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20 <title>Free Culture
</title>
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
27 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
29 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
33 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
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41 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
43 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
52 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
58 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
59 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
64 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
70 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.png" width=
"100%" align=
"center"/>
73 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.svg" width=
"100%" align=
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76 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
82 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
83 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
84 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
85 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
86 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
91 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
94 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
95 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
96 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
97 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
98 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
99 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
100 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
101 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
102 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
103 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
104 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
105 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
106 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
107 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
112 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
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130 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
133 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
135 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
143 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
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146 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
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151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
155 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
158 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
161 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
166 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
175 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
176 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
177 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
186 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
190 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
193 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
194 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
195 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
198 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
199 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
202 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
203 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
206 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
210 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
211 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
220 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
224 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
227 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
233 343.7309'
9—dc22
236 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
239 Printed in the United States of America
245 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
253 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
254 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
255 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
256 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
257 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
258 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
259 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
260 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
261 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
262 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
263 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
270 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
278 <title>List of figures
</title>
285 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
286 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
287 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
288 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
293 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
297 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
298 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
299 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
300 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
301 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
302 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
306 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
307 2 Architecture and Law: Force
308 2 Market: Concentration
311 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
312 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
313 2 Constraining Creators
314 2 Constraining Innovators
315 2 Corrupting Citizens
317 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
318 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
322 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
323 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
325 2 1. More Formalities
326 3 Registration and Renewal
329 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
330 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
331 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
339 <preface id=
"preface">
340 <title>PREFACE
</title>
341 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
342 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
345 At the end of his review of my first book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other
346 Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
347 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
351 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
352 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
353 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
354 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
355 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
360 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
361 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
362 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
363 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
364 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
365 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
369 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
370 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
371 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
372 causes even after the modem is turned
373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
374 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
375 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
376 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
378 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
380 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
381 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
382 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
383 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
387 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
388 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
389 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
390 free software movement
<footnote>
392 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
393 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
394 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
395 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
396 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
397 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
398 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
399 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
400 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
401 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
402 "permission culture"
—a culture in which creators get to create
403 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
407 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
408 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
409 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
410 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
411 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
412 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
413 culture deem fundamental.
415 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
417 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
418 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
419 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
420 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
421 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
422 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
423 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
424 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
426 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
430 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
431 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
432 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
433 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
434 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
435 "The Great Media Gulp,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
436 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
441 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
442 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
443 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
444 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
445 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
446 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
447 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
448 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
449 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
450 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
451 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
452 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
453 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
454 that this work is "merely" derivative.
457 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
458 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
459 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
460 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
461 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
462 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
463 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
464 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
467 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
468 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
469 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
470 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
471 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
475 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
476 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
477 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
478 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
479 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
480 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
481 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
486 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
489 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
490 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
492 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
493 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
494 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
495 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
496 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
497 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
500 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
501 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
502 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
503 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
504 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
505 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
508 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
509 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
510 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
513 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
514 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
515 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
516 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
517 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
518 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
519 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
521 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
522 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
524 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
525 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
526 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
527 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
528 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
529 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
530 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
531 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
532 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
534 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
537 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
538 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
539 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
540 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
541 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
542 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
543 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
544 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
548 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
549 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
550 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
551 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
552 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
553 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
554 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
555 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
557 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
558 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
559 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
560 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
561 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
562 Authorship,"
<citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
563 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
565 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
566 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
571 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
574 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
575 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
576 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
578 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
579 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
580 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
581 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
582 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
584 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
585 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
587 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
588 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
589 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
590 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
591 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
592 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
593 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
594 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
595 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
596 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
597 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
598 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
599 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
600 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
601 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
602 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
605 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
606 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
607 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
608 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
609 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
610 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
611 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
612 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
613 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
614 understanding of radio.
615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
616 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
617 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
618 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
621 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
622 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
623 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
624 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
625 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
626 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
627 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
628 much less transmitter power and static.
631 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
632 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
633 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
634 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
635 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
636 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
637 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
638 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
639 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
642 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
646 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
647 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
648 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
649 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
650 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
651 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
652 box."
<footnote><para>
653 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
654 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
659 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
660 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
661 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
662 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
663 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
664 a handful of networks.
665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
668 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
669 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
670 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
671 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
672 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
673 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
677 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
678 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
679 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
680 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
681 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
682 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
684 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
689 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
690 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
691 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
693 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
697 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
698 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
699 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
700 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
701 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
702 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
707 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
708 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
709 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
710 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
711 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
712 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
713 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
714 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
715 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
716 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
717 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
722 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
723 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
724 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
725 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
730 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
732 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
733 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
734 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
735 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
736 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
737 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
738 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
742 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
743 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
744 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
745 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
746 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
747 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
748 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
749 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
750 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
751 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
754 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
755 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
756 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
757 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
758 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
759 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
760 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
761 course always public spirited; the reality is something
762 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
763 to themselves, would crumble in
764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
765 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
766 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
767 effect of technological change.
770 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
771 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
772 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
773 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
774 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
775 before.
<footnote><para>
776 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
777 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
778 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
779 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
781 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
785 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
786 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
787 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
788 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
789 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
790 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
791 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
792 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
793 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
796 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
797 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
798 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
799 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
800 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
801 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
805 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
806 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
807 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
808 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
809 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
812 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
813 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
814 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
815 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
816 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
819 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
820 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
821 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
822 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
823 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
824 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
825 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
826 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
827 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
830 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
831 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
832 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
833 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
834 marketplace.
<footnote>
836 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
837 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
838 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
839 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
840 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
841 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
842 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
844 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
846 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
847 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
848 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
849 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
852 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
853 been erased.
<footnote><para>
854 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
856 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
858 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
859 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
860 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
861 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
862 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
863 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
864 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
865 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
866 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
867 culture, more and more a permission culture.
869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
871 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
872 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
873 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
874 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
875 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
876 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
877 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
878 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
879 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
880 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
884 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
885 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
886 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
887 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
888 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
889 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
890 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
891 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
892 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
893 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
894 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
895 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
896 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
897 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
898 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
899 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
900 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
903 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
904 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
905 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
906 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
907 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
908 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
912 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
914 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
915 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
916 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
917 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
918 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
919 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
920 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
921 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,"
<citetitle>New York
922 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
923 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
924 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
925 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
929 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
930 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
931 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
932 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
933 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
937 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
938 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
939 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
940 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
943 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
944 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
945 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
946 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
947 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
949 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"
<citetitle>Yale Law
950 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
951 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
953 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
954 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
955 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
956 could cultivate and extend our culture.
959 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
960 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
961 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
962 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
963 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
964 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
965 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
966 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
967 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
971 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
972 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
973 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
974 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
975 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
979 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
980 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
981 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
982 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
983 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
984 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
985 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
987 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
988 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
990 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
991 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
992 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
993 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
994 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
995 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
996 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
997 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
998 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
999 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1000 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
1001 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1004 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1005 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1007 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1008 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1009 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1010 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
1013 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1017 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1018 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1019 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1020 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1021 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
1022 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1023 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1024 accepted as it is now.
1027 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1028 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1029 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1030 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1033 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1034 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1037 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1038 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1039 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1040 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1041 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1044 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1045 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1046 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1047 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1050 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1051 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1053 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1054 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1055 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1056 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1057 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1058 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1059 this silliness will be much more profound.
1060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1063 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1064 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1068 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1069 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1070 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1071 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1072 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1073 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1076 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1077 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1078 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1079 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1080 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1081 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1082 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1083 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1084 fundamental about who we have always been.
1087 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1088 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1089 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1090 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1091 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1092 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1096 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1097 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1100 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1101 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1104 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1105 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1106 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1107 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1108 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1112 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1113 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1114 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1116 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1119 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1122 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1123 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1124 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1125 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1126 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1127 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1131 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1132 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1133 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1134 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1135 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1139 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1140 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1141 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1142 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1143 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1144 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1147 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1148 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1149 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1150 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1153 The idea goes something like this:
1157 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1158 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1159 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1160 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1161 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1165 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1167 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1168 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1169 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1171 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1172 in the Pepsi Generation,"
<citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1174 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1175 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1176 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1177 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1179 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1180 Up,"
<citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1181 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1182 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1183 Speech, No One Wins,"
<citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1184 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1186 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1187 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1189 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1191 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1192 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1194 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1195 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1196 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1199 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1200 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1201 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1202 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1203 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1206 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1207 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1208 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1209 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1210 copyright law today regulates both.
1213 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1214 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1215 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1216 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1217 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1218 more expense of doing business.
1220 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1222 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1223 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1224 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1225 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1226 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1227 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1228 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1229 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1230 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1231 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1232 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1233 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1234 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1235 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1236 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1238 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1241 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1242 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1243 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1244 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1245 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1246 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1247 enabled are much more tenuous.
1248 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1250 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1251 this creative class.
1254 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1255 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1256 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1261 <chapter id=
"creators">
1262 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1264 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1265 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1266 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1267 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1268 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1271 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1272 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1273 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1274 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1275 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1276 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1280 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1281 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1282 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1283 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1287 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1288 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1289 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1290 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1291 synchronization was pretty close.
1294 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1295 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1296 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1297 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1298 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1300 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1301 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1306 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1307 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1308 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1309 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1312 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1313 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1314 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1315 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1316 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1317 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1318 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1321 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1322 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1323 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1324 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1327 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1328 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1329 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1330 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1331 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1332 and among the best of its genre.
1335 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1338 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1339 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1341 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1342 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1343 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1344 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1345 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1346 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1347 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1348 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1350 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1351 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1352 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1353 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1354 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1358 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1359 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1360 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1362 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1363 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1364 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1366 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1367 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1368 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1369 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1370 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1371 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1372 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1373 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1377 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1378 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1379 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1380 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1381 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1382 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1383 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1386 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1387 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1388 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1389 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1390 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1391 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1392 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1393 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1394 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1395 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1396 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1398 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1399 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1400 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1401 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1402 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1403 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1404 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1405 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1408 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1409 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1410 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1411 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1412 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1413 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1414 culture around us and makes it something different.
1416 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1417 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1418 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1419 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1420 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1422 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1423 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1425 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1426 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1427 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1429 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1430 Web site associated with this book, available at
1431 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1433 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1434 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1435 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1436 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1439 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1440 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1441 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1442 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1443 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1444 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1445 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1448 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1449 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1450 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1451 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1454 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1455 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1456 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1457 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1458 content from before the Great Depression.
1461 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1462 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1463 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1467 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1468 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1469 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1470 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1471 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1472 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1473 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1476 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1477 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1478 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1479 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1480 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1481 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1482 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1483 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1484 interestingly different way.
1487 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1488 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1489 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1492 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1493 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1494 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1495 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1496 transforming it either subtly or
1497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1498 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1499 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1500 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1501 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1502 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1503 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1504 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1507 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1508 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1509 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1510 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1511 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1512 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1513 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1514 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1515 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1518 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1519 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1520 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1521 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1522 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1523 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1524 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1525 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1526 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1527 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1528 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1529 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1531 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1532 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1535 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1536 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1537 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1538 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1539 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1541 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1542 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1543 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1545 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1546 York: Perennial,
2000).
1550 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1551 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1552 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1553 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1554 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1555 which are fifty years old."
1557 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1559 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1560 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1561 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1562 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1563 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1564 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1565 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1567 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1568 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?"
<citetitle>Rutgers Law
1569 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
"[T]here might be a collective economic
1570 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1571 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1572 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1573 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1574 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1578 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1579 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1580 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1581 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1582 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1583 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1584 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1585 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1589 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1590 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1591 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1592 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1593 to prosecute cases like this."
1596 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1597 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1598 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1599 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1601 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1602 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1603 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1604 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1605 their clients or hurt them?
1606 Let's pause for a moment.
1609 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1610 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1611 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1614 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1615 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1616 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1617 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1619 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1620 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1621 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1622 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1623 describes a set of "property" rights
—copyright, patents,
1624 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1626 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1628 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1629 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1633 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1634 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1635 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1636 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1637 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1638 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1639 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1640 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1641 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1642 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1643 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1644 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1648 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1649 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1650 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1653 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1657 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1658 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1659 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1660 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1661 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1662 form, whether large or small.
1665 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1666 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1667 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1668 particular find it hard to say why.
1671 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1672 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1673 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1674 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1675 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1676 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1677 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1678 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1679 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1680 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1681 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1682 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1685 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1686 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1687 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1688 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1689 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1690 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1691 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1692 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1696 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1697 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1698 question instead is "
<emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1699 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1700 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1701 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1702 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1703 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1704 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1708 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1709 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1710 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1715 <chapter id=
"mere-copyists">
1716 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1717 <indexterm id=
"idxphotography" class='startofrange'
>
1718 <primary>photography
</primary>
1721 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1722 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1723 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1724 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1725 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1726 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1727 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1728 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1731 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1732 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1733 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1734 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1735 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1736 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1737 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1738 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1740 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1742 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1743 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1746 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1747 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1749 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1750 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1751 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1752 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1753 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1754 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1755 population of photographers.
1758 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1759 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1760 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1761 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1763 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1764 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1768 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1769 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1770 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1771 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1772 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1773 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1774 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1775 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1776 chemicals.
<footnote>
1779 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1781 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1786 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1787 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1788 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1789 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1790 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1791 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1792 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1793 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1794 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1795 percent.
<footnote><para>
1798 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1799 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1801 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1804 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1808 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1809 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1810 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1811 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1812 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1813 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1814 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1815 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1816 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1817 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1823 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1824 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1825 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1826 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1827 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1828 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1829 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1830 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1831 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1832 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1836 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1837 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1838 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1839 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1840 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1841 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1842 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1843 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1845 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1846 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1847 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1848 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1853 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1854 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1855 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1856 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1857 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1860 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1861 that they thought valuable.
1863 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1865 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1866 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1867 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1868 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1869 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1872 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1873 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1874 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1875 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1876 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1877 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1878 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1879 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1882 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1883 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1884 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1885 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1886 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1887 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1888 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1889 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1890 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1892 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity,"
<citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1893 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
"Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1894 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1895 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1900 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1901 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1902 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1903 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1904 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1905 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1906 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1907 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1908 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1909 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1910 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1911 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1912 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1917 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1918 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1919 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1920 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1921 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1922 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1923 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1924 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1925 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1926 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1927 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1928 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1929 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1930 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1931 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1932 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1933 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1934 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1935 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1936 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1937 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1938 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1941 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1942 <indexterm startref=
"idxphotography" class='endofrange'
/>
1944 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1945 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1946 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1947 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1948 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1950 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1951 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1952 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1953 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1955 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1956 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1957 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1958 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1962 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1963 Think!, puts it, "is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
1964 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1965 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1966 the way people access it."
1967 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
1970 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1971 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1972 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1976 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1977 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1978 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1980 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1981 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1982 Study,"
<citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
1984 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1985 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1986 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1987 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1988 (at least at first) terrible media.
1991 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1992 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1993 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
1994 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1995 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
1996 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1997 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1998 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2001 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2002 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2003 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2004 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2005 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2006 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2008 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2010 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2011 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2012 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2015 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2016 about "the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2020 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2022 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2023 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2025 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2026 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2027 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2028 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2029 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2030 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2031 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2032 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2034 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
2035 November
2000, available at
2036 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
2038 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2041 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2043 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2044 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2045 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2046 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2047 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2050 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2051 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2052 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2053 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2057 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2058 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2059 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2060 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2065 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2066 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2070 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2071 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2072 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2073 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2076 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2077 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2081 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2082 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2083 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2084 language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2089 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2091 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2092 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2093 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2094 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2095 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2096 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2097 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2098 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2099 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2100 students know something about
—gun violence.
2103 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2104 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2105 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2106 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2107 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2108 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2111 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2112 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2113 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2114 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2115 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2116 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2117 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2118 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2119 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2120 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2121 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2122 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2123 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2124 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2125 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2130 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2131 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2132 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2133 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2134 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2135 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2136 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2141 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2142 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2143 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2144 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2145 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2146 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2147 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2148 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2149 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2150 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2151 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2152 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2153 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2154 camera and
… saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2155 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2156 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2157 about the topic.
…
2160 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2161 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2162 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2163 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2164 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2167 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2168 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2169 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2171 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2172 had a lot of power with this language."
2176 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2177 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2178 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2179 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2180 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2181 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2182 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2183 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2184 world would be watching.
2187 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2188 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2189 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2190 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2191 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2192 entertainment is tragedy.
2194 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2195 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2197 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2198 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2199 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2200 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2201 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2202 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2203 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2204 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2205 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2206 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2207 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2208 was also the Internet.
2211 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2212 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2213 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2214 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2217 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2221 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2222 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2223 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2224 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2225 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2226 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2227 spread practically instantaneously.
2230 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2231 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2232 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2233 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2234 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2235 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2236 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2239 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2240 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2241 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2242 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2243 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2244 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2245 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2246 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2247 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2248 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2249 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2250 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2253 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2254 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2255 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2256 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2257 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2260 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2261 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2264 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2265 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2266 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2267 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2268 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2269 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2270 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2271 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2272 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2273 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2274 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2275 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2276 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2277 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2279 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2280 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2284 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2285 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2286 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2288 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day,"
<citetitle>Journal of
2289 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2291 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2292 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2293 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2296 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2297 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2298 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2299 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2300 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2301 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2303 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2304 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2305 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2306 little beyond what our friends say.
2309 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2310 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2311 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2312 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2313 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2316 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2320 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2321 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2322 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2323 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2324 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2325 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2328 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2329 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2330 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2331 is having an effect.
2332 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2335 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2336 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2337 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2338 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2339 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2340 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2341 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2342 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2343 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2344 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2346 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2347 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2349 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2352 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2353 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2354 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2355 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2359 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2360 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2361 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2362 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2363 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2364 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2365 peer-generated rankings.
2367 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2368 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2371 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2373 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2374 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2375 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2376 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2377 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2378 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2379 get it out of the way."
2381 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2383 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2384 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2385 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2386 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2387 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2389 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2391 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2392 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2393 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2394 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2395 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2396 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2397 told her
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> they were writing "the story.")
2399 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2400 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2401 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2402 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2403 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2404 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2405 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2407 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2408 Information Online,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2409 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2410 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2411 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2413 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2414 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2415 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2416 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2419 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2420 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2421 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2422 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2423 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2426 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?"
<citetitle>New
2427 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2428 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2429 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2430 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2431 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2432 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2433 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2434 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2436 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2439 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2440 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2441 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2442 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2443 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2446 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2447 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2448 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2449 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2450 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2451 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2452 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2453 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2454 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2455 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2456 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2457 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2458 extraordinary to report.
2460 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2461 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2462 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2465 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2466 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and
… the
2467 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation."
2470 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2471 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2472 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2473 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2477 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2478 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2479 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2480 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2481 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2482 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2484 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2485 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2486 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2487 the tinkering of many others.
2490 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2491 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2492 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2493 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2494 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2497 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2498 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2499 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2500 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2501 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2502 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2505 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2506 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2507 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2508 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2509 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2510 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2514 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2515 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2516 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2517 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2518 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2519 text. "The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2520 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2521 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2522 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2524 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2526 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2527 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2530 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2531 kind of recognition.
2534 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2535 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2536 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2537 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2538 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2539 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2540 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2543 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2544 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2545 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2546 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2547 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2548 general.
<footnote><para>
2550 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2551 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,"
<citetitle>Communications
2552 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2554 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2555 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2558 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2559 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2563 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2564 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2565 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2566 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2567 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2569 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2571 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2572 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2573 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2574 the law to close down that technology.
2577 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2578 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2579 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2583 <chapter id=
"catalogs">
2584 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2586 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2587 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2588 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2589 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2590 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2593 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2594 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2595 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2596 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2597 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2598 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2601 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2602 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2603 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2604 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2605 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2608 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2610 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2611 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2612 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2613 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2614 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2615 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2616 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2617 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2620 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2621 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2622 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2623 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2624 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2625 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2626 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2629 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2630 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2631 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2632 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2633 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2634 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2635 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2636 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2637 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2641 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2642 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2643 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2644 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2645 be on users' computers.
2648 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2649 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2650 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2651 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2653 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2657 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2658 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2659 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2660 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2661 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2662 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2663 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2664 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2665 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2666 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2667 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2668 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2672 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2673 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2674 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2675 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2676 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2677 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2678 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2681 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2682 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2683 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2684 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2685 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2686 easier to use"
—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2687 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2688 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2689 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2690 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2694 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2695 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2697 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2698 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2699 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2700 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2701 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2702 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2705 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2706 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2707 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2708 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2709 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2710 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2711 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2712 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2713 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2714 2001.
<footnote><para>
2717 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2718 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,"
<citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2719 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2723 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2724 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2725 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2726 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2727 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2730 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2731 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2732 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2733 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2734 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2735 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2736 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2737 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2738 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2741 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2742 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2743 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2744 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2745 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2747 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2748 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2751 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2752 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2755 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2756 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2757 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2758 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2759 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2760 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2761 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2763 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2764 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2765 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2767 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2768 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2769 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2771 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2772 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2776 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2777 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2778 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2783 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2784 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2785 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2786 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2790 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2791 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2792 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2793 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2794 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2798 <chapter id=
"pirates">
2799 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2801 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2802 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2803 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2804 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2805 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2806 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2811 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2813 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2814 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2815 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2816 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2818 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2819 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2820 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2821 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2822 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2823 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2824 this creative property
2825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2826 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2829 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2833 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2834 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2835 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2836 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2837 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2838 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2839 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2842 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2843 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2844 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2845 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2846 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2847 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2848 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2849 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2850 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2851 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2853 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2854 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2855 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2856 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2857 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2858 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2859 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2860 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2861 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2862 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2863 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2864 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
2865 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2866 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2870 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2871 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2872 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2873 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2874 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2876 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios,"
<citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2877 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2879 That led the independents to flee the East
2880 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2881 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2882 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2886 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2887 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2888 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2891 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2892 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2893 Edison's creative property.
2896 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
2897 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2899 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2900 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2902 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
>
2903 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary>
2906 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2907 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2908 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2909 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2910 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2911 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2912 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2913 right to perform it publicly.
2915 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2917 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2918 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2919 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2920 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2921 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2922 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2923 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2924 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2925 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2926 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2927 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2928 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2929 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2930 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2931 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2932 its composer anything.
2934 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
2936 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2938 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2940 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
2944 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2945 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2946 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2947 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2948 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2949 rights.
<footnote><para>
2951 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2952 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2953 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2954 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
2955 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2956 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2957 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
2962 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2963 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2964 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2966 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2967 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2969 and the "music publishing industry"
2970 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2972 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2973 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2976 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2977 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2979 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2980 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2984 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2985 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2986 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2987 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2988 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2989 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2992 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2993 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2994 Perforating Company of New York).
2995 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2996 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2997 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2998 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2999 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3000 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3001 statute."
<footnote><para>
3003 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3004 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3005 Graphophone Company Association).
3007 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3010 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3011 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3012 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
3013 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3014 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3015 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3016 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3017 recorded once. This is the part of
3019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3020 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3021 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3022 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3025 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
3026 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
3027 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3028 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3029 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3030 the fee set by the statute.
3033 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3034 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3035 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3036 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3037 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3038 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3040 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3043 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3044 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3045 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3046 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3047 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3048 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3049 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3050 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3051 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3052 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3053 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3054 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3057 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3058 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3059 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3060 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3061 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3063 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3066 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3067 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3068 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3073 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3074 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3075 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3076 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3077 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3078 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3079 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3080 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3081 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3082 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3083 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3084 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3085 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3086 choice.
<footnote><para>
3088 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3089 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3090 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3091 this report.
</para></footnote>
3095 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3096 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3099 <section id=
"radio">
3100 <title>Radio
</title>
3102 Radio was also born of piracy.
3105 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3106 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3108 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3109 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3110 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3111 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3112 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3113 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3114 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3115 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3116 Copyright,"
<citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3117 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3118 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3120 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3121 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3122 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3125 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3126 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3127 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3128 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3129 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3130 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3131 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3132 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3133 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3135 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3140 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3141 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3142 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3143 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3144 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3145 of playing the song.
3147 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3148 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3151 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3152 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3153 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3154 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3157 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3158 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3159 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3160 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3161 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3162 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3163 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3166 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3168 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3169 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3170 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3171 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3172 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3173 to take something for nothing.
3176 <section id=
"cabletv">
3177 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3180 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3183 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3184 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3185 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3186 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3187 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3188 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3189 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3190 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3193 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3194 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3196 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3197 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3198 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3200 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3201 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3202 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3203 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3206 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3207 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3208 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3209 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3211 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3212 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3214 As another broadcaster put it,
3218 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3219 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3220 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3222 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3223 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3228 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3232 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3233 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3234 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3235 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3237 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3238 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3239 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3244 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3245 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3246 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3248 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3249 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3253 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3254 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3258 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3259 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3260 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3261 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3264 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3265 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3267 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3268 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3269 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3271 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3275 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3276 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3279 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3280 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3281 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3282 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3283 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3284 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3285 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3286 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3287 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3288 created by broadcasters' content.
3291 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3292 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3293 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3294 today
<footnote><para>
3296 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3297 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3298 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3299 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3300 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3301 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3303 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3304 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3305 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3306 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3307 last. Every generation
—until now.
3309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3312 <chapter id=
"piracy">
3313 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3315 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3316 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3317 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3318 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3319 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3323 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3324 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3325 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3326 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3327 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3328 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3329 has so often done in the past.
3330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3332 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3333 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3335 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3336 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3337 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3338 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3339 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3341 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3342 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3343 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3344 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
<citetitle>Financial
3345 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3347 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3348 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3351 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3352 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3353 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3354 This piracy is wrong.
3357 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3358 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3359 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3360 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3361 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3362 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3363 of our existence, treated as right.
3366 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3367 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3368 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3369 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3370 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3371 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3372 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3373 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3374 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3377 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3378 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3380 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3381 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3385 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3386 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3387 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3388 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3390 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
<citetitle>Who
3391 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3392 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3393 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3394 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3395 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3396 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3397 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3398 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3399 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3400 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3401 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3402 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3403 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3404 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3405 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3406 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3407 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3411 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3412 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3413 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3414 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3415 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3417 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3418 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3419 144–90. "In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3420 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3421 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3422 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3423 pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3424 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3428 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3429 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3430 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3431 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3432 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3433 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3434 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3435 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3436 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3437 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3438 piracy of the tangible.
3441 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3442 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3443 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3444 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3445 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3446 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3447 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3448 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3449 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3452 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3453 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3454 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3455 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3456 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3459 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3460 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3461 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3462 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3463 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3464 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3465 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3466 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3467 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3468 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3469 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3470 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3471 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3473 <primary>Microsoft
</primary>
3474 <secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary>
3476 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3479 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3480 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3481 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3482 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3483 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3484 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3487 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3488 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3489 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3490 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3491 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3492 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3493 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3494 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3495 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3496 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3497 violating the law is still wrong.
3498 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3499 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3503 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3504 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3505 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3506 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3507 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3508 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3509 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3513 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3514 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3515 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3516 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3517 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3518 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3519 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3522 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3523 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3524 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3525 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3528 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3529 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3530 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3531 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3534 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3535 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3539 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3540 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3542 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3543 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3545 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3547 This means we must determine whether
3548 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3550 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3551 author of his profit.
3554 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3555 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3556 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3557 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3559 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3560 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3561 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3562 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3563 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3564 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3565 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3566 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3568 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3569 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3570 put together components that had been developed independently.
3571 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3574 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3575 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3576 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3577 system.
<footnote><para>
3579 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
<citetitle>San
3580 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3581 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3582 Secures New Financing,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3583 "Napster's Wake-Up Call,"
<citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3584 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3586 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3587 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3588 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3589 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3590 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3591 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3592 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3595 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3596 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3597 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3598 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3601 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3602 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3603 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3604 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3606 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3607 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3608 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3610 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,"
<citetitle>New
3611 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3613 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3614 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3615 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3616 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3619 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3620 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3621 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3622 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3623 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3624 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3629 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3630 different kinds into four types.
3632 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3635 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3636 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3637 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3638 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3639 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3640 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3641 users who download instead of purchasing.
3642 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3646 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3647 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3648 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3649 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3650 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3651 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3652 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3657 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3658 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3659 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3660 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3661 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3662 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3663 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3664 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3665 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3666 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3667 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3668 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3674 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3675 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3680 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3683 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3684 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3685 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3686 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3688 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3689 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3691 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3692 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3693 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3694 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3695 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3696 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3699 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3700 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3701 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3702 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3703 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3704 "devastating" the industry.
3707 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3708 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3709 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3710 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3711 & Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3712 technology, the labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3714 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3715 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3716 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3717 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3718 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3719 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3720 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3721 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3722 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3723 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3724 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3725 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3726 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3727 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3728 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3729 regulating technology was the answer.
3732 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3733 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3734 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis'
… was
3735 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3737 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3738 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3740 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3744 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3745 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3746 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3747 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3748 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3749 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3750 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3751 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3754 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3755 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3756 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3757 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3758 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3759 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3760 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3765 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3766 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3767 actually suggest it might be close.
3770 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3771 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3772 percent.
<footnote><para>
3774 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3776 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3777 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3778 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3779 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3780 #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3781 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3782 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3783 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3784 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3785 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3786 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3789 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3790 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3791 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3792 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3793 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3794 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3795 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3798 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3799 February
2003, available at
3800 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3801 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3804 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3805 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes, "The
3806 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3807 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3808 $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3816 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3817 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3818 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3819 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3820 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3821 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3824 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3825 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3826 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3827 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own numbers
3828 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3829 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3830 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3831 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3832 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry
3833 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3834 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3835 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3836 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3839 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3840 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3841 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3845 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3846 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3847 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3848 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3849 available.
<footnote><para>
3851 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3852 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3853 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3854 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3855 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3856 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3858 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3859 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3860 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3861 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3862 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3865 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3867 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3868 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3869 today.
<footnote><para>
3871 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3872 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3873 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet
3874 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
3875 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3877 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3880 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3882 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3883 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3884 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
3885 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3886 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3887 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3888 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3889 the content they sell.
3891 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3893 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3894 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3895 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3896 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3897 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3898 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3899 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3900 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3901 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3902 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3903 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3906 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3907 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3908 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3909 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3910 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3914 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3915 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3916 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3917 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3918 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
3919 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3922 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3923 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3924 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3925 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3926 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3927 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3931 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3932 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3933 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3934 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3937 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3938 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3939 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3940 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3944 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3945 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3946 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3947 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
3948 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3949 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3950 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3951 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3952 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3953 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3954 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3955 found only with time.
3958 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3959 just what you call type A sharing?"
3962 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3964 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3965 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3967 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3969 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3970 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3971 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3972 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3973 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3975 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3976 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3979 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
3980 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
3981 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
3982 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3986 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3987 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3988 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3989 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3990 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3991 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3992 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3993 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3994 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3997 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3998 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3999 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4000 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4001 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4002 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4003 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4006 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
4007 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4008 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4009 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4010 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4011 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4012 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
4013 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4014 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4018 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4019 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4020 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4021 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4022 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4027 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4028 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4029 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4030 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4031 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4032 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4033 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4034 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4035 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4036 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4037 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4038 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4039 Congress chose a path that would assure
4040 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4041 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4043 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4045 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4046 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4047 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4048 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4049 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4050 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4051 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4052 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4053 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4054 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4055 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4058 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4059 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4060 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4061 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4062 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4063 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4064 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4065 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4066 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4067 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4068 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4069 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4070 for the architecture it chose.
4073 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4074 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4075 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4076 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4077 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4078 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4080 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4081 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4082 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4083 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4085 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4086 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4087 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4088 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4089 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4090 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4092 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4094 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4095 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4097 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4100 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4101 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4102 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4103 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4104 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4105 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4106 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4108 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4113 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4114 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4115 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4116 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4117 Circuit"
—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4118 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4119 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4120 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4121 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4122 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4123 technology.
<footnote><para>
4125 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4130 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4133 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4134 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4139 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4140 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4142 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4144 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4145 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4147 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4149 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4154 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4155 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4156 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4157 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4158 together, a pattern is clear:
4162 <title>Pattern of Court and Congress response
</title>
4163 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4167 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4168 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4169 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4174 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4175 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4176 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4177 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4180 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4181 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4183 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4186 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4187 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4188 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4189 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4193 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4194 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4195 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4202 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4203 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4205 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4206 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4207 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4208 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4209 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4210 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4211 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4212 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4213 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4214 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4215 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4217 In each case, throughout our history,
4218 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4222 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4223 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4224 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4225 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4226 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4227 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4228 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4229 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4234 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4235 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4236 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4237 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4238 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4240 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4241 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4242 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4243 permission to record a song?
4246 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4247 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4248 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4249 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4251 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4254 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4255 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4256 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4257 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4258 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4259 facilitate the distribution of content.
4262 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4263 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4264 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4265 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4266 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4267 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4268 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4269 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4270 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4271 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4272 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4273 public interest that innovation continue.
4277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4278 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4279 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4280 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4281 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4282 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4283 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4284 fight."
<footnote><para>
4286 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4287 Echoes Past Efforts,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4289 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4290 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4291 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4292 warriors insist, "is our
<emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we
4293 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4294 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4295 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4296 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4300 "It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4301 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4307 <part id=
"c-property">
4308 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4313 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4314 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4315 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4316 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4317 the price she can get.
4320 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4321 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4322 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4323 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4324 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4325 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4326 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4327 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4328 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4332 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4333 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4335 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4337 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4338 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4339 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4340 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4341 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4342 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4343 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4345 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4346 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4347 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4351 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4352 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4353 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4355 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4359 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4360 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4361 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4362 "property" in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4364 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4365 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4366 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4367 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4368 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4369 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4370 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4374 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4375 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4376 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4377 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4378 these stories, the significance of this true
4379 statement
—"copyright material is property"
— will be a bit
4380 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4381 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4386 <chapter id=
"founders">
4387 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4389 William Shakespeare wrote
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play
4390 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4391 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4392 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4393 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4394 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4395 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4396 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4397 is so full of clichés."
4400 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4401 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4402 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4404 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4405 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4406 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4407 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4408 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4409 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4410 Bookseller,"
<citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4412 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4413 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4415 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4416 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4418 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4419 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4420 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4423 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4424 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4425 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4428 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4429 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4430 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4431 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4432 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4433 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4434 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4435 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4437 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4438 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4439 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4440 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4441 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4442 Tonson's control in
1774?
4445 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4446 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4447 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4448 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4449 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4450 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4451 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4452 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4454 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4457 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4458 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4459 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4460 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4461 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4462 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4463 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4464 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4465 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4466 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4469 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4470 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4471 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4472 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4475 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4476 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4478 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4481 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4482 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4483 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4484 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4485 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4486 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4490 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4491 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4492 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4493 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4496 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4497 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4498 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4499 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4500 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4501 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4502 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4503 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4504 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4507 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4508 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4509 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4513 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4514 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4515 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4516 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4517 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4518 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4519 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4522 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4523 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4524 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4525 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4528 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4529 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4530 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4532 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4534 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4535 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4536 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4537 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4540 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4541 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4543 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4544 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4545 monopolies
—especially
4546 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4547 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4548 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4549 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4551 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4552 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4556 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4558 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4559 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4560 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4561 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4562 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4564 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4567 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4568 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4569 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4570 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4573 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4574 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4575 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4576 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4577 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4578 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4579 indetted."
<footnote><para>
4582 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4583 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4587 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4588 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4589 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4590 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4591 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4595 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4596 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4597 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4598 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4599 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4600 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4602 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4603 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4604 construction and spread of culture.
4607 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4608 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4609 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4610 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4611 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4612 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4613 they said; they needed more time.
4616 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4617 words that echo today,
4621 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4622 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4624 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4625 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4626 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4627 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4628 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4629 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4631 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4632 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4633 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4634 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4635 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4636 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4637 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4642 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4643 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4644 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4645 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4646 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4647 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4648 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4649 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4650 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4651 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4652 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4653 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4654 way to protect authors.
4657 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4658 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4659 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4660 "The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4661 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4663 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,"
<citetitle>Vanderbilt
4664 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4665 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4666 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4668 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4669 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4672 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4673 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4674 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4676 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4677 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4681 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4682 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4683 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4684 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4686 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4689 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4691 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4692 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4693 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4694 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4698 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4701 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4702 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4703 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4704 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4705 Property."
<footnote><para>
4707 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4710 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4711 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4712 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4715 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4716 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4717 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4720 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4721 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4722 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4723 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4724 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4725 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4727 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4728 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,"
<citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4732 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4733 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4736 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4737 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4738 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4739 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4740 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4741 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4742 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4743 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4744 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4747 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4748 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4749 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4750 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4751 with in
1710: How best to limit
4752 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4753 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4754 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4755 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4756 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4757 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4758 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4760 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4762 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4763 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4765 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4767 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4768 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4769 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4773 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4774 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4775 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4776 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4777 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4778 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4781 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4782 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4783 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4784 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4785 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4786 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4787 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4788 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4791 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4792 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4793 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4794 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4795 House of Lords generally voted.
4798 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4799 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4801 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4802 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4803 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4804 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4805 passed into the public domain.
4808 "The public domain." Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4809 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4810 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4811 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4812 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4813 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4814 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4815 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4816 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4817 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4818 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4819 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4820 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4823 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4824 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4825 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4826 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
4827 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4828 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4829 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4830 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4831 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4837 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4838 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
4843 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4844 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4845 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4846 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4847 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4848 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4849 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4850 successors.
<footnote><para>
4857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4858 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4859 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4860 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4861 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4862 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4863 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4864 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4865 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4866 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4867 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
4868 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4869 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4870 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4871 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4872 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4873 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
4874 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4875 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4876 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4879 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4880 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4881 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4886 <chapter id=
"recorders">
4887 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4889 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4890 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4891 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4892 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4896 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4897 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4901 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4902 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4903 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4904 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4905 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4907 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4910 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4911 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4912 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4913 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
4914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4915 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4919 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4920 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
4921 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4922 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4923 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4926 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4927 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4928 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4929 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4930 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4931 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4934 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4935 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4936 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4937 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4938 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4939 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4942 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4943 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4944 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4945 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4946 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
4947 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4950 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4951 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4952 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here.
… We're
4953 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4954 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4955 confirm what he had been told.
4958 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4959 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4960 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4964 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4965 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4966 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4970 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4971 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4972 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4973 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4974 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4975 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
4976 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4977 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
4980 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4981 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
4982 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4983 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4984 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4985 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4986 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4987 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4988 says the owner gets to control.
4991 For example, "public performance" is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
4992 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4993 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4994 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4995 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4996 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5000 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5001 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
5003 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
5004 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
5005 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5006 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5007 Law School, 5 August 2003.
5009 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
5010 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>—and fair use does
5011 not require the permission of anyone.
5014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5015 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use.
" Here's his reply:
5019 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5020 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5021 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5022 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
5023 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5024 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5026 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5029 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5030 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5031 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5032 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5033 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5037 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5038 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5039 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5040 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5041 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5042 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5043 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5044 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5046 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5050 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5051 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5052 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5053 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5054 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5055 pockets, me or them.
5056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5060 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5061 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5067 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5068 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5069 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5070 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5071 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5072 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5075 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5076 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5077 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5078 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5083 <chapter id=
"transformers">
5084 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5085 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5086 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5088 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5089 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5090 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5091 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5092 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5094 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5096 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5097 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5098 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5099 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5100 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5101 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5102 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5103 important to his career.
5105 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5107 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5108 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5109 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5110 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5114 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5115 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5116 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5117 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5118 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5120 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5122 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5123 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5124 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5125 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5126 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5129 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5131 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5132 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5134 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5136 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5137 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5138 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5142 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5143 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5144 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5145 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5147 <primary>artists
</primary>
5148 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5153 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5154 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5155 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5156 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5157 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5160 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5161 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5162 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5166 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5167 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5168 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5169 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5170 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5171 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5175 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5176 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5177 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5178 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5179 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5180 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5181 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5182 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5183 started calling people.
5186 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5188 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5189 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5190 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5191 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5192 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5193 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5194 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5195 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5199 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—"and even then we
5200 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5202 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5204 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5205 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5206 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5210 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5211 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5212 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5213 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5214 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5215 directors,
… this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5216 systematically and cleared the rights.
5221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5222 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5223 loved it, and it sold very well.
5225 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5226 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5228 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5229 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5230 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5231 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5232 at all."
<footnote><para>
5234 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5235 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5236 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5238 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5242 For, as he acknowledged, "very few
… have the time and resources,
5243 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5244 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5245 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5246 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5250 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5251 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5252 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5253 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5254 compensated for that.
5258 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5259 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5260 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5261 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5262 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5263 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5264 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5265 made to be more clean?
5269 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5270 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5271 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5272 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5274 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5275 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5276 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5277 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5278 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5279 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5280 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5281 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5282 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5283 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5284 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5285 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5288 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5290 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5291 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5292 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5293 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5294 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5295 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5296 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5297 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5298 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5299 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5300 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5301 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5302 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5303 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5304 "Does this still make sense?"
5307 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5308 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5309 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5310 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5313 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5314 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5317 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5318 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5319 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5320 judges loved every minute of it.
5322 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5324 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5325 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5326 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5327 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5328 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5329 were just violated in this room?"
5331 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5333 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5334 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5335 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5336 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5337 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5338 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5339 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5340 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5341 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5342 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5343 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5344 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5345 couldn't easily do them legally.
5348 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5349 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5350 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5351 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5352 planted in your presentation.
5355 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5357 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5358 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5359 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5360 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5361 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5362 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5363 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5364 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5367 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5368 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5369 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5370 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5371 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5374 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5375 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5376 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5377 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5378 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5379 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5380 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5381 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5382 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5383 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5384 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5385 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5389 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5390 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5391 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5392 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5395 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5396 Myers, the comic genius of
<citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5398 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5399 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5400 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5401 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5402 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5403 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5407 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5408 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5409 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5410 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5411 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5412 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5413 new audiences, it is Mike."
5416 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5417 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5418 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5419 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5420 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5421 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5422 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5423 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5426 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5427 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5428 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5429 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5430 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5431 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5432 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5433 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5434 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5435 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5436 curse, reserved for the few.
5438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5440 <chapter id=
"collectors">
5441 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5443 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5444 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5445 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5446 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5447 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5448 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5449 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5452 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5453 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5454 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5455 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5456 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5457 well as when those pages changed.
5460 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5461 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5462 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5463 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5467 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5468 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5469 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5470 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5473 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5474 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5475 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5476 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5477 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5480 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5481 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5482 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5483 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5484 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5486 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5487 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5488 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5489 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5490 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5494 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5495 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5496 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5497 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5498 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5499 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5500 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5501 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5505 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5506 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5507 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5508 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5509 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5510 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5511 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5514 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5515 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5516 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5517 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5519 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5520 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5521 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5522 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5525 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5526 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5527 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5528 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5529 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5530 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5531 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5532 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5535 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5536 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5537 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5538 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5539 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5540 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5541 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5542 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5543 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5544 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5545 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5546 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5547 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5548 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5549 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5553 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5554 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5555 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5556 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5557 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5560 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5561 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5565 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5566 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5567 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5568 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5569 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5570 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5573 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5574 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5575 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5576 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5577 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5581 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5582 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5583 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5584 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5585 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5586 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5587 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5588 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5590 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5591 the Library of Congress,"
<citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5592 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5593 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5598 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5599 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5600 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5601 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5602 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5603 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5604 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5605 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5606 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5609 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5611 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5612 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5613 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5614 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5615 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5616 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5620 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5621 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5622 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5623 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5624 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5625 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5626 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5627 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5628 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5629 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5630 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5631 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5632 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5633 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5634 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5635 few minutes
—for free.
5636 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5639 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5640 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5641 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5642 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5643 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5647 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5648 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5649 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5650 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5651 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5652 has
—a noncommercial life.
5655 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5656 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5659 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5660 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5661 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5662 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5663 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5664 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5667 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5668 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5669 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5670 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5671 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5672 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5676 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5677 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5679 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5680 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,"
<citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5681 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5682 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5683 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,"
<citetitle>Boston
5684 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5685 </para></footnote>). After
5686 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5687 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5688 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5689 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5690 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5693 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5694 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5695 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5696 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5697 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5698 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5699 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5700 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5704 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5705 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5706 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5707 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5708 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5711 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5712 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5713 little practical effect.
5716 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5717 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5718 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5719 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5720 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5721 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5724 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5725 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5726 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5731 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5732 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5733 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5734 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5735 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5736 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5737 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5738 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5739 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5740 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5741 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5745 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5746 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5747 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5748 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5749 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5750 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5751 will draw upon it to understand it;
5752 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5753 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5754 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5755 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5756 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5757 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5760 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5761 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5762 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5763 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5764 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5765 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5769 <chapter id=
"property-i">
5770 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5772 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5773 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5774 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5775 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5776 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5777 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5778 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5779 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5780 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
5783 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5784 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5785 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5786 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5787 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5788 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5789 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5790 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5791 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5793 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5794 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5795 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5796 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5797 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5798 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5799 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5802 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5803 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5804 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5805 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5806 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5807 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5808 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5809 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5810 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5811 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5815 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5816 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5817 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5818 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5819 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5820 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5821 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5824 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5829 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5830 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5831 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5832 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
5833 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5834 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5835 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5836 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5838 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5839 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5840 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5841 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5842 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5848 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5849 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5850 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5853 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5854 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5855 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5856 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5859 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5860 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5861 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5862 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
5863 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5864 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5865 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5866 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5867 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5868 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5871 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5872 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5874 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5875 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5876 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5877 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5878 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5879 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
5880 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5881 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5882 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5883 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5884 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5885 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5889 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5890 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5891 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5892 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5893 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5894 culture would develop.
5897 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5898 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5899 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5900 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5901 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5902 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5903 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5904 the same would be to
5906 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5907 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5908 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5912 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5913 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5914 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5915 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5916 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5917 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5918 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5919 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5920 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5921 Constitution itself.
5924 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5925 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5926 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5927 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5928 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5929 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5930 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5931 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
5932 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5935 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5936 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5937 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5938 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5939 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5940 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5941 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5942 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5943 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5944 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5946 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5947 compensation at all.
5950 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5951 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5952 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5953 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5954 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5955 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5959 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5960 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5961 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5962 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5963 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5964 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5965 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5966 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5967 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5968 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5971 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5972 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
5973 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
5974 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
5975 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
5979 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5980 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5981 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5982 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5983 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
5984 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
5985 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
5986 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
5987 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
5988 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
5989 also control how culture develops.
5993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5994 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5995 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5996 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
5997 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5998 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5999 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6000 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6002 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6003 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6004 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6007 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6008 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6009 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6010 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6011 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6012 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6013 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6014 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6015 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6016 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6017 Web, you can be punished
6018 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6019 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6020 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6021 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6024 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6025 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6026 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6027 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6028 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6029 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6030 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6031 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6032 the source of the enforcement.
6035 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6036 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6037 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6038 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6039 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6040 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6041 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6042 individual or group might behave.
6045 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6046 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6047 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6048 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6049 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6050 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6051 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6052 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6053 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6054 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
6055 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6056 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6057 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6062 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6063 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6064 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6065 undermined by another.
6068 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6069 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6070 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6071 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6072 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6073 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6074 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6076 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6077 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6080 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6081 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6082 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6083 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6084 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6085 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6086 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6087 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6088 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6089 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6090 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6091 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6094 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6095 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6096 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6098 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6099 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6100 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6101 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6102 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6103 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6104 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School,"
<citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6107 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6108 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6109 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6110 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6111 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6112 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6113 used to require that other laws be more
6114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6115 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6116 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6119 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6121 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6122 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6123 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6126 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6127 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6128 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6129 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6130 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6134 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6135 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6136 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6137 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6138 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6139 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6140 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6141 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6142 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6143 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6144 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6145 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a long tradition of
6146 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6147 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6148 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6149 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
<citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana:
6150 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6151 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6152 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6153 J. Samuels, eds.,
<citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6154 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6155 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6156 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6157 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6158 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6159 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6160 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6161 of these groups might face.
6162 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6165 <section id=
"hollywood">
6166 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6168 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6169 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6170 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6171 rallying makes sense.
6174 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6177 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6178 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6179 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6183 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6184 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6185 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6186 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6187 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6188 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6189 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6190 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6191 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6192 this form of infringement.
6195 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6196 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6197 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6198 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6199 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6200 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6203 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6204 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6205 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6206 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6209 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6210 looting that results.
6212 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6213 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6214 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6217 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6218 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6219 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6220 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6221 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6222 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6223 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6224 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6225 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6226 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6229 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6230 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6231 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6232 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6233 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6234 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6235 life. Homeowners living in a
6237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6238 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6239 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6240 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6241 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6242 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6243 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6246 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6247 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6248 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6249 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6250 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6251 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6254 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6255 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6256 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6257 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6258 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6259 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6260 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6262 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6263 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6264 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6265 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6266 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6267 October
2003, available at
6268 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6271 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6272 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6273 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6274 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6275 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6276 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6277 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6278 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6279 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6280 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6281 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6284 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6285 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6286 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6288 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6289 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6290 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6291 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6292 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6294 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6297 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6298 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6299 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6300 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6301 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6303 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6306 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6307 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6308 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6309 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6310 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6311 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6312 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6313 opportunities for innovation and change.
6316 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6317 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6318 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6319 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6320 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6321 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6322 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6323 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6324 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6325 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6326 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6327 regulation is justified.
6330 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6332 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6333 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6334 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6335 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6336 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6339 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6341 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6342 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6345 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6346 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6347 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6348 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6349 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6350 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6353 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6354 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6355 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6357 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6359 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6360 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6361 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6362 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6363 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6364 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6367 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6368 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6369 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6370 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6371 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6372 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6373 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6376 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6377 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6378 culture.
<footnote><para>
6380 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6381 Environmentalism for the Net?"
<citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6383 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6384 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6385 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6386 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6387 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6388 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6390 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6391 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6392 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6393 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6394 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6397 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6398 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6399 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6400 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6401 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6402 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6403 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6404 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6405 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6408 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6409 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6412 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6414 <section id=
"beginnings">
6415 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6417 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6418 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6419 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6420 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6423 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6424 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6425 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6428 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6429 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6430 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6433 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6434 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6435 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6436 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6437 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6438 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6441 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6442 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6443 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6444 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6445 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6446 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6447 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6448 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6451 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6452 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6453 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6454 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6455 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6456 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6457 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6458 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6459 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6460 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6461 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6462 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6463 concentrations of power.
6466 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6467 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6468 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6469 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6470 years since they first struck its design.
6473 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6474 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6476 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6479 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6480 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6481 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6486 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6487 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6488 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6495 <section id=
"lawduration">
6496 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6498 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6499 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6500 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6501 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6502 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6503 authorship.
<footnote>
6506 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6507 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6508 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6509 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6510 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis>"
6512 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6514 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6515 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6516 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6517 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6518 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6519 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6522 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6523 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6524 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6525 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6526 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6527 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6530 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6531 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6532 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6533 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6534 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6537 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6538 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6539 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6540 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6541 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6542 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6543 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6545 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6546 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6547 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6548 of an Industry, 1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6549 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6550 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6551 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7–10 (2002),
6552 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/
">link
6553 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6554 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6555 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6556 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6557 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6558 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6561 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6562 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6564 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6565 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6566 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6570 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6571 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6572 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6573 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6574 domain.<footnote><para>
6576 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6577 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6578 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6579 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
"
6580 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6581 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6582 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6583 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6584 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6587 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6588 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6589 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6591 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6592 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6593 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6594 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6595 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6596 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6599 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6600 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6601 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6602 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6603 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6604 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6607 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6608 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6609 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6610 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6611 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6612 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6613 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6614 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6617 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6618 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6619 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6620 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6623 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6624 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6625 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6628 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6629 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6630 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6631 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6632 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6633 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6634 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6638 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6639 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6640 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6641 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6642 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6643 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6644 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6645 was ninety-five years.
6648 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6649 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6650 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6651 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6652 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6653 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6657 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6658 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6659 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6660 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6661 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6662 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6663 years.
<footnote><para>
6665 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6666 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6667 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6668 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6673 <section id=
"lawscope">
6674 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6676 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6677 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6678 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6679 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6682 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6683 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6684 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6685 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6686 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6687 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6688 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6689 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6690 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6691 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6692 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6695 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6696 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6697 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6698 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6699 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6700 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6701 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6702 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6703 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6704 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6705 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6706 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6707 on the initial creative work.
6710 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6711 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6712 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6714 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6715 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6716 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6717 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6718 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6719 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6720 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6724 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6725 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6726 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6727 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6728 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6729 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6730 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6731 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6732 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6733 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6734 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6738 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6739 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6740 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6741 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6742 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6743 copy available for others to copy.
6746 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6750 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6751 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6752 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6753 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6754 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6755 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6757 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6758 Creation of American Literature,"
29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6759 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6760 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6763 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6764 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6765 the United States
—publishers.
6768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6769 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6770 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6771 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6772 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6773 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6774 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6778 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6779 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6780 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
6781 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
6782 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6783 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6787 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6788 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6789 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6792 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6794 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6795 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6796 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6797 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6798 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6799 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6800 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6802 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6803 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6806 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6807 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6809 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6811 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6812 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6813 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6814 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6818 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6819 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
6820 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6821 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6822 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6823 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6824 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6825 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6826 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6828 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage,"
<citetitle>Legal Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
6830 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6831 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6833 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6834 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6835 the wrong of direct piracy.
6838 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6839 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6840 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6841 of my book.
<footnote><para>
6843 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6844 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6845 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6846 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6847 Copyright's Constitutionality,"
<citetitle>Yale Law Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
6848 1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6850 These two different uses of my creative work are
6854 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6855 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6856 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6858 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6859 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6863 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6864 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6866 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6867 rights originally granted.
6870 <section id=
"lawreach">
6871 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6873 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6874 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6875 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6876 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6878 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6879 certainly regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a
6880 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6881 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6882 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy";
17
6883 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
6884 existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6885 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6889 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6890 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6891 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6892 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6893 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6894 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6895 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6896 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6897 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6898 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6899 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
6900 the trigger for copyright law.
6903 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6904 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6905 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6906 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6908 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6909 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6910 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6912 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6914 because it is clear that the
6915 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6916 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6919 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6922 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6923 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6924 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6928 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6929 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6930 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6931 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6932 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6933 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6934 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6935 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6936 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6937 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6938 acts do not make a copy.
6940 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6941 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6942 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6945 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6946 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6947 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6948 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6949 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6950 diagram on next page).
6953 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6954 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6957 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6958 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6959 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6962 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6963 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6965 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6966 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6967 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6968 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6969 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6970 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6972 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6973 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6974 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6977 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6978 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6979 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6983 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6984 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6985 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6988 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6989 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6991 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6992 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6993 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6994 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6996 And because of this single,
6997 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6999 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7001 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7002 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7003 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7004 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
7006 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7008 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
7009 burden of this shift.
7012 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7013 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7014 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7015 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7016 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7017 the book once, ten times, or every
7018 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7019 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
7020 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7025 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7026 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7027 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7028 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7029 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7030 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7031 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7032 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7033 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7034 copyright owner's wish.
7037 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7038 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7039 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7040 points also become clear:
7043 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7044 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7045 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7046 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7047 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7048 part of free culture before the Internet.
7051 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7052 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7053 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7054 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7055 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
7056 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7057 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7058 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7059 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7063 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7066 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7067 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7068 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7069 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7070 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7072 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7073 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7075 before because reading was not regulated.
7078 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7079 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7080 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7081 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7082 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7083 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7084 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7088 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7089 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7090 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7091 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7092 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7095 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7097 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7099 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7100 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7101 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7102 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7107 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7109 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7110 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7111 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7113 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7115 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7116 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7117 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7119 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7120 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7121 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7124 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7125 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7127 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7129 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7130 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7131 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7132 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7133 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7136 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7137 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7138 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7139 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7140 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7141 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7142 Disney's permission.
7145 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7146 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7147 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7148 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7149 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7150 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7151 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7152 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7153 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7154 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7155 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7156 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7160 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7161 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7162 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7163 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7164 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7165 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7166 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7167 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7168 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7169 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7170 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7171 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7172 happening are quite slight.
7175 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7176 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7177 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7178 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7179 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7180 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7183 <section id=
"lawforce">
7184 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7186 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7187 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7188 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7189 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7192 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7193 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7194 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7195 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7196 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7199 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7200 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7201 <primary>Marx Brothers
</primary>
7203 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7204 <primary>Warner Brothers
</primary>
7207 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7208 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7210 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7211 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7212 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7213 plan.
<footnote><para>
7215 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain,"
<citetitle>Law and
7216 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7220 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7221 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7222 you were."
<footnote><para>
7224 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7225 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7226 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7228 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7229 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7230 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7231 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7234 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7235 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7236 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7237 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7240 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7241 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7242 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7243 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7244 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7245 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7246 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7247 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7249 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7250 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7252 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
>
7253 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary>
7256 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7259 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7260 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7261 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7262 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7266 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7270 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7271 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7272 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7273 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7274 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7275 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7276 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7279 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7280 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7282 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7283 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7284 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7287 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7288 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7290 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7291 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7292 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7296 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7297 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7298 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7299 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7300 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7301 read aloud through the computer.
7304 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7305 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7306 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7307 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7309 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7310 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7311 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7314 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7315 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7318 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7319 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7320 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7323 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7324 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7328 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7329 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7330 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7333 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7336 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7337 "permissions"
— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7338 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7339 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7340 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7341 power.
<footnote><para>
7343 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7344 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7345 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7346 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7347 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7348 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7349 subsequently acquired the book.
7351 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7352 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7353 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7354 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7355 control that the law would enable.
7358 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7359 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7360 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7361 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7362 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7363 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7364 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7365 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7366 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7367 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7368 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7369 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7370 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7371 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7376 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7377 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7378 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7380 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7383 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7384 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7385 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7386 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7387 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7388 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7389 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7392 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7393 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7394 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7395 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7396 to defeat these protections as well?
7399 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7403 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7404 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7405 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7406 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7407 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7409 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7411 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7412 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7413 Wonderland
".
</title>
7414 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7418 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7419 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7420 "permissions" indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7423 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7424 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7425 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7426 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7427 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7428 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7431 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7432 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7433 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7434 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7435 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7436 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7437 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7438 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7439 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7440 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7441 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7444 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7445 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7446 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7447 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7448 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7451 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7453 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7454 story of mine that makes the same point.
7456 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo" class='startofrange'
>
7457 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7460 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7461 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7462 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7465 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7466 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7467 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7469 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7470 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7471 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7474 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7475 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7476 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7477 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7478 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7479 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7482 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7483 word
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7484 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7485 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much
7486 more positive term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the program to
7487 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7488 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7489 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7490 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7491 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7494 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7495 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7496 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7497 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7501 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7502 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7503 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7504 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7505 than Sony had built.
7507 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo" class='endofrange'
/>
7509 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7510 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7511 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7512 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7515 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7516 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7517 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7518 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7519 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7520 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7521 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7522 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7525 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7526 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7527 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7528 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7529 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7530 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7531 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7532 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7533 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7536 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7538 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7539 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
"Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7540 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7541 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7542 DMCA,"
<citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7543 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,"
<citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7544 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7545 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7546 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7547 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7548 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7550 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7551 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7552 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7553 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7556 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7557 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7558 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7559 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7560 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7561 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7562 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7566 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7567 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7568 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7569 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7572 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7573 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7574 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7575 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7576 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7579 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7580 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7581 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7582 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7583 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7584 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7587 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7588 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7589 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7590 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7591 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7592 constituted, succeed.
7595 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7596 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7597 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7602 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7603 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7604 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7608 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7609 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7610 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7614 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7616 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7617 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7618 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7622 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7623 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7624 spreading such information an offense.
7627 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7628 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7629 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7630 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7631 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7632 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7633 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7634 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7635 protection for copyright owners.
7638 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7639 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7640 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7641 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7642 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7645 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7646 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7647 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7648 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7649 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7650 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7651 have been a copyright violation.
7654 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7655 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7656 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7657 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7658 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7659 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7660 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7662 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7663 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7666 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7667 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7668 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7669 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7670 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7671 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7674 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7675 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7676 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7677 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7678 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7679 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "
<citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,"
7680 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7681 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7682 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7686 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7687 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7688 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7689 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7690 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7691 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7692 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7693 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7694 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7695 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7696 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7697 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7698 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7699 important.
<footnote><para>
7701 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
7702 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7703 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7704 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7710 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7711 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7712 the VCR responsible.
7715 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7717 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7720 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7723 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7724 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7725 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7726 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7727 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7728 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7731 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7733 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7734 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7735 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7738 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7739 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7740 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7743 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7744 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7745 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
7746 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7747 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7748 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7749 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7752 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7753 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7754 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7755 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7756 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7757 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7760 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
7761 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7762 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7763 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7764 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7765 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7766 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7767 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
7768 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7769 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7772 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7773 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7774 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7775 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7776 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7777 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7778 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7779 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7780 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7785 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
7786 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7787 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7788 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7789 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7791 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7792 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,"
<citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7793 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
7797 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7798 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7799 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7800 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7801 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7804 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7805 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7806 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7807 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7808 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7809 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7810 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7811 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7814 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7815 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7816 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7817 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7818 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7819 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7822 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
7823 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7825 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7826 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7827 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7828 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7829 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7832 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7833 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7834 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7835 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7836 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7837 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7838 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7839 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7843 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7844 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7845 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7846 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7847 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7850 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7851 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7852 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7853 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7854 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7855 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7856 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7857 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7861 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7864 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7866 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7867 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7868 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7870 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7871 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7872 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7873 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7874 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7875 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7877 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7878 Slide,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
7880 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7881 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7883 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,"
<citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
7886 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
7889 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7890 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7892 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
7893 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7894 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
7895 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
7896 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
7897 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7900 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7901 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7902 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7903 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7904 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7905 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7906 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7907 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7908 protected
— by the market.
7911 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7912 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7913 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7914 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7918 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7919 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7920 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7921 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7922 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7923 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7924 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7925 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7926 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7927 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7929 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch,"
<citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
7931 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7936 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7937 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7938 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7939 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7941 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7942 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7943 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7946 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7947 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7948 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7952 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7953 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7954 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7955 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7958 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7959 integration may matter.
7961 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7962 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7963 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7965 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
7966 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7967 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7968 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7969 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7972 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7973 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7974 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7975 control.
<footnote><para>
7977 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7978 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7980 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7981 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7982 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7983 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7989 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7990 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7991 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7992 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
7993 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7994 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
7998 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7999 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
8000 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8001 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
8002 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8003 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8004 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
8005 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8006 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
8008 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8009 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8010 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8011 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8012 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8013 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8014 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8017 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8018 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8019 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8020 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8021 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8022 63%."
<footnote><para>
8027 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8029 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8030 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8031 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8032 owned by the network.
8035 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8036 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8037 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8038 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8039 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8043 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8044 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8045 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8046 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8048 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8049 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8050 handful.
<footnote><para>
8052 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,"
<citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8053 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8054 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8059 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8060 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8061 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8062 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8063 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8064 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8065 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8066 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8067 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8070 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8072 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8073 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8074 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8075 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8076 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8077 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8079 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8080 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8081 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8082 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8083 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8084 Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
<citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8085 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8086 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8087 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8088 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8090 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8091 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8093 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8096 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8097 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8098 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8102 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8103 suggest the concern.
8106 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8107 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8108 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8111 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8112 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8113 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8116 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8117 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8118 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8119 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8120 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8121 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8122 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8123 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8124 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8125 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8126 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8127 outweigh these costs.
8130 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8131 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8132 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8136 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8137 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8138 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8139 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8140 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8141 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8142 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8143 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8144 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8145 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8148 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8149 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8152 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8153 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8154 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8158 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8160 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8161 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8162 message will be heard then?
8165 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8166 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8167 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8168 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8169 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8170 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8171 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8172 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8173 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8175 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8176 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8177 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8178 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8179 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8180 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8181 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8182 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8183 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8184 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,"
<citetitle>New
8185 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8186 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8187 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8188 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8189 Radio,"
<citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8190 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8191 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8192 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8193 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8194 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8195 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8196 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8197 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8198 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8199 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8200 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8201 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8202 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8203 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8204 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8208 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8209 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8210 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8211 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8212 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8213 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8214 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8215 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8216 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8219 <section id=
"together">
8220 <title>Together
</title>
8222 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8223 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8224 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8225 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8228 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8229 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8230 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8231 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8235 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8236 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8237 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8238 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8239 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8240 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8244 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8245 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8246 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8250 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8251 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8252 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8253 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8254 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8255 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8256 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8257 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8258 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8259 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8262 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8263 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8264 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8265 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8266 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8267 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8268 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8269 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8270 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8271 in control that technology and the market enable.
8274 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8275 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8277 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8278 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8279 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8280 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8283 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8284 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8285 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8286 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8287 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8288 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8289 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8290 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8291 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8292 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8293 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8294 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8295 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8296 known.
<footnote><para>
8298 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8299 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8300 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8304 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8307 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8308 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8309 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8310 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8311 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8315 <title>Law status in
1790</title>
8316 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8320 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8321 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8326 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8327 <entry>©</entry>
8331 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8340 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8341 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8342 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8345 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8346 noncommercial work was also free.
8349 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8353 <title>Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory
</title>
8354 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8358 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8359 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8364 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8365 <entry>©</entry>
8366 <entry>©</entry>
8369 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8378 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8379 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8380 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8381 transformation were still essentially free.
8384 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8385 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8386 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8387 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8388 we could say the law began to look like this:
8392 <title>Law status in
1975</title>
8393 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8398 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8403 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8404 <entry>©</entry>
8405 <entry>©</entry>
8408 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8409 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8417 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8418 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8419 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8420 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8421 that the law now looks like this:
8425 <title>Law status now
</title>
8426 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8431 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8436 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8437 <entry>©</entry>
8438 <entry>©</entry>
8441 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8442 <entry>©</entry>
8443 <entry>©</entry>
8450 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8451 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8454 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8455 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8458 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8459 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8460 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8461 these domains actually does any good.
8464 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8465 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8466 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8467 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8468 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8469 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8470 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8471 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8472 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8473 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8476 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8477 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8478 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8479 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8480 property rights
<footnote><para>
8482 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8483 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8484 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8485 Disintegration of Property," in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8486 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8489 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8490 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8491 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8492 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8493 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8494 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8495 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8496 vibrant and rich free culture.
8499 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8500 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8501 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8502 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8503 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8504 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8505 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8507 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8508 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8509 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8510 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8511 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8512 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8513 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8514 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8515 dominates the debate today.
8518 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8519 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8520 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8521 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8522 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8523 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8524 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8525 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8526 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8527 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8534 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8535 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8538 <chapter id=
"chimera">
8539 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8540 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8541 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8543 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8544 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8546 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8547 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8551 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8552 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8553 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8555 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8556 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8557 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8559 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8560 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8561 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8562 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8563 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8564 villagers to explore life as a king.
8567 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8568 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8569 "blind." They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8570 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8571 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8572 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8573 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8574 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8579 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8580 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8581 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8582 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8583 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8584 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8585 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8586 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8587 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8590 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8591 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8592 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8593 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8596 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8597 is affected," he reports.
8600 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8601 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8605 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8606 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8607 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8608 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8611 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8612 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8613 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8614 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8615 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8616 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8617 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8618 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8621 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8622 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8625 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8626 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8628 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8629 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8630 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8631 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8632 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8633 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8636 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8637 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8638 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8639 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8640 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8641 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8642 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8643 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8644 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8645 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8646 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8647 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8650 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8651 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8652 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8653 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8654 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8655 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8656 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8659 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8660 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8661 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8662 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8663 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8665 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8670 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8671 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8672 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8673 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8674 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8675 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8676 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8677 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8680 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8681 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8682 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8683 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8684 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8687 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8688 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8689 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8690 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8691 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8692 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8693 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8694 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8696 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8697 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8698 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
8700 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8701 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8702 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8703 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8704 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8705 Stakes on Piracy,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
8706 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8707 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8708 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8709 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8710 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8711 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8712 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8713 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8714 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8715 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8716 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8717 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8718 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8719 August
2003, available at
8720 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8721 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8722 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8723 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8724 Name Students,"
<citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8725 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8726 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
8727 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8731 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8733 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8734 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8735 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8736 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8737 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8740 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8741 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8742 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8743 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8744 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8745 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
8746 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8747 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8752 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8753 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8754 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8755 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8756 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8757 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8760 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8761 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8762 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8763 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8764 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8765 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8766 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8767 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8768 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8769 protection for copyrighted material,
8773 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8774 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8777 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8778 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8779 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8781 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8782 well produce a totally different industry model.
8785 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8786 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8787 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8788 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8789 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8790 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8791 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8792 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8793 interests.
<footnote><para>
8795 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8796 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8797 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8798 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
8799 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8800 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8801 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
8804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8806 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8807 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8809 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
8812 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8813 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8814 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8819 <chapter id=
"harms">
8820 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8823 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8824 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8825 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8826 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8828 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8831 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8832 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8834 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8838 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8839 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8840 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8843 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8844 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8846 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8847 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8848 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8849 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8853 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8854 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8855 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8856 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8857 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8859 <section id=
"constrain">
8860 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8862 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8863 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8864 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8865 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8866 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8867 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8868 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8869 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8870 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8871 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8872 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8873 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8874 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8877 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8878 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8879 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8880 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8881 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8882 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8883 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8884 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8885 the culture all around.
8888 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8889 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8893 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8894 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8895 storytelling extended across the globe.
8898 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8899 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8900 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8901 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8902 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8903 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8904 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8905 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8906 work is presumptively illegal.
8909 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8910 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8911 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8912 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8913 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8914 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8915 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8916 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8917 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8918 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8919 million.
<footnote><para>
8921 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
8922 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8923 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8924 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8925 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8926 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8928 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8929 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8930 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8931 suffering.
<footnote>
8933 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8934 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8935 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8936 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8937 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8938 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8940 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8942 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8944 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8945 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8946 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8947 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8950 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8951 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
8952 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
8953 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
8954 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
8955 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
8958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8959 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
8960 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
8961 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
8962 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
8963 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
8964 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
8965 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
8966 States.
<footnote><para>
8969 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free,"
<citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
8971 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8972 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8974 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8975 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8976 critical or reflective.
8979 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8980 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
8981 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
8982 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8983 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8984 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8985 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8986 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8987 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8988 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8991 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8992 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8993 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8994 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8995 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8996 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8997 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8998 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8999 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9002 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9003 described in chapter
9004 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
9005 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9006 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9007 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9013 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9014 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9015 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9016 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9017 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9018 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9019 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9020 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9023 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9024 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9025 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9026 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9027 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9028 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9029 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9030 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9034 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9035 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9036 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9037 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9038 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9039 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9040 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9041 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9042 culture that is free.
9045 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9049 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9050 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9051 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9052 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9053 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9055 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9056 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9057 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9061 <section id=
"innovators">
9062 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9064 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9065 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9066 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9067 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9068 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9069 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9072 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9073 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9074 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9075 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9076 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9077 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9078 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9081 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9082 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9083 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9084 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9085 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9086 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9087 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9088 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9089 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9090 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9091 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9093 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9095 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9097 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9098 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9099 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9100 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9101 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9102 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9103 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9104 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9105 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9108 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9109 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9110 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9113 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9114 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9115 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9116 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9117 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9118 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9121 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9122 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9123 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9124 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9126 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9129 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9130 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9131 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9132 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9133 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9134 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9135 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9136 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9137 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9138 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9141 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9142 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9145 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9146 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9147 the kind of content the users liked.
9150 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9151 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9152 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9153 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9154 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9155 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9156 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9157 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9158 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9159 they had already bought.
9161 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9162 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9165 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9166 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9167 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9168 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9169 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9170 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9171 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9172 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9175 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9178 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9179 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9180 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9181 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9182 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9183 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9184 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9188 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9189 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9190 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9192 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9193 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9194 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9195 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9196 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9198 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9199 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9200 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9202 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9203 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9204 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9205 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9206 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9208 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles
9209 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9210 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9211 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9212 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9213 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles
9214 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9216 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9217 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9218 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9219 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9220 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9221 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9222 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9223 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9224 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9225 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
<citetitle>Business
9226 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9229 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9231 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9232 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9233 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9234 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9235 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9236 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9237 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9240 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s,"
<citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9242 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9243 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9244 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9249 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9250 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9251 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9252 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9253 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9254 constantly threatened by litigation.
9258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9259 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9260 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9261 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9262 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9263 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9265 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9267 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9268 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9269 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9270 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9271 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9274 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9275 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9276 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9277 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9278 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9279 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9280 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9281 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9282 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9283 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9286 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9287 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9288 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9289 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9290 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9291 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9292 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9293 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9294 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9295 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9296 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9297 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9299 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9300 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9301 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9302 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9303 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9304 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9305 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9308 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9309 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9310 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9311 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9312 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9313 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9314 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9315 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9318 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9319 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9320 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9321 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9322 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9323 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9324 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9325 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9329 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9331 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9332 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9333 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9334 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9335 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9337 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9338 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9343 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9344 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9346 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9347 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9350 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9354 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9355 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9356 impose.
<footnote><para>
9357 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9358 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9360 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9361 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9365 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9366 innovation
—again,
9367 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9371 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9372 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9373 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9374 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9377 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9378 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9379 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9380 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9381 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9383 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9384 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9385 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9387 overall this history of copyright
9388 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9389 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9390 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9391 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9394 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9395 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9396 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9397 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9398 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9401 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9403 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9404 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9405 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9406 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9407 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9408 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9409 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9410 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9411 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9412 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9413 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9414 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9417 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9418 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9419 here.
<footnote><para>
9421 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9422 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9423 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9424 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9425 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9426 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9427 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9428 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9429 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9430 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9431 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9432 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34,
9434 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9435 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9437 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9438 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9443 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9444 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9445 artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
9446 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9447 version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9448 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9449 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9450 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9451 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9452 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9455 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9456 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9457 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9458 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9459 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9460 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9461 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9462 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9466 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9467 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9468 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9469 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9470 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9471 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9475 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9476 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9477 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9478 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9479 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9480 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9481 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9482 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9483 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9484 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9485 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9490 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9491 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9492 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9493 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9494 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9495 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9500 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9501 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9502 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9503 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9504 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9505 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9506 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9507 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9508 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9509 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9510 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9511 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9512 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9519 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9520 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9521 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9522 legislation"
<footnote><para>
9526 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9529 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9530 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9531 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9532 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9533 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9537 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9538 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9541 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9542 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9543 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9544 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9545 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9546 of "Happy Birthday" on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9547 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9548 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9549 burdens terrestrial radio.
9552 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9553 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9554 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9555 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9556 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9559 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9560 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9561 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9562 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9563 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9564 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9565 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9566 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9567 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9568 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9569 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9570 Distribution,"
<citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9571 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9572 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9573 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9574 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9575 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9576 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9577 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9579 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9583 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9584 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9585 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9586 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9589 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9591 name of the service;
9594 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9597 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9600 date of transmission;
9603 time of transmission;
9606 time zone of origination of transmission;
9609 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9612 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9615 sound recording title;
9618 ISRC code of the recording;
9621 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9624 featured recording artist;
9633 UPC code of the retail album;
9639 copyright owner information;
9642 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9645 name of the service or entity;
9651 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9654 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9657 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9660 Unique User identifier;
9663 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9668 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9669 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9670 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9671 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9672 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
9673 that terrestrial radio does not.
9676 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9677 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9678 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9680 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9682 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9683 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9684 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9688 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9689 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9690 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9691 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9692 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9693 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… "How do you come up with a
9695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9696 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9698 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9699 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9700 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9701 of business.
…"
9704 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9705 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
9706 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9707 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9712 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9713 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9714 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9715 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9716 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9717 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9718 effective to prevent it.
9721 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9722 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9724 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9726 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9727 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9730 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9731 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9732 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9735 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9736 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9737 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
9738 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9739 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9740 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9741 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9742 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9743 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9745 According to the RIAA,
9746 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9747 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9750 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9751 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9753 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9754 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9755 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9757 response by the other.
9760 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9761 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9762 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9763 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9764 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9765 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9766 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9767 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9768 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9769 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9770 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9771 was.
<footnote><para>
9773 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,"
<citetitle>Los
9774 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
9776 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9777 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9778 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9779 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9780 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9781 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9785 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9786 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9787 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9788 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9789 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9790 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9791 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9792 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9793 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9795 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9796 Prohibition,"
<citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9800 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9801 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9803 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9804 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9805 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9807 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9808 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9809 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9810 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9811 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9813 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9814 Compliance,"
<citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9815 compliance literature).
9817 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9818 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9819 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9820 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
9823 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9824 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9825 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9826 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9827 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9828 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9829 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9830 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9831 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9832 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9833 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9834 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9835 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9836 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9837 degree of illegality.
9840 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9841 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9842 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9843 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9844 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9845 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9846 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9847 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9848 to consider the alternative.
9852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9853 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9854 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9855 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9856 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9857 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9860 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9861 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9862 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9863 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9864 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9865 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9866 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9867 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9868 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9869 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9870 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9871 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9874 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9875 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9876 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9877 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9878 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9879 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9880 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9881 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9882 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9886 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9889 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9890 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9891 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9892 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9896 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9900 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9901 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9902 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9903 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9904 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9905 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9906 capacities of digital technologies.
9908 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9910 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9911 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9912 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9913 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9914 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9915 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9916 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9917 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9918 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9921 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9922 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9923 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9924 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9925 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9926 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9927 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9928 on people's machines.
9931 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9932 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9933 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9934 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9935 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9936 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9939 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9940 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9941 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9945 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9946 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9947 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9948 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9949 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9950 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9951 freedom to move content easily?
9954 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9955 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9956 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9957 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9958 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9959 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9960 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9961 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9962 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9965 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9966 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9967 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9968 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9969 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9970 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9971 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9974 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9975 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9976 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9977 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9980 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9981 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9985 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9986 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9987 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9988 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9989 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9990 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9991 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9992 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9994 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
9997 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9999 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10003 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10004 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
10005 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10006 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10007 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10008 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10009 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10010 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10011 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10015 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10016 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10017 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10020 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10021 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10022 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10023 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10024 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10025 an Internet user is revealed.
10028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10029 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10030 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10031 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10032 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10033 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10034 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10035 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10036 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10038 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10039 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10040 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10041 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10042 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10043 Being Sued,"
<citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10044 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10045 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10046 Fan, Either,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10047 Brianna a Criminal?"
<citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10052 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10053 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10054 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10056 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10057 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10058 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10060 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10061 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10062 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10065 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10066 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10067 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10068 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10069 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10070 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10071 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10072 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10073 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10074 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10075 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10077 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10078 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10079 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10080 Colleges,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10081 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,"
<citetitle>Christian Science
10082 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10083 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10084 Lawsuit Possible,"
<citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10085 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,"
<citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10086 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10087 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
10088 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10089 Sharing,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10090 Are Weapons at Universities,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10092 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10093 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10096 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10097 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10098 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10099 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10100 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10101 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10105 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10106 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10108 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10112 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10113 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10114 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10115 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10116 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10117 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10118 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10119 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10120 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10121 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10122 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10123 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10124 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10125 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10126 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10127 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10132 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10133 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10134 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10135 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10136 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10137 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10144 <part id=
"c-balances">
10145 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10150 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10151 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10152 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10153 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10156 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10157 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10158 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10159 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10160 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10164 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10165 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10166 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10167 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10168 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10169 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10173 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10174 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10175 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10176 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10177 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10178 made that is happening all around.
10181 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10182 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10183 gasoline onto this fire.
10186 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10187 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10188 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10189 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10192 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10193 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10194 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10195 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10196 success will require.
10200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10201 <chapter id=
"eldred">
10202 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10204 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10205 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10206 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10207 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10208 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10209 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10213 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10214 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10215 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10216 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10217 them available for free.
10220 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10221 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10222 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10223 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10224 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10226 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10227 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10228 accessible
—today.
10231 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10232 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10233 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10234 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10235 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10236 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10237 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10238 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10239 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10240 commercial publications of public domain works.
10243 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10244 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10245 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10246 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10247 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10248 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10249 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10250 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10251 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10252 generally.
<footnote><para>
10254 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10255 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10256 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10257 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10258 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10259 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10260 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10261 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10262 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10263 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10264 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10265 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10266 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10267 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10268 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10271 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10272 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10273 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10274 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10275 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10276 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10277 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10278 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10279 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10280 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10281 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10282 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10287 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10288 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10289 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10290 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10292 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10293 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10294 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10295 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10296 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10297 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10298 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10303 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10304 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10305 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10306 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10307 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10308 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10312 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10314 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10316 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10317 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10319 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10323 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10324 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10325 their
… Writings.
…
10329 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10330 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10331 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10332 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10333 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10334 specific
—to "promote
… Progress"
—through means that
10335 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10336 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10339 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10340 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10341 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10342 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10344 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10345 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10346 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10347 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10348 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10351 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10352 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10353 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10354 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10355 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10356 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10357 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10358 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10359 this gravy train going.
10362 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10363 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10364 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10365 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10366 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10367 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10368 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10371 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10372 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10373 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10374 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10375 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10376 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10377 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10378 published by anyone for free.
10381 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10382 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10383 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10384 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10388 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10391 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10392 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10396 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10397 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10398 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10399 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10402 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10406 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10407 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10408 they support the bill."
10411 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10412 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10413 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10417 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10418 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10419 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10420 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10423 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10424 correct conclusion:
10427 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10428 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10430 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10433 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10435 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10436 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10439 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10440 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10441 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10442 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10444 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10446 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10447 the copyright term extended.
10450 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10451 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10452 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10455 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10457 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10458 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10459 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10460 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10461 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10462 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10463 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10464 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10466 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10467 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10468 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10469 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10471 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10473 Disney is estimated to have
10474 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10475 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10477 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10478 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10479 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10484 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10485 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10487 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10488 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10489 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10490 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10491 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10493 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10497 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10498 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10499 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10500 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10501 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10502 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10506 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10510 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10511 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10512 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10514 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10515 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10520 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10521 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10522 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10523 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10524 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10527 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10528 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10529 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10530 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10531 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10532 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10533 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10534 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10535 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10536 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10537 position to second-guess Congress.
10540 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10541 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10542 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10544 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10545 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10546 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10547 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10549 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10553 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10554 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10556 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10557 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10558 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10559 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10560 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10561 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10562 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10563 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10564 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10566 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10567 yield the conclusion that Congress
10568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10569 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10570 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10571 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10572 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10573 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10574 term of existing copyrights.
10577 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10578 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10579 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10580 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10581 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10582 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10583 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10584 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10585 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10586 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10587 were going to be petty politicians.
10590 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10591 argument in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10592 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10593 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10594 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10595 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10596 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10597 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10598 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10599 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10600 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10601 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10602 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10603 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10604 piracy that affects us all.
10607 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10610 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10611 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10613 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10614 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10615 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10617 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10618 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10619 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10621 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
10624 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10626 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10628 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10629 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10630 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10631 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10632 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10633 bought to extend them again.
10636 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10638 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10639 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10641 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10643 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10644 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10645 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10646 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10648 and no longer available as a result.
10651 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10652 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10653 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10654 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10655 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10656 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10657 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10659 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10660 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
10661 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10666 Think practically about the consequence of this
10667 extension
—practically,
10668 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10671 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10672 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10673 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10675 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10678 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10679 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10680 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10681 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10682 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10683 list of books still under copyright.
10686 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10687 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10690 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10692 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10693 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10694 being at least a list?
10697 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10698 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10700 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10702 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10703 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10706 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10707 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10711 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
10712 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10713 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10714 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10715 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10716 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10717 what tangible property.
10720 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10721 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10722 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10725 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10726 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10728 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10729 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10730 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10731 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10732 know quite well who owns what property.
10735 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10736 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10738 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10739 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10740 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10741 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10742 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10743 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10744 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10747 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10748 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10750 for other creative works is much more dire.
10752 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10754 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10755 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10756 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10757 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
10758 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10759 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10760 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10761 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10762 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10763 films."
<footnote><para>
10765 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10766 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10767 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10768 Down Copyright Extension,"
<citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
10771 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
10774 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10775 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10776 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10777 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10780 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10783 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10784 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10785 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10786 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10787 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10788 work available for distribution.
10791 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10792 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10793 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10794 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10795 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10796 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10798 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10799 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
10800 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10801 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10802 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
10803 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10808 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10810 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10811 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10812 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10813 locate the copyright owner.
10816 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10817 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10818 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10819 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10820 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10821 to these films is exceptionally high.
10824 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10825 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10826 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10827 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10828 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10829 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10830 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10831 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10832 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10835 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10838 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10840 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10841 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10842 the copyright expires.
10845 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10846 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10847 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10849 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10853 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10854 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10855 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10856 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10858 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10862 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10863 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10865 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10866 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10867 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10869 the commercial life ends.
10872 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10873 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10874 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10876 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10878 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10879 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10880 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10881 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10882 have, we need to have access to this history.
10885 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10888 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10889 this context do no good.
10892 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10893 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10894 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10895 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10896 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10897 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10898 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10899 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10900 was independent of copyright law.
10903 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10904 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10905 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10906 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10907 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10908 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10909 market didn't have more to offer.
10912 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10913 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10914 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10915 would not have interfered with anything.
10918 But this situation has now changed.
10921 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10922 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10923 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10924 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10925 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10926 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10927 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10928 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10929 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10930 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10934 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10935 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10936 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10937 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10938 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10939 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10940 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10941 written for a radically different context.
10944 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10945 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10946 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10947 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
10948 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
10949 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
10950 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
10951 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
10952 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
10955 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10956 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10957 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10961 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10962 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10963 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10964 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10965 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10966 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10967 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10968 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10969 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10972 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10973 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10974 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10975 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10978 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10979 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10980 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10981 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10982 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10984 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10985 December
2002, available at
10986 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10991 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10992 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10993 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10994 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10995 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10996 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10999 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11000 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11001 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11002 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11003 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11006 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11007 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11008 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11009 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11010 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11011 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11012 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11013 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11014 power to extend existing terms.
11017 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11018 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11019 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11020 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11023 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11024 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11027 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11028 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11029 overstepped its bounds.
11032 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11033 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11034 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11035 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11036 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11039 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11040 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11041 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11042 briefs and preparing for argument.
11045 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11046 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11047 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11048 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11049 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11050 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11051 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11052 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11055 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11056 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11057 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11060 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11062 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11063 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11064 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11065 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11068 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11069 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11070 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11072 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11073 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11074 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11076 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11077 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11078 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11079 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11080 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11081 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11082 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11083 most powerful media companies in the world."
11086 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11087 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11088 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11089 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11090 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11091 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11092 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11093 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11095 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11096 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11098 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11099 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11100 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11102 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11103 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11104 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11107 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11108 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11109 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11110 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11111 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11112 why it was unconstitutional.
11115 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11117 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11118 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11119 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11120 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11121 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11122 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11123 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11124 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11125 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11126 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11127 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11128 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11129 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11130 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11131 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11134 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11135 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11136 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11137 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11138 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11139 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11140 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11141 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11142 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11143 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11144 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11145 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11146 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11147 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11150 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11151 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11152 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11153 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11154 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11155 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11158 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11159 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11161 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11162 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11163 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11164 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11165 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11166 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11167 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11168 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11169 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11170 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11171 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11174 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11175 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11176 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11177 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11178 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11179 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11182 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11183 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11184 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11185 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11188 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11189 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11190 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11191 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11192 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11194 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11195 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11196 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11197 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11198 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11199 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11200 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11201 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11202 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11205 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11206 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11207 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11208 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11209 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11210 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11211 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11212 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11215 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11216 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11217 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11220 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11221 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11222 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11223 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11224 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11225 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11226 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11227 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11228 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11229 confidence in our argument.
11230 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11233 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11234 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11235 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11236 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11240 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11241 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11242 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11243 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11244 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11245 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11249 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11250 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11251 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11252 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11253 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11254 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11256 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11257 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11259 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11260 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11261 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11262 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11264 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11265 Mouse Joins the Fray,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11269 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11270 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11271 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11274 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11275 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11276 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11277 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11278 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11279 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11280 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11281 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11282 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11283 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11286 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11287 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11288 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11289 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11290 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11291 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11292 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11295 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11296 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11297 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11298 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11299 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11300 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line of cases that said that
11301 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11304 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11306 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11307 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11308 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11311 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11312 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11313 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11314 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11315 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11318 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11319 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11320 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11321 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11322 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11323 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11324 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11325 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11328 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11330 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11331 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11332 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11333 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11334 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11335 these retrospective extensions.
11338 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11339 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11340 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11341 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11342 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11343 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11346 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11347 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11348 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11350 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11351 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11352 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11353 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11356 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11357 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11358 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11361 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11362 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11363 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11364 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11365 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to
11366 regulate commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to
11367 regulate copyright be limited.
11370 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11371 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11372 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11373 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11374 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11377 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11378 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11379 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11381 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11384 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11386 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11387 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11388 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11390 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11392 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11393 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11395 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11396 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11397 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11399 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11400 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11403 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11404 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11407 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11408 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11409 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11410 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11412 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11413 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11416 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11418 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11419 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11420 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11421 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11422 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11425 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11426 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11427 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11428 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11429 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11431 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11433 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11434 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11435 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11436 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11437 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11438 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11439 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11440 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11441 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11442 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11443 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11446 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11447 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11450 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11451 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11452 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11453 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11455 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11456 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11457 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11458 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11459 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11460 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11461 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11462 family of the Justices.
11465 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11466 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11467 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11468 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11471 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11472 The history was bothering her.
11476 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11477 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11478 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11479 practice that began with the very first act.
11483 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11484 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11485 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11489 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11490 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11492 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11497 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11498 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11499 Kennedy, who observed,
11503 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11504 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11505 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11506 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11507 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11511 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11517 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11518 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11519 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11520 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11521 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11524 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11526 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11527 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11528 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11529 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11530 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11533 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11534 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11535 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11538 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11539 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11545 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11546 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11549 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11550 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11552 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11553 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11554 into the Copyright Clause.
11558 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11559 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11560 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11564 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11565 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11566 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11567 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11572 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11573 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11574 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11575 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11576 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11577 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11578 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11579 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11580 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11581 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11585 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11586 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11589 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11593 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11594 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11595 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11596 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11597 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11598 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11599 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11600 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11601 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11602 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11603 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11604 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11605 law that it had established elsewhere.
11608 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11609 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11610 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11611 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11612 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11615 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11616 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11617 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11620 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11621 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
11622 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11626 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11627 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11628 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11629 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11630 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11635 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11636 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11637 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11640 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11641 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11642 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11643 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11646 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11647 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11648 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11649 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11650 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
11651 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11652 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11653 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11654 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11657 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11658 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11659 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11660 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11661 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11662 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11663 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11664 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11665 the system we have.
11667 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11669 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11670 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11671 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11672 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11673 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11674 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11675 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11676 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11677 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11679 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11681 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11682 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11683 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11684 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11685 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11686 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11687 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11688 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11689 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11690 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11693 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11694 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11695 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11696 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11697 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
11700 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11701 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11702 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11705 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11706 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
11707 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11708 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11709 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11710 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11711 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11712 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11713 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11714 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11718 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11719 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11720 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11721 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11724 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11725 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11726 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11727 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11728 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11729 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11733 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11735 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11738 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11740 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11741 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11742 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11743 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11744 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11745 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11746 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11747 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11748 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11751 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11752 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11753 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11754 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11755 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11756 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11757 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11758 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11759 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11760 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11761 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11762 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11763 effort to persuade; but I
11764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11765 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11766 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11767 should decide the issue.
11769 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11771 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11772 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11774 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11777 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11778 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11779 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11780 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11783 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11784 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11785 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11786 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11790 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11791 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11792 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11793 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11794 issue should not be raised until it is.
11795 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11798 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11799 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11800 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11801 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11802 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11803 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11804 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11805 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11806 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11807 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11808 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11811 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11812 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11813 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11814 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11815 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11819 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11820 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11821 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11822 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11823 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11824 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11828 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11829 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11830 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
11831 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit
11832 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
11833 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11835 <figure id=
"fig-18">
11836 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
11837 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
11840 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11841 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11842 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11843 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11844 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11845 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11846 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11850 <chapter id=
"eldred-ii">
11851 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11853 The day
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11854 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was
11855 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11856 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11857 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11858 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11859 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11861 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11863 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11864 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11865 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11866 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11867 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11868 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11869 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11870 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11873 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11874 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11876 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11877 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11878 the work passed into the public domain.
11881 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11882 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11883 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11886 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11887 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11888 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11889 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11890 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11891 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11892 everything else, let the content go.
11894 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11896 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11897 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11898 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11899 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11900 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11901 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11902 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11903 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11904 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11905 the stupid harm of the present system.
11908 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11909 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11910 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11911 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11912 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11913 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11914 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11915 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11916 where copyright owners could be identified.
11918 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11919 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11922 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
11923 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11924 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11925 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11927 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11928 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11929 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11930 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11931 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11932 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11933 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11934 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11935 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11936 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11937 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11938 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11939 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11940 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11941 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11942 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
11943 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
11944 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11945 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11946 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11947 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11948 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11949 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11950 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11953 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11954 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11955 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11956 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11957 know what's protected and what's not.
11959 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11961 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11962 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11963 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11964 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11965 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11966 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11967 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
11968 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
11971 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11972 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11973 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11974 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11975 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11976 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11979 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11980 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11981 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11982 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11984 imposed upon creators.
11987 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11988 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11991 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11992 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11993 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11994 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11995 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11999 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12000 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12001 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12002 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12003 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12004 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12008 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12009 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12010 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12011 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12012 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12013 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12014 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12015 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12016 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12017 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12018 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12019 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12020 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12021 system of protection for property generally.
12024 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12025 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12026 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12027 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12028 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12029 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12030 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12031 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12034 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12035 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12036 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12039 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12040 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12041 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12042 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12043 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12044 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12045 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12046 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12049 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12050 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12051 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12052 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12053 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12054 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12055 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12058 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12059 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12060 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12061 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12062 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12065 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12066 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12067 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12068 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12069 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12072 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12073 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12074 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12078 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12079 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12080 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12083 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12084 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12085 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12086 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12087 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12088 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12089 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12090 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12091 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12092 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12094 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12096 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12097 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12098 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12099 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12102 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12103 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12104 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12105 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12106 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12107 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12108 something good might happen here.
12109 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12112 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12113 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12114 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12115 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12116 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12117 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12120 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12121 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12122 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12123 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12124 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12125 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12126 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12127 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12128 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12129 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12130 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12131 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12132 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12133 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12134 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12135 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12136 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12137 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12138 film is a valid derivative use.
12141 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12142 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12143 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12144 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12145 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12146 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12149 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12150 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12151 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12152 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12153 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12154 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12155 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12159 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12160 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12161 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12162 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12168 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12169 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12170 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12171 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12172 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12173 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12174 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12175 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12176 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12179 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12180 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12181 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12182 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12183 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12184 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12185 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12186 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12187 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12190 What does this industry really want?
12193 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12194 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12195 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12196 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12197 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12198 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12199 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12200 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12204 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12205 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12206 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12207 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12208 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12212 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12213 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12216 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12217 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12218 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12219 and to share its own creation.
12221 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12222 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12224 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12225 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12226 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12227 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12228 block the progress of others.
12231 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12232 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12233 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12234 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12235 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12236 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12237 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12242 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12243 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12245 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12246 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12247 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12248 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12249 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12252 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12253 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12254 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12255 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12256 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12257 the disease almost invisible.
12260 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12261 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12262 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12263 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12265 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12266 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12267 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12268 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12270 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12272 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12273 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12278 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12279 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12280 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12281 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12282 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12283 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12286 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12287 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12288 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12289 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12290 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12291 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12292 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12293 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12297 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12298 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12299 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12300 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12301 costs significantly below the market price.
12304 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12305 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12306 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12307 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12308 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12309 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12310 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12313 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12314 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12315 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12316 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12320 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12321 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12322 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12323 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12324 imports."
<footnote><para>
12326 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12327 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12328 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12329 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12330 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12331 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12332 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12333 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12334 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12337 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12338 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12339 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12340 possible trade sanctions.
12341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12342 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12343 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12344 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12345 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12346 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12347 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12348 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12349 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12350 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12351 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12353 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12354 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12355 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12356 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12359 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12360 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12361 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12362 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12363 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12364 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12365 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12366 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12369 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12370 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12371 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12372 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12373 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12374 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12377 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12378 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12379 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12380 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12381 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12382 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12386 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12387 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12390 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12392 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12393 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12394 May
1999, A1, available at
12395 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12396 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12397 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12398 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12399 Medicines,"
<citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12400 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12401 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12402 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12403 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,"
<citetitle>Widener Law
12404 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12407 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12408 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12409 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12410 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12413 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12414 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12415 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12416 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12417 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12418 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12419 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12420 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12423 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12424 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12425 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12426 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12427 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12428 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12431 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12432 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12433 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12434 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12435 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12436 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12439 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12440 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12441 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12442 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12443 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12444 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12445 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12446 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12448 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12449 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12450 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12451 idea called "intellectual property."
12454 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12455 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12456 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12457 What is the argument?
12460 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12461 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12462 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12463 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12464 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12465 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12466 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12467 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12468 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12469 were balanced in just this sense.
12472 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12473 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12474 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12475 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12476 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12477 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12478 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12479 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12480 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12481 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12482 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12483 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12485 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12486 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12487 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12488 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12489 this common sense open its eyes.
12492 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12493 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12494 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12495 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12496 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12497 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12498 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12499 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12500 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12501 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12502 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12503 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12506 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12507 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12508 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12509 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12510 August
2003, E1, available at
12511 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12512 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,"
<citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12513 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12514 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12515 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,"
<citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12516 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12517 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12519 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12520 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12521 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12522 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12523 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12524 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12525 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12526 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12527 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12528 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12529 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12530 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12531 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12533 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12534 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12535 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12536 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12537 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12538 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12541 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12542 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12543 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12544 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12545 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12548 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12549 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12552 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12553 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12554 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12555 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12559 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12560 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12561 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12562 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12563 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12564 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12565 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12566 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12567 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12568 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12569 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12570 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12571 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12572 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12573 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12574 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12575 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12578 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12579 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12580 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12583 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12584 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12585 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12586 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12589 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12590 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12591 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12592 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12593 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12594 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12595 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12596 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12597 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12600 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12601 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12602 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12603 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12604 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12605 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM
12606 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12607 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12608 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12609 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12611 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12612 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12613 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12614 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12615 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12616 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12617 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,"
<citetitle>Government Policy
12618 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12619 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12620 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12621 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12622 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
12623 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12624 May
2001), available at
12625 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12627 <indexterm><primary>"copyleft" licenses
</primary></indexterm>
12628 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12629 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12632 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12633 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12634 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12635 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12636 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12639 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12640 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12641 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12642 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12643 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12644 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12645 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12646 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12647 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12650 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12651 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12652 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12653 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12654 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12655 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12656 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12658 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12659 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12661 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12664 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12665 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12666 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12667 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12668 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12669 its lobbying efforts.
12672 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12673 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12674 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12675 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12676 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12677 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12678 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12682 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12686 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12687 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12688 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12689 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12690 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12691 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12692 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12693 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12696 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12697 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12698 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12699 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12700 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12701 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12702 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12703 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12704 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12705 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12706 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12709 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12710 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12711 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12712 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12713 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12714 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12715 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
12716 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12717 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12718 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12719 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
12720 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12723 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12724 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12725 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12727 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12728 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12729 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12730 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12731 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12735 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12736 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12737 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12738 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12739 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12740 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12741 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12742 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12743 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12746 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12747 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12749 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12750 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12752 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
12753 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12755 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12756 choice now is whether that information society will be
12757 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
12761 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12762 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12763 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12764 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12768 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12769 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12770 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12771 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12772 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12773 say anything wrong. But in the world
12774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12775 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12776 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12780 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12781 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12782 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12783 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12784 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12785 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12786 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12787 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12790 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12791 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12792 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12793 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12794 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12795 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12798 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12799 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12800 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12801 our own country's history).
12804 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12805 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12806 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12807 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12808 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12809 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12810 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12811 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12812 democracy in the world, become?
12815 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12816 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12817 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12819 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12820 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12822 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12824 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12825 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12826 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12827 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12828 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12829 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12830 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12831 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12832 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12833 hearings and a different result.
12834 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
12835 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
12838 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12839 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12840 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12841 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12842 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12843 concentration in the media.
12846 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12847 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12848 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12849 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12850 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12853 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12854 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12855 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12856 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12857 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12858 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12859 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12863 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12864 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12865 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12866 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12867 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12870 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12871 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12872 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12873 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12874 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12875 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12878 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12881 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12883 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12884 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12886 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12888 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12889 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12891 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12892 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12893 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,"
<citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
12894 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12895 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12896 Defendants,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12897 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,"
<citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
12899 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12901 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12902 music.
<footnote><para>
12904 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,"
12905 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12906 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12908 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12909 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12911 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12912 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12913 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12916 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12917 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12918 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12919 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12920 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12921 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12922 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12923 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12924 kids who use a computer to share content.
12926 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12927 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12928 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12929 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12931 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12932 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12933 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12934 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12935 24 August
2003, available at
12936 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12938 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12939 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12940 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12941 country.
<footnote><para>
12943 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12945 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12948 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12949 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12950 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12951 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12952 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12953 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12954 day into the Causbys.
12957 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12958 potential is ever to be realized.
12960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12964 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12965 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12969 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12970 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12971 maps what might be done.
12974 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12975 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12976 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12977 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12980 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12981 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12982 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12983 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12987 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12988 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12989 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12990 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12991 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12995 <section id=
"usnow">
12996 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12998 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12999 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
13000 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13001 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13004 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13005 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13006 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
13007 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
13008 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13009 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13010 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13011 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13014 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13015 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13016 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13017 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13021 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13022 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13026 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13027 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13028 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13029 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13030 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13031 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13032 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13033 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13034 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13035 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13036 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13037 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13040 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13041 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
13042 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13043 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13044 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13048 <section id=
"examples">
13049 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13051 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13052 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13053 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13054 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13055 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13056 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13057 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13061 What made it assured?
13063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13065 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13066 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13067 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13068 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13069 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13070 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13071 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13072 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13073 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13074 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13075 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13076 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13077 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13078 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13080 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13082 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13083 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13084 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13085 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13086 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13087 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13088 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13089 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13090 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13093 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13094 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13095 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13096 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13097 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13098 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13099 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13103 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13104 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13105 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13106 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13109 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13110 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),"
<citetitle>Stanford Technology
13111 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13113 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13114 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13115 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13116 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13117 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13118 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13119 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13122 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13123 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13124 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13127 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13128 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13129 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13130 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13131 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13132 care much about controlling their software.
13134 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13136 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13137 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13138 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13139 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13140 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13144 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13145 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13146 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13147 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13148 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13149 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13150 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13151 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13152 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13156 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13157 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13158 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13159 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13160 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13161 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13162 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13165 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13166 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13168 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13169 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13170 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13171 fundamentally weakened.
13174 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13175 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13176 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13177 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13178 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13179 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13182 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13183 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13184 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13185 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13186 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13187 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13188 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13189 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13193 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13194 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13195 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13196 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13197 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13198 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13201 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13202 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13203 scientific journals are produced.
13205 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
>
13206 <primary>academic journals
</primary>
13209 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13210 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13211 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13212 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13213 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13214 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13215 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13216 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13217 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13218 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13219 and Westlaw are also free
13220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13221 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13222 Court opinion through their respective services.
13225 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13226 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13227 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13228 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13229 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13230 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13231 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13234 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13235 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13236 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13239 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13240 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13241 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13242 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13243 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13244 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13245 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13246 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13247 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13248 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13251 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13252 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13253 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13254 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13255 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13259 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13260 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13261 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13262 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13264 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13265 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13266 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13267 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13268 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13269 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13270 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13273 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13274 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13275 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13276 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13277 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13278 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13281 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13284 <section id=
"oneidea">
13285 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13286 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13287 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13290 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13291 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13294 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13295 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13296 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13297 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13298 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13299 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13300 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13301 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13302 make this possible.
13305 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13306 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13307 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13308 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13309 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13310 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13311 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13312 human-readable description, and
13313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13314 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13315 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13316 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13317 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13318 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13319 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13320 certain freedoms are given.
13323 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13324 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13325 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13326 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13327 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13328 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13329 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13330 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13331 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13334 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13335 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13336 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13337 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13338 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13339 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13340 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13341 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13345 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13346 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13347 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13348 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13349 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13350 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13352 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13353 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13354 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13355 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13358 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13359 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13360 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13361 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13362 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13363 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13364 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13365 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13366 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13367 to begin to build those rules.
13370 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13371 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13372 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13373 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13374 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13377 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13378 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13379 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13380 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13381 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13382 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13383 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13384 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13385 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13386 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13389 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13390 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13391 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13392 was a total success.
13395 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13396 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13398 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13399 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13400 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13401 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13402 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13404 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13405 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13408 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13409 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13410 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13411 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13412 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13413 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13414 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13415 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13416 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13417 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13418 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13419 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13420 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13421 high
<footnote><para>
13424 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13425 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13426 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13427 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13428 </para></footnote>),
13429 these artists release into the creative environment content
13430 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13433 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13434 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13435 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13436 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13437 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13438 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13439 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13440 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13441 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13445 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13446 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13447 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13448 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13451 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13452 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13455 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13456 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13457 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13458 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13459 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13460 steps are possible.
13463 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13464 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13465 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13466 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13467 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13468 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13469 creativity to spread more easily.
13471 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13476 <section id=
"themsoon">
13477 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13479 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13480 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13481 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13482 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13483 changes that we need.
13486 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13487 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13488 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13492 <section id=
"formalities">
13493 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13495 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13496 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13497 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13498 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13502 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13503 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13507 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13508 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13509 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13510 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13516 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13517 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13518 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13519 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13520 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13521 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13522 formalities were getting in the way.
13525 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13526 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13527 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13528 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13529 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13530 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13531 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13532 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13533 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13534 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13537 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13539 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13540 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13541 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13542 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13543 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13544 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13547 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13548 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13549 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13550 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13551 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13552 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13553 developed by others.
13556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13558 <section id=
"registration">
13559 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13561 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13562 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13563 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13564 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13565 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13566 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13567 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13568 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13569 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13570 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13571 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13574 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13575 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13576 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13577 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13578 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13579 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13580 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13583 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13584 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13585 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13586 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13587 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13588 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13589 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13590 with which registration occurs up.
13593 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13594 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13595 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13596 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13597 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13598 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13599 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13600 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13601 formality
—while producing a database
13602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13603 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13607 <section id=
"marking">
13608 <title>MARKING
</title>
13610 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13611 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13612 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13613 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13614 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13615 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13616 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13617 uniformly across all media.
13620 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13621 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13622 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13626 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13627 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13628 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13629 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13630 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13631 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13632 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13633 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13636 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13637 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13638 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13639 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13640 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13641 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13643 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13644 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13645 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13647 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13648 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13649 stop using the work in any new
13650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13651 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13652 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13656 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13657 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13658 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13659 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13660 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13663 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13664 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13665 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13666 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13667 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13668 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13669 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13670 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13671 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13672 other important functions.
13675 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13676 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13677 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13678 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13679 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13680 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13683 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13684 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13685 make things unclear.
13688 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13689 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13690 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13691 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13692 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13693 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13699 <section id=
"shortterms">
13700 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13702 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13703 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13707 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13708 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13709 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13710 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13711 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13712 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
13715 "A Radical Rethink,"
<citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13717 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13719 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13722 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13723 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13724 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13727 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13730 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13731 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13732 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13733 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13734 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13735 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13739 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
13740 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13741 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13742 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13743 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13744 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13745 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13746 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13747 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13752 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13753 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13754 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13755 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13756 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13757 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13758 pension.
<footnote><para>
13760 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13761 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13763 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13765 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13766 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13768 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
13772 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13773 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13774 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13775 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13776 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13777 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
13778 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13779 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13780 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
13781 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13782 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13783 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13784 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13785 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13788 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
13789 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
13790 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13794 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13795 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13796 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13797 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13803 <section id=
"freefairuse">
13804 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13806 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13807 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13808 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13809 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13810 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13811 the emergence of that new technology.
13814 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13815 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13816 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13817 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13818 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13819 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13820 though that movie is not "my writing."
13823 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13824 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13825 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13827 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13828 University Press,
1967),
32.
13830 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13831 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13832 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13833 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
13837 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13838 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13839 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13840 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13841 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13846 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13847 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13848 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13849 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13850 Consider each limitation in turn.
13853 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13854 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13855 sense to protect John
13857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13858 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13859 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13860 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13861 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13862 after the creative work is done.
13863 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
13866 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13867 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13868 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13869 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13870 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13871 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13872 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13873 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13874 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13875 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13876 the creative process. Smothers it.
13879 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13880 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13881 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13882 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13883 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13887 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13888 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13889 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13890 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13893 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13894 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13895 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13897 His view is that the law should be written so that
13898 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13901 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13902 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13903 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13904 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13905 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13908 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13910 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13911 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13912 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13913 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13917 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
13918 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13920 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13921 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13922 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13923 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13924 battles around the sharing of music.
13927 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13928 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13929 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13930 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13931 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13932 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13933 innovation on the network.
13936 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13937 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13938 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13939 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13940 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13943 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
13944 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
13945 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
13946 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
13947 four different kinds of sharing:
13949 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13952 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13953 for purchasing CDs.
13957 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13958 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13963 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13964 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13965 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13969 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13970 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13971 owner plainly endorses.
13975 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13976 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13977 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13978 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13979 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13980 significantly weakened.
13983 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13984 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13985 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13986 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13987 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13991 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13992 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13996 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13997 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13998 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13999 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14000 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14001 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14002 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14003 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14004 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14005 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14008 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14009 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14010 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14012 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14013 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14014 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14015 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14016 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14017 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14018 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14019 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14020 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14023 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14024 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14025 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14026 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14027 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14028 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14029 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14030 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14031 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14032 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14033 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14034 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14035 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14036 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14037 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14038 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
14039 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14041 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14042 April
2002, available at
14043 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14048 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14049 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14050 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14051 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14052 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14053 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14054 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14055 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14056 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14057 artists get paid, during
14059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14060 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14061 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14064 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14065 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14066 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14067 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14068 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14069 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14070 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14071 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14072 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14075 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14076 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14077 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14078 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14079 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14080 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14081 way that returns something to the artist.
14084 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14085 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14086 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14087 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14088 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14089 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14090 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14091 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14094 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14095 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14096 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14097 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14098 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14099 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14100 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14105 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14106 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14107 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14108 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14109 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14110 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14111 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14115 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14116 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14117 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14118 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14119 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14120 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14121 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14122 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14125 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14126 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14127 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14128 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14129 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14130 delivering and accessing content.
14133 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14134 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14137 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14138 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14139 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14140 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14141 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14142 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14143 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14144 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14148 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14149 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14150 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14151 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14152 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14153 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14156 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14157 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14160 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14161 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14162 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14163 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14164 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14165 2004), ch.
6, available at
14166 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14167 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14168 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14169 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14170 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14171 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14172 Broadband?"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14173 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14174 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14176 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14177 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14178 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14179 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14181 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14182 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14183 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14184 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14186 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14187 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14188 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14189 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14190 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14191 debate by about a decade. See
14192 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14193 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14194 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14196 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14197 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14198 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14199 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14200 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14201 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14202 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14203 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14207 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14208 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14209 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14210 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14211 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14212 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14213 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14214 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14215 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14216 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14217 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14218 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14219 controlling access.
14222 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14223 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14224 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14225 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14226 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14227 limits on derivative
14229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14230 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14231 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14232 allowed to do with the content itself.
14235 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14236 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14237 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14238 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14239 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14240 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14241 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14242 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14243 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14244 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14245 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14246 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14250 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14251 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14252 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14253 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14254 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14255 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14256 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14257 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14258 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14259 finding ways to compete with "free."
14262 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14263 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14264 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14265 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14266 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14267 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14271 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14276 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14277 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14278 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14279 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14283 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14286 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14289 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14293 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14294 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14299 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14300 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14304 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14305 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14306 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14310 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14311 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14312 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14313 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14314 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14315 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14316 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14317 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14318 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14319 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14320 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14324 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14325 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14326 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14329 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14330 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14334 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14335 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14337 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14338 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14339 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14340 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14343 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14344 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14345 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14346 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14347 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14348 strong view queers the law.
14351 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14352 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14353 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14354 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14355 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14356 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14357 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14358 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14360 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14361 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14366 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14367 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14368 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14371 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14372 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14373 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14374 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14376 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14377 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14378 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14379 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14380 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14381 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14382 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14383 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14384 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14385 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14387 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14388 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14389 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14390 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14391 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14392 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14394 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14395 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14400 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14401 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14402 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14403 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14404 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14405 practically never be done.
14408 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14409 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14410 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14411 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14412 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14413 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14414 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14415 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14418 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14419 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14420 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14421 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14422 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14423 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14426 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14427 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14428 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14432 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14433 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14434 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14435 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14436 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14437 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14438 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14441 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14442 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14445 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14446 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14447 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14450 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14451 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14452 keep your lawyers away.
14454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14458 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14459 <title>NOTES
</title>
14461 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14462 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14463 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14464 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14465 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14466 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14467 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14468 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14469 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14475 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14476 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14478 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14479 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14480 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14481 to him that this book is dedicated.
14484 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14485 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14486 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14487 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14488 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14489 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14490 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14491 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14492 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14493 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14494 critical eye on much of this.
14497 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14498 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14499 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14500 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14502 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14503 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14504 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14505 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14508 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14509 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14510 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14511 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14512 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14513 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14514 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14515 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14516 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14517 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14518 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14519 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14520 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14521 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14522 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14523 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14524 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14525 a bunch of great replies.)
14528 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14529 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14530 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14531 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14532 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14533 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14534 throughout this book.
14537 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14538 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14539 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14540 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14542 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->