069 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9070 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9071 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9072 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9073 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9074 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9075 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9079 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9080 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9081 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9083 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9084 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9085 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9086 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9087 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9089 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9090 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9092 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9093 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9094 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9095 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9096 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9097 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9098 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9100 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9102 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available at
9103 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9104 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9107 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9108 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9110 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9111 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9112 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9113 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9114 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9115 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9116 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9117 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9118 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9121 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9123 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9124 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9125 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9126 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9127 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9128 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9129 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote>
9132 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9134 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9135 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9136 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9141 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9142 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9143 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9144 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9145 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9146 constantly threatened by litigation.
9150 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9151 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9152 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9153 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9154 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9155 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9157 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9159 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9160 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9161 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9162 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9163 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9166 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9167 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9168 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9169 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9170 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9171 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9172 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9173 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9174 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9175 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9178 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9179 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9180 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9181 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9182 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9183 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9184 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9185 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9186 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9187 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9188 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9189 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9191 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9192 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9193 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9194 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9195 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9196 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9197 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9200 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9201 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9202 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9203 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9204 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9205 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9206 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9207 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9210 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9211 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9212 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9213 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9214 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9215 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9216 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9217 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9221 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9223 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9224 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9225 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9226 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9227 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9229 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9230 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9235 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9236 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9238 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9239 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9242 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9246 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9247 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9248 impose.
<footnote><para>
9249 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9250 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9252 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9253 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9257 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9258 innovation
—again,
9259 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9263 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9264 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9265 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9266 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9269 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9270 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9271 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9272 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9275 overall this history of copyright
9276 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9277 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9278 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9279 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9282 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9283 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9284 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9285 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9286 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9289 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9290 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9291 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9292 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9293 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9295 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9297 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9298 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9299 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9301 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9302 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9303 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9304 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9307 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9308 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9310 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9311 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9312 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9313 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9314 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9315 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9316 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9317 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9318 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9319 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9320 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9321 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34,
9323 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9324 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9326 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9327 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9332 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9333 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless
9334 he or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9335 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9336 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9337 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9338 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9339 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9342 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9343 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9344 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9345 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9346 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9347 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9348 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9349 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9353 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9354 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9355 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9356 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9357 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9358 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9362 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9363 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9364 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9365 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9366 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9367 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9368 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9369 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9370 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9371 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9372 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9377 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9378 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9379 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9380 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9381 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9382 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9387 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9388 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9389 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9390 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9391 than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation
9392 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9393 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9394 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9395 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9396 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9397 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9398 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9399 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9406 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9407 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9408 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9409 legislation"
<footnote><para>
9413 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9416 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9417 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9418 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9419 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9420 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9424 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9425 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9428 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9430 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9431 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9432 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9434 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9435 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9436 neutral toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio
9437 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9440 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9441 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9442 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9443 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9444 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9447 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9448 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9449 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9450 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9451 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9452 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9453 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9454 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9455 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9456 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9457 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9458 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9459 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9460 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9461 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9462 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9463 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9464 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9465 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9467 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9471 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9472 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9473 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9476 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9478 name of the service;
9481 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9484 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9487 date of transmission;
9490 time of transmission;
9493 time zone of origination of transmission;
9496 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9499 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9502 sound recording title;
9505 ISRC code of the recording;
9508 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9511 featured recording artist;
9520 UPC code of the retail album;
9526 copyright owner information;
9529 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9532 name of the service or entity;
9538 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9541 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9544 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9547 Unique User identifier;
9550 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9555 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9556 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9557 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9558 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9559 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9563 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9564 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9565 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9567 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9569 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9570 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9571 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9575 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9576 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9577 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9578 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9579 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9580 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9583 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9585 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9586 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9587 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9591 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9592 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9593 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9594 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9598 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9599 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9600 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9601 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9602 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9603 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9604 effective to prevent it.
9607 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9608 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9610 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9612 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9613 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9616 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9617 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9618 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9621 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9622 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9623 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
9624 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9625 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9626 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9627 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9628 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9629 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9631 According to the RIAA,
9632 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9633 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9635 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9636 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9637 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9639 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9640 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9641 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9643 response by the other.
9646 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9647 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9648 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9649 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9650 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9651 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9652 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9653 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9654 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9655 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9656 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9657 was.
<footnote><para>
9659 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9660 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
9662 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9663 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9664 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9665 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9666 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9667 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9671 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9672 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9673 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9674 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9675 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9676 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9677 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9678 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9679 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9681 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9682 Prohibition," American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9686 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9687 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9689 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9690 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9691 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9693 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9694 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9695 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9696 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9697 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9699 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9700 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9701 compliance literature).
9703 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9704 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9705 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9708 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9709 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9710 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9711 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9712 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9713 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9714 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9715 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9716 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9717 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9718 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9719 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9720 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9721 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9722 degree of illegality.
9725 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9726 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9727 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9728 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9729 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9730 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9731 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9732 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9733 to consider the alternative.
9737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9738 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9739 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9740 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9741 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9742 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9745 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9746 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9747 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9748 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9749 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9750 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9751 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9752 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9753 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9754 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9755 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9756 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9759 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9760 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9761 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9762 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9763 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9764 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9765 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9766 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9767 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9771 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9774 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9775 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9776 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9777 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9781 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9785 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9786 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9787 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9788 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9789 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9790 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9791 capacities of digital technologies.
9793 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9795 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9796 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9797 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9798 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9799 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9800 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9801 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9802 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9803 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9806 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9807 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9808 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9809 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9810 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9811 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9812 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9813 on people's machines.
9816 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9817 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9818 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9819 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9820 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9821 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9824 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9825 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9826 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9830 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9831 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9832 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9833 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9834 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9835 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9836 freedom to move content easily?
9839 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9840 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9841 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9842 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9843 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9844 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9845 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9846 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9847 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9850 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9851 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9852 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9853 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9854 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9855 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9856 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9859 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9860 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9861 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9862 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9865 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9866 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9870 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9871 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9872 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9873 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9874 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9875 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9876 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9877 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9879 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
9882 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9887 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9888 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9889 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9890 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9891 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9892 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9893 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9894 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9895 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9899 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9900 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9901 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9904 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
9905 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9906 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9907 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9908 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9909 an Internet user is revealed.
9912 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9913 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9914 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9915 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9916 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9917 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9918 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9919 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9920 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
9922 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9923 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9924 Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9925 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9926 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9927 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
9928 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
9929 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9930 Fan, Either," New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9931 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
9936 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9937 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9938 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
9940 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9941 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9942 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
9944 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9945 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9946 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9949 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9950 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
9951 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9952 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9953 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9954 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9955 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9956 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9957 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
9958 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
9959 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
9961 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
9962 Boston Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
9963 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
9964 Colleges," Washington Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
9965 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
9966 Monitor,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
9967 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
9968 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
9969 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News,
30 January
9970 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9971 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
9972 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
9973 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
9974 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
9976 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
9977 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
9980 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
9981 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
9982 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
9983 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
9984 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
9985 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
9988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
9989 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
9990 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
9995 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
9996 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
9997 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
9998 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
9999 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10000 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10001 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10002 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10003 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10004 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10005 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10006 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10007 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10008 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10009 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10010 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10015 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10016 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10017 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10018 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10019 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10020 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10027 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10028 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10032 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10033 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10034 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10035 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10038 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10039 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10040 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10041 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10042 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10046 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10047 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10048 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10049 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10050 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10051 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10055 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10056 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10057 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10058 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10059 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10060 made that is happening all around.
10063 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10064 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10065 gasoline onto this fire.
10068 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10069 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10070 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10071 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10074 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10075 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10076 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10077 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10078 success will require.
10081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10082 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10083 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10085 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10086 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10087 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10088 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10089 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10090 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10094 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10095 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10096 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10097 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10098 them available for free.
10101 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10102 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10103 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10104 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10105 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10107 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10108 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10109 accessible
—today.
10112 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10113 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10114 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10115 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10116 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10117 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10118 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10119 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10120 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10121 commercial publications of public domain works.
10124 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10125 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10126 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10127 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10128 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10129 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10130 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10131 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10132 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10133 generally.
<footnote><para>
10135 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10136 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10137 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10138 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10139 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10140 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10141 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10142 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10143 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10144 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10145 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10146 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10147 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10148 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10149 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10152 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10153 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10154 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10155 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10,
10156 in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10157 terms of existing copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred
10158 would not be free to add any works more recent than
1923 to his
10159 collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10160 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10161 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than
1
10162 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10167 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10168 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10169 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10170 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10172 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10173 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10174 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10175 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10176 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10177 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10178 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10183 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10184 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10185 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10186 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10187 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10188 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10192 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10194 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10196 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10197 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10199 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10203 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10204 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10205 their . . . Writings. . . .
10209 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10210 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10211 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10212 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10213 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10214 specific
—to "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that
10215 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10216 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10219 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10220 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10221 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10222 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10224 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10225 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10226 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10227 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10228 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10231 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10232 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10233 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10234 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10235 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10236 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10237 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10238 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10239 this gravy train going.
10242 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10243 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10244 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10245 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10246 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10247 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10248 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10251 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10252 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10253 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10254 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10255 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10256 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10257 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10258 published by anyone for free.
10261 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10262 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10263 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10264 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10268 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10271 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10272 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10276 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10277 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10278 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10279 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10282 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10286 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10287 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10288 they support the bill."
10291 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10292 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10293 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10297 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10298 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10299 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10300 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10303 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10304 correct conclusion:
10307 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10308 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10310 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10313 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10315 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10316 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10319 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10320 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10321 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10322 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10324 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10326 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10327 the copyright term extended.
10330 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10332 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10333 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10336 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10338 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10339 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10340 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10341 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10342 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10343 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10344 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10345 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10347 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10348 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10349 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10350 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10352 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10354 Disney is estimated to have
10355 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10356 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10357 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10359 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10360 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10365 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10366 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10368 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10369 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10370 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10371 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10372 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10374 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10378 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10379 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10380 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10381 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10382 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10384 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10387 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10391 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10392 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10393 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10395 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10396 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10401 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10402 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10404 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10405 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10407 to impose no limit.
10410 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10411 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10412 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10413 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10414 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10415 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10416 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10417 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10418 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10420 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10423 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10425 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10426 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10428 If anything Congress says is interstate
10429 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10430 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10431 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10432 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10437 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10438 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10439 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10440 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10442 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10443 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10444 commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10445 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10446 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10447 to regulate copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10449 And if it is applied to the
10450 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10453 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10455 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10456 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10457 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10459 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10460 existing copyrights.
10463 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10464 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics
—a conservative
10465 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10466 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10468 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10469 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10470 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10471 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10473 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10474 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10477 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10478 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10480 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10481 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy
—piracy of
10482 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10483 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10484 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10486 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10487 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10488 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10489 work. But now these entities were using their power
—expressed
10490 through the power of lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year
10491 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10492 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10495 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10498 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10499 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10500 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
10501 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
10502 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10505 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10506 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10507 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10510 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10512 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10514 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10515 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10516 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10517 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10518 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10519 bought to extend them again.
10522 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10524 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10525 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10527 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10529 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10530 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10531 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10532 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10534 and no longer available as a result.
10537 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10538 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10539 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10540 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10541 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10542 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10543 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10545 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10546 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
10547 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10552 Think practically about the consequence of this
10553 extension
—practically,
10554 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10557 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10558 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10559 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10561 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10564 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10565 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10566 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10567 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10568 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10569 list of books still under copyright.
10572 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10573 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10576 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10578 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10579 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10580 being at least a list?
10583 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10584 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10586 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10588 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10589 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10592 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10594 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10598 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10599 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10600 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10602 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10603 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10604 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10607 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10608 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10609 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10612 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10613 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10615 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10616 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10617 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10618 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10619 know quite well who owns what property.
10622 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10623 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10625 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10626 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10627 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10628 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10629 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10630 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10631 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10634 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10635 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10637 for other creative works is much more dire.
10639 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10641 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10642 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10643 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10644 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10645 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10646 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10647 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10648 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10649 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10650 films."
<footnote><para>
10652 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10653 Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10654 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10655 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9 October
2002.
10660 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10661 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10662 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10663 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10666 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10668 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10669 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10670 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10671 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10672 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10673 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10674 work available for distribution.
10677 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10678 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10679 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10680 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10681 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10682 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10683 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10685 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
10686 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10687 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10688 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10693 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10695 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10696 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10697 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10698 locate the copyright owner.
10701 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10702 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10703 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10704 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10705 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10710 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10711 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10712 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10713 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10714 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10715 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10716 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10717 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10718 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10721 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10724 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10726 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10727 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10728 the copyright expires.
10731 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10732 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10733 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10735 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10739 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10740 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10741 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10742 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10744 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10748 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10749 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10751 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10752 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10753 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10755 the commercial life ends.
10758 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10759 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10760 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10762 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10764 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10765 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10766 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10767 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10768 have, we need to have access to this history.
10771 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10774 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10775 this context do no good.
10778 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10779 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10780 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10781 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10782 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10783 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10784 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10785 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10788 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10789 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10790 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10791 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10792 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10793 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10794 market didn't have more to offer.
10797 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10798 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10799 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10800 would not have interfered with anything.
10803 But this situation has now changed.
10806 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10807 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10808 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10809 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10810 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10811 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10812 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10813 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10814 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10815 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10819 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10820 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10821 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10822 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10823 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10824 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10825 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10826 written for a radically different context.
10829 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10830 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10831 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10832 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10833 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10834 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10835 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10836 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10837 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10840 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10841 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10842 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10846 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10847 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10848 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10849 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10850 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10851 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10852 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10853 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10854 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10857 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10858 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10859 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10860 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10863 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10864 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10865 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10866 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10867 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10869 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10870 December
2002, available at
10871 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10876 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10877 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10878 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10879 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10880 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10881 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10884 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10885 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10886 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10887 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10888 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10891 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10892 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10893 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10894 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10895 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10896 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10897 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10898 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10899 power to extend existing terms.
10902 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10903 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10904 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10905 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10908 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10909 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10912 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10913 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10914 overstepped its bounds.
10917 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10918 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10919 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10920 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10921 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10924 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10925 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10926 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
10927 briefs and preparing for argument.
10930 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10931 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10932 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10933 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10934 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10935 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10936 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10937 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10940 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10941 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10942 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10945 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
10947 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10948 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10949 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10950 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10953 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10954 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10955 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10957 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
10958 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
10959 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
10961 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
10962 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
10963 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
10964 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
10965 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
10966 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
10967 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
10968 most powerful media companies in the world."
10971 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
10972 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
10973 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
10974 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
10975 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
10976 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
10977 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
10978 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
10980 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
10981 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
10983 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
10984 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
10985 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
10987 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
10988 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
10989 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
10992 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
10993 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
10994 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
10995 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
10996 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
10997 why it was unconstitutional.
11000 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11003 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11004 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11005 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11006 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11007 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11009 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11010 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11011 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11012 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11013 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11014 gather the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11015 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11016 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11019 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11020 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11021 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11022 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11023 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11024 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11025 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11026 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11027 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11028 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11029 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11030 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11031 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11032 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11035 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11036 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11037 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11038 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11039 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11040 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11043 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11044 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11047 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11048 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11049 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11050 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11051 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11052 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11053 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11054 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11057 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11058 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11059 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11060 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11063 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11064 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11065 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11066 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11069 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11070 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11071 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11072 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11073 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11075 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11076 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11077 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11078 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11079 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11080 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11081 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11082 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11083 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11086 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11087 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11088 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11089 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11090 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11091 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11092 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11093 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11096 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11097 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11098 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11101 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11102 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11103 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11104 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11105 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11106 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11107 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11108 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11109 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11110 confidence in our argument.
11111 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11114 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11115 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11116 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11117 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11121 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11122 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11123 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11124 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11125 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11126 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11130 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11131 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11132 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11133 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11134 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11135 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11137 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537
11138 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11140 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11141 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11142 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11143 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11145 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11146 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11150 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11151 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11152 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11155 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11156 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11157 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11158 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11159 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11160 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11161 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11162 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11163 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11164 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11167 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11168 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11169 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11170 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11171 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11172 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11173 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11176 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11177 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11178 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11179 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11180 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11181 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11182 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11185 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11187 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11188 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11189 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11192 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11193 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11194 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11195 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11196 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11199 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11200 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11201 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11202 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11203 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11204 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11205 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11206 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11209 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11211 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11212 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11213 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11214 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11215 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11216 these retrospective extensions.
11219 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11220 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11221 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11222 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11223 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11224 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11227 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11228 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11229 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11231 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11232 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11233 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11234 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11237 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11238 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11241 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11242 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11243 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11244 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11245 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11246 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11247 copyright be limited.
11250 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11252 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11254 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11255 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11256 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11259 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11260 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11261 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11263 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11266 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11268 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11269 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11270 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11272 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11274 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11275 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11277 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11278 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11279 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11281 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11282 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11285 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11286 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11289 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11290 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11291 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11292 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11294 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11295 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11298 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11300 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11301 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11302 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11303 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11304 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11307 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11308 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11309 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11310 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11311 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11313 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11315 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11316 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11317 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11318 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11319 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11320 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11321 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11322 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11323 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11324 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11325 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11328 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11329 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11332 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11333 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11334 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11335 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11337 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11338 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11339 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11340 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11341 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11342 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11343 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11344 family of the Justices.
11347 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11348 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11349 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11350 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11353 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11354 The history was bothering her.
11358 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11359 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11360 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11361 practice that began with the very first act.
11365 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11366 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11367 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11371 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11372 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11374 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11379 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11380 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11381 Kennedy, who observed,
11385 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11386 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11387 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11388 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11389 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11393 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11399 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11400 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11401 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11402 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11404 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11407 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11409 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11410 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11411 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11412 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11413 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11416 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11417 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11418 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11421 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11423 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11429 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11430 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11433 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11434 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11436 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11437 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11438 into the Copyright Clause.
11442 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11443 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11444 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11448 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11449 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11450 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11451 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11456 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11457 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11458 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11459 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11460 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11461 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11462 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11463 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11464 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11465 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11469 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11470 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11473 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11477 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11478 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11479 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11480 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11481 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11482 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11483 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11484 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11485 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11486 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11487 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11488 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11489 law that it had established elsewhere.
11492 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11493 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11494 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11495 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11496 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11499 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11500 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11501 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11504 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the world
11505 against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor, scouring
11506 the pages, looking for reasoning.
11509 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11510 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11511 Lopez. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11512 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11513 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11518 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11519 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11520 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11523 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11524 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11525 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11526 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11529 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11530 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11531 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11532 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11533 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11534 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11535 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11536 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context
11540 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11541 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11542 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11543 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11544 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11545 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11546 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11547 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11548 the system we have.
11550 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11552 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11553 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11554 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11555 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11556 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11557 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11558 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11559 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11560 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11562 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11565 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11566 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11567 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11568 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11569 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11570 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11571 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11572 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11573 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11576 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11577 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11578 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11579 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11580 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11583 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11584 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11585 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11588 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11589 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11590 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11591 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11592 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11593 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11594 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11595 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11596 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11597 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11601 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11602 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11603 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11604 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11607 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11608 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11609 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11610 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11611 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11612 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11616 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11618 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11621 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11623 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11624 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11625 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11626 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11627 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11628 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11629 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11630 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11631 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11634 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11635 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11636 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11637 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11638 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11639 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11640 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11641 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11642 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11643 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11644 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11645 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11646 effort to persuade; but I
11647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11648 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11649 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11650 should decide the issue.
11652 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11654 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11655 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11657 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11660 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11661 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11662 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11663 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11666 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11667 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11668 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11669 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11673 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11674 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11675 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11676 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11677 issue should not be raised until it is.
11678 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11681 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11682 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11683 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11684 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11685 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11686 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11687 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11688 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11689 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11690 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11691 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11694 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11695 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11696 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11697 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11698 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11702 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11703 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11704 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11705 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11706 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11707 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11711 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11712 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11713 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11714 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11715 in the face felt exactly like that.
11716 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11719 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11720 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11721 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11722 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11723 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11724 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11725 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11729 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
11730 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11732 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11733 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11734 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11735 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11736 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11737 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11738 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11740 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11742 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11743 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11744 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11745 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11746 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11747 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11748 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11749 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11752 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11753 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11755 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11756 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11757 the work passed into the public domain.
11760 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11761 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11762 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11765 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11766 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11767 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11768 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11769 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11770 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11771 everything else, let the content go.
11773 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11775 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11776 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11777 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11778 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11779 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11780 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11781 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11782 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11783 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11784 the stupid harm of the present system.
11787 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11788 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11789 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11790 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11791 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11792 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11793 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11794 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11795 where copyright owners could be identified.
11797 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11798 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11801 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
11802 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11803 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11805 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11806 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11807 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11808 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11809 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11810 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11811 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11812 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11813 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11814 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11815 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11816 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11817 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11818 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11819 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11820 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11821 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11822 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11823 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11824 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11825 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11826 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11827 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11828 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11831 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11832 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11833 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11834 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11835 know what's protected and what's not.
11837 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11839 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11840 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11841 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11842 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11843 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11844 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11845 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11846 in the loss of widows' only income.
11849 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11850 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11851 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11852 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11853 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11854 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11857 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11858 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11859 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11860 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11862 imposed upon creators.
11865 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11866 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11869 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11870 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11871 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11872 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11873 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11877 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11878 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11879 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11880 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11881 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11882 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11886 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11887 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11888 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11889 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11890 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11891 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
11892 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11893 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11894 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11895 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11896 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11897 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11898 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11899 system of protection for property generally.
11902 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11903 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11904 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11905 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11906 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11907 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11908 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11909 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11912 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11916 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11917 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11918 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11919 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11920 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11921 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11922 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11923 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11926 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11927 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11928 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11929 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11930 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11931 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11932 seen before because there are no formalities.
11935 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11936 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11937 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11938 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11939 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11942 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11943 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11944 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11945 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11946 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
11949 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11950 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11951 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
11955 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
11956 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
11957 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
11959 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
11960 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
11961 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
11962 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
11963 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
11964 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
11965 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
11966 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
11967 historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial
11968 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
11969 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
11971 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11973 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
11974 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
11975 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
11976 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
11979 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
11980 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
11981 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
11982 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
11983 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
11984 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
11985 something good might happen here.
11988 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
11989 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
11990 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
11991 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
11992 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
11993 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
11996 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
11997 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
11998 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
11999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12000 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12001 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12002 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12003 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12004 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12005 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12006 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12007 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12008 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12009 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12010 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12011 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12012 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12013 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12014 film is a valid derivative use.
12017 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12018 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12019 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12020 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12021 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12022 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12025 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12026 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12027 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12028 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12029 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12030 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12031 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12035 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12036 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12037 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12038 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12044 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12045 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12046 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12047 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12048 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12049 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12050 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12051 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12052 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12055 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12056 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12057 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12058 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12059 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12060 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12061 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12062 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12065 What does this industry really want?
12068 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12069 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12070 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12071 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12072 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12073 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12074 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12078 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12079 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12080 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12081 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12082 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12085 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12086 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12089 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12090 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12091 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12092 and to share its own creation.
12094 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12095 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12097 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12098 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12099 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12100 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12101 block the progress of others.
12104 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12105 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12106 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12107 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12108 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12109 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12110 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12115 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12116 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12118 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12119 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12120 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12121 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12122 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12125 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12126 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12127 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12128 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12129 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12130 the disease almost invisible.
12133 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12134 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12135 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12136 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12138 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12139 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12140 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12141 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12143 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12145 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12146 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12150 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12151 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12152 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12153 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12154 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12155 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12156 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12159 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12160 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12161 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12162 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12163 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12164 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12165 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12166 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12170 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12171 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12172 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12173 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12174 costs significantly below the market price.
12177 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12178 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12179 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12180 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12181 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12182 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12183 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12186 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12187 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12188 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12189 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12193 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12194 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12196 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12197 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12198 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12199 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12201 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12202 2000),
14, available at
12203 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12204 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12205 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12206 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57
12207 (statement of James Love).
12210 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12211 asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add pressure to that
12213 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12215 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12217 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12219 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12220 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12222 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12224 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent
—
12225 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12226 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12227 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12228 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12230 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12231 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12232 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12233 Organization (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12236 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12237 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12238 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12239 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12240 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12241 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12242 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12243 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12246 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12247 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12248 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12249 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12250 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12251 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12254 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12255 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12256 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12257 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12258 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12259 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12263 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12264 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12267 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12269 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12270 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12271 May
1999, A1, available at
12272 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12273 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12274 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12275 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12276 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12277 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12278 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12279 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12280 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12281 Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12284 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12285 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12286 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12287 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12290 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12291 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12292 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12293 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12294 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12295 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12296 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12297 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12300 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12301 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12302 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12303 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12304 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12305 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12308 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12309 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12310 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12311 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12312 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12313 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12316 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12317 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12318 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12319 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12320 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12321 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12322 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12323 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12325 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12326 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12327 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12328 idea called "intellectual property."
12331 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12332 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12333 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12334 What is the argument?
12337 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12338 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12339 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12340 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12341 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12342 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12343 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12344 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12345 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12346 were balanced in just this sense.
12349 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12350 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12351 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12352 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12353 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12354 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12355 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12356 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12357 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12358 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12359 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12360 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12363 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12364 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12365 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12366 this common sense open its eyes.
12369 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12370 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12371 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12372 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12373 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12374 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12375 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12376 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12377 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12378 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12379 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12380 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12383 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12384 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12385 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12386 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12387 August
2003, E1, available at
12388 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12389 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12390 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12391 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12392 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12393 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12394 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12396 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12397 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12398 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12399 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12400 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12401 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12402 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12403 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12404 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12405 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12406 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12407 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12408 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12410 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12411 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12412 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12413 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12414 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12417 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12418 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12419 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12420 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12421 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12424 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12425 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12428 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12429 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12430 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12431 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12435 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12436 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12437 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12438 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12439 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12440 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12441 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12442 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12443 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12444 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12445 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12446 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12447 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12448 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12449 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12450 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12451 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12454 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12455 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12456 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12459 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12460 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12461 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12462 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12465 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12466 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12467 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12468 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12469 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12470 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12471 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12472 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12473 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12476 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12477 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12478 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12479 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12480 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12481 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM
12482 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12483 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12484 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12485 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12487 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12488 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12489 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12490 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12491 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12492 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12493 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," Government Policy
12494 Toward Open Source Software (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12495 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12496 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12497 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12498 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, The Commercial Software
12499 Model, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12500 May
2001), available at
12501 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12505 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12506 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12507 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12508 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12509 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12512 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12513 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12514 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12515 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12516 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12517 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12518 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12519 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12520 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12523 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12524 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12525 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12526 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12527 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12528 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12529 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12531 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12532 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12534 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12537 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12538 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12539 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12540 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12541 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12542 its lobbying efforts.
12545 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12546 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12547 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12548 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12549 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12550 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12551 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12555 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12559 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12560 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12561 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12562 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12563 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12564 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12565 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12566 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12569 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12570 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12571 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12572 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12573 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12574 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12575 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12576 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12577 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12578 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12579 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12582 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12583 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12584 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12585 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12586 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12587 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12588 $
20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12589 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12590 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12591 right to decide what to do with their property.
12592 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12595 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12596 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12597 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12599 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12600 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12601 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12602 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12603 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12607 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12608 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12609 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12610 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12611 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12612 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12613 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12614 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12615 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12618 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12619 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12621 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12622 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12624 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210–20.
12625 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12627 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12628 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12629 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12632 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12633 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12634 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12635 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12639 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12640 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12641 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12642 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12643 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12644 say anything wrong. But in the world
12645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12646 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12647 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12651 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12652 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12653 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12654 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12655 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12656 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12657 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12658 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12661 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12662 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12663 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12664 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12665 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12666 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12669 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12670 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12671 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12672 our own country's history).
12675 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12676 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12677 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12678 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12679 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12680 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12681 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12682 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12683 democracy in the world, become?
12686 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12687 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12688 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12690 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12691 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12693 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12695 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12696 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12697 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12698 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12699 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12700 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12701 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12702 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12703 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12704 hearings and a different result.
12705 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
12706 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
12709 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12710 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12711 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12712 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12713 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12714 concentration in the media.
12717 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12718 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12719 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12720 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12721 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12724 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12725 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12726 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12727 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12728 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12729 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12730 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12734 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12735 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12736 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12737 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12738 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12741 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12742 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12743 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12744 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12745 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12746 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12749 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12752 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12754 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12755 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12757 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12759 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12760 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12762 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12763 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12764 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News,
9
12765 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12766 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12767 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12768 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
12770 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12772 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12773 music.
<footnote><para>
12775 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12776 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12777 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12779 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12780 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12782 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12783 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12784 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12787 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12788 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12789 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12790 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12791 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12792 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12793 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12794 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12795 kids who use a computer to share content.
12797 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12798 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12799 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12800 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12802 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12803 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12804 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12805 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12806 24 August
2003, available at
12807 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12809 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12810 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12811 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12812 country.
<footnote><para>
12814 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12816 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12819 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12820 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12821 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12822 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12823 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12824 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12825 day into the Causbys.
12828 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12829 potential is ever to be realized.
12831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12835 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12836 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12840 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12841 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12842 maps what might be done.
12845 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12846 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12847 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12848 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12851 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12852 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12853 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12854 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12858 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12859 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12860 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12861 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12862 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12867 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12869 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12870 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
12871 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12872 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12875 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12876 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12877 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
12878 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
12879 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12880 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12881 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12882 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12885 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12886 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12887 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12888 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12892 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12893 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12897 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12898 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12899 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12900 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12901 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12902 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12903 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12904 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12905 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12906 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12907 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12908 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12911 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
12912 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12913 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12914 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12915 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12919 <sect2 id=
"examples">
12920 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
12922 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12923 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12924 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12925 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12926 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12927 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12928 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12932 What made it assured?
12934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12936 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12937 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12938 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12939 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12940 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12941 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12942 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12943 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12944 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12945 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12946 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12947 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12948 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12950 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
12952 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12953 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
12954 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
12955 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
12956 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
12957 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
12958 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
12959 protected by the friction disappears, too.
12962 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
12963 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
12964 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
12965 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
12966 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
12967 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
12968 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
12972 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
12973 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
12974 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
12975 friction did.
<footnote><para>
12978 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
12979 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
12980 Law Review
1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
12982 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
12983 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
12984 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
12985 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
12986 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
12987 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
12988 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
12990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
12991 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
12992 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
12993 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
12996 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
12997 movement. When computers with software were first made available
12998 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
12999 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13000 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13001 care much about controlling their software.
13003 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13005 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13006 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13007 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13008 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13009 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13013 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13014 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13015 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13016 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13017 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13018 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13019 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13020 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13021 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13025 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13026 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13027 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13028 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13029 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13030 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13031 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13034 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13035 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13037 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13038 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13039 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13040 fundamentally weakened.
13043 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13044 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13045 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13046 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13049 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13050 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13051 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13052 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13053 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13054 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13055 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13056 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13060 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13061 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13062 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13063 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13064 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13065 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13068 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13069 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13070 scientific journals are produced.
13073 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13074 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13075 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13076 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13077 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13078 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13079 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13080 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13081 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13082 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13083 and Westlaw are also free
13084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13085 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13086 Court opinion through their respective services.
13089 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13090 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13091 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13092 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13093 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13094 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13095 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13098 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13099 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13100 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13103 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13104 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13105 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13106 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13107 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13108 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13109 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13110 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13111 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13112 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13115 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13116 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13117 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13118 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13119 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13123 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13124 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13125 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13126 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13128 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13129 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13130 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13131 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13132 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13133 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13134 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13137 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13138 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13139 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13140 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13141 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13142 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13147 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13148 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13149 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13150 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13153 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13154 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13157 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13158 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13159 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13160 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13161 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13162 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13163 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13164 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13167 Simple
—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13168 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13169 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13170 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13171 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13172 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13173 three expressions together
—a legal license, a human-readable
13175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13176 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13177 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13178 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13179 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13180 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13181 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13182 certain freedoms are given.
13185 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13186 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13187 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13188 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13189 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13190 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13191 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13192 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13193 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13196 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13197 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13198 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13199 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13200 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13201 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13202 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13203 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13207 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13208 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13209 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13210 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13211 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13212 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13214 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13215 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13216 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13217 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13220 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13221 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13222 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13223 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13224 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13225 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13226 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13227 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13228 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13229 to begin to build those rules.
13232 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13233 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13234 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13235 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13236 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13239 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13240 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13241 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13242 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13243 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13244 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13245 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13246 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13247 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13248 sales of Cory's book.
13251 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13252 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13253 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13254 was a total success.
13257 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13258 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13260 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13261 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13262 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13263 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13264 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13268 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13269 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13270 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13271 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13272 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13273 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13274 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13275 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13276 with their own art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13277 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13278 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13279 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13280 because the legal costs are so high
<footnote><para>
13283 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13284 Culture Wars (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13285 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13286 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13287 </para></footnote>),
13288 these artists release into the creative environment content
13289 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13292 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13293 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13294 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13295 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13296 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13297 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13298 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13299 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13300 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13304 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13305 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13306 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13307 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13310 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13311 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13314 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13315 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13316 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13317 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13318 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13319 steps are possible.
13322 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13323 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13324 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13325 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13326 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13327 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13328 creativity to spread more easily.
13330 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13335 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13336 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13338 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13339 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13340 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13341 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13342 changes that we need.
13345 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13346 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13347 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13351 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13352 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13354 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13355 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13356 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13357 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13361 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13362 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13366 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13367 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13368 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13369 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13375 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13376 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13377 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13378 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13379 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13380 formalities were getting in the way.
13383 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13384 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13385 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13386 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13387 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13388 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13389 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13390 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13391 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13392 they otherwise could speak.
13395 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13397 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13398 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13399 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13400 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13401 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13402 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13405 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13406 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13407 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13408 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13409 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13410 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13411 developed by others.
13414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13416 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13417 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13419 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13420 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13421 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13422 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13423 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13424 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13425 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13426 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13427 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13428 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13429 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13432 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13433 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13434 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13435 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13436 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13437 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13438 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13441 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13442 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13443 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13444 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13445 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13446 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13447 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13448 with which registration occurs up.
13451 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13452 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13453 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13454 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13455 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13456 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13457 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13458 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13459 formality
—while producing a database
13460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13461 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13465 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13466 <title>MARKING
</title>
13468 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13469 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13470 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13471 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13472 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13473 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13474 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13475 uniformly across all media.
13478 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13479 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13480 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13484 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13485 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13486 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13487 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13488 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13489 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13490 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13491 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13494 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13495 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13496 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13497 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13498 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13499 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13501 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13502 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13503 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13505 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13506 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13507 stop using the work in any new
13508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13509 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13510 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13514 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13515 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13516 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13517 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13518 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13521 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13522 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13523 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13524 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13525 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13526 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13527 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13528 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13529 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13532 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13533 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13534 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13535 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13536 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13537 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13540 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13541 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13542 make things unclear.
13545 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13546 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13547 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13548 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13549 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13550 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13556 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13557 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13559 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13560 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13564 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13565 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13566 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13567 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13568 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13569 term.
<footnote><para>
13571 "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13573 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13575 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13578 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13579 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13580 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13583 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13586 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13587 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13588 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13589 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13590 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13591 regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
</para></listitem>
13594 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13595 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13596 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13597 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13598 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13599 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13600 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13601 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13607 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13608 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13609 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13610 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13611 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13612 veteran to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
13614 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13615 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13617 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13619 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13620 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13625 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13626 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13627 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in
1923 for the law to
13628 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13629 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13630 fewer authors to create in
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13631 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13632 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13633 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13634 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13635 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13636 not increase their creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done,
13637 and there's nothing we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13640 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13641 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
13642 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13645 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13646 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13647 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13648 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13654 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
13655 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13657 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13658 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13659 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13660 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13661 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13662 the emergence of that new technology.
13665 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13666 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13667 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13668 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13669 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13670 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13671 though that movie is not "my writing."
13674 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13675 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13676 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13678 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13679 University Press,
1967),
32.
13681 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13682 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13683 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13687 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13688 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13689 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13690 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13691 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13696 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13697 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13698 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13699 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13700 Consider each limitation in turn.
13703 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13704 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13707 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13708 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13709 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13710 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13711 after the creative work is done.
13712 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
13715 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13716 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13717 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13718 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13719 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13720 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13721 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13722 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13723 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13724 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13727 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13728 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13729 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13730 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13731 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13735 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13736 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13737 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13738 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13741 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13742 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13743 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13745 His view is that the law should be written so that
13746 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13749 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13750 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13751 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13752 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13753 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13756 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13758 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13759 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13760 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13761 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13765 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
13766 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13768 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13769 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13770 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13771 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13772 battles around the sharing of music.
13775 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13776 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13777 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13778 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13779 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13780 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13781 innovation on the network.
13784 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13785 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13786 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13787 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13788 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13791 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13792 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13793 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13794 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13796 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13799 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13800 for purchasing CDs.
13804 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13805 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13810 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13811 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13812 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13816 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13817 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13818 owner plainly endorses.
13822 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13823 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13824 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13825 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13826 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13827 significantly weakened.
13830 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13831 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13832 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13833 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13837 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13838 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13842 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13843 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13844 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13845 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13846 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
13847 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13848 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13849 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13850 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13851 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13854 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13855 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13856 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13858 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13859 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13860 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13861 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13862 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13863 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
13864 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
13865 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13866 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13869 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13870 that give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet
13871 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13872 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13873 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13874 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13875 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13876 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13877 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13878 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13879 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13880 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13881 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13882 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13883 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13884 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
13886 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
13887 April
2002, available at
13888 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
13893 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13894 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13895 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
13896 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13897 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13898 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13899 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13900 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13901 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13902 artists get paid, during
13904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13905 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13906 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13909 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13910 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
13911 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13912 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13913 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13914 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13915 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13916 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13917 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13920 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13921 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13922 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13923 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13924 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13925 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13926 way that returns something to the artist.
13929 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13930 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13931 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13932 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13933 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13934 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13935 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13936 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13939 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13940 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13941 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13942 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13943 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13944 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13945 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13950 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
13951 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
13952 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
13953 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
13954 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
13955 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
13956 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
13960 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
13961 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
13962 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
13963 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
13964 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
13965 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
13966 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
13967 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
13970 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
13971 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
13972 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
13973 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
13974 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
13975 delivering and accessing content.
13978 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
13979 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
13982 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
13983 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
13984 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
13985 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
13986 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
13987 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
13988 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
13989 harmed the interests of the content industry.
13992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
13993 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
13994 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
13995 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
13996 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
13997 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
13998 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14001 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14002 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14004 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14005 10 October
2000), available at
14006 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14007 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14008 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14009 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14010 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14011 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14012 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14013 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14014 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14015 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14016 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14017 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14019 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14020 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14021 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14022 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14024 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14025 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14026 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14027 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14029 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14030 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14031 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14032 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14033 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14034 debate by about a decade. See
14035 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14036 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14037 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14039 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14040 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14041 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14042 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14043 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14044 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14045 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14046 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14050 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14051 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14052 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14053 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14054 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14055 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14056 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14057 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14058 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14059 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14060 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14061 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14062 controlling access.
14065 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14066 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14067 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14068 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14069 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14070 limits on derivative
14072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14073 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14074 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14075 allowed to do with the content itself.
14078 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14079 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14080 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14081 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14082 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14083 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14084 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14085 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14086 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14087 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14088 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14089 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14093 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14094 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14095 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14096 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14097 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14098 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14099 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14100 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14101 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14102 finding ways to compete with "free."
14105 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14106 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14107 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14108 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14109 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14110 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14114 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14119 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14120 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14121 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14122 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14126 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14129 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14132 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14136 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14137 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14142 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14143 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14147 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14148 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14149 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14153 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14154 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14155 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14156 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14157 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14158 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14159 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14160 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14161 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14162 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14163 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14167 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14168 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14169 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14172 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14173 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14177 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14178 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14180 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14181 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14182 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14183 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14186 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14187 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14188 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14189 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14190 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14191 strong view queers the law.
14194 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14195 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14196 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14197 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14198 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14199 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14200 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14201 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14203 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14204 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14209 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14210 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14211 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14214 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14215 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14216 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14217 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14219 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14220 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14221 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14222 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14223 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14224 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14225 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14226 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14227 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14228 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14230 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14231 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14232 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14233 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14234 Rethinking,
174–76.
14235 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14237 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14238 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14243 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14244 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14245 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14246 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14247 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14248 practically never be done.
14251 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14252 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14253 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14254 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14255 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14256 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14257 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14258 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14261 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14262 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14263 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14264 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14265 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14266 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14269 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14270 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14271 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14275 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14276 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14277 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14278 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14279 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14280 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14281 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14284 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14285 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14288 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14289 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14290 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14293 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14294 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14295 keep your lawyers away.
14297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14301 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14302 <title>NOTES
</title>
14304 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14305 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14306 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14307 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14308 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14309 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14310 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14311 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14312 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14318 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14319 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14321 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14322 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14323 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14324 to him that this book is dedicated.
14327 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14328 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14329 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14330 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14331 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14332 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14333 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14334 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14335 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14336 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14337 critical eye on much of this.
14340 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14341 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14342 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14343 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14345 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14346 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14347 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14348 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14351 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14352 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14353 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14354 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14355 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14356 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14357 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14358 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14359 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14360 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14361 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14362 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14363 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14364 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14365 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14366 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14367 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14368 a bunch of great replies.)
14371 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14372 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14373 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14374 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14375 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14376 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14377 throughout this book.
14380 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14381 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14382 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14383 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->