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   1 <html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"><title>Fri kultur</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.75.2"><meta name="description" content="Om forfatteren Lawrense Lessig (http://www.lessig.org), professor i juss og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School, er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i Creative Commons (http://creativecommons.org). Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code: And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public Knowledge. Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's &quot;e.biz 25,&quot; og omtalt som en av Scientific American's &quot;50 visjonærer&quot;. Etter utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."></head><body bgcolor="white" text="black" link="#0000FF" vlink="#840084" alink="#0000FF"><div lang="nb" class="book" title="Fri kultur"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="index"></a>Fri kultur</h1></div><div><h2 class="subtitle">Hvordan store mediaaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
   2 og kontrollere kreativiteten</h2></div><div><div class="authorgroup"><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Lawrence</span> <span class="surname">Lessig</span></h3></div></div></div><div><p class="releaseinfo">Versjon 2004-02-10</p></div><div><p class="copyright">Opphavsrett © 2004 Lawrence Lessig</p></div><div><div class="legalnotice" title="Rettslig merknad"><a name="id2729028"></a><p>
   3 Denne versjonen av <em class="citetitle">Fri Kultur</em> er lisensert med en
   4 Creative Commons-lisens.  Denne lisensen tillater ikke-kommersiell
   5 utnyttelse av verket, hvis opphavsinnehaveren er navngitt.  For mer
   6 informasjon om lisensen, klikk på ikonet over eller besøk <a class="ulink" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/" target="_top">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</a>
   7   </p></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">2004-03-25</p></div><div><div class="abstract" title="Om forfatteren"><p class="title"><b>Om forfatteren</b></p><p>
   8 Lawrense Lessig (<a class="ulink" href="http://www.lessig.org/" target="_top">http://www.lessig.org</a>), professor i
   9 juss og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law
  10 School, er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og
  11 styreleder i Creative Commons (<a class="ulink" href="http://creativecommons.org/" target="_top">http://creativecommons.org</a>).
  12 Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code:
  13 And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i
  14 Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public
  15 Knowledge.  Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the
  16 Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's "e.biz
  17 25," og omtalt som en av Scientific American's "50 visjonærer".  Etter
  18 utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law
  19 School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit
  20 Court of Appeals.
  21   </p></div></div></div><hr></div><div class="dedication" title="Dedikasjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="id2697040"></a>Dedikasjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
  22 Til Eric Eldred &#8212; hvis arbeid først trakk meg til denne saken, og for
  23 hvem saken fortsetter.
  24 </p><p>
  25 </p><div class="figure"><a name="CreativeCommons"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 1. Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/cc.png" alt="Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert"></div></div></div><p><br class="figure-break">
  26 </p></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="preface"><a href="#preface">Forord</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-introduction">1. Introduksjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-piracy">2. "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#catalogs">Kapittel tre: Kataloger</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#pirates">Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#piracy">Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-property">3. "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-puzzles">4. Nøtter</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-balances">5. Maktfordeling</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-conclusion">6. Konklusjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-afterword">7. Etterord</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#usnow">Oss, nå</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbyggeing av fri kultur: En idé</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#themsoon">Dem, snart</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-notes">8. Notater</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-acknowledgments">9. Takk til</a></span></dt></dl></div><div class="list-of-figures"><p><b>Figuroversikt</b></p><dl><dt>1. <a href="#CreativeCommons">Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert</a></dt><dt>3.1. <a href="#fig-1331">How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
  27 the right or regulation.</a></dt><dt>3.2. <a href="#fig-1361">Law has a special role in affecting the three.</a></dt><dt>3.3. <a href="#fig-1371">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</a></dt><dt>3.4. <a href="#fig-1381">effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</a></dt><dt>3.5. <a href="#fig-1441">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</a></dt><dt>3.6. <a href="#fig-1442">"Opphavsrett" i dag.</a></dt><dt>3.7. <a href="#fig-1521">Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.</a></dt><dt>3.8. <a href="#fig-1531">Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.</a></dt><dt>3.9. <a href="#fig-1541">Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
  28 copyrighted work.</a></dt><dt>3.10. <a href="#fig-1542">Unregulated copying considered "fair uses."</a></dt><dt>3.11. <a href="#fig-1551">Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
  29 regulated.</a></dt><dt>3.12. <a href="#fig-1611">Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.</a></dt><dt>3.13. <a href="#fig-1612">List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</a></dt><dt>3.14. <a href="#fig-1621">E-book of Aristotle;s "Politics"</a></dt><dt>3.15. <a href="#fig-1622">Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politics".</a></dt><dt>3.16. <a href="#fig-1631">List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".</a></dt><dt>3.17. <a href="#fig-1641">List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".</a></dt><dt>3.18. <a href="#fig-1711">VCR/handgun cartoon.</a></dt><dt>3.19. <a href="#fig-1761">Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.</a></dt></dl></div><div class="list-of-tables"><p><b>tabelloversikt</b></p><dl><dt>2.1. <a href="#t1">Tabell</a></dt><dt>3.1. <a href="#t2"></a></dt><dt>3.2. <a href="#t3"></a></dt><dt>3.3. <a href="#t4"></a></dt><dt>3.4. <a href="#t5"></a></dt></dl></div><div class="colophon" title="Kolofon"><h2 class="title"><a name="id2733294"></a>Kolofon</h2><p>
  30 Du kan kjøpe en kopi av denne boken ved å klikke på en av lenkene nedenfor:
  31 </p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" type="number" compact><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.amazon.com/" target="_top">Amazon</a></p></li><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/" target="_top">B&amp;N</a></p></li><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.penguin.com/" target="_top">Penguin</a></p></li></ul></div><p>
  32 Andre bøker av Lawrence Lessig
  33 </p><p>
  34 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
  35 </p><p>
  36 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
  37 </p><p>
  38 The Penguin Press, New York
  39 </p><p>
  40 Fri Kultur
  41 </p><p>
  42 Hvordan store mediaaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
  43 og kontrollere kreativiteten
  44 </p><p>
  45 Lawrence Lessig
  46 </p><p>
  47 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.  375 Hudson Street
  48 New York, New York
  49 </p><p>
  50 Opphavsrettbeskyttet © Lawrence Lessig.  Alle rettigheter reservert.
  51 </p><p>
  52 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
  53 <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
  54 © 2003 by The New York Times Co.  Reprinted with permission.
  55 </p><p>
  56 Cartoon in <a class="xref" href="#fig-1711" title="Figur 3.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.">Figur 3.18, &#8220;VCR/handgun cartoon.&#8221;</a> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
  57 Media Services, Inc.  All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
  58 </p><p>
  59 Diagram in <a class="xref" href="#fig-1761" title="Figur 3.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.">Figur 3.19, &#8220;Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.&#8221;</a> courtesy of the office of FCC
  60 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
  61 </p><p>
  62 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
  63 </p><p>
  64 Lessig, Lawrence.  Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law
  65 to lock down culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
  66 </p><p>
  67 p. cm.
  68 </p><p>
  69 Includes index.
  70 </p><p>
  71 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
  72 </p><p>
  73 1. Intellectual property&#8212;United States. 2. Mass media&#8212;United
  74 States.
  75 </p><p>
  76 3. Technological innovations&#8212;United States. 4. Art&#8212;United
  77 States. I. Title.
  78 </p><p>
  79 KF2979.L47
  80 </p><p>
  81 343.7309'9&#8212;dc22
  82 </p><p>
  83 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
  84 </p><p>
  85 Printed in the United States of America
  86 </p><p>
  87 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
  88 </p><p>
  89 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
  90 </p><p>
  91 Oversatt til bokmål av Petter Reinholdtsen og Anders Hagen
  92 Jarmund. Kildefilene til oversetterprosjektet er <a class="ulink" href="https://github.com/petterreinholdtsen/free-culture-lessig" target="_top">tilgjengelig
  93 fra github</a>.  Rapporter feil med oversettelsen via github.
  94 </p><p>
  95 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this
  96 publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval
  97 system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
  98 photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission
  99 of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.  The
 100 scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via
 101 any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and
 102 punishable by law.  Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and
 103 do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
 104 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
 105 </p></div><div class="preface" title="Forord"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="preface"></a>Forord</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxpoguedavid"></a><p>
 106 David Pogue, en glimrende skribent og forfatter av utallige tekniske
 107 datarelaterte tekster, skrev dette på slutten av hans gjennomgang av min
 108 første bok, <em class="citetitle">Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace</em>:
 109 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 110 I motsetning til faktiske lover, så har ikke internett-programvare
 111 kapasiteten til å straffe.  Den påvirker ikke folk som ikke er online (og
 112 kun en veldig liten minoritet av verdens befolkning er online).  Og hvis du
 113 ikke liker systemet på internett, så kan du alltid slå av
 114 modemet.<sup>[<a name="preface01" href="#ftn.preface01" class="footnote">1</a>]</sup>
 115 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 116 Pogue var skeptisk til argumentet som er kjernen av boken &#8212; at
 117 programvaren, eller "koden", fungerte som en slags lov &#8212; og foreslo i
 118 sin anmeldelse den lykkelig tanken at hvis livet i cyberspace gikk dårlig,
 119 så kan vi alltid som med en trylleformel slå over en bryter og komme hjem
 120 igjen. Slå av modemet, koble fra datamaskinen, og eventuelle problemer som
 121 finnes <span class="emphasis"><em>den</em></span> virkeligheten ville ikke "påvirke" oss mer.
 122 </p><p>
 123
 124 Pogue kan ha hatt rett i 1999 &#8212; jeg er skeptisk, men det kan
 125 hende. Men selv om han hadde rett da, så er ikke argumentet gyldig
 126 nå. <em class="citetitle">Fri Kultur</em> er om problemene internett forårsaker
 127 selv etter at modemet er slått av.  Den er et argument om hvordan slagene
 128 som nå brer om seg i livet on-line har fundamentalt påvirket "folk som er
 129 ikke pålogget."  Det finnes ingen bryter som kan isolere oss fra
 130 internettets effekt.
 131 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2696560"></a><p>
 132 Men i motsetning til i boken <em class="citetitle">Code</em>, er argumentet her
 133 ikke så mye om internett i seg selv. Istedet er det om konsekvensen av
 134 internett for en del av vår tradisjon som er mye mer grunnleggende, og
 135 uansett hvor hardt dette er for en geek-wanna-be å innrømme, mye viktigere.
 136 </p><p>
 137 Den tradisjonen er måten vår kultur blir laget på.  Som jeg vil forklare i
 138 sidene som følger, kommer vi fra en tradisjon av "fri kultur"&#8212;ikke
 139 "fri" som i "fri bar" (for å låne et uttrykk fra stifteren av fri
 140 programvarebevegelsen<sup>[<a name="id2696541" href="#ftn.id2696541" class="footnote">2</a>]</sup>), men "fri" som i
 141 "talefrihet", "fritt marked", "frihandel", "fri konkurranse", "fri vilje" og
 142 "frie valg".  En fri kultur støtter og beskytter skapere og oppfinnere.
 143 Dette gjør den direkte ved å tildele immaterielle rettigheter.  Men det gjør
 144 den indirekte ved å begrense rekkevidden for disse rettighetene, for å
 145 garantere at neste generasjon skapere og oppfinnere forblir <span class="emphasis"><em>så fri
 146 som mulig</em></span> fra kontroll fra fortiden.  En fri kultur er ikke en
 147 kultur uten eierskap, like lite som et fritt marked er et marked der alt er
 148 gratis.  Det motsatte av fri kultur er "tillatelseskultur"&#8212;en kultur
 149 der skapere kun kan skape med tillatelse fra de mektige, eller fra skaperne
 150 fra fortiden.
 151 </p><p>
 152 Hvis vi forsto denne endringen, så tror jeg vi ville stå imot den.  Ikke
 153 "vi" på venstresiden eller "dere" på høyresiden, men vi som ikke har
 154 investert i den bestemt kulturindustrien som har definert det tjuende
 155 århundre. Enten du er på venstre eller høyresiden, hvis du i denne forstand
 156 ikke har interesser, vil historien jeg forteller her gi deg problemer. For
 157 endringene jeg beskriver påvirker verdier som begge sider av vår politiske
 158 kultur anser som grunnleggende.
 159 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2697263"></a><p>
 160 Vi så et glimt av dette tverrpolitiske raseri på forsommeren i 2003. Da FCC
 161 vurderte endringer i reglene for medieeierskap som ville slakke på
 162 begrensningene rundt mediakonsentrasjon, sendte en ekstraordinær koalisjon
 163 mer enn 700 000 brev til FCC for å motsette seg endringen.  Mens William
 164 Safire beskrev å marsjere "ubehagelig sammen med CodePink Women for Peace
 165 and the National Rifle Association, mellom liberale Olympia Snowe og
 166 konservative Ted Stevens", formulerte han  kanskje det enkleste uttrykket
 167 for hva som var på spill: konsentrasjonen av makt.  Så spurte han:
 168 <a class="indexterm" name="id2697282"></a>
 169 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 170 Høres dette ikke-konservativt ut?  Ikke for meg.  Denne konsentrasjonen av
 171 makt&#8212;politisk, selskapsmessig, pressemessig, kulturelt&#8212;bør være
 172 bannlyst av konservative.  Spredningen av makt gjennom lokal kontroll, og
 173 derigjennom oppmuntre til individuell deltagelse, er essensen i føderalismen
 174 og det største uttrykk for demokrati.<sup>[<a name="id2697305" href="#ftn.id2697305" class="footnote">3</a>]</sup>
 175 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 176 Denne idéen er et element i argumentet til <em class="citetitle">Fri
 177 Kultur</em>, selv om min fokus ikke bare er på konsentrasjonen av
 178 makt som følger av konsentrasjonen i eierskap, men mer viktig, og fordi det
 179 er mindre synlig, på konsentrasjonen av makt som er resultat av en radikal
 180 endring i det effektive virkeområdet til loven.  Loven er i endring, og
 181 endringen forandrer på hvordan vår kultur blir skapt. Den endringen bør
 182 bekymre deg&#8212;Uansett om du bryr deg om internett eller ikke, og uansett
 183 om du er til venstre for Safires eller til høyre. Inspirasjonen til tittelen
 184 og mye av argumentet i denne boken kommer fra arbeidet til Richard Stallman
 185 og Free Software Foundation. Faktisk, da jeg leste Stallmans egne tekster på
 186 nytt, spesielt essyene i <em class="citetitle">Free Software, Free Society</em>,
 187 innser jeg at alle de teoretiske innsiktene jeg utvikler her er innsikter
 188 som Stallman beskrev for tiår siden.  Man kan dermed godt argumentere for at
 189 dette verket kun er et avledet verk.
 190 </p><p>
 191
 192 Jeg godtar kritikken, hvis det faktisk er kritikk.  Arbeidet til en advokat
 193 er alltid avledede verker, og jeg mener ikke å gjøre noe mer i denne boken
 194 enn å minne en kultur om en tradisjon som alltid har vært deres egen. Som
 195 Stallman forsvarer jeg denne tradisjonen på grunnlag av verdier. Som
 196 Stallman tror jeg dette er verdiene til frihet.  Og som Stallman, tror jeg
 197 dette er verdier fra vår fortid som må forsvares i vår fremtid.  En fri
 198 kultur har vært vår fortid, men vil bare være vår fremtid hvis vi endrer
 199 retningen vi følger akkurat nå.  På samme måte som Stallmans argumenter for
 200 fri programvare, treffer argumenter for en fri kultur på forvirring som er
 201 vanskelig å unngå, og enda vanskeligere å forstå.  En fri kultur er ikke en
 202 kultur uten eierskap. Det er ikke en kultur der kunstnere ikke får
 203 betalt. En kultur uten eierskap eller en der skaperne ikke kan få betalt, er
 204 anarki, ikke frihet.  Anarki er ikke hva jeg fremmer her.
 205 </p><p>
 206 I stedet er den frie kulturen som jeg forsvarer i denne boken en balanse
 207 mellom anarki og kontroll.  En fri kultur, i likhet med et fritt marked, er
 208 fylt med eierskap.  Den er fylt med regler for eierskap og kontrakter som
 209 blir håndhevet av staten.  Men på samme måte som det frie markedet blir
 210 pervertert hvis dets eierskap blir føydalt, så kan en fri kultur bli ødelagt
 211 av ekstremisme i eierskapsrettighetene som definerer den.  Det er dette jeg
 212 frykter om vår kultur i dag.  Det er som motpol til denne ekstremismen at
 213 denne boken er skrevet.
 214 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.preface01" href="#preface01" class="para">1</a>] </sup>
 215 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," <em class="citetitle">New York
 216 Times</em>, 30. januar 2000
 217 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2696541" href="#id2696541" class="para">2</a>] </sup>
 218 Richard M. Stallman, <em class="citetitle">Fri programvare, Frie samfunn</em> 57
 219 (Joshua Gay, red. 2002).
 220 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2697305" href="#id2697305" class="para">3</a>] </sup> William Safire, "The Great Media Gulp," <em class="citetitle">New York
 221 Times</em>, 22. mai 2003.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2697312"></a>
 222 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 1. Introduksjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-introduction"></a>Kapittel 1. Introduksjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
 223 17. desember 1903, på en vindfylt strand i Nord-Carolina i såvidt under
 224 hundre sekunder, demonstrerte Wright-brødrene at et selvdrevet fartøy tyngre
 225 enn luft kunne fly.  Øyeblikket var elektrisk, og dens betydning ble alment
 226 forstått. Nesten umiddelbart, eksploderte interessen for denne nye
 227 teknologien som muliggjorde bemannet luftfart og en hærskare av oppfinnere
 228 begynte å bygge videre på den.
 229 </p><p>
 230 Da Wright-brødrene fant opp flymaskinen, hevdet loven i USA at en grunneier
 231 ble antatt å eie ikke bare overflaten på området sitt, men også alt landet
 232 under bakken, helt ned til senterpunktet i jorda, og alt volumet over
 233 bakken, "i ubestemt grad, oppover".<sup>[<a name="id2697468" href="#ftn.id2697468" class="footnote">4</a>]</sup> I
 234 mange år undret lærde over hvordan en best skulle tolke idéen om at
 235 eiendomsretten gikk helt til himmelen. Betød dette at du eide stjernene?
 236 Kunne en dømme gjess for at de regelmessig og med vilje tok seg inn på annen
 237 manns eiendom?
 238 </p><p>
 239 Så kom flymaskiner, og for første gang hadde dette prinsippet i lovverket i
 240 USA&#8212;dypt nede i grunnlaget for vår tradisjon og akseptert av de
 241 viktigste juridiske tenkerne i vår fortid&#8212;en betydning. Hvis min
 242 eiendom rekker til himmelen, hva skjer når United flyr over mitt område?
 243 Har jeg rett til å nekte dem å bruke min eiendom?  Har jeg mulighet til å
 244 inngå en eksklusiv avtale med Delta Airlines?  Kan vi gjennomføre en auksjon
 245 for å finne ut hvor mye disse rettighetene er verdt?
 246 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2697488"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2697514"></a><p>
 247 I 1945 ble disse spørsmålene en føderal sak. Da bøndene Thomas Lee og Tinie
 248 Causby i Nord Carolina begynte å miste kyllinger på grunn av lavtflygende
 249 militære fly (vettskremte kyllinger fløy tilsynelatende i låveveggene og
 250 døde), saksøkte Causbyene regjeringen for å trenge seg inn på deres
 251 eiendom. Flyene rørte selvfølgelig aldri overflaten på Causbys' eiendom. Men
 252 hvis det stemte som Blackstone, Kent, og Cola hadde sagt, at deres eiendom
 253 strakk seg "i ubestemt grad, oppover," så hadde regjeringen trengt seg inn
 254 på deres eiendom, og Causbys ønsket å sette en stopper for dette.
 255 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2697534"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2697541"></a><p>
 256 Høyesterett gikk med på å ta opp Causbys sak. Kongressen hadde vedtatt at
 257 luftfartsveiene var tilgjengelig for alle, men hvis ens eiendom virkelig
 258 rakk til himmelen, da kunne muligens kongressens vedtak ha vært i strid med
 259 grunnlovens forbud mot å "ta" eiendom uten kompensasjon.  Retten erkjente at
 260 "det er gammel doktrine etter sedvane at en eiendom rakk til utkanten av
 261 universet.", men dommer Douglas hadde ikke tålmodighet for forhistoriske
 262 doktriner.  I et enkelt avsnitt, ble hundrevis av år med
 263 eiendomslovgivningen strøket. Som han skrev på vegne av retten,
 264 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 265 [Denne] doktrinen har ingen plass i den moderne verden.  Luften er en
 266 offentlig motorvei, slik kongressen har erklært.  Hvis det ikke var
 267 tilfelle, ville hver eneste transkontinentale flyrute utsette operatørene
 268 for utallige søksmål om inntrenging på annen manns eiendom.  Idéen er i
 269 strid med sunn fornuft.  Å anerkjenne slike private krav til luftrommet
 270 ville blokkere disse motorveiene, seriøst forstyrre muligheten til kontroll
 271 og utvikling av dem i fellesskapets interesse og overføre til privat
 272 eierskap det som kun fellesskapet har et rimelig krav til.<sup>[<a name="id2697579" href="#ftn.id2697579" class="footnote">5</a>]</sup>
 273 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 274 "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft."
 275 </p><p>
 276
 277 Det er hvordan loven vanligvis fungerer.  Ikke ofte like brått eller
 278 utålmodig, men til slutt er dette hvordan loven fungerer.  Det var ikke
 279 stilen til Douglas å utbrodere.  Andre dommere ville ha skrevet mange flere
 280 sider før de nådde sin konklusjon, men for Douglas holdt det med en enkel
 281 linje: "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft.".  Men uansett om det tar flere
 282 sider eller kun noen få ord, så er det en genial egenskap med et
 283 lovpraksis-system, slik som vårt er, at loven tilpasser seg til aktuelle
 284 teknologiene.  Og mens den tilpasser seg, så endres den.  Idéer som var
 285 solide som fjell i en tidsalder knuses i en annen.
 286 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2750659"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2750666"></a><p>
 287 Eller, det er hvordan ting skjer når det ikke er noen mektige på andre siden
 288 av endringen.  Causbyene var bare bønder.  Og selv om det uten tvil var
 289 mange som dem som var lei av den økende trafikken i luften (og en håper ikke
 290 for mange kyllinger flakset seg inn i vegger), ville Causbyene i verden
 291 finne det svært hardt å samles for å stoppe idéen, og teknologien, som
 292 Wright-brødrene hadde ført til verden.  Wright-brødrene spyttet flymaskiner
 293 inn i den teknologiske meme-dammen. Idéen spredte seg deretter som et virus
 294 i en kyllingfarm. Causbyene i verden fant seg selv omringet av "det synes
 295 rimelig" gitt teknologien som Wright-brødrene hadde produsert.  De kunne stå
 296 på sine gårder, med døde kyllinger i hendene, og heve knyttneven mot disse
 297 nye teknologiene så mye de ville.  De kunne ringe sine representanter eller
 298 til og med saksøke.  Men når alt kom til alt, ville kraften i det som virket
 299 "åpenbart" for alle andre&#8212;makten til "sunn fornuft"&#8212;ville vinne
 300 frem.  Deres "personlige interesser" ville ikke få lov til å nedkjempe en
 301 åpenbar fordel for fellesskapet.
 302 </p><p>
 303 Edwin Howard Armstrong er en av USAs glemte oppfinnergenier. Han dukket opp
 304 på oppfinnerscenen etter titaner som Thomas Edison og Alexander Graham
 305 Bell.  Alle hans bidrag på området radioteknologi gjør han til kanskje den
 306 viktigste av alle enkeltoppfinnere i de første femti årene av radio.  Han
 307 var bedre utdannet enn Michael Faraday, som var bokbinderlærling da han
 308 oppdaget elektrisk induksjon i 1831.  Men han hadde like god intuisjon om
 309 hvordan radioverden virket, og ved minst tre anledninger, fant Armstrong opp
 310 svært viktig teknologier som brakte vår forståelse av radio et hopp videre.
 311 <a class="indexterm" name="id2750728"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2750737"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2750743"></a>
 312 </p><p>
 313 Dagen etter julaften i 1933, ble fire patenter utstedt til Armstrong for
 314 hans mest signifikante oppfinnelse&#8212;FM-radio.  Inntil da hadde
 315 forbrukerradioer vært amplitude-modulert (AM) radio.  Tidens teoretikere
 316 hadde sagt at frekvens-modulert (FM) radio.  De hadde rett når det gjelder
 317 et smalt bånd av spektrumet.  Men Armstrong oppdaget at frekvens-modulert
 318 radio i et vidt bånd i spektrumet leverte en forbløffende gjengivelse av
 319 lyd, med mye mindre senderstyrke og støy.
 320 </p><p>
 321 Den 5. november 1935 demonstrerte han teknologien på et møte hos institutt
 322 for radioingeniører ved Empire State-bygningen i New York City.  Han vred
 323 radiosøkeren over en rekke AM-stasjoner, inntil radioen låste seg mot en
 324 kringkasting som han hadde satt opp 27 kilometer unna.  Radioen ble helt
 325 stille, som om den var død, og så, med en klarhet ingen andre i rommet noen
 326 gang hadde hørt fra et elektrisk apparat, produserte det lyden av en
 327 opplesers stemme: "Dette er amatørstasjon W2AG ved Yonkers, New York, som
 328 opererer på frekvensmodulering ved to og en halv meter."
 329 </p><p>
 330 Publikum hørte noe ingen hadde trodd var mulig:
 331 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 332 Et glass vann ble fylt opp foran mikrofonen i Yonkers, og det hørtes ut som
 333 et plass som ble fylt opp. . . . Et papir ble krøllet og revet opp, og det
 334 hørtes ut som papir og ikke som en sprakende skogbrann. . . . Sousa-marsjer
 335 ble spilt av fra plater og en pianosolo og et gitarnummer ble
 336 utført. . . . Musikken ble presentert med en livaktighet som sjeldent om
 337 noen gang før hadde vært hørt fra en radio-"musikk-boks".<sup>[<a name="id2750808" href="#ftn.id2750808" class="footnote">6</a>]</sup>
 338 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 339
 340 Som vår egen sunn fornuft forteller oss, hadde Armstrong oppdaget en mye
 341 bedre radioteknologi.  Men på tidspunktet for hans oppfinnelse, jobbet
 342 Armstrong for RCA. RCA var den dominerende aktøren i det da dominerende
 343 AM-radiomarkedet. I 1935 var det tusen radiostasjoner over hele USA, men
 344 stasjonene i de store byene var alle eid av en liten håndfull selskaper.
 345
 346 </p><p>
 347 Presidenten i RCA, David Sarnoff, en venn av Armstrong, var ivrig etter å få
 348 Armstrong til å oppdage en måte å fjerne støyen fra AM-radio. Så Sarnoff var
 349 ganske spent da Armstrong fortalte ham at han hadde en enhet som fjernet
 350 støy fra "radio.".   Men da Armstrong demonstrerte sin oppfinnelse, var ikke
 351 Sarnoff fornøyd.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2695789"></a>
 352 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 353 Jeg trodde Armstrong ville finne opp et slags filter for å fjerne skurring
 354 fra AM-radioen vår. Jeg trodde ikke han skulle starte en revolusjon &#8212;
 355 starte en hel forbannet ny industri i konkurranse med RCA.<sup>[<a name="id2750755" href="#ftn.id2750755" class="footnote">7</a>]</sup>
 356 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 357 Armstrongs oppfinnelse truet RCAs AM-herredømme, så selskapet lanserte en
 358 kampanje for å knuse FM-radio. Mens FM kan ha vært en overlegen teknologi,
 359 var Sarnoff en overlegen taktiker. En forfatter beskrev det slik,
 360 <a class="indexterm" name="id2695831"></a>
 361 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 362 Kreftene til fordel for FM, i hovedsak ingeniørfaglige, kunne ikke overvinne
 363 tyngden til strategien utviklet av avdelingene for salg, patenter og juss
 364 for å undertrykke denne trusselen til selskapets posisjon.  For FM utgjorde,
 365 hvis det fikk utvikle seg uten begrensninger . . . en komplett endring i
 366 maktforholdene rundt radio . . . og muligens fjerningen av det nøye
 367 begrensede AM-systemet som var grunnlaget for RCA stigning til
 368 makt.<sup>[<a name="id2695855" href="#ftn.id2695855" class="footnote">8</a>]</sup>
 369 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 370 RCA holdt først teknologien innomhus, og insistere på at det var nødvendig
 371 med ytterligere tester. Da Armstrong, etter to år med testing, ble
 372 utålmodig, begynte RCA å bruke sin makt hos myndighetene til holde tilbake
 373 den generelle spredningen av FM-radio. I 1936, ansatte RCA den tidligere
 374 lederen av FCC og ga ham oppgaven med å sikre at FCC tilordnet
 375 radiospekteret på en måte som ville kastrere FM&#8212;hovedsakelig ved å
 376 flytte FM-radio til et annet band i spekteret. I første omgang lyktes ikke
 377 disse forsøkene.  Men mens Armstrong og nasjonen var distrahert av andre
 378 verdenskrig, begynte RCAs arbeid å bære frukter.  Like etter at krigen var
 379 over, annonserte FCC et sett med avgjørelser som ville ha en klar effekt:
 380 FM-radio ville bli forkrøplet.Lawrence lessing beskrevet det slik,
 381 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 382 Serien med slag mot kroppen som FM-radio mottok rett etter krigen, i en
 383 serie med avgjørelser manipulert gjennom FCC av de store radiointeressene,
 384 var nesten utrolige i deres kraft og underfundighet.<sup>[<a name="id2695870" href="#ftn.id2695870" class="footnote">9</a>]</sup>
 385 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2695886"></a><p>
 386 For å gjøre plass i spektrumet for RCAs nyeste satsingsområde, televisjon,
 387 skulle FM-radioens brukere flyttes til et helt nytt band i spektrumet.
 388 Sendestyrken til FM-radioene ble også redusert, og gjorde at FM ikke lenger
 389 kunne brukes for å sende programmer fra en del av landet til en annen.
 390 (Denne endringen ble sterkt støttet av AT&amp;T, på grunn av at fjerningen
 391 av FM-videresendingsstasjoner ville bety at radiostasjonene ville bli nødt
 392 til å kjøpe kablede linker fra AT&amp;T.)  Spredningen av FM-radio var
 393 dermed kvalt, i hvert fall midlertidig.
 394 </p><p>
 395 Armstrong sto imot RCAs innsats. Som svar motsto RCA Armstrongs patenter.
 396 Etter å ha bakt FM-teknologi inn i den nye standarden for TV, erklærte RCS
 397 patentene ugyldige&#8212;uten grunn og nesten femten år etter at de ble
 398 utstedet.  De nektet dermed å betale ham for bruken av patentene.  I seks år
 399 kjempet Armstrong en dyr søksmålskrig for å forsvare patentene sine.  Til
 400 slutt, samtidig som patentene utløp, tilbød RCA et forlik så lavt at det
 401 ikke engang dekket Armstrongs advokatregning.  Beseiret, knust og nå blakk,
 402 skrev Armstrong i 1954 en kort beskjed til sin kone, før han gikk ut av et
 403 vindu i trettende etasje og falt i døden.
 404 </p><p>
 405
 406 Dette er slik loven virker noen ganger.  Ikke ofte like tragisk, og sjelden
 407 med heltemodig drama, men noen ganger er det slik det virker. Fra starten
 408 har myndigheter og myndighetsorganer blitt tatt til fange. Det er mer
 409 sannsynlig at de blir fanget når en mektig interesse er truet av enten en
 410 juridisk eller teknologisk endring.  Denne mektige interessen utøver for
 411 ofte sin innflytelse hos myndighetene til å få myndighetene til å beskytte
 412 den.  Retorikken for denne beskyttelsen er naturligvis alltid med fokus på
 413 fellesskapets beste.  Realiteten er noe annet.  Idéer som kan være solide
 414 som fjell i en tidsalder, men som overlatt til seg selv, vil falle sammen i
 415 en annen, er videreført gjennom denne subtile korrupsjonen i vår politiske
 416 prosess.  RCA hadde hva Causby-ene ikke hadde: Makten til å undertrykke
 417 effekten av en teknologisk endring.
 418 </p><p>
 419 Det er ingen enkeltoppfinner av Internet.  Ei heller er det en god dato som
 420 kan brukes til å markere når det ble født.  Likevel har internettet i løpet
 421 av svært kort tid blitt en del av vanlige amerikaneres liv.  I følge the Pew
 422 Internet and American Life-prosjektet, har 58 prosent av amerikanerne hatt
 423 tilgang til internettet i 2002, opp fra 49 prosent to år
 424 tidligere.<sup>[<a name="id2751188" href="#ftn.id2751188" class="footnote">10</a>]</sup> Det tallet kan uten
 425 problemer passere to tredjedeler av nasjonen ved utgangen av 2004.
 426 </p><p>
 427 Etter hvert som internett er blitt integrert inn i det vanlige liv har ting
 428 blitt endret.  Noen av disse endringene er teknisk&#8212;internettet har
 429 gjort kommunikasjon raskere, det har redusert kostnaden med å samle inn
 430 data, og så videre.  Disse tekniske endringene er ikke fokus for denne
 431 boken.  De er viktige.  De er ikke godt forstått.  Men de er den type ting
 432 som ganske enkelt ville blir borte hvis vi alle bare slo av internettet.  De
 433 påvirker ikke folk som ikke bruker internettet, eller i det miste påvirker
 434 det ikke dem direkte.  De er et godt tema for en bok om internettet.  Men
 435 dette er ikke en bok om internettet.
 436 </p><p>
 437 I stedet er denne boken om effekten av internettet ut over internettet i seg
 438 selv.  En effekt på hvordan kultur blir skapt.  Min påstand er at
 439 internettet har ført til en viktig og ukjent endring i denne prosessen.
 440 Denne endringen vil forandre en tradisjon som er like gammel som republikken
 441 selv.  De fleste, hvis de la merke til denne endringen, ville avvise den.
 442 Men de fleste legger ikke engang merke til denne endringen som internettet
 443 har introdusert.
 444 </p><p>
 445
 446 Vi kan få en følelse av denne endringen ved å skille mellom kommersiell og
 447 ikke-kommersiell kultur, ved å knytte lovens reguleringer til hver av dem.
 448 Med "kommersiell kultur" mener jeg den delen av vår kultur som er produsert
 449 og solgt eller produsert for å bli solgt.  Med "ikke-kommersiell kultur"
 450 mener jeg alt det andre. Da gamle menn satt rundt i parker eller på
 451 gatehjørner og fortalte historier som unger og andre lyttet til, så var det
 452 ikke-kommersiell kultur.  Da Noah Webster publiserte sin "Reader", eller
 453 Joel Barlow sin poesi, så var det kommersiell kultur.
 454 </p><p>
 455 Fra historisk tid, og for omtrent hele vår tradisjon, har ikke-kommersiell
 456 kultur i hovedsak ikke vært regulert.  Selvfølgelig, hvis din historie var
 457 utuktig, eller hvis dine sanger forstyrret freden, kunne loven gripe inn.
 458 Men loven var aldri direkte interessert i skapingen eller spredningen av
 459 denne form for kultur, og lot denne kulturen være "fri".  Den vanlige måten
 460 som vanlige individer delte og formet deres kultur&#8212;historiefortelling,
 461 formidling av scener fra teater eller TV, delta i fan-klubber, deling av
 462 musikk, laging av kassetter&#8212;ble ikke styrt av lovverket.
 463 </p><p>
 464 Fokuset på loven var kommersiell kreativitet.  I starten forsiktig, etter
 465 hvert betraktelig, beskytter loven insentivet til skaperne ved å tildele dem
 466 en eksklusiv rett til deres kreative verker, slik at de kan selge disse
 467 eksklusive rettighetene på en kommersiell markedsplass.<sup>[<a name="id2751281" href="#ftn.id2751281" class="footnote">11</a>]</sup> Dette er også, naturligvis, en viktig del av
 468 kreativitet og kultur, og det har blitt en viktigere og viktigere del i
 469 USA.  Men det var på ingen måte dominerende i vår tradisjon.  Det var i
 470 stedet bare en del, en kontrollert del, balansert mot det frie.
 471 </p><p>
 472 Denne grove inndelingen mellom den frie og den kontrollerte har nå blitt
 473 fjernet.<sup>[<a name="id2751318" href="#ftn.id2751318" class="footnote">12</a>]</sup> Internettet har satt scenen
 474 for denne fjerningen, og pressen frem av store medieaktører har loven nå
 475 påvirket det.  For første gang i vår tradisjon, har de vanlige måtene som
 476 individer skaper og deler kultur havnet innen rekekvidde for reguleringene
 477 til loven, som har blitt utvidet til å dra inn i sitt kontrollområde den
 478 enorme mengden kultur og kreativitet som den aldri tidligere har nådd over.
 479 Teknologien som tok vare på den historiske balansen&#8212;mellom bruken av
 480 den delen av kulturen vår som var fri og bruken av vår kultur som krevde
 481 tillatelse&#8212;har blitt borte.  Konsekvensen er at vi er mindre og mindre
 482 en fri kultur, og mer og mer en tillatelseskultur.
 483 </p><p>
 484 Denne endringen blir rettferdiggjort som nødvendig for å beskytte
 485 kommersiell kreativitet.  Og ganske riktig, proteksjonisme er nøyaktig det
 486 som motiverer endringen.  Men proteksjonismen som rettferdiggjør endringene
 487 som jeg skal beskrive lenger ned er ikke den begrensede og balanserte typen
 488 som har definert loven tidligere.  Dette er ikke en proteksjonisme for å
 489 beskytte artister.  Det er i stedet en proteksjonisme for å beskytte
 490 bestemte forretningsformer.  Selskaper som er truet av potensialet til
 491 internettet for å endre måten både kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell kultur
 492 blir skapt og delt, har samlet seg for å få lovgiverne til å bruke loven for
 493 å beskytte selskapene.  Dette er historien om RCA og Armstrong, og det er
 494 drømmen til Causbyene.
 495 </p><p>
 496 For internettet har sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mulighet for mange til å
 497 delta i prosessen med å bygge og kultivere en kultur som rekker lagt utenfor
 498 lokale grenselinjer.  Den makten har endret markedsplassen for å lage og
 499 kultivere kultur generelt, og den endringen truer i neste omgang etablerte
 500 innholdsindustrier. Internettet er dermed for industriene som bygget og
 501 distribuerte innhold i det tjuende århundret hva FM-radio var for AM-radio,
 502 eller hva traileren var for jernbaneindustrien i det nittende århundret:
 503 begynnelsen på slutten, eller i hvert fall en markant endring. Digitale
 504 teknologier, knyttet til internettet, kunne produsere et mye mer
 505 konkurransedyktig og levende marked for å bygge og kultivere kultur.  Dette
 506 markedet kunne inneholde en mye videre og mer variert utvalg av skapere.
 507 Disse skaperne kunne produsere og distribuere et mye mer levende utvalg av
 508 kreativitet. Og avhengig av noen få viktige faktorer, så kunne disse
 509 skaperne tjenere mer i snitt fra dette systemet enn skaperne gjør i
 510 dag&#8212;så lenge RCA-ene av i dag ikke bruker loven til å beskytte dem
 511 selv mot denne konkurransen.
 512 </p><p>
 513 Likevel, som jeg argumenterer for i sidene som følger, er dette nøyaktig det
 514 som skjer i vår kultur i dag.  Dette som er dagens ekvivalenter til tidlig
 515 tjuende århundres radio og nittende århundres jernbaner bruker deres makt
 516 til å få loven til å beskytte dem mot dette nye, mer effektive, mer levende
 517 teknologi for å bygge kultur. De lykkes i deres plan om å gjøre om
 518 internettet før internettet gjør om på dem.
 519 </p><p>
 520 Det ser ikke slik ut for mange.  Kamphandlingene over opphavsrett og
 521 internettet er fjernt for de fleste.  For de få som følger dem, virker de i
 522 hovedsak å handle om et enklere sett med spørsmål&#8212;hvorvidt
 523 "piratvirksomhet" vil bli akseptert, og hvorvidt "eiendomsretten" vil bli
 524 beskyttet.  "Krigen" som har blitt erklært mot teknologiene til
 525 internettet&#8212;det presidenten for Motion Picture Association of America
 526 (MPAA) Jack Valenti kaller sin "egen terroristkrig"<sup>[<a name="id2751440" href="#ftn.id2751440" class="footnote">13</a>]</sup>&#8212;har blitt rammet inn som en kamp om å følge
 527 loven og respektere eiendomsretten.  For å vite hvilken side vi bør ta i
 528 denne krigen, de fleste tenker at vi kun trenger å bestemme om hvorvidt vi
 529 er for eiendomsrett eller mot den.
 530 </p><p>
 531 Hvis dette virkelig var alternativene, så ville jeg være enig med Jack
 532 Valenti og innholdsindustrien.  Jeg tror også på eiendomsretten, og spesielt
 533 på viktigheten av hva Mr. Valenti så pent kaller "kreativ eiendomsrett".
 534 Jeg tror at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at loven, riktig innstilt, bør
 535 straffe "piratvirksomhet", både på og utenfor internettet.
 536 </p><p>
 537 Men disse enkle trosoppfatninger maskerer et mye mer grunnleggende spørsmål
 538 og en mye mer dramatisk endring. Min frykt er at med mindre vi begynner å
 539 legge merke til denne endringen, så vil krigen for å befri verden fra
 540 internettets "pirater" også fjerne verdier fra vår kultur som har vært
 541 integrert til vår tradisjon helt fra starten.
 542 </p><p>
 543 Disse verdiene bygget en tradisjon som, for i hvert fall de første 180 årene
 544 av vår republikk, garanterte skaperne rettigheten til å bygge fritt på deres
 545 fortid, og beskyttet skaperne og innovatørene fra både statlig og privat
 546 kontroll.  Det første grunnlovstillegget beskyttet skaperne fra statlig
 547 kontroll.  Og som professor Neil Netanel kraftfylt argumenterer,<sup>[<a name="id2751505" href="#ftn.id2751505" class="footnote">14</a>]</sup> opphavsrettslov, skikkelig balansert, beskyttet
 548 skaperne mot privat kontroll.  Vår tradisjon var dermed hverken Sovjet eller
 549 tradisjonen til velgjørere.  I stedet skar det ut en bred manøvreringsrom
 550 hvor skapere kunne kultivere og utvide vår kultur.
 551 </p><p>
 552 Likevel har lovens respons til internettet, når det knyttes sammen til
 553 endringer i teknologien i internettet selv, ført til massiv økting av den
 554 effektive reguleringen av kreativitet i USA.  For å bygge på eller kritisere
 555 kulturen rundt oss må en spørre, som Oliver Twist, om tillatelse først.
 556 Tillatelse er, naturligvis, ofte innvilget&#8212;men det er ikke ofte
 557 innvilget til den kritiske eller den uavhengige.  Vi har bygget en slags
 558 kulturell adel.  De innen dette adelskapet har et enkelt liv, mens de på
 559 utsiden har det ikke.  Men det er adelskap i alle former som er fremmed for
 560 vår tradisjon.
 561 </p><p>
 562 Historien som følger er om denne krigen.  Er det ikke om "betydningen av
 563 teknologi" i vanlig liv.  Jeg tror ikke på guder, hverken digitale eller
 564 andre typer.  Det er heller ikke et forsøk på å demonisere noen individer
 565 eller gruppe, jeg tro heller ikke i en djevel, selskapsmessig eller på annen
 566 måte.  Det er ikke en moralsk historie.  Ei heller er det et rop om hellig
 567 krig mot en industri.
 568 </p><p>
 569 Det er i stedet et forsøk på å forstå en håpløst ødeleggende krig som er
 570 inspirert av teknologiene til internettet, men som rekker lang utenfor dens
 571 kode.  Og ved å forstå denne kampen er den en innsats for å finne veien til
 572 fred.  Det er ingen god grunn for å fortsette dagens batalje rundt
 573 internett-teknologiene.  Det vil være til stor skade for vår tradisjon og
 574 kultur hvis den får lov til å fortsette ukontrollert. Vi må forstå kilden
 575 til denne krigen.  Vi må finne en løsning snart.
 576 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2751588"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2751593"></a><p>
 577 Lik Causbyenes kamp er denne krigen, delvis, om "eiendomsrett". Eiendommen i
 578 denne krigen er ikke like håndfast som den til Causbyene, og ingen uskyldige
 579 kyllinger har så langt mistet livet.  Likevel er idéene rundt denne
 580 "eiendomsretten" like åpenbare for de fleste som Causbyenes krav om
 581 ukrenkeligheten til deres bondegård var for dem. De fleste av oss tar for
 582 gitt de uvanlig mektige krav som eierne av "immaterielle rettigheter" nå
 583 hevder.  De fleste av oss, som Causbyene, behandler disse kravene som
 584 åpenbare.  Og dermed protesterer vi, som Causbyene,, når ny teknologi griper
 585 inn i denne eiendomsretten.  Det er så klart for oss som det var fro dem at
 586 de nye teknologiene til internettet "tar seg til rette" mot legitime krav
 587 til "eiendomsrett".  Det er like klart for oss som det var for dem at loven
 588 skulle ta affære for å stoppe denne inntrengingen i annen manns eiendom.
 589 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2751636"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2751642"></a><p>
 590
 591 Og dermed, når nerder og teknologer forsvarer sin tids Armstrong og
 592 Wright-brødenes teknologi, får de lite sympati fra de fleste av oss. Sunn
 593 fornuft gjør ikke opprør.  I motsetning til saken til de uheldige Causbyene,
 594 er sunn fornuft på samme side som eiendomseierne i denne krigen.  I
 595 motsetning til hos de heldige Wright-brødrene, har internettet ikke
 596 inspirert en revolusjon til fordel for seg.
 597 </p><p>
 598 Mitt håp er å skyve denne sunne fornuften videre.  Jeg har blitt stadig mer
 599 overrasket over kraften til denne idéen om immaterielle rettigheter og, mer
 600 viktig, dets evne til å slå av kritisk tanke hos lovmakere og innbyggere.
 601 Det har aldri før i vår historie vært så mye av vår "kultur" som har vært
 602 "eid" enn det er nå.  Og likevel har aldri før konsentrasjonen av makt til å
 603 kontrollere <span class="emphasis"><em>bruken</em></span> av kulturen vært mer akseptert uten
 604 spørsmål enn det er nå.
 605 </p><p>
 606 Gåten er, hvorfor det?  Er det fordi vi fått en innsikt i sannheten om
 607 verdien og betydningen av absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur? Er det
 608 fordi vi har oppdaget at vår tradisjon med å avvise slike absolutte krav var
 609 feil?
 610 </p><p>
 611 Eller er det på grunn av at idéer om absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur
 612 gir fordeler til RCA-ene i vår tid, og passer med vår ureflekterte
 613 intuisjon?
 614 </p><p>
 615 Er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår tradisjon om fri kultur en
 616 forekomst av USA som korrigerer en feil fra sin fortid, slik vi gjorde det
 617 etter en blodig krig mot slaveri, og slik vi sakte gjør det mot
 618 forskjellsbehandling?  Eller er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår
 619 tradisjon med fri kultur nok et eksempel på at vårt politiske system er
 620 fanget av noen få mektige særinteresser?
 621 </p><p>
 622 Fører sunn fornuft til det ekstreme i dette spørsmålet på grunn av at sunn
 623 fornuft faktisk tror på dette ekstreme?  Eller står sunn fornuft i stillhet
 624 i møtet med dette ekstreme fordi, som med Armstrong versus RCA, at den mer
 625 mektige siden har sikret seg at det har et mye mer mektig synspunkt?
 626 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2751731"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2751737"></a><p>
 627
 628 Jeg forsøker ikke å være mystisk.  Mine egne synspunkter er klare. Jeg mener
 629 det var riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør mot ekstremismen til
 630 Causbyene.  Jeg mener det ville være riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør
 631 mot de ekstreme krav som gjøres i dag på vegne av "immaterielle
 632 rettigheter".  Det som loven krever i dag er mer å mer like dumt som om
 633 lensmannen skulle arrestere en flymaskin for å trenge inn på annen manns
 634 eiendom.  Men konsekvensene av den nye dumskapen vil bli mye mer
 635 dyptgripende.
 636
 637 </p><p>
 638 Basketaket som pågår akkurat nå senterer seg rundt to idéer:
 639 "piratvirksomhet" og "eiendom".  Mitt mål med denne bokens neste to deler er
 640 å utforske disse to idéene.
 641 </p><p>
 642 Metoden min er ikke den vanlige metoden for en akademiker.  Jeg ønsker ikke
 643 å pløye deg inn i et komplisert argument, steinsatt med referanser til
 644 obskure franske teoretikere&#8212;uansett hvor naturlig det har blitt for
 645 den rare sorten vi akademikere har blitt.  Jeg vil i stedet begynne hver del
 646 med en samling historier som etablerer en sammenheng der disse
 647 tilsynelatende enkle idéene kan bli fullt ut forstått.
 648 </p><p>
 649 De to delene setter opp kjernen i påstanden til denne boken: at mens
 650 internettet faktisk har produsert noe fantastisk og nytt, bidrar våre
 651 myndigheter, presset av store medieaktører for å møte dette "noe nytt" til å
 652 ødelegge noe som er svært gammelt.  I stedet for å forstå endringene som
 653 internettet kan gjøre mulig, og i stedet for å ta den tiden som trengs for å
 654 la "sunn fornuft" finne ut hvordan best svare på utfordringen, så lar vi de
 655 som er mest truet av endringene bruke sin makt til å endre loven&#8212;og
 656 viktigere, å bruke sin makt til å endre noe fundamentalt om hvordan vi
 657 alltid har fungert.
 658 </p><p>
 659 Jeg tror vi tillater dette, ikke fordi det er riktig, og heller ikke fordi
 660 de fleste av oss tror på disse endringene.  Vi tillater det på grunn av at
 661 de interessene som er mest truet er blant de mest mektige aktørene i vår
 662 deprimerende kompromitterte prosess for å utforme lover. Denne boken er
 663 historien om nok en konsekvens for denne type korrupsjon&#8212;en konsekvens
 664 for de fleste av oss forblir ukjent med.
 665 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2697468" href="#id2697468" class="para">4</a>] </sup>
 666 St. George Tucker, <em class="citetitle">Blackstone's Commentaries</em> 3 (South
 667 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
 668 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2697579" href="#id2697579" class="para">5</a>] </sup>
 669 USA mot Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. Domstolen fant at det kunne være
 670 å "ta" hvis regjeringens bruk av sitt land reelt sett hadde ødelagt verdien
 671 av eiendomen til Causby.  Dette eksemplet ble foreslått for meg i Keith
 672 Aokis flotte stykke, "(intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward
 673 a cultural Geography of Authorship", <em class="citetitle">Stanford Law
 674 Review</em> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. Se også Paul Goldstein,
 675 <em class="citetitle">Real Property</em> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press
 676 (1984)), 1112&#8211;13.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2750628"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2750624"></a>
 677 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2750808" href="#id2750808" class="para">6</a>] </sup>
 678 Lawrence Lessing, <em class="citetitle">Man of High Fidelity:: Edwin Howard
 679 Armstrong</em> (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
 680 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2750755" href="#id2750755" class="para">7</a>] </sup> Se "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," første
 681 elektroniske kirke i USA, hos www.webstationone.com/fecha, tilgjengelig fra
 682 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #1</a>.
 683 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2695855" href="#id2695855" class="para">8</a>] </sup>Lessing, 226.
 684 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2695870" href="#id2695870" class="para">9</a>] </sup>
 685 Lessing, 256.
 686 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2751188" href="#id2751188" class="para">10</a>] </sup>
 687 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
 688 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American Life
 689 Project, 15. april 2003: 6, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #2</a>.
 690 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2751281" href="#id2751281" class="para">11</a>] </sup>
 691 Dette er ikke det eneste formålet med opphavsrett, men det er helt klart
 692 hovedformålet med opphavsretten slik den er etablert i føderal grunnlov.
 693 Opphavsrettslovene i delstatene beskyttet historisk ikke bare kommersielle
 694 interesse når det gjalt publikasjoner, men også personverninteresser.  Ved å
 695 gi forfattere eneretten til å publisere først, ga delstatenes
 696 opphavsrettslovene forfatterne makt til å kontrollere spredningen av fakta
 697 om seg selv. Se Samuel D. Warren og Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy",
 698 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193, 198&#8211;200.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2750810"></a>
 699 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2751318" href="#id2751318" class="para">12</a>] </sup>
 700 Se Jessica Litman, <em class="citetitle">Digital Copyright</em> (New York:
 701 Prometheus bøker, 2001), kap. 13.
 702 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2751440" href="#id2751440" class="para">13</a>] </sup>
 703 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates Use New Tools
 704 to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," <em class="citetitle">New York
 705 Times</em>, 17. januar 2002.
 706 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2751505" href="#id2751505" class="para">14</a>] </sup>
 707 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," <em class="citetitle">Yale
 708 Law Journal</em> 106 (1996): 283.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2751514"></a>
 709 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 2. "Piratvirksomhet"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-piracy"></a>Kapittel 2. "Piratvirksomhet"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#catalogs">Kapittel tre: Kataloger</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#pirates">Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#piracy">Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxmansfield1"></a><p>
 710 Helt siden loven begynte å regulere kreative eierrettigheter, har det vært
 711 en krig mot "piratvirksomhet".  De presise konturene av dette konseptet,
 712 "piratvirksomhet", har vært vanskelig å tegne opp, men bildet av
 713 urettferdighet er enkelt å beskrive.  Som Lord Mansfield skrev i en sak som
 714 utvidet rekkevidden for engelsk opphavsrettslov til å inkludere noteark,
 715 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 716 En person kan bruke kopien til å spille den, men han har ingen rett til å
 717 robbe forfatteren for profitten, ved å lage flere kopier og distribuere
 718 etter eget forgodtbefinnende.<sup>[<a name="id2751872" href="#ftn.id2751872" class="footnote">15</a>]</sup>
 719 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2751886"></a></blockquote></div><p>
 720
 721 I dag er vi midt inne i en annen "krig" mot "piratvirksomhet". Internettet
 722 har fremprovosert denne krigen.  Internettet gjør det mulig å effektivt spre
 723 innhold.  Peer-to-peer (p2p) fildeling er blant det mest effektive av de
 724 effektive teknologier internettet muliggjør. Ved å bruke distribuert
 725 intelligens, kan p2p-systemer muliggjøre enkel spredning av innhold på en
 726 måte som ingen forestilte seg for en generasjon siden.
 727
 728 </p><p>
 729 Denne effektiviteten respekterer ikke de tradisjonelle skillene i
 730 opphavsretten. Nettverket skiller ikke mellom deling av
 731 opphavsrettsbeskyttet og ikke opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold. Dermed har det
 732 vært deling av en enorm mengde opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold.  Denne
 733 delingen har i sin tur ansporet til krigen, på grunn av at eiere av
 734 opphavsretter frykter delingen vil "frata forfatteren overskuddet."
 735 </p><p>
 736 Krigerne har snudd seg til domstolene, til lovgiverne, og i stadig større
 737 grad til teknologi for å forsvare sin "eiendom" mot denne
 738 "piratvirksomheten".  En generasjon amerikanere, advarer krigerne, blir
 739 oppdratt til å tro at "eiendom" skal være "gratis".  Glem tatoveringer, ikke
 740 tenk på kroppspiercing&#8212;våre barn blir <span class="emphasis"><em>tyver</em></span>!
 741 </p><p>
 742 Det er ingen tvil om at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at pirater bør
 743 straffes.  Men før vi roper på bødlene, bør vi sette dette
 744 "piratvirksomhets"-begrepet i en sammenheng.  For mens begrepet blir mer og
 745 mer brukt, har det i sin kjerne en ekstraordinær idé som nesten helt sikkert
 746 er feil.
 747 </p><p>
 748 Idéen høres omtrent slik ut:
 749 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 750 Kreativt arbeid har verdi.  Når jeg bruker, eller tar, eller bygger på det
 751 kreative arbeidet til andre, så tar jeg noe fra dem som har verdi.  Når jeg
 752 tar noe av verdi fra noen andre, bør jeg få tillatelse fra dem.  Å ta noe
 753 som har verdi fra andre uten tillatelse er galt.  Det er en form for
 754 piratvirksomhet.
 755 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2751984"></a><p>
 756 Dette synet går dypt i de pågående debattene.  Det er hva jussprofessor
 757 Rochelle Dreyfuss ved NYU kritiserer som "hvis verdi, så rettighet"-teorien
 758 for kreative eierrettigheter <sup>[<a name="id2751999" href="#ftn.id2751999" class="footnote">16</a>]</sup>&#8212;hvis det finnes verdi, så må noen ha rettigheten til denne
 759 verdien.  Det er perspektivet som fikk komponistenes rettighetsorganisasjon,
 760 ASCAP, til å saksøke jentespeiderne for å ikke betale for sangene som
 761 jentene sagt rundt jentespeidernes leirbål.<sup>[<a name="id2752019" href="#ftn.id2752019" class="footnote">17</a>]</sup> Det fantes "verdi" (sangene), så det måtte ha vært en
 762 "rettighet"&#8212;til og med mot jentespeiderne.
 763 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2752048"></a><p>
 764
 765 Denne idéen er helt klart en mulig forståelse om hvordan kreative
 766 eierrettigheter bør virke.  Det er helt klart et mulig design for et
 767 lovsystem som beskytter kreative eierrettigheter.  Men teorien om "hvis
 768 verdi, så rettighet" for kreative eierrettigheter har aldri vært USAs teori
 769 for kreative eierrettigheter.  It har aldri stått rot i vårt lovverk.
 770 </p><p>
 771 I vår tradisjon har immaterielle rettigheter i stedet vært et instrument.
 772 Det bygger fundamentet for et rikt kreativt samfunn, men er fortsatt servilt
 773 til verdien av kreativitet.  Dagens debatt har snudd dette helt rundt.  Vi
 774 har blitt så opptatt av å beskytte instrumentet at vi mister verdien av
 775 syne.
 776 </p><p>
 777 Kilden til denne forvirringen er et skille som loven ikke lenger bryr seg om
 778 å markere&#8212;skillet mellom å gjenpublisere noens verk på den ene siden,
 779 og bygge på og gjøre om verket på den andre.  Da opphavsretten kom var det
 780 kun publisering som ble berørt. Opphavsretten i dag regulerer begge.
 781 </p><p>
 782 Før teknologiene til internettet dukket opp, betød ikke denne begrepsmessige
 783 sammenblandingen mye.  Teknologiene for å publisere var kostbare, som betød
 784 at det meste av publisering var kommersiell. Kommersielle aktører kunne
 785 håndtere byrden pålagt av loven&#8212;til og med byrden som den bysantiske
 786 kompleksiteten som opphavsrettsloven har blitt.  Det var bare nok en kostnad
 787 ved å drive forretning.
 788 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2752102"></a><p>
 789 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of the
 790 law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of commercial
 791 creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that expansion would not
 792 matter much if copyright law regulated only "copying," when the law
 793 regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does, the extension matters a
 794 lot. The burden of this law now vastly outweighs any original
 795 benefit&#8212;certainly as it affects noncommercial creativity, and
 796 increasingly as it affects commercial creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see
 797 more clearly in the chapters below, the law's role is less and less to
 798 support creativity, and more and more to protect certain industries against
 799 competition. Just at the time digital technology could unleash an
 800 extraordinary range of commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law
 801 burdens this creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the
 802 threat of obscenely severe penalties. We may be seeing, as Richard Florida
 803 writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<sup>[<a name="id2752111" href="#ftn.id2752111" class="footnote">18</a>]</sup> Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of
 804 regulation of this creative class.
 805 </p><p>
 806 Disse byrdene gir ingen mening i vår tradisjon.  Vi bør begynne med å forstå
 807 den tradisjonen litt mer, og ved å plassere dagens slag om oppførsel med
 808 merkelappen "piratvirksomhet" i sin rette sammenheng.
 809 </p><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel en: Skaperne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="creators"></a>Kapittel en: Skaperne</h2></div></div></div><p>
 810 I 1928 ble en tegnefilmfigur født.  En tidlig Mikke Mus debuterte i mai
 811 dette året, i en stille flopp ved navn <em class="citetitle">Plane Crazy</em>.
 812 I november, i Colony teateret i New York City, ble den første vidt
 813 distribuerte tegnefilmen med synkronisert lyd, <em class="citetitle">Steamboat
 814 Willy</em>, vist frem med figuren som skulle bli til Mikke Mus.
 815 </p><p>
 816 Film med sykronisert lyd hadde blitt introdusert et år tidligere i filmen
 817 <em class="citetitle">The Jazz Singer</em>.  Suksessen fikk Walt Disney til å
 818 kopiere teknikken og mikse lyd med tegnefilm.  Ingen visste hvorvidt det
 819 ville virke eller ikke, og om det fungere, hvorvidt publikum villa ha sans
 820 for det.  Men da Disney gjorde en test sommeren 1928, var resutlatet
 821 entydig.  Som Disney beskriver dette første eksperimentet,
 822 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 823
 824 Et par av guttene mine kunne lese noteark, og en av dem kunne spille
 825 munnspill.  Vi stappet dem inn i et rom hvor de ikke kunne se skjermen, og
 826 gjorde det slik at lyden de spilte ble sendt videre til et rom hvor våre
 827 koner og venner var plassert for å se på bildet.
 828
 829 </p><p>
 830 Guttene brukte et note- og lydeffekt-ark.  Etter noen dårlige oppstarter,
 831 kom endelig lyd og handlig i gang med et smell. Munnspilleren spilte
 832 melodien, og resten av oss i lydavdelingen slamret på tinnkasseroller og
 833 blåste på slide-fløyte til rytmen. Synkroniseringen var nesten helt riktig.
 834 </p><p>
 835 Effekten på vårt lille publikum var intet mindre enn elektrisk.  De reagerte
 836 nesten instiktivt til denne union av lyd og bevegelse.  Jeg trodde de tullet
 837 med meg.  Så de puttet meg i publikum og satte igang på nytt.  Det var
 838 grufult, men det var fantastisk.  Og det var noe nytt!<sup>[<a name="id2752278" href="#ftn.id2752278" class="footnote">19</a>]</sup>
 839 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 840 Disneys daværende partner, og en av animasjonsverdenens mest ekstraordinære
 841 talenter, Ub Iwerks, uttalte det sterkere: "Jeg har aldri vært så begeistret
 842 i hele mitt liv. Ingenting annet har noen sinne vært like bra." <a class="indexterm" name="id2752300"></a>
 843 </p><p>
 844 Disney hadde laget noe helt nyt, basert på noe relativt nytt. Synkronisert
 845 lyd ga liv til en form for kreativitet som sjeldent hadde&#8212;unntatt fra
 846 Disneys hender&#8212;vært noe annet en fyllstoff for andre filmer.  Gjennom
 847 animasjonens tidligere historie var det Disneys oppfinnelse som satte
 848 standarden som andre måtte sloss for å oppfylle.  Og ganske ofte var Disneys
 849 store geni, hans gnist av kreativitet, bygget på arbeidet til andre.
 850 </p><p>
 851 Dette er kjent stoff.  Det du kanskje ikke vet er at 1928 også markerer en
 852 annen viktig overgang.  I samme år laget et komedie-geni (i motsetning til
 853 tegnefilm-geni) sin siste uavhengig produserte stumfilm.  Dette geniet var
 854 Buster Keaton.  Filmen var <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr</em>.
 855 </p><p>
 856 Keaton ble født inn i en vauderville-familie i 1895.  I stumfilm-æraen hadde
 857 han mestret bruken av bredpenslet fysisk komedie på en måte som tente
 858 ukontrollerbar latter fra hans publikum. <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill,
 859 Jr</em>. var en klassiker av denne typen, berømt blant film-elskere
 860 for sine utrolige stunts.  Filmen var en klassisk Keaton&#8212;fantastisk
 861 populær og blant de beste i sin sjanger.
 862 </p><p>
 863 <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr</em>. appeared before Disney's cartoon
 864 Steamboat Willie.  The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat
 865 Willie is a direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<sup>[<a name="id2752369" href="#ftn.id2752369" class="footnote">20</a>]</sup> and both are built upon a common song as a
 866 source. It is not just from the invention of synchronized sound in
 867 <em class="citetitle">The Jazz Singer</em> that we get <em class="citetitle">Steamboat
 868 Willie</em>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of Steamboat
 869 Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill," that we get
 870 Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey Mouse.
 871 </p><p>
 872 Denne "låningen" var ikke unik, hverken for Disney eller for industrien.
 873 Disney apet alltid etter full-lengde massemarkedsfilmene rundt
 874 ham.<sup>[<a name="id2752416" href="#ftn.id2752416" class="footnote">21</a>]</sup> Det samme gjorde mange andre.
 875 Tidlige tegnefilmer er stappfulle av etterapninger&#8212;små variasjoner
 876 over suksessfulle temaer, gamle historier fortalt på nytt.  Nøkkelen til
 877 suksess var brilliansen i forskjellene.  Med Disney var det lyden som ga
 878 gnisten til hans animasjoner.  Senere var det kvaliteten på hans arbeide
 879 relativt til de masseproduserte tegnefilmene som han konkurrerte med.
 880 Likevel var disse bidragene bygget på toppen av fundamentet som var lånt.
 881 Disney bygget på arbeidet til andre som kom før han, og skapte noe nytt ut
 882 av noe som bare var litt gammelt.
 883 </p><p>
 884 Noen ganger var låningen begrenset, og noen ganger var den betydelig. Tenkt
 885 på eventurene til brødrene Grimm.  Hvis du er like ubevisst som jeg var, så
 886 tror du sannsynlighvis at disse fortellingene er glade, søte historier som
 887 passer for ethvert barn ved leggetid.  Realiteten er at Grimm-eventyrene er,
 888 for oss, ganske dystre.  Det er noen sjeldne og kanskje spesielt ambisiøse
 889 foreldre som ville våge å lese disse blodige moralistiske historiene til
 890 sine barn, ved leggetid eller hvilken som helst annet tidspunkt.
 891 </p><p>
 892
 893 Disney tok disse historiene og fortalte dem på nytt på en måte som førte dem
 894 inn i en ny tidsalder. Han ga historiene liv, med både karakterer og
 895 lys. Uten å fjerne bitene av frykt og fare helt, gjorde han morsomt det som
 896 var mørkt og satte inn en ekte følelse av medfølelse der det før var
 897 frykt. Og ikke bare med verkene av brødrene Grimm.  Faktisk er katalogen
 898 over Disney-arbeid som baserer seg på arbeidet til andre ganske forbløffende
 899 når den blir samlet: <em class="citetitle">Snøhvit</em> (1937),
 900 <em class="citetitle">Fantasia</em> (1940), <em class="citetitle">Pinocchio</em>
 901 (1940), <em class="citetitle">Dumbo</em> (1941), <em class="citetitle">Bambi</em>
 902 (1942), <em class="citetitle">Song of the South</em> (1946),
 903 <em class="citetitle">Askepott</em> (1950), <em class="citetitle">Alice in
 904 Wonderland</em> (1951), <em class="citetitle">Robin Hood</em> (1952),
 905 <em class="citetitle">Peter Pan</em> (1953), <em class="citetitle">Lady og
 906 landstrykeren</em> (1955), <em class="citetitle">Mulan</em> (1998),
 907 <em class="citetitle">Tornerose</em> (1959), <em class="citetitle">101
 908 dalmatinere</em> (1961), <em class="citetitle">Sverdet i steinen</em>
 909 (1963), og <em class="citetitle">Jungelboken</em> (1967)&#8212;for ikke å nevne
 910 et nylig eksempel som vi bør kanskje glemme raskt, <em class="citetitle">Treasure
 911 Planet</em> (2003). I alle disse tilfellene, har Disney (eller
 912 Disney, Inc.) hentet kreativitet fra kultur rundt ham, blandet med
 913 kreativiteten fra sitt eget ekstraordinære talent, og deretter brent denne
 914 blandingen inn i sjelen til sin kultur. Hente, blande og brenne.
 915 </p><p>
 916 Dette er en type kreativitet.  Det er en kreativitet som vi bør huske på og
 917 feire.  Det er noen som vil si at det finnes ingen kreativitet bortsett fra
 918 denne typen.  Vi trenger ikke gå så langt for å anerkjenne dens betydning.
 919 Vi kan kalle dette "Disney-kreativitet", selv om det vil være litt
 920 misvisende.  Det er mer presist "Walt Disney-kreativitet"&#8212;en
 921 uttrykksform og genialitet som bygger på kulturen rundt oss og omformer den
 922 til noe annet.
 923 </p><p> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was relatively
 924 fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was therefore quite
 925 vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around thirty
 926 years&#8212;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
 927 copyrighted.<sup>[<a name="id2752558" href="#ftn.id2752558" class="footnote">22</a>]</sup> That means that for thirty
 928 years, on average, the authors or copyright holders of a creative work had
 929 an "exclusive right" to control certain uses of the work. To use this
 930 copyrighted work in limited ways required the permission of the copyright
 931 owner.
 932 </p><p>
 933 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.  No
 934 permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No permission and,
 935 hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free zone." Thus, most of
 936 the content from the nineteenth century was free for Disney to use and build
 937 upon in 1928. It was free for anyone&#8212; whether connected or not,
 938 whether rich or not, whether approved or not&#8212;to use and build upon.
 939 </p><p>
 940
 941 This is the ways things always were&#8212;until quite recently. For most of
 942 our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From until 1978,
 943 the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two years, meaning
 944 that most culture just a generation and a half old was free for anyone to
 945 build upon without the permission of anyone else.  Today's equivalent would
 946 be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s to now be free for the next
 947 Walt Disney to build upon without permission. Yet today, the public domain
 948 is presumptive only for content from before the Great Depression.
 949 </p><p>
 950 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity." Nor does
 951 America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and except within
 952 totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite universal.
 953 </p><p>
 954 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
 955 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
 956 <em class="citetitle">manga</em>, or comics. The Japanese are fanatics about
 957 comics. Some 40 percent of publications are comics, and 30 percent of
 958 publication revenue derives from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese
 959 society, at every magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters
 960 on Japan's extraordinary system of public transportation.
 961 </p><p>
 962 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
 963 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand much
 964 about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to the stories
 965 that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga cover every aspect
 966 of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights." And anyway, it's not as
 967 if the New York subways are filled with readers of Joyce or even
 968 Hemingway. People of different cultures distract themselves in different
 969 ways, the Japanese in this interestingly different way.
 970 </p><p>
 971 Men mitt formål her er ikke å forstå manga.  Det er a beskrive en variant av
 972 manga som fra en avokats perspektiv er ganske merkelig, men som fra en
 973 Disneys perspektiv er ganske godt kjent.
 974 </p><p>
 975
 976 This is the phenomenon of <em class="citetitle">doujinshi</em>. Doujinshi are
 977 also comics, but they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the
 978 creation of doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
 979 <span class="emphasis"><em>just</em></span> a copy; the artist must make a contribution to the
 980 art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or significantly. A
 981 doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and develop it
 982 differently&#8212;with a different story line. Or the comic can keep the
 983 character in character but change its look slightly. There is no formula for
 984 what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they must be
 985 different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed, there are
 986 committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows and reject any
 987 copycat comic that is merely a copy.
 988 </p><p>
 989 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
 990 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce these
 991 bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come together
 992 twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country, to exchange
 993 and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the mainstream commercial
 994 manga market. In some ways, it obviously competes with that market, but
 995 there is no sustained effort by those who control the commercial manga
 996 market to shut the doujinshi market down. It flourishes, despite the
 997 competition and despite the law.
 998 </p><p>
 999 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained in the
1000 law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under Japanese
1001 copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors American copyright
1002 law, the doujinshi market is an illegal one. Doujinshi are plainly
1003 "derivative works." There is no general practice by doujinshi artists of
1004 securing the permission of the manga creators. Instead, the practice is
1005 simply to take and modify the creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
1006 <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr</em>. Under both Japanese and American
1007 law, that "taking" without the permission of the original copyright owner is
1008 illegal. It is an infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a
1009 derivative work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1010 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxwinickjudd"></a><p>
1011 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in the
1012 view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1013 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The early
1014 days of comics in America are very much like what's going on in Japan
1015 now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each other. . . . That's
1016 how [the artists] learn to draw&#8212;by going into comic books and not
1017 tracing them, but looking at them and copying them" and building from
1018 them.<sup>[<a name="id2752683" href="#ftn.id2752683" class="footnote">23</a>]</sup>
1019 </p><p>
1020 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part because of
1021 the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1022 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules and
1023 you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot" do. "As a
1024 creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters which are fifty
1025 years old."
1026 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2752772"></a><p>
1027 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is precisely
1028 the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that explains the
1029 mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra, for example,
1030 hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these technical violations
1031 because they spur the manga market to be more wealthy and
1032 productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were banned, so the law
1033 does not ban doujinshi.<sup>[<a name="id2752790" href="#ftn.id2752790" class="footnote">24</a>]</sup>
1034 </p><p>
1035 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges, is that
1036 the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not clear. It may
1037 well be that the market as a whole is better off if doujinshi are permitted
1038 rather than banned, but that doesn't explain why individual copyright owners
1039 don't sue nonetheless. If the law has no general exception for doujinshi,
1040 and indeed in some cases individual manga artists have sued doujinshi
1041 artists, why is there not a more general pattern of blocking this "free
1042 taking" by the doujinshi culture?
1043 </p><p>
1044 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question as often
1045 as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by a friend from
1046 a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough lawyers," he told me one
1047 afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources to prosecute cases like
1048 this."
1049 </p><p>
1050
1051 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1052 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those words
1053 have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is begged: Would
1054 Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga be richer if doujinshi
1055 artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the Japanese gain something
1056 important if they could end this practice of uncompensated sharing? Does
1057 piracy here hurt the victims of the piracy, or does it help them? Would
1058 lawyers fighting this piracy help their clients or hurt them? Let's pause
1059 for a moment.
1060 </p><p>
1061 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they first
1062 start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should be puzzled
1063 about something you hadn't thought through before.
1064 </p><p>
1065 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1066 celebrants.  I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1067 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1068 "intellectual property."<sup>[<a name="id2752865" href="#ftn.id2752865" class="footnote">25</a>]</sup> A large,
1069 diverse society cannot survive without property; a large, diverse, and
1070 modern society cannot flourish without intellectual property.
1071 </p><p>
1072 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is plenty of
1073 value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't mean "money can't
1074 buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly part of a process of
1075 production, including commercial as well as noncommercial production.  If
1076 Disney animators had stolen a set of pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd
1077 have no hesitation in condemning that taking as wrong&#8212; even though
1078 trivial, even if unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the
1079 law of the day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1080 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because Disney's
1081 use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing wrong with the
1082 taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in the public domain.
1083 </p><p>
1084
1085 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&#8212;or more generally, the
1086 things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&#8212;are valuable,
1087 our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some things remain free
1088 for the taking within a free culture, and that freedom is good.
1089 </p><p>
1090 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into a
1091 publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1092 work&#8212;or even one copy&#8212;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1093 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would have
1094 stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever form,
1095 whether large or small.
1096 </p><p>
1097 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to say that
1098 the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt Disney
1099 creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in particular find it
1100 hard to say why.
1101 </p><p>
1102 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you begin
1103 to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists without asking
1104 or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor Einstein, but may I have
1105 permission to use your theory of relativity to show that you were wrong
1106 about quantum physics?") Acting companies perform adaptations of the works
1107 of Shakespeare without securing permission from anyone. (Does
1108 <span class="emphasis"><em>anyone</em></span> believe Shakespeare would be better spread
1109 within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse
1110 that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood
1111 goes through cycles with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the
1112 late 1990s; two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1113 </p><p>
1114
1115 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building upon the
1116 creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.  That building is
1117 always and everywhere at least partially done without permission and without
1118 compensating the original creator. No society, free or controlled, has ever
1119 demanded that every use be paid for or that permission for Walt Disney
1120 creativity must always be sought. Instead, every society has left a certain
1121 bit of its culture free for the taking&#8212;free societies more fully than
1122 unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1123
1124 </p><p>
1125 The hard question is therefore not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> a culture is
1126 free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is
1127 "<span class="emphasis"><em>How</em></span> free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly,
1128 is the culture free for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom
1129 limited to party members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten
1130 corporations on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread
1131 broadly? To artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1132 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether
1133 affiliated with a studio or not?
1134 </p><p>
1135 Frie kulturer er kulturer som etterlater mye åpent for andre å bygge på.
1136 Ufrie, eller tillatelse-kulturer etterlater mye mindre.  Vår var en fri
1137 kultur. Den er på tur til å bli mindre fri.
1138 </p></div><div class="sect1" title='Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="mere-copyists"></a>Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2753016"></a><p>
1139 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1140 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they were
1141 called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and expensive, and the
1142 field was thus limited to professionals and a few zealous and wealthy
1143 amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre Association that helped
1144 regulate the industry, as do all such associations, by keeping competition
1145 down so as to keep prices up.)
1146 </p><p>
1147 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.  This
1148 pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make "automatic
1149 pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for making "negatives."
1150 But because the negatives were glass, and had to be kept wet, the process
1151 still remained expensive and cumbersome. In the 1870s, dry plates were
1152 developed, making it easier to separate the taking of a picture from its
1153 developing. These were still plates of glass, and thus it was still not a
1154 process within reach of most amateurs.
1155 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxeastmangeorge"></a><p>
1156
1157 The technological change that made mass photography possible didn't happen
1158 until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George Eastman, himself an
1159 amateur photographer, was frustrated by the technology of photographs made
1160 with plates. In a flash of insight (so to speak), Eastman saw that if the
1161 film could be made to be flexible, it could be held on a single
1162 spindle. That roll could then be sent to a developer, driving the costs of
1163 photography down substantially. By lowering the costs, Eastman expected he
1164 could dramatically broaden the population of photographers.
1165 </p><p>
1166 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed rolls of
1167 it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was marketed on the basis
1168 of its simplicity. "You press the button and we do the rest."<sup>[<a name="id2753088" href="#ftn.id2753088" class="footnote">26</a>]</sup> As he described in <em class="citetitle">The Kodak
1169 Primer</em>:
1170 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1171 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that any
1172 person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work that only an
1173 expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or child, who has
1174 sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and press a button, with an
1175 instrument which altogether removes from the practice of photography the
1176 necessity for exceptional facilities or, in fact, any special knowledge of
1177 the art. It can be employed without preliminary study, without a darkroom
1178 and without chemicals.<sup>[<a name="id2753117" href="#ftn.id2753117" class="footnote">27</a>]</sup>
1179 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1180 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded with film,
1181 and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an Eastman factory,
1182 where the film was developed. Over time, of course, the cost of the camera
1183 and the ease with which it could be used both improved. Roll film thus
1184 became the basis for the explosive growth of popular photography. Eastman's
1185 camera first went on sale in 1888; one year later, Kodak was printing more
1186 than six thousand negatives a day.  From 1888 through 1909, while industrial
1187 production was rising by 4.7 percent, photographic equipment and material
1188 sales increased by percent.<sup>[<a name="id2753150" href="#ftn.id2753150" class="footnote">28</a>]</sup> Eastman
1189 Kodak's sales during the same period experienced an average annual increase
1190 of over 17 percent.<sup>[<a name="id2753158" href="#ftn.id2753158" class="footnote">29</a>]</sup>
1191 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2753167"></a><p>
1192
1193
1194 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not economic. It
1195 was social. Professional photography gave individuals a glimpse of places
1196 they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography gave them the ability to
1197 record their own lives in a way they had never been able to do before. As
1198 author Brian Coe notes, "For the first time the snapshot album provided the
1199 man on the street with a permanent record of his family and its
1200 activities. . . . For the first time in history there exists an authentic
1201 visual record of the appearance and activities of the common man made
1202 without [literary] interpretation or bias."<sup>[<a name="id2753186" href="#ftn.id2753186" class="footnote">30</a>]</sup>
1203 </p><p>
1204 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of expression.  The
1205 pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of expression, of course. But it
1206 took years of training before they could be deployed by amateurs in any
1207 useful or effective way. With the Kodak, expression was possible much sooner
1208 and more simply. The barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at
1209 its "quality"; professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a
1210 child study how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the
1211 experience of creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave
1212 ordinary people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1213 have before.
1214 </p><p>
1215 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously, Eastman's
1216 genius was an important part. But also important was the legal environment
1217 within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in the history of
1218 photography, there was a series of judicial decisions that could well have
1219 changed the course of photography substantially.  Courts were asked whether
1220 the photographer, amateur or professional, required permission before he
1221 could capture and print whatever image he wanted. Their answer was
1222 no.<sup>[<a name="id2753232" href="#ftn.id2753232" class="footnote">31</a>]</sup>
1223 </p><p>
1224
1225 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1226 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1227 building whose photograph he shot&#8212;pirating something of value. Some
1228 even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as Disney was not free to
1229 take the pencils that his animators used to draw Mickey, so, too, should
1230 these photographers not be free to take images that they thought valuable.
1231 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2753265"></a><p>
1232 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.  Sure,
1233 there may be something of value being used. But citizens should have the
1234 right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.  (Louis
1235 Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought the rule should
1236 be different for images from private spaces.<sup>[<a name="id2753288" href="#ftn.id2753288" class="footnote">32</a>]</sup>) It may be that this means that the photographer gets something for
1237 nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from <em class="citetitle">Steamboat
1238 Bill, Jr</em>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be free
1239 to capture an image without compensating the source.
1240 </p><p>
1241 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these early
1242 decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no permission would be
1243 required before an image could be captured and shared with others. Instead,
1244 permission was presumed. Freedom was the default.  (The law would eventually
1245 craft an exception for famous people: commercial photographers who snap
1246 pictures of famous people for commercial purposes have more restrictions
1247 than the rest of us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured
1248 without clearing the rights to do the capturing.<sup>[<a name="id2753332" href="#ftn.id2753332" class="footnote">33</a>]</sup>)
1249 </p><p>
1250 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had the law
1251 gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the photographer,
1252 then the photographer would have had to demonstrate permission. Perhaps
1253 Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate permission, too, before it
1254 developed the film upon which images were captured. After all, if permission
1255 were not granted, then Eastman Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft"
1256 committed by the photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1257 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting from the
1258 "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could imagine the law
1259 then requiring that some form of permission be demonstrated before a company
1260 developed pictures. We could imagine a system developing to demonstrate that
1261 permission.
1262 </p><p>
1263
1264
1265
1266 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be very hard
1267 to see how photography could have flourished as it did if the requirement
1268 for permission had been built into the rules that govern it. Photography
1269 would have existed. It would have grown in importance over
1270 time. Professionals would have continued to use the technology as they
1271 did&#8212;since professionals could have more easily borne the burdens of
1272 the permission system. But the spread of photography to ordinary people
1273 would not have occurred. Nothing like that growth would have been
1274 realized. And certainly, nothing like that growth in a democratic technology
1275 of expression would have been realized.  If you drive through San
1276 Francisco's Presidio, you might see two gaudy yellow school buses painted
1277 over with colorful and striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place
1278 of the name of a school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the
1279 projects that these busses enable.  These buses are filled with technologies
1280 that teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1281 film of your VCR.  Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think! is a
1282 project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand and critique
1283 the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each year, these busses
1284 travel to more than thirty schools and enable three hundred to five hundred
1285 children to learn something about media by doing something with media.  By
1286 doing, they think. By tinkering, they learn.
1287 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2753379"></a><p>
1288 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is increasingly
1289 so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has fallen
1290 dramatically.  As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good real-time
1291 digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get professional
1292 quality for $595."<sup>[<a name="id2753422" href="#ftn.id2753422" class="footnote">34</a>]</sup> These buses are
1293 filled with technology that would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten
1294 years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but
1295 classrooms across the country where kids are learning more and more of
1296 something teachers call "media literacy."
1297 </p><p>
1298
1299 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just Think!,
1300 puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and deconstruct media
1301 images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the way media works, the
1302 way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and the way people access it."
1303 <a class="indexterm" name="id2753451"></a>
1304 </p><p>
1305 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most people,
1306 literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway and noticing
1307 split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know about.
1308 </p><p>
1309 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of television
1310 commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000 commercials
1311 generally,<sup>[<a name="id2753472" href="#ftn.id2753472" class="footnote">35</a>]</sup> it is increasingly important
1312 to understand the "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the
1313 written word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to
1314 write by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1315 constructing lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1316 </p><p>
1317 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy as
1318 crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has written
1319 understands how difficult writing is&#8212;how difficult it is to sequence
1320 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1321 understandable&#8212;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1322 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works, how it
1323 holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers emotion or
1324 builds suspense.
1325 </p><p>
1326 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.  But
1327 even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about the
1328 film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not from
1329 reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then reflecting
1330 upon what one has written. One learns to write with images by making them
1331 and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1332 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2753516"></a><p>
1333 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film, as
1334 Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1335 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the USC School
1336 of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was about "the placement
1337 of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and texture."<sup>[<a name="id2753530" href="#ftn.id2753530" class="footnote">36</a>]</sup> But as computers open up an interactive space where
1338 a story is "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1339 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1340 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.  But when he
1341 tried to design a computer game based on one of his works, it was a new
1342 craft he had to learn. How to lead people through a game without their
1343 feeling they have been led was not obvious, even to a wildly successful
1344 author.<sup>[<a name="id2753562" href="#ftn.id2753562" class="footnote">37</a>]</sup>
1345 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2753584"></a><p>
1346 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley describes,
1347 "people are very surprised about how they are led through a film. [I]t is
1348 perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you have no idea. If a
1349 filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were led." If you know you were
1350 led through a film, the film has failed.
1351 </p><p>
1352 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&#8212;one that goes beyond text to
1353 include audio and visual elements&#8212;is not about making better film
1354 directors.  The aim is not to improve the profession of filmmaking at all.
1355 Instead, as Daley explained,
1356 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1357 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide is not
1358 access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the language that
1359 that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people can write with this
1360 language, and all the rest of us are reduced to being read-only.
1361 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1362 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.  Couch
1363 potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the twentieth century.
1364 </p><p>
1365 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point: It
1366 could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better understanding
1367 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the tools that
1368 enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy, and this
1369 literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the appropriate
1370 language for what they need to create or express."<sup>[<a name="id2753634" href="#ftn.id2753634" class="footnote">38</a>]</sup> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
1371 language of the twenty-first century."<sup>[<a name="id2753652" href="#ftn.id2753652" class="footnote">39</a>]</sup>
1372 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2753659"></a><p>
1373 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1374 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1375 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the Institute for
1376 Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe one particularly
1377 poignant example of a project they ran in a high school.  The high school
1378 was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles school. In all the traditional
1379 measures of success, this school was a failure. But Daley and Barish ran a
1380 program that gave kids an opportunity to use film to express meaning about
1381 something the students know something about&#8212;gun violence.
1382 </p><p>
1383 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively new
1384 problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was getting the
1385 kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them away. The "kids
1386 were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night," said Barish. They were
1387 working harder than in any other class to do what education should be
1388 about&#8212;learning how to express themselves.
1389 </p><p>
1390 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple tools
1391 to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said this class
1392 produced a series of projects that showed something about gun violence that
1393 few would otherwise understand. This was an issue close to the lives of
1394 these students. The project "gave them a tool and empowered them to be able
1395 to both understand it and talk about it," Barish explained. That tool
1396 succeeded in creating expression&#8212;far more successfully and powerfully
1397 than could have been created using only text. "If you had said to these
1398 students, `you have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands
1399 up and gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
1400 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students can do
1401 well. Yet neither is text a form in which <span class="emphasis"><em>these</em></span> ideas
1402 can be expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its
1403 connection to this form of expression.
1404 </p><p>
1405
1406
1407
1408 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part, of
1409 course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education, Daley
1410 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing meaning." To say
1411 that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing is only about
1412 teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&#8212;and increasingly, not the
1413 most powerful part&#8212;of constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the
1414 most moving part of our interview,
1415 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1416 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing meaning. If all
1417 you give them is text, they're not going to do it.  Because they can't. You
1418 know, you've got Johnny who can look at a video, he can play a video game,
1419 he can do graffiti all over your walls, he can take your car apart, and he
1420 can do all sorts of other things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny
1421 comes to school and you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do
1422 matters." Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
1423 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
1424 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you can
1425 do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think reflects
1426 that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw for me
1427 something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video camera and
1428 . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and make a little
1429 movie." But instead, really help you take these elements that you
1430 understand, that are your language, and construct meaning about the
1431 topic. . . .
1432 </p><p>
1433 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of course, is eventually,
1434 as it has happened in all these classes, they bump up against the fact, "I
1435 need to explain this and I really need to write something." And as one of
1436 the teachers told Stephanie, they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8
1437 times, till they got it right.
1438 </p><p>
1439
1440 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They needed to say
1441 something, as opposed to just jumping through your hoops. They actually
1442 needed to use a language that they didn't speak very well. But they had come
1443 to understand that they had a lot of power with this language."
1444 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1445 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
1446 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the world
1447 shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for that week,
1448 and for weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold
1449 the story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a retelling,
1450 because we had seen the events that were described. The genius of this awful
1451 act of terrorism was that the delayed second attack was perfectly timed to
1452 assure that the whole world would be watching.
1453 </p><p>
1454 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music scored
1455 for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across the
1456 screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance," and
1457 seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have increasingly
1458 come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the entertainment is
1459 tragedy.
1460 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2753813"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2753818"></a><p>
1461 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September 11,"
1462 those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different production as
1463 well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same events. Yet these
1464 Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some people constructed photo
1465 pages that captured images from around the world and presented them as slide
1466 shows with text. Some offered open letters. There were sound
1467 recordings. There was anger and frustration.  There were attempts to provide
1468 context. There was, in short, an extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in
1469 the sense Mike Godwin uses the term in his book <em class="citetitle">Cyber
1470 Rights</em>, around a news event that had captured the attention of
1471 the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there was also the Internet.
1472 </p><p>
1473
1474 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&#8212;though I do think the
1475 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean instead
1476 to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a Kodak, the
1477 Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a movie by a student
1478 on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed with sound or
1479 text.
1480 </p><p>
1481 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet allows
1482 these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of people,
1483 practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
1484 tradition&#8212;not just that culture can be captured mechanically, and
1485 obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but that this
1486 mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely spread
1487 practically instantaneously.
1488 </p><p>
1489 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the same
1490 time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was just beginning
1491 to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or blog. The blog is a kind
1492 of public diary, and within some cultures, such as in Japan, it functions
1493 very much like a diary. In those cultures, it records private facts in a
1494 public way&#8212;it's a kind of electronic <em class="citetitle">Jerry
1495 Springer</em>, available anywhere in the world.
1496 </p><p>
1497 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different character.
1498 There are some who use the space simply to talk about their private
1499 life. But there are many who use the space to engage in public
1500 discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing others who are
1501 mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about the decisions they
1502 make, offering solutions to problems we all see: blogs create the sense of a
1503 virtual public meeting, but one in which we don't all hope to be there at
1504 the same time and in which conversations are not necessarily linked. The
1505 best of the blog entries are relatively short; they point directly to words
1506 used by others, criticizing with or adding to them.  They are arguably the
1507 most important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
1508 </p><p>
1509
1510 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as it
1511 does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most difficult for
1512 those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy has atrophied.  Of
1513 course we have elections, and most of the time the courts allow those
1514 elections to count. A relatively small number of people vote in those
1515 elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally professionalized
1516 and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
1517 </p><p>
1518 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy means rule by
1519 the people, but rule means something more than mere elections. In our
1520 tradition, it also means control through reasoned discourse.  This was the
1521 idea that captured the imagination of Alexis de Tocqueville, the
1522 nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the most important account of
1523 early "Democracy in America." It wasn't popular elections that fascinated
1524 him&#8212;it was the jury, an institution that gave ordinary people the
1525 right to choose life or death for other citizens.  And most fascinating for
1526 him was that the jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would
1527 impose. They deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they
1528 tried to persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
1529 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to come to
1530 an end.<sup>[<a name="id2753860" href="#ftn.id2753860" class="footnote">40</a>]</sup>
1531 </p><p>
1532 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its place,
1533 there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some are
1534 pushing to create just such an institution.<sup>[<a name="id2753946" href="#ftn.id2753946" class="footnote">41</a>]</sup> And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
1535 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or place
1536 for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
1537 </p><p>
1538 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to occur.  We,
1539 the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a strong norm
1540 against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about politics with people
1541 you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics with people you
1542 disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated, and isolated discourse
1543 becomes more extreme.<sup>[<a name="id2753977" href="#ftn.id2753977" class="footnote">42</a>]</sup> We say what our
1544 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
1545 </p><p>
1546
1547 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
1548 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they want
1549 to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.  Technologies that
1550 enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail, increase the opportunity
1551 for communication. Blogs allow for public discourse without the public ever
1552 needing to gather in a single public place.
1553 </p><p>
1554 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
1555 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
1556 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and the
1557 left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian, but
1558 there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
1559 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
1560 </p><p>
1561 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The name
1562 Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race but for
1563 blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading is having an
1564 effect.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2754020"></a>
1565 </p><p>
1566 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
1567 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott "misspoke"
1568 at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising Thurmond's
1569 segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this story would
1570 disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight hours. It did. But he
1571 didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The bloggers kept researching
1572 the story. Over time, more and more instances of the same "misspeaking"
1573 emerged. Finally, the story broke back into the mainstream press. In the
1574 end, Lott was forced to resign as senate majority leader.<sup>[<a name="id2754040" href="#ftn.id2754040" class="footnote">43</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2754048"></a>
1575 </p><p>
1576 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures don't
1577 exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and newspapers are
1578 commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.  If they lose
1579 readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
1580 </p><p>
1581 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they can
1582 focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a particularly
1583 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as the
1584 number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks of
1585 stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been selected by a
1586 very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
1587 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxwinerdave"></a><p>
1588
1589 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle from
1590 the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this movement and
1591 a software author for many decades, told me, another difference is the
1592 absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you have to take the
1593 conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.  "An amateur
1594 journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the conflict of
1595 interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of get it out of
1596 the way."
1597 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2754100"></a><p>
1598 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more concentrated
1599 (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more from the public
1600 than an unconcentrated media can&#8212;as CNN admitted it did after the Iraq
1601 war because it was afraid of the consequences to its own
1602 employees.<sup>[<a name="id2753920" href="#ftn.id2753920" class="footnote">44</a>]</sup> It also needs to sustain a
1603 more coherent account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
1604 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink
1605 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
1606 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer
1607 a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
1608 told her <span class="emphasis"><em>that</em></span> they were writing "the story.")
1609 </p><p> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate&#8212;"amateur" not in
1610 the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning
1611 not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much broader range
1612 of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when
1613 hundreds from across the southwest United States turned to the Internet to
1614 retell what they had seen.<sup>[<a name="id2754135" href="#ftn.id2754135" class="footnote">45</a>]</sup> And it
1615 drives readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as
1616 Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly
1617 with our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"&#8212;with all the
1618 benefits, and costs, that might entail.
1619 </p><p>
1620
1621 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
1622 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for public
1623 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
1624 "journalism" is happy about this&#8212;some journalists have been told to
1625 curtail their blogging.<sup>[<a name="id2754166" href="#ftn.id2754166" class="footnote">46</a>]</sup> But it is clear
1626 that we are still in transition. "A lot of what we are doing now is warm-up
1627 exercises," Winer told me.  There is a lot that must mature before this
1628 space has its mature effect.  And as the inclusion of content in this space
1629 is the least infringing use of the Internet (meaning infringing on
1630 copyright), Winer said, "we will be the last thing that gets shut down."
1631 </p><p>
1632 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you don't
1633 have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper." That is
1634 true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.  As more and more
1635 citizens express what they think, and defend it in writing, that will change
1636 the way people understand public issues. It is easy to be wrong and
1637 misguided in your head. It is harder when the product of your mind can be
1638 criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare human who admits that he has
1639 been persuaded that he is wrong. But it is even rarer for a human to ignore
1640 when he has been proven wrong.  The writing of ideas, arguments, and
1641 criticism improves democracy.  Today there are probably a couple of million
1642 blogs where such writing happens. When there are ten million, there will be
1643 something extraordinary to report.
1644 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2754246"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxbrownjohnseely"></a><p>
1645 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.  His work,
1646 as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the creation of
1647 knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
1648 </p><p>
1649 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
1650 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
1651 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his real
1652 excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
1653 </p><p>
1654
1655 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up," he
1656 explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower engines,
1657 automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies enable a different
1658 kind of tinkering&#8212;with abstract ideas though in concrete form. The
1659 kids at Just Think! not only think about how a commercial portrays a
1660 politician; using digital technology, they can take the commercial apart and
1661 manipulate it, tinker with it to see how it does what it does. Digital
1662 technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or "free collage," as Brown calls
1663 it. Many get to add to or transform the tinkering of many others.
1664 </p><p>
1665 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
1666 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose source
1667 code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a FS/OSS
1668 program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of FS/OSS
1669 technology works can tinker with the code.
1670 </p><p>
1671 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform," as
1672 Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .  unleash a free
1673 collage on the community, so that other people can start looking at your
1674 code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can improve it." Each
1675 effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major
1676 apprenticeship platform."
1677 </p><p>
1678 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.  They
1679 are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the abstract, and
1680 this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're doing in your
1681 garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .  You are
1682 tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the more you
1683 improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
1684 </p><p>
1685 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
1686 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts it,
1687 "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
1688 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
1689 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
1690 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if you
1691 are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot you
1692 can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor these
1693 multiple forms of intelligence."
1694 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2754340"></a><p>
1695
1696 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and Just
1697 Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well as
1698 creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind of
1699 recognition.
1700 </p><p>
1701 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.  Indeed, as
1702 we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is increasingly
1703 highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father had the right to
1704 tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that your child will have
1705 the right to tinker with the images she finds all around.  The law and,
1706 increasingly, technology interfere with a freedom that technology, and
1707 curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
1708 </p><p>
1709 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
1710 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter 10) has
1711 developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to tinker" as it
1712 applies to computer science and to knowledge in general.<sup>[<a name="id2754373" href="#ftn.id2754373" class="footnote">47</a>]</sup> But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more
1713 fundamental. It is about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because
1714 of the law.
1715 </p><p>
1716 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
1717 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think and want
1718 to learn."
1719 </p><p>
1720 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will evince, "we
1721 are building a legal system that completely suppresses the natural
1722 tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an architecture
1723 that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal system that closes down
1724 that part of the brain."
1725 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2754404"></a><p>
1726 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes moving
1727 images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an opportunity to
1728 spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building the law to close down
1729 that technology.
1730 </p><p>
1731 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in chapter 9,
1732 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
1733 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel tre: Kataloger"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="catalogs"></a>Kapittel tre: Kataloger</h2></div></div></div><p>
1734 Høsten 2001, ble Jesse Jordan fra Oceanside, New York, innrullert som
1735 førsteårsstudent ved Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, i Troy, New York.
1736 Hans studieprogram ved RPI var informasjonsteknologi.  Selv om han ikke var
1737 en programmerer, bestemte Jesse seg i oktober å begynne å fikle med en
1738 søkemotorteknologi som var tilgjengelig på RPI-nettverket.
1739 </p><p>
1740 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.  It
1741 offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering to
1742 information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
1743 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
1744 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to imagine
1745 and then build, a generation for the network age.
1746 </p><p>
1747 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to one
1748 another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything available on the
1749 RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network is designed to
1750 enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as more intimate
1751 access to other members of the RPI community.
1752 </p><p>
1753
1754 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google brought the
1755 Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving the quality of
1756 search on the network. Specialty search engines can do this even better. The
1757 idea of "intranet" search engines, search engines that search within the
1758 network of a particular institution, is to provide users of that institution
1759 with better access to material from that institution.  Businesses do this
1760 all the time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
1761 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
1762 </p><p>
1763 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.  Microsoft, for
1764 example, has a network file system that makes it very easy for search
1765 engines tuned to that network to query the system for information about the
1766 publicly (within that network) available content.  Jesse's search engine was
1767 built to take advantage of this technology. It used Microsoft's network file
1768 system to build an index of all the files available within the RPI network.
1769 </p><p>
1770 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.  Indeed,
1771 his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had built. His
1772 single most important improvement over those engines was to fix a bug within
1773 the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a user's computer to
1774 crash. With the engines that existed before, if you tried to access a file
1775 through a Windows browser that was on a computer that was off-line, your
1776 computer could crash. Jesse modified the system a bit to fix that problem,
1777 by adding a button that a user could click to see if the machine holding the
1778 file was still on-line.
1779 </p><p>
1780 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six months,
1781 he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By March, the system
1782 was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one million files in his
1783 directory, including every type of content that might be on users'
1784 computers.
1785 </p><p>
1786
1787 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which students
1788 could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or research; copies
1789 of information pamphlets; movie clips that students might have created;
1790 university brochures&#8212;basically anything that users of the RPI network
1791 made available in a public folder of their computer.
1792 </p><p>
1793 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the files
1794 that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that means, of
1795 course, that three quarters were not, and&#8212;so that this point is
1796 absolutely clear&#8212;Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files
1797 in their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
1798 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a university
1799 where he was studying information science, and hence, tinkering was the
1800 aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from
1801 this tinkering; he was not connected to any business that would make any
1802 money from this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
1803 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
1804 supposed to do.
1805 </p><p>
1806 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at RPI. The
1807 dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association of America, the
1808 RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three other students whom he
1809 didn't even know, two of them at other universities.  A few hours later,
1810 Jesse was served with papers from the suit.  As he read these papers and
1811 watched the news reports about them, he was increasingly astonished.
1812 </p><p>
1813 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything wrong. . . .  I
1814 don't think there's anything wrong with the search engine that I ran or
1815 . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't modified it in any way that
1816 promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the search engine
1817 in a way that would make it easier to use"&#8212;again, a <span class="emphasis"><em>search
1818 engine</em></span>, which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows
1819 filesharing system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of
1820 the RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
1821 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do with
1822 music.
1823 </p><p>
1824
1825 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a network and
1826 had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They demanded that he pay
1827 them the damages for his wrong. For cases of "willful infringement," the
1828 Copyright Act specifies something lawyers call "statutory damages." These
1829 damages permit a copyright owner to claim $150,000 per infringement. As the
1830 RIAA alleged more than one hundred specific copyright infringements, they
1831 therefore demanded that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
1832 </p><p>
1833 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
1834 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
1835 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case was
1836 different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same: huge
1837 demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.  If you
1838 added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in the United
1839 States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
1840 <span class="emphasis"><em>billion</em></span>&#8212;six times the <span class="emphasis"><em>total</em></span>
1841 profit of the film industry in 2001.<sup>[<a name="id2754605" href="#ftn.id2754605" class="footnote">48</a>]</sup>
1842 </p><p>
1843 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.  An
1844 uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They demanded to
1845 know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved $12,000 from summer jobs and
1846 other employment. They demanded $12,000 to dismiss the case.
1847 </p><p>
1848 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He refused. They
1849 wanted him to agree to an injunction that would essentially make it
1850 impossible for him to work in many fields of technology for the rest of his
1851 life. He refused. They made him understand that this process of being sued
1852 was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief
1853 lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay
1854 another visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
1855 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
1856 </p><p>
1857
1858 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.  But
1859 Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the American
1860 legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even win. But the cost of
1861 fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be at least $250,000. If
1862 he won, he would not recover that money. If he won, he would have a piece of
1863 paper saying he had won, and a piece of paper saying he and his family were
1864 bankrupt.
1865 </p><p>
1866 Så Jesse hadde et mafia-lignende valg: $250,000 og en sjanse til å vinne,
1867 eller $12.000 og et forlik.
1868 </p><p>
1869 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.  Let's
1870 put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.  Where is the
1871 morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in scapegoatism? The
1872 RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The president of the RIAA is
1873 reported to make more than $1 million a year.  Artists, on the other hand,
1874 are not well paid. The average recording artist makes $45,900.<sup>[<a name="id2754670" href="#ftn.id2754670" class="footnote">49</a>]</sup> There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect and
1875 direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a student for
1876 running a search engine?<sup>[<a name="id2754685" href="#ftn.id2754685" class="footnote">50</a>]</sup>
1877 </p><p>
1878 23. juni overførte Jesse alle sine oppsparte midler til advokaten som jobbet
1879 for RIA.  Saken mot ham ble trukket.  Og med dette, ble unggutten som hadde
1880 fiklet med en datamaskin og blitt saksøkt for 15 millioner dollar en
1881 aktivist:
1882 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1883 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be an
1884 activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I ever
1885 foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely absurd what the
1886 RIAA has done.
1887 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1888 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As his
1889 father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
1890 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
1891 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the wrong
1892 message. And he wants to correct the record."
1893 </p></div><div class="sect1" title='Kapittel fire: "Pirater"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="pirates"></a>Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</h2></div></div></div><p>
1894 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without their
1895 permission&#8212;if "if value, then right" is true&#8212;then the history of
1896 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of "big
1897 media" today&#8212;film, records, radio, and cable TV&#8212;was born of a
1898 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
1899 pirates join this generation's country club&#8212;until now.
1900 </p><div class="sect2" title="Film"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="film"></a>Film</h3></div></div></div><p>
1901
1902 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<sup>[<a name="id2754762" href="#ftn.id2754762" class="footnote">51</a>]</sup> Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast
1903 to California in the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that
1904 patents granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls
1905 were exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
1906 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative property&#8212;patents.
1907 Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property gave
1908 him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
1909 </p><p>
1910 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
1911 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1912 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with the
1913 license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to themselves as
1914 independents protested the trust and carried on business without submitting
1915 to the Edison monopoly. In the summer of 1909 the independent movement was
1916 in full-swing, with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
1917 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
1918 </p><p>
1919 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
1920 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement by
1921 forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company to block
1922 the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics that have
1923 become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment,
1924 discontinued product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
1925 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all U.S. film
1926 exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent William Fox who
1927 defied the Trust even after his license was revoked.<sup>[<a name="id2754820" href="#ftn.id2754820" class="footnote">52</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2754846"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2754852"></a>
1928 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1929 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like Fox. And
1930 no less than today, these independents were vigorously resisted.  "Shooting
1931 was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents' resulting in loss of
1932 negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life and limb frequently
1933 occurred."<sup>[<a name="id2754873" href="#ftn.id2754873" class="footnote">53</a>]</sup> That led the independents to
1934 flee the East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
1935 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And
1936 the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
1937 </p><p>
1938
1939 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement of federal
1940 law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the patent holder a
1941 truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that time), by the time
1942 enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had expired. A new industry
1943 had been born, in part from the piracy of Edison's creative property.
1944 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Innspilt musikk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="recordedmusic"></a>Innspilt musikk</h3></div></div></div><p>
1945 Plateindustrien ble født av en annen type piratvirksomhet, dog for å forstå
1946 hvordan krever at en setter seg inn i detaljer om hvordan loven regulerer
1947 musikk.
1948 </p><p>
1949 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines for
1950 reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player piano), the
1951 law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of their music and
1952 the exclusive right to control public performances of their music. In other
1953 words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's 1899 hit "Happy Mose,"
1954 the law said I would have to pay for the right to get a copy of the musical
1955 score, and I would also have to pay for the right to perform it publicly.
1956 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2754936"></a><p>
1957 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph or
1958 Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear enough that I
1959 would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I performed in making
1960 this recording. And it was clear enough that I would have to pay for any
1961 public performance of the work I was recording.  But it wasn't totally clear
1962 that I would have to pay for a "public performance" if I recorded the song
1963 in my own house (even today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing
1964 their songs in the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in
1965 your brain are not&#8212;yet&#8212; regulated by copyright law). So if I
1966 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own home,
1967 it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more importantly, it
1968 wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I then made copies of
1969 those recordings.  Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively
1970 pirate someone else's song without paying its composer anything.
1971 </p><p>
1972
1973 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about this capacity to
1974 pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge put it,
1975 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1976 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an opera. A
1977 publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and copyrights
1978 it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who cut music rolls
1979 and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the composer and publisher
1980 without any regard for [their] rights.<sup>[<a name="id2754982" href="#ftn.id2754982" class="footnote">54</a>]</sup>
1981 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1982 The innovators who developed the technology to record other people's works
1983 were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and genius of American
1984 composers,"<sup>[<a name="id2755005" href="#ftn.id2755005" class="footnote">55</a>]</sup> and the "music publishing
1985 industry" was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one
1986 pirate."<sup>[<a name="id2755016" href="#ftn.id2755016" class="footnote">56</a>]</sup> As John Philip Sousa put it,
1987 in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money out of my pieces, I
1988 want a share of it."<sup>[<a name="id2755027" href="#ftn.id2755027" class="footnote">57</a>]</sup>
1989 </p><p>
1990 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too, do the
1991 arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the player piano
1992 argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the introduction of automatic
1993 music players has not deprived any composer of anything he had before their
1994 introduction." Rather, the machines increased the sales of sheet
1995 music.<sup>[<a name="id2755044" href="#ftn.id2755044" class="footnote">58</a>]</sup> In any case, the innovators
1996 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
1997 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
1998 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company wrote, "is
1999 the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas musical, literary
2000 or artistic, except as defined by statute."<sup>[<a name="id2755050" href="#ftn.id2755050" class="footnote">59</a>]</sup>
2001 </p><p>
2002
2003 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2004 <span class="emphasis"><em>and</em></span> the recording artist. Congress amended the law to
2005 make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of
2006 their music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete control
2007 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2008 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once the
2009 composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of copyright law
2010 that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer authorizes a recording of
2011 his song, others are free to record the same song, so long as they pay the
2012 original composer a fee set by the law.
2013 </p><p>
2014 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will refer
2015 to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose key
2016 terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright Act in
2017 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of recordings so long
2018 as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)  the fee set by the statute.
2019 </p><p>
2020 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham writes a
2021 novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham gives the
2022 publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge whatever he wants
2023 for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is thus set by Grisham,
2024 and copyright law ordinarily says you have no permission to use Grisham's
2025 work except with permission of Grisham.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2755110"></a>
2026 </p><p>
2027 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And thus, in
2028 effect, the law <span class="emphasis"><em>subsidizes</em></span> the recording industry
2029 through a kind of piracy&#8212;by giving recording artists a weaker right
2030 than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over
2031 their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less
2032 control are the recording industry and the public. The recording industry
2033 gets something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public
2034 gets access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2035 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2036 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would stifle
2037 follow-on creativity.<sup>[<a name="id2754786" href="#ftn.id2754786" class="footnote">60</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2755161"></a>
2038 </p><p>
2039 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2040 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2041 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary relates,
2042 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2043 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory license system
2044 must be retained. They asserted that the record industry is a
2045 half-billion-dollar business of great economic importance in the United
2046 States and throughout the world; records today are the principal means of
2047 disseminating music, and this creates special problems, since performers
2048 need unhampered access to musical material on nondiscriminatory
2049 terms. Historically, the record producers pointed out, there were no
2050 recording rights before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory
2051 license as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2052 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of recorded music,
2053 with the public being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2054 choice.<sup>[<a name="id2755193" href="#ftn.id2755193" class="footnote">61</a>]</sup>
2055 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2056 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their creative
2057 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2058 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Radio"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="radio"></a>Radio</h3></div></div></div><p>
2059 Radio was also born of piracy.
2060 </p><p>
2061 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a "public
2062 performance" of the composer's work.<sup>[<a name="id2755230" href="#ftn.id2755230" class="footnote">62</a>]</sup> As
2063 I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)  an
2064 exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio station thus
2065 owes the composer money for that performance.
2066 </p><p>
2067
2068 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a copy
2069 of the <span class="emphasis"><em>composer's</em></span> work. The radio station is also
2070 performing a copy of the <span class="emphasis"><em>recording artist's</em></span> work. It's
2071 one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's
2072 choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle
2073 Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the value of the composition
2074 performed on the radio station.  And if the law were perfectly consistent,
2075 the radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work, just
2076 as it pays the composer of the music for his work.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2755296"></a>
2077
2078
2079 </p><p>
2080 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
2081 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station need
2082 only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of something for
2083 nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for free, even if it
2084 must pay the composer something for the privilege of playing the song.
2085 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxmadonna"></a><p>
2086 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.  Imagine
2087 it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize public
2088 performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your song in public,
2089 she has to get your permission.
2090 </p><p>
2091 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She then
2092 decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top hit. Under
2093 our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get some money. But
2094 Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on the sale of her CDs. The
2095 public performance of her recording is not a "protected" right. The radio
2096 station thus gets to <span class="emphasis"><em>pirate</em></span> the value of Madonna's work
2097 without paying her anything.
2098 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2755347"></a><p>
2099 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
2100 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
2101 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law ordinarily
2102 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the choice for
2103 him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take something for
2104 nothing.
2105 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Kabel-TV"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="cabletv"></a>Kabel-TV</h3></div></div></div><p>
2106
2107 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
2108 </p><p>
2109
2110 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
2111 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content that
2112 they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies started
2113 selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay for what they
2114 sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing broadcasters' content, but more
2115 egregiously than anything Napster ever did&#8212; Napster never charged for
2116 the content it enabled others to give away.
2117 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2755381"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2755397"></a><p>
2118 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.  Rosel
2119 Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of "unfair and
2120 potentially destructive competition."<sup>[<a name="id2755409" href="#ftn.id2755409" class="footnote">63</a>]</sup>
2121 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable TV,
2122 but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association of
2123 Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
2124 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<sup>[<a name="id2755425" href="#ftn.id2755425" class="footnote">64</a>]</sup> As another broadcaster put it,
2125 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2126 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the only
2127 business I know of where the product that is being sold is not paid
2128 for.<sup>[<a name="id2755442" href="#ftn.id2755442" class="footnote">65</a>]</sup>
2129 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2130 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
2131 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2132 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now take our
2133 property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop piracy and I don't
2134 think there is any lesser word to describe it. I think there are harsher
2135 words which would fit it.<sup>[<a name="id2755466" href="#ftn.id2755466" class="footnote">66</a>]</sup>
2136 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2137 Disse var "gratispassasjerer", sa presidenten Charlton Heston i Screen
2138 Actor's Guild, som "tok lønna fra skuespillerne"<sup>[<a name="id2755484" href="#ftn.id2755484" class="footnote">67</a>]</sup>
2139 </p><p>
2140 Men igjen, det er en annen side i debatten.  Som assisterende justisminister
2141 Edwin Zimmerman sa det,
2142 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2143 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any copyright
2144 protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright holders who are
2145 already compensated, who already have a monopoly, should be permitted to
2146 extend that monopoly. . . . The question here is how much compensation they
2147 should have and how far back they should carry their right to
2148 compensation.<sup>[<a name="id2755510" href="#ftn.id2755510" class="footnote">68</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2755529"></a>
2149 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2150 Opphavsrettinnehaverne tok kabelselskapene til retten. Høyesterett fant to
2151 ganger at kabelselskaper ikke skyldte opphavsrettinnehaverne noen ting.
2152 </p><p>
2153 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question of
2154 whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated." In the
2155 end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it resolved the
2156 question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable companies would
2157 have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but the price they would
2158 have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.  The price was set by law,
2159 so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto power over the emerging
2160 technologies of cable. Cable companies thus built their empire in part upon
2161 a "piracy" of the value created by broadcasters' content.
2162 </p><p>
2163 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means using value
2164 from someone else's creative property without permission from that
2165 creator&#8212;as it is increasingly described today<sup>[<a name="id2755516" href="#ftn.id2755516" class="footnote">69</a>]</sup> &#8212; then <span class="emphasis"><em>every</em></span> industry
2166 affected by copyright today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind
2167 of piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. . . . The list is long and could
2168 well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
2169 generation&#8212;until now.
2170 </p></div></div><div class="sect1" title='Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="piracy"></a>Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</h2></div></div></div><p>
2171 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in
2172 many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized
2173 taking of other people's content within a commercial context. Despite the
2174 many justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
2175 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
2176 </p><p>
2177
2178 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking" that is
2179 more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems wrong to
2180 many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this taking
2181 "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.  For the harm
2182 of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than outright copying, and
2183 the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has so often done in the
2184 past.
2185
2186 </p><div class="sect2" title="Piracy I"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="piracy-i"></a>Piracy I</h3></div></div></div><p>
2187 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there are
2188 businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted content,
2189 copy it, and sell it&#8212;all without the permission of a copyright
2190 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
2191 every year to physical piracy<sup>[<a name="id2755593" href="#ftn.id2755593" class="footnote">70</a>]</sup> (that
2192 works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it
2193 loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
2194 </p><p>
2195 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this book, nor
2196 in the argument that most people make when talking about the subject of this
2197 book, should draw into doubt this simple point: This piracy is wrong.
2198 </p><p>
2199 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made for
2200 it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one hundred
2201 years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign copyrights. We
2202 were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might therefore seem
2203 hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other developing nations
2204 treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our existence,
2205 treated as right.
2206 </p><p>
2207 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban the
2208 taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
2209 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works without the
2210 permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.  The copy shops
2211 in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law does protect
2212 foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops violate that law. So
2213 the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a moral wrong, but a
2214 legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal wrong, but a locally
2215 legal wrong as well.
2216 </p><p>
2217
2218 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
2219 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose not to
2220 protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a pirate nation,
2221 but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar childhood.
2222 </p><p>
2223 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are its
2224 laws regardless of their source. The international law under which these
2225 nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden of
2226 intellectual property law.<sup>[<a name="id2755724" href="#ftn.id2755724" class="footnote">71</a>]</sup> In my view,
2227 more developing nations should take advantage of that opportunity, but when
2228 they don't, then their laws should be respected. And under the laws of these
2229 nations, this piracy is wrong.
2230 </p><p>
2231 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in any
2232 case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access to
2233 American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have bought those
2234 American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any less money than they
2235 otherwise would have had.<sup>[<a name="id2755783" href="#ftn.id2755783" class="footnote">72</a>]</sup>
2236 </p><p>
2237 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many thousands
2238 of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay for the content they
2239 have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree the harm caused by such
2240 taking. Extremists in this debate love to say, "You wouldn't go into Barnes
2241 &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf without paying; why should it
2242 be any different with on-line music?" The difference is, of course, that
2243 when you take a book from Barnes &amp; Noble, it has one less book to
2244 sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3 from a computer network, there is
2245 not one less CD that can be sold.  The physics of piracy of the intangible
2246 are different from the physics of piracy of the tangible.
2247 </p><p>
2248
2249 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a property
2250 right of a very special sort, it <span class="emphasis"><em>is</em></span> a property
2251 right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to
2252 decide the terms under which content is shared. If the copyright owner
2253 doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important
2254 statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish
2255 of the copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
2256 copyrighted content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
2257 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is wrong to
2258 take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have a property
2259 system, and that system is properly balanced to the technology of a time,
2260 then it is wrong to take property without the permission of a property
2261 owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
2262 </p><p>
2263 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
2264 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal" Windows,
2265 that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.  Microsoft loses the value of
2266 the software that was taken. But it gains users who are used to life in the
2267 Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation grows more wealthy, more and more
2268 people will buy software rather than steal it. And hence over time, because
2269 that buying will benefit Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If
2270 instead of pirating Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux
2271 operating system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
2272 Microsoft.  Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2755878"></a>
2273 </p><p>
2274 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
2275 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law students,
2276 for example, are given free access to the two largest legal databases. The
2277 companies marketing both hope the students will become so used to their
2278 service that they will want to use it and not the other when they become
2279 lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
2280 </p><p>
2281 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the alcoholic
2282 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will make it
2283 more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we ordinarily allow
2284 businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give their product
2285 away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can
2286 give its product away, as it did, for example, with Internet Explorer to
2287 fight Netscape. A property right means giving the property owner the right
2288 to say who gets access to what&#8212;at least ordinarily. And if the law
2289 properly balances the rights of the copyright owner with the rights of
2290 access, then violating the law is still wrong.
2291 </p><p>
2292
2293
2294 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy, and I
2295 certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts at
2296 justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy is
2297 rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it steals; it
2298 doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives someone access
2299 to something that the law says he should not have.  Nothing has changed to
2300 draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy is flat out wrong.
2301 </p><p>
2302 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
2303 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or at
2304 least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the way it is
2305 increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful and productive,
2306 to produce either new content or new ways of doing business.  Neither our
2307 tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all "piracy" in that sense of
2308 the term.
2309 </p><p>
2310 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest piracy
2311 concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we need to
2312 understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before we condemn it
2313 to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
2314 </p><p>
2315 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
2316 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
2317 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable TV, no
2318 one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
2319 </p><p>
2320 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They should push
2321 us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this sharing to survive.
2322 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Piracy II"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="piracy-ii"></a>Piracy II</h3></div></div></div><p>
2323
2324 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s] the
2325 author of [his] profit."<sup>[<a name="id2755973" href="#ftn.id2755973" class="footnote">73</a>]</sup> This means we
2326 must determine whether and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how
2327 strongly the law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to
2328 assure the author of his profit.
2329 </p><p>
2330 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of the
2331 Napster technology had not made any major technological innovations.  Like
2332 every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and, arguably, off the
2333 Internet as well<sup>[<a name="id2755996" href="#ftn.id2755996" class="footnote">74</a>]</sup>), Shawn Fanning and
2334 crew had simply put together components that had been developed
2335 independently.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2756026"></a>
2336 </p><p>
2337 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999, Napster
2338 amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After eighteen months,
2339 there were close to 80 million registered users of the system.<sup>[<a name="id2756039" href="#ftn.id2756039" class="footnote">75</a>]</sup> Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other
2340 services emerged to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p
2341 service. It boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are
2342 different architecturally, though not very different in function: Each
2343 enables users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
2344 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&#8212;
2345 or your 20,000 best friends.
2346 </p><p>
2347 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans have
2348 tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in September 2002
2349 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded music&#8212;28 percent of
2350 Americans older than 12.<sup>[<a name="id2756074" href="#ftn.id2756074" class="footnote">76</a>]</sup> A survey by
2351 the NPD group quoted in <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em> estimated
2352 that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to exchange content in
2353 May 2003.<sup>[<a name="id2756103" href="#ftn.id2756103" class="footnote">77</a>]</sup> The vast majority of these
2354 are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive quantity of content is
2355 being "taken" on these networks. The ease and inexpensiveness of
2356 file-sharing networks have inspired millions to enjoy music in a way that
2357 they hadn't before.
2358 </p><p>
2359 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
2360 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright infringement,
2361 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more complicated than one
2362 might think. So consider&#8212;a bit more carefully than the polarized
2363 voices around this debate usually do&#8212;the kinds of sharing that file
2364 sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
2365 </p><p>
2366
2367
2368 Fildelerne deler ulike typer innhold.  Vi kan derel disse ulike typene inn i
2369 fire typer.
2370 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="A"><li class="listitem"><p>
2371
2372 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
2373 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying the CD,
2374 these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether everyone who
2375 takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't make it available
2376 for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who
2377 would.  The latter are the target of category A: users who download instead
2378 of purchasing.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2756164"></a>
2379 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2380
2381
2382 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before purchasing
2383 it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist he's not heard
2384 of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This is a kind of
2385 targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed.  If the friend recommending
2386 the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation, then one could expect
2387 that the recommendations will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
2388 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
2389 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2390
2391
2392 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted content
2393 that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased because the
2394 transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of sharing networks is
2395 among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were part of your childhood
2396 but have long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on the
2397 network. (One friend told me that when she discovered Napster, she spent a
2398 solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She was astonished at the range and mix
2399 of content that was available.)  For content not sold, this is still
2400 technically a violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is
2401 not selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&#8212;the same
2402 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to a
2403 local collector.
2404 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2405
2406
2407
2408
2409 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access to content
2410 that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner wants to give away.
2411 </p></li></ol></div><p>
2412 Hvordan balanserer disse ulike delingstypene?
2413 </p><p>
2414 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the perspective of
2415 the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the perspective of
2416 economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<sup>[<a name="id2756233" href="#ftn.id2756233" class="footnote">78</a>]</sup> Type B sharing is illegal but plainly
2417 beneficial. Type C sharing is illegal, yet good for society (since more
2418 exposure to music is good)  and harmless to the artist (since the work is
2419 not otherwise available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard
2420 question to answer&#8212;and certainly much more difficult than the current
2421 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
2422 </p><p>
2423 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how harmful
2424 type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood, composers
2425 complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained about radio, and
2426 broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music industry complains that
2427 type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is "devastating" the industry.
2428 </p><p>
2429 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how harmful is harder
2430 to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's practice to blame
2431 technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette recording is a
2432 good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young put it, "Rather
2433 than exploiting this new, popular technology, the labels fought
2434 it."<sup>[<a name="id2756277" href="#ftn.id2756277" class="footnote">79</a>]</sup> The labels claimed that every
2435 album taped was an album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent
2436 in 1981, the industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
2437 problem, and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
2438 </p><p>
2439 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity to enact
2440 regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record turnaround. "In
2441 the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was not the fault of the
2442 tapers&#8212;who did not [stop after MTV came into being]&#8212;but had to a
2443 large extent resulted from stagnation in musical innovation at the major
2444 labels."<sup>[<a name="id2756324" href="#ftn.id2756324" class="footnote">80</a>]</sup>
2445 </p><p>
2446 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is wrong
2447 today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to the industry
2448 in particular, and society in general&#8212;or at least the society that
2449 inherits the tradition that gave us the film industry, the record industry,
2450 the radio industry, cable TV, and the VCR&#8212;the question is not simply
2451 whether type A sharing is harmful. The question is also
2452 <span class="emphasis"><em>how</em></span> harmful type A sharing is, and how beneficial the
2453 other types of sharing are.
2454 </p><p>
2455 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
2456 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.  The
2457 "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type A sharing
2458 exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records through sampling
2459 than they lost through substitution, then sharing networks would actually
2460 benefit music companies on balance. They would therefore have little
2461 <span class="emphasis"><em>static</em></span> reason to resist them.
2462
2463 </p><p>
2464 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because of file
2465 sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales actually suggest
2466 it might be close.
2467 </p><p>
2468 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent, from 882
2469 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<sup>[<a name="id2756380" href="#ftn.id2756380" class="footnote">81</a>]</sup> This confirms a trend over the past few years. The
2470 RIAA blames Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other
2471 causes that could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a
2472 more than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
2473 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
2474 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average price
2475 of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<sup>[<a name="id2756424" href="#ftn.id2756424" class="footnote">82</a>]</sup> Competition from other forms of media could also
2476 account for some of the decline. As Jane Black of
2477 <em class="citetitle">BusinessWeek</em> notes, "The soundtrack to the film
2478 <em class="citetitle">High Fidelity</em> has a list price of $18.98. You could
2479 get the whole movie [on DVD] for $19.99."<sup>[<a name="id2756457" href="#ftn.id2756457" class="footnote">83</a>]</sup>
2480 </p><p>
2481
2482
2483
2484 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales is
2485 because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period that the
2486 RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA estimates that 2.1
2487 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus, although 2.6 times the total
2488 number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7
2489 percent.
2490 </p><p>
2491 There are too many different things happening at the same time to explain
2492 these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable: The recording
2493 industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between downloading a song
2494 and stealing a CD?"&#8212;but their own numbers reveal the difference. If I
2495 steal a CD, then there is one less CD to sell. Every taking is a lost
2496 sale. But on the basis of the numbers the RIAA provides, it is absolutely
2497 clear that the same is not true of downloads. If every download were a lost
2498 sale&#8212;if every use of Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his]
2499 profit"&#8212;then the industry would have suffered a 100 percent drop in
2500 sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold
2501 were downloaded for free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent,
2502 then there is a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a
2503 CD."
2504 </p><p>
2505 These are the harms&#8212;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's assume,
2506 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the recording
2507 industry. What value does it produce in addition to these costs?
2508 </p><p>
2509 One benefit is type C sharing&#8212;making available content that is
2510 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially available.
2511 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of tracks that
2512 are no longer commercially available.<sup>[<a name="id2756480" href="#ftn.id2756480" class="footnote">84</a>]</sup>
2513 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
2514 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
2515 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
2516 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic sense
2517 <span class="emphasis"><em>to the company</em></span> to make it available.
2518 </p><p>
2519 In real space&#8212;long before the Internet&#8212;the market had a simple
2520 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are thousands
2521 of used book and used record stores in America today.<sup>[<a name="id2756537" href="#ftn.id2756537" class="footnote">85</a>]</sup> These stores buy content from owners, then sell the
2522 content they buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell
2523 this content, <span class="emphasis"><em>even if the content is still under
2524 copyright</em></span>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used book and
2525 record stores are commercial entities; their owners make money from the
2526 content they sell; but as with cable companies before statutory licensing,
2527 they don't have to pay the copyright owner for the content they sell.
2528 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2756584"></a><p>
2529 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used record
2530 stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the content
2531 available isn't making money from making the content available.  It is also
2532 different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a record, I don't
2533 have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone shares my 1949 recording
2534 of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs," I still have it. That difference would
2535 matter economically if the owner of the copyright were selling the record in
2536 competition to my sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that
2537 is not currently commercially available. The Internet is making it
2538 available, through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
2539 </p><p>
2540 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
2541 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may well
2542 be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
2543 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
2544 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be shut as
2545 well?
2546 </p><p>
2547
2548 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable type D
2549 sharing to occur&#8212;the sharing of content that copyright owners want to
2550 have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This sharing
2551 clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author Cory Doctorow,
2552 for example, released his first novel, <em class="citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
2553 Kingdom</em>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
2554 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
2555 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read part
2556 on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If they liked
2557 it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is type D
2558 content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then both he and
2559 society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a great book!)
2560 </p><p>
2561 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society with
2562 no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem of type A
2563 sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we lose something
2564 important in order to protect type A content.
2565 </p><p>
2566 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry understandably
2567 says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask, "How much has society
2568 gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies? What is the content that
2569 otherwise would be unavailable?"
2570 </p><p>
2571 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter, much
2572 of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good.  And
2573 like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of this piracy is motivated
2574 by a new way of spreading content caused by changes in the technology of
2575 distribution. Thus, consistent with the tradition that gave us Hollywood,
2576 radio, the recording industry, and cable TV, the question we should be
2577 asking about file sharing is how best to preserve its benefits while
2578 minimizing (to the extent possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The
2579 question is one of balance. The law should seek that balance, and that
2580 balance will be found only with time.
2581 </p><p>
2582 Men er ikke krigen bare en krig mot ulovlig deling?  Er ikke angrepsmålet
2583 bare det du kaller type A-deling?
2584 </p><p>
2585 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The effect of
2586 the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far beyond that
2587 one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the Napster case
2588 itself. When Napster told the district court that it had developed a
2589 technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified infringing
2590 material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4 percent was not
2591 good enough. Napster had to push the infringements "down to
2592 zero."<sup>[<a name="id2756687" href="#ftn.id2756687" class="footnote">86</a>]</sup>
2593 </p><p>
2594 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
2595 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to assure
2596 that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance with the
2597 law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of VCRs or 100
2598 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns are used in compliance
2599 with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.  The court's ruling means that
2600 we as a society must lose the benefits of p2p, even for the totally legal
2601 and beneficial uses they serve, simply to assure that there are zero
2602 copyright infringements caused by p2p.
2603 </p><p>
2604 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the content
2605 industry that we know today. The history of American law has been a process
2606 of balance. As new technologies changed the way content was distributed, the
2607 law adjusted, after some time, to the new technology.  In this adjustment,
2608 the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights of creators while protecting
2609 innovation. Sometimes this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes
2610 less.
2611 </p><p>
2612 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the interests
2613 of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers against the
2614 interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to composers, but
2615 also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but at a price set
2616 by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the recordings made by
2617 these recording artists, and they complained to Congress that their
2618 "creative property" was not being respected (since the radio station did not
2619 have to pay them for the creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their
2620 claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
2621 </p><p>
2622 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts rejected the
2623 claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content they rebroadcast,
2624 Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to compensation, but at a
2625 level set by the law. It likewise gave cable companies the right to the
2626 content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
2627 </p><p>
2628
2629
2630
2631 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player pianos,
2632 served two important goals&#8212;indeed, the two central goals of any
2633 copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators would have
2634 the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.  Second, the law assured
2635 that copyright holders would be paid for the content that was
2636 distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply required cable TV to pay
2637 copyright holders whatever they demanded for their content, then copyright
2638 holders associated with broadcasters would use their power to stifle this
2639 new technology, cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use
2640 broadcasters' content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized
2641 cable. Thus Congress chose a path that would assure
2642 <span class="emphasis"><em>compensation</em></span> without giving the past (broadcasters)
2643 control over the future (cable).
2644 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2756784"></a><p>
2645 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major producers and
2646 distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another technology, the
2647 video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today, VCRs) that Sony had
2648 produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's claim against Sony was
2649 relatively simple: Sony produced a device, Disney and Universal claimed,
2650 that enabled consumers to engage in copyright infringement. Because the
2651 device that Sony built had a "record" button, the device could be used to
2652 record copyrighted movies and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the
2653 copyright infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
2654 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
2655 </p><p>
2656
2657 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did decide to
2658 design its machine to make it very simple to record television shows. It
2659 could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct copying from a
2660 television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the machine to copy
2661 only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the line. It was clear that
2662 there were many television shows that did not grant anyone permission to
2663 copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no doubt the majority of shows would not
2664 have authorized copying. And in the face of this obvious preference, Sony
2665 could have designed its system to minimize the opportunity for copyright
2666 infringement. It did not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold
2667 it responsible for the architecture it chose.
2668 </p><p>
2669 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal champion. Valenti
2670 called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are 20, 30, 40 million of
2671 these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by millions of `tapeworms,'
2672 eating away at the very heart and essence of the most precious asset the
2673 copyright owner has, his copyright."<sup>[<a name="id2756832" href="#ftn.id2756832" class="footnote">87</a>]</sup>
2674 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and creative
2675 judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation on the
2676 after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of tapings that
2677 will adversely impact on the future of the creative community in this
2678 country. It is simply a question of basic economics and plain common
2679 sense."<sup>[<a name="id2756849" href="#ftn.id2756849" class="footnote">88</a>]</sup> Indeed, as surveys would later
2680 show, percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or
2681 more<sup>[<a name="id2756859" href="#ftn.id2756859" class="footnote">89</a>]</sup> &#8212; a use the Court would
2682 later hold was not "fair." By "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the
2683 means of an exemption from copyright infringementwithout creating a
2684 mechanism to compensate copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would
2685 "take from the owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive
2686 right to control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and
2687 thereby profit from its reproduction."<sup>[<a name="id2756767" href="#ftn.id2756767" class="footnote">90</a>]</sup>
2688 </p><p>
2689 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme Court. In
2690 the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Hollywood in
2691 its jurisdiction&#8212;leading Judge Alex Kozinski, who sits on that court,
2692 refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&#8212;held that Sony would be liable
2693 for the copyright infringement made possible by its machines. Under the
2694 Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar technology&#8212;which Jack
2695 Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry"
2696 (worse yet, it was a <span class="emphasis"><em>Japanese</em></span> Boston Strangler of the
2697 American film industry)&#8212;was an illegal technology.<sup>[<a name="id2756893" href="#ftn.id2756893" class="footnote">91</a>]</sup>
2698 </p><p>
2699
2700 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.  And in
2701 its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of when and
2702 whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the Court wrote,
2703 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2704 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
2705 Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
2706 copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the
2707 institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
2708 competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
2709 technology.<sup>[<a name="id2756938" href="#ftn.id2756938" class="footnote">92</a>]</sup>
2710 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2711 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.  But as with
2712 the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress ignored the
2713 request. Congress was convinced that American film got enough, this "taking"
2714 notwithstanding.  If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
2715 </p><div class="table"><a name="t1"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 2.1. Tabell</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Tabell" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char">CASE</th><th align="char">WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</th><th align="char">RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</th><th align="char">RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Innspillinger</td><td align="char">Komponister</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Statutory license</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Radio</td><td align="char">Innspillingsartister</td><td align="char">N/A</td><td align="char">Ingenting</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Kabel-TV</td><td align="char">Kringkastere</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Statutory license</td></tr><tr><td align="char">VCR</td><td align="char">Filmskapere</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Ingenting</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
2716 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the way
2717 content was distributed.<sup>[<a name="id2757067" href="#ftn.id2757067" class="footnote">93</a>]</sup> In each case,
2718 throughout our history, that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on
2719 someone else's work.
2720 </p><p>
2721
2722 In <span class="emphasis"><em>none</em></span> of these cases did either the courts or
2723 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <span class="emphasis"><em>none</em></span> of these
2724 cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should assure that the
2725 copyright holder get all the value that his copyright created. In every
2726 case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy." In every case, Congress
2727 acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in the behavior of the "pirates."
2728 In each case, Congress allowed some new technology to benefit from content
2729 made before. It balanced the interests at stake.
2730
2731 </p><p>
2732 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that make up
2733 the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes sense. Was Walt
2734 Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators had to ask
2735 permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and spread images as
2736 a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better regulated? Is it
2737 really right that building a search engine should expose you to $15 million
2738 in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had controlled film? Should
2739 every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get permission to record a song?
2740 </p><p>
2741 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition has
2742 answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated, copyright
2743 "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible
2744 uses of his work."<sup>[<a name="id2757155" href="#ftn.id2757155" class="footnote">94</a>]</sup> Instead, the
2745 particular uses that the law regulates have been defined by balancing the
2746 good that comes from granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an
2747 exclusive right creates. And this balancing has historically been done
2748 <span class="emphasis"><em>after</em></span> a technology has matured, or settled into the mix
2749 of technologies that facilitate the distribution of content.
2750 </p><p>
2751 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the Internet is
2752 changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet (wires
2753 vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network should not
2754 become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should the law become
2755 a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists (or more accurately,
2756 distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail in the last chapter of
2757 this book, we should be securing income to artists while we allow the market
2758 to secure the most efficient way to promote and distribute content. This
2759 will require changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes
2760 should be designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
2761 public interest that innovation continue.
2762 </p><p>
2763
2764
2765 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly superior mode
2766 of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies can be ideally
2767 efficient in moving content across a widely diverse network.  Left to
2768 develop, they could make the network vastly more efficient.  Yet these
2769 "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in <em class="citetitle">The New
2770 York Times</em>, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<sup>[<a name="id2757206" href="#ftn.id2757206" class="footnote">95</a>]</sup> Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the
2771 copyright warriors raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about
2772 balance and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our
2773 content," the warriors insist, "is our <span class="emphasis"><em>property</em></span>. Why
2774 should we wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have
2775 to wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
2776 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask
2777 whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
2778 </p><p>
2779 "It is <span class="emphasis"><em>our property</em></span>," the warriors insist. "And it
2780 should be protected just as any other property is protected."
2781 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2751872" href="#id2751872" class="para">15</a>] </sup>
2782
2783
2784 <em class="citetitle">Bach</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Longman</em>, 98
2785 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
2786 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2751999" href="#id2751999" class="para">16</a>] </sup>
2787
2788
2789 Se Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
2790 Pepsi Generation," <em class="citetitle">Notre Dame Law Review</em> 65 (1990):
2791 397.
2792 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2752019" href="#id2752019" class="para">17</a>] </sup>
2793
2794 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay Up,"
2795 <em class="citetitle">Wall Street Journal</em>, 21. august 1996, tilgjengelig
2796 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #3</a>; Jonathan
2797 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
2798 Speech, No One Wins," <em class="citetitle">Boston Globe</em>, 24. november
2799 2002.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2752037"></a>
2800 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2752111" href="#id2752111" class="para">18</a>] </sup>
2801
2802 I <em class="citetitle">The Rise of the Creative Class</em> (New York: Basic
2803 Books, 2002), dokumenterer Richard Florida en endring i arbeidsstokken mot
2804 kreativitetsarbeide.  Hans tekst omhandler derimot ikke direkte de juridiske
2805 vilkår som kreativiteten blir muliggjort eller hindret under.  Jeg er helt
2806 klart enig med ham i viktigheten og betydningen av denne endringen, men jeg
2807 tror også at vilkårene som disse endringene blir aktivert under er mye
2808 vanskeligere.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2752166"></a>
2809 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2752278" href="#id2752278" class="para">19</a>] </sup>
2810
2811
2812 Leonard Maltin, <em class="citetitle">Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
2813 Cartoons</em> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&#8211;35.
2814 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2752369" href="#id2752369" class="para">20</a>] </sup>
2815
2816
2817 Jeg er takknemlig overfor David Gerstein og hans nøyaktige historie,
2818 beskrevet på <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #4</a>.  I
2819 følge Dave Smith ved the Disney Archives, betalte Disney for å bruke
2820 musikken til fem sanger i <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Willie</em>:
2821 "Steamboat Bill," "The Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara),
2822 "Joyful Hurry No. 1" (Baron), og "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). En sjette sang, "The
2823 Turkey in the Straw," var allerede allemannseie.  Brev fra David Smith til
2824 Harry Surden, 10. juli 2003, tilgjenglig i arkivet til forfatteren.
2825 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2752416" href="#id2752416" class="para">21</a>] </sup>
2826
2827
2828 Han var også tilhenger av allmannseiet. Se Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse that
2829 Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5. mars 2002, fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #5</a>.
2830 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2752558" href="#id2752558" class="para">22</a>] </sup>
2831
2832
2833 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
2834 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
2835 determining the weighted average of total registrations for any particular
2836 year, and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in
2837 year 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
2838 average term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data,
2839 see the Web site associated with this book, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #6</a>.
2840 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2752683" href="#id2752683" class="para">23</a>] </sup>
2841
2842
2843 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <em class="citetitle">Reinventing
2844 Comics</em> (New York: Perennial, 2000).
2845 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2752790" href="#id2752790" class="para">24</a>] </sup>
2846
2847
2848 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All
2849 the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" <em class="citetitle">Rutgers Law
2850 Review</em> 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective
2851 economic rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo
2852 bringing legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
2853 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their individual
2854 self-interest and decide not to press their legal rights. This is
2855 essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
2856 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2752865" href="#id2752865" class="para">25</a>] </sup>
2857
2858 The term <em class="citetitle">intellectual property</em> is of relatively
2859 recent origin. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
2860 Copywrongs</em>, 11 (New York: New York University Press, 2001). See
2861 also Lawrence Lessig, <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em> (New York:
2862 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
2863 "property" rights&#8212;copyright, patents, trademark, and
2864 trade-secret&#8212;but the nature of those rights is very different.
2865 <a class="indexterm" name="id2752882"></a>
2866 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753088" href="#id2753088" class="para">26</a>] </sup>
2867
2868
2869 Reese V. Jenkins, <em class="citetitle">Images and Enterprise</em> (Baltimore:
2870 Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
2871 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753117" href="#id2753117" class="para">27</a>] </sup>
2872
2873 Brian Coe, <em class="citetitle">The Birth of Photography</em> (New York:
2874 Taplinger Publishing, 1977), 53.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2753125"></a>
2875 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753150" href="#id2753150" class="para">28</a>] </sup>
2876
2877
2878 Jenkins, 177.
2879 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753158" href="#id2753158" class="para">29</a>] </sup>
2880
2881
2882 Basert på et diagram i Jenkins, s. 178.
2883 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753186" href="#id2753186" class="para">30</a>] </sup>
2884
2885
2886 Coe, 58.
2887 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753232" href="#id2753232" class="para">31</a>] </sup>
2888
2889
2890 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <em class="citetitle">Pavesich</em>
2891 v. <em class="citetitle">N.E. Life Ins. Co</em>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
2892 <em class="citetitle">Foster-Milburn Co</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Chinn</em>,
2893 123090 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909); <em class="citetitle">Corliss</em>
2894 v. <em class="citetitle">Walker</em>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.  Dist. Ct. 1894).
2895 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753288" href="#id2753288" class="para">32</a>] </sup>
2896
2897 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
2898 <em class="citetitle">Harvard Law Review</em> 4 (1890): 193.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2753296"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2753305"></a>
2899 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753332" href="#id2753332" class="para">33</a>] </sup>
2900
2901
2902 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," <em class="citetitle">Law and
2903 Contemporary Problems</em> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser,
2904 "Privacy," <em class="citetitle">California Law Review</em> 48 (1960)
2905 398&#8211;407; <em class="citetitle">White</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Samsung
2906 Electronics America, Inc</em>., 971 F.  2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992),
2907 cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
2908 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753422" href="#id2753422" class="para">34</a>] </sup>
2909
2910
2911 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and Software You
2912 Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst, februar 2002,
2913 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #7</a>.
2914 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753472" href="#id2753472" class="para">35</a>] </sup>
2915
2916
2917 Judith Van Evra, <em class="citetitle">Television and Child Development</em>
2918 (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family
2919 and TV Study," <em class="citetitle">Denver Post</em>, 25 May 1997, B6.
2920 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753530" href="#id2753530" class="para">36</a>] </sup>
2921
2922 Intervju med Elizabeth Daley og Stephanie Barish, 13. desember 2002.
2923 <a class="indexterm" name="id2753538"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2753546"></a>
2924 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753562" href="#id2753562" class="para">37</a>] </sup>
2925
2926
2927 Se Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4. november
2928 2000, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
2929 #8</a>; "Timeline," 22. november 2000, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #9</a>.
2930 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753634" href="#id2753634" class="para">38</a>] </sup>
2931
2932 Intervju med Daley og Barish.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2753641"></a>
2933 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753652" href="#id2753652" class="para">39</a>] </sup>
2934
2935
2936 Ibid.
2937 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753860" href="#id2753860" class="para">40</a>] </sup>
2938
2939
2940 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <em class="citetitle">Democracy in
2941 America</em>, bk. 1, trans.  Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2942 2000), ch. 16.
2943 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753946" href="#id2753946" class="para">41</a>] </sup>
2944
2945
2946 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," <em class="citetitle">Journal of
2947 Political Philosophy</em> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2948 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753977" href="#id2753977" class="para">42</a>] </sup>
2949
2950
2951 Cass Sunstein, <em class="citetitle">Republic.com</em> (Princeton: Princeton
2952 University Press, 2001), 65&#8211;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2953 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754040" href="#id2754040" class="para">43</a>] </sup>
2954
2955
2956 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New York
2957 Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2958 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2753920" href="#id2753920" class="para">44</a>] </sup>
2959
2960
2961 Telefonintervju med David Winer, 16. april 2003.
2962 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754135" href="#id2754135" class="para">45</a>] </sup>
2963
2964
2965 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of Information
2966 Online," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2967 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
2968 Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #10</a>.
2969 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754166" href="#id2754166" class="para">46</a>] </sup>
2970
2971 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?"
2972 <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news
2973 organizations have been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a
2974 CNN correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war
2975 on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year
2976 Steve Olafson, a <em class="citetitle">Houston Chronicle</em> reporter, was
2977 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym, that
2978 dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")  <a class="indexterm" name="id2754197"></a>
2979 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754373" href="#id2754373" class="para">47</a>] </sup>
2980
2981
2982 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2983 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,"
2984 <em class="citetitle">Communications of the Association for Computer
2985 Machinery</em> 43 (2000): 9.
2986 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754605" href="#id2754605" class="para">48</a>] </sup>
2987
2988
2989
2990 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks: Suit
2991 Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," <em class="citetitle">Professional Media Group
2992 LCC</em> 6 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2993 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754670" href="#id2754670" class="para">49</a>] </sup>
2994
2995
2996 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2997 (27&#8211;2042&#8212;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2998 the Arts, <em class="citetitle">More Than One in a Blue Moon</em> (2000).
2999 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754685" href="#id2754685" class="para">50</a>] </sup>
3000
3001
3002 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
3003 <em class="citetitle">Wall Street Journal</em>, 10 September 2003, A24.
3004 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754762" href="#id2754762" class="para">51</a>] </sup>
3005
3006 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
3007 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
3008 Copywrongs</em>, 87&#8211;93, which details Edison's "adventures"
3009 with copyright and patent.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2754676"></a>
3010 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754820" href="#id2754820" class="para">52</a>] </sup>
3011
3012
3013 J. A. Aberdeen, <em class="citetitle">Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent
3014 Motion Picture Producers</em> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and
3015 expanded texts posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture
3016 Patents Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #11</a>. For a discussion of
3017 the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits imposed by
3018 Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3019 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright"
3020 (September 2002), University of Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in
3021 Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 159.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754873" href="#id2754873" class="para">53</a>] </sup>
3022
3023
3024 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," <em class="citetitle">The Silents
3025 Majority</em>, archived at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #12</a>.
3026 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754982" href="#id2754982" class="para">54</a>] </sup>
3027
3028
3029 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on S. 6330
3030 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th Cong. 59, 1st
3031 sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of South Dakota,
3032 chairman), reprinted in <em class="citetitle">Legislative History of the Copyright
3033 Act</em>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3034 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3035 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755005" href="#id2755005" class="para">55</a>] </sup>
3036
3037
3038 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223 (statement of
3039 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3040 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755016" href="#id2755016" class="para">56</a>] </sup>
3041
3042
3043 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226 (statement of
3044 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3045 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755027" href="#id2755027" class="para">57</a>] </sup>
3046
3047
3048 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23 (statement of
3049 John Philip Sousa, composer).
3050 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755044" href="#id2755044" class="para">58</a>] </sup>
3051
3052
3053
3054 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&#8211;84
3055 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music Perforating
3056 Company of New York).
3057 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755050" href="#id2755050" class="para">59</a>] </sup>
3058
3059
3060 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
3061 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3062 Graphophone Company Association).
3063 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2754786" href="#id2754786" class="para">60</a>] </sup>
3064
3065
3066
3067 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3068 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st sess.,
3069 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted in
3070 <em class="citetitle">Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</em>,
3071 E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman
3072 Reprints, 1976).
3073 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755193" href="#id2755193" class="para">61</a>] </sup>
3074
3075
3076 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee on
3077 the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8 March
3078 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to this report.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755230" href="#id2755230" class="para">62</a>] </sup>
3079
3080 See 17 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>, sections 106 and 110. At
3081 the beginning, record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast"
3082 and other messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3083 radio station.  Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning
3084 attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See
3085 <em class="citetitle">RCA Manufacturing
3086 Co</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Whiteman</em>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3087 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.  Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag:
3088 Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright,"
3089 <em class="citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review</em> 70 (2003): 281.
3090 <a class="indexterm" name="id2755255"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2755263"></a>
3091 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755409" href="#id2755409" class="para">63</a>] </sup>
3092
3093
3094 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3095 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
3096 on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)  (statement of Rosel
3097 H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3098 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755425" href="#id2755425" class="para">64</a>] </sup>
3099
3100
3101 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3102 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3103 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755442" href="#id2755442" class="para">65</a>] </sup>
3104
3105
3106 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3107 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3108 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755466" href="#id2755466" class="para">66</a>] </sup>
3109
3110
3111 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.  Krim,
3112 president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of United
3113 Artists Television, Inc.).
3114 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755484" href="#id2755484" class="para">67</a>] </sup>
3115
3116
3117 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 209 (vitnemål fra Charlton Heston,
3118 president i Screen Actors Guild).
3119 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755510" href="#id2755510" class="para">68</a>] </sup>
3120
3121 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.  Zimmerman,
3122 acting assistant attorney general).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2755489"></a>
3123 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755516" href="#id2755516" class="para">69</a>] </sup>
3124
3125
3126 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <em class="citetitle">The
3127 Engine of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&#8212;The Myth of Free
3128 Information</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #13</a>. "The threat of
3129 piracy&#8212;the use of someone else's creative work without permission or
3130 compensation&#8212;has grown with the Internet."
3131 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755593" href="#id2755593" class="para">70</a>] </sup>
3132
3133
3134 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
3135 <em class="citetitle">The Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</em>,
3136 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3137 #14</a>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3138 <em class="citetitle">Financial Times</em>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3139 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755724" href="#id2755724" class="para">71</a>] </sup>
3140
3141 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3142 <em class="citetitle">Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?</em> (New York: The New
3143 Press, 2003), 10&#8211;13, 209.  The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
3144 Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create
3145 administrative and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights,
3146 a costly proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights
3147 may lead to higher prices for staple industries such as agriculture. Critics
3148 of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens imposed upon developing
3149 countries and benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does
3150 permit governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3151 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may be
3152 able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3153 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS
3154 framework.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2755051"></a>
3155 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755783" href="#id2755783" class="para">72</a>] </sup>
3156
3157 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3158 Liebowitz, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy</em> (New York:
3159 Amacom, 2002), 144&#8211;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy
3160 on the copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3161 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3162 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if pirating
3163 were not an option." Ibid., 149.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2755733"></a>
3164 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755973" href="#id2755973" class="para">73</a>] </sup>
3165
3166
3167 <em class="citetitle">Bach</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Longman</em>, 98
3168 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3169 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2755996" href="#id2755996" class="para">74</a>] </sup>
3170
3171 See Clayton M. Christensen, <em class="citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
3172 Revolutionary National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do
3173 Business</em> (New York: HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen
3174 examines why companies that give rise to and dominate a product area are
3175 frequently unable to come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses
3176 for their own products.  This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3177 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3178 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <em class="citetitle">Future</em>,
3179 89&#8211;92, 139.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2755792"></a>
3180 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756039" href="#id2756039" class="para">75</a>] </sup>
3181
3182
3183 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3184 <em class="citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle</em>, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock
3185 'n' Roll Suicide," <em class="citetitle">New Scientist</em>, 6 July 2002, 42;
3186 Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO, Secures New Financing,"
3187 <em class="citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle</em>, 23 May 2003, C1; "Napster's
3188 Wake-Up Call," <em class="citetitle">Economist</em>, 24 June 2000, 23; John
3189 Naughton, "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London)
3190 <em class="citetitle">Times</em>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3191 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756074" href="#id2756074" class="para">76</a>] </sup>
3192
3193
3194
3195 See Ipsos-Insight, <em class="citetitle">TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music
3196 Distribution</em> (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of
3197 Americans aged twelve and older have downloaded music off of the Internet
3198 and 30 percent have listened to digital music files stored on their
3199 computers.
3200 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756103" href="#id2756103" class="para">77</a>] </sup>
3201
3202
3203 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," <em class="citetitle">New
3204 York Times</em>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3205 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756233" href="#id2756233" class="para">78</a>] </sup>
3206
3207 See Liebowitz, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy</em>,
3208 148&#8211;49.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2756014"></a>
3209 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756277" href="#id2756277" class="para">79</a>] </sup>
3210
3211
3212 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <em class="citetitle">Technology Evolution and the
3213 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</em> (2003), 3. This report
3214 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding practice of
3215 cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a
3216 cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping is killing music." At the
3217 time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical Assessment
3218 conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers
3219 older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.  Congress, Office
3220 of Technology Assessment, <em class="citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying: Technology
3221 Challenges the Law</em>, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3222 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&#8211;56.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756324" href="#id2756324" class="para">80</a>] </sup>
3223
3224
3225 U.S. Congress, <em class="citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying</em>, 4.
3226 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756380" href="#id2756380" class="para">81</a>] </sup>
3227
3228
3229 See Recording Industry Association of America, <em class="citetitle">2002 Yearend
3230 Statistics</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #15</a>. A later report
3231 indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry Association of
3232 America, <em class="citetitle">Some Facts About Music Piracy</em>, 25 June 2003,
3233 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #16</a>:
3234 "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music have fallen by 26
3235 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million units in 2002 in the
3236 United States (based on units shipped).  In terms of sales, revenues are
3237 down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6 billion last year (based on
3238 U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music industry worldwide has gone from
3239 a $39 billion industry in 2000 down to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based
3240 on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3241 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756424" href="#id2756424" class="para">82</a>] </sup>
3242 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13. februar
3243 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3244 #17</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2756438"></a>
3245 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756457" href="#id2756457" class="para">83</a>] </sup>
3246
3247
3248 Ibid.
3249 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756480" href="#id2756480" class="para">84</a>] </sup>
3250
3251
3252 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3253 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&#8212;Coming
3254 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
3255 the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared statement of
3256 the Future of Music Coalition), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #18</a>.
3257 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756537" href="#id2756537" class="para">85</a>] </sup>
3258
3259
3260 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3261 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3262 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <em class="citetitle">The
3263 Quiet Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</em> (2002),
3264 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3265 #19</a>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3266 National Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3267 Results," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3268 #20</a>.
3269 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756687" href="#id2756687" class="para">86</a>] </sup>
3270
3271
3272 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34- 35
3273 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183 MHP, available at
3274 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #21</a>. For an account
3275 of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn, <em class="citetitle">All
3276 the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</em> (New
3277 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&#8211;82.
3278 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756832" href="#id2756832" class="para">87</a>] </sup>
3279
3280
3281 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on S. 1758
3282 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess.,
3283 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion Picture Association
3284 of America, Inc.).
3285 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756849" href="#id2756849" class="para">88</a>] </sup>
3286
3287
3288 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
3289 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756859" href="#id2756859" class="para">89</a>] </sup>
3290
3291
3292 <em class="citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Sony
3293 Corp. of America</em>, 480 F. Supp. 429, (C.D. Cal., 1979).
3294 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756767" href="#id2756767" class="para">90</a>] </sup>
3295
3296
3297 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony of Jack
3298 Valenti).
3299 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756893" href="#id2756893" class="para">91</a>] </sup>
3300
3301
3302 <em class="citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Sony
3303 Corp. of America</em>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.  1981).
3304 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2756938" href="#id2756938" class="para">92</a>] </sup>
3305
3306
3307 <em class="citetitle">Sony Corp. of America</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Universal City
3308 Studios, Inc</em>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
3309 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757067" href="#id2757067" class="para">93</a>] </sup>
3310
3311 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
3312 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example, was
3313 regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy Congress
3314 imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and controlling the
3315 technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (Title 17 of the
3316 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
3317 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
3318 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
3319 Lessig, <em class="citetitle">Future</em>, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to
3320 the Broadcast Flag," <em class="citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review</em>
3321 70 (2003): 293&#8211;96.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2756710"></a>
3322 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757155" href="#id2757155" class="para">94</a>] </sup>
3323
3324
3325 <em class="citetitle">Sony Corp. of America</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Universal City
3326 Studios, Inc</em>., 464 U.S. 417, (1984).
3327 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757206" href="#id2757206" class="para">95</a>] </sup>
3328
3329
3330 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software Echoes Past
3331 Efforts," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 22 September 2003, C3.
3332 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 3. "Eiendom"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-property"></a>Kapittel 3. "Eiendom"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><p>
3333
3334
3335
3336 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of property. It can
3337 be owned and sold, and the law protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the
3338 copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the
3339 supply and demand that partially determine the price she can get.
3340 </p><p>
3341 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a bit
3342 misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
3343 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
3344 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you put in
3345 your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I take it,
3346 you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
3347 <span class="emphasis"><em>idea</em></span> you had to put a picnic table in the
3348 backyard&#8212;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a table, and putting
3349 it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking then?
3350 </p><p>
3351 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus ideas,
3352 though that's an important difference. The point instead is that in the
3353 ordinary case&#8212;indeed, in practically every case except for a narrow
3354 range of exceptions&#8212;ideas released to the world are free. I don't take
3355 anything from you when I copy the way you dress&#8212;though I might seem
3356 weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
3357 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true when I
3358 copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea from me,
3359 receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
3360 taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<sup>[<a name="id2757278" href="#ftn.id2757278" class="footnote">96</a>]</sup>
3361 </p><p>
3362 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the reach of the
3363 law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that I won't discuss
3364 here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or expression without my
3365 permission: The law turns the intangible into property.
3366 </p><p>
3367 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&#8212;the details, in other
3368 words&#8212;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of turning the
3369 intangible into property emerged, we need to place this "property" in its
3370 proper context.<sup>[<a name="id2757323" href="#ftn.id2757323" class="footnote">97</a>]</sup>
3371 </p><p>
3372 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the preceding
3373 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright material is
3374 property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are its limits? How
3375 does it function in practice? After these stories, the significance of this
3376 true statement&#8212;"copyright material is property"&#8212; will be a bit
3377 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different from
3378 the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
3379 </p><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="founders"></a>Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</h2></div></div></div><p>
3380 William Shakespeare skrev <em class="citetitle">Romeo og Julie</em> i
3381 1595. Skuespillet ble først utgitt i 1597. Det var det ellevte store
3382 skuespillet Shakespeare hadde skrevet. Han fortsatte å skrive skuespill helt
3383 til 1613, og stykkene han skrevhar fortsatt å definere angloamerikansk
3384 kultur siden. Så dypt har verkene av en 1500-talls forfatter sunket inn i
3385 vår kultur at vi ofte ikke engang kjenner kilden. Jeg overhørte en gang noen
3386 som kommentere Kenneth Branaghs utgave av Henry V: "Jeg likte det, men
3387 Shakespeare er så full av klisjeer."
3388 </p><p>
3389
3390 I 1774, nesten 180 år etter at <em class="citetitle">Romeo og Julie</em> ble
3391 skrevet, mente mange at "opphavsretten" kun tilhørte én eneste utgiver i
3392 London, John Tonson. <sup>[<a name="id2757398" href="#ftn.id2757398" class="footnote">98</a>]</sup> Tonson var den
3393 mest fremstående av en liten gruppe utgivere kalt "the Conger"<sup>[<a name="id2757428" href="#ftn.id2757428" class="footnote">99</a>]</sup>, som kontrollerte boksalget i England gjennom hele
3394 1700-tallet. The Conger hevdet at de hadde en evigvarende rett over "kopier"
3395 av bøker de hadde fått av forfatterne. Denne evigvarende retten innebar at
3396 ingen andre kunne publisere kopier av disse bøkene. Slik ble prisen på
3397 klassiske bøker holdt oppe; alle konkurrenter som lagde bedre eller
3398 billigere utgaver, ble fjernet.
3399 </p><p>
3400 Men altså, det er noe spennende med året 1774 for alle som vet litt om
3401 opphavsretts-lovgivning. Det mest kjente året for opphavsrett er 1710, da
3402 det britiske parlamentet vedtok den første loven. Denne loven er kjent som
3403 "Statute of Anne" og sa at alle publiserte verk skulle være beskyttet i
3404 fjorten år, en periode som kunne fornyes én gang dersom forfatteren ennå
3405 levde, og at alle verk publisert i eller før 1710 skulle ha en ekstraperiode
3406 på 22 tillegsår.<sup>[<a name="id2757465" href="#ftn.id2757465" class="footnote">100</a>]</sup> På grunn av denne
3407 loven, så skulle <em class="citetitle">Rome og Julie</em> ha falt i det fri i
3408 1731. Hvordan kunne da Tonson fortsatt ha kontroll over verket i 1774?
3409 </p><p>
3410 Årsaken var ganske enkelt at engelskmennene ikke hadde bestemt hva
3411 opphavsrett innebar -- faktisk hadde ingen i verden det. På den tiden da
3412 engelskmennene vedtok "Statute of Anne", var det ingen annen lovgivning om
3413 opphavsrett. Den siste loven som regulerte utgivere var lisensieringsloven
3414 av 1662, utløpt i 1695. At loven ga utgiverne monopol over publiseringen,
3415 noe som gjorde det enklere for kronen å kontrollere hva ble publisert. Men
3416 etter at det har utløpt, var det ingen positiv lov som sa at utgiverne hadde
3417 en eksklusiv rett til å trykke bøker.
3418 </p><p>
3419 At det ikke fantes noen <span class="emphasis"><em>positiv</em></span> lov, betydde ikke at
3420 det ikke fantes noen lov. Den anglo-amerikanske juridiske tradisjon ser både
3421 til lover skapt av politikere (det lovgivende statsorgen)og til lover
3422 (prejudikater) skapt av domstolene for å bestemme hvordan folket skal
3423 leve. Vi kaller politikernes lover for positiv lov og vi kaller lovene fra
3424 dommerne sedvanerett."Common law" angir bakgrunnen for de lovgivendes
3425 lovgivning; retten til lovgiving, vanligvis kan trumfe at bakgrunnen bare
3426 hvis det går gjennom en lov til å forskyve den. Og så var det virkelige
3427 spørsmålet etter lisensiering lover hadde utløpt om felles lov beskyttet
3428 opphavsretten, uavhengig av lovverket positiv.
3429 </p><p>
3430
3431 Dette spørsmålet var viktig for utgiverne eller "bokselgere," som de ble
3432 kalt, fordi det var økende konkurranse fra utenlandske utgivere, Særlig fra
3433 Skottland hvor publiseringen og eksporten av bøker til England hadde økt
3434 veldig. Denne konkurransen reduserte fortjenesten til "The Conger", som
3435 derfor krevde at parlamentet igjen skulle vedta en lov for å gi dem
3436 eksklusiv kontroll over publisering. Dette kravet resulterte i "Statute of
3437 Anne".
3438 </p><p>
3439 "Statute of Anne" ga forfatteren eller "eieren" av en bok en eksklusiv rett
3440 til å publisere denne boken. Men det var, til bokhandernes forferdelse en
3441 viktig begrensning, nemlig hvor lenge denne retten skulle vare. Etter dette
3442 gikk trykkeretten bort og verket falt i det fri og kunne trykkes av hvem som
3443 helst. Det var ihvertfall det lovgiverne hadde tenkt.
3444 </p><p>
3445 Men nå det mest interessante med dette: Hvorfor ville parlamentet begrense
3446 trykkeretten? Sprøsmålet er ikke hvorfor de bestemte seg for denne perioden,
3447 men hvorfor ville de begrense retten <span class="emphasis"><em>i det hele tatt?</em></span>
3448 </p><p>
3449 Bokhandlerne, og forfatterne som de representerte, hadde et veldig sterkt
3450 krav. Ta <em class="citetitle">romeo og Julie</em> som et eksempel: Skuespillet
3451 ble skrevet av Shakespeare. Det var hans kreativitet som brakte det til
3452 verden. Han krenket ikke noens rett da han skrev dette verket (det er en
3453 kontroversiell påstanden, men det er urelevant), og med sin egen rett skapte
3454 han verket, han gjorde det ikke noe vanskeligere for andre til å lage
3455 skuespill. Så hvorfor skulle loven tillate at noen annen kunne komme og ta
3456 Shakespeares verkuten hans, eller hans arvingers, tillatelse? Hvilke grunner
3457 finnes for å tillate at noen "stjeler" Shakespeares verk?
3458 </p><p>
3459 Svaret er todel. Først må vi se på noe spesielt med oppfatningen av
3460 opphavsrett som fantes på tidspunktet da "Statute of Anne" ble
3461 vedtatt. Deretter må vi se på noe spesielt med bokhandlerne.
3462 </p><p>
3463
3464 Først om opphavsretten. I de siste tre hundre år har vi kommet til å bruke
3465 begrepet "copyright" i stadig videre forstand. Men i 1710 var det ikke så
3466 mye et konsept som det var en bestemt rett. Opphavsretten ble født som et
3467 svært spesifikt sett med begrensninger: den forbød andre å reprodusere en
3468 bok. I 1710 var "kopi-rett" en rett til å bruke en bestemt maskin til å
3469 replikere en bestemt arbeid. Den gikk ikke utover dette svært smale
3470 formålet. Den kontrollerte ikke mer generelt hvordan et verk kunne
3471 <span class="emphasis"><em>brukes</em></span>. Idag inkluderer retten en stor samling av
3472 restriksjoner på andres frihet: den gir forfatteren eksklusiv rett til å
3473 kopiere, eksklusiv rett til å distribuere, eksklusiv rett til å fremføre, og
3474 så videre.
3475 </p><p>
3476 Så selv om f. eks. opphavsretten til Shakespeares verker var evigvarende,
3477 betydde det under den opprinnelige betydningen av begrepet at ingen kunne
3478 trykke Shakespeares arbeid uten tillatelse fra Shakespeares arvinger. Den
3479 ville ikke ha kontrollert noe mer, for eksempel om hvordan verket kunne
3480 fremføres, om verket kunne oversettes eller om Kenneth Branagh ville hatt
3481 lov til å lage filmer. "Kopi-retten" var bare en eksklusiv rett til å
3482 trykke--ikke noe mindre, selvfølgelig, men heller ikke mer.
3483 </p><p>
3484 Selv dnne begrensede retten ble møtt med skepsis av britene. De hadde hatt
3485 en lang og stygg erfaring med "eksklusive rettigheter," spesielt "enerett"
3486 gitt av kronen. Engelskmennene hadde utkjempet en borgerkrig delvis mot
3487 kronens praksis med å dele ut monopoler--spesielt monopoler for verk som
3488 allerede eksisterte. Kong Henrik VIII hadde gitt patent til å trykke Bibelen
3489 og monopol til Darcy for å lage spillkort. Det engelske parlamentet begynte
3490 å kjempe tilbake mot denne makten hos kronen. I 1656 ble "Statute of
3491 Monopolis" vedtatt for å begrense monopolene på patenter for nye
3492 oppfinnelser. Og i 1710 var parlamentet ivrig etter å håndtere det voksende
3493 monopolet på publisering.
3494 </p><p>
3495 Dermed ble "kopi-retten", når den sees på som en monopolrett, en rettighet
3496 som bør være begrenset. (Uansett hvor overbevisende påstanden om at "det er
3497 min eiendom, og jeg skal ha for alltid," prøv hvor overbevisende det er når
3498 men sier "det er mitt monopol, og jeg skal ha det for alltid.") Staten ville
3499 beskytte eneretten, men bare så lenge det gavnet samfunnet. Britene så
3500 skadene særinteresserte kunne skape; de vedtok en lov for å stoppe dem.
3501 </p><p>
3502 Dernest, om bokhandlerne. Det var ikke bare at kopiretten var et
3503 monopol. Det var også et monopol holdt av bokhandlerne. En bokhandler høres
3504 greie og ufarlige ut for oss, men slik var det ikke i syttenhundretallets
3505 England. Medlemmene i "the Conger" ble av en voksende mengde sett på som
3506 monopolister av verste sort - et verktøy for kronens undertrykkelse, de
3507 solgte Englands frihet mot å være garantert en monopolskinntekt. Men
3508 monopolistene ble kvast kritisert: Milton beskrev dem som "gamle
3509 patentholdere og monopolister i bokhandlerkunsten"; de var "menn som derfor
3510 ikke hadde  et ærlig arbeide hvor utdanning er nødvendig."<sup>[<a name="id2757701" href="#ftn.id2757701" class="footnote">101</a>]</sup>
3511 </p><p>
3512 Mange trodde at den makten bokhandlerne utøvde over spredning av kunnskap,
3513 var til skade for selve spredningen, men på dette tidspunktet viste
3514 Opplysningen viktigheten av utdannelse og kunnskap for alle. idéen om at
3515 kunnskap burde være gratis er et kjennetegn for tiden, og disse kraftige
3516 kommersielle interesser forstyrret denne idéen.
3517 </p><p>
3518 For å balansere denne makten, besluttet Parlamentet å øke konkurransen blant
3519 bokhandlerne, og den enkleste måten å gjøre det på, var å spre mengden av
3520 verdifulle bøker. Parlamentet begrenset derfor begrepet om opphavsrett, og
3521 garantert slik at verdifulle bøker ville bli frie for alle utgiver å
3522 publisere etter en begrenset periode. Slik ble det å gi eksisterende verk en
3523 periode på tjueen år et kompromiss for å bekjempe bokhandlernes
3524 makt. Begrensninger med dato var en indirekte måte å skape konkurranse
3525 mellom utgivere, og slik en skapelse og spredning av kultur.
3526 </p><p>
3527 Når 1731 (1710+21) kom, ble bokhandlerne engstelige. De så konsekvensene av
3528 mer konkurranse, og som alle konkurrenter, likte de det ikke. Først
3529 ignorerte bokhandlere ganske enkelt "Statute of Anne", og fortsatte å kreve
3530 en evigvarende rett til å kontrollere publiseringen. Men i 1735 og 1737 de
3531 prøvde å tvinge Parlamentet til å utvide periodene. Tjueen år var ikke nok,
3532 sa de; de trengte mer tid.
3533 </p><p>
3534 Parlamentet avslo kravene, Som en pamflett sa, i en vending som levere ennå
3535 idag,
3536 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3537 Jeg ser ingen grunn til å gi en utvidet perioden nå som ikke ville kunne gi
3538 utvidelser om igjen og om igjen, så fort de gamle utgår; så dersom dette
3539 lovforslaget blir vedtatt, vil effekten være: at et evig monopol blir skapt,
3540 et stort nederlag for handelen, et angrep mot kunnskapen, ingen fordel for
3541 forfatterne, men en stor avgift for folket; og alt dette kun for å øke
3542 bokhandlernes personlige rikdom.<sup>[<a name="id2757779" href="#ftn.id2757779" class="footnote">102</a>]</sup>
3543 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3544 Etter å ha mislyktes i Parlamentet gikk utgiverne til rettssalen i en rekke
3545 saker. Deres argument var enkelt og direkte: "Statute of Anne" ga
3546 forfatterne en viss beskyttelse gjennom positiv loven, men denne
3547 beskyttelsenvar ikke ment som en erstatning for felles lov. Istedet var de
3548 ment å supplere felles lov. Ifølge sedvanerett var det galt å ta en annen
3549 persons kreative eiendom og bruke den uten hans tillatelse. "Statute of
3550 Anne", hevdet bokhandlere, endret ikke dette faktum. Derfor betydde ikke det
3551 at beskyttelsen gitt av "Statute of Anne" utløp, at beskyttelsen fra
3552 sedvaneretten utløp: Ifølge sedvaneretten hadde de rett til å fordømme
3553 publiseringen av en bok, selv følgelig om "Statute of Anne" sa at de var
3554 falt i det fri. Dette, mente de, var den eneste måten å beskytte
3555 forfatterne.
3556 </p><p>
3557 Dette var et godt argument, og hadde støtte fra flere av den tidens ledende
3558 jurister. Det viste også en ekstraordinær chutzpah. Inntail da, som
3559 jusprofessor Raymond Pattetson har sagt, "var utgiverne ... like bekymret
3560 for forfatterne som en gjeter for sine lam."<sup>[<a name="id2757845" href="#ftn.id2757845" class="footnote">103</a>]</sup> Bokselgerne brydde seg ikke det spor om forfatternes
3561 rettigheter. Deres bekymring var den monopolske inntekten forfatterens verk
3562 ga.
3563 </p><p>
3564 Men bokhandlernes argument ble ikke godtatt uten kamp. Helten fra denne
3565 kampen var den skotske bokselgeren Alexander Donaldson.<sup>[<a name="id2757872" href="#ftn.id2757872" class="footnote">104</a>]</sup>
3566 </p><p>
3567 Donaldson var en fremmed for Londons "the Conger". Han startet in karriere i
3568 Edinburgh i 1750. Hans forretningsidé var billige kopier av standardverk
3569 falt i det fri, ihvertfall fri ifølge "Statute of Anne".<sup>[<a name="id2757895" href="#ftn.id2757895" class="footnote">105</a>]</sup> Donaldsons forlag vokste og ble "et sentrum for
3570 litterære skotter." "Blant dem," skriver professor Mark Rose, var "den unge
3571 James Boswell som, sammen med sin venn Andrew Erskine, publiserte en hel
3572 antologi av skotsk samtidspoesi sammen med Donaldson."<sup>[<a name="id2757914" href="#ftn.id2757914" class="footnote">106</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2757922"></a>
3573 </p><p>
3574 Da Londons bokselgere prøvde å få stengt Donaldsons butikk i Skottland, så
3575 flyttet han butikken til London. Her solgte han billige utgaver av "de mest
3576 populære, engelske bøker, i kamp mot sedvanerettens rett til litterær
3577 eiendom." <sup>[<a name="id2757940" href="#ftn.id2757940" class="footnote">107</a>]</sup> Bøkene hans var mellom 30%
3578 og 50% billigere enn "the Conger"s, og han baserte sin rett til denne
3579 konkurransen på at bøkene, takket være "Statute of Anne", var falt i det
3580 fri.
3581 </p><p>
3582 Londons bokselgere begynte straks å slå ned mot "pirater" som
3583 Donaldson. Flere tiltak var vellykkede, den viktigste var den tidlig seieren
3584 i kampen mellom <em class="citetitle">Millar</em> og
3585 <em class="citetitle">Taylor</em>.
3586 </p><p>
3587 Millar var en bokhandler som i 1729 hadde kjøpt opp rettighetene til James
3588 Thomsons dikt "The Seasons". Millar hadde da full beskyttelse gjennom
3589 "Statute of Anne", men etter at denne beskyttelsen var uløpt, begynte Robert
3590 Taylor å trykke et konkurrerende bind. Millar gikk til sak, og hevdet han
3591 hadde en evig rett gjennom sedvaneretten, uansett hva "Statute of Anne"
3592 sa.<sup>[<a name="id2757986" href="#ftn.id2757986" class="footnote">108</a>]</sup>
3593 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxmansfield2"></a><p>
3594 Til moderne juristers forbløffelse, var en av, ikke bare datidens, men en av
3595 de største dommere i engelsk historie, Lord Mansfield, enig med
3596 bokhandlerne. Uansett hvilken beskyttelse "Statute of Anne" gav
3597 bokhandlerne, så sa han at den ikke fortrengte noe fra
3598 sedvaneretten. Spørsmålet var hvorvidt sedvaneretten beskyttet forfatterne
3599 mot pirater. Mansfield svar var ja: Sedvaneretten nektet Taylor å
3600 reprodusere Thomsons dikt uten Millars tillatelse. Slik gav sedvaneretten
3601 bokselgerne en evig publiseringsrett til bøker solgt til dem.
3602 </p><p>
3603
3604 Ser man på det som et spørsmål innen abstrakt jus - dersom man resonnere som
3605 om rettferdighet bare var logisk deduksjon fra de første bud - kunne
3606 Mansfields konklusjon gitt mening. Men den overså det Parlamentet hadde
3607 kjempet for i 1710: Hvordan man på best mulig vis kunne innskrenke
3608 utgivernes monopolmakt. Parlamentets strategi hadde vært å kjøpe fred
3609 gjennom å tilby en beskyttelsesperiode også for eksisterende verk, men
3610 perioden måtte være så kort at kulturen ble utsatt for konkurranse innen
3611 rimelig tid. Storbritannia skulle vokse fra den kontrollerte kulturen under
3612 kronen, inn i en fri og åpen kultur.
3613 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2758052"></a><p>
3614 Kampen for å forsvare "Statute of Anne"s begrensninger sluttet uansett ikke
3615 der, for nå kommer Donaldson.
3616 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2758068"></a><p>
3617 Millar døde kort tid etter sin seier. Boet hans solgte rettighetene over
3618 Thomsons dikt til et syndikat av utgivere, deriblant Thomas
3619 Beckett.<sup>[<a name="id2758081" href="#ftn.id2758081" class="footnote">109</a>]</sup> Da ga Donaldson ut en
3620 uautorisert utgave av Thomsons verk. Etter avgjørelsen i
3621 <em class="citetitle">Millar</em>-saken, gikk Beckett til sak mot
3622 Donaldson. Donaldson tok saken inn for Overhuset, som da fungerte som en
3623 slags høyesterett. I februar 1774 hadde dette organet muligheten til å tolke
3624 Parlamentets mening med utøpsdatoen fra seksti år før.
3625 </p><p>
3626 Rettssaken <em class="citetitle">Donaldson</em> mot
3627 <em class="citetitle">Beckett</em> fikk en enorm oppmerksomhet i hele
3628 Storbritannia. Donaldsons advokater mente at selv om det før fantes en del
3629 rettigheter i sedvaneretten, så var disse fortrengt av "Statute of
3630 Anne". Etter at "Statute of Anne" var blitt vedtatt, skulle den eneste
3631 lovlige beskyttelse for trykkerett kom derfra. Og derfor, mente de, i tråd
3632 med vilkårene i "Statute of Anne", falle i det fri så fort
3633 beskyttelsesperioden var over.
3634 </p><p>
3635 Overhuset var en merkelig institusjon. Juridiske spørsmål ble presentert for
3636 huset, og ble først stemt over av "juslorder", medlemmer av enspesiell
3637 rettslig gruppe som fungerte nesten slik som justiariusene i vår
3638 Høyesterett. Deretter, etter at "juslordene" hadde stemt, stemte resten av
3639 Overhuset.
3640 </p><p>
3641
3642 Rapportene om juslordene stemmer er uenige. På enkelte punkter ser det ut
3643 som om evigvarende beskyttelse fikk flertall. Men det er ingen tvil om
3644 hvordan resten av Overhuset stemte. Med en majoritet på to mot en (22 mot
3645 11) stemte de ned forslaget om en evig beskyttelse. Uansett hvordan man
3646 hadde tolket sedvaneretten, var nå kopiretten begrenset til en periode, og
3647 etter denne ville verket falle i det fri.
3648 </p><p>
3649 "Å falle i det fri". Før rettssaken <em class="citetitle">Donaldson</em> mot
3650 <em class="citetitle">Beckett</em> var det ingen klar oppfatning om hva å falle
3651 i det fri innebar. Før 1774 var det jo en allmenn oppfatning om at
3652 kopiretten var evigvarende. Men etter 1774 ble Public Domain født.For første
3653 gang i angloamerikansk historie var den lovlige beskyttelsen av et verk
3654 utgått, og de største verk i engelsk historie - inkludert Shakespeare,
3655 Bacon, Milton, Johnson og Bunyan - var frie.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2758178"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2758184"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2758190"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2758196"></a>
3656 <a class="indexterm" name="id2758203"></a>
3657 </p><p>
3658 Vi kan knapt forestille oss det, men denne avgjørelsen fra Overhuset fyrte
3659 opp under en svært populær og politisk reaksjon. I Skottland, hvor de fleste
3660 piratugiverne hadde holdt til, ble avgjørelsen feiret i gatene. Som
3661 <em class="citetitle">Edinburgh Advertiser</em> skrev "Ingen privatsak har noen
3662 gang fått slik oppmerksomhet fra folket, og ingen sak som har blitt prøvet i
3663 Overhuset har interessert så mange enkeltmennesker." "Stor glede i Edinburgh
3664 etter seieren over litterær eiendom: bål og *illuminations*.<sup>[<a name="id2758231" href="#ftn.id2758231" class="footnote">110</a>]</sup>
3665 </p><p>
3666 I London, ihvertfall blant utgiverne, var reaksjonen like sterk, men i
3667 motsatt retning. <em class="citetitle">Morning Chronicle</em> skrev:
3668 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3669 Gjennom denne avgjørelsen ... er verdier til nesten 200 000 pund, som er
3670 blitt ærlig kjøpt gjennom allment salg, og som i går var eiendom, er nå
3671 redusert til ingenting. Bokselgerne i London og Westminster, mange av dem
3672 har solgt hus og eiendom for å kjøpe kopirettigheter, er med ett ruinerte,
3673 og mange som gjennom mange år har opparbeidet kompetanse for å brødfø
3674 familien, sitter nå uten en shilling til sine.<sup>[<a name="id2758262" href="#ftn.id2758262" class="footnote">111</a>]</sup>
3675 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3676
3677
3678 Ruinert er en overdrivelse. Men det er ingen overdrivelse å si at endringen
3679 var stor. Vedtaket fra Overhuset betydde at bokhandlerne ikke lenger kunnen
3680 kontrollere hvordan kulturen i England ville vokse og utvikle seg. Kulturen
3681 i England var etter dette <span class="emphasis"><em>fri</em></span>. Ikke i den betydning at
3682 kopiretten ble ignorert, for utgiverne hadde i en begrenset periode rett
3683 over trykkingen. Og heller ikke i den betydningen at bøker kunne stjeles,
3684 for selv etter at boken var falt i det fri, så måtte den kjøpes. Men
3685 <span class="emphasis"><em>fri</em></span> i betydningen at kulturen og dens vekst ikke lenger
3686 var kontrollert av en liten gruppe utgivere. Som alle frie markeder, ville
3687 dette markedet vokse og utvikle seg etter tilbud og etterspørsel. Den
3688 engelske kulturen ble nå formet slik flertallet Englands lesere ville at det
3689 skulle formes - gjennom valget av hva de kjøpte og skrev, gjennom valget av
3690 *memes* de gjentok og beundret. Valg i en <span class="emphasis"><em>konkurrerende
3691 sammenheng</em></span>, ikke der hvor valgene var om hvilken kultur som
3692 skulle være tilgjengelig for folket og hvor deres tilgang til den ble styrt
3693 av noen få, på tros av flertallets ønsker.
3694 </p><p>
3695 Til sist, dette var en verden hvor Parlamentet var antimonopolistisk, og
3696 holdt stand mot utgivernes krav. I en verden hvor parlamentet er lett å
3697 påvirke, vil den frie kultur være mindre beskyttet.
3698 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel sju: Innspillerne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="recorders"></a>Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</h2></div></div></div><p>
3699 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and has been
3700 very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and as a teacher
3701 myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students feel for him. (I
3702 met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.  He was their god.)
3703 </p><p>
3704 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break, he told me
3705 a story about the freedom to create with film in America today.
3706 </p><p>
3707 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring Cycle. The
3708 focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.  Stagehands are a
3709 particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.  During a show, they
3710 hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in the lighting loft. They
3711 make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2758364"></a>
3712 </p><p>
3713
3714 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands playing
3715 checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.  Playing on the
3716 television set, while the stagehands played checkers and the opera company
3717 played Wagner, was <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>. As Else judged it,
3718 this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special about
3719 the scene.
3720 </p><p>
3721 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
3722 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <em class="citetitle">The
3723 Simpsons</em>.  For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and
3724 of course, to use copyrighted material you need the permission of the
3725 copyright owner, unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
3726 </p><p>
3727 Else called <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> creator Matt Groening's office
3728 to get permission.  Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
3729 four-and-a-halfsecond image on a tiny television set in the corner of the
3730 room. How could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he
3731 told Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
3732 <a class="indexterm" name="id2758409"></a>
3733 </p><p>
3734 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted to be
3735 careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.  Else
3736 called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one room shot
3737 of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission, Else said. He was
3738 just confirming the permission with Fox.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2758424"></a>
3739 </p><p>
3740 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered . . . that
3741 Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&#8212;or at least that someone
3742 [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And second, Fox "wanted
3743 ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use this four-point-five
3744 seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> which
3745 was in the corner of the shot."
3746 </p><p>
3747 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone he
3748 thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera.  He explained
3749 to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .  We're asking for your
3750 educational rate on this." That was the educational rate, Herrera told
3751 Else. A day or so later, Else called again to confirm what he had been told.
3752 </p><p>
3753
3754 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you have
3755 your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the clip of
3756 <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em> in the corner of a shot in a documentary
3757 film about Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else,
3758 "And if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
3759 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
3760 money."
3761 </p><p>
3762 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing on
3763 the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce this
3764 reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very last
3765 minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the shot
3766 with a clip from another film that he had worked on, <em class="citetitle">The Day
3767 After Trinity</em>, from ten years before.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2758481"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2758488"></a>
3768 </p><p>
3769 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
3770 copyright to <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>. That copyright is their
3771 property.  To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
3772 permission of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of
3773 the <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> copyright were one of the uses
3774 restricted by the law, then he would need to get the permission of the
3775 copyright owner before he could use the work in that way. And in a free
3776 market, it is the owner of the copyright who gets to set the price for any
3777 use that the law says the owner gets to control.
3778 </p><p>
3779 For example, "public performance" is a use of <em class="citetitle">The
3780 Simpsons</em> that the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a
3781 selection of favorite episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets
3782 to come see "My Favorite <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em>," then you need to
3783 get permission from the copyright owner. And the copyright owner (rightly,
3784 in my view) can charge whatever she wants&#8212;$10 or $1,000,000. That's
3785 her right, as set by the law.
3786 </p><p>
3787 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first thought
3788 is "fair use."<sup>[<a name="id2758535" href="#ftn.id2758535" class="footnote">112</a>]</sup> Else's use of just 4.5
3789 seconds of an indirect shot of a <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> episode is
3790 clearly a fair use of <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>&#8212;and fair use
3791 does not require the permission of anyone.
3792 </p><p>
3793
3794
3795 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
3796 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3797 The <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the
3798 gulf between what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what
3799 is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make
3800 and broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly fair
3801 use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the concept in any
3802 concrete way. Here's why:
3803 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
3804
3805
3806 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy Errors
3807 and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed "visual cue sheet"
3808 listing the source and licensing status of each shot in the film. They take
3809 a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the
3810 application process to a halt.
3811 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3812
3813 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first place. But I
3814 knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of tracking down and
3815 stopping unlicensed <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em> usage, just as George
3816 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <em class="citetitle">Star Wars</em>
3817 usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted
3818 free or cheap license to four seconds of <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em>. As
3819 a documentary producer working to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing
3820 I wanted was to risk legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to
3821 defend a principle.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2758624"></a>
3822 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3823
3824
3825
3826 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law School
3827 . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed that Fox would
3828 "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your life," regardless of the
3829 merits of my claim. He made clear that it would boil down to who had the
3830 bigger legal department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
3831
3832 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3833
3834
3835 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the project, when we
3836 are up against a release deadline and out of money.
3837 </p></li></ol></div></blockquote></div><p>
3838 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
3839 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.  But in
3840 practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of the law,
3841 tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means that the
3842 effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law has the
3843 right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
3844 </p><p>
3845 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
3846 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
3847 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
3848 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
3849 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel åtte: Omformere"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="transformers"></a>Kapittel åtte: Omformere</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2758689"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2758695"></a><p>
3850 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc.  Starwave was an
3851 innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop
3852 digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave
3853 began investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
3854 anticipation of the power of networks.
3855 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2758710"></a><p>
3856 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by the
3857 emerging market for CD-ROM technology&#8212;not to distribute film, but to
3858 do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.  In 1993, he
3859 launched an initiative to develop a product to build retrospectives on the
3860 work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was Clint Eastwood. The
3861 idea was to showcase all of the work of Eastwood, with clips from his films
3862 and interviews with figures important to his career.
3863 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2758718"></a><p>
3864 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and as a
3865 director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood, asking him
3866 about his career. Because Starwave produced those interviews, it was free to
3867 include them on the CD.
3868 </p><p>
3869
3870
3871 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so Starwave
3872 wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career: posters,
3873 scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood made. Most of his
3874 career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was relatively easy to get
3875 permission for that content.
3876 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2758752"></a><p>
3877 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our goal was
3878 that we were going to have a clip from every one of Eastwood's films," Alben
3879 told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No one had ever really done
3880 this before," Alben explained. "No one had ever tried to do this in the
3881 context of an artistic look at an actor's career."
3882 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2758768"></a><p>
3883 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.  Slade asked,
3884 "Well, what will it take?"
3885 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2758779"></a><p>
3886 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from everyone who
3887 appears in these films, and the music and everything else that we want to
3888 use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go for it."<sup>[<a name="id2758791" href="#ftn.id2758791" class="footnote">113</a>]</sup>
3889 </p><p>
3890 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what clearing
3891 those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films could have a claim
3892 to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD- ROMs had not been specified
3893 in the contracts for the actors, so there was no clear way to know just what
3894 Starwave was to do.
3895 </p><p>
3896 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious pride in his
3897 resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his tale, Alben
3898 recounted just what they did:
3899 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3900 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.  We made some
3901 artistic decisions about what film clips to include&#8212;of course we were
3902 going to use the "Make my day" clip from <em class="citetitle">Dirty
3903 Harry</em>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's
3904 wiggling under the gun and you need to get his permission.  And then you
3905 have to decide what you are going to pay him.
3906 </p><p>
3907
3908
3909 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate for
3910 the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of less than
3911 a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the rate at the time
3912 was about $600.  So we had to identify the people&#8212;some of them were
3913 hard to identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
3914 crashing through the glass&#8212;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And
3915 then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we
3916 just started calling people.
3917 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2758852"></a><p>
3918 Some actors were glad to help&#8212;Donald Sutherland, for example, followed
3919 up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.  Others were
3920 dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask, "Hey, can I pay you $600
3921 or maybe if you were in two films, you know, $1,200?" And they would say,
3922 "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love to get $1,200." And some of course were a
3923 bit difficult (estranged ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and
3924 his team had cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint
3925 Eastwood's career.
3926 </p><p>
3927 It was one <span class="emphasis"><em>year</em></span> later&#8212;"and even then we weren't
3928 sure whether we were totally in the clear."
3929 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2758890"></a><p>
3930 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and the
3931 only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive project for
3932 the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
3933 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3934 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their hands
3935 and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's the music,
3936 there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the actors." But we
3937 just broke it down. We just put it into its constituent parts and said,
3938 "Okay, there's this many actors, this many directors, . . . this many
3939 musicians," and we just went at it very systematically and cleared the
3940 rights.
3941 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3942
3943
3944
3945 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood loved it,
3946 and it sold very well.
3947 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2758924"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2758930"></a><p>
3948 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to take a
3949 year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
3950 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is nothing so
3951 useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
3952 all."<sup>[<a name="id2758943" href="#ftn.id2758943" class="footnote">114</a>]</sup> Did it make sense, I asked Alben,
3953 that this is the way a new work has to be made?
3954 </p><p>
3955 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources, and
3956 the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be made. Does
3957 it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what anybody really
3958 thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that you would have to
3959 go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
3960 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3961 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie, he or she
3962 gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of that performance is
3963 used in a new product that is a retrospective of somebody's career, I don't
3964 think that that person . . . should be compensated for that.
3965 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3966 Or at least, is this <span class="emphasis"><em>how</em></span> the artist should be
3967 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of
3968 statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use
3969 of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
3970 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit
3971 permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of
3972 the creative process could be made to be more clean?
3973 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3974
3975 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
3976 mechanism&#8212;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
3977 subject to estranged former spouses&#8212;you'd see a lot more of this work,
3978 because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a retrospective of
3979 someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with lots of media from that
3980 person's career. You'd build in a cost as the producer of one of these
3981 things. You'd build in a cost of paying X dollars to the talent that
3982 performed. But it would be a known cost. That's the thing that trips
3983 everybody up and makes this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If
3984 you knew I have a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to
3985 cost me X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get investments
3986 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I want
3987 a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going to cost
3988 me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for money," then
3989 it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
3990 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2759032"></a><p>
3991 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
3992 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access that
3993 the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a year, how long
3994 would it take someone else? And how much creativity is never made just
3995 because the costs of clearing the rights are so high? These costs are the
3996 burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a Republican hat for a moment, and
3997 get angry for a bit. The government defines the scope of these rights, and
3998 the scope defined determines how much it's going to cost to negotiate
3999 them. (Remember the idea that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the
4000 pilot purchasing flythrough rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles
4001 to San Francisco.)  These rights might well have once made sense; but as
4002 circumstances change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a
4003 well-trained, regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and
4004 ask, "Does this still make sense?"
4005 </p><p>
4006
4007 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only a
4008 few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
4009 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I was
4010 asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer from an
4011 L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a friend, Robert
4012 Fairbank, had produced.
4013 </p><p>
4014 Videoen var en glimrende sammenstilling av filmer fra hver periode i det
4015 tjuende århundret, rammet inn rundt idéen om en episode i TV-serien
4016 <em class="citetitle">60 Minutes</em>. Utførelsen var perfekt, ned til seksti
4017 minutter stoppeklokken. Dommerne elsket enhver minutt av den.
4018 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2759085"></a><p>
4019 Da lysene kom på, kikket jeg over til min medpaneldeltager, David Nimmer,
4020 kanskje den ledende opphavsrettakademiker og utøver i nasjonen. Han hadde en
4021 forbauset uttrykk i ansiktet sitt, mens han tittet ut over rommet med over
4022 250 godt underholdte dommere. Med en en illevarslende tone, begynte han sin
4023 tale med et spørsmål: "Vet dere hvor mange føderale lover som nettopp brutt
4024 i dette rommet?"
4025 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2759105"></a><p>
4026 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this film
4027 hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the rights to
4028 these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law.  Of course,
4029 it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for this
4030 violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle of federal marshals
4031 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point: A year before
4032 anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two years before another
4033 member of our panel, David Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth
4034 Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that
4035 the law would not be friendly to the capacities that this technology would
4036 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
4037 couldn't easily do them legally.
4038 </p><p>
4039 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone building
4040 a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut and paste
4041 architecture of the Internet created&#8212;in a second you can find just
4042 about any image you want; in another second, you can have it planted in your
4043 presentation.
4044 </p><p>
4045 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and its
4046 archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never before
4047 imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on computers
4048 around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes images of
4049 politicians and blends them with music to create biting political
4050 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of the most biting
4051 criticism of the record industry that there is through the mixing of Flash!
4052 and music.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2759146"></a>
4053 </p><p>
4054 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators wanted
4055 to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
4056 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is never
4057 made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the clearance
4058 rules, it doesn't get released.
4059 </p><p>
4060 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of rights so
4061 that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or mix as they
4062 see fit. We could even make this change without necessarily requiring that
4063 the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the system could simply
4064 make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate artists without requiring
4065 an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for example, that says "the
4066 royalty owed the copyright owner of an unregistered work for the derivative
4067 reuse of his work will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in
4068 escrow for the copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could
4069 benefit from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
4070 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he registers
4071 the work.
4072 </p><p>
4073 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be for
4074 objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made; which if
4075 made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.  What reason
4076 would anyone have to oppose it?
4077 </p><p>
4078
4079 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers,
4080 the comic genius of <em class="citetitle">Saturday Night Live</em> and Austin
4081 Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works would work
4082 together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the agreement, DreamWorks
4083 "will acquire the rights to existing motion picture hits and classics, write
4084 new storylines and&#8212;with the use of stateof-the-art digital
4085 technology&#8212;insert Myers and other actors into the film, thereby
4086 creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
4087 </p><p>
4088 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained, "Film
4089 Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing films and
4090 allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap artists have been
4091 doing this for years with music and now we are able to take that same
4092 concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is quoted as saying, "If
4093 anyone can create a way to bring old films to new audiences, it is Mike."
4094 </p><p>
4095 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if you
4096 don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point about this
4097 announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage remains under
4098 copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks announcement is just this: It
4099 is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is free to sample. Any general freedom
4100 to build upon the film archive of our culture, a freedom in other contexts
4101 presumed for us all, is now a privilege reserved for the funny and
4102 famous&#8212;and presumably rich.
4103 </p><p>
4104 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
4105 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use." Much
4106 of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would rely upon so
4107 weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason that the
4108 privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the legal rights
4109 for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.  These costs
4110 mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to defend your fair
4111 use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions so you don't have to
4112 rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative process is a process of
4113 paying lawyers&#8212;again a privilege, or perhaps a curse, reserved for the
4114 few.
4115 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel ni: Samlere"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="collectors"></a>Kapittel ni: Samlere</h2></div></div></div><p>
4116 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&#8212;computer codes designed to "spider,"
4117 or automatically search the Internet and copy content&#8212;began running
4118 across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based information
4119 onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San Francisco's
4120 Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet, they started
4121 again. Over and over again, once every two months, these bits of code took
4122 copies of the Internet and stored them.
4123 </p><p>
4124 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of copies. And
4125 at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive that these
4126 copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the world. Using a
4127 technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could enter a Web page, and
4128 see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well as when those pages
4129 changed.
4130 </p><p>
4131 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have appreciated.  In
4132 the dystopia described in <em class="citetitle">1984</em>, old newspapers were
4133 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved of
4134 by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
4135 </p><p>
4136
4137
4138 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was no way
4139 ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the story that was
4140 printed on the date published on the paper.
4141 </p><p>
4142 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today, there's no
4143 way for you to know whether the content you are reading is the same as the
4144 content you read before. The page may seem the same, but the content could
4145 easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's library&#8212;constantly
4146 updated, without any reliable memory.
4147 </p><p>
4148 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and the
4149 Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet was. You have
4150 the power to see what you remember. More importantly, perhaps, you also have
4151 the power to find what you don't remember and what others might prefer you
4152 forget.<sup>[<a name="id2759318" href="#ftn.id2759318" class="footnote">115</a>]</sup>
4153 </p><p>
4154 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
4155 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction of your
4156 hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to Bull Connor's
4157 water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public library and look at the
4158 newspapers. Those papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they
4159 exist in paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back
4160 and remember&#8212;not just what it is convenient to remember, but remember
4161 something close to the truth.
4162 </p><p>
4163 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to repeat
4164 it. That's not quite correct. We <span class="emphasis"><em>all</em></span> forget
4165 history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we
4166 forget. More directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
4167 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it, for
4168 schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this
4169 knowedge.
4170 </p><p>
4171
4172 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
4173 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the quintessentially
4174 transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more important in forming and
4175 reforming society, it becomes more and more important to maintain in some
4176 historical form. It's just bizarre to think that we have scads of archives
4177 of newspapers from tiny towns around the world, yet there is but one copy of
4178 the Internet&#8212;the one kept by the Internet Archive.
4179 </p><p>
4180 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
4181 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
4182 researcher.  In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
4183 success.  It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
4184 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The Internet
4185 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie of the
4186 Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion pages, and it
4187 was growing at about a billion pages a month.
4188 </p><p>
4189 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in human
4190 history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty terabytes of
4191 material"&#8212;and was "ten times larger than the Library of Congress." And
4192 this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set out to build. In
4193 addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been constructing the Television
4194 Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more ephemeral than the
4195 Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture was constructed through
4196 television, only a tiny proportion of that culture is available for anyone
4197 to see today. Three hours of news are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt
4198 University&#8212;thanks to a specific exemption in the copyright law. That
4199 content is indexed, and is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But
4200 other than that, [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you
4201 were Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
4202 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
4203 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4204
4205 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown? Remember
4206 that back and forth surreal experience of a politician interacting with a
4207 fictional television character? If you were a graduate student wanting to
4208 study that, and you wanted to get those original back and forth exchanges
4209 between the two, the <em class="citetitle">60 Minutes</em> episode that came out
4210 after it . . . it would be almost impossible. . . . Those materials are
4211 almost unfindable. . . .
4212 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4213 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded in
4214 newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is recorded
4215 on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world where researchers
4216 trying to understand the effect of media on nineteenthcentury America will
4217 have an easier time than researchers trying to understand the effect of
4218 media on twentieth-century America?
4219 </p><p>
4220 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
4221 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
4222 libraries.  These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
4223 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once the
4224 copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
4225 </p><p>
4226 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of Congress
4227 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long as such
4228 deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to borrow back the
4229 deposits&#8212;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915 alone, there were
4230 more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back." Thus, when the
4231 copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any library. The copy
4232 exists&#8212;if it exists at all&#8212;in the library archive of the film
4233 company.<sup>[<a name="id2759382" href="#ftn.id2759382" class="footnote">116</a>]</sup>
4234 </p><p>
4235 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts were
4236 originally not copyrighted&#8212;there was no way to capture the broadcasts,
4237 so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled capturing,
4238 broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law required they make a
4239 copy of each broadcast for the work to be "copyrighted." But those copies
4240 were simply kept by the broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the
4241 government didn't demand them.  The content of this part of American culture
4242 is practically invisible to anyone who would look.
4243 </p><p>
4244
4245 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and his
4246 allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty stations from
4247 around the world and hit the Record button. After September 11, Kahle,
4248 working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations from around the
4249 world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their coverage during the week
4250 of September 11 available free on-line.  Anyone could see how news reports
4251 from around the world covered the events of that day.
4252 </p><p>
4253 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
4254 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning films
4255 other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted), Kahle
4256 established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize 1,300 films in
4257 this archive and post those films on the Internet to be downloaded for
4258 free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells copies of these films as
4259 stock footage. What he has discovered is that after he made a significant
4260 chunk available for free, his stock footage sales went up
4261 dramatically. People could easily find the material they wanted to use. Some
4262 downloaded that material and made films on their own. Others purchased
4263 copies to enable other films to be made.  Either way, the archive enabled
4264 access to this important part of our culture.  Want to see a copy of the
4265 "Duck and Cover" film that instructed children how to save themselves in the
4266 middle of nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film
4267 in a few minutes&#8212;for free.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2759489"></a>
4268 </p><p>
4269 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
4270 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
4271 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law doesn't
4272 require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in an archive
4273 by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
4274 </p><p>
4275 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to this
4276 content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His aim is
4277 to ensure competition in access to this important part of our culture.  Not
4278 during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but during a
4279 second life that all creative property has&#8212;a noncommercial life.
4280 </p><p>
4281
4282 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit of
4283 creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
4284 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial market
4285 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
4286 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
4287 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial market,
4288 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
4289 </p><p>
4290 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our tradition has
4291 always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers the news every
4292 day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is used to wrap fish
4293 or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive of knowledge
4294 about our history. In this second life, the content can continue to inform
4295 even if that information is no longer sold.
4296 </p><p>
4297 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print very
4298 quickly (the average today is after about a year<sup>[<a name="id2759588" href="#ftn.id2759588" class="footnote">117</a>]</sup>). After it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores
4299 without the copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where
4300 many get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are
4301 thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely important to
4302 the spread and stability of culture.
4303 </p><p>
4304 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for creative
4305 property does not hold true with the most important components of popular
4306 culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
4307 these&#8212;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&#8212;there is no
4308 guarantee of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've
4309 replaced libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture,
4310 what's accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
4311 Beyond that, culture disappears.
4312 </p><p>
4313
4314 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this so. It
4315 would have been insanely expensive to collect and make accessible all
4316 television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily
4317 high. So even though the law in principle would have restricted the ability
4318 of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the real restriction was
4319 economics. The market made it impossibly difficult to do anything about this
4320 ephemeral culture; the law had little practical effect.
4321 </p><p>
4322 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is that
4323 for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
4324 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or distributed
4325 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all books
4326 published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
4327 moving images and sound.
4328 </p><p>
4329 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
4330 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but we are
4331 for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As Kahle
4332 describes,
4333 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4334 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
4335 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of movies,
4336 . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during the twentieth
4337 century. There are about twenty-six million different titles of books. All
4338 of these would fit on computers that would fit in this room and be able to
4339 be afforded by a small company.  So we're at a turning point in our
4340 history. Universal access is the goal. And the opportunity of leading a
4341 different life, based on this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the
4342 things humankind would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of
4343 Alexandria, putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
4344 press.
4345 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4346
4347 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
4348 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
4349 libraries or archives could be. <span class="emphasis"><em>When</em></span> the commercial
4350 life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it
4351 does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and
4352 culture, remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
4353 it; some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
4354 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
4355 become unimaginable for much of our past&#8212;a future
4356 <span class="emphasis"><em>for</em></span> our past. The technology of digital arts could make
4357 the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
4358 </p><p>
4359 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
4360 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to call
4361 these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem, the
4362 "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also someone's
4363 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that Kahle and
4364 others would exercise.
4365 </p></div><div class="sect1" title='Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="property-i"></a>Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</h2></div></div></div><p>
4366 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association of
4367 America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
4368 administration&#8212;literally. The famous picture of Johnson's swearing-in
4369 on Air Force One after the assassination of President Kennedy has Valenti in
4370 the background. In his almost forty years of running the MPAA, Valenti has
4371 established himself as perhaps the most prominent and effective lobbyist in
4372 Washington.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2759710"></a>
4373 </p><p>
4374 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
4375 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal was to
4376 defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.  The
4377 organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
4378 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its board is
4379 made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major producers and
4380 distributors of motion picture and television programs in the United States:
4381 Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth
4382 Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Warner Brothers.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2759768"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2759773"></a>
4383 <a class="indexterm" name="id2759779"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2759785"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2759792"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2759798"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2759804"></a>
4384 </p><p>
4385
4386
4387 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before him has
4388 had as much influence over that organization, or over Washington. As a
4389 Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important political skill of a
4390 Southerner&#8212;the ability to appear simple and slow while hiding a
4391 lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays the simple, humble
4392 man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four books, who finished high
4393 school at the age of fifteen and flew more than fifty combat missions in
4394 World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When Valenti went to Washington, he mastered
4395 the city in a quintessentially Washingtonian way.
4396 </p><p>
4397 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our culture
4398 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting the MPAA rating
4399 system, it has probably avoided a great deal of speech-regulating harm. But
4400 there is an aspect to the organization's mission that is both the most
4401 radical and the most important. This is the organization's effort,
4402 epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine the meaning of "creative
4403 property."
4404 </p><p>
4405 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy perfectly:
4406 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4407 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
4408 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men and
4409 women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central theme which
4410 animates this entire debate: <span class="emphasis"><em>Creative property owners must be
4411 accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other property
4412 owners in the nation</em></span>. That is the issue.  That is the
4413 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
4414 debates to follow must rest.<sup>[<a name="id2759871" href="#ftn.id2759871" class="footnote">118</a>]</sup>
4415 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4416
4417 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
4418 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The "central
4419 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this: "Creative
4420 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protections resident in
4421 all other property owners in the nation." There are no second-class
4422 citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should be no second-class
4423 property owners.
4424 </p><p>
4425 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated with
4426 such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we use
4427 elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a claim
4428 made by <span class="emphasis"><em>anyone</em></span> who is serious in this debate than this
4429 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is
4430 perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and
4431 scope of "creative property." His views have <span class="emphasis"><em>no</em></span>
4432 reasonable connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull
4433 of his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
4434 Washington.
4435 </p><p>
4436 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and precise
4437 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<sup>[<a name="id2759923" href="#ftn.id2759923" class="footnote">119</a>]</sup> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that "creative
4438 property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and protection resident
4439 in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were
4440 given the same rights as all other property owners, that would effect a
4441 radical, and radically undesirable, change in our tradition.
4442 </p><p>
4443 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for our
4444 tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry that is
4445 instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British overturned in
4446 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a powerful few would
4447 exercise powerful control over how our creative culture would develop.
4448 </p><p>
4449
4450 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you that,
4451 historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to convince
4452 you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our history.  We have
4453 always treated rights in creative property differently from the rights
4454 resident in all other property owners. They have never been the same. And
4455 they should never be the same, because, however counterintuitive this may
4456 seem, to make them the same would be to fundamentally weaken the opportunity
4457 for new creators to create.  Creativity depends upon the owners of
4458 creativity having less than perfect control.
4459 </p><p>
4460 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful of
4461 the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric notwithstanding, in
4462 assuring that the new can displace them. No organization does. No person
4463 does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)  But what's good for the MPAA is
4464 not necessarily good for America. A society that defends the ideals of free
4465 culture must preserve precisely the opportunity for new creativity to
4466 threaten the old.  To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally
4467 wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
4468 Constitution itself.
4469 </p><p>
4470 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly did
4471 they love property that they built into the Constitution an important
4472 requirement. If the government takes your property&#8212;if it condemns your
4473 house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&#8212;it is required,
4474 under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you "just compensation"
4475 for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a
4476 certain sense, sacred. It cannot <span class="emphasis"><em>ever</em></span> be taken from the
4477 property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
4478 </p><p>
4479
4480 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what Valenti
4481 calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the power to
4482 create "creative property," the Constitution <span class="emphasis"><em>requires</em></span>
4483 that after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
4484 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
4485 Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
4486 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not have any
4487 obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
4488 Constitution that requires compensation for your land requires that you lose
4489 your "creative property" right without any compensation at all.
4490 </p><p>
4491 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of property
4492 are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be treated
4493 differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in our
4494 tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be accorded
4495 the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is effectively
4496 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
4497 </p><p>
4498 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.  There
4499 was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.  The
4500 Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be appointed
4501 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college to
4502 produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it did in
4503 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be the first to
4504 admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected some of those
4505 mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should reject as well. So
4506 my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
4507 </p><p>
4508 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at least
4509 try to understand <span class="emphasis"><em>why</em></span>. Why did the framers, fanatical
4510 property types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be
4511 given the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
4512 creative property there must be a public domain?
4513 </p><p>
4514 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the history of
4515 these "creative property" rights, and the control that they enabled.  Once
4516 we see clearly how differently these rights have been defined, we will be in
4517 a better position to ask the question that should be at the core of this
4518 war: Not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> creative property should be protected,
4519 but how. Not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> we will enforce the rights the law
4520 gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
4521 ought to be. Not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> artists should be paid, but
4522 whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
4523 control how culture develops.
4524 </p><p>
4525
4526
4527
4528 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about how
4529 property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way than the
4530 narrow language of the law allows. In <em class="citetitle">Code and Other Laws of
4531 Cyberspace</em>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
4532 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks how
4533 four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the
4534 right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
4535 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1331"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.1. How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
4536 the right or regulation.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4537 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or group
4538 that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each case
4539 throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.  For
4540 simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)  The ovals represent
4541 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&#8212; either
4542 constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious constraint
4543 (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening punishments after the
4544 fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for example, you
4545 willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song from her latest CD
4546 and posting it on the Web, you can be punished with a $150,000 fine. The
4547 fine is an ex post punishment for violating an ex ante rule. It is imposed
4548 by the state.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2759820"></a>
4549 </p><p>
4550 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an individual
4551 for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is imposed by a
4552 community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be no law against
4553 spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished if you spit on the
4554 ground while standing in line at a movie. The punishment might not be harsh,
4555 though depending upon the community, it could easily be more harsh than many
4556 of the punishments imposed by the state. The mark of the difference is not
4557 the severity of the rule, but the source of the enforcement.
4558 </p><p>
4559 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected through
4560 conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you do N. These
4561 constraints are obviously not independent of law or norms&#8212;it is
4562 property law that defines what must be bought if it is to be taken legally;
4563 it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But given a set of norms,
4564 and a background of property and contract law, the market imposes a
4565 simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or group might behave.
4566 </p><p>
4567 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
4568 "architecture"&#8212;the physical world as one finds it&#8212;is a
4569 constraint on behavior.  A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get
4570 across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community
4571 to integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
4572 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with the
4573 market, architecture effects its constraint through simultaneous
4574 conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing contracts,
4575 or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
4576 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces
4577 this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
4578 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
4579 </p><p>
4580
4581
4582
4583 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is obvious:
4584 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by
4585 another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.
4586 </p><p>
4587 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the effective
4588 freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any particular thing, we
4589 have to consider how these four modalities interact.  Whether or not there
4590 are other constraints (there may well be; my claim is not about
4591 comprehensiveness), these four are among the most significant, and any
4592 regulator (whether controlling or freeing)  must consider how these four in
4593 particular interact.
4594 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxdrivespeed"></a><p>
4595 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high speed. That
4596 freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say how fast you
4597 can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in part restricted
4598 by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most rational drivers;
4599 governors in buses, as another example, set the maximum rate at which the
4600 driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel
4601 efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly
4602 constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not
4603 constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
4604 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The same
4605 norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
4606 </p><p>
4607
4608 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear: While
4609 these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a special role
4610 in affecting the three.<sup>[<a name="id2750885" href="#ftn.id2750885" class="footnote">120</a>]</sup> The law, in
4611 other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a
4612 particular modality.  Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on
4613 gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to drive more slowly. The law
4614 might be used to mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty
4615 of driving rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize
4616 reckless driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be
4617 more strict&#8212;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
4618 limit, for example&#8212;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
4619 driving.
4620 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2750907"></a><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1361"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.2. Law has a special role in affecting the three.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1361.png" alt="Law has a special role in affecting the three."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4621 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To understand
4622 the effective protection of liberty or protection of property at any
4623 particular moment, we must track these changes over time. A restriction
4624 imposed by one modality might be erased by another. A freedom enabled by one
4625 modality might be displaced by another.<sup>[<a name="id2750952" href="#ftn.id2750952" class="footnote">121</a>]</sup>
4626 </p><div class="sect2" title="Hvorfor Hollywood har rett"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="hollywood"></a>Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</h3></div></div></div><p>
4627 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just how,
4628 Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress and the
4629 courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that rallying makes
4630 sense.
4631 </p><p>
4632 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the Internet:
4633 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1371"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.3. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4634
4635
4636 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
4637 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on those
4638 who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by technologies
4639 that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture) and expensive to
4640 copy and share content (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by
4641 norms we all recognize&#8212;kids, for example, taping other kids'
4642 records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but
4643 the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
4644 this form of infringement.
4645 </p><p>
4646 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and p2p
4647 sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically, as does
4648 the constraint of the market. And as both the market and architecture relax
4649 the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The happy balance (for the
4650 warriors, at least) of life before the Internet becomes an effective state
4651 of anarchy after the Internet.
4652 </p><p>
4653
4654 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
4655 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
4656 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of protection
4657 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq after the fall
4658 of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the looting that
4659 results.
4660 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1381"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.4. effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1381.png" alt="effective state of anarchy after the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4661 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
4662 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce Department
4663 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995, this mix of
4664 regulatory modalities had already been identified and the strategy to
4665 respond already mapped. In response to the changes the Internet had
4666 effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should strengthen intellectual
4667 property law, (2) businesses should adopt innovative marketing techniques,
4668 (3) technologists should push to develop code to protect copyrighted
4669 material, and (4) educators should educate kids to better protect copyright.
4670 </p><p>
4671
4672 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&#8212;if it was to
4673 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
4674 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry to
4675 push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life you have
4676 as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if something comes
4677 along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a flood plain have no
4678 hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild (and rebuild again) when a
4679 flood (architecture) wipes away their property (law). Farmers have no
4680 hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when a virus
4681 (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to
4682 the government to bail them out when imports (market) wipe out the
4683 U.S. steel industry.
4684 </p><p>
4685 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's campaign
4686 to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a technological
4687 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the changing
4688 technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the content
4689 industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown describes it, its
4690 "architecture of revenue."
4691 </p><p>
4692 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
4693 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because technology
4694 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't follow that the
4695 government should intervene to support that old way of doing
4696 business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20 percent of
4697 their traditional film market to the emerging technologies of digital
4698 cameras.<sup>[<a name="id2760786" href="#ftn.id2760786" class="footnote">122</a>]</sup> Does anyone believe the
4699 government should ban digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have
4700 weakened the freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban
4701 trucks from roads <span class="emphasis"><em>for the purpose of</em></span> protecting the
4702 railroads? Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
4703 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring commercial
4704 comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that
4705 this change has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
4706 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
4707 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch to only
4708 ten channels within an hour?)
4709 </p><p>
4710 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.  In a free
4711 society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and free trade,
4712 the government's role is not to support one way of doing business against
4713 others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect them against loss. If
4714 the government did this generally, then we would never have any progress. As
4715 Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in 1991, in a memo criticizing software
4716 patents, "established companies have an interest in excluding future
4717 competitors."<sup>[<a name="id2760843" href="#ftn.id2760843" class="footnote">123</a>]</sup> And relative to a
4718 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and FM
4719 radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight not only the
4720 market but also the government is a world in which competitors with new
4721 ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and increasingly
4722 concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under Brezhnev.
4723 <a class="indexterm" name="id2760863"></a>
4724 </p><p>
4725 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
4726 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the government
4727 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to guarantee that
4728 that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the duty of policy
4729 makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they create, in response
4730 to the request of those hurt by changing technology, are changes that
4731 preserve the incentives and opportunities for innovation and change.
4732 </p><p>
4733 In the context of laws regulating speech&#8212;which include, obviously,
4734 copyright law&#8212;that duty is even stronger. When the industry
4735 complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in a
4736 way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be especially
4737 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government to get into
4738 the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and dangers of that
4739 game are precisely why our framers created the First Amendment to our
4740 Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of
4741 speech." So when Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge"
4742 the freedom of speech, it should ask&#8212; carefully&#8212;whether such
4743 regulation is justified.
4744 </p><p>
4745
4746 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether the changes
4747 that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are "justified." My argument
4748 is about their effect. For before we get to the question of justification, a
4749 hard question that depends a great deal upon your values, we should first
4750 ask whether we understand the effect of the changes the content industry
4751 wants.
4752 </p><p>
4753 Her kommer metaforen som vil forklare argumentet.
4754 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxddt"></a><p>
4755 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss chemist Paul
4756 Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work demonstrating the
4757 insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the insecticide was widely
4758 used around the world to kill disease-carrying pests. It was also used to
4759 increase farm production.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2760940"></a>
4760 </p><p>
4761 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
4762 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
4763 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
4764 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2760957"></a><p>
4765 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <em class="citetitle">Silent Spring</em>,
4766 which argued that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having
4767 unintended environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
4768 reproduce.  Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2760973"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2760980"></a>
4769 </p><p>
4770 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did not aim
4771 to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems produced
4772 another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than the problems that
4773 were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the problems DDT caused were
4774 worse than the problems it solved, at least when considering the other, more
4775 environmentally friendly ways to solve the problems that DDT was meant to
4776 solve.
4777 </p><p>
4778
4779 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James Boyle
4780 appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
4781 culture.<sup>[<a name="id2761009" href="#ftn.id2761009" class="footnote">124</a>]</sup> His point, and the point I
4782 want to develop in the balance of this chapter, is not that the aims of
4783 copyright are flawed. Or that authors should not be paid for their work. Or
4784 that music should be given away "for free." The point is that some of the
4785 ways in which we might protect authors will have unintended consequences for
4786 the cultural environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And
4787 just as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
4788 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
4789 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
4790 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware of
4791 our actions' effects on the environment.
4792 </p><p>
4793 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly this
4794 effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic effect on
4795 the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But there should
4796 also be little doubt that when you add together the changes in copyright law
4797 over time, plus the change in technology that the Internet is undergoing
4798 just now, the net effect of these changes will not be only that copyrighted
4799 work is effectively protected. Also, and generally missed, the net effect of
4800 this massive increase in protection will be devastating to the environment
4801 for creativity.
4802 </p><p>
4803 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences for free
4804 culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will be lost.
4805 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2761053"></a></div><div class="sect2" title="Opphav"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="beginnings"></a>Opphav</h3></div></div></div><p>
4806 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
4807 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
4808 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English aim to
4809 avoid overly powerful publishers.
4810 </p><p>
4811 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to Congress in
4812 a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I, section
4813 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
4814 </p><p>
4815
4816 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
4817 by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
4818 to their respective Writings and Discoveries.  We can call this the
4819 "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does not say. It does not say
4820 Congress has the power to grant "creative property rights." It says that
4821 Congress has the power <span class="emphasis"><em>to promote progress</em></span>. The grant
4822 of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of
4823 enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
4824 </p><p>
4825 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw in
4826 chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a
4827 few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
4828 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers followed
4829 the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the English, the framers
4830 reinforced that objective, by requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors"
4831 only.
4832 </p><p>
4833 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
4834 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
4835 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built a
4836 structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them short. To
4837 prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the federal
4838 government from establishing a church. To prevent concentrating power in the
4839 federal government, they built structures to reinforce the power of the
4840 states&#8212;including the Senate, whose members were at the time selected
4841 by the states, and an electoral college, also selected by the states, to
4842 select the president. In each case, a <span class="emphasis"><em>structure</em></span> built
4843 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to prevent
4844 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
4845 </p><p>
4846 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
4847 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
4848 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
4849 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210 years
4850 since they first struck its design.
4851 </p><p>
4852
4853 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes in
4854 technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a particular
4855 concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we started here:
4856 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1441"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.5. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4857 Vi kommer til å ende opp her:
4858 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1442"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.6. "Opphavsrett" i dag.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1442.png" alt='"Opphavsrett" i dag.'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4859
4860 La meg forklare hvordan.
4861
4862 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Loven: Varighet"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="lawduration"></a>Loven: Varighet</h3></div></div></div><p>
4863 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it faced
4864 the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that the English
4865 had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws protecting creative
4866 property, and some believed that these laws simply supplemented common law
4867 rights that already protected creative authorship.<sup>[<a name="id2761213" href="#ftn.id2761213" class="footnote">125</a>]</sup> This meant that there was no guaranteed public
4868 domain in the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
4869 common law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work published in
4870 the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
4871 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public domain
4872 to reprint and distribute works.
4873 </p><p>
4874 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
4875 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
4876 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.  Just
4877 as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the copyrights for
4878 all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any state copyrights
4879 expired as well.
4880 </p><p>
4881 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a federal
4882 copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If the author was
4883 alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could opt to renew the
4884 copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not renew the copyright, his
4885 work passed into the public domain.
4886 </p><p>
4887 Selv om det ble skapt mange verker i USA i de første 10 årene til
4888 republikken, så ble kun 5 prosent av verkene registrert under det føderale
4889 opphavsrettsregimet.  Av alle verker skapt i USA både før 1790 og fra 1790
4890 fram til 1800, så ble 95 prosent øyeblikkelig allemannseie (public
4891 domain). Resten ble allemannseie etter maksimalt 20 år, og som oftest etter
4892 14 år.<sup>[<a name="id2761284" href="#ftn.id2761284" class="footnote">126</a>]</sup>
4893 </p><p>
4894
4895 Dette fornyelsessystemet var en avgjørende del av det amerikanske systemet
4896 for opphavsrett.  Det sikret at maksimal vernetid i opphavsretten bare ble
4897 gitt til verker der det var ønsket. Etter den første perioden på fjorten år,
4898 hvis forfatteren ikke så verdien av å fornye sin opphavsrett, var det heller
4899 ikke verdt det for samfunnet å håndheve opphavsretten.
4900 </p><p>
4901 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
4902 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small minority of
4903 them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the balance allowed their
4904 work to pass into the public domain.<sup>[<a name="id2761351" href="#ftn.id2761351" class="footnote">127</a>]</sup>
4905 </p><p>
4906 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work has an
4907 actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall out of
4908 print after one year.<sup>[<a name="id2761379" href="#ftn.id2761379" class="footnote">128</a>]</sup> When that
4909 happens, the used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the
4910 books are no longer <span class="emphasis"><em>effectively</em></span> controlled by
4911 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time is to
4912 sell the books as used books; that use&#8212;because it does not involve
4913 publication&#8212;is effectively free.
4914 </p><p>
4915 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
4916 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28 years to
4917 a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright from 14 years to
4918 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic, the term increased once
4919 again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal term of 14 years to 28 years,
4920 setting a maximum term of 56 years.
4921 </p><p>
4922 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
4923 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress has
4924 extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty years,
4925 Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the extensions
4926 of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.  In 1976,
4927 Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.  And in 1998,
4928 in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress extended the term
4929 of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
4930 </p><p>
4931
4932 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing of
4933 works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the public
4934 domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five years, or 70
4935 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years after the Sonny
4936 Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the public domain, zero
4937 copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue of the expiration of a
4938 copyright term.
4939 </p><p>
4940 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
4941 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the framers
4942 established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright owner to
4943 renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of renewal meant
4944 that works that no longer needed copyright protection would pass more
4945 quickly into the public domain. The works remaining under protection would
4946 be those that had some continuing commercial value.
4947 </p><p>
4948 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For all works
4949 created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&#8212;the maximum
4950 term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty years. For
4951 corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992, Congress
4952 abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created before 1978. All
4953 works still under copyright would be accorded the maximum term then
4954 available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term was ninety-five years.
4955 </p><p>
4956 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to assure
4957 that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public domain. And
4958 indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is even possible to
4959 put works into the public domain. The public domain is orphaned by these
4960 changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement that terms be "limited,"
4961 we have no evidence that anything will limit them.
4962 </p><p>
4963 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
4964 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to renew
4965 their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright in 1973 was
4966 just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal requirement, the
4967 average term of copyright is now the maximum term.  In thirty years, then,
4968 the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95 years.<sup>[<a name="id2761475" href="#ftn.id2761475" class="footnote">129</a>]</sup>
4969 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Loven: Virkeområde"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="lawscope"></a>Loven: Virkeområde</h3></div></div></div><p>
4970 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.  The
4971 scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those changes are not
4972 necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent of the changes if we're
4973 to keep this debate in context.
4974 </p><p>
4975 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps, charts,
4976 and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
4977 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave the
4978 author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That means
4979 someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the work without
4980 the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted by a copyright
4981 was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right did not extend to
4982 what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not, therefore, interfere
4983 with the right of someone other than the author to translate a copyrighted
4984 book, or to adapt the story to a different form (such as a drama based on a
4985 published book).
4986 </p><p>
4987 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright today
4988 are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the right covers
4989 practically any creative work that is reduced to a tangible form. It covers
4990 music as well as architecture, drama as well as computer programs. It gives
4991 the copyright owner of that creative work not only the exclusive right to
4992 "publish" the work, but also the exclusive right of control over any
4993 "copies" of that work. And most significant for our purposes here, the right
4994 gives the copyright owner control over not only his or her particular work,
4995 but also any "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In
4996 this way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
4997 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way on the
4998 initial creative work.
4999 </p><p>
5000
5001 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
5002 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
5003 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition to the
5004 renewal requirement, for most of the history of American copyright law,
5005 there was a requirement that a work be registered before it could receive
5006 the protection of a copyright. There was also a requirement that any
5007 copyrighted work be marked either with that famous © or the word
5008 <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright</em></span>. And for most of the history of American
5009 copyright law, there was a requirement that works be deposited with the
5010 government before a copyright could be secured.
5011 </p><p>
5012 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible understanding
5013 that for most works, no copyright was required. Again, in the first ten
5014 years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible for copyright were never
5015 copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the norm: Most works apparently didn't
5016 need copyright, so registration narrowed the regulation of the law to the
5017 few that did. The same reasoning justified the requirement that a work be
5018 marked as copyrighted&#8212;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright
5019 was being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
5020 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
5021 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the original
5022 author.
5023 </p><p>
5024 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when we
5025 decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement that you
5026 register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is automatic; the
5027 copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with a ©; and the
5028 copyright exists whether or not you actually make a copy available for
5029 others to copy.
5030 </p><p>
5031 Vurder et praktisk eksempel for å forstå omfanget av disse forskjellene.
5032 </p><p>
5033 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who actually
5034 copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you against another
5035 publisher's taking your book and republishing it without your
5036 permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers so as to prevent
5037 that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were 174 publishers in the
5038 United States.<sup>[<a name="id2761611" href="#ftn.id2761611" class="footnote">130</a>]</sup> The Copyright Act was
5039 thus a tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative
5040 market in the United States&#8212;publishers.
5041 </p><p>
5042
5043
5044 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem by
5045 hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act was totally
5046 unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made a play based upon
5047 it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of those activities were
5048 regulated by the original copyright act. These creative activities remained
5049 free, while the activities of publishers were restrained.
5050 </p><p>
5051 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
5052 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail, every
5053 note to your spouse, every doodle, <span class="emphasis"><em>every</em></span> creative act
5054 that's reduced to a tangible form&#8212;all of this is automatically
5055 copyrighted.  There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection
5056 follows the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
5057 </p><p>
5058 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of fair use
5059 exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they copy it to
5060 republish it or to share an excerpt.
5061 </p><p>
5062 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would control
5063 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of today
5064 that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative rights."
5065 If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your book without
5066 permission. No one can translate it without permission.  CliffsNotes can't
5067 make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All of these derivative
5068 uses of your original work are controlled by the copyright holder. The
5069 copyright, in other words, is now not just an exclusive right to your
5070 writings, but an exclusive right to your writings and a large proportion of
5071 the writings inspired by them.
5072 </p><p>
5073 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our framers,
5074 though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this expansion was
5075 created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower copyright.  If I write a
5076 book, can you change one word and then claim a copyright in a new and
5077 different book? Obviously that would make a joke of the copyright, so the
5078 law was properly expanded to include those slight modifications as well as
5079 the verbatim original work.
5080 </p><p>
5081
5082 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within a free
5083 culture&#8212;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the law
5084 applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
5085 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone else's
5086 work. But whatever <span class="emphasis"><em>that</em></span> wrong is, transforming someone
5087 else's work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
5088 all&#8212;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
5089 protect derivative rights at all.<sup>[<a name="id2761692" href="#ftn.id2761692" class="footnote">131</a>]</sup>
5090 Whether or not you go that far, it seems plain that whatever wrong is
5091 involved is fundamentally different from the wrong of direct piracy.
5092 </p><p>
5093 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I can
5094 go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I can go to
5095 court and get an injunction against your transformative use of my
5096 book.<sup>[<a name="id2761739" href="#ftn.id2761739" class="footnote">132</a>]</sup> These two different uses of my
5097 creative work are treated the same.
5098 </p><p>
5099 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should you be
5100 able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from it without
5101 paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature called "Mickey
5102 Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to
5103 trade on the value that Disney originally created?
5104 </p><p>
5105 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
5106 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower: simply to
5107 make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the rights
5108 originally granted.
5109 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="lawreach"></a>Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</h3></div></div></div><p>
5110 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
5111 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users, and
5112 authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making copies,
5113 and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<sup>[<a name="id2761789" href="#ftn.id2761789" class="footnote">133</a>]</sup>
5114 </p><p>
5115
5116
5117 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
5118 <span class="emphasis"><em>copy</em></span>right law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's
5119 argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative property" deserves the
5120 "same rights" as all other property, it is the <span class="emphasis"><em>obvious</em></span>
5121 that we need to be most careful about. For while it may be obvious that in
5122 the world before the Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright
5123 law, upon reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the
5124 Internet, copies should <span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span> be the trigger for
5125 copyright law. More precisely, they should not <span class="emphasis"><em>always</em></span>
5126 be the trigger for copyright law.
5127 </p><p>
5128 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this very
5129 slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the Internet
5130 should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which the law of
5131 copyright automatically applies,<sup>[<a name="id2761850" href="#ftn.id2761850" class="footnote">134</a>]</sup>
5132 because it is clear that the current reach of copyright was never
5133 contemplated, much less chosen, by the legislators who enacted copyright
5134 law.
5135 </p><p>
5136 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely empty
5137 circle.
5138 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1521"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.7. Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1521.png" alt="Alle potensielle bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5139
5140
5141 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent all
5142 its potential <span class="emphasis"><em>uses</em></span>. Most of these uses are unregulated
5143 by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a book,
5144 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone the book,
5145 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a book, that act
5146 is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that after the first sale
5147 of a book, the copyright owner can impose no further conditions on the
5148 disposition of the book). If you sleep on the book or use it to hold up a
5149 lamp or let your puppy chew it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright
5150 law, because those acts do not make a copy.
5151 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1531"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.8. Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1531.png" alt="Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5152 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated by
5153 copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It is
5154 therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands at
5155 the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
5156 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
5157 diagram on next page).
5158 </p><p>
5159 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses that
5160 remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
5161 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1541"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.9. Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
5162 copyrighted work.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1541.png" alt="Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5163 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats as
5164 unregulated because public policy demands that they remain unregulated.  You
5165 are free to quote from this book, even in a review that is quite negative,
5166 without my permission, even though that quoting makes a copy. That copy
5167 would ordinarily give the copyright owner the exclusive right to say whether
5168 the copy is allowed or not, but the law denies the owner any exclusive right
5169 over such "fair uses" for public policy (and possibly First Amendment)
5170 reasons.
5171 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1542"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.10. Unregulated copying considered "fair uses."</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1542.png" alt='Unregulated copying considered "fair uses."'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p> </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1551"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.11. Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
5172 regulated.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1551.png" alt="Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5173
5174
5175 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
5176 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
5177 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
5178 </p><p>
5179 Enter the Internet&#8212;a distributed, digital network where every use of a
5180 copyrighted work produces a copy.<sup>[<a name="id2761796" href="#ftn.id2761796" class="footnote">135</a>]</sup> And
5181 because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a digital
5182 network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were
5183 presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated. No longer is
5184 there a set of presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom
5185 associated with a copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the
5186 copyright, because each use also makes a copy&#8212;category 1 gets sucked
5187 into category 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
5188 copyrighted work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
5189 burden of this shift.
5190 </p><p>
5191
5192 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
5193 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be no
5194 plausible <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright</em></span>-related argument that the copyright
5195 owner could make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
5196 nothing to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
5197 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
5198 use&#8212;reading&#8212; could be regulated by copyright law because none of
5199 those uses produced a copy.
5200 </p><p>
5201 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different set of
5202 rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book only once or
5203 only once a month, then <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright law</em></span> would aid the
5204 copyright owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
5205 accidental feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
5206 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says you
5207 may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or any portion
5208 of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to
5209 the copyright owner's wish.
5210 </p><p>
5211 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim just now is
5212 not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim is only to make
5213 clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other points also become
5214 clear:
5215 </p><p>
5216 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker ever
5217 intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the presumptively
5218 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no evidence at all that
5219 policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed our policy here to
5220 shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of free culture before the
5221 Internet.
5222 </p><p>
5223 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of transformative
5224 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong in
5225 commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
5226 <span class="emphasis"><em>any</em></span> transformation you make of creative work using a
5227 machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with
5228 a story and releasing it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a
5229 requirement of justification.  However troubling the expansion with respect
5230 to copying a particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect
5231 to transformative uses of creative work.
5232 </p><p>
5233
5234 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary burden
5235 on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.  If a
5236 copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read a book
5237 on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a violation of
5238 my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation about whether I
5239 have a fair use right to read, because before the Internet, reading did not
5240 trigger the application of copyright law and hence the need for a fair use
5241 defense. The right to read was effectively protected before because reading
5242 was not regulated.
5243 </p><p>
5244 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for free
5245 culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights depend upon fair
5246 use&#8212;never even addressing the earlier question about the expansion in
5247 effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in fair use makes sense
5248 when the vast majority of uses are <span class="emphasis"><em>unregulated</em></span>. But
5249 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the protections of
5250 fair use are not enough.
5251 </p><p>
5252 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was in the
5253 business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available to video
5254 stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
5255 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put the
5256 trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
5257 </p><p>
5258 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began to
5259 think about the Internet as another way to distribute these previews.  The
5260 idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by giving on-line
5261 stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can
5262 read a few pages of a book before you buy the book, so, too, you would be
5263 able to sample a bit from the movie on-line before you bought it.
5264 </p><p>
5265
5266 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors that it
5267 intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet (rather than
5268 sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two years later, Disney
5269 told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video Pipeline asked Disney to
5270 talk about the matter&#8212;he had built a business on distributing this
5271 content as a way to help sell Disney films; he had customers who depended
5272 upon his delivering this content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video
5273 Pipeline stopped the distribution immediately.  Video Pipeline thought it
5274 was within their "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So
5275 they filed a lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in
5276 fact their rights.
5277 </p><p>
5278 Disney countersued&#8212;for $100 million in damages. Those damages were
5279 predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully infringed" on
5280 Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of willful infringement, it
5281 can award damages not on the basis of the actual harm to the copyright
5282 owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the statute. Because Video
5283 Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of Disney movies to enable
5284 video stores to sell copies of those movies, Disney was now suing Video
5285 Pipeline for $100 million.
5286 </p><p>
5287 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
5288 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
5289 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim in
5290 court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
5291 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
5292 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
5293 Disney's permission.
5294 </p><p>
5295 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
5296 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
5297 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control how
5298 people got access to their content. Once a video was in the marketplace, the
5299 "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he wished,
5300 including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the entire
5301 movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to
5302 centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
5303 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
5304 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
5305 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
5306 </p><p>
5307
5308
5309 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for control
5310 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say you
5311 can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.  But
5312 the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble
5313 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.  Competition
5314 protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does
5315 not even question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger
5316 when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
5317 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you read
5318 a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But in a
5319 competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this happening
5320 are quite slight.
5321 </p><p>
5322 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
5323 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
5324 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
5325 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private owners
5326 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
5327 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
5328 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Arkitektur og lov: Makt"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="lawforce"></a>Arkitektur og lov: Makt</h3></div></div></div><p>
5329 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a second
5330 important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
5331 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
5332 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
5333 </p><p>
5334 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
5335 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.  The law,
5336 meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human, trained in the
5337 tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that tradition embraced,
5338 who said whether and how the law would restrict your freedom.
5339 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2762306"></a><p>
5340 Det er en berømt historie om en kamp mellom Marx-brødrene (the Marx
5341 Brothers) og Warner Brothers.  Marx-brødrene planla å lage en parodi av
5342 <em class="citetitle">Casablanca</em>. Warner Brothers protesterte.  De skrev et
5343 ufint brev til Marx-brødrene og advarte dem om at det ville få seriøse
5344 juridiske konsekvenser hvis de gikk videre med sin plan.<sup>[<a name="id2762328" href="#ftn.id2762328" class="footnote">136</a>]</sup>
5345 </p><p>
5346 Dette fikk Marx-brødrene til å svare tilbake med samme mynt.  De advarte
5347 Warner Brothers om at Marx-brødrene "var brødre lenge før dere var
5348 det".<sup>[<a name="id2762350" href="#ftn.id2762350" class="footnote">137</a>]</sup> Marx-brødrene eide derfor ordet
5349 <em class="citetitle">Brothers</em>, og hvis Warner Brothers insisterte på å
5350 forsøke å kontrollere <em class="citetitle">Casablanca</em>, så ville
5351 Marx-brødrene insistere på kontroll over <em class="citetitle">Brothers</em>.
5352 </p><p>
5353 Det var en absurd og hul trussel, selvfølgelig, fordi Warner Brothers, på
5354 samme måte som Marx-brødrene, visste at ingen domstol noensinne ville
5355 håndheve et slikt dumt krav. Denne ekstremismen var irrelevant for de ekte
5356 friheter som alle (inkludert Warner Brothers) nøt godt av.
5357 </p><p>
5358 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on the
5359 Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a machine:
5360 Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by the copyright
5361 owner, get built into the technology that delivers copyrighted content. It
5362 is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem with code regulations
5363 is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code would not get the humor of the
5364 Marx Brothers. The consequence of that is not at all funny.
5365 </p><p>
5366 La oss se på livet til min Adobe eBook Reader.
5367 </p><p>
5368 En ebok er en bok levert i elektronisk form.  En Adobe eBook er ikke en bok
5369 som Adobe har publisert.  Adobe produserer kun programvaren som utgivere
5370 bruker å levere e-bøker.  Den bidrar med teknologien, og utgiveren leverer
5371 innholdet ved hjelp av teknologien.
5372 </p><p>
5373 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook Reader.
5374 </p><p>
5375
5376 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this e-book
5377 library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the public domain:
5378 <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em>, for example, is in the public domain.
5379 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My own book
5380 <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em> is not yet within the public
5381 domain.  Consider <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em> first. If you click on
5382 my e-book copy of <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em>, you'll see a fancy
5383 cover, and then a button at the bottom called Permissions.
5384 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1611"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.12. Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1611.png" alt="Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5385 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the permissions
5386 that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
5387 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1612"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.13. List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1612.png" alt="List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5388
5389
5390 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the clipboard
5391 of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far, I've copied no
5392 text to the clipboard.)  I also have the permission to print ten pages from
5393 the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the permission to use the Read Aloud
5394 button to hear <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em> read aloud through the
5395 computer.
5396 </p><p>
5397 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
5398 translation): Aristotle's <em class="citetitle">Politics</em>.
5399 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1621"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.14. E-book of Aristotle;s "Politics"</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1621.png" alt='E-book of Aristotle;s "Politics"'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5400 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted at
5401 all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear the book.
5402 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1622"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.15. Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politics".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1622.png" alt='Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politics".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5403 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the original
5404 e-book version of my last book, <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em>:
5405 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1631"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.16. List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1631.png" alt='List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5406 Ingen kopiering, ingen utskrift, og våg ikke å prøve å lytte til denne
5407 boken!
5408 </p><p>
5409 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&#8212; as if
5410 the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.  For works
5411 under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have the power&#8212;up
5412 to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not under copyright, there
5413 is no such copyright power.<sup>[<a name="id2762582" href="#ftn.id2762582" class="footnote">138</a>]</sup> When my
5414 e-book of <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em> says I have the permission to
5415 copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten days, what that
5416 really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control
5417 how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would
5418 enable.
5419 </p><p>
5420 The control comes instead from the code&#8212;from the technology within
5421 which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are permissions,
5422 they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal with. When a
5423 teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she knows (unless
5424 she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but will suffer a
5425 punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the
5426 permission to make ten copies of the text into the computer's memory, that
5427 means that after I've made ten copies, the computer will not make any
5428 more. The same with the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook
5429 Reader will not print any more pages.  It's the same with the silly
5430 restriction that says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my
5431 book aloud&#8212;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
5432 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply won't
5433 read aloud.
5434 </p><p>
5435
5436
5437 These are <span class="emphasis"><em>controls</em></span>, not permissions. Imagine a world
5438 where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried
5439 to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
5440 </p><p>
5441 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
5442 <span class="emphasis"><em>law</em></span> as copyright <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span>. The
5443 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified by
5444 courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that are coded
5445 by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into the law are
5446 always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are built into the
5447 technology have no similar built-in check.
5448 </p><p>
5449 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the controls
5450 built into the technology? Software used to be sold with technologies that
5451 limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those were trivial
5452 protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these protections
5453 as well?
5454 </p><p>
5455 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe eBook
5456 Reader.
5457 </p><p>
5458 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
5459 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free on the
5460 Adobe site was a copy of <em class="citetitle">Alice's Adventures in
5461 Wonderland</em>.  This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet
5462 when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
5463 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1641"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.17. List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1641.png" alt="List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in Wonderland&quot;."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5464
5465
5466 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to copy,
5467 not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the "permissions"
5468 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
5469 </p><p>
5470 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.  For the
5471 text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read Aloud button;
5472 it said you did not have the permission to read the book aloud. That led
5473 some people to think that Adobe was restricting the right of parents, for
5474 example, to read the book to their children, which seemed, to say the least,
5475 absurd.
5476 </p><p>
5477 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying to
5478 restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only restricting
5479 the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book read aloud. But
5480 the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would Adobe thus agree that a
5481 consumer was free to use software to hack around the restrictions built into
5482 the eBook Reader? If some company (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to
5483 disable the technological protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a
5484 blind person, say, could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe
5485 agree that such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer
5486 because the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
5487 </p><p>
5488 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most innovative
5489 companies developing strategies to balance open access to content with
5490 incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's technology enables
5491 control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this control.  That incentive
5492 is understandable, yet what it creates is often crazy.
5493 </p><p>
5494 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite story
5495 of mine that makes the same point.
5496 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxaibo"></a><p>
5497 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo learns tricks,
5498 cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity and that doesn't
5499 leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
5500 </p><p>
5501
5502 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world have set up
5503 clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web site to enable
5504 information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set up aibopet.com
5505 (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site), and on that site he
5506 provided information about how to teach an Aibo to do tricks in addition to
5507 the ones Sony had taught it.
5508 </p><p>
5509 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.  You
5510 teach a computer how to do something by programming it differently.  So to
5511 say that aibopet.com was giving information about how to teach the dog to do
5512 new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com was giving information to users
5513 of the Aibo pet about how to hack their computer "dog" to make it do new
5514 tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
5515 </p><p>
5516 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
5517 <em class="citetitle">hack</em> has a particularly unfriendly
5518 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror
5519 movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them,
5520 <em class="citetitle">hack</em> is a much more positive
5521 term. <em class="citetitle">Hack</em> just means code that enables the program
5522 to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy a
5523 new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer doesn't
5524 run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be happy
5525 to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a driver to enable
5526 the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
5527 </p><p>
5528 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a community like
5529 to challenge themselves and others with increasingly difficult
5530 tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
5531 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
5532 ethically.
5533 </p><p>
5534 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program and
5535 offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to dance
5536 jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever bit of
5537 tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature than Sony had
5538 built.
5539 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2762830"></a><p>
5540
5541 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the United
5542 States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience, is it
5543 permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We forget that
5544 stories about the backcountry still flow across much of the world. So let's
5545 just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime anywhere (anymore) to
5546 dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog to dance jazz. Nor should it
5547 be a crime (though we don't have a lot to go on here) to teach your robot
5548 dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a completely legal activity. One imagines
5549 that the owner of aibopet.com thought, <span class="emphasis"><em>What possible problem could
5550 there be with teaching a robot dog to dance?</em></span>
5551 </p><p>
5552 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&#8212; not
5553 literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic named Ed
5554 Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic is well known and
5555 respected. He was hired by the government in the Microsoft case to test
5556 Microsoft's claims about what could and could not be done with its own
5557 code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his brilliance and his
5558 coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft lawyers, Ed Felten stood his
5559 ground. He was not about to be bullied into being silent about something he
5560 knew very well.
5561 </p><p>
5562 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<sup>[<a name="id2762875" href="#ftn.id2762875" class="footnote">139</a>]</sup> He and a group of colleagues were working on a
5563 paper to be submitted at conference.  The paper was intended to describe the
5564 weakness in an encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
5565 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
5566 </p><p>
5567 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content owners to
5568 exercise much better control over their content than the Internet, as it
5569 originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI hoped to develop a
5570 standard that would allow the content owner to say "this music cannot be
5571 copied," and have a computer respect that command.  The technology was to be
5572 part of a "trusted system" of control that would get content owners to trust
5573 the system of the Internet much more.
5574 </p><p>
5575 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.  In
5576 exchange for providing contestants with the code to an SDMI-encrypted bit of
5577 content, contestants were to try to crack it and, if they did, report the
5578 problems to the consortium.
5579 </p><p>
5580
5581
5582 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and the
5583 team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption systems
5584 would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team thought it
5585 worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
5586 </p><p>
5587 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
5588 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not just
5589 because it is the law, but also because it is a really great idea. A
5590 strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to encourage a wide
5591 range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in turn, to improve the
5592 systems or people or ideas criticized.
5593 </p><p>
5594 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper describing
5595 the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free music, or
5596 building and deploying this technology. The paper was an academic essay,
5597 unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the weakness in the
5598 SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently constituted, succeed.
5599 </p><p>
5600 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they then
5601 received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the aibopet.com
5602 hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony wrote:
5603 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5604 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent AIBO-ware's
5605 copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the anti-circumvention
5606 provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
5607 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5608 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system of
5609 encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter from an
5610 RIAA lawyer that read:
5611 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5612
5613 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the Public
5614 Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by the
5615 Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions under the
5616 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
5617 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5618 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the spread
5619 of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made spreading such
5620 information an offense.
5621 </p><p>
5622 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear about
5623 cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively dead; the
5624 response was to find technologies that might compensate.  These new
5625 technologies would be copyright protection technologies&#8212; technologies
5626 to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted material. They
5627 were designed as <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span> to modify the original
5628 <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span> of the Internet, to reestablish some protection
5629 for copyright owners.
5630 </p><p>
5631 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this code
5632 designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
5633 <span class="emphasis"><em>legal code</em></span> intended to buttress <span class="emphasis"><em>software
5634 code</em></span> which itself was intended to support the <span class="emphasis"><em>legal
5635 code of copyright</em></span>.
5636 </p><p>
5637 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to the
5638 extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did not end at
5639 the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated devices that were
5640 designed to circumvent copyright protection measures. It was designed to ban
5641 those devices, whether or not the use of the copyrighted material made
5642 possible by that circumvention would have been a copyright violation.
5643 </p><p>
5644
5645 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
5646 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to dance
5647 jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted material. But
5648 as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did not enable
5649 subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that aibopet.com's hack
5650 was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet fair use is not a defense
5651 to the DMCA. The question is not whether the use of the copyrighted material
5652 was a copyright violation. The question is whether a copyright protection
5653 system was circumvented.
5654 </p><p>
5655 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the same line
5656 of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a copyright protection
5657 system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer suggested, Felten himself was
5658 distributing a circumvention technology.  Thus, even though he was not
5659 himself infringing anyone's copyright, his academic paper was enabling
5660 others to infringe others' copyright.
5661 </p><p>
5662 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in 1981 by
5663 Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that the VCR could
5664 be banned because it was a copyright-infringing technology: It enabled
5665 consumers to copy films without the permission of the copyright owner. No
5666 doubt there were uses of the technology that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
5667 "<em class="citetitle">Mr. Rogers</em>," for example, had testified in that case
5668 that he wanted people to feel free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
5669 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5670 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
5671 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that it's
5672 a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show them
5673 at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all of this
5674 new technology that allows people to tape the "Neighborhood" off-the-air,
5675 and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood" because that's what I produce, that
5676 they then become much more active in the programming of their family's
5677 television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by
5678 others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always been "You are an
5679 important person just the way you are. You can make healthy decisions."
5680 Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a
5681 person to be more active in the control of his or her life, in a healthy
5682 way, is important.<sup>[<a name="id2763124" href="#ftn.id2763124" class="footnote">140</a>]</sup>
5683 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5684
5685
5686 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were some uses
5687 that were illegal, the court held the companies producing the VCR
5688 responsible.
5689 </p><p>
5690 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to the DMCA.
5691 </p><p>
5692 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
5693 </p><p>
5694 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright circumvention
5695 technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for different
5696 ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive pirating of
5697 copyrighted material&#8212;a bad end. Or they can be used to enable the use
5698 of particular copyrighted materials in ways that would be considered fair
5699 use&#8212;a good end.
5700 </p><p>
5701
5702 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most would agree
5703 such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target practice or to
5704 protect against an intruder. At least some would say that such a use would
5705 be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good and bad uses.
5706 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1711"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1711.png" alt="VCR/handgun cartoon."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5707 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world where guns
5708 are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and circumvention
5709 technologies) are illegal. Flash: <span class="emphasis"><em>No one ever died from copyright
5710 circumvention</em></span>. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
5711 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but permits
5712 guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
5713 </p><p>
5714 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are changing the
5715 balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright owners restrict
5716 fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would attempt to evade the
5717 restrictions on fair use that they impose through code. Technology becomes a
5718 means by which fair use can be erased; the law of the DMCA backs up that
5719 erasing.
5720 </p><p>
5721 This is how <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span> becomes <span class="emphasis"><em>law</em></span>. The
5722 controls built into the technology of copy and access protection become
5723 rules the violation of which is also a violation of the law. In this way,
5724 the code extends the law&#8212;increasing its regulation, even if the
5725 subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute
5726 fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the
5727 law; code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&#8212;at
5728 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the nasty
5729 letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
5730 </p><p>
5731 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and law
5732 that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is the ease
5733 with which infringements of the law can be detected. For contrary to the
5734 rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the Internet, no one
5735 knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing technologies deployed on
5736 the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who committed a legal wrong. The
5737 technologies of the Internet are open to snoops as well as sharers, and the
5738 snoops are increasingly good at tracking down the identity of those who
5739 violate the rules.
5740 </p><p>
5741
5742
5743 For example, imagine you were part of a <em class="citetitle">Star Trek</em> fan
5744 club. You gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of
5745 fan fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
5746 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then simply
5747 continue it.<sup>[<a name="id2763264" href="#ftn.id2763264" class="footnote">141</a>]</sup>
5748 </p><p>
5749 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated activity.
5750 No matter what happened inside your club room, you would never be interfered
5751 with by the copyright police. You were free in that space to do as you
5752 wished with this part of our culture. You were allowed to build on it as you
5753 wished without fear of legal control.
5754 </p><p>
5755 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
5756 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
5757 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would quickly find
5758 your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon the ownership of the
5759 series that you're depicting, could well inspire a lawyer's threat. And
5760 ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely costly indeed.  The law of
5761 copyright is extremely efficient. The penalties are severe, and the process
5762 is quick.
5763 </p><p>
5764 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change in the
5765 ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts the law's
5766 balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at which you
5767 traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just one step before
5768 the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you transmitted. That
5769 is, in effect, what is happening here.
5770 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Marked: Konsentrasjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="marketconcentration"></a>Marked: Konsentrasjon</h3></div></div></div><p>
5771
5772 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&#8212;tripled in the past
5773 thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as well&#8212;from
5774 regulating only publishers to now regulating just about everyone. And
5775 copyright's reach has changed, as every action becomes a copy and hence
5776 presumptively regulated. And as technologists find better ways to control
5777 the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly enforced through
5778 technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is easier to find and
5779 easier to control. This regulation of the creative process, which began as a
5780 tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the market for creative work, has
5781 become the single most important regulator of creativity there is. It is a
5782 massive expansion in the scope of the government's control over innovation
5783 and creativity; it would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth
5784 to copyright's control.
5785 </p><p>
5786 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it weren't
5787 for one more change that we must also consider. This is a change that is in
5788 some sense the most familiar, though its significance and scope are not well
5789 understood. It is the one that creates precisely the reason to be concerned
5790 about all the other changes I have described.
5791 </p><p>
5792 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.  In
5793 the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone a radical
5794 alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the media.  Before
5795 this change happened, the different forms of media were owned by separate
5796 media companies. Now, the media is increasingly owned by only a few
5797 companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC announced in June 2003,
5798 most expect that within a few years, we will live in a world where just
5799 three companies control more than percent of the media.
5800 </p><p>
5801 Det er her to sorter endringer: omfanget av konsentrasjon, og dens natur.
5802 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2763367"></a><p>
5803 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John McCain
5804 summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media ownership, "five
5805 companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<sup>[<a name="id2763378" href="#ftn.id2763378" class="footnote">142</a>]</sup> The five recording labels of Universal Music Group,
5806 BMG, Sony Music Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8
5807 percent of the U.S. music market.<sup>[<a name="id2763390" href="#ftn.id2763390" class="footnote">143</a>]</sup> The
5808 "five largest cable companies pipe programming to 74 percent of the cable
5809 subscribers nationwide."<sup>[<a name="id2763403" href="#ftn.id2763403" class="footnote">144</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2763414"></a>
5810 </p><p>
5811
5812 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation, the
5813 nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
5814 seventy-five stations. Today <span class="emphasis"><em>one</em></span> company owns more than
5815 1,200 stations.  During that period of consolidation, the total number of
5816 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two largest
5817 broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's revenues. Overall, just
5818 four companies control 90 percent of the nation's radio advertising
5819 revenues.
5820 </p><p>
5821 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well.  Today, there are
5822 six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than there were
5823 eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the nation's
5824 circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in the United
5825 States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all film revenue. The
5826 ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent of all cable
5827 revenue. This is a market far from the free press the framers sought to
5828 protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well protected&#8212; by the
5829 market.
5830 </p><p>
5831 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious change is in
5832 the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows put it in a recent
5833 article about Rupert Murdoch, <a class="indexterm" name="id2763446"></a>
5834 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5835 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system unmatched in its
5836 integration. They supply content&#8212;Fox movies . . .  Fox TV shows
5837 . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus newspapers and books. They sell
5838 the content to the public and to advertisers&#8212;in newspapers, on the
5839 broadcast network, on the cable channels. And they operate the physical
5840 distribution system through which the content reaches the
5841 customers. Murdoch's satellite systems now distribute News Corp. content in
5842 Europe and Asia; if Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that
5843 system will serve the same function in the United States.<sup>[<a name="id2763470" href="#ftn.id2763470" class="footnote">145</a>]</sup>
5844 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5845 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not just large
5846 companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies owning as many
5847 outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this pattern better than a
5848 thousand words could do:
5849 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1761"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 3.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1761.png" alt="Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5850
5851
5852 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or what is
5853 distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and distribute
5854 content?
5855 </p><p>
5856 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was nothing
5857 more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after reading and
5858 listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the contrary, I am
5859 beginning to change my mind.
5860 </p><p>
5861 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this integration
5862 may matter.
5863 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2763540"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2763546"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2763553"></a><p>
5864 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <em class="citetitle">All in the
5865 Family</em>. He took the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It
5866 was too edgy, they told Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more
5867 edgy than the first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they
5868 told Lear.  We wanted less edgy, not more.
5869 </p><p>
5870 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS was happy to
5871 have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.  The copyrights that
5872 Lear held assured an independence from network control.<sup>[<a name="id2763576" href="#ftn.id2763576" class="footnote">146</a>]</sup>
5873 </p><p>
5874
5875
5876
5877 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade the
5878 networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law required a
5879 separation between the networks and the content producers; that separation
5880 would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992, because of these rules,
5881 the vast majority of prime time television&#8212;75 percent of it&#8212;was
5882 "independent" of the networks.
5883 </p><p>
5884 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.  After
5885 that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.  In 1985, there were
5886 twenty-five independent television production studios; in 2002, only five
5887 independent television studios remained. "In 1992, only 15 percent of new
5888 series were produced for a network by a company it controlled. Last year,
5889 the percentage of shows produced by controlled companies more than
5890 quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16 new series were produced
5891 independently of conglomerate control, last year there was one."<sup>[<a name="id2763606" href="#ftn.id2763606" class="footnote">147</a>]</sup> In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was
5892 owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and
5893 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week produced by network
5894 studios increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television
5895 hours per week produced by independent studios decreased 63%."<sup>[<a name="id2763650" href="#ftn.id2763650" class="footnote">148</a>]</sup>
5896 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2763657"></a><p>
5897 Today, another Norman Lear with another <em class="citetitle">All in the
5898 Family</em> would find that he had the choice either to make the show
5899 less edgy or to be fired: The content of any show developed for a network is
5900 increasingly owned by the network.
5901 </p><p>
5902 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership of
5903 those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As Barry
5904 Diller said to Bill Moyers, <a class="indexterm" name="id2763679"></a>
5905 <a class="indexterm" name="id2763685"></a>
5906 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5907 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on their
5908 channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes through their
5909 controlled distribution system, then what you get is fewer and fewer actual
5910 voices participating in the process. [We u]sed to have dozens and dozens of
5911 thriving independent production companies producing television programs. Now
5912 you have less than a handful.<sup>[<a name="id2763704" href="#ftn.id2763704" class="footnote">149</a>]</sup>
5913 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5914 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such large
5915 and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.  Increasingly
5916 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from networks like
5917 this is increasingly tailored to the message the network wants to
5918 convey. This is not the communist party, though from the inside, it must
5919 feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question without risk of
5920 consequence&#8212;not necessarily banishment to Siberia, but punishment
5921 nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are quashed. This is not
5922 the environment for a democracy.
5923 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2763738"></a><p>
5924 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
5925 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
5926 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
5927 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.  The
5928 same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media companies
5929 would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<sup>[<a name="id2763755" href="#ftn.id2763755" class="footnote">150</a>]</sup> Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not,
5930 sprint. Yet if the field is only open to the giants, there will be far too
5931 little sprinting.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2763784"></a>
5932 </p><p>
5933 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media market to say
5934 with certainty what concentration and integration will do. The efficiencies
5935 are important, and the effect on culture is hard to measure.
5936 </p><p>
5937 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly suggest
5938 the concern.
5939 </p><p>
5940 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
5941 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
5942 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
5943 </p><p>
5944
5945 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to any
5946 position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound mistake. I
5947 am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once wrecked by
5948 drugs&#8212;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all quite legal. I
5949 believe this war is a profound mistake because the collateral damage from it
5950 is so great as to make waging the war insane.  When you add together the
5951 burdens on the criminal justice system, the desperation of generations of
5952 kids whose only real economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the
5953 queering of constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance
5954 this war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
5955 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the local
5956 drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal benefit in
5957 reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
5958 </p><p>
5959 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it is
5960 through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we depend
5961 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about these issues.
5962 </p><p>
5963 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched a
5964 media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced scores
5965 of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In one series
5966 (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing the idea of
5967 legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral damage from the
5968 war. One advances an argument in favor of drug legalization. The other
5969 responds in a powerful and effective way against the argument of the
5970 first. In the end, the first guy changes his mind (hey, it's
5971 television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on the pro-legalization
5972 campaign.
5973 </p><p>
5974 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
5975 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
5976 </p><p>
5977 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
5978 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
5979 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
5980 war. Can you do it?
5981 </p><p>
5982
5983 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
5984 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in the
5985 world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your message will be
5986 heard then?
5987 </p><p>
5988 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
5989 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
5990 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
5991 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First Amendment, but
5992 the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to choose what they
5993 run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media will refuse one side of a
5994 crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.  And the courts will
5995 defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<sup>[<a name="id2763898" href="#ftn.id2763898" class="footnote">151</a>]</sup>
5996 </p><p>
5997 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&#8212;if we lived in a
5998 media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media throws
5999 that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control access to the
6000 media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which political
6001 positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in an obvious
6002 and important way, concentration matters. You might like the positions the
6003 handful of companies selects. But you should not like a world in which a
6004 mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
6005 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Sammen"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="together"></a>Sammen</h3></div></div></div><p>
6006 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the copyright
6007 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In the abstract,
6008 it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No sane sort who is
6009 not an anarchist could disagree.
6010 </p><p>
6011
6012 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&#8212; when we
6013 recognize how it might now interact with both technology and markets to mean
6014 that the effective constraint on the liberty to cultivate our culture is
6015 dramatically different&#8212;the claim begins to seem less innocent and
6016 obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to supplement the law's control,
6017 and (2) the power of concentrated markets to weaken the opportunity for
6018 dissent, if strictly enforcing the massively expanded "property" rights
6019 granted by copyright fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture
6020 to cultivate and build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this
6021 property should be redefined.
6022 </p><p>
6023 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish copyright
6024 or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total mistake,
6025 disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within our culture
6026 today.
6027 </p><p>
6028 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
6029 notwithstanding.  And these massive shifts in the effective power of
6030 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
6031 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
6032 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether
6033 another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that increases
6034 copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
6035 adjustment to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
6036 regulation&#8212;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
6037 </p><p>
6038 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of constant
6039 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and geeks now
6040 flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a short period of
6041 time, as the technologies of distribution and creation have changed and as
6042 lobbyists have pushed for more control by copyright holders. Changes in the
6043 past in response to changes in technology suggest that we may well need
6044 similar changes in the future. And these changes have to be
6045 <span class="emphasis"><em>reductions</em></span> in the scope of copyright, in response to
6046 the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the market enable.
6047 </p><p>
6048
6049 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that we
6050 see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add together
6051 the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and changing technology,
6052 together they produce an astonishing conclusion: <span class="emphasis"><em>Never in our
6053 history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the development of
6054 our culture than now</em></span>.
6055 </p><p>
6056 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were perpetual, they
6057 affected only that precise creative work. Not when only publishers had the
6058 tools to publish, for the market then was much more diverse. Not when there
6059 were only three television networks, for even then, newspapers, film
6060 studios, radio stations, and publishers were independent of the
6061 networks. <span class="emphasis"><em>Never</em></span> has copyright protected such a wide
6062 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
6063 remotely as long. This form of regulation&#8212;a tiny regulation of a tiny
6064 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding&#8212;is now a
6065 massive regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
6066 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the
6067 most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
6068 known.<sup>[<a name="id2764082" href="#ftn.id2764082" class="footnote">152</a>]</sup>
6069 </p><p>
6070 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
6071 </p><p>
6072 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
6073 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have distinguished
6074 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now combine these two
6075 distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes that copyright law has
6076 undergone.  In 1790, the law looked like this:
6077 </p><div class="table"><a name="t2"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 3.1. </b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Publiser</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6078
6079 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by copyright
6080 law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as copyright attached
6081 only with registration, and only those who intended to benefit commercially
6082 would register, copying through publishing of noncommercial work was also
6083 free.
6084 </p><p>
6085 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
6086 </p><div class="table"><a name="t3"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 3.2. </b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Publiser</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6087 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&#8212;if published,
6088 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time, means if offered
6089 commercially. But noncommercial publishing and transformation were still
6090 essentially free.
6091 </p><p>
6092 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after this
6093 change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the technology of
6094 copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law expanded.  Thus by 1975,
6095 as photocopying machines became more common, we could say the law began to
6096 look like this:
6097 </p><div class="table"><a name="t4"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 3.3. </b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Kopier</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">©/Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6098 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say, copy
6099 machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial market
6100 remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital technologies,
6101 especially in the context of a digital network, means that the law now looks
6102 like this:
6103 </p><div class="table"><a name="t5"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 3.4. </b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Kopier</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6104
6105 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most creativity was
6106 not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&#8212; commercial or
6107 not, transformative or not&#8212;with the same rules designed to regulate
6108 commercial publishers.
6109 </p><p>
6110 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation that does
6111 no good. So the question that we should be asking just now is whether
6112 extending the regulations of copyright law into each of these domains
6113 actually does any good.
6114 </p><p>
6115 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.  But I
6116 also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when regulating (as it
6117 regulates just now) noncommercial copying and, especially, noncommercial
6118 transformation. And increasingly, for the reasons sketched especially in
6119 chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder whether it does more harm than good
6120 for commercial transformation.  More commercial transformative work would be
6121 created if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
6122 </p><p>
6123 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of course
6124 copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any property, the
6125 state ought to protect it. But first impressions notwithstanding,
6126 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<sup>[<a name="id2764427" href="#ftn.id2764427" class="footnote">153</a>]</sup>)  has been crafted to balance the important need to
6127 give authors and artists incentives with the equally important need to
6128 assure access to creative work. This balance has always been struck in light
6129 of new technologies.  And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
6130 did not control <span class="emphasis"><em>at all</em></span> the freedom of others to build
6131 upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
6132 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free
6133 culture.
6134 </p><p>
6135
6136 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important limits on
6137 the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very birth of
6138 "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by granting
6139 copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story of chapter
6140 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar concern that is
6141 increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair use right
6142 become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding statutory rights
6143 where markets might stifle innovation is another familiar limit on the
6144 property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And granting archives and
6145 libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property notwithstanding, is
6146 a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free
6147 cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But the nature of the
6148 property that builds a free culture is very different from the extremist
6149 vision that dominates the debate today.
6150 </p><p>
6151 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In response
6152 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
6153 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing and
6154 distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed in a way
6155 that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property right that
6156 is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or was intended to
6157 be. The property right that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted
6158 toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened
6159 in a world in which creation requires permission and creativity must check
6160 with a lawyer.
6161 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757278" href="#id2757278" class="para">96</a>] </sup>
6162
6163
6164 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
6165 <em class="citetitle">The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</em>, vol. 6 (Andrew
6166 A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&#8211;34.
6167 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757323" href="#id2757323" class="para">97</a>] </sup>
6168
6169
6170 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
6171 intangible.  A property right is simply a right that an individual has
6172 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach
6173 to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to
6174 which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What
6175 Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together," <em class="citetitle">Arizona Law
6176 Review</em> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
6177 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757398" href="#id2757398" class="para">98</a>] </sup>
6178
6179
6180 Jacob Tonson er vanligvis husket for sin omgang med 1700-tallets litterære
6181 storheter, spesielt John Dryden, og for hans kjekke"ferdige versjoner" av
6182 klassiske verk. I tillegg til <em class="citetitle">Romeo og Julie</em>, utga
6183 han en utrolig rekke liste av verk som ennå er hjertet av den engelske
6184 kanon, inkludert de samlede verk av Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, John Milton, og
6185 John Dryden. Se Keith Walker: "Jacob Tonson, Bookseller,"
6186 <em class="citetitle">American Scholar</em> 61:3 (1992): 424-31.
6187 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757428" href="#id2757428" class="para">99</a>] </sup>
6188
6189
6190 Lyman Ray Patterson, <em class="citetitle">Copyright in Historical
6191 Perspective</em> (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968),
6192 151&#8211;52.
6193 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757465" href="#id2757465" class="para">100</a>] </sup>
6194
6195 Som Siva Vaidhyanathan så pent argumenterer, er det feilaktige å kalle dette
6196 en "opphavsrettslov." Se Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
6197 Copywrongs</em>, 40.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2757476"></a>
6198 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757701" href="#id2757701" class="para">101</a>] </sup>
6199
6200
6201
6202 Philip Wittenberg, <em class="citetitle">The Protection and Marketing of Literary
6203 Property</em> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
6204 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757779" href="#id2757779" class="para">102</a>] </sup>
6205
6206
6207 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending in the
6208 House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the Eighth Year of the
6209 Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
6210 Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
6211 Copies, during the Times therein mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici
6212 Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
6213 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
6214 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757845" href="#id2757845" class="para">103</a>] </sup>
6215
6216 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,"
6217 <em class="citetitle">Vanderbilt Law Review</em> 40 (1987): 28. For en
6218 fantastisk overbevisende fortelling, se Vaidhyanathan, 37&#8211;48.
6219 <a class="indexterm" name="id2757438"></a>
6220 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757872" href="#id2757872" class="para">104</a>] </sup>
6221
6222
6223 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <em class="citetitle">Authorship and
6224 Copyright</em> (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&#8211;69.
6225 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757895" href="#id2757895" class="para">105</a>] </sup>
6226
6227
6228 Mark Rose, <em class="citetitle">Authors and Owners</em> (Cambridge: Harvard
6229 University Press, 1993), 92.
6230 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757914" href="#id2757914" class="para">106</a>] </sup>
6231
6232
6233 Ibid., 93.
6234 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757940" href="#id2757940" class="para">107</a>] </sup>
6235
6236
6237 Lyman Ray Patterson, <em class="citetitle">Copyright in Historical
6238 Perspective</em>, 167 (quoting Borwell).
6239 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2757986" href="#id2757986" class="para">108</a>] </sup>
6240
6241
6242 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
6243 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," <em class="citetitle">Wayne Law
6244 Review</em> 29 (1983): 1152.
6245 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2758081" href="#id2758081" class="para">109</a>] </sup>
6246
6247
6248 Ibid., 1156.
6249 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2758231" href="#id2758231" class="para">110</a>] </sup>
6250
6251
6252 Rose, 97.
6253 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2758262" href="#id2758262" class="para">111</a>] </sup>
6254
6255
6256 Ibid.
6257 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2758535" href="#id2758535" class="para">112</a>] </sup>
6258
6259
6260 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers
6261 don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with
6262 William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
6263 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>" (draft on file with author), University of
6264 Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
6265 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2758791" href="#id2758791" class="para">113</a>] </sup>
6266
6267 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
6268 publicity&#8212;rights an artist has to control the commercial exploitation
6269 of his image.  But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix, Burn" creativity, as
6270 this chapter evinces.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2758720"></a>
6271 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2758943" href="#id2758943" class="para">114</a>] </sup>
6272
6273
6274 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
6275 <em class="citetitle">Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services
6276 Acquisition</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #22</a>.
6277 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2759318" href="#id2759318" class="para">115</a>] </sup>
6278
6279
6280 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White House
6281 changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press release
6282 stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later changed,
6283 without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." E-mail from
6284 Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
6285 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2759382" href="#id2759382" class="para">116</a>] </sup>
6286
6287
6288 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
6289 Library of Congress," <em class="citetitle">Film Library Quarterly</em> 13
6290 nos. 2&#8211;3 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <em class="citetitle">Nitrate Won't Wait: A
6291 History of Film Preservation in the United States</em> ( Jefferson,
6292 N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
6293 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2759588" href="#id2759588" class="para">117</a>] </sup>
6294
6295
6296 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord, Bar
6297 Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," <em class="citetitle">Chicago
6298 Tribune</em>, 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published
6299 between 1927 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony
6300 Reese, "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,"
6301 <em class="citetitle">Boston College Law Review</em> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
6302 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2759871" href="#id2759871" class="para">118</a>] </sup>
6303
6304
6305 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.  4794,
6306 H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcommittee on
6307 Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee
6308 on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd
6309 sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
6310 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2759923" href="#id2759923" class="para">119</a>] </sup>
6311
6312
6313 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
6314 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
6315 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
6316 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
6317 ordinary meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman,
6318 <em class="citetitle">Private Property and the Constitution</em> (New Haven:
6319 Yale University Press, 1977), 26&#8211;27.
6320 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2750885" href="#id2750885" class="para">120</a>] </sup>
6321
6322
6323 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6324 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6325 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right
6326 self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the other three is
6327 more timidly expressed.  See Lawrence Lessig, <em class="citetitle">Code: And Other
6328 Laws of Cyberspace</em> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&#8211;95;
6329 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," <em class="citetitle">Journal of Legal
6330 Studies</em>, June 1998.
6331 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2750952" href="#id2750952" class="para">121</a>] </sup>
6332
6333 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6334 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6335 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6336 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6337 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6338 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss
6339 of freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries
6340 of ordinary life.  I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view,
6341 which depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6342 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of
6343 liberty. As I argued in <em class="citetitle">Code</em>, we come from a long
6344 tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question
6345 of what the government did when.  John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6346 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of
6347 government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, <em class="citetitle">On Liberty</em>
6348 (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.  John R. Commons famously
6349 defended the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the
6350 market; John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and
6351 Warren J. Samuels, eds., <em class="citetitle">John R. Commons: Selected
6352 Essays</em> (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with
6353 Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical disabilities
6354 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making access
6355 to those places easier; 42 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>,
6356 section 12101 (2000).  Each of these interventions to change existing
6357 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of those
6358 interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the effective
6359 liberty that each of these groups might face.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2751001"></a>
6360 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2760786" href="#id2760786" class="para">122</a>] </sup>
6361
6362
6363 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6364 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #23</a>. For a more recent
6365 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6366 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6 October 2003, available at
6367 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #24</a>.
6368 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2760843" href="#id2760843" class="para">123</a>] </sup>
6369
6370
6371 Fred Warshofsky, <em class="citetitle">The Patent Wars</em> (New York: Wiley,
6372 1994), 170&#8211;71.
6373 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761009" href="#id2761009" class="para">124</a>] </sup>
6374
6375
6376 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6377 Environmentalism for the Net?" <em class="citetitle">Duke Law Journal</em> 47
6378 (1997): 87.
6379 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761213" href="#id2761213" class="para">125</a>] </sup>
6380
6381 William W. Crosskey, <em class="citetitle">Politics and the Constitution in the History
6382 of the United States</em> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953),
6383 vol. 1, 485&#8211;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6384 Law of the Land,' <span class="emphasis"><em>the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6385 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</em></span>" (emphasis
6386 added).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2761229"></a>
6387 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761284" href="#id2761284" class="para">126</a>] </sup>
6388
6389
6390 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790 to
6391 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <em class="citetitle">A
6392 History of Book Publishing in the United States</em>, vol. 1,
6393 <em class="citetitle">The Creation of an Industry, 1630&#8211;1865</em> (New
6394 York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000 imprints recorded before 1790, only
6395 twelve were copyrighted under the 1790 act; William J. Maher,
6396 <em class="citetitle">Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension and the Copyright Law of
6397 1790 in Historical Context</em>, 7&#8211;10 (2002), available at
6398 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #25</a>.  Thus, the
6399 overwhelming majority of works fell immediately into the public domain. Even
6400 those works that were copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly,
6401 because the term of copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was
6402 fourteen years, with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen
6403 years. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761351" href="#id2761351" class="para">127</a>] </sup>
6404
6405
6406 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For instance, of
6407 the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were renewed in 1910. For
6408 a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
6409 "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright," <em class="citetitle">Studies on
6410 Copyright</em>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1963),
6411 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William M. Landes and
6412 Richard A.  Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6413 <em class="citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review</em> 70 (2003): 471,
6414 498&#8211;501, and accompanying figures.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761379" href="#id2761379" class="para">128</a>] </sup>
6415
6416
6417 Se Ringer, kap. 9, n. 2.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761475" href="#id2761475" class="para">129</a>] </sup>
6418
6419
6420 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the first
6421 year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never more than
6422 thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and Posner,
6423 "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6424 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761611" href="#id2761611" class="para">130</a>] </sup>
6425
6426
6427 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of
6428 American Literature," 29 <em class="citetitle">New York University Journal of
6429 International Law and Politics</em> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth,
6430 ed., Federal Copyright Records, 1790&#8211;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6431
6432 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761692" href="#id2761692" class="para">131</a>] </sup>
6433
6434 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," <em class="citetitle">Legal
6435 Affairs</em>, July/August 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #26</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2761720"></a>
6436 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761739" href="#id2761739" class="para">132</a>] </sup>
6437
6438
6439 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument about
6440 the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective of the
6441 First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See Jed
6442 Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,"
6443 <em class="citetitle">Yale Law Journal</em> 112 (2002): 1&#8211;60 (see
6444 especially pp. 53&#8211;59).
6445 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761789" href="#id2761789" class="para">133</a>] </sup>
6446
6447
6448 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6449 regulates more than "copies"&#8212;a public performance of a copyrighted
6450 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't make
6451 a copy; 17 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>, section 106(4). And it
6452 certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 <em class="citetitle">United States
6453 Code</em>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the existing law
6454 (which regulates "copies;" 17 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>,
6455 section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6456 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761850" href="#id2761850" class="para">134</a>] </sup>
6457
6458
6459 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends, we
6460 should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for its
6461 extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the basis of
6462 arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6463 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2761796" href="#id2761796" class="para">135</a>] </sup>
6464
6465
6466 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather
6467 that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not
6468 make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be
6469 designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies
6470 remain.
6471 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2762328" href="#id2762328" class="para">136</a>] </sup>
6472
6473
6474 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," <em class="citetitle">Law and
6475 Contemporary Problems</em> 44 (1981): 172&#8211;73.
6476 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2762350" href="#id2762350" class="para">137</a>] </sup>
6477
6478 Ibid. Se også Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
6479 Copywrongs</em>, 1&#8211;3.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2762340"></a>
6480 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2762582" href="#id2762582" class="para">138</a>] </sup>
6481
6482
6483 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
6484 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
6485 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
6486 obligation (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
6487 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would not
6488 necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
6489 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2762875" href="#id2762875" class="para">139</a>] </sup>
6490
6491 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
6492 <em class="citetitle">Science</em> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play
6493 Dead: Sony Muzzles the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,"
6494 <em class="citetitle">American Prospect</em>, January 2002; "Court Dismisses
6495 Computer Scientists' Challenge to DMCA," <em class="citetitle">Intellectual Property
6496 Litigation Reporter</em>, 11 December 2001; Bill Holland, "Copyright
6497 Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," <em class="citetitle">Billboard</em>, May
6498 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com, April 2001;
6499 Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked Questions about
6500 <em class="citetitle">Felten and USENIX</em> v. <em class="citetitle">RIAA</em>
6501 Legal Case," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
6502 #27</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2762913"></a>
6503 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763124" href="#id2763124" class="para">140</a>] </sup>
6504
6505
6506 <em class="citetitle">Sony Corporation of America</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Universal
6507 City Studios, Inc</em>., 464 U.S. 417, 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers
6508 never changed his view about the VCR. See James Lardner, <em class="citetitle">Fast
6509 Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of the VCR</em>
6510 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&#8211;71.
6511 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763264" href="#id2763264" class="para">141</a>] </sup>
6512
6513
6514 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
6515 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," <em class="citetitle">Loyola of Los
6516 Angeles Entertainment Law Journal</em> 17 (1997): 651.
6517 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763378" href="#id2763378" class="para">142</a>] </sup>
6518
6519
6520 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
6521 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)  (statement
6522 of Senator John McCain).  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763390" href="#id2763390" class="para">143</a>] </sup>
6523
6524
6525 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to Slide,"
6526 <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 23 December 2002.
6527 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763403" href="#id2763403" class="para">144</a>] </sup>
6528
6529
6530 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," <em class="citetitle">Charleston
6531 Gazette</em>, 31 May 2003.
6532 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763470" href="#id2763470" class="para">145</a>] </sup>
6533
6534 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," <em class="citetitle">Atlantic Monthly</em>
6535 (September 2003): 89.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2763486"></a>
6536 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763576" href="#id2763576" class="para">146</a>] </sup>
6537
6538
6539 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center Forum,
6540 "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis, Missouri, 3 April
6541 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #28</a>; for the Lear story,
6542 not included in the prepared remarks, see <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #29</a>).
6543 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763606" href="#id2763606" class="para">147</a>] </sup>
6544
6545
6546 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
6547 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
6548 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union and
6549 the Consumer Federation of America), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #30</a>. Kimmelman quotes
6550 Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West, in her Remarks
6551 at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February 2003.
6552 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763650" href="#id2763650" class="para">148</a>] </sup>
6553
6554
6555 Ibid.
6556 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763704" href="#id2763704" class="para">149</a>] </sup>
6557
6558
6559 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," <em class="citetitle">Now with Bill
6560 Moyers</em>, Bill Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available
6561 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #31</a>.
6562 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763755" href="#id2763755" class="para">150</a>] </sup>
6563
6564
6565 Clayton M. Christensen, <em class="citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
6566 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do
6567 Business</em> (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
6568 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean
6569 Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and
6570 Market Concepts in Technological Evolution," <em class="citetitle">Research
6571 Policy</em> 14 (1985): 235&#8211;51. For a more recent study, see
6572 Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan, <em class="citetitle">Creative Destruction: Why
6573 Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market&#8212;and How to
6574 Successfully Transform Them</em> (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
6575 2001).  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2763898" href="#id2763898" class="para">151</a>] </sup>
6576
6577 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
6578 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
6579 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
6580 policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
6581 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
6582 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and returned
6583 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.  These
6584 restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for example,
6585 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection
6586 from TV Networks," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 13 March 2003,
6587 C4.  Outside of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC
6588 or the courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general
6589 overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
6590 Advertising on Television and Radio," <em class="citetitle">Yale Law and Policy
6591 Review</em> 6 (1988): 449&#8211;79, and for a more recent summary of
6592 the stance of the FCC and the courts, see <em class="citetitle">Radio-Television News
6593 Directors Association</em> v. <em class="citetitle">FCC</em>, 184 F. 3d
6594 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
6595 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
6596 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel
6597 buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni
6598 Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #32</a>. The ground was that
6599 the criticism was "too controversial." <a class="indexterm" name="id2763945"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2763953"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2763960"></a>
6600 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2764082" href="#id2764082" class="para">152</a>] </sup>
6601
6602 Siva Vaidhyanathan fanger et lignende poeng i hans "fire kapitulasjoner" for
6603 opphavsrettsloven i den digitale tidsalder. Se Vaidhyanathan, 159&#8211;60.
6604 <a class="indexterm" name="id2763924"></a>
6605 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2764427" href="#id2764427" class="para">153</a>] </sup>
6606
6607
6608 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist movement
6609 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance public
6610 and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of Property,"
6611 in <em class="citetitle">Nomos XXII: Property</em>, J. Roland Pennock and John
6612 W.  Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
6613 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 4. Nøtter"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-puzzles"></a>Kapittel 4. Nøtter</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><p></p><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel elleve: Chimera"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="chimera"></a>Kapittel elleve: Chimera</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxchimera"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxwells"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxtcotb"></a><p>
6614 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez
6615 trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in
6616 the Peruvian Andes.<sup>[<a name="id2764559" href="#ftn.id2764559" class="footnote">154</a>]</sup> The valley is
6617 extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate,
6618 slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent
6619 fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an
6620 opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed
6621 Man is King." So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a
6622 king.
6623 </p><p>
6624 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of sight
6625 to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are "blind."
6626 They don't have the word <em class="citetitle">blind</em>. They think he's just
6627 thick.  Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
6628 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to
6629 control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
6630 understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute,
6631 and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
6632 </p><p>
6633
6634
6635 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
6636 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his affection,
6637 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in the whole of
6638 creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's description of what he
6639 sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies, and she listened to his
6640 description of the stars and the mountains and her own sweet white-lit
6641 beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells
6642 tells us, and "she could only half understand, but she was mysteriously
6643 delighted."
6644 </p><p>
6645 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted" love,
6646 the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her father instructs,
6647 "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything right." They take
6648 Nunez to the village doctor.
6649 </p><p>
6650 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain is
6651 affected," he reports.
6652 </p><p>
6653 "What affects it?" the father asks.  "Those queer things that are called the
6654 eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect his brain."
6655 </p><p>
6656 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty that in
6657 order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple and easy
6658 surgical operation&#8212;namely, to remove these irritant bodies [the
6659 eyes]."
6660 </p><p>
6661
6662 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform Nunez
6663 of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.  (You'll have
6664 to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I believe in free
6665 culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)  It sometimes happens
6666 that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
6667 "chimera." A chimera is a single creature with two sets of DNA. The DNA in
6668 the blood, for example, might be different from the DNA of the skin. This
6669 possibility is an underused plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows
6670 with 100 percent certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at
6671 the scene. . . ."
6672 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2764655"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2764663"></a><p>
6673 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were impossible.  A
6674 single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of DNA is that it is
6675 the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two individuals have
6676 the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person can have two different
6677 sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of a "person" should reflect this
6678 reality.
6679 </p><p>
6680 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
6681 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not unfairly
6682 enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing with a
6683 chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is p2p file
6684 sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.  One side
6685 says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
6686 records&#8212;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
6687 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
6688 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just send
6689 the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant respects,
6690 just like what every executive in every recording company no doubt did as a
6691 kid: sharing music.
6692 </p><p>
6693 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is on a
6694 p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then sure, my
6695 friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of "friends" beyond
6696 recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can get access. Whether or
6697 not sharing my music with my best friend is what "we have always been
6698 allowed to do," we have not always been allowed to share music with "our ten
6699 thousand best friends."
6700 </p><p>
6701 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking into
6702 a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out with it,"
6703 that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally) releases a
6704 new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free copy to
6705 take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2764695"></a>
6706 </p><p>
6707
6708
6709
6710 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD from
6711 Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a CD from
6712 Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and something to show on
6713 my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note that when I take a
6714 CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that might be imposed on me, under
6715 California law, at least, is $1,000.  According to the RIAA, by contrast, if
6716 I download a ten-song CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
6717 </p><p>
6718 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that it
6719 is both&#8212;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It is
6720 a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side asserts, we
6721 need to begin to think about how we should respond to this chimera. What
6722 rules should govern it?
6723 </p><p>
6724 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We could,
6725 with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a felony. We
6726 could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages just because
6727 file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get universities to
6728 monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no computer is used to commit
6729 this crime. These responses might be extreme, but each of them has either
6730 been proposed or actually implemented.<sup>[<a name="id2764764" href="#ftn.id2764764" class="footnote">155</a>]</sup>
6731
6732 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2764843"></a><p>
6733 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act as
6734 though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be no
6735 copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making copyrighted
6736 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip: regulated, if
6737 at all, by social norms but not by law.
6738 </p><p>
6739 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.  Rather than
6740 embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace something that
6741 recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book with a sketch of a
6742 system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter is to show just how
6743 awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
6744 <span class="emphasis"><em>either</em></span> extreme would be worse than a reasonable
6745 alternative.  But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
6746 of the two extremes.
6747 </p><p>
6748
6749
6750
6751 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the middle of
6752 the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land grab is
6753 occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give content holders
6754 a kind of control over our culture that they have never had before. And in
6755 this extremism, many an opportunity for new innovation and new creativity
6756 will be lost.
6757 </p><p>
6758 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My focus
6759 instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war will also
6760 kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so broadly among our
6761 citizens, and we have just begun to see the innovation that this power will
6762 unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the passing of one cycle of
6763 innovation around technologies to distribute content. The law is responsible
6764 for this passing. As the vice president for global public policy at one of
6765 these new innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
6766 protection for copyrighted material,
6767 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
6768 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted material,
6769 and we want to protect those rights.
6770 </p><p>
6771 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the major
6772 labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright interests, nor is it
6773 necessarily the best. It is simply too early to answer that question. Market
6774 forces operating naturally may very well produce a totally different
6775 industry model.
6776 </p><p>
6777 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make with
6778 respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the market for
6779 digital media and the manner in which digital media are distributed. This in
6780 turn will directly influence the options that are available to consumers,
6781 both in terms of the ease with which they will be able to access digital
6782 media and the equipment that they will require to do so. Poor choices made
6783 this early in the game will retard the growth of this market, hurting
6784 everyone's interests.<sup>[<a name="id2764928" href="#ftn.id2764928" class="footnote">156</a>]</sup>
6785 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6786 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal, one of "the
6787 major labels." Its position on these matters has now changed.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2764950"></a>
6788 </p><p>
6789 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash piracy. It
6790 will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will kill
6791 opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
6792 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel tolv: Skader"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="harms"></a>Kapittel tolv: Skader</h2></div></div></div><p>
6793
6794 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has launched
6795 a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
6796 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both direct
6797 and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these damages will be
6798 suffered most by our own people.
6799 </p><p>
6800 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
6801 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to extend
6802 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war justified?
6803 </p><p>
6804 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the first
6805 time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the power of
6806 the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in our
6807 history.
6808 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2764998"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2765004"></a><p>
6809 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on the
6810 side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims of control
6811 in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical rejection of "piracy"
6812 still has play.
6813 </p><p>
6814
6815
6816 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to describe
6817 just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite confident
6818 the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The first two
6819 protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in the wings to fight
6820 today's monopolists of culture.
6821 </p><div class="sect2" title="Constraining Creators"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="constrain"></a>Constraining Creators</h3></div></div></div><p>
6822 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital technologies.
6823 These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture and share
6824 content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what humans have done
6825 since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and communicate. But capturing and
6826 sharing through digital technology is different. The fidelity and power are
6827 different. You could send an e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on
6828 Comedy Central, or you could send the clip. You could write an essay about
6829 the inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
6830 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
6831 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could weave
6832 together a string&#8212;a mash-up&#8212; of songs from your favorite artists
6833 in a collage and make it available on the Net.
6834 </p><p>
6835 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
6836 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture, and in
6837 part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but it explodes
6838 the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology of digital
6839 "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily diverse
6840 creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that creativity is
6841 applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of citizens to use
6842 technology to express and criticize and contribute to the culture all
6843 around.
6844 </p><p>
6845
6846 Teknologien har dermed gitt oss en mulighet til å gjøre noe med kultur som
6847 bare har vært mulig for enkeltpersoner i små grupper, isolert fra andre
6848 grupper. Forestill deg en gammel mann som forteller en historie til en
6849 samling med naboer i en liten landsby.  Forestill deg så den samme
6850 historiefortellingen utvidet til å nå over hele verden.
6851 </p><p>
6852 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In the
6853 current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for a
6854 moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web sites that
6855 offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites that catalog
6856 cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound to criticize
6857 politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles on remote
6858 topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative work spread
6859 across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this work is
6860 presumptively illegal.
6861 </p><p>
6862 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the examples of
6863 extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to proliferate. It is
6864 impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed and what's not, and at the
6865 same time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly harsh.  The
6866 four students who were threatened by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3
6867 was just one) were threatened with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search
6868 engines that permitted songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&#8212;which
6869 defrauded investors of $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in
6870 market capitalization of over $200 billion&#8212;received a fine of a mere
6871 $750 million.<sup>[<a name="id2765109" href="#ftn.id2765109" class="footnote">157</a>]</sup> And under legislation
6872 being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who negligently removes the
6873 wrong leg in an operation would be liable for no more than $250,000 in
6874 damages for pain and suffering.<sup>[<a name="id2765145" href="#ftn.id2765145" class="footnote">158</a>]</sup> Can
6875 common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where the maximum fine for
6876 downloading two songs off the Internet is more than the fine for a doctor's
6877 negligently butchering a patient? <a class="indexterm" name="id2765182"></a>
6878 </p><p>
6879 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely high
6880 penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either never
6881 be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this creative
6882 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys "pirates." We
6883 make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public domain, because the
6884 boundaries of the public domain are designed to be unclear. It never pays to
6885 do anything except pay for the right to create, and hence only those who can
6886 pay are allowed to create. As was the case in the Soviet Union, though for
6887 very different reasons, we will begin to see a world of underground
6888 art&#8212;not because the message is necessarily political, or because the
6889 subject is controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is
6890 legally fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
6891 States.<sup>[<a name="id2764748" href="#ftn.id2764748" class="footnote">159</a>]</sup> In what does their "illegality"
6892 consist? In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that
6893 is critical or reflective.
6894 </p><p>
6895 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the changing
6896 law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an even bigger
6897 part has to do with the increasing ease with which infractions can be
6898 tracked. As users of file-sharing systems discovered in 2002, it is a
6899 trivial matter for copyright owners to get courts to order Internet service
6900 providers to reveal who has what content. It is as if your cassette tape
6901 player transmitted a list of the songs that you played in the privacy of
6902 your own home that anyone could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
6903 </p><p>
6904 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether his painting
6905 infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day painter, using the
6906 tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web, must worry all the
6907 time. Images are all around, but the only safe images to use in the act of
6908 creation are those purchased from Corbis or another image farm. And in
6909 purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free market in pencils; we needn't
6910 worry about its effect on creativity. But there is a highly regulated,
6911 monopolized market in cultural icons; the right to cultivate and transform
6912 them is not similarly free.
6913 </p><p>
6914 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I described
6915 in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else,
6916 I have been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
6917 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a use.
6918 </p><p>
6919
6920
6921
6922 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend
6923 your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system for
6924 defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&#8212;in practically
6925 every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers too
6926 slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the justice
6927 underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich.
6928 For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides itself
6929 on the rule of law.
6930 </p><p>
6931 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
6932 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law should
6933 allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system has become
6934 that anyone actually believes this. The rules that publishers impose upon
6935 writers, the rules that film distributors impose upon filmmakers, the rules
6936 that newspapers impose upon journalists&#8212; these are the real laws
6937 governing creativity. And these rules have little relationship to the "law"
6938 with which judges comfort themselves.
6939 </p><p>
6940 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful infringement of
6941 a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of dollars to even defend
6942 against a copyright infringement claim, and which would never return to the
6943 wrongfully accused defendant anything of the costs she suffered to defend
6944 her right to speak&#8212;in that world, the astonishingly broad regulations
6945 that pass under the name "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in
6946 that world, it takes a studied blindness for people to continue to believe
6947 they live in a culture that is free.
6948 </p><p>
6949 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
6950 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
6951
6952 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people are
6953 being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
6954 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still won't
6955 get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not going to get
6956 it distributed in the mainstream media unless you've got a little note from
6957 a lawyer saying, "This has been cleared." You're not even going to get it on
6958 PBS without that kind of permission. That's the point at which they control
6959 it.
6960 </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="sect2" title="Constraining Innovators"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="innovators"></a>Constraining Innovators</h3></div></div></div><p>
6961 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty story&#8212;creativity
6962 quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada yada. Maybe that doesn't get you
6963 going. Maybe you think there's enough weird art out there, and enough
6964 expression that is critical of what seems to be just about everything.  And
6965 if you think that, you might think there's little in this story to worry
6966 you.
6967 </p><p>
6968 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.  Indeed,
6969 it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme promarket
6970 ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special one at that, 188
6971 pages into a book like this), then you can see this other aspect by
6972 substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of "free culture." The
6973 point is the same, even if the interests affecting culture are more
6974 fundamental.
6975 </p><p>
6976 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the same
6977 charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of course,
6978 concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&#8212;at a minimum, we
6979 need rules of property and contract, and courts to enforce both. Likewise,
6980 in this culture debate, everyone concedes that at least some framework of
6981 copyright is also required. But both perspectives vehemently insist that
6982 just because some regulation is good, it doesn't follow that more regulation
6983 is better. And both perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which
6984 regulation simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect
6985 themselves against the competitors of tomorrow.
6986 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2765364"></a><p>
6987
6988 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory strategy
6989 that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this massive threat of
6990 liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is that innovators
6991 who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate only if they have the
6992 sign-off from last generation's dominant industries.  That lesson has been
6993 taught through a series of cases that were designed and executed to teach
6994 venture capitalists a lesson. That lesson&#8212;what former Napster CEO Hank
6995 Barry calls a "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&#8212;has been
6996 learned.
6997 </p><p>
6998 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning I told in
6999 <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em> and which has progressed in a way
7000 that even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
7001 </p><p>
7002 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com.  MP3.com was
7003 keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to facilitate new
7004 ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to facilitate new ways to
7005 create content. Unlike the major labels, MP3.com offered creators a venue to
7006 distribute their creativity, without demanding an exclusive engagement from
7007 the creators.
7008 </p><p>
7009 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
7010 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
7011 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
7012 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie Raitt. And
7013 so on.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2765433"></a>
7014 </p><p>
7015 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
7016 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this preference
7017 data. In January 2000, the company launched a service called
7018 my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would sign into an
7019 account and then insert into her computer a CD. The software would identify
7020 the CD, and then give the user access to that content.  So, for example, if
7021 you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then wherever you were&#8212;at work or at
7022 home&#8212;you could get access to that music once you signed into your
7023 account. The system was therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
7024 </p><p>
7025
7026 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But that
7027 opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the my.mp3.com
7028 service was to give users access to their own content, and as a by-product,
7029 by seeing the content they already owned, to discover the kind of content
7030 the users liked.
7031 </p><p>
7032 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000 CDs to
7033 a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who uploaded the music,
7034 but that would have taken a great deal of time, and would have produced a
7035 product of questionable quality.) It therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a
7036 store, and started the process of making copies of those CDs. Again, it
7037 would not serve the content from those copies to anyone except those who
7038 authenticated that they had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while
7039 this was 50,000 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers
7040 something they had already bought.
7041 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxvivendiuniversal"></a><p>
7042 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels, headed
7043 by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled with four of
7044 the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found MP3.com to have been
7045 guilty of willful infringement with respect to the fifth. Applying the law
7046 as it is, the judge imposed a fine against MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com
7047 then settled with the remaining plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over
7048 $54 million. Vivendi purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
7049 </p><p>
7050 Den delen av historien har jeg fortalt før.  Nå kommer konklusjonen.
7051 </p><p>
7052 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
7053 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they had a
7054 good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be considered
7055 legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it should have been
7056 obvious that the courts would find this behavior illegal; therefore, this
7057 lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had dared to suggest that the law
7058 was less restrictive than the labels demanded.
7059 </p><p>
7060
7061 Den åpenbare hensikten med dette søksmålet (som ble avsluttet med et forlik
7062 for et uspesifisert beløp like etter at saken ikke lenger fikk
7063 pressedekning), var å sende en melding som ikke kan misforstås til advokater
7064 som gir råd til klienter på dette området: Det er ikke bare dine klienter
7065 som får lide hvis innholdsindustrien retter sine våpen mot dem.  Det får
7066 også du.  Så de av dere som tror loven burde være mindre restriktiv bør
7067 innse at et slikt syn på loven vil koste deg og ditt firma dyrt.
7068 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2765537"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2765545"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2765551"></a><p>
7069 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003, Universal
7070 and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the venture capital firm
7071 (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of its development, its
7072 cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner (Hank Barry).<sup>[<a name="id2765564" href="#ftn.id2765564" class="footnote">160</a>]</sup> The claim here, as well, was that the VC should
7073 have recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
7074 industry should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
7075 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim
7076 of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
7077 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at risk
7078 not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.  Your investment
7079 buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.  So extreme has the
7080 environment become that even car manufacturers are afraid of technologies
7081 that touch content. In an article in <em class="citetitle">Business 2.0</em>,
7082 Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
7083 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><a class="indexterm" name="id2765608"></a><p>
7084 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in the car,
7085 there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW engineers in Germany
7086 had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via the car's built-in sound system,
7087 but that the company's marketing and legal departments weren't comfortable
7088 with pushing this forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are
7089 sold in the United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <sup>[<a name="id2765623" href="#ftn.id2765623" class="footnote">161</a>]</sup>
7090 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7091 Dette er verden til mafiaen&#8212;fylt med "penger eller livet"-trusler, som
7092 ikke er regulert av domstolene men av trusler som loven gir
7093 rettighetsinnehaver mulighet til å komme med. Det er et system som åpenbart
7094 og nødvendigvis vil kvele ny innovasjon. Det er vanskelig nok å starte et
7095 selskap. Det blir helt umulig hvis selskapet er stadig truet av søksmål.
7096 </p><p>
7097
7098
7099
7100 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
7101 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
7102 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
7103 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and by
7104 embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law imposes, that
7105 uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more conservative than is
7106 right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking tickets, we'd not
7107 only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much less driving. The same
7108 principle applies to innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this
7109 uncertain and unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation
7110 and much less creativity.
7111 </p><p>
7112 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
7113 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
7114 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
7115 systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
7116 industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
7117 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant competition.
7118 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of competition.
7119 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect of too
7120 much control in the market is to produce an overregulatedregulated market.
7121 </p><p>
7122
7123 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is the
7124 first important way in which the changes I have described will burden
7125 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&#8212;a culture in
7126 which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again, I am not
7127 antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I am certainly
7128 not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its limits. And
7129 leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the high costs that
7130 our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an
7131 embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our profession should
7132 therefore do everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at
7133 least do everything it can to limit the reach of the law where the law is
7134 not doing any good. The transaction costs buried within a permission culture
7135 are enough to bury a wide range of creativity.  Someone needs to do a lot of
7136 justifying to justify that result.  The uncertainty of the law is one burden
7137 on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more directly. This is
7138 the effort by many in the content industry to use the law to directly
7139 regulate the technology of the Internet so that it better protects their
7140 content.
7141 </p><p>
7142 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
7143 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the Internet's
7144 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this feature is a
7145 "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content distributors have
7146 a harder time controlling the distribution of content.  One obvious response
7147 to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet less efficient. If the
7148 Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says, we should break the
7149 kneecaps of the Internet.
7150 </p><p>
7151 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of the
7152 content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that would
7153 require computers to determine whether the content they access is protected
7154 or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<sup>[<a name="id2765757" href="#ftn.id2765757" class="footnote">162</a>]</sup> Congress has already launched proceedings to
7155 explore a mandatory "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device
7156 capable of transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would
7157 disable the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast
7158 flag. Other members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers
7159 from liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
7160 copyright violators and disable their machines.<sup>[<a name="id2765780" href="#ftn.id2765780" class="footnote">163</a>]</sup>
7161
7162 </p><p>
7163
7164 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the code, why
7165 not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any regulation of technical
7166 infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular technology of the
7167 day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on the technology, but
7168 will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly those requirements.
7169 </p><p>
7170 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by Intel,
7171 tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
7172 impose.<sup>[<a name="id2765803" href="#ftn.id2765803" class="footnote">164</a>]</sup> Their argument was obviously
7173 not that copyright should not be protected. Instead, they argued, any
7174 protection should not do more harm than good.
7175 </p><p>
7176 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
7177 innovation&#8212;again, a story that will be quite familiar to the free
7178 market crowd.
7179 </p><p>
7180 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form of
7181 regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.  When
7182 done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done wrong, it is
7183 regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
7184 </p><p>
7185 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
7186 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
7187 Litman in her book <em class="citetitle">Digital Copyright</em>,<sup>[<a name="id2765837" href="#ftn.id2765837" class="footnote">165</a>]</sup> overall this history of copyright is not bad. As
7188 chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come along, Congress has
7189 struck a balance to assure that the new is protected from the
7190 old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of that
7191 strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
7192 </p><p>
7193 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed with the
7194 rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between the claims of a
7195 new technology and the legitimate rights of content creators, both the
7196 courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions that will have the
7197 effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
7198 </p><p>
7199 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<sup>[<a name="id2765866" href="#ftn.id2765866" class="footnote">166</a>]</sup> It has been mirrored in the responses threatened
7200 and actually implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
7201 here.<sup>[<a name="id2765902" href="#ftn.id2765902" class="footnote">167</a>]</sup> But there is one example that
7202 captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the demise of Internet
7203 radio.
7204 </p><p>
7205
7206
7207
7208 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
7209 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or
7210 she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
7211 version of "Happy Birthday"&#8212;to memorialize her famous performance
7212 before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&#8212; then whenever that
7213 recording was played on the radio, the current copyright owners of "Happy
7214 Birthday" would get some money, whereas Marilyn Monroe would not.
7215 </p><p>
7216 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some sense. The
7217 justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The recording artist
7218 thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio station was making it
7219 more likely that her records would be purchased.  Thus, the recording artist
7220 got something, even if only indirectly.  Probably this reasoning had less to
7221 do with the result than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists
7222 were quite good at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require
7223 compensation to the recording artists.
7224 </p><p>
7225 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a technology to
7226 stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast travels
7227 across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.  Thus, I can
7228 "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting in San
7229 Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a regular radio
7230 station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
7231 </p><p>
7232 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there are
7233 potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could tune in
7234 to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture for broadcast
7235 radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of broadcasters and clear
7236 broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore be more competitive
7237 than regular radio; it could provide a wider range of selections. And
7238 because the potential audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche
7239 stations could easily develop and market their content to a relatively large
7240 number of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
7241 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
7242 </p><p>
7243
7244
7245
7246 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an improvement
7247 potentially vastly more significant than the FM improvement over AM, since
7248 not only is the technology better, so, too, is the competition. Indeed,
7249 there is a direct parallel between the fight to establish FM radio and the
7250 fight to protect Internet radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's
7251 struggle to enable FM radio,
7252 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7253 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the shortwaves,
7254 thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in the crowded
7255 longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of stations would be
7256 limited only by economics and competition rather than by technical
7257 restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation that had grown up in
7258 radio to that following the invention of the printing press, when
7259 governments and ruling interests attempted to control this new instrument of
7260 mass communications by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was
7261 broken only when it became possible for men freely to acquire printing
7262 presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention
7263 as the printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
7264 shackles.<sup>[<a name="id2766021" href="#ftn.id2766021" class="footnote">168</a>]</sup>
7265 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7266 This potential for FM radio was never realized&#8212;not because Armstrong
7267 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated the power of
7268 "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<sup>[<a name="id2765819" href="#ftn.id2765819" class="footnote">169</a>]</sup> to retard the growth of this competing technology.
7269 </p><p>
7270 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For again, there
7271 is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of Internet radio
7272 stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are those imposed by the
7273 law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first question we should ask is,
7274 what copyright rules would govern Internet radio?
7275 </p><p>
7276
7277 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a new
7278 industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very powerful
7279 lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon of Internet
7280 radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt a different rule
7281 for Internet radio than the rule that applies to terrestrial radio. While
7282 terrestrial radio does not have to pay our hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when
7283 it plays her hypothetical recording of "Happy Birthday" on the air,
7284 <span class="emphasis"><em>Internet radio does</em></span>. Not only is the law not neutral
7285 toward Internet radio&#8212;the law actually burdens Internet radio more
7286 than it burdens terrestrial radio.
7287 </p><p>
7288 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor William Fisher
7289 estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree popular music to
7290 (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four hours a day, the total
7291 artist fees that radio station would owe would be over $1 million a
7292 year.<sup>[<a name="id2766081" href="#ftn.id2766081" class="footnote">170</a>]</sup> A regular radio station
7293 broadcasting the same content would pay no equivalent fee.
7294 </p><p>
7295 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
7296 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
7297 would have to collect the following data from <span class="emphasis"><em>every listening
7298 transaction</em></span>:
7299 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
7300 name of the service;
7301 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7302 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
7303 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7304 type of program (archived/looped/live);
7305 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7306 date of transmission;
7307 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7308 time of transmission;
7309 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7310 time zone of origination of transmission;
7311 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7312 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
7313 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7314 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
7315 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7316 sound recording title;
7317 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7318 ISRC code of the recording;
7319 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7320 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of
7321 compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of
7322 the track;
7323 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7324 featured recording artist;
7325 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7326 retail album title;
7327 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7328 recording label;
7329 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7330 UPC code of the retail album;
7331 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7332 catalog number;
7333 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7334 copyright owner information;
7335 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7336 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
7337 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7338 name of the service or entity;
7339 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7340 channel or program;
7341 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7342 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
7343 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7344 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
7345 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7346 time zone where the signal was received (user);
7347 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7348 Unique User identifier;
7349 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7350 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
7351 </p></li></ol></div><p>
7352 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting requirements,
7353 pending further study. And he also changed the original rates set by the
7354 arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the basic difference
7355 between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains: Internet radio has to
7356 pay a <span class="emphasis"><em>type of copyright fee</em></span> that terrestrial radio does
7357 not.
7358 </p><p>
7359 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the economic
7360 consequences from Internet radio that would justify these differences? Was
7361 the motive to protect artists against piracy?
7362 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2766293"></a><p>
7363 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious to
7364 everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public Policy at
7365 Real Networks, told me,
7366 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7367
7368 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented some testimony
7369 about what they thought a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, and
7370 it was much higher. It was ten times higher than what radio stations pay to
7371 perform the same songs for the same period of time. And so the attorneys
7372 representing the webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
7373 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because here we
7374 have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and that should
7375 establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so high, you're going to
7376 drive the small webcasters out of business. . . ."
7377 </p><p>
7378 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an industry
7379 with thousands of webcasters, <span class="emphasis"><em>we think it should be an industry
7380 with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a high rate and it's a
7381 stable, predictable market</em></span>." (Emphasis added.)
7382 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7383 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so that
7384 this platform of potentially immense competition, which would cause the
7385 diversity and range of content available to explode, would not cause pain to
7386 the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right or the left, who
7387 should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is practically no one, on
7388 either the right or the left, who is doing anything effective to prevent it.
7389 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Corrupting Citizens"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="corruptingcitizens"></a>Corrupting Citizens</h3></div></div></div><p>
7390 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
7391 dinosaurs a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
7392 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
7393 </p><p>
7394 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was important
7395 to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation corrupts
7396 citizens and weakens the rule of law.
7397 </p><p>
7398
7399 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with every war
7400 of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very large number
7401 of citizens. According to <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em>, 43
7402 million Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<sup>[<a name="id2766380" href="#ftn.id2766380" class="footnote">171</a>]</sup> According to the RIAA, the behavior of those 43 million Americans
7403 is a felony. We thus have a set of rules that transform 20 percent of
7404 America into criminals. As the RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the
7405 Napsters and Kazaas of the world, but against students building search
7406 engines, and increasingly against ordinary users downloading content, the
7407 technologies for sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal
7408 use. It is an arms race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side
7409 inviting a more extreme response by the other.
7410 </p><p>
7411 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American legal
7412 system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it knew that in
7413 Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The threat of having to
7414 pay either all the money in the world in damages ($15,000,000) or almost all
7415 the money in the world to defend against paying all the money in the world
7416 in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)  led Jordan to choose to pay all the
7417 money he had in the world ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same
7418 strategy animates the RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
7419 2003, the RIAA sued 261 individuals&#8212;including a twelve-year-old girl
7420 living in public housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what
7421 file sharing was.<sup>[<a name="id2766071" href="#ftn.id2766071" class="footnote">172</a>]</sup> As these scapegoats
7422 discovered, it will always cost more to defend against these suits than it
7423 would cost to simply settle. (The twelve year old, for example, like Jesse
7424 Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000 to settle the case.) Our law is an
7425 awful system for defending rights. It is an embarrassment to our
7426 tradition. And the consequence of our law as it is, is that those with the
7427 power can use the law to quash any rights they oppose.
7428 </p><p>
7429 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just something
7430 more extreme than anything we've seen before. We experimented with alcohol
7431 prohibition, at a time when the per capita consumption of alcohol was 1.5
7432 gallons per capita per year. The war against drinking initially reduced that
7433 consumption to just 30 percent of its preprohibition levels, but by the end
7434 of prohibition, consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
7435 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast number
7436 were criminals.<sup>[<a name="id2766454" href="#ftn.id2766454" class="footnote">173</a>]</sup> We have launched a war
7437 on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated narcotics that 7
7438 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<sup>[<a name="id2766468" href="#ftn.id2766468" class="footnote">174</a>]</sup> That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
7439 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast majority
7440 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex tax system
7441 that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.<sup>[<a name="id2766484" href="#ftn.id2766484" class="footnote">175</a>]</sup> We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an
7442 endless array of ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a
7443 result, a huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
7444 </p><p>
7445 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
7446 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
7447 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told a
7448 class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students who
7449 have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and sometimes
7450 drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven cars. These
7451 are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the norm. And then we,
7452 as law professors, are supposed to teach them how to behave
7453 ethically&#8212;how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds separate, or
7454 honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that your case is
7455 over. Generations of Americans&#8212;more significantly in some parts of
7456 America than in others, but still, everywhere in America today&#8212;can't
7457 live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a
7458 certain degree of illegality.
7459 </p><p>
7460 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law more
7461 severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how to make
7462 that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense depends, in part, at
7463 least, upon whether the costs of the law, both intended and collateral,
7464 outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and collateral, do outweigh
7465 the benefits, then the law ought to be changed.  Alternatively, if the costs
7466 of the existing system are much greater than the costs of an alternative,
7467 then we have a good reason to consider the alternative.
7468 </p><p>
7469
7470
7471
7472 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
7473 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
7474 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But that
7475 wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the week. A
7476 society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
7477 </p><p>
7478 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations, but
7479 that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends upon people
7480 obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we as citizens
7481 experience violating the law, the less we respect the law. Obviously, in
7482 most cases, the important issue is the law, not respect for the law. I don't
7483 care whether the rapist respects the law or not; I want to catch and
7484 incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether my students respect the
7485 law. And I do care if the rules of law sow increasing disrespect because of
7486 the extreme of regulation they impose.  Twenty million Americans have come
7487 of age since the Internet introduced this different idea of "sharing." We
7488 need to be able to call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not
7489 "felons."
7490 </p><p>
7491 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
7492 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
7493 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be asking is
7494 not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be whether this
7495 particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve the proper
7496 ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to assure that artists
7497 get paid without transforming forty-three million Americans into felons?
7498 Does it make sense if there are other ways to assure that artists get paid
7499 without transforming America into a nation of felons?
7500 </p><p>
7501 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
7502 </p><p>
7503
7504 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces of
7505 plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought.  The law
7506 protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a copyright
7507 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used record store
7508 and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the recordings is free.
7509 </p><p>
7510 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of phonograph
7511 records that is effectively free. Because these recordings were made without
7512 copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy, or "rip," music from my
7513 records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed, Apple Corporation went so far as
7514 to suggest that "freedom" was a right: In a series of commercials, Apple
7515 endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn" capacities of digital technologies.
7516 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2766604"></a><p>
7517 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large process
7518 at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing them in one
7519 archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful program called
7520 Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music: Bach, Baroque,
7521 Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others&#8212;the potential is
7522 endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists, these technologies
7523 help build a creativity with play lists that is itself independently
7524 valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and meaningful in their own
7525 right.
7526 </p><p>
7527 This use is enabled by unprotected media&#8212;either CDs or records.  But
7528 unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens (or so
7529 the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair return
7530 from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to experiment with
7531 technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These technologies, for
7532 example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or they might enable spy
7533 programs to identify ripped content on people's machines.
7534 </p><p>
7535
7536 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of your
7537 own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker circles,
7538 and get technology to disable the technologies that protect the
7539 content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that doesn't
7540 bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people, these
7541 protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving use of
7542 CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to the world
7543 where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of plastic or were
7544 part of a massively complex "digital rights management" system.
7545 </p><p>
7546 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination of the
7547 ability to freely move content, then these technologies to interfere with
7548 the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what if there were
7549 another way to assure that artists are paid, without locking down any
7550 content? What if, in other words, a different system could assure
7551 compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom to move content
7552 easily?
7553 </p><p>
7554 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer a
7555 version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now, the only
7556 point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system achieved
7557 the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright system achieved,
7558 but left consumers and creators much more free, then we'd have a very good
7559 reason to pursue this alternative&#8212;namely, freedom.  The choice, in
7560 other words, would not be between property and piracy; the choice would be
7561 between different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
7562 </p><p>
7563 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without turning
7564 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature of this
7565 alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for producing
7566 and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today control the vast
7567 majority of the distribution of content in the world, would no longer
7568 exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go the way of the
7569 horse-drawn buggy.
7570 </p><p>
7571 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
7572 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this new form
7573 of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree million Americans
7574 as criminals and their own survival.
7575 </p><p>
7576 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not understandable
7577 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack Valenti is charming;
7578 but not so charming as to justify giving up a tradition as deep and
7579 important as our tradition of free culture.  There's one more aspect to this
7580 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and follows
7581 directly from any war of prohibition.  As Electronic Frontier Foundation
7582 attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that
7583 "arises whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
7584 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
7585 <a class="indexterm" name="id2766717"></a>
7586 </p><p>
7587 "Hvis du kan behandle noen som en antatt lovbryter," forklarer von Lohmann,
7588 <a class="indexterm" name="id2766730"></a>
7589 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7590 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections evaporate to
7591 one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright infringer, how can you
7592 hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright infringer, how can
7593 you hope to be secure against seizures of your computer? How can you hope to
7594 continue to receive Internet access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon
7595 as we think, "Oh, well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well,
7596 what this campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
7597 percentage of the American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
7598 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7599 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public into
7600 criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
7601 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
7602 </p><p>
7603 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
7604 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over the
7605 names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
7606 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a judge,
7607 and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of an Internet
7608 user is revealed.
7609 </p><p>
7610
7611 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy to
7612 sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have downloaded
7613 copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've seen, the
7614 potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a family's computer
7615 is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the family could be liable
7616 for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop the RIAA from suing a number of
7617 these families, just as they had sued Jesse Jordan.<sup>[<a name="id2766781" href="#ftn.id2766781" class="footnote">176</a>]</sup>
7618
7619 </p><p>
7620 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the RIAA. A
7621 report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the RIAA had adopted
7622 to track Napster users.<sup>[<a name="id2766821" href="#ftn.id2766821" class="footnote">177</a>]</sup> Using a
7623 sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a
7624 fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those
7625 MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
7626 </p><p>
7627 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a friend gives a
7628 CD to your daughter&#8212;a collection of songs just like the cassettes you
7629 used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does your daughter, where
7630 these songs came from. But she copies these songs onto her computer. She
7631 then takes her computer to college and connects it to a college network, and
7632 if the college network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she
7633 hasn't properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to
7634 do that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as
7635 a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning to
7636 deploy,<sup>[<a name="id2766672" href="#ftn.id2766672" class="footnote">178</a>]</sup> your daughter can lose the
7637 right to use the university's computer network.  She can, in some cases, be
7638 expelled.
7639 </p><p>
7640 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire a
7641 lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead that
7642 she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that they came
7643 from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes her. But the
7644 university might not believe her. It might treat this "contraband" as
7645 presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students have already
7646 learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in the middle of wars of
7647 prohibition. This war is no different.  Says von Lohmann, <a class="indexterm" name="id2766916"></a>
7648 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7649 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million Americans
7650 that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a situation where the
7651 civil liberties of those people are very much in peril in a general
7652 matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where you could randomly
7653 choose any person off the street and be confident that they were committing
7654 an unlawful act that could put them on the hook for potential felony
7655 liability or hundreds of millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly
7656 we all speed, but speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely
7657 forfeit civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
7658 closest analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has eroded
7659 all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many Americans as
7660 criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of
7661 magnitude larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
7662 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a slippery
7663 slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty million of
7664 them.
7665 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7666 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under the
7667 law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&#8212; securing
7668 rights to authors&#8212;without these millions being considered "criminals,"
7669 who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is American, a constant war
7670 on our own people or a concerted effort through our democracy to change our
7671 law?
7672 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2764559" href="#id2764559" class="para">154</a>] </sup>
7673
7674
7675 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
7676 <em class="citetitle">The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</em>, Michael
7677 Sherborne, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
7678 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2764764" href="#id2764764" class="para">155</a>] </sup>
7679
7680 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
7681 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, "Copyright
7682 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available at
7683 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #33</a>. Reps. John
7684 Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill
7685 that would treat unauthorized on-line copying as a felony offense with
7686 punishments ranging as high as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
7687 "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy," <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles
7688 Times</em>, 17 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #34</a>. Civil penalties are
7689 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
7690 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
7691 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer, see
7692 <em class="citetitle">RIAA</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Verizon Internet Services (In
7693 re. Verizon Internet Services)</em>, 240 F.  Supp. 2d 24
7694 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
7695 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful arsenal
7696 in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from $12,000 to
7697 $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on university
7698 networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98 billion the RIAA
7699 could seek should the matter proceed to court. See Elizabeth Young,
7700 "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com, August 2003, available
7701 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #35</a>. For an
7702 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
7703 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer identities,
7704 see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students,"
7705 <em class="citetitle">Boston Globe</em>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #36</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2764832"></a>
7706 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2764928" href="#id2764928" class="para">156</a>] </sup>
7707
7708
7709 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
7710 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
7711 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, House
7712 Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter Harter,
7713 vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards, EMusic.com), available
7714 in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony File.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765109" href="#id2765109" class="para">157</a>] </sup>
7715
7716 See Lynne W. Jeter, <em class="citetitle">Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at
7717 WorldCom</em> (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204;
7718 for details of the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins
7719 U.S. District Court Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
7720 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #37</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2765132"></a>
7721 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765145" href="#id2765145" class="para">158</a>] </sup>
7722  The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
7723 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For an
7724 overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,' Say
7725 Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #38</a>, and "Senate Turns Back
7726 Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #39</a>. President Bush has
7727 continued to urge tort reform in recent months.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2765169"></a>
7728 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2764748" href="#id2764748" class="para">159</a>] </sup>
7729
7730
7731
7732 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," <em class="citetitle">Wired</em>,
7733 7 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7734 #40</a>. For an overview of the exhibition, see <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #41</a>.
7735 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765564" href="#id2765564" class="para">160</a>] </sup>
7736
7737
7738 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," <em class="citetitle">Los
7739 Angeles Times</em>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the
7740 effects on innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The
7741 Music Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
7742 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #42</a>.  See also
7743 Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles
7744 Times</em>, 28 May 2001.
7745 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765623" href="#id2765623" class="para">161</a>] </sup>
7746
7747 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," <em class="citetitle">Business
7748 2.0</em>, 16 June 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #43</a>. I am grateful to
7749 Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2765640"></a>
7750 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765757" href="#id2765757" class="para">162</a>] </sup>
7751
7752 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and the
7753 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School (2003),
7754 33&#8211;35, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7755 #44</a>.
7756 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765780" href="#id2765780" class="para">163</a>] </sup>
7757
7758 GartnerG2, 26&#8211;27.
7759 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765803" href="#id2765803" class="para">164</a>] </sup>
7760
7761 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes, February
7762 2002 (Entertainment).
7763 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765837" href="#id2765837" class="para">165</a>] </sup>
7764
7765 Jessica Litman, <em class="citetitle">Digital Copyright</em> (Amherst, N.Y.:
7766 Prometheus Books, 2001).
7767 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765866" href="#id2765866" class="para">166</a>] </sup>
7768
7769
7770 The only circuit court exception is found in <em class="citetitle">Recording Industry
7771 Association of America (RIAA)</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Diamond Multimedia
7772 Systems</em>, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of
7773 appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player
7774 were not liable for contributory copyright infringement for a device that is
7775 unable to record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function
7776 is to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard drive).
7777 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
7778 <em class="citetitle">Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
7779 Inc</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Grokster, Ltd</em>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
7780 1029 (C.D.  Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
7781 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
7782 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
7783 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765902" href="#id2765902" class="para">167</a>] </sup>
7784
7785 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
7786 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
7787 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
7788 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In August
7789 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
7790 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
7791 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
7792 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
7793 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act,
7794 which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
7795 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
7796 World," 27 June 2003, 33&#8211;34, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #44</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2765910"></a>
7797 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766021" href="#id2766021" class="para">168</a>] </sup>
7798
7799
7800 Lessing, 239.
7801 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2765819" href="#id2765819" class="para">169</a>] </sup>
7802
7803
7804 Ibid., 229.
7805 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766081" href="#id2766081" class="para">170</a>] </sup>
7806
7807 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright Arbitration
7808 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example offered by
7809 Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw (Stanford), 3 July
7810 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain submitted
7811 testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.  See Jonathan
7812 Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
7813 Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #45</a>.  For an excellent
7814 analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry
7815 Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," <em class="citetitle">Antitrust
7816 Bulletin</em> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these
7817 are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected
7818 from digital entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is
7819 done in the name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the
7820 play of powerful interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral
7821 way." <a class="indexterm" name="id2766110"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2766120"></a>
7822 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766380" href="#id2766380" class="para">171</a>] </sup>
7823
7824 Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew Internet
7825 and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #46</a>.  The Pew Internet and
7826 American Life Project reported that 37 million Americans had downloaded
7827 music files from the Internet by early 2001.
7828 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766071" href="#id2766071" class="para">172</a>] </sup>
7829
7830
7831 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,"
7832 <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles Times</em>, 10 September 2003, Business.
7833 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766454" href="#id2766454" class="para">173</a>] </sup>
7834
7835
7836 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
7837 Prohibition," <em class="citetitle">American Economic Review</em> 81, no. 2
7838 (1991): 242.
7839 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766468" href="#id2766468" class="para">174</a>] </sup>
7840
7841
7842 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government Reform
7843 Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of John
7844 P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
7845 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766484" href="#id2766484" class="para">175</a>] </sup>
7846
7847
7848 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax Compliance,"
7849 <em class="citetitle">Journal of Economic Literature</em> 36 (1998): 818 (survey
7850 of compliance literature).
7851 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766781" href="#id2766781" class="para">176</a>] </sup>
7852
7853
7854 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single Mother in
7855 Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants," <em class="citetitle">Washington
7856 Post</em>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull
7857 Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File
7858 Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being Sued,"
7859 <em class="citetitle">Orlando Sentinel Tribune</em>, 30 August 2003, C1;
7860 Jefferson Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," <em class="citetitle">USA
7861 Today</em>, 15 September 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No
7862 Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>,
7863 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a Criminal?"
7864 <em class="citetitle">Toronto Star</em>, 18 September 2003, P7.
7865 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766821" href="#id2766821" class="para">177</a>] </sup>
7866
7867
7868 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses Some
7869 Methods Used," CNN.com, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #47</a>.
7870 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2766672" href="#id2766672" class="para">178</a>] </sup>
7871
7872
7873 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
7874 <em class="citetitle">Boston Globe</em>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank
7875 Ahrens, "Four Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File
7876 Sharing at Colleges," <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, 4 April 2003,
7877 E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,"
7878 <em class="citetitle">Christian Science Monitor</em>, 2 September 2003, 20;
7879 Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two
7880 Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible," <em class="citetitle">Chicago
7881 Tribune</em>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy
7882 Guns on Universities," <em class="citetitle">Internet News</em>, 30 January
7883 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7884 #48</a>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman Orientation
7885 This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing,"
7886 <em class="citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle</em>, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid,
7887 Letters Are Weapons at Universities," <em class="citetitle">USA Today</em>, 26
7888 September 2000, 3D.
7889 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 5. Maktfordeling"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-balances"></a>Kapittel 5. Maktfordeling</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
7890 Så her er bildet: Du står på siden av veien. Bilen din er på brann. Du er
7891 sint og opprørt fordi du delvis bidro til å starte brannen. Nå vet du ikke
7892 hvordan du slokker den.  Ved siden av deg er en bøtte, fylt med
7893 bensin. Bensin vil åpenbart ikke slukke brannen.
7894 </p><p>
7895 Mens du tenker over situasjonen, kommer noen andre forbi.  I panikk griper
7896 hun bøtta, og før du har hatt sjansen til å be henne stoppe&#8212;eller før
7897 hun forstår hvorfor hun bør stoppe&#8212;er bøtten i svevet.  Bensinen er på
7898 tur mot den brennende bilen.  Og brannen som bensinen kommer til å fyre opp
7899 vil straks sette fyr på alt i omgivelsene.
7900 </p><p>
7901 En krig om opphavsrett pågår over alt&#8212; og vi fokuserer alle på feil
7902 ting.  Det er ingen tvil om at dagens teknologier truer eksisterende
7903 virksomheter.  Uten tvil kan de true artister.  Men teknologier endrer seg.
7904 Industrien og teknologer har en rekke måter å bruke teknologi til å beskytte
7905 dem selv mot dagens trusler på Internet.  Dette er en brann som overlatt til
7906 seg selv vil brenne ut.
7907 </p><p>
7908
7909
7910 Likevel er ikke besluttningstagere villig til å la denne brannen i fred.
7911 Ladet med masse penger fra lobbyister er de lystne på å gå i mellom for å
7912 fjerne problemet slik de oppfatter det.  Men problemet slik de oppfatter det
7913 er ikke den reelle trusselen som denne kulturen står med ansiktet mot.  For
7914 mens vi ser på denne lille brannen i hjørnet er det en massiv endring i
7915 hvordan kultur blir skapt som pågår over alt.
7916 </p><p>
7917 På en eller annen måte må vi klare å snu oppmerksomheten mot dette mer
7918 viktige og fundametale problemet.  Vi må finne en måte å unngå å helle
7919 bensin på denne brannen.
7920 </p><p>
7921 Vi har ikke funne denne måten ennå.  Istedet synes vi å være fanget i en
7922 enklere og sort-hvit tenkning.  Uansett hvor mange folk som presser på for å
7923 gjøre rammen for debatten litt bredere, er det dette enkle sort-hvit-synet
7924 som består.  Vi kjører sakte forbi og stirrer på brannen når vi i stedet
7925 burde holde øynene på veien.
7926 </p><p>
7927 Denne utfordringen har vært livet mitt de siste årene.  Det har også vært
7928 min falitt.  I de to neste kapittlene, beskriver jeg en liten innsats, så
7929 langt uten suksess, på å finne en måte å endre fokus på denne debatten.  Vi
7930 må forstå disse mislyktede forsøkene hvis vi skal forstå hva som kreves for
7931 å lykkes.
7932 </p><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel tretten: Eldred"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="eldred"></a>Kapittel tretten: Eldred</h2></div></div></div><p>
7933 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
7934 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least one
7935 did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in
7936 New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
7937 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would make this
7938 nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
7939 </p><p>
7940 It didn't work&#8212;at least for his daughters. They didn't find Hawthorne
7941 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave birth to a
7942 hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a library of public
7943 domain works by scanning these works and making them available for free.
7944 </p><p>
7945
7946 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain works,
7947 though even a copy would have been of great value to people across the world
7948 who can't get access to printed versions of these works. Instead, Eldred was
7949 producing derivative works from these public domain works. Just as Disney
7950 turned Grimm into stories more accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred
7951 transformed Hawthorne, and many others, into a form more
7952 accessible&#8212;technically accessible&#8212;today.
7953 </p><p>
7954 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same source
7955 as Disney's. Hawthorne's <em class="citetitle">Scarlet Letter</em> had passed
7956 into the public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
7957 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover Press
7958 and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and produce printed
7959 editions, which they sell in bookstores across the country. Others, such as
7960 Disney, take these stories and turn them into animated cartoons, sometimes
7961 successfully (<em class="citetitle">Cinderella</em>), sometimes not
7962 (<em class="citetitle">The Hunchback of Notre Dame</em>, <em class="citetitle">Treasure
7963 Planet</em>). These are all commercial publications of public domain
7964 works.
7965 </p><p>
7966 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of public
7967 domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally thousands of
7968 others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have discovered this
7969 platform of expression and now use it to share works that are, by law, free
7970 for the taking. This has produced what we might call the "noncommercial
7971 publishing industry," which before the Internet was limited to people with
7972 large egos or with political or social causes. But with the Internet, it
7973 includes a wide range of individuals and groups dedicated to spreading
7974 culture generally.<sup>[<a name="id2767175" href="#ftn.id2767175" class="footnote">179</a>]</sup>
7975 </p><p>
7976 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's collection
7977 of poems <em class="citetitle">New Hampshire</em> was slated to pass into the
7978 public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
7979 library.  But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10, in
7980 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the terms of
7981 existing copyrights&#8212;this time by twenty years. Eldred would not be
7982 free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his collection until 2019.
7983 Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into the public domain until that
7984 year (and not even then, if Congress extends the term again). By contrast,
7985 in the same period, more than 1 million patents will pass into the public
7986 domain.
7987 </p><p>
7988
7989
7990 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), enacted in
7991 memory of the congressman and former musician Sonny Bono, who, his widow,
7992 Mary Bono, says, believed that "copyrights should be forever."<sup>[<a name="id2767207" href="#ftn.id2767207" class="footnote">180</a>]</sup>
7993
7994 </p><p>
7995 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
7996 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
7997 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a second law
7998 passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act of publishing
7999 would make Eldred a felon&#8212;whether or not anyone complained. This was a
8000 dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer to undertake.
8001 </p><p>
8002 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
8003 constitutional scholar whose first passion was constitutional
8004 interpretation.  And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
8005 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as importantly
8006 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
8007 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8008 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .  by securing
8009 for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to their
8010 . . . Writings. . . .
8011 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8012 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting clause of
8013 Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause granting power
8014 to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do something&#8212;for
8015 example, to regulate "commerce among the several states" or "declare War."
8016 But here, the "something" is something quite specific&#8212;to "promote
8017 . . . Progress"&#8212;through means that are also specific&#8212; by
8018 "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
8019 </p><p>
8020 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of extending
8021 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me about this was, if
8022 Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then the Constitution's
8023 requirement that terms be "limited" will have no practical effect. If every
8024 time a copyright is about to expire, Congress has the power to extend its
8025 term, then Congress can achieve what the Constitution plainly
8026 forbids&#8212;perpetual terms "on the installment plan," as Professor Peter
8027 Jaszi so nicely put it.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2767249"></a>
8028 </p><p>
8029 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember sitting
8030 late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious consideration
8031 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's practice of extending
8032 existing terms. That failure may in part be why Congress seemed so
8033 untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the practice had become so
8034 lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that copyright owners will be willing
8035 to pay a great deal of money to see their copyright terms extended. And so
8036 Congress is quite happy to keep this gravy train going.
8037 </p><p>
8038 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
8039 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
8040 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the beneficiaries
8041 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce it to
8042 act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can do. Why
8043 not limit its actions to those things it must do&#8212;and those things that
8044 pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
8045 </p><p>
8046 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one of the
8047 very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to make money one
8048 hundred years after it was created. The Estate of Robert Frost is a good
8049 example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry continues to be extraordinarily
8050 valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate benefits greatly from any extension
8051 of copyright, since no publisher would pay the estate any money if the poems
8052 Frost wrote could be published by anyone for free.
8053 </p><p>
8054 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from three of
8055 Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems is about to
8056 expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.  Your financial
8057 adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim report:
8058 </p><p>
8059
8060 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B, and C
8061 will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be receiving
8062 the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of those works.
8063 </p><p>
8064 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that could change
8065 this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the terms of copyright
8066 by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily valuable to us. So we
8067 should hope this bill passes."
8068 </p><p>
8069 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something about it?"
8070 </p><p>
8071 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute to the
8072 campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that they support
8073 the bill."
8074 </p><p>
8075 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want to know
8076 whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much would we get if this
8077 extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How much is it worth?"
8078 </p><p>
8079 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue to get
8080 at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the `discount
8081 rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent), then this law
8082 would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
8083 </p><p>
8084 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the correct
8085 conclusion:
8086 </p><p>
8087 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than $1,000,000 in
8088 campaign contributions if we were confident those contributions would assure
8089 that the bill was passed?"
8090 </p><p>
8091 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to contribute up
8092 to the `present value' of the income you expect from these copyrights. Which
8093 for us means over $1,000,000."
8094 </p><p>
8095
8096 You quickly get the point&#8212;you as the member of the board and, I trust,
8097 you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every beneficiary
8098 in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same choice: If they
8099 can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights, they will benefit
8100 greatly from that extension. And so each time copyrights are about to
8101 expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get the copyright term
8102 extended.
8103 </p><p>
8104 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation can be
8105 bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in the world to
8106 buy further extensions of copyright.
8107 </p><p>
8108 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
8109 Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved real. Ten of the
8110 thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House received the maximum
8111 contribution from Disney's political action committee; in the Senate, eight
8112 of the twelve sponsors received contributions.<sup>[<a name="id2767434" href="#ftn.id2767434" class="footnote">181</a>]</sup> The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over $1.5 million
8113 lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more than $200,000 in
8114 campaign contributions.<sup>[<a name="id2767449" href="#ftn.id2767449" class="footnote">182</a>]</sup> Disney is
8115 estimated to have contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in
8116 the cycle.<sup>[<a name="id2767463" href="#ftn.id2767463" class="footnote">183</a>]</sup>
8117
8118 </p><p>
8119 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least, it need not
8120 be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this reality about the
8121 never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term was central to my
8122 thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed to interpreting and
8123 applying the Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the
8124 power to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
8125 constitutional requirement that terms be "limited." If they could extend it
8126 once, they would extend it again and again and again.
8127 </p><p>
8128
8129 It was also my judgment that <span class="emphasis"><em>this</em></span> Supreme Court would
8130 not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
8131 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power of
8132 Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the power
8133 granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional scholars, the most
8134 famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's decision in 1995 to
8135 strike down a law that banned the possession of guns near schools.
8136 </p><p>
8137 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted powers very
8138 broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
8139 only "commerce among the several states" (aka "interstate commerce"), the
8140 Supreme Court had interpreted that power to include the power to regulate
8141 any activity that merely affected interstate commerce.
8142 </p><p>
8143 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was no
8144 limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every activity, when
8145 considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.  A Constitution
8146 designed to limit Congress's power was instead interpreted to impose no
8147 limit.
8148 </p><p>
8149 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed that in
8150 <em class="citetitle">United States</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>. The
8151 government had argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
8152 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values,
8153 and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government
8154 whether there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce
8155 under the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there was
8156 not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then that
8157 activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the government
8158 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
8159 </p><p>
8160 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments," the
8161 Chief Justice wrote.<sup>[<a name="id2767554" href="#ftn.id2767554" class="footnote">184</a>]</sup> If anything
8162 Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be considered interstate
8163 commerce, then there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in
8164 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> was reaffirmed five years later in
8165 <em class="citetitle">United States</em>
8166 v. <em class="citetitle">Morrison</em>.<sup>[<a name="id2767581" href="#ftn.id2767581" class="footnote">185</a>]</sup>
8167 </p><p>
8168
8169 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
8170 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<sup>[<a name="id2767601" href="#ftn.id2767601" class="footnote">186</a>]</sup>
8171 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should yield the
8172 conclusion that Congress can't extend an existing term. If Congress could
8173 extend an existing term, then there would be no "stopping point" to
8174 Congress's power over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that
8175 there is such a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to
8176 grant copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
8177 term of existing copyrights.
8178 </p><p>
8179 <span class="emphasis"><em>If</em></span>, that is, the principle announced in
8180 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> stood for a principle.  Many believed the
8181 decision in <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> stood for politics&#8212;a
8182 conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its
8183 power over Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
8184 rejected that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
8185 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
8186 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides
8187 cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring.  I was
8188 not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine
8189 Justices were going to be petty politicians.
8190 </p><p>
8191 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the argument in
8192 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> was not about. By insisting on the
8193 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
8194 piracy.  Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
8195 piracy&#8212;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work
8196 and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was
8197 just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
8198 already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had gotten
8199 the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In exchange for
8200 a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new work. But now
8201 these entities were using their power&#8212;expressed through the power of
8202 lobbyists' money&#8212;to get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That
8203 twenty-year dollop would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was
8204 fighting a piracy that affects us all.
8205 </p><p>
8206 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief before the
8207 Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association wrote that the public
8208 domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<sup>[<a name="id2767680" href="#ftn.id2767680" class="footnote">187</a>]</sup> But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our
8209 constitutional system, our law requires it. Some may not like the
8210 Constitution's requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a
8211 pirate's charter.
8212 </p><p>
8213 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on copyright as a
8214 way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily influence the
8215 development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric Eldred discovered,
8216 we have set up a system that assures that copyright terms will be repeatedly
8217 extended, and extended, and extended. We have created the perfect storm for
8218 the public domain. Copyrights have not expired, and will not expire, so long
8219 as Congress is free to be bought to extend them again.
8220 </p><p>
8221 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being extended.
8222 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too valuable for
8223 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from copyright
8224 extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's.  Forget Mickey
8225 Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from the 1920s and 1930s
8226 that have continuing commercial value. The real harm of term extension comes
8227 not from these famous works. The real harm is to the works that are not
8228 famous, not commercially exploited, and no longer available as a result.
8229 </p><p>
8230 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to 1942)
8231 affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 2 percent of that
8232 work has any continuing commercial value. It was the copyright holders for
8233 that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.  But the law and its effect were
8234 not limited to that 2 percent. The law extended the terms of copyright
8235 generally.<sup>[<a name="id2767740" href="#ftn.id2767740" class="footnote">188</a>]</sup>
8236
8237 </p><p>
8238
8239 Think practically about the consequence of this extension&#8212;practically,
8240 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal work. In 1930,
8241 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those books were still in
8242 print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you wanted to make available
8243 to the world in your iArchive project the remaining 9,873. What would you
8244 have to do?
8245 </p><p>
8246 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were still
8247 under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are not
8248 on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the titles and
8249 authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration and renewal
8250 records for works published in 1930. That will produce a list of books still
8251 under copyright.
8252 </p><p>
8253 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate the
8254 current copyright owners. How would you do that?
8255 </p><p>
8256 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright owners
8257 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be thousands and
8258 thousands of government monopolies without there being at least a list?
8259 </p><p>
8260 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in 1959, of
8261 the person who registered the copyright. But just think practically about
8262 how impossibly difficult it would be to track down thousands of such
8263 records&#8212;especially since the person who registered is not necessarily
8264 the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
8265 </p><p>
8266 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the apologists for
8267 the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright owners?"
8268 </p><p>
8269 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <span class="emphasis"><em>are</em></span> plenty
8270 of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles
8271 to cars.  And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty
8272 good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in
8273 your backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a
8274 pretty good way to know who owns what tangible property.
8275 </p><p>
8276
8277 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who owns the house
8278 by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see a car, there is
8279 ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the car. If you see a
8280 bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a house, it's fairly
8281 easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you happen to see a baseball
8282 lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look around for a second for some
8283 kids playing ball. If you don't see any kids, then okay: Here's a bit of
8284 property whose owner we can't easily determine. It is the exception that
8285 proves the rule: that we ordinarily know quite well who owns what property.
8286 </p><p>
8287 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.  The
8288 library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've already
8289 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors' names, of
8290 course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or passed down in an
8291 estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who owns what, you would have to
8292 hire a private detective. The bottom line: The owner cannot easily be
8293 located. And in a regime like ours, in which it is a felony to use such
8294 property without the property owner's permission, the property isn't going
8295 to be used.
8296 </p><p>
8297 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be digitized,
8298 and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the consequence for other
8299 creative works is much more dire.
8300 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2767873"></a><p>
8301 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios, which
8302 owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a direct
8303 beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were made between
8304 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <em class="citetitle">The Lucky
8305 Dog</em>, is currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made
8306 after 1923 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee
8307 controls the exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal
8308 of money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
8309 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent films."<sup>[<a name="id2767894" href="#ftn.id2767894" class="footnote">189</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2767911"></a>
8310 </p><p>
8311 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in this
8312 culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme Court that
8313 the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left standing, destroy
8314 a whole generation of American film.
8315 </p><p>
8316
8317 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has any
8318 continuing commercial value. The rest&#8212;to the extent it survives at
8319 all&#8212;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that some of this work
8320 not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be valuable by the owners of
8321 the vaults. For this to occur, however, the commercial benefit from the work
8322 must exceed the costs of making the work available for distribution.
8323 </p><p>
8324 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.  For most
8325 of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very high; digital
8326 technology has lowered these costs substantially. While it cost more than
8327 $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white film in 1993, it can now
8328 cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of mm film.<sup>[<a name="id2767948" href="#ftn.id2767948" class="footnote">190</a>]</sup>
8329
8330 </p><p>
8331 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most important.
8332 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
8333 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
8334 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
8335 locate the copyright owner.
8336 </p><p>
8337 Or more accurately, <span class="emphasis"><em>owners</em></span>. As we've seen, there isn't
8338 only a single copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't
8339 a single person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
8340 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
8341 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
8342 exceptionally high.
8343 </p><p>
8344 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
8345 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
8346 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when she
8347 does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you have
8348 made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
8349 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
8350 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way, you
8351 have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have to
8352 talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
8353 </p><p>
8354
8355 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed these
8356 costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the benefit would
8357 outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old films, Agee
8358 argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until the copyright
8359 expires.
8360 </p><p>
8361 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will have
8362 expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and nitrate stock
8363 dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal canisters in which
8364 they are now stored will be filled with nothing more than dust.
8365 </p><p>
8366 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has
8367 continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a
8368 crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright
8369 creates incentives to produce and distribute the creative work. For that
8370 tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of free expression."
8371 </p><p>
8372 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the creative
8373 work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've indicated, most books
8374 go out of print within one year. The same is true of music and
8375 film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.  And when a
8376 creative work falls out of favor with the commercial distributors, the
8377 commercial life ends.
8378 </p><p>
8379 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't keep
8380 libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and we don't
8381 have archives of films because we expect people to choose between spending
8382 Friday night watching new movies and spending Friday night watching a 1930
8383 news documentary. The noncommercial life of culture is important and
8384 valuable&#8212;for entertainment but also, and more importantly, for
8385 knowledge. To understand who we are, and where we came from, and how we have
8386 made the mistakes that we have, we need to have access to this history.
8387 </p><p>
8388
8389 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.  In
8390 this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in this
8391 context do no good.
8392 </p><p>
8393 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of our
8394 history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
8395 <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright-related use</em></span> that would be inhibited by an
8396 exclusive right.  When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a
8397 publisher.  But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a
8398 used book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
8399 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
8400 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
8401 </p><p>
8402 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring a
8403 film&#8212;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&#8212;were so high,
8404 it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains
8405 of a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
8406 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the end
8407 of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
8408 </p><p>
8409 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most of our
8410 history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works that lost
8411 their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works would not have
8412 interfered with anything.
8413 </p><p>
8414 But this situation has now changed.
8415 </p><p>
8416 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital technologies
8417 is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.  Digital
8418 technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access to all sorts
8419 of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now imagine digitizing
8420 it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once a film goes out of
8421 distribution, we could digitize it and make it available to everyone,
8422 forever. Digital technologies give new life to copyrighted material after it
8423 passes out of its commercial life. It is now possible to preserve and assure
8424 universal access to this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
8425 </p><p>
8426
8427
8428 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing this
8429 digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
8430 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires permission
8431 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other aspect of
8432 our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these things
8433 available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want to
8434 explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
8435 radically different context.
8436 </p><p>
8437 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
8438 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law gets in
8439 the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
8440 <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright</em></span> purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to
8441 enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
8442 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright
8443 is serving no purpose <span class="emphasis"><em>at all</em></span> related to the spread of
8444 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
8445 expression. Copyright is a brake.
8446 </p><p>
8447 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for Brewster
8448 Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.  So won't
8449 Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading culture widely?"
8450 </p><p>
8451 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
8452 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble offered
8453 to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that eliminate the need
8454 for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a library is to serve
8455 what "the market" would demand. But if you think the role of a library is
8456 bigger than this&#8212;if you think its role is to archive culture, whether
8457 there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture or not&#8212;then we
8458 can't count on the commercial market to do our library work for us.
8459 </p><p>
8460 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We should
8461 rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable culture. My
8462 message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the market is not
8463 doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the freedom to fill the
8464 gaps. As one researcher calculated for American culture, 94 percent of the
8465 films, books, and music produced between and 1946 is not commercially
8466 available. However much you love the commercial market, if access is a
8467 value, then 6 percent is a failure to provide that value.<sup>[<a name="id2768183" href="#ftn.id2768183" class="footnote">191</a>]</sup>
8468
8469 </p><p>
8470 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
8471 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the Sonny
8472 Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two central claims
8473 that we made were (1) that extending existing terms violated the
8474 Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that extending terms by
8475 another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
8476 </p><p>
8477 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an argument.  A
8478 panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also dismissed our
8479 claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But that decision at
8480 least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative judges on that
8481 court. That dissent gave our claims life.
8482 </p><p>
8483 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that copyrights
8484 be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as it was simple:
8485 If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no "stopping point" to
8486 Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The power to extend existing
8487 terms means Congress is not required to grant terms that are "limited."
8488 Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to interpret the term "limited
8489 Times" to give it meaning. And the best interpretation, Judge Sentelle
8490 argued, would be to deny Congress the power to extend existing terms.
8491 </p><p>
8492 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to hear the
8493 case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for important
8494 cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a whole, where
8495 the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
8496 </p><p>
8497
8498 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.  This
8499 time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
8500 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the most
8501 liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had overstepped its
8502 bounds.
8503 </p><p>
8504 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the Supreme
8505 Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It hears about one
8506 hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand appeals.) And it
8507 practically never reviews a decision that upholds a statute when no other
8508 court has yet reviewed the statute.
8509 </p><p>
8510 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by granting our
8511 petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument was set for October of
8512 2002. The summer would be spent writing briefs and preparing for argument.
8513 </p><p>
8514 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
8515 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we lost
8516 the appeal. And if you know something more than just the minimum, you
8517 probably think there was no way this case could have been won. After our
8518 defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and
8519 supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed
8520 cause. And none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail
8521 from my client, Eric Eldred.
8522 </p><p>
8523 Men min klient og disse vennene tok feil. Denne saken kunne vært vunnet. Det
8524 burde ha vært vunnet.  Og uansett hvor hardt jeg prøver å fortelle den
8525 historien til meg selv, kan jeg aldri unnslippe troen på at det er min feil
8526 at vi ikke vant.
8527 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2768303"></a><p>
8528
8529 Feil ble gjort tidlig, skjønt den ble først åpenbart på slutten. Vår sak
8530 hadde støtte hos en ekstraordinær advokat, Geoffrey Stewart, helt fra
8531 starten, og hos advokatfirmaet hadde han flyttet til, Jones, Day, Reavis og
8532 Pogue. Jones Day mottok mye press fra sine opphavsrettsbeskyttende klienter
8533 på grunn av sin støtte til oss.  De ignorert dette presset (noe veldig få
8534 advokatfirmaer noen sinne ville gjøre), og ga alt de hadde gjennom hele
8535 saken.
8536 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2768326"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2768332"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2768338"></a><p>
8537 Det var tre viktige advokater på saken fra Jones DaY. Geoff Stewart var den
8538 først, men siden ble Dan Bromberg og Don Ayer ganske involvert. Bromberg og
8539 Ayer spesielt hadde en felles oppfatning om hvordan denne saken ville bli
8540 vunnet: vi ville bare vinne, fortalte de gjentatte ganger til meg, hvis vi
8541 få problemet til å virke "viktig" for Høyesterett. Det måtte synes som om
8542 dramatisk skade ble gjort til ytringsfriheten og fri kultur, ellers ville de
8543 aldri stemt mot "de mektigste mediaselskapene i verden".
8544 </p><p>
8545 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act was a
8546 dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still think it
8547 is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based on how
8548 important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be "right" as
8549 in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be that
8550 way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the framers of
8551 our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the CTEA was
8552 unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful interpretation of what
8553 the First Amendment means would yield the conclusion that the power to
8554 extend existing copyright terms is unconstitutional, I was not persuaded
8555 that we had to sell our case like soap.  Just as a law that bans the
8556 swastika is unconstitutional not because the Court likes Nazis but because
8557 such a law would violate the Constitution, so too, in my view, would the
8558 Court decide whether Congress's law was constitutional based on the
8559 Constitution, not based on whether they liked the values that the framers
8560 put in the Constitution.
8561 </p><p>
8562 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and the harm
8563 caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review? There was no
8564 reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they weren't convinced that
8565 this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we didn't need to persuade them
8566 that this law was bad, we needed to show why it was unconstitutional.
8567 </p><p>
8568
8569 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter and in
8570 which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced that the Court
8571 would not hear our arguments if it thought these were just the arguments of
8572 a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was not about to launch into a
8573 new field of judicial review if it seemed that this field of review was
8574 simply the preference of a small political minority.  Although my focus in
8575 the case was not to demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to
8576 demonstrate that it was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument
8577 against a background of briefs that covered the full range of political
8578 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
8579 <span class="emphasis"><em>law</em></span> and not politics, then, we tried to gather the
8580 widest range of credible critics&#8212;credible not because they were rich
8581 and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated that this law
8582 was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
8583 </p><p>
8584 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
8585 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very beginning.
8586 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In November 1998,
8587 she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the Republican Congress for
8588 allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you sometimes wonder why bills
8589 that create a financial windfall to narrow special interests slide easily
8590 through the intricate legislative process, while bills that benefit the
8591 general public seem to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial
8592 documented, was the power of money.  Schlafly enumerated Disney's
8593 contributions to the key players on the committees. It was money, not
8594 justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control,
8595 Schlafly argued.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2768445"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2768451"></a>
8596 </p><p>
8597 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief supporting
8598 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the core claim in
8599 the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of existing copyrights,
8600 there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.  That strong
8601 conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
8602 </p><p>
8603 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as it
8604 gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free Software
8605 Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux possible). They
8606 included a powerful brief about the costs of uncertainty by Intel. There
8607 were two law professors' briefs, one by copyright scholars and one by First
8608 Amendment scholars. There was an exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the
8609 world's experts in the history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there
8610 was a new brief by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
8611 <a class="indexterm" name="id2768480"></a>
8612 </p><p>
8613 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal argument,
8614 there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and archives, including
8615 the Internet Archive, the American Association of Law Libraries, and the
8616 National Writers Union.
8617 </p><p>
8618 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the argument I've
8619 already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that unless the law
8620 was struck, a whole generation of American film would disappear. The other
8621 made the economic argument absolutely clear.
8622 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2768505"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2768511"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2768517"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2768524"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2768530"></a><p>
8623 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including five
8624 Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Milton
8625 Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as the list of
8626 Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political spectrum. Their
8627 conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible claim that extending the
8628 terms of existing copyrights would do anything to increase incentives to
8629 create. Such extensions were nothing more than "rent-seeking"&#8212;the
8630 fancy term economists use to describe special-interest legislation gone
8631 wild.
8632 </p><p>
8633 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered to
8634 write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with us from
8635 the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we added three
8636 lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan Morrison, a
8637 lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had made constitutional
8638 history with a series of seminal victories in the Supreme Court defending
8639 individual rights; my colleague and dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued
8640 many cases in the Court, and who had advised us early on about a First
8641 Amendment strategy; and finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
8642 <a class="indexterm" name="id2768540"></a>
8643 </p><p>
8644 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
8645 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give media
8646 companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried was the only
8647 one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up for something he
8648 believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer in the Supreme
8649 Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that limited Congress's power
8650 in the context of the Commerce Clause. And while he had argued many
8651 positions in the Supreme Court that I personally disagreed with, his joining
8652 the cause was a vote of confidence in our argument.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2768597"></a>
8653 </p><p>
8654 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of friends, as
8655 well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included historians or
8656 economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were written
8657 exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and copyright holders.
8658 </p><p>
8659 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain from the
8660 law. The congressmen were not surprising either&#8212;they were defending
8661 their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of contributions such power
8662 induced. And of course it was not surprising that the copyright holders
8663 would defend the idea that they should continue to have the right to control
8664 who did what with content they wanted to control.
8665 </p><p>
8666 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was better for the
8667 Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to Dr. Seuss's work&#8212; better
8668 than allowing it to fall into the public domain&#8212;because if this
8669 creativity were in the public domain, then people could use it to "glorify
8670 drugs or to create pornography."<sup>[<a name="id2768627" href="#ftn.id2768627" class="footnote">192</a>]</sup> That
8671 was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection"
8672 of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license
8673 <em class="citetitle">Porgy and Bess</em> to anyone who refuses to use African
8674 Americans in the cast.<sup>[<a name="id2768652" href="#ftn.id2768652" class="footnote">193</a>]</sup> That's their
8675 view of how this part of American culture should be controlled, and they
8676 wanted this law to help them effect that control.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2768666"></a>
8677 </p><p>
8678 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this debate.
8679 When Congress decides to extend the term of existing copyrights, Congress is
8680 making a choice about which speakers it will favor.  Famous and beloved
8681 copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate and Dr. Seuss, come to
8682 Congress and say, "Give us twenty years to control the speech about these
8683 icons of American culture. We'll do better with them than anyone else."
8684 Congress of course likes to reward the popular and famous by giving them
8685 what they want. But when Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak
8686 in a certain way, that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally
8687 meant to block.
8688 </p><p>
8689 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA mean
8690 that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
8691 copyrights&#8212;extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
8692 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
8693 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.  Between
8694 February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing for this
8695 case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
8696 </p><p>
8697 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we called
8698 "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest." The Conservatives
8699 included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice
8700 Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had been the most consistent in
8701 limiting Congress's power. They were the five who had supported the
8702 <em class="citetitle">Lopez/Morrison</em> line of cases that said that an
8703 enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's powers had
8704 limits.
8705 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2768716"></a><p>
8706
8707 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
8708 Congress's power. These four&#8212;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
8709 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&#8212;had repeatedly argued that the
8710 Constitution gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement
8711 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
8712 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four justices
8713 were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed with, they
8714 were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
8715 </p><p>
8716 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to her
8717 general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of gender are
8718 involved), she had been particularly deferential in the context of
8719 intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an excellent and
8720 well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from the same
8721 intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with the writings
8722 of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this context to do as it
8723 wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
8724 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2768750"></a><p>
8725 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
8726 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly favored
8727 deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were also very
8728 sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly believed, there was a
8729 very important free speech argument against these retrospective extensions.
8730 </p><p>
8731 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
8732 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest judges
8733 on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just means that no
8734 simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he had consistently argued
8735 for limits in the context of intellectual property generally. We were fairly
8736 confident he would recognize limits here.
8737 </p><p>
8738 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus had to be:
8739 on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these five and
8740 get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single overriding argument
8741 that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives' most important
8742 jurisprudential innovation&#8212;the argument that Judge Sentelle had relied
8743 upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power must be interpreted so
8744 that its enumerated powers have limits.
8745 </p><p>
8746
8747 This then was the core of our strategy&#8212;a strategy for which I am
8748 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
8749 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> case, under the government's argument here,
8750 Congress would always have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If
8751 anything was plain about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was
8752 that this power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
8753 Court to reconcile <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> with
8754 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce was
8755 limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright be
8756 limited.
8757 </p><p>
8758 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has done
8759 it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government claimed that
8760 from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
8761 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say that
8762 practice is unconstitutional.
8763 </p><p>
8764 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We certainly
8765 agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in and in 1909. And of
8766 course, in 1962, Congress began extending existing terms
8767 regularly&#8212;eleven times in forty years.
8768 </p><p>
8769
8770 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress extended
8771 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.  It then
8772 extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare extensions
8773 are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending existing
8774 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that restraint was
8775 now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there was no reason to
8776 expect that cycle would end. This Court had not hesitated to intervene where
8777 Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.  There was no reason it
8778 couldn't intervene here.  Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in
8779 October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
8780 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to help in
8781 the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where wannabe justices
8782 fire questions at wannabe winners.
8783 </p><p>
8784 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a single
8785 point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to the
8786 power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that terms would be
8787 effectively unlimited; going with us would give Congress a clear line to
8788 follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots were an effective practice; I
8789 found ways to take every question back to this central idea.
8790 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2768862"></a><p>
8791 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the skeptic. He
8792 had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor General Charles
8793 Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme Court. And in his review
8794 of the moot, he let his concern speak: <a class="indexterm" name="id2768875"></a>
8795 </p><p>
8796 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be willing
8797 to upset this practice that the government says has been a consistent
8798 practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see the
8799 harm&#8212;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they don't see
8800 that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
8801 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2768885"></a><p>
8802
8803 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but he didn't
8804 understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the right
8805 thing&#8212;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
8806 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court does the
8807 right thing&#8212;not because of politics but because it is right. As I
8808 listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood his
8809 point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.  Let the
8810 politicians learn to see that it was also good.  The night before the
8811 argument, a line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The
8812 case had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
8813 culture. Hundreds stood in line for the chance to see the
8814 proceedings. Scores spent the night on the Supreme Court steps so that they
8815 would be assured a seat.
8816 </p><p>
8817 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can ask for
8818 seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for my
8819 parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get a seat in a
8820 special section reserved for them. And senators and congressmen have a
8821 special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of course, the press
8822 has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on the Court. As we
8823 entered that morning, there was no place that was not taken. This was an
8824 argument about intellectual property law, yet the halls were filled. As I
8825 walked in to take my seat at the front of the Court, I saw my parents
8826 sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table, I saw Jack Valenti sitting
8827 in the special section ordinarily reserved for family of the Justices.
8828 </p><p>
8829 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began where I
8830 intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's power. This
8831 was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether those enumerated
8832 powers had any limit.
8833 </p><p>
8834 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.  The history
8835 was bothering her.
8836 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8837 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often through the years,
8838 and if you are right, don't we run the risk of upsetting previous extensions
8839 of time? I mean, this seems to be a practice that began with the very first
8840 act.
8841 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8842 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face of
8843 what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again was to
8844 emphasize limits on Congress's power.
8845 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8846
8847 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in mind,
8848 then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their words that gives
8849 effect to what they had in mind, and the answer is yes.
8850 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8851 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen where the
8852 Court was going. The first was a question by Justice Kennedy, who observed,
8853 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8854 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that the '76 act,
8855 too, should have been declared void, and that we might leave it alone
8856 because of the disruption, is that for all these years the act has impeded
8857 progress in science and the useful arts.  I just don't see any empirical
8858 evidence for that.
8859 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8860 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a student, I
8861 answered,
8862 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8863 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.  Nothing
8864 in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical assertion about
8865 impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a structural limit necessary
8866 to assure that what would be an effectively perpetual term not be permitted
8867 under the copyright laws.
8868 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2769012"></a><p>
8869 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right answer
8870 was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any number of
8871 briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And here was the
8872 place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a softball; my answer
8873 was a swing and a miss.
8874 </p><p>
8875 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
8876 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>
8877 ruling, and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
8878 </p><p>
8879
8880 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all sympathetic.
8881 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
8882
8883
8884 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8885 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the right to copy
8886 verbatim other people's books, don't you?
8887 </p><p>
8888 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that should be in the
8889 public domain and would be in the public domain but for a statute that
8890 cannot be justified under ordinary First Amendment analysis or under a
8891 proper reading of the limits built into the Copyright Clause.
8892 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8893 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument; for now the
8894 Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia asked Solicitor
8895 General Olson,
8896 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8897 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited time
8898 would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely the
8899 argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited time which is
8900 extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited time.
8901 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8902 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.  Olson's
8903 flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed to the
8904 academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if this were the
8905 first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright and Patent Clause
8906 power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I closed by pointing out the
8907 long history of the Court imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of
8908 the Copyright and Patent Clause&#8212; indeed, the very first case striking
8909 a law of Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon
8910 the Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
8911 Court to my side.
8912 </p><p>
8913
8914 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I wished I
8915 could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had answered
8916 differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me optimistic.
8917 </p><p>
8918 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit? Over
8919 and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was precisely the
8920 answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not imagine how the Court
8921 could understand that the government believed Congress's power was unlimited
8922 under the terms of the Copyright Clause, and sustain the government's
8923 argument. The solicitor general had made my argument for me. No matter how
8924 often I tried, I could not understand how the Court could find that
8925 Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
8926 Copyright Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe
8927 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&#8212;in
8928 particular, the Conservatives&#8212;would feel itself constrained by the
8929 rule of law that it had established elsewhere.
8930 </p><p>
8931 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office and
8932 missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the
8933 message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
8934 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
8935 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
8936 </p><p>
8937 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the phone off
8938 the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat down to see where I
8939 had been wrong in my reasoning.
8940 </p><p>
8941 My <span class="emphasis"><em>reasoning</em></span>. Here was a case that pitted all the money
8942 in the world against <span class="emphasis"><em>reasoning</em></span>. And here was the last
8943 naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
8944 </p><p>
8945 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would distinguish the
8946 principle in this case from the principle in
8947 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case
8948 was not even cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did
8949 not even appear in the Court's opinion.
8950 </p><p>
8951
8952
8953
8954 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.  Consistent
8955 with her view that Congress's power was not limited generally, she had found
8956 Congress's power not limited here.
8957 </p><p>
8958 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&#8212;for her, and for Justice
8959 Souter. Neither believes in <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>. It would be too
8960 much to expect them to write an opinion that recognized, much less
8961 explained, the doctrine they had worked so hard to defeat.
8962 </p><p>
8963 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I was
8964 reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile limited
8965 powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the Progress
8966 Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could reconcile the two
8967 simply <span class="emphasis"><em>by not addressing the argument</em></span>. There was no
8968 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.  There was
8969 therefore no principle that followed from the <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>
8970 case: In that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this
8971 context it would not.
8972 </p><p>
8973 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values they
8974 would respect? By what right did they&#8212;the silent five&#8212;get to
8975 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the values
8976 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that I said I
8977 hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue here was
8978 important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I might hate a
8979 system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional values that it
8980 will respect, that is the system we have.
8981 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2769203"></a><p>
8982 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's opinion
8983 was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
8984 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension of
8985 terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had governed in the
8986 context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court discounted the
8987 parallel&#8212;without explaining how the very same words in the Progress
8988 Clause could come to mean totally different things depending upon whether
8989 the words were about patents or copyrights.  The Court let Justice Stevens's
8990 charge go unanswered.
8991 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2769221"></a><p>
8992
8993
8994 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever written, was
8995 external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of copyrights has
8996 become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said that under the
8997 current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8 percent of the value of a
8998 perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the actual number was
8999 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the point was clear: If the
9000 Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and the existing term was so
9001 long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
9002 </p><p>
9003 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But because
9004 neither believed in the <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> case, neither was
9005 willing to push it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was
9006 decided without anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried
9007 from Judge Sentelle. It was <em class="citetitle">Hamlet</em> without the
9008 Prince.
9009 </p><p>
9010 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when depression
9011 gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure the
9012 depression. This anger was of two sorts.
9013 </p><p>
9014 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been one
9015 thing for them to have explained why the principle of
9016 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> didn't apply in this case. That wouldn't have
9017 been a very convincing argument, I don't believe, having read it made by
9018 others, and having tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been
9019 an act of integrity.  These justices in particular have repeatedly said that
9020 the proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&#8212;to
9021 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in light
9022 of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
9023 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was
9024 their "originalism" now?
9025 </p><p>
9026
9027 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain what the
9028 framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they did; they joined
9029 an opinion that never once tried to explain how the structure of that clause
9030 would affect the interpretation of Congress's power. And they joined an
9031 opinion that didn't even try to explain why this grant of power could be
9032 unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause would be limited. In short, they had
9033 joined an opinion that did not apply to, and was inconsistent with, their
9034 own method for interpreting the Constitution. This opinion may well have
9035 yielded a result that they liked. It did not produce a reason that was
9036 consistent with their own principles.
9037 </p><p>
9038 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with myself.  For I
9039 had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of the law as
9040 it is.
9041 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2769321"></a><p>
9042 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for idealism
9043 about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.  Most have a
9044 much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this case would be won
9045 based on whether I could convince the Justices that the framers' values were
9046 important, I fought the idea, because I didn't want to believe that that is
9047 how this Court decides. I insisted on arguing this case as if it were a
9048 simple application of a set of principles.  I had an argument that followed
9049 in logic. I didn't need to waste my time showing it should also follow in
9050 popularity.
9051 </p><p>
9052
9053 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I can see
9054 a hundred places where the answers could have taken the conversation in
9055 different directions, where the truth about the harm that this unchecked
9056 power will cause could have been made clear to this Court. Justice Kennedy
9057 in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically, corrected his
9058 question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown the First
9059 Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the question to make the
9060 logical point. I had shown them how they could strike this law of Congress
9061 if they wanted to. There were a hundred places where I could have helped
9062 them want to, yet my stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have
9063 stood before hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion
9064 in that effort to persuade; but I refused to stand before this audience and
9065 try to persuade with the passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis
9066 on which a court should decide the issue.
9067 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2769363"></a><p>
9068 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it have
9069 been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or Kathleen
9070 Sullivan? <a class="indexterm" name="id2769374"></a>
9071 </p><p>
9072 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court was not
9073 ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It would take
9074 a great deal more to show our society why our framers were right. And when
9075 we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
9076 </p><p>
9077 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in doing
9078 anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have little
9079 reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had stepped
9080 down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could have
9081 persuaded.
9082 </p><p>
9083 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
9084 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
9085 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case
9086 was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
9087 not be raised until it is.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2769405"></a>
9088 </p><p>
9089
9090 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and publicly,
9091 that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have been persuaded,
9092 then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that here again Peter
9093 was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in a way that would do
9094 some good or they were not ready to hear this case in a way that would do
9095 some good. Either way, the decision to bring this case&#8212;a decision I
9096 had made four years before&#8212;was wrong.  While the reaction to the Sonny
9097 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's
9098 decision was mixed.  No one, at least in the press, tried to say that
9099 extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over
9100 ideas. Where the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had
9101 been skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
9102 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was
9103 attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful
9104 law. <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em> wrote in its editorial,
9105 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
9106 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are seeing
9107 the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of copyright
9108 perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment, one that should
9109 not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on the entire creative
9110 output of humanity is one of the reasons we live in a time of such fruitful
9111 creative ferment.
9112 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9113 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of hilarious
9114 images&#8212;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view of the
9115 case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page. The "powerful and
9116 wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like
9117 that.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2769290"></a>
9118 </p><p>
9119 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the quote from
9120 <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em>. That "grand experiment" we call
9121 the "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey, I
9122 shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in our
9123 Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I fathered, the
9124 Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A better lawyer would
9125 have made them see differently.
9126 </p></div><div class="sect1" title="Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="eldred-ii"></a>Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</h2></div></div></div><p>
9127 The day <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> was decided, fate would have it that I
9128 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
9129 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> was denied&#8212;meaning the case was really
9130 finally over&#8212;fate would have it that I was giving a speech to
9131 technologists at Disney World.)  This was a particularly long flight to my
9132 least favorite city. The drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because
9133 of traffic, so I opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
9134 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2769503"></a><p>
9135 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
9136 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head the same
9137 advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is important. And
9138 alternating with that command was the question of Justice Kennedy: "For all
9139 these years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts. I
9140 just don't see any empirical evidence for that." And so, having failed in
9141 the argument of constitutional principle, finally, I turned to an argument
9142 of politics.
9143 </p><p>
9144
9145 <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em> published the piece. In it, I
9146 proposed a simple fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the
9147 copyright owner would be required to register the work and pay a small
9148 fee. If he paid the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of
9149 copyright. If he did not, the work passed into the public domain.
9150 </p><p>
9151 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.  Eric
9152 Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as he said
9153 early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
9154 </p><p>
9155 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this is either
9156 the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright Term Deregulation
9157 Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear and obvious: Remove
9158 copyright where it is doing nothing except blocking access and the spread of
9159 knowledge. Leave it for as long as Congress allows for those works where its
9160 worth is at least $1. But for everything else, let the content go.
9161 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2769559"></a><p>
9162 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed it in
9163 an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters expressing
9164 support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people can see the
9165 copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican might say, here
9166 government regulation is simply getting in the way of innovation and
9167 creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the government is
9168 blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no good reason. Indeed,
9169 there is no real difference between Democrats and Republicans on this
9170 issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm of the present system.
9171 </p><p>
9172 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
9173 requirement.  For one of the hardest things about the current system for
9174 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to look
9175 for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not required, since
9176 marking content is not required, since no formality at all is required, it
9177 is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask permission to use
9178 or license their work. This system would lower these costs, by establishing
9179 at least one registry where copyright owners could be identified.
9180 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2769603"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2769609"></a><p>
9181
9182 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were removed in
9183 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning any formal
9184 requirement before a copyright is granted.<sup>[<a name="id2769621" href="#ftn.id2769621" class="footnote">194</a>]</sup> The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right."
9185 Natural rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the
9186 Anglo-American tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if
9187 their rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
9188 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
9189 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
9190 </p><p>
9191 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is absurd
9192 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a world
9193 without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread "Walt Disney
9194 creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to know what's
9195 protected and what's not.
9196 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2769669"></a><p>
9197 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin in
9198 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne Convention in 1908,
9199 to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as the
9200 abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated because the
9201 stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was as if a Charles
9202 Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
9203 <em class="citetitle">i</em> or cross a <em class="citetitle">t</em> resulted in the
9204 loss of widows' only income.
9205 </p><p>
9206 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
9207 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
9208 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
9209 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities totally,
9210 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more equitable system
9211 of registration.
9212 </p><p>
9213 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration in the
9214 nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was also a
9215 hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save the
9216 starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory burden
9217 imposed upon creators.
9218 </p><p>
9219
9220 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was a moral
9221 claim as well. There was no reason that creative property should be a
9222 second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table, his rights
9223 over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the government.  He has
9224 a property right over the table "naturally," and he can assert that right
9225 against anyone who would steal the table, whether or not he has informed the
9226 government of his ownership of the table.
9227 </p><p>
9228 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
9229 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative property
9230 being second-class property. The argument in favor of formalities turns upon
9231 the special problems that creative property presents.  The law of
9232 formalities responds to the special physics of creative property, to assure
9233 that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
9234 </p><p>
9235 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just because
9236 you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is to be
9237 effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just because
9238 you must register the car with the state and tag it with a license.  In both
9239 of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important reason to secure
9240 registration&#8212;both because it makes the markets more efficient and
9241 because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without a registration
9242 system for land, landowners would perpetually have to guard their
9243 property. With registration, they can simply point the police to a
9244 deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would be much
9245 easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden to sell a
9246 stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but those
9247 burdens produce a much better system of protection for property generally.
9248 </p><p>
9249 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
9250 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
9251 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
9252 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
9253 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
9254 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property with
9255 confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is the author
9256 and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in a world without
9257 formalities. Complex, expensive, <span class="emphasis"><em>lawyer</em></span> transactions
9258 take their place.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2769743"></a>
9259 </p><p>
9260 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono Act that we
9261 tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it didn't "get."
9262 Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no way easily to
9263 build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright terms were, as Justice
9264 Story said they would be, "short," then this wouldn't matter much. For
9265 fourteen years, under the framers' system, a work would be presumptively
9266 controlled. After fourteen years, it would be presumptively uncontrolled.
9267 </p><p>
9268 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the inability to
9269 know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a huge and obvious
9270 burden on the creative process. If the only way a library can offer an
9271 Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a lawyer to clear the rights
9272 to every image and sound, then the copyright system is burdening creativity
9273 in a way that has never been seen before <span class="emphasis"><em>because there are no
9274 formalities</em></span>.
9275 </p><p>
9276 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If it is
9277 worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the longer
9278 term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how to get your
9279 permission if they want to use your work. And you will get the benefit of an
9280 extended copyright term.
9281 </p><p>
9282 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
9283 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
9284 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public domain
9285 where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a movie based
9286 on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
9287 </p><p>
9288 Noen bekymrer seg over byrden på forfattere. Gjør ikke byrden med å
9289 registrere verket at beløpet $1 egentlig er misvisende?  Er ikke
9290 ekstraarbeidet verdt mer enn $1? Er ikke dette det virkelige problemet med
9291 registrering?
9292 </p><p>
9293
9294 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
9295 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no doubt
9296 because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
9297 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must address
9298 the real problem of <span class="emphasis"><em>governments</em></span> standing at the core of
9299 any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
9300 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it was
9301 Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
9302 registration.  The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click registration
9303 fifty years after a work was published. Based upon historical data, that
9304 system would move up to 98 percent of commercial work, commercial work that
9305 no longer had a commercial life, into the public domain within fifty
9306 years. What do you think?
9307 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2769857"></a><p>
9308 Da Steve Forbes støttet idéen, begynte enkelte i Washington å følge
9309 med. Mange kontaktet meg med tips til representanter som kan være villig til
9310 å introdusere en Eldred-lov. og jeg hadde noen få som foreslo direkte at de
9311 kan være villige til å ta det første skrittet.
9312 </p><p>
9313 En representant, Zoe Lofgren fra California, gikk så langt som å få
9314 lovforslaget utarbeidet. Utkastet løste noen problemer med internasjonal
9315 lov. Det påla de enklest mulige forutsetninger på innehaverne av
9316 opphavsretter. I mai 2003 så det ut som om loven skulle være introdusert.
9317 16. mai, postet jeg på Eldred Act-bloggen, "vi er nære".  Det oppstod en
9318 generell reaksjon i blogg-samfunnet om at noe godt kunne skje her.
9319 <a class="indexterm" name="id2769890"></a>
9320 </p><p>
9321 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and the
9322 MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give the view of
9323 the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti informed the
9324 congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred Act. The reasons are
9325 embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their thinness shows something clear
9326 about what this debate is really about.
9327 </p><p>
9328
9329 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central concept
9330 in the proposed bill"&#8212;that copyrights be renewed. That was true, but
9331 irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred long before the
9332 Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.  Second, they argued that
9333 the proposal would harm poor copyright owners&#8212;apparently those who
9334 could not afford the $1 fee. Third, they argued that Congress had determined
9335 that extending a copyright term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in
9336 the case of the small percentage of work covered by copyright law that is
9337 still commercially valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal
9338 would not cut off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth,
9339 the MPAA argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
9340 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are certainly
9341 less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright whose owner is
9342 not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the copyright to a story
9343 underlying a film were to pass into the public domain. But what risk is
9344 that? If it is in the public domain, then the film is a valid derivative
9345 use.
9346 </p><p>
9347 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to do
9348 this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are thousands of
9349 copyright owners who don't even know they have a copyright to give. Whether
9350 they are free to give away their copyright or not&#8212;a controversial
9351 claim in any case&#8212;unless they know about a copyright, they're not
9352 likely to.
9353 </p><p>
9354 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law reacting to
9355 changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.  In the other,
9356 common sense was delayed. The difference between the two stories was the
9357 power of the opposition&#8212;the power of the side that fought to defend
9358 the status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
9359 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
9360 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
9361 </p><p>
9362 Jeg brukte disse to tilfellene som en måte å ramme inn krigen som denne
9363 boken har handlet om.  For her er det også en ny teknologi som tvinger loven
9364 til å reagere.  Og her bør vi også spørre, er loven i tråd med eller i strid
9365 med sunn fornuft.  Hvis sunn fornuft støtter loven, hva forklarer denne
9366 sunne fornuften?
9367 </p><p>
9368
9369
9370
9371 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the copyright
9372 owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and harmful, and the
9373 law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is p2p sharing, it is easy
9374 to understand why the law backs the owners still: Much of this sharing is
9375 wrong, even if much is harmless. When the issue is copyright terms for the
9376 Mickey Mouses of the world, it is possible still to understand why the law
9377 favors Hollywood: Most people don't recognize the reasons for limiting
9378 copyright terms; it is thus still possible to see good faith within the
9379 resistance.
9380 </p><p>
9381 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred Act,
9382 then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked selfinterest
9383 driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary range of content that
9384 is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with any copyright owner's desire
9385 to exercise continued control over his content. It would simply liberate
9386 what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark Content" that fills archives around the
9387 world. So when the warriors oppose a change like this, we should ask one
9388 simple question:
9389 </p><p>
9390 Hva ønsker denne industrien egentlig?
9391 </p><p>
9392 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So the
9393 effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about protecting
9394 <span class="emphasis"><em>their</em></span> content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an
9395 effort to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is
9396 another step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
9397 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
9398 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require
9399 <span class="emphasis"><em>their</em></span> permission first.
9400 </p><p>
9401 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side is. The
9402 most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as its aim not
9403 the protection of "property" but the rejection of a tradition.  Their aim is
9404 not simply to protect what is theirs. <span class="emphasis"><em>Their aim is to assure that
9405 all there is is what is theirs</em></span>.
9406 </p><p>
9407
9408 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not hard
9409 to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public domain
9410 tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA feared the
9411 competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public domain connected to
9412 a public that now has the means to create with it and to share its own
9413 creation.
9414 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2770043"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2770050"></a><p>
9415 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is as if
9416 the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the Causbys and
9417 demands that their remote and useless property rights be respected, so that
9418 these remote and forgotten copyright holders might block the progress of
9419 others.
9420 </p><p>
9421 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
9422 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so long
9423 as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of the
9424 Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission society." The
9425 past can be cultivated only if you can identify the owner and gain
9426 permission to build upon his work. The future will be controlled by this
9427 dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
9428 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767175" href="#id2767175" class="para">179</a>] </sup>
9429
9430
9431 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
9432 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world of
9433 noncommercial pornographers&#8212;people who were distributing porn but were
9434 not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution.  Such a
9435 class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the costs of
9436 distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got
9437 special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the
9438 Communications Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
9439 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
9440 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial publishers
9441 after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the world before the
9442 Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at least as important to
9443 protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect noncommercial pornographers.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767207" href="#id2767207" class="para">180</a>] </sup>
9444
9445
9446 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to
9447 last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
9448 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
9449 copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is
9450 also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one
9451 day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress," 144
9452 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
9453 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767434" href="#id2767434" class="para">181</a>] </sup>
9454
9455 Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse
9456 Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
9457 <em class="citetitle">Chicago Tribune</em>, 17 October 1998, 22.
9458 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767449" href="#id2767449" class="para">182</a>] </sup>
9459
9460 Se Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information Age,"
9461 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9462 #49</a>.
9463 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767463" href="#id2767463" class="para">183</a>] </sup>
9464
9465
9466 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
9467 <em class="citetitle">Congressional Quarterly This Week</em>, 8 August 1990,
9468 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #50</a>.
9469 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767554" href="#id2767554" class="para">184</a>] </sup>
9470
9471 <em class="citetitle">United States</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>, 514
9472 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
9473 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767581" href="#id2767581" class="para">185</a>] </sup>
9474
9475
9476 <em class="citetitle">United States</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Morrison</em>, 529
9477 U.S. 598 (2000).
9478 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767601" href="#id2767601" class="para">186</a>] </sup>
9479
9480
9481 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
9482 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the context of
9483 the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the government
9484 would allow the government unending power to regulate commerce&#8212;the
9485 limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The same point is true in
9486 the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's
9487 interpretation would allow the government unending power to regulate
9488 copyrights&#8212;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
9489 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767680" href="#id2767680" class="para">187</a>] </sup>
9490
9491
9492 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
9493 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S.
9494 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #51</a>.
9495 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767740" href="#id2767740" class="para">188</a>] </sup>
9496
9497 The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
9498 Congressional Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal
9499 ranges. See Brief of Petitioners, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9500 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 7, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #52</a>.
9501 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767894" href="#id2767894" class="para">189</a>] </sup>
9502
9503
9504 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
9505 <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles Times</em>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld,
9506 "Classic Movies, Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today
9507 on Striking Down Copyright Extension," <em class="citetitle">Orlando Sentinel
9508 Tribune</em>, 9 October 2002.
9509 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2767948" href="#id2767948" class="para">190</a>] </sup>
9510
9511
9512 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
9513 Petitoners, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9514 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618),
9515 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by the
9516 Internet Archive, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9517 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #53</a>.
9518 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2768183" href="#id2768183" class="para">191</a>] </sup>
9519
9520
9521 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20 December
9522 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9523 #54</a>.
9524 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2768627" href="#id2768627" class="para">192</a>] </sup>
9525
9526
9527 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9528 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S.  (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
9529 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2768652" href="#id2768652" class="para">193</a>] </sup>
9530
9531
9532 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins
9533 the Fray," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 28 March 1998, B7.
9534 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2769621" href="#id2769621" class="para">194</a>] </sup>
9535
9536
9537 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
9538 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
9539 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
9540 author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act, every text
9541 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
9542 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any formality."
9543 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article 5(2) of
9544 the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue to impose
9545 some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as a condition
9546 of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
9547 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.  Copies of
9548 books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in the British
9549 Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar of Authors where
9550 the author's true name can be filed in the case of anonymous or pseudonymous
9551 works. Paul Goldstein, <em class="citetitle">International Intellectual Property Law,
9552 Cases and Materials</em> (New York: Foundation Press, 2001),
9553 153&#8211;54.  </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 6. Konklusjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-conclusion"></a>Kapittel 6. Konklusjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
9554 Det er mer enn trettifem millioner mennesker over hele verden med
9555 AIDS-viruset. Tjuefem millioner av dem bor i Afrika sør for Sahara.  Sytten
9556 millioner har allerede dødd.  Sytten millioner afrikanere er prosentvis
9557 proporsjonalt med syv millioner amerikanere.  Viktigere er det at dette er
9558 17 millioner afrikanere.
9559 </p><p>
9560 Det finnes ingen kur for AIDS, men det finnes medisiner som kan hemme
9561 sykdommens utvikling.  Disse antiretrovirale terapiene er fortsatt
9562 eksperimentelle, men de har hatt en dramatisk effekt allerede.  I USA øker
9563 AIDS-pasienter som regelmessig tar en cocktail av disse medisinene sin
9564 levealder med ti til tjue år. For noen gjøre medisinene sykdommen nesten
9565 usynlig.
9566 </p><p>
9567 Disse medisinene er dyre.  Da de ble først introdusert i USA, kostet de
9568 mellom $10 000 og $15 000 pr. person hvert år.  I dag koster noen av dem $25
9569 000 pr. år.  Med disse prisene har, selvfølgelig, ingen afrikansk stat  råd
9570 til medisinen for det store flertall av sine innbyggere: $15 000 er tredve
9571 ganger brutto nasjonalprodukt pr. innbygger i Zimbabwe.  Med slike priser er
9572 disse medisinene fullstendig utilgjengelig.<sup>[<a name="id2770130" href="#ftn.id2770130" class="footnote">195</a>]</sup>
9573 </p><p>
9574
9575
9576 Disse prisene er ikke høye fordi ingrediensene til medisinene er dyre.
9577 Disse prisene er høye fordi medisinene er beskyttet av patenter.
9578 Farmasiselskapene som produserer disse livreddende blandingene nyter minst
9579 tjue års monopol på sine oppfinnelser.  De bruker denne monopolmakten til å
9580 hente ut så mye de kan fra markedet.  Ved hjelp av denne makten holder de
9581 prisene høye.
9582 </p><p>
9583 Det er mange som er skeptiske til patenter, spesielt patenter på
9584 medisiner. Det er ikke jeg. Faktisk av alle forskningsområder som kan være
9585 støttet av patenter, er forskning på medisiner, etter min mening, det
9586 klareste tilfelle der patenter er nødvendig. Patenter gir et farmasøytiske
9587 firma en viss forsikring om at hvis det lykkes i å finne opp et nytt
9588 medikament som kan behandle en sykdom, vil det kunne tjene tilbake
9589 investeringen og mer til. Dette ber sosialt et ekstremt verdifullt
9590 insentiv. Jeg er den siste personen som vil argumentere for at loven skal
9591 avskaffe dette, i det minste uten andre endringer.
9592 </p><p>
9593 Men det er én ting å støtte patenter, selv patenter på medisiner. Det er en
9594 annen ting å avgjøre hvordan en best skal håndtere en krise. Og i det
9595 afrikanske ledere begynte å erkjenne ødeleggelsen AIDS brakte, begynte de å
9596 se etter måter å importere HIV-medisiner til kostnader betydelig under
9597 markedspris.
9598 </p><p>
9599 I 1997 forsøkte Sør-Afrika seg på en tilnærming.  Landet vedtok en lov som
9600 tillot import av patenterte medisiner som hadde blitt produsert og solgt i
9601 en annen nasjons marked med godkjenning fra patenteieren.  For eksempel,
9602 hvis medisinen var solgt i India, så kunne den bli importert inn til Afrika
9603 fra India.  Dette kalles "parallellimport" og er generelt tillatt i
9604 internasjonal handelslovgivning, og spesifikt tillatt i den europeiske
9605 union.<sup>[<a name="id2770208" href="#ftn.id2770208" class="footnote">196</a>]</sup>
9606 </p><p>
9607 Men USA var imot lovendringen.  Og de nøyde seg ikke med å være imot. Som
9608 International Intellectual Property Association karakteriserte det,
9609 "Myndighetene i USA presset Sør-Afrika . . . til å ikke tillate tvungen
9610 lisensiering eller parallellimport"<sup>[<a name="id2770244" href="#ftn.id2770244" class="footnote">197</a>]</sup>
9611 Gjennom kontoret til USAs handelsrepresentant (USTR), ba myndighetene
9612 Sør-Afrika om å endre loven&#8212;og for å legge press bak den
9613 forespørselen, listet USTR i 1998 opp Sør-Afrika som et land som burde
9614 vurderes for handelsrestriksjoner.  Samme år gikk mer enn førti
9615 farmasiselskaper til retten for å utfordre myndighetenes handlinger. USA
9616 fikk selskap av andre myndigheter fra EU.  Deres påstand, og påstanden til
9617 farmasiselskapene, var at Sør-Afrika brøt sine internasjonale forpliktelser
9618 ved å distriminere mot en bestemt type patenter&#8212;farmasøytiske
9619 patenter.  Kravet fra disse myndighetene, med USA i spissen, var at
9620 Sør-Afrika skulle respektere disse patentene på samme måte som alle andre
9621 patenter, uavhengig av eventuell effekt på behandlingen av AIDS i
9622 Sør-Afrika.<sup>[<a name="id2770273" href="#ftn.id2770273" class="footnote">198</a>]</sup>
9623 </p><p>
9624 Vi bør sette intervensjonen til USA i sammenheng.  Det er ingen tvil om at
9625 patenter ikke er den viktigste årsaken til at Afrikanere ikke har tilgang
9626 til medisiner.  Fattigdom og den totale mangel på effektivt helsevesen betyr
9627 mer. Men uansett om patenter er en viktigste grunnen eller ikke, så har
9628 prisen på medisiner en effekt på etterspørselen, og patenter påvirker
9629 prisen. Så uansett, massiv eller marginal, så var det en effekt av våre
9630 myndigheters intervensjon for å stoppe flyten av medisiner inn til Afrika.
9631 </p><p>
9632 Ved å stoppe flyten av HIV-behandling til Afrika, sikret ikke myndighetene i
9633 USA medisiner til USA borgere. Dette er ikke som hvete (hvis de spise det så
9634 kan ikke vi spise det). Det som USA i effekt intervenerte for å stoppe, var
9635 flyten av kunnskap: Informasjon om hvordan en kan ta kjemikalier som finnes
9636 i Afrika og gjøre disse kjemikaliene om til medisiner som kan redde 15 til
9637 30 millioner liv.
9638 </p><p>
9639 Intervensjonen fra USA ville heller ikke beskytte fortjenesten til
9640 medisinselskapene i USA&#8212; i hvert fall ikke betydelig.  Det var jo ikke
9641 slik at disse landene hadde mulighet til å kjøpe medisinene til de prisene
9642 som medisinselskapene forlangte.  Igjen var afrikanerne for fattige til å ha
9643 råd til disse medisinene til de tilbudte prisene.  Å blokkere for
9644 parallellimport av disse medisinene ville ikke øke salget til de amerikanske
9645 selskapene betydelig.
9646 </p><p>
9647 I stedet var argumentet til fordel for restriksjoner på denne flyten av
9648 informasjon, som var nødvendig for å redde millioner av liv, et argument om
9649 eiendoms ukrenkelighet.<sup>[<a name="id2770367" href="#ftn.id2770367" class="footnote">199</a>]</sup>  Det var på
9650 grunn av at "intellektuell eiendom" ville bli krenket at disse medisinene
9651 ikke skulle flomme inn til Afrika.  Det var prinsippet om viktigheten av
9652 "intellektuell eiendom" som fikk disse myndighetsaktørene til å intervenere
9653 mot Sør-Afrikas mottiltak mot AIDS.
9654 </p><p>
9655 La oss ta et skritt tilbake for et øyeblikk.  En gang om tredve år vil våre
9656 barn se tilbake på oss og spørre, hvordan kunne vi la dette skje?  Hvordan
9657 kunne vi tillate å gjennomføre en politikk hvis direkte kostnad var få 15
9658 til 30 millioner afrikanere til å dø raskere, og hvis eneste virkelige
9659 fordel var å opprettholde "ukrenkeligheten" til en idé?  Hva slags
9660 berettigelse kan noen sinne eksistere for en politikk som resulterer i så
9661 mange døde?  Hva slags galskap er det egentlig som tillater at så mange dør
9662 for slik en abstraksjon?
9663 </p><p>
9664 Noen skylder på farmasiselskapene.  Det gjør ikke jeg.  De er selskaper, og
9665 deres ledere er lovpålagt å tjene penger for selskapene.  De presser på for
9666 en bestemt patentpolitikk, ikke på grunn av idealer, men fordi det er dette
9667 som gjør at de tjener mest penger.  Og dette gjør kun at de tjener mest
9668 penger på grunn av en slags korrupsjon i vårt politiske system&#8212; en
9669 korrupsjon som farmasiselskapene helt klart ikke er ansvarlige for.
9670 </p><p>
9671 Denne korrupsjonen er våre egne politikeres manglende integritet.  For
9672 medisinprodusentene ville elske&#8212;sier de selv, og jeg tror dem &#8212;
9673 å selge sine medisiner så billig som de kan til land i Afrika og andre
9674 steder. Det er utfordringer de må løse å sikre at medisinene ikke kommer
9675 tilbake til USA, men dette er bare teknologiske utfordring. De kan bli
9676 overvunnet.
9677 </p><p>
9678
9679 Et annet problem kan derimot ikke løses. Det er frykten for at en politiker
9680 som skal vise seg og kaller inn lederne hos medisinprodusentene til høring i
9681 senatet eller representantenes hus og spør, "hvordan har det seg at du kan
9682 selge HIV-medisinen i Afrika for bare $1 pr. pille, mens samme pille koster
9683 en amerikansker $1500?" Da det ikke finnes et "kjapt svar" på det
9684 spørsmålet, ville effekten bli regulering av priser i Amerika.
9685 Medisinprodusentene unngård dermed denne spiralen ved å sikre at det første
9686 steget ikke tas.  De forsterker idéen om at eierrettigheter skal være
9687 ukrenkelige.  De legger seg på en rasjonell strategi i en irrasjonell
9688 omgivelse, med den utilsiktede konsekvens at kanskje millioner dør.  Og den
9689 rasjonelle strategien rammes dermed inn ved hjel av dette
9690 ideal&#8212;helligheten til en idé som kalles "immaterielle rettigheter".
9691 </p><p>
9692 Så når du konfronteres av ditt barns sunne fornuft, hva vil du si?  Når den
9693 sunne fornuften hos en generasjon endelig gjør opprør mot hva vi har gjort,
9694 hvordan vil vi rettferdiggjøre det?  Hva er argumentet?
9695 </p><p>
9696 En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk støtte til
9697 patentsystemet uten å måtte nå alle overalt på nøyaktig samme måte. På samme
9698 måte som en fornuftig opphavsrettspolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk
9699 støtte til et opphavsretts-system uten å måtte regulere spredningen av
9700 kultur perfekt og for alltid.  En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for
9701 og gi sterk støtte til et patentsystem uten å måtte blokkere spredning av
9702 medisiner til et land som uansett ikke er rikt nok til å ha råd til
9703 markedsprisen.  En fornuftig politikk kan en dermed si kunne være en
9704 balansert politikk.  For det meste av vår historie har både opphavsrett- og
9705 patentpolitikken i denne forstand vært balansert.
9706 </p><p>
9707
9708 Men vi som kultur har mistet denne følelsen for balanse.  Vi har mistet det
9709 kritiske blikket som hjelper oss til å se forkjellen mellom sannhet og
9710 ekstremisme.  En slags eiendomsfundamentalisme, uten grunnlag i vår
9711 tradisjon, hersker nå i vår kultur&#8212;sært, og med konsekvenser mer
9712 alvorlig for spredningen av idéer og kultur enn nesten enhver annen politisk
9713 enkeltavgjørelse vi som demokrati kan fatte.  En enkel idé blender oss, og
9714 under dekke av mørket skjer mye som de fleste av oss ville avvist hvis vi
9715 hadde fulgt med.  Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om eierskap til idéer at
9716 vi ikke engang legger merke til hvor uhyrlig det er å nekte tilgang til
9717 idéer for et folk som dør uten dem.  Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om
9718 eiendom til kulturen at vi ikke engang stiller spørsmål ved når kontrollen
9719 over denne eiendommen fjerner vår evne, som folk, til å utvikle vår kultur
9720 demokratisk.  Blindhet blir vår sunne fornuft, og utfordringen for enhver
9721 som vil gjenvinne retten til å dyrke vår kultur er å finne en måte å få
9722 denne sunne fornuften til å åpne sine øyne.
9723 </p><p>
9724 Så langt sover sunn fornuft.  Det er intet opprør.  Sunn fornuft ser ennå
9725 ikke hva det er å gjøre opprør mot.  Ekstremismen som nå domunerer denne
9726 debatten resonerer med idéer som virker naturlige, og resonansen er
9727 forsterket av våre moderne RCA-ene.  De fører en frenetisk krig for å
9728 bekjempe "piratvirksomhet" og knuser kreativitetskultur.  De forsvarer idéen
9729 om "kreativt eierskap", mens de endrer ekte skapere til moderne
9730 leilendinger.  De blir fornermet av idéen om at rettigheter skulle være
9731 balanserte, selv om hver av hovedaktørene i denne innholdskrigen selv hadde
9732 fordeler av et mer balansert ideal.  Hykleriet rår.  Men i en by som
9733 Washington blir ikke hykleriet en gang lakt merke til.  Mektige lobbyister,
9734 kompliserte problemer og MTV-oppmerksomhetsspenn gir en "perfekt storm" for
9735 fri kultur.
9736 </p><p>
9737 I august 2003 brøt en kamp ut i USA om en avgjørelse fra World Intellectual
9738 Property Organiation om å avlyse et møte.<sup>[<a name="id2770491" href="#ftn.id2770491" class="footnote">200</a>]</sup> På forespørsel fra en lang rekke med interresenter hadde WIPO
9739 bestemt å avholde et møte for å diskutere "åpne og sammarbeidende prosjekter
9740 for å skape goder for felleskapet".  Disse prosjektene som hadde lyktes i å
9741 produsere goder for fellesskapet uten å basere seg eksklusivt på bruken av
9742 proprietære immaterielle rettigheter.  Eksempler inkluderer internettet og
9743 verdensveven, begge som ble utviklet på grunnlag av protokoller i
9744 allemannseie.  Det hadde med en begynnende trend for å støtte åpne
9745 akademiske tidsskrifter, og inkluderte Public Library of Science-prosjektet
9746 som jeg beskriver i etterordet.  Det inkluderte et prosjekt for a utvikle
9747 enkeltnukleotidforskjeller (SNPs), som er antatt å få stor betydning i
9748 biomedisinsk forskning.  (Dette ideelle prosjektet besto av et konsortium av
9749 Wellcome Trust og farmasøytiske og teknologiske selskaper, inkludert
9750 Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
9751 Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, og
9752 Searle.)  Det inkluderte Globalt posisjonssystem (GPS) som Ronald Reagen
9753 frigjorde tidlig på 1980-tallet.  Og det inkluderte "åpen kildekode og fri
9754 programvare". <a class="indexterm" name="id2770668"></a>
9755 </p><p>
9756 Formålet med møtet var å vurdere denne rekken av prosjekter fra et felles
9757 perspektiv: at ingen av disse prosjektene hadde som grunnlag immateriell
9758 ekstremisme. I stedet, hos alle disse, ble immaterielle rettigheter
9759 balansert med avtaler om å holde tilgang åpen, eller for å legge
9760 begrensninger på hvordan proprietære krav kan bli brukt.
9761 </p><p>
9762 Dermed var, fra perspektivet i denne boken, denne konferansen
9763 ideell.<sup>[<a name="id2770695" href="#ftn.id2770695" class="footnote">201</a>]</sup> Prosjektene innenfor temaet var
9764 både kommersielle og ikkekommersielle verker.  De involverte i hovedsak
9765 vitenskapet, men fra mange perspektiver.  Og WIPO var et ideelt sted for
9766 denne diskusjonen, siden WIPO var den fremstående internasjonale aktør som
9767 drev med immaterielle rettighetsspørsmål.
9768 </p><p>
9769
9770 Faktisk fikk jeg en gang offentlig kjeft for å ikke anerkjenne dette faktum
9771 om WIPO.  I februar 2003 leverte jeg et hovedinnlegg på en forberedende
9772 konferanse for World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).  På en
9773 pressekonferanse før innlegget, ble jeg spurt hva jeg skulle snakke om.  Jeg
9774 svarte at jeg skulle snakke litt om viktigheten av balanse rundt
9775 immaterielle verdier for utviklingen av informasjonssamfunnet.  Ordstyreren
9776 på arrangementet avbrøt meg da brått for å informere meg og journalistene
9777 tilstede at ingen spørsmål rundt immaterielle verdier ville bli diskutert av
9778 WSIS, da slike spørsmål kun skulle diskuteres i WIPO.  I innlegget jeg hadde
9779 forberedt var temaet om immaterielle verdier en forholdvis liten del av det
9780 hele.  Men etter denne forbløffende uttalelsen, gjorde jeg immaterielle
9781 verdier til hovedfokus for mitt innlegg.  Det var ikke mulig å snakke om et
9782 "informasjonssamfunn" uten at en også snakket om andelen av informasjon og
9783 kultur som ikke er vernet av opphavsretten.  Mitt innlegg gjorde ikke min
9784 overivrige moderator veldig glad.  Og hun hadde uten tvil rett i at omfanget
9785 til vern av immaterielle rettigheter normalt hørte inn under WIPO.  Men
9786 etter mitt syn, kunne det ikke bli for mye diskusjon om hvor mye
9787 immaterielle rettigheter som trengs, siden etter mitt syn, hadde selve ideen
9788 om en balanse rundt immaterielle rettigheter hadde gått tapt.
9789 </p><p>
9790 Så uansett om WSIS kan diskutere balanse i intellektuell eiendom eller ikke,
9791 så hadde jeg trodd det var tatt for gitt at WIPO kunne og burde.  Og dermed
9792 møtet om "åpne og samarbeidende prosjekter for å skape fellesgoder" virker å
9793 passe perfekt for WIPOs agenda.
9794 </p><p>
9795 Men det er ett prosjekt i listen som er svært kontroversielt, i hvert fall
9796 blant lobbyister. Dette prosjektet er "åpen kildekode og fri
9797 programvare". Microsoft spesielt er skeptisk til diskusjon om emnet. Fra
9798 deres perspektiv, ville en konferanse for å diskutere åpen kildekode og fri
9799 programvare være som en konferanse for å diskutere Apples operativsystem.
9800 Både åpen kildekode og fri programvare konkurrerer med Microsofts
9801 programvare.  Og internasjonalt har mange myndigheter begynt å utforske krav
9802 om at de skal bruke åpen kildekode eller fri programvare, i stedet for
9803 "proprietær programvare," til sine egne interne behov.
9804 </p><p>
9805 Jeg mener ikke å gå inn i den debatten her.  Det er viktig kun for å gjøre
9806 det klart at skillet ikke er mellom kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell
9807 programvare.  Det er mange viktige selskaper som er fundamentalt avhengig av
9808 fri programvare, der IBM er den mest fremtredende.  IBM har i stadig større
9809 grad skiftet sitt fokus til GNU/Linux-operativsystemet, det mest berømte
9810 biten av "fri programvare"&#8212;og IBM er helt klart en kommernsiell
9811 aktør. Dermed er det å støtte "fri programvare" ikke å motsette seg
9812 kommersielle aktører.  Det er i stedet å støtte en måte å drive
9813 programvareutvikling som er forskjellig fra Microsofts.<sup>[<a name="id2770550" href="#ftn.id2770550" class="footnote">202</a>]</sup>
9814 </p><p>
9815
9816 Mer viktig for våre formål, er at å støtte "åpen kildekode og fri
9817 programvare" ikke er å motsette seg opphasvrett. "Åpen kildekode og fri
9818 programvare" er ikke programvare uten opphavsrettslig vern. Istedet, på
9819 samme måte som programvare fra Microsoft, insisterer opphavsrettsinnehaverne
9820 av fri programvare ganske sterkt at vilkårene i deres programvarelisens blir
9821 respektert av de som tar i bruk fri programvare.  Vilkårene i den lisensen
9822 er uten tvil forskjellig fra vilkårene i en proprietær programvarelisens.
9823 For eksempel krever fri programvare lisensiert med den generelle offentlige
9824 lisensen (GPL), at kildekoden for programvare gjøres tilgjengelig for alle
9825 som endrer og redistribuerer programvaren.  Men dette kravet er kun
9826 effektivt hvis opphavsrett råder over programvare.  Hvis opphavsretten ikke
9827 råder over programvare, så kunne ikke fri programvare pålegge slike krav på
9828 de som tar i bruk programvaren.  Den er dermed like avhengig av
9829 opphavsrettsloven som Microsoft.
9830 </p><p>
9831 Det er dermed forståelig at Microsoft, som utviklere av proprietær
9832 programvare, gikk imot et slikt WIPO-møte, og like fullt forståelig at de
9833 bruker sine lobbyister til å få USAs myndigheter til å gå imot møtet.  Og
9834 ganske riktig, det er akkurat dette som i følge rapporter hadde skjedd.  I
9835 følge Jonathan Krim i <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, lyktes
9836 Microsofts lobbyister i å få USAs myndigheter til å legge ned veto mot et
9837 slikt møte.<sup>[<a name="id2770902" href="#ftn.id2770902" class="footnote">203</a>]</sup> Og uten støtte fra USA ble
9838 møtet avlyst.
9839 </p><p>
9840 Jeg klandrer ikke Microsoft for å gjøre det de kan for å fremme sine egne
9841 interesser i samsvar med loven. Og lobbyvirksomhet mot myndighetene er
9842 åpenbart i samsvar med loven. Det er ikke noe overraskende her med deres
9843 lobbyvirksomhet, og ikke veldig overraskende at den mektigste
9844 programvareprodusenten i USA har lyktes med sin lobbyvirksomhet.
9845 </p><p>
9846 Det som var overraskende var USAs regjerings begrunnelse for å være imot
9847 møtet.  Igjen, siterert av krim, forklarte Lois Boland, direktør for
9848 internasjonale forbindelser ved USAs patent og varemerkekontor, at
9849 "programvare med åpen kildekode går imot til formålet til WIPO, som er å
9850 fremme immatterielle rettigheter.".  Hun skal i følge sitatet ha sagt, "Å
9851 holde et møte som har som formål å fraskrive seg eller frafalle slike
9852 rettigheter synes for oss å være i strid med formålene til WIPO."
9853 </p><p>
9854 Disse utsagnene er forbløffende på flere nivåer.
9855 </p><p>
9856 For det første er de ganske enkelt enkelt ikke riktige.  Som jeg beskrev, er
9857 det meste av åpen kildekode og fri programvare fundamentalt avhengig av den
9858 immaterielle retten kalt "opphavsrett".  Uten den vil begresningene definert
9859 av disse lisensene ikke fungere. Dermed er det å si at de "går imot"
9860 formålet om å fremme immaterielle rettigheter å avsløre en ekstraordinær
9861 mangel på forståelse&#8212;den type feil som er tilgivelig hos en førsteårs
9862 jusstudent, men pinlig fra en høyt plassert statstjenestemann som håndterer
9863 utfordringer rundt immaterielle rettigheter.
9864 </p><p>
9865 For det andre, hvem har noen gang hevdet at WIPOs eksklusive mål var å
9866 "fremme" immaterielle rettigheter maksimalt?  Som jeg fikk kjeft om på den
9867 forberedende konferansen til WSIS, skal WIPO vurdere ikke bare hvordan best
9868 beskytte immaterielle rettigheter, men også hva som er den beste balansen
9869 rundt immaterielle rettigheter.  Som enhver økonom og advokat vet, er det
9870 vanskelige spørsmålet i immaterielle rettighetsjuss å finne den balansen.
9871 Men at det skulle være en grense, trodde jeg, var ubestridt.  Man ønsker å
9872 spørre Ms. boland om generelle medisiner (medisiner basert på medisiner med
9873 patenter som er utløpt) i strid med WIPOs oppdrag?  Svekker allemannseie
9874 immaterielle rettigheter?  Ville det vært bedre om internettets protokoller
9875 hadde vært patentert?
9876 </p><p>
9877 For det tredje, selv om en tror at formålet med WIPO var å maksimere
9878 immaterielle rettigheter, så innehas immaterielle rettigheter, i vår
9879 tradisjon, av individer og selskaper.  De får bestemme hva som skal gjøres
9880 med disse rettighetene, igjen fordi det er <span class="emphasis"><em>de</em></span> som eier
9881 rettigetene. Hvis de ønsker å "frafalle" eller "frasi" seg sine rettigheter,
9882 så er det helt etter boka i vår tradisjon.  Når Bill Gates gir bort mer enn
9883 $20 milliarder til gode formål, så er ikke det uforenelig med målene til
9884 eiendomssystemet.  Det er heller tvert i mot, akkurat hva eiendomssysstemet
9885 er ment å oppnå, at individer har retten til å bestemme hva de vil gjøre med
9886 <span class="emphasis"><em>sin</em></span> eiendom.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2771040"></a>
9887 </p><p>
9888
9889 Når Ms. Boland sier at det er noe galt med et møte "som har som sitt formål
9890 å fraskrive eller frafalle slike rettigheter", så sier hun at WIPO har en
9891 interesse i å påvirke valgene til enkeltpersoner som eier immaterielle
9892 rettigheter.  At på en eller annen WIPOs oppdrag bør være å stoppe individer
9893 fra å "frakrive" eller "frafalle" seg sine immaterielle rettigheter.  At
9894 interessen til WIPO ikke bare er  maksimale immaterielle rettigheter, men
9895 også at de skal utøves på den mest ekstreme og restriktive mulig måten.
9896 </p><p>
9897 Det er en historie om akkurat et slikt eierskapssystem som er velkjent i den
9898 anglo-amerikansk tradisjon.  Det kalles "føydalisme". Under føydalismen var
9899 eiendommer ikke bare kontrollert av et relativt lite antall individer og
9900 aktører.  Men det føydale systemet hadde en sterk interesse i å sikre at
9901 landeier i systemet ikke svekke føydalismen ved å frigjøre folkene og
9902 eiendomene som de kontrollerte til det frie markedet.  Føydalismen var
9903 avhengig av maksimal kontroll og konsentrasjon.  Det sloss mot enhver frihet
9904 som kunne forstyrre denne kontrollen.
9905 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2771080"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2771086"></a><p>
9906 Som Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite beskriver, dette er nøyaktig det valget
9907 vi nå gjør om immaterielle rettigheter.<sup>[<a name="id2771099" href="#ftn.id2771099" class="footnote">204</a>]</sup>
9908 Vi kommer til å få et informasjonssamfunn.  Så mye er sikkert.  Vårt eneste
9909 valg nå er hvorvidt dette informasjonssamfunnet skal være
9910 <span class="emphasis"><em>fritt</em></span> eller <span class="emphasis"><em>føydalt</em></span>.  Trenden er
9911 mot det føydale.
9912 </p><p>
9913 Da denne bataljen brøt ut, blogget jeg om dette.  En heftig debatt brøt ut i
9914 kommentarfeltet.  Ms. Boland hadde en rekke støttespillere som forsøkte å
9915 vise hvorfor hennes kommentarer ga mening.  Men det var spesielt en
9916 kommentar som gjorde meg trist.  En anonym kommentator skrev,
9917 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
9918
9919 George, du misforstår Lessig: Han snakker bare om verden slik den burde være
9920 ("målet til WIPO, og målet til enhver regjering, bør være å fremme den
9921 riktige balansen for immaterielle rettigheter, ikke bare å fremme
9922 immaterielle rettigheter"), ikke som den er.  Hvis vi snakket om verden slik
9923 den er, så har naturligvis Boland ikke sagt noe galt.  Men i verden slik
9924 Lessig vil at den skal være, er det åpenbart at hun har sagt noe galt.  En
9925 må alltid være oppmerksom på forskjellen mellom Lessigs og vår verden.
9926 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9927 Jeg gikk glipp av ironien først gangen jeg leste den. Jeg lese den raskt og
9928 trodde forfatteren støttet idéen om at det våre myndigheter burde gjøre var
9929 å søke balanse. (Min kritikk av Ms Boland, selvfølgelig, var ikke om
9930 hvorvidt hun søkte balanse eller ikke; min kritikk var at hennes kommentarer
9931 avslørte en feil kun en førsteårs jussstudent burde kunne gjøre. Jeg har
9932 noen illusjon om ekstremismen hos våre myndigheter, uansett om de er
9933 republikanere eller demokrater. Min eneste tilsynelatende illusjon er
9934 hvorvidt våre myndigheter bør snakke sant eller ikke.)
9935 </p><p>
9936 Det var dermot åpenbart at den som postet meldingen ikke støttet idéen.  I
9937 stedet latterliggjorde forfatteren selve idéen om at i den virkelig verden
9938 skulle "målet" til myndighetene være "å fremme den riktige balanse" for
9939 immaterielle rettigheter.  Det var åpenbart tåpelig for ham.  Og det
9940 avslørte åpenbart, trodde han, min egen tåpelige utopisme.  "Typisk for en
9941 akademiker", kunne forfatteren like gjerne ha fortsatt.
9942 </p><p>
9943 Jeg forstår kritikken av akademisk utopisme.  Jeg mener også at utopisme er
9944 tåpelig, og jeg vil være blant de første til å gjøre narr av de aburde
9945 urealisistiske idealer til akademikere gjennom historien (og ikke bare i
9946 vårt eget lands historie).
9947 </p><p>
9948 Men når det har blitt dumt å anta at rollen til våre myndigheter bør være å
9949 "oppnå balanse", da kan du regne meg blant de dumme, for det betyr at dette
9950 faktisk har blitt ganske seriøst.  Hvis det bør være åpenbart for alle at
9951 myndighetene ikke søker å oppnå balanse, at myndighetene ganske enkelt et
9952 verktøy for de mektigste lobbyistene, at ideen om å forvente bedre av
9953 myndighetene er absurd, at ideen om å kreve at myndighetene snakker sant og
9954 ikke lyver bare er naiv, hva har da vi, det mektigste demokratiet i verden,
9955 blitt?
9956 </p><p>
9957
9958 Det kan være galskap å forvente at en mektig myndigshetsperson skal si
9959 sannheten. Det kan være galskap å tro at myndighetenes politikk skal gjøre
9960 mer enn å tjene de mektigste interesser. Det kan være galskap å argumentere
9961 for å bevare en tradisjon som har vært en del av vår tradisjon for
9962 mesteparten av vår historie&#8212;fri kultur.
9963 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2771224"></a><p>
9964 Hvis dette er galskap, så la det være mer gærninger.  Snart. Det finnes
9965 øyeblikk av håp i denne kampen. Og øyeblikk som overrasker. Da FCC vurderte
9966 mindre strenge eierskapregler, som ville ytterligere konsentrere
9967 mediaeierskap, dannet det seg en en ekstraordinær koalisjon på tvers av
9968 partiene for å bekjempe endringen. For kanskje første gang i historien
9969 organiserte interesser så forskjellige som NRA, ACLU, moveon.org, William
9970 Safire, Ted Turner og Codepink Women for Piece seg for å protestere på denne
9971 endringen i FCC-reglene.  Så mange som 700 000 brev ble sendt til FCC med
9972 krav om flere høringer og et annet resultat.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2771245"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2771251"></a>
9973 </p><p>
9974 Disse protestene stoppet ikke FCC, men like etter stemte en bred koalisjon i
9975 senatet for å reversere avgjørelsen i FCC. De fientlige høringene som ledet
9976 til avstemmingen avslørte hvor mektig denne bevegelsen hadde blitt.  Det var
9977 ingen betydnigsfull støtte for FCCs avgjørelse, mens det var bred og
9978 vedvarende støtte for å bekjempe ytterligere konsentrasjon i media.
9979 </p><p>
9980 Men selv denne bevegelsen går glipp av en viktig brikke i puslespillet.  Å
9981 være stor er ikke ille i seg selv. Frihet er ikke truet bare på grunn av at
9982 noen blir veldig rik, eller på grunn av at det bare er en håndfull store
9983 aktører.  Den dårlige kvaliteten til Big Macs eller Quartar Punders betyr
9984 ikke at du ikke kan få en god hamburger andre steder.
9985 </p><p>
9986 Faren med mediakonsentrasjon kommer ikke fra selve konsentrasjonen, men
9987 kommer fra føydalismen som denne konsentrasjonen fører til når den kobles
9988 til endringer i opphavsretten. Det er ikke kun at det er noen mektige
9989 selskaper som styrer en stadig voksende andel av mediene. Det er at denne
9990 konsentrasjonen kan påkalle en like oppsvulmet rekke
9991 rettigheter&#8212;eiendomsrettigheter i en historisk ekstrem form&#8212;som
9992 gjør størrelsen ille.
9993 </p><p>
9994 Det er derfor betydningsfullt at så mange vil kjempe for å kreve konkurranse
9995 og økt mangfold. Likevel, hvis kampanjen blir forstått til å kun gjelde
9996 størrelse, så er ikke det veldig overraskende. Vi amerikanere har en lang
9997 historie med å slåss mot "stort", klokt eller ikke. At vi kan være motivert
9998 til å slåss mot "store" igjen ikke noe nytt.
9999 </p><p>
10000 Det ville vært noe nytt, og noe veldig viktig, hvis like mange kan være med
10001 på en kampanje for å bekjempe økende ekstremisme bygget inn i idéen om
10002 "intellektuell eiendom".  Ikke fordi balanse er fremmed for vår
10003 tradisjon. Jeg agumenterer for at balanse er vår tradisjon.  Men fordi evnen
10004 til å tenke kritisk på omfanget av alt som kalles "eiendom" ikke er lenger
10005 er godt trent i denne tradisjonen.
10006 </p><p>
10007 Hvis vi var Akilles, så ville dette være vår hæl. Dette ville være stedet
10008 for våre tragedie.
10009 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2771344"></a><p>
10010 Mens jeg skriver disse avsluttende ordene, er nyhetene fylt med historier om
10011 at RIAA saksøker nesten tre hundre individer.<sup>[<a name="id2771356" href="#ftn.id2771356" class="footnote">205</a>]</sup>  Eminem har nettopp blitt saksøkt for å ha "samplet" noen andres
10012 musikk.<sup>[<a name="id2771402" href="#ftn.id2771402" class="footnote">206</a>]</sup>  Historien om hvordan Bob Dylan
10013 har "stjålet" fra en japansk forfatter har nettopp gått verden
10014 over.<sup>[<a name="id2771420" href="#ftn.id2771420" class="footnote">207</a>]</sup>  En på innsiden i
10015 Hollywood&#8212;som insisterer på at han må forbli anonym&#8212;rapporterer
10016 "en utrolig samtale med disse studiofolkene.  De har fantastisk [gammelt]
10017 innhold som de ville elske å bruke, men det kan de ikke på grunn av at de
10018 først må klarere rettighetene.  De har hauger med ungdommer som kunne gjøre
10019 fantastiske ting med innholdet, men det vil først kreve hauger med advokater
10020 for å klarere det først".  Kongressrepresentanter snakker om å gi datavirus
10021 politimyndighet for å ta ned datamaskiner som antas å bryte loven.
10022 Universiteter truer med å utvise ungdommer som bruker en datamaskin for å
10023 dele innhold.
10024 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2771436"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2771460"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2771467"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2771473"></a><p>
10025
10026 I mens på andre siden av atlanteren har BBC nettopp annonsert at de vil
10027 bygge opp et "kreativt arkiv" som britiske borgere kan laste ned BBC-innhold
10028 fra, og rippe, mikse og brenne det ut.<sup>[<a name="id2771490" href="#ftn.id2771490" class="footnote">208</a>]</sup>
10029 Og i Brasil har kulturministeren, Gilberto Gil, i seg selv en folkehelt i
10030 brasiliansk musikk, slått seg sammen med Creative Commons for å gi ut
10031 innhold og frie lisenser i dette latinamerikanske landet.<sup>[<a name="id2771511" href="#ftn.id2771511" class="footnote">209</a>]</sup>  Jeg har fortalt en mørk historie.  Sannheten mer
10032 mer blandet.  En teknologi har gitt oss mer frihet.  Sakte begynner noen å
10033 forstå at denne friheten trenger ikke å bety anarki.  Vi kan få med oss fri
10034 kultur inn i det tjueførste århundre, uten at artister taper og uten at
10035 potensialet for digital teknologi blir knust.  Det vil kreve omtanke, og
10036 viktigere, det vil kreve at noen omforme RCAene av i dag til Causbyere.
10037 </p><p>
10038
10039 Sunn fornuft må gjøre opprør. Den må handle for å frigjøre kulturen. Og
10040 snart, hvis dette potensialet skal noen gang bli realisert.
10041
10042
10043
10044 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2770130" href="#id2770130" class="para">195</a>] </sup>
10045
10046 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
10047 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
10048 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10049 #55</a>. I følge en pressemelding fra verdens helseorganisasjon sendt ut
10050 9. juli 2002, mottar kun 320 000 av de 6 millioner som trenger medisiner i
10051 utviklingsland dem de trenger&#8212;og halvparten av dem er i Brasil.
10052 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2770208" href="#id2770208" class="para">196</a>] </sup>
10053
10054 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
10055 <em class="citetitle">Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?</em> (New York: The New
10056 Press, 2003), 37.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2770216"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2770225"></a>
10057 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2770244" href="#id2770244" class="para">197</a>] </sup>
10058
10059
10060 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <em class="citetitle">Patent
10061 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a
10062 Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property Organization</em>
10063 (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #56</a>. For a firsthand
10064 account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing Before the
10065 Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House
10066 Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22
10067 July 1999), 150&#8211;57 (statement of James Love).
10068 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2770273" href="#id2770273" class="para">198</a>] </sup>
10069
10070
10071 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <em class="citetitle">Patent
10072 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a
10073 Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property Organization</em>
10074 (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2770367" href="#id2770367" class="para">199</a>] </sup>
10075
10076
10077
10078 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's Needs at
10079 Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," <em class="citetitle">San Francisco
10080 Chronicle</em>, 24 May 1999, A1, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #57</a> ("compulsory licenses
10081 and gray markets pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property
10082 protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
10083 Access to Essential Medicines," <em class="citetitle">Foreign Policy in
10084 Focus</em> 4:23 (August 1999), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #58</a> (describing
10085 U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the
10086 HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property
10087 Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," <em class="citetitle">Widener Law Symposium
10088 Journal</em> (Spring 2001): 175.
10089
10090 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2770491" href="#id2770491" class="para">200</a>] </sup>
10091
10092 Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," <em class="citetitle">Washington
10093 Post</em>, August 2003, E1, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #59</a>; William New, "Global
10094 Group's Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," <em class="citetitle">National
10095 Journal's Technology Daily</em>, 19 August 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #60</a>; William New,
10096 "U.S. Official Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," <em class="citetitle">National
10097 Journal's Technology Daily</em>, 19 August 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #61</a>.
10098 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2770695" href="#id2770695" class="para">201</a>] </sup>
10099
10100 Jeg bør nevne at jeg var en av folkene som ba WIPO om dette møtet.
10101 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2770550" href="#id2770550" class="para">202</a>] </sup>
10102
10103
10104 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
10105 sophisticated.  As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open
10106 source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
10107 opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license,
10108 meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any
10109 derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling
10110 the Marketplace to Decide," <em class="citetitle">Government Policy Toward Open Source
10111 Software</em> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
10112 Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
10113 Research, 2002), 69, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #62</a>. See also Craig Mundie,
10114 Microsoft senior vice president, <em class="citetitle">The Commercial Software
10115 Model</em>, discussion at New York University Stern School of
10116 Business (3 May 2001), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #63</a>.
10117 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2770902" href="#id2770902" class="para">203</a>] </sup>
10118
10119
10120 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #64</a>.
10121 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2771099" href="#id2771099" class="para">204</a>] </sup>
10122
10123 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <em class="citetitle">Information Feudalism</em>,
10124 210&#8211;20.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2770267"></a>
10125 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2771356" href="#id2771356" class="para">205</a>] </sup>
10126
10127
10128 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September 2003,
10129 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #65</a>;
10130 Paul R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
10131 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10132 #66</a>; Soni Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a
10133 Song, N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," <em class="citetitle">New York
10134 Daily News</em>, 9 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits
10135 Meet Surprised Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in
10136 N.Y. Among Defendants," <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, 10 September
10137 2003, E1; Katie Dean, "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," <em class="citetitle">Wired
10138 News</em>, 10 September 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #67</a>.
10139 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2771402" href="#id2771402" class="para">206</a>] </sup>
10140
10141
10142 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
10143 17. september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #68</a>.
10144 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2771420" href="#id2771420" class="para">207</a>] </sup>
10145
10146
10147
10148 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for Dylan
10149 Songs," Kansascity.com, 9. juli 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #69</a>.
10150
10151 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2771490" href="#id2771490" class="para">208</a>] </sup>
10152
10153 "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," pressemelding fra BBC,
10154 24. august 2003, tilgjengelig  fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #70</a>.
10155 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2771511" href="#id2771511" class="para">209</a>] </sup>
10156
10157
10158 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6. august 2003,
10159 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10160 #71</a>.
10161 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 7. Etterord"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-afterword"></a>Kapittel 7. Etterord</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#usnow">Oss, nå</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbyggeing av fri kultur: En idé</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#themsoon">Dem, snart</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><p>
10162
10163
10164
10165 I hvert fall noen av de som har lest helt hit vil være enig med meg om at
10166 noe må gjøres for å endre retningen vi holder.  Balansen i denne boken
10167 kartlegger hva som kan gjøres.
10168 </p><p>
10169 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now, and that
10170 which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson that we can
10171 draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that it requires
10172 remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
10173 </p><p>
10174 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
10175 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators, authors,
10176 musicians, filmmakers, scientists&#8212;all to tell this story in their own
10177 words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
10178 </p><p>
10179 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of having
10180 an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people think
10181 matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands opposed, but
10182 still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I sketch changes that
10183 Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
10184 </p><div class="sect1" title="Oss, nå"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="usnow"></a>Oss, nå</h2></div></div></div><p>
10185 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far has
10186 been framed at the extremes&#8212;as a grand either/or: either property or
10187 anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is
10188 the choice, then the warriors should win.
10189 </p><p>
10190 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are extremes in
10191 this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There are those who
10192 believe in maximal copyright&#8212;"All Rights Reserved"&#8212; and those
10193 who reject copyright&#8212;"No Rights Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved"
10194 sorts believe that you should ask permission before you "use" a copyrighted
10195 work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able
10196 to do with content as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or
10197 not.
10198 </p><p>
10199
10200 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
10201 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
10202 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
10203 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
10204 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
10205 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively unprotected.
10206 </p><p>
10207 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite equal)
10208 by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this book. Through
10209 legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's design, copyright
10210 holders have been able to change the essential character of the environment
10211 of the original Internet. If the original architecture made the effective
10212 default "no rights reserved," the future architecture will make the
10213 effective default "all rights reserved." The architecture and law that
10214 surround the Internet's design will increasingly produce an environment
10215 where all use of content requires permission.  The "cut and paste" world
10216 that defines the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and
10217 paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
10218 </p><p>
10219 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&#8212;neither "all
10220 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&#8212;
10221 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content as
10222 they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of freedoms
10223 that we could just take for granted before.
10224 </p><div class="sect2" title="Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="examples"></a>Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</h3></div></div></div><p>
10225 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
10226 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before the
10227 Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about our lives
10228 that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore and browsed
10229 through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need to worry about
10230 explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of
10231 your browsing habits was assured.
10232 </p><p>
10233 Hva gjorde at det var sikret?
10234 </p><p>
10235 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter 10, your
10236 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for gathering
10237 data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who wanted to gather
10238 that data. If you were a suspected spy for North Korea, working for the CIA,
10239 no doubt your privacy would not be assured.  But that's because the CIA
10240 would (we hope) find it valuable enough to spend the thousands required to
10241 track you. But for most of us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The
10242 highly inefficient architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly
10243 robust amount of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not
10244 by law (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
10245 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the
10246 costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
10247 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2771704"></a><p>
10248 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular has
10249 become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you browse the
10250 pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked at. You know this
10251 because at the side of the page, there's a list of "recently viewed"
10252 pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net and the function of
10253 cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the data than not. The friction
10254 has disappeared, and hence any "privacy" protected by the friction
10255 disappears, too.
10256 </p><p>
10257 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry about
10258 libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that people
10259 should have the "right" to browse in a library without the government
10260 knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties, too), then this
10261 change in the technology of monitoring might concern you. If it becomes
10262 simple to gather and sort who does what in electronic spaces, then the
10263 friction-induced privacy of yesterday disappears.
10264 </p><p>
10265
10266 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy" on the
10267 Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what friction
10268 before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what friction
10269 did.<sup>[<a name="id2771742" href="#ftn.id2771742" class="footnote">210</a>]</sup> And whether you're in favor of
10270 those laws or not, it is the pattern that is important here. We must take
10271 affirmative steps to secure a kind of freedom that was passively provided
10272 before. A change in technology now forces those who believe in privacy to
10273 affirmatively act where, before, privacy was given by default.
10274 </p><p>
10275 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
10276 movement. When computers with software were first made available
10277 commercially, the software&#8212;both the source code and the
10278 binaries&#8212; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data
10279 General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
10280 about controlling their software.
10281 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2771777"></a><p>
10282 Dette var verden Richard Stallman ble født inn i, og mens han var forsker
10283 ved MIT, lærte han til å elske samfunnet som utviklet seg når en var fri til
10284 å utforske og fikle med programvaren som kjørte på datamaskiner. Av den
10285 smarte sorten selv, og en talentfull programmerer, begynte Stallman å basere
10286 seg frihet til å legge til eller endre på andre personers arbeid.
10287 </p><p>
10288 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In a
10289 math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that someone
10290 offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a theorem, you could
10291 take what someone else did and change it. In a classics department, if you
10292 believed a colleague's translation of a recently discovered text was flawed,
10293 you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you
10294 should be free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
10295 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like anything
10296 else?
10297 </p><p>
10298 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue for
10299 computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from one system
10300 to another, it became economically attractive (at least in the view of some)
10301 to hide the code of your program. So, too, as companies started selling
10302 peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just take your printer driver
10303 and copy it, then that would make it easier for me to sell a printer to the
10304 market than it was for you.
10305 </p><p>
10306
10307 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the early
10308 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.  The world of
10309 free software had been erased by a change in the economics of computing. And
10310 as he believed, if he did nothing about it, then the freedom to change and
10311 share software would be fundamentally weakened.
10312 </p><p>
10313 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
10314 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That was
10315 the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux" kernel was
10316 added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
10317 </p><p>
10318 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of software
10319 that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free Software
10320 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the source code
10321 for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone building upon
10322 GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free as well. This would
10323 assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code would develop that
10324 remained free for others to build upon. His fundamental goal was freedom;
10325 innovative creative code was a byproduct.
10326 </p><p>
10327 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now do for
10328 privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that was taken
10329 for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses that bind
10330 copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a space where free
10331 software would survive. He was actively protecting what before had been
10332 passively guaranteed.
10333 </p><p>
10334 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates with
10335 the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and scientific
10336 journals are produced.
10337 </p><p>
10338
10339 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
10340 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them to
10341 libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
10342 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
10343 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
10344 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
10345 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
10346 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
10347 service.  Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and anyone is
10348 free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free to
10349 charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme Court
10350 opinion through their respective services.
10351 </p><p>
10352 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
10353 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive for
10354 people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.  The law has
10355 agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed to flourish. And if
10356 there's nothing wrong with selling the public domain, then there could be
10357 nothing wrong, in principle, with selling access to material that is not in
10358 the public domain.
10359 </p><p>
10360 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data was
10361 through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to browse this
10362 data except by paying for a subscription?
10363 </p><p>
10364 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
10365 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
10366 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to the
10367 library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts because the
10368 library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand the risks of a
10369 certain treatment could research those risks by reading all available
10370 articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a function of the
10371 institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of paper journals
10372 (architecture)&#8212;namely, that it was very hard to control access to a
10373 paper journal.
10374 </p><p>
10375 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding that
10376 libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This means
10377 that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries begin to
10378 disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing technology
10379 and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
10380 </p><p>
10381 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to restore the
10382 freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science (PLoS), for
10383 example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making scientific research
10384 available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors of scientific work submit
10385 that work to the Public Library of Science.  That work is then subject to
10386 peer review. If accepted, the work is then deposited in a public, electronic
10387 archive and made permanently available for free. PLoS also sells a print
10388 version of its work, but the copyright for the print journal does not
10389 inhibit the right of anyone to redistribute the work for free.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2771953"></a>
10390 </p><p>
10391 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for granted
10392 before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.  There's no
10393 doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional publishers and
10394 their efforts to make money from the exclusive distribution of content. But
10395 competition in our tradition is presumptively a good&#8212;especially when
10396 it helps spread knowledge and science.
10397 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="Gjenoppbyggeing av fri kultur: En idé"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="oneidea"></a>Gjenoppbyggeing av fri kultur: En idé</h3></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxcc"></a><p>
10398 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
10399 increasing control effected through law and technology.
10400 </p><p>
10401 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation
10402 established in Massachusetts, but with its home at Stanford University. Its
10403 aim is to build a layer of <span class="emphasis"><em>reasonable</em></span> copyright on top
10404 of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to
10405 build upon other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express
10406 the freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags, tied
10407 to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this
10408 possible.
10409 </p><p>
10410
10411 <span class="emphasis"><em>Simple</em></span>&#8212;which means without a middleman, or
10412 without a lawyer.  By developing a free set of licenses that people can
10413 attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content
10414 that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
10415 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers automatically
10416 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three expressions
10417 together&#8212;a legal license, a human-readable description, and
10418 machine-readable tags&#8212;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
10419 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
10420 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal that
10421 the person associated with the license believes in something different than
10422 the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the CC mark, which does
10423 not mean that copyright is waived, but that certain freedoms are given.
10424 </p><p>
10425 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their precise
10426 contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The creator can choose a
10427 license that permits any use, so long as attribution is given. She can
10428 choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.  She can choose a
10429 license that permits any use so long as the same freedoms are given to other
10430 uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is
10431 made. Or any use at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so
10432 long as full copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
10433 </p><p>
10434 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
10435 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional fair
10436 use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way that
10437 subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
10438 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content, governed by
10439 a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build upon. Voluntary
10440 choice of individuals and creators will make this content available. And
10441 that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a public domain.
10442 </p><p>
10443 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons.  And of
10444 course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
10445 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from many is
10446 that we are not interested only in talking about a public domain or in
10447 getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our aim is to build a
10448 movement of consumers and producers of content ("content conducers," as
10449 attorney Mia Garlick calls them)  who help build the public domain and, by
10450 their work, demonstrate the importance of the public domain to other
10451 creativity.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2772077"></a>
10452 </p><p>
10453 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
10454 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture are
10455 produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written centuries
10456 ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have imagined. The
10457 rules may well have made sense against a background of technologies from
10458 centuries ago, but they do not make sense against the background of digital
10459 technologies. New rules&#8212;with different freedoms, expressed in ways so
10460 that humans without lawyers can use them&#8212;are needed. Creative Commons
10461 gives people a way effectively to begin to build those rules.
10462 </p><p>
10463 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some participate
10464 to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example, is a science
10465 fiction author. His first novel, <em class="citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
10466 Kingdom</em>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
10467 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
10468 </p><p>
10469 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher reasoned
10470 like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)  those who will buy
10471 Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2) those who may never
10472 hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for free on the
10473 Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book instead of buying
10474 it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)  will download Cory's book, like
10475 it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.  If there are more
10476 (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line
10477 will probably <span class="emphasis"><em>increase</em></span> sales of Cory's book.
10478 </p><p>
10479 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that conclusion.
10480 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the publisher had
10481 expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was a total success.
10482 </p><p>
10483
10484 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content was
10485 confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner, who wrote a
10486 book about the free software movement titled <em class="citetitle">Free for
10487 All</em>, made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a
10488 Creative Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
10489 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
10490 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as well.
10491 </p><p>
10492 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
10493 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the Commons. There
10494 are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other reasons. Many who use
10495 the "sampling license" do so because anything else would be
10496 hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are free, for commercial
10497 or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from the licensed work; they
10498 are just not free to make full copies of the licensed work available to
10499 others. This is consistent with their own art&#8212;they, too, sample from
10500 others. Because the <span class="emphasis"><em>legal</em></span> costs of sampling are so high
10501 (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
10502 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow" Public
10503 Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so high<sup>[<a name="id2772172" href="#ftn.id2772172" class="footnote">211</a>]</sup>), these artists release into the creative
10504 environment content that others can build upon, so that their form of
10505 creativity might grow.
10506 </p><p>
10507 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
10508 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
10509 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is, you
10510 are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved" model. Good
10511 for you, but many do not. Many believe that however appropriate that rule is
10512 for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate description of how most
10513 creators view the rights associated with their content. The Creative Commons
10514 license expresses this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the
10515 chance to say it to others.
10516 </p><p>
10517
10518 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over 1 million
10519 objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next step is
10520 partnerships with middleware content providers to help them build into their
10521 technologies simple ways for users to mark their content with Creative
10522 Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and celebrate creators who
10523 build content based upon content set free.
10524 </p><p>
10525 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not mere
10526 arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first step to
10527 showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
10528 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve this
10529 rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary steps are
10530 possible.
10531 </p><p>
10532 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by individuals and
10533 creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the creative field. The
10534 project does not compete with copyright; it complements it. Its aim is not
10535 to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it easier for authors and
10536 creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and cheaply. That
10537 difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread more easily.
10538 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2772259"></a></div></div><div class="sect1" title="Dem, snart"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="themsoon"></a>Dem, snart</h2></div></div></div><p>
10539 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will also
10540 take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before the
10541 politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.  But
10542 that also means that we have time to build awareness around the changes that
10543 we need.
10544 </p><p>
10545 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general, and
10546 one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each is a
10547 step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way to our
10548 end.
10549 </p><div class="sect2" title="1. Flere formaliteter"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="formalities"></a>1. Flere formaliteter</h3></div></div></div><p>
10550 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
10551 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.  If
10552 you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
10553 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
10554 </p><p>
10555
10556
10557 These are all formalities associated with property. They are requirements
10558 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
10559 </p><p>
10560 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a copyright,
10561 regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You don't have to
10562 register. You don't even have to mark your content. The default is control,
10563 and "formalities" are banished.
10564 </p><p>
10565 Why?
10566 </p><p>
10567 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
10568 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities imposed a
10569 burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it was progress when
10570 the law relaxed the formal requirements that a copyright owner must bear to
10571 protect and secure his work. Those formalities were getting in the way.
10572 </p><p>
10573 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
10574 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that burdens
10575 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with
10576 whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the creative work of
10577 others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&#8212; there is no
10578 simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the massive increase in
10579 the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is a necessary step for
10580 any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the <span class="emphasis"><em>lack</em></span>
10581 of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
10582 </p><p>
10583 The law should therefore change this requirement<sup>[<a name="id2772358" href="#ftn.id2772358" class="footnote">212</a>]</sup>&#8212;but it should not change it by going back to the old, broken
10584 system. We should require formalities, but we should establish a system that
10585 will create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
10586 </p><p>
10587 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work, registering
10588 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally, the first of
10589 these three was something the copyright owner did; the second two were
10590 something the government did. But a revised system of formalities would
10591 banish the government from the process, except for the sole purpose of
10592 approving standards developed by others.
10593 </p><div class="sect3" title="Registrering og fornying"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="registration"></a>Registrering og fornying</h4></div></div></div><p>
10594 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with the
10595 Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
10596 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
10597 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the burden
10598 of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.  And as
10599 the Copyright Office is not a main target of government policymaking, the
10600 office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus, when people who
10601 know something about the process hear this idea about formalities, their
10602 first reaction is panic&#8212;nothing could be worse than forcing people to
10603 deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
10604 </p><p>
10605 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition of
10606 extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer think
10607 innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.  Just because
10608 there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't follow that the
10609 government must actually administer the role. Instead, we should be creating
10610 incentives for private parties to serve the public, subject to standards
10611 that the government sets.
10612 </p><p>
10613 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.  There
10614 are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.  Domain name
10615 owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their registration
10616 alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net), there is a central
10617 registry. The actual registrations are, however, performed by many competing
10618 registrars. That competition drives the cost of registering down, and more
10619 importantly, it drives the ease with which registration occurs up.
10620 </p><p>
10621
10622 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
10623 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry, but
10624 it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should establish a
10625 database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
10626 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete with
10627 one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for registering and
10628 renewing copyrights. That competition would substantially lower the burden
10629 of this formality&#8212;while producing a database of registrations that
10630 would facilitate the licensing of content.
10631 </p></div><div class="sect3" title="Merking"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="marking"></a>Merking</h4></div></div></div><p>
10632 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
10633 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh punishment for
10634 failing to comply with a regulatory rule&#8212;akin to imposing the death
10635 penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.  Here again,
10636 there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be enforced in this
10637 way. And more importantly, there is no reason a marking requirement needs to
10638 be enforced uniformly across all media.
10639 </p><p>
10640 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is copyrighted
10641 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also makes it easy
10642 to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use the work.
10643 </p><p>
10644 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was that
10645 different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't clear
10646 how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A new
10647 marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing the
10648 differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to evolve as
10649 technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special signal from the
10650 failure to mark&#8212;not the loss of the copyright, but the loss of the
10651 right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
10652 </p><p>
10653
10654 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work to be
10655 published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that failure need
10656 not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could instead be that
10657 anyone has the right to use this work, until the copyright owner complains
10658 and demonstrates that it is his work and he doesn't give
10659 permission.<sup>[<a name="id2772482" href="#ftn.id2772482" class="footnote">213</a>]</sup> The meaning of an unmarked
10660 work would therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
10661 complain, then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
10662 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.  This
10663 would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark their work.
10664 </p><p>
10665 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be marked. Here
10666 again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies evolve. The best way
10667 to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the Copyright Office's role to
10668 that of approving standards for marking content that have been crafted
10669 elsewhere.
10670 </p><p>
10671 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
10672 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The Copyright
10673 Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could be made. The
10674 Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it judged preferable,
10675 and it would base that choice <span class="emphasis"><em>solely</em></span> upon the
10676 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the registration
10677 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to innovate; but we
10678 would count on the government to keep the product of innovation in line with
10679 its other important functions.
10680 </p><p>
10681 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration requirements.
10682 If photographs were marked by author and year, there would be little reason
10683 not to allow a photographer to reregister, for example, all photographs
10684 taken in a particular year in one quick step. The aim of the formality is
10685 not to burden the creator; the system itself should be kept as simple as
10686 possible.
10687 </p><p>
10688 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing system
10689 does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to make things
10690 unclear.
10691 </p><p>
10692 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
10693 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.  It
10694 would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it would be
10695 simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular kind of content;
10696 it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew that assertion at
10697 the appropriate time.
10698 </p></div></div><div class="sect2" title="2. Kortere vernetid"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="shortterms"></a>2. Kortere vernetid</h3></div></div></div><p>
10699 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five years for
10700 corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for natural
10701 authors.
10702 </p><p>
10703 In <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em>, I proposed a
10704 seventy-five-year term, granted in five-year increments with a requirement
10705 of renewal every five years.  That seemed radical enough at the time. But
10706 after we lost <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
10707 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, the proposals became even more
10708 radical. <em class="citetitle">The Economist</em> endorsed a proposal for a
10709 fourteen-year copyright term.<sup>[<a name="id2772603" href="#ftn.id2772603" class="footnote">214</a>]</sup> Others
10710 have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
10711 </p><p>
10712 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in copyright's
10713 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four principles
10714 that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
10715 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
10716
10717
10718 <span class="emphasis"><em>Keep it short:</em></span> The term should be as long as necessary
10719 to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
10720 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
10721 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
10722 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal regulations
10723 when it no longer benefits an author.
10724 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10725
10726
10727
10728 <span class="emphasis"><em>Gjør det enkelt:</em></span> Skillelinjen mellom verker uten
10729 opphavsrettslig vern og innhold som er beskyttet må forbli klart.  Advokater
10730 liker uklarheten som "rimelig bruk" og forskjellen mellom "idéer" og
10731 "uttrykk" har.  Denne type lovverk gir dem en masse arbeid.  Men de som
10732 skrev grunnloven hadde en enklere idé: vernet versus ikke vernet. Verdien av
10733 korte vernetider er at det er lite behov for å bygge inn unntak i
10734 opphavsretten når vernetiden holdes kort.  En klar og aktiv "advokat-fri
10735 sone" gjør komplesiteten av "rimelig bruk" og "idé/uttrykk" mindre nødvendig
10736 å håndtere.
10737
10738 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10739
10740 <span class="emphasis"><em>Keep it alive:</em></span> Copyright should have to be renewed.
10741 Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be
10742 required to signal periodically that he wants the protection continued. This
10743 need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly
10744 protection has to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes
10745 for a veteran to apply for a pension.<sup>[<a name="id2772691" href="#ftn.id2772691" class="footnote">215</a>]</sup>
10746 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't require
10747 authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
10748 <a class="indexterm" name="id2772710"></a>
10749 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10750
10751
10752 <span class="emphasis"><em>Keep it prospective:</em></span> Whatever the term of copyright
10753 should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once
10754 given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the
10755 law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
10756 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got fewer
10757 authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct
10758 that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we
10759 will not increase the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can
10760 increase the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
10761 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
10762 increasing their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.  What's
10763 not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do about that now.  </p></li></ol></div><p>
10764 Disse endringene vil sammen gi en <span class="emphasis"><em>gjennomsnittlig</em></span>
10765 opphavsrettslig vernetid som er mye kortere enn den gjeldende vernetiden.
10766 Frem til 1976 var gjennomsnittelig vernetid kun 32.2 år.  Vårt mål bør være
10767 det samme.
10768 </p><p>
10769 Uten tvil vil ekstremistene kalle disse idéene "radikale". (Tross alt, så
10770 kaller jeg dem "ekstremister".) Men igjen, vernetiden jeg anbefalte var
10771 lengre enn vernetiden under Richard Nixon. hvor "radikalt" kan det være å be
10772 om en mer sjenerøs opphavsrettighet enn da Richard Nixon var president?
10773 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="freefairuse"></a>3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</h3></div></div></div><p>
10774 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally granted
10775 property owners the right to control their property from the ground to the
10776 heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property rights quickly
10777 changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional challenge.  It made no sense
10778 anymore to grant that much control, given the emergence of that new
10779 technology.
10780 </p><p>
10781 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive right"
10782 to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive right to "their
10783 writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that are
10784 sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
10785 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the right to
10786 release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
10787 </p><p>
10788 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it expanded the
10789 exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control translations and
10790 dramatizations of a work.<sup>[<a name="id2772806" href="#ftn.id2772806" class="footnote">216</a>]</sup> The courts
10791 have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This
10792 expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
10793 Benjamin Kaplan.
10794 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
10795 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a large range
10796 of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense the oddity of
10797 accepting such an enlargement of copyright while yet intoning the
10798 abracadabra of idea and expression.<sup>[<a name="id2772829" href="#ftn.id2772829" class="footnote">217</a>]</sup>
10799 </p></blockquote></div><p>
10800 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
10801 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
10802 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that a
10803 copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.  Consider
10804 each limitation in turn.
10805 </p><p>
10806 <span class="emphasis"><em>Term:</em></span> If Congress wants to grant a derivative right,
10807 then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect
10808 John Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at
10809 least I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that
10810 right to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
10811 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
10812 after the creative work is done.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2772860"></a>
10813 </p><p>
10814 <span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Likewise should the scope of derivative rights
10815 be narrowed.  Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are
10816 important.  Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines
10817 around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
10818 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses, perhaps
10819 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer makes
10820 sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the creative
10821 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses
10822 into the machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does
10823 to the creative process. Smothers it.
10824 </p><p>
10825 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the Clint
10826 Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for foreseeable
10827 derivative rights&#8212;turning a book into a movie, or a poem into a
10828 musical score&#8212;it doesn't make sense to require negotiation for the
10829 unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much more sense.
10830 </p><p>
10831 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are protected, and
10832 the presumption should be that other uses are not protected.  This is the
10833 reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul Goldstein.<sup>[<a name="id2772903" href="#ftn.id2772903" class="footnote">218</a>]</sup> His view is that the law should be written so that
10834 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
10835 </p><p>
10836 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
10837 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of the
10838 Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the incentives
10839 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a strong
10840 copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
10841 </p><p>
10842
10843 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection beyond the
10844 part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon certain statutory
10845 conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great deal of culture
10846 to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights regime, that reuse
10847 would earn artists more income.
10848 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="liberatemusic"></a>4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</h3></div></div></div><p>
10849 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't be
10850 fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most people,
10851 most pressing&#8212;music. There is no other policy issue that better
10852 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing of
10853 music.
10854 </p><p>
10855 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the Internet's
10856 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more powerfully than any
10857 other single application. It was the Internet's killer app&#8212;possibly in
10858 two senses of that word. It no doubt was the application that drove demand
10859 for bandwidth. It may well be the application that drives demand for
10860 regulations that in the end kill innovation on the network.
10861 </p><p>
10862 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
10863 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed, performed,
10864 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving an exclusive
10865 right to a composer to control public performances of his work, and to a
10866 performing artist to control copies of her performance.
10867 </p><p>
10868 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
10869 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course, that's not
10870 all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter 5, they enable
10871 four different kinds of sharing:
10872 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="A"><li class="listitem"><p>
10873
10874
10875 Det er noen som bruker delingsnettverk som erstatninger for å kjøpe CDer.
10876 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10877
10878
10879 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample, on the way to
10880 purchasing CDs.
10881 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10882
10883
10884
10885
10886 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk til å få tilgang til innhold som
10887 ikke lenger er i salg, men fortsatt er vernet av opphavsrett eller som ville
10888 ha vært altfor vanskelig å få kjøpt via nettet.
10889 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10890
10891
10892 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk for å få tilgang til innhold som
10893 ikke er opphavsrettsbeskyttet, eller for å få tilgang som
10894 opphavsrettsinnehaveren åpenbart går god for.
10895 </p></li></ol></div><p>
10896 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It must
10897 avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The eagerness
10898 with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover, should depend upon
10899 the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net effect of sharing is
10900 actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is significantly
10901 weakened.
10902 </p><p>
10903 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is controversial.
10904 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is real. I
10905 assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly greater than
10906 type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
10907 </p><p>
10908 Uansett, det er et avgjørende faktum om den gjeldende teknologiske
10909 omgivelsen som vi må huske på hvis vi skal forstå hvordan loven bør reagere.
10910 </p><p>
10911 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
10912 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
10913 content.  It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of
10914 content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and
10915 slow&#8212;we in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at
10916 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and
10917 down. Although wireless access is growing, most of us still get access
10918 across wires. Most only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The
10919 idea of the always on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
10920 </p><p>
10921
10922 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to the
10923 Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should not make
10924 policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should make policy on
10925 the basis of where the technology is going. The question should not be, how
10926 should the law regulate sharing in this world? The question should be, what
10927 law will we require when the network becomes the network it is clearly
10928 becoming? That network is one in which every machine with electricity is
10929 essentially on the Net; where everywhere you are&#8212;except maybe the
10930 desert or the Rockies&#8212;you can instantaneously be connected to the
10931 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service,
10932 where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
10933 </p><p>
10934 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that give
10935 you access to content on the fly&#8212;such as Internet radio, content that
10936 is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the critical
10937 point: When it is <span class="emphasis"><em>extremely</em></span> easy to connect to services
10938 that give access to content, it will be <span class="emphasis"><em>easier</em></span> to
10939 connect to services that give you access to content than it will be to
10940 download and store content <span class="emphasis"><em>on the many devices you will have for
10941 playing content</em></span>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
10942 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
10943 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially is. Content
10944 services will compete with content sharing, even if the services charge
10945 money for the content they give access to. Already cell-phone services in
10946 Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell phones (enhanced with plugs
10947 for headphones). The Japanese are paying for this content even though "free"
10948 content is available in the form of MP3s across the Web.<sup>[<a name="id2773141" href="#ftn.id2773141" class="footnote">219</a>]</sup>
10949
10950 </p><p>
10951
10952 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
10953 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
10954 sharing&#8212;to the extent there is a real problem&#8212;is a problem that
10955 will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to the
10956 Internet.  And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy makers today
10957 to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology that will be gone
10958 tomorrow.  The question should not be how to regulate the Internet to
10959 eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve that problem away). The question
10960 instead should be how to assure that artists get paid, during this
10961 transition between twentieth-century models for doing business and
10962 twenty-first-century technologies.
10963 </p><p>
10964 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems" here
10965 to solve. Let's start with type D content&#8212;uncopyrighted content or
10966 copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The "problem" with this
10967 content is to make sure that the technology that would enable this kind of
10968 sharing is not rendered illegal. You can think of it this way: Pay phones
10969 are used to deliver ransom demands, no doubt.  But there are many who need
10970 to use pay phones who have nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to
10971 ban pay phones in order to eliminate kidnapping.
10972 </p><p>
10973 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was, at
10974 one time, published and is no longer available. It may be unavailable
10975 because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the record label he
10976 signed with to carry his work. Or it may be unavailable because the work is
10977 forgotten. Either way, the aim of the law should be to facilitate the access
10978 to this content, ideally in a way that returns something to the artist.
10979 </p><p>
10980 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of print,
10981 it may still be available in libraries and used book stores. But libraries
10982 and used book stores don't pay the copyright owner when someone reads or
10983 buys an out-of-print book. That makes total sense, of course, since any
10984 other system would be so burdensome as to eliminate the possibility of used
10985 book stores' existing. But from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of
10986 his content without his being compensated is less than ideal.
10987 </p><p>
10988 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
10989 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of the
10990 music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial providers would
10991 be free, under this rule, to "share" that content, even though the sharing
10992 involved making a copy. The copy here would be incidental to the trade; in a
10993 context where commercial publishing has ended, trading music should be as
10994 free as trading books.
10995 </p><p>
10996
10997
10998
10999 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would ensure
11000 that artists get something from the trade of their work. For example, if the
11001 law set a low statutory rate for the commercial sharing of content that was
11002 not offered for sale by a commercial publisher, and if that rate were
11003 automatically transferred to a trust for the benefit of the artist, then
11004 businesses could develop around the idea of trading this content, and
11005 artists would benefit from this trade.
11006 </p><p>
11007 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep works
11008 available commercially. Works that are available commercially would not be
11009 subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect the right to charge
11010 whatever they want for content if they kept the work commercially
11011 available. But if they don't keep it available, and instead, the computer
11012 hard disks of fans around the world keep it alive, then any royalty owed for
11013 such copying should be much less than the amount owed a commercial
11014 publisher.
11015 </p><p>
11016 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is hard only
11017 because the extent of the problem will change over time, as the technologies
11018 for gaining access to content change. The law's solution should be as
11019 flexible as the problem is, understanding that we are in the middle of a
11020 radical transformation in the technology for delivering and accessing
11021 content.
11022 </p><p>
11023 Så her er en løsning som i første omgang kan virke veldig undelig for begge
11024 sider i denne krigen, men som jeg tror vil gi mer mening når en får tenkt
11025 seg om.
11026 </p><p>
11027 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic claim of
11028 the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)  has harmed a
11029 set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to be protected,
11030 then the content industry should be compensated for that harm. Just as the
11031 technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions of Americans, or the
11032 technology of asbestos caused grave illness to thousands of miners, so, too,
11033 has the technology of digital networks harmed the interests of the content
11034 industry.
11035 </p><p>
11036
11037
11038 Jeg elsker internett, så jeg liker ikke å sammenligne det med tobakk eller
11039 asbest.  Men analogien er rimelig når en ser det fra lovens perspektiv. Og
11040 det foreslår en rimelig respons: I stedet for å forsøke å ødelegge internett
11041 eller p2p-teknologien som i dag skader innholdsleverandører på internett, så
11042 bør vi finne en relativt enkel måte å kompensere de som blir skadelidende.
11043 </p><p>
11044 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been floated by
11045 Harvard law professor William Fisher.<sup>[<a name="id2773296" href="#ftn.id2773296" class="footnote">220</a>]</sup>
11046 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
11047 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission would
11048 (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to
11049 evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once
11050 the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
11051 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the basis of
11052 those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The compensation would
11053 be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
11054 </p><p>
11055 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
11056 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
11057 <em class="citetitle">Promises to Keep</em>. The modification that I would make
11058 is relatively simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing
11059 copyright system.  I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim
11060 of the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
11061 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at facilitating
11062 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal after a period of
11063 years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free exchange of content,
11064 supported through a taxation system, then it can be continued. If this form
11065 of protection is no longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the
11066 old system of controlling access.
11067 </p><p>
11068
11069 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim is
11070 not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the system
11071 supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But the aims of
11072 semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes I described were
11073 accomplished&#8212;in particular, the limits on derivative uses. A system
11074 that simply charges for access would not greatly burden semiotic democracy
11075 if there were few limitations on what one was allowed to do with the content
11076 itself.
11077 </p><p>
11078 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of "harm" to
11079 an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation would be
11080 outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This background system
11081 to compensate would also not need to interfere with innovative proposals
11082 such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted when Apple launched the
11083 MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being easier than free is. This has
11084 proven correct: Apple has sold millions of songs at even the very high price
11085 of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents, the cost is the equivalent of a per-song
11086 CD price, though the labels have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's
11087 move was countered by Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a
11088 song. And no doubt there will be a great deal of competition to offer and
11089 sell music on-line.
11090 </p><p>
11091 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free" music
11092 from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known for thirty
11093 years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than that, there is
11094 nothing impossible at all about "competing with free." Indeed, if anything,
11095 the competition spurs the competitors to offer new and better products. This
11096 is precisely what the competitive market was to be about. Thus in Singapore,
11097 though piracy is rampant, movie theaters are often luxurious&#8212;with
11098 "first class" seats, and meals served while you watch a movie&#8212;as they
11099 struggle and succeed in finding ways to compete with "free."
11100 </p><p>
11101 Dette konkurranseregimet, med en sikringsmekanisme å sikre at kunstnere ikke
11102 taper, ville bidra mye til nyskapning innen levering av
11103 innhold. Konkurransen ville fortsette å redusere type-A-deling.  Det ville
11104 inspirere en ekstraordinær rekke av nye innovatører&#8212;som ville ha
11105 retten til a bruke innhold, og ikke lenger frykte usikre og barbarisk
11106 strenge straffer fra loven.
11107 </p><p>
11108 Oppsummert, så er dette mitt forslag:
11109 </p><p>
11110
11111
11112
11113 Internett er i endring. Vi bør ikke regulere en teknologi i endring. Vi bør
11114 i stedet regulere for å minimere skaden påført interesser som er berørt av
11115 denne teknologiske endringen, samtidig vi muliggjør, og oppmuntrer, den mest
11116 effektive teknologien vi kan lage.
11117 </p><p>
11118 Vi kan minimere skaden og samtidig maksimere fordelen med innovasjon ved å
11119 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
11120
11121
11122 garantere retten til å engasjere seg i type-D-deling;
11123 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
11124
11125
11126 tillate ikke-kommersiell type-C-deling uten erstatningsansvar, og
11127 kommersiell type-C-deling med en lav og fast rate fastsatt ved lov.
11128 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
11129
11130
11131 mens denne overgangen pågår, skattlegge og kompensere for type-A-deling, i
11132 den grad faktiske skade kan påvises.
11133 </p></li></ol></div><p>
11134 Men hva om "piratvirksomheten" ikke forsvinner?  Hva om det finnes et
11135 konkurranseutsatt marked som tilbyr innhold til en lav kostnad, men et
11136 signifikant antall av forbrukere fortsetter å "ta" innhold uten å betale?
11137 Burde loven gjøre noe da?
11138 </p><p>
11139 Ja, det bør den.  Men, nok en gang, hva den bør gjøre avhenger hvordan
11140 realitetene utvikler seg. Disse endringene fjerner kanskje ikke all
11141 type-A-deling. Men det virkelige spørmålet er ikke om de eliminerer deling i
11142 abstrakt betydning.  Det virkelige spørsmålet er hvilken effekt det har på
11143 markedet.  Er det bedre (a) å ha en teknologi som er 95 prosent sikker og
11144 gir et marked av størrelse <em class="citetitle">x</em>, eller (b) å ha en
11145 teknologi som er 50 prosent sikker, og som gir et marked som er fem ganger
11146 større enn <em class="citetitle">x</em>?  Mindre sikker kan gi mer uautorisert
11147 deling, men det vil sannsynligvis også gi et mye større marked for
11148 autorisert deling. Det viktigste er å sikre kunstneres kompensasjon uten å
11149 ødelegge internettet.  Når det er på plass, kan det hende det er riktig å
11150 finne måter å spore opp de smålige piratene.
11151 </p><p>
11152
11153 Men vi er langt unna å spikke problemet ned til dette delsettet av
11154 type-A-delere.  Og vårt fokus inntil er der bør ikke være å finne måter å
11155 ødelegge internettet.  Var fokus inntil vi er der bør være hvordan sikre at
11156 artister får betalt, mens vi beskytter rommet for nyskapning og kreativitet
11157 som internettet er.
11158 </p></div><div class="sect2" title="5. Spark en masse advokater"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="firelawyers"></a>5. Spark en masse advokater</h3></div></div></div><p>
11159 Jeg er en advokat. Jeg lever av å utdanne advokater. Jeg tror på loven. Jeg
11160 tror på opphavsrettsloven. Jeg har faktisk viet livet til å jobbe med loven,
11161 ikke fordi det er mye penger å tjene, men fordi det innebærer idealer som
11162 jeg elsker å leve opp til.
11163 </p><p>
11164 Likevel har mye av denne boken vært kritikk av advokater, eller rollen
11165 advokater har spilt i denne debatten.  Loven taler om idealer, mens det er
11166 min oppfatning av vår yrkesgruppe er blitt for knyttet til klienten.  Og i
11167 en verden der rike klienter har sterke synspunkter vil uviljen hos vår
11168 yrkesgruppe til å stille spørsmål med eller protestere mot dette sterke
11169 synet ødelegge loven.
11170 </p><p>
11171 Indisiene for slik bøyning er overbevisene.  Jeg er angrepet som en
11172 "radikal" av mange innenfor yrket, og likevel er meningene jeg argumenterer
11173 for nøyaktig de meningene til mange av de mest moderate og betydningsfulle
11174 personene i historien til denne delen av loven. Mange trodde for eksempel at
11175 vår utfordring til lovforslaget om å utvide opphavsrettens vernetid var
11176 galskap.  Mens bare tredve år siden mente den dominerende foreleser og
11177 utøver i opphavsrettsfeltet, Melville Nimmer, at den var
11178 åpenbar.<sup>[<a name="id2773671" href="#ftn.id2773671" class="footnote">221</a>]</sup>
11179
11180 </p><p>
11181 Min kritikk av rollen som advokater har spilt i denne debatten handler
11182 imidlertid ikke bare om en profesjonell skjevhet. Det handler enda viktigere
11183 om vår manglende evne til å faktisk ta inn over oss hva loven koster.
11184 </p><p>
11185 Økonomer er forventet å være gode til å forstå utgifter og inntekter.  Men
11186 som oftest antar økonomene uten peiling på hvordan det juridiske systemet
11187 egentlig fungerer, at transaksjonskostnaden i det juridiske systemet er
11188 lav.<sup>[<a name="id2773704" href="#ftn.id2773704" class="footnote">222</a>]</sup>  De ser et system som har
11189 eksistert i hundrevis av år, og de antar at det fungerer slik grunnskolens
11190 samfunnsfagsundervisning lærte dem at det fungerer.
11191 </p><p>
11192
11193
11194 Men det juridiske systemet fungerer ikke. Eller for å være mer nøyaktig, det
11195 fungerer kun for de med mest ressurser.  Det er ikke fordi systemet er
11196 korrupt. Jeg tror overhodet ikke vårt juridisk system (på føderalt nivå, i
11197 hvert fall) er korrupt. Jeg mener ganske enkelt at på grunn av at kostnadene
11198 med vårt juridiske systemet er så hårreisende høyt vil en praktisk talt
11199 aldri oppnå rettferdighet.
11200 </p><p>
11201 Disse kostnadene forstyrrer fri kultur på mange vis.  En advokats tid
11202 faktureres hos de største firmaene for mer enn $400 pr. time. Hvor mye tid
11203 bør en slik advokat bruke på å lese sakene nøye, eller undersøke obskure
11204 rettskilder.  Svaret er i økende grad: svært lite. Jussen er avhengig av
11205 nøye formulering og utvikling av doktrine, men nøye formulering og utvikling
11206 av doktrine er avhengig av nøyaktig arbeid.  Men nøyaktig arbeid koster for
11207 mye, bortsett fra i de mest høyprofilerte og kostbare sakene.
11208 </p><p>
11209 Kostbarheten, klomsetheten og tilfeldigheten til dette systemet håner vår
11210 tradisjon. Og advokater, såvel som akademikere, bør se det som sin plikt å
11211 endre hvordan loven praktiseres&#8212; eller bedre, endre loven slik at den
11212 fungerer. Det er galt at systemet fungerer godt bare for den øverste
11213 1-prosenten av klientene.  Det kan gjøres radikalt mer effektivt, og billig,
11214 og dermed radikalt mer rettferdig.
11215 </p><p>
11216 Men inntil en slik reform er gjennomført, bør vi som samfunn holde lover
11217 unna områder der vi vet den bare vil skade.  Og det er nettopp det loven
11218 altfor ofte vil gjøre hvis for mye av vår kultur er lovregulert.
11219 </p><p>
11220 Tenk på de fantastiske tingene ditt barn kan gjøre eller lage med digital
11221 teknologi&#8212;filmen, musikken, web-siden, bloggen. Eller tenk på de
11222 fantastiske tingene ditt fellesskap kunne få til med digital
11223 teknologi&#8212;en wiki, oppsetting av låve, kampanje til å endre noe. Tenk
11224 på alle de kreative tingene, og tenk deretter på kald sirup helt inn i
11225 maskinene. Dette er hva et hvert regime som krever tillatelser fører
11226 til. Dette er virkeligheten slik den var i Brezhnevs Russland.
11227 </p><p>
11228
11229 Loven bør regulere i visse områder av kulturen&#8212;men det bør regulere
11230 kultur bare der reguleringen bidrar positivt. Likevel tester advokater
11231 sjeldent sin kraft, eller kraften som de fremmer, mot dette enkle pragmatisk
11232 spørsmålet: "vil det bidra positivt?".  Når de blir utfordret om det
11233 utvidede rekkevidden til loven, er advokat-svaret, "Hvorfor ikke?"
11234 </p><p>
11235 Vi burde spørre: "Hvorfor?". Vis meg hvorfor din regulering av kultur er
11236 nødvendig og vis meg hvordan reguleringen bidrar positivt.  Før du kan vise
11237 meg begge, holde advokatene din unna.
11238 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2771742" href="#id2771742" class="para">210</a>] </sup>
11239
11240
11241
11242 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
11243 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," <em class="citetitle">Stanford
11244 Technology Law Review</em> 1 (2001): par. 6&#8211;18, available at
11245 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #72</a> (describing
11246 examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey
11247 Rosen, <em class="citetitle">The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an
11248 Anxious Age</em> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
11249 between technology and privacy).</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2772172" href="#id2772172" class="para">211</a>] </sup>
11250
11251
11252
11253 <em class="citetitle">Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
11254 Culture Wars</em> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
11255 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #72</a>.
11256 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2772358" href="#id2772358" class="para">212</a>] </sup>
11257
11258
11259 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
11260 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
11261 by other countries as well.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2772482" href="#id2772482" class="para">213</a>] </sup>
11262
11263
11264 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not solved
11265 here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated system
11266 than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
11267 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2772603" href="#id2772603" class="para">214</a>] </sup>
11268
11269
11270
11271 "A Radical Rethink," <em class="citetitle">Economist</em>, 366:8308 (25 January
11272 2003): 15, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11273 #74</a>.
11274 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2772691" href="#id2772691" class="para">215</a>] </sup>
11275
11276
11277 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
11278 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001), tilgjengelig
11279 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #75</a>.
11280 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2772806" href="#id2772806" class="para">216</a>] </sup>
11281
11282
11283 Benjamin Kaplan, <em class="citetitle">An Unhurried View of Copyright</em> (New
11284 York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 32.
11285 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2772829" href="#id2772829" class="para">217</a>] </sup>
11286
11287 Ibid., 56.
11288 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2772903" href="#id2772903" class="para">218</a>] </sup>
11289
11290 Paul Goldstein, <em class="citetitle">Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the
11291 Celestial Jukebox</em> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003),
11292 187&#8211;216.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2771753"></a>
11293 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773141" href="#id2773141" class="para">219</a>] </sup>
11294
11295
11296 For eksempel, se, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3 April
11297 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11298 #76</a>.
11299 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773296" href="#id2773296" class="para">220</a>] </sup>
11300
11301 William Fisher, <em class="citetitle">Digital Music: Problems and
11302 Possibilities</em> (last revised: 10 October 2000), available at
11303 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #77</a>; William Fisher,
11304 <em class="citetitle">Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
11305 Entertainment</em> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University
11306 Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #78</a>. Professor Netanel has
11307 proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial sharing from the
11308 reach of copyright and would establish compensation to artists to balance
11309 any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
11310 Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #79</a>. For other proposals,
11311 see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back Broadband?" <em class="citetitle">Washington
11312 Post</em>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on behalf of Sharman
11313 Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman of the Senate
11314 Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #80</a>; Serguei Osokine,
11315 <em class="citetitle">A Quick Case for Intellectual Property Use Fee
11316 (IPUF)</em>, 3 March 2002, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #81</a>; Jefferson Graham,
11317 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," <em class="citetitle">USA
11318 Today</em>, 13 May 2002, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #82</a>; Steven M. Cherry,
11319 "Getting Copyright Right," IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
11320 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #83</a>; Declan
11321 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August 2002,
11322 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #84</a>.
11323 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
11324 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
11325 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
11326 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
11327 debate by about a decade. See <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #85</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2773396"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2773404"></a>
11328 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773671" href="#id2773671" class="para">221</a>] </sup>
11329
11330
11331 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer Memorial
11332 Lecture), <em class="citetitle">UCLA Law Review</em> 48 (2001): 1057,
11333 1069&#8211;70.
11334 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a name="ftn.id2773704" href="#id2773704" class="para">222</a>] </sup>
11335
11336 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to be
11337 commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading him to
11338 question his own publicly stated position&#8212;twice. He initially
11339 predicted that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
11340 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view
11341 again.  Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking the Network
11342 Economy: The True Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace</em> (New
11343 York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism)
11344 with Stan J.  Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working
11345 paper, June 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #86</a>.  Liebowitz's careful
11346 analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the effect of file-sharing
11347 technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the costs of the legal
11348 system. See, for example, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking</em>, 174&#8211;76.
11349 <a class="indexterm" name="id2773681"></a>
11350 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 8. Notater"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-notes"></a>Kapittel 8. Notater</h2></div></div></div><p>
11351 I denne teksten er det referanser til lenker på verdensveven.  Og som alle
11352 som har forsøkt å bruke nettet vet, så vil disse lenkene være svært
11353 ustabile.  Jeg har forsøkt å motvirke denne ustabiliteten ved å omdirigere
11354 lesere til den originale kilden gjennom en nettside som hører til denne
11355 boken.  For hver lenke under, så kan du gå til http://free-culture.cc/notes
11356 og finne den originale kilden ved å klikke på nummeret etter #-tegnet.  Hvis
11357 den originale lenken fortsatt er i live, så vil du bli omdirigert til den
11358 lenken.  Hvis den originale lenken har forsvunnet, så vil du bli omdirigert
11359 til en passende referanse til materialet.
11360 </p></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 9. Takk til"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-acknowledgments"></a>Kapittel 9. Takk til</h2></div></div></div><p>
11361 Denne boken er produktet av en lang og så langt mislykket kamp som begynte
11362 da jeg leste om Eric Eldreds krig for å sørge for at bøker forble
11363 frie. Eldreds innsats bidro til å lansere en bevegelse, fri
11364 kultur-bevegelsen, og denne boken er tilegnet ham.
11365 </p><p>
11366 Jeg fikk veiledning på ulike steder fra venner og akademikere, inkludert
11367 Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner, Mark Rose og
11368 Kathleen Sullivan. Og jeg fikk korreksjoner og veiledning fra mange
11369 fantastiske studenter ved Stanford Law School og Stanford University. Det
11370 inkluderer Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James P. Fellers, Christopher
11371 Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman, Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn,
11372 Brian-Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng og Erica Platt. Jeg er særlig takknemlig
11373 overfor Catherine Crump og Harry Surden, som hjalp til med å styre deres
11374 forskning og til Laura Lynch, som briljant håndterte hæren de samlet, samt
11375 bidro med sitt egen kritisk blikk på mye av dette.
11376 </p><p>
11377
11378 Yuko Noguchi hjalp meg å forstå lovene i Japan, så vel som Japans
11379 kultur. Jeg er henne takknemlig, og til de mange i Japan som hjalp meg med
11380 forundersøkelsene til denne boken: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto
11381 Misaki, Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata og Yoshihiro
11382 Yonezawa.  Jeg er også takknemlig til professor Nobuhiro Nakayama og Tokyo
11383 University Business Law Center, som ga meg muligheten til å bruke tid i
11384 Japan, og Tadashi Shiraishi og Kiyokazu Yamagami for deres generøse hjelp
11385 mens jeg var der.
11386 </p><p>
11387 Dette er de tradisjonelle former for hjelp som akademikere regelmessig
11388 trekker på. Men i tillegg til dem, har Internett gjort det mulig å motta råd
11389 og korrigering fra mange som jeg har aldri møtt.  Blant de som har svart med
11390 svært nyttig råd etter forespørsler om boken på bloggen min er Dr. Muhammed
11391 Al-Ubaydli, David Gerstein og Peter Dimauro, I tillegg en lang liste med de
11392 som hadde spesifikke ideer om måter å utvikle mine argumenter på.  De
11393 inkluderte Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
11394 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
11395 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
11396 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred
11397 Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.  Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer,
11398 Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg,
11399 Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink,"
11400 Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," og Richard Yanco. (jeg beklager hvis jeg gikk
11401 glipp av noen, med datamaskiner kommer feil og en krasj i e-postsystemet
11402 mitt gjorde at jeg mistet en haug med flotte svar.)
11403 </p><p>
11404 Richard Stallman og Michael Carroll har begge lest hele boken i utkast, og
11405 hver av dem har bidratt med svært nyttige korreksjoner og råd. Michael hjalp
11406 meg å se mer tydelig betydningen av regulering for avledede verker . Og
11407 Richard korrigerte en pinlig stor mengde feil.  Selv om mitt arbeid er
11408 delvis inspirert av Stallmans, er han ikke enig med meg på vesentlige steder
11409 i denne boken.
11410 </p><p>
11411 Til slutt, og for evig, er jeg Bettina takknemlig, som alltid har insistert
11412 på at det ville være endeløs lykke utenfor disse kampene, og som alltid har
11413 hatt rett.  Denne trege eleven er som alltid takknemlig for hennes
11414 evigvarende tålmodighet og kjærlighet.
11415 </p></div></div></body></html>