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   1 <html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"><title>Fri kultur</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.76.1"><meta name="description" content="Om forfatteren Lawrense Lessig (http://www.lessig.org), professor i juss og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School, er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i Creative Commons (http://creativecommons.org). Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code: And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public Knowledge. Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's &quot;e.biz 25,&quot; og omtalt som en av Scientific American's &quot;50 visjonærer&quot;. Etter utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."></head><body bgcolor="white" text="black" link="#0000FF" vlink="#840084" alink="#0000FF"><div lang="nb" class="book" title="Fri kultur"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="index"></a>Fri kultur</h1></div><div><h2 class="subtitle">Hvordan store medieaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
   2 og kontrollere kreativiteten</h2></div><div><div class="authorgroup"><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Lawrence</span> <span class="surname">Lessig</span></h3></div></div></div><div><p class="releaseinfo">Versjon 2004-02-10</p></div><div><p class="copyright">Opphavsrett © 2004 Lawrence Lessig</p></div><div><div class="legalnotice" title="Rettslig merknad"><a name="id2795679"></a><p>
   3      <span class="inlinemediaobject"><img src="images/cc.png" align="middle" width="100%" alt="Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert"></span>
   4    </p><p>
   5 Denne versjonen av <em class="citetitle">Fri Kultur</em> er lisensiert med en
   6 Creative Commons-lisens.  Denne lisensen tillater ikke-kommersiell
   7 utnyttelse av verket, hvis opphavsinnehaveren er navngitt.  For mer
   8 informasjon om lisensen, klikk på ikonet over eller besøk <a class="ulink" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/" target="_top">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</a>
   9    </p></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">2004-03-25</p></div><div><div class="abstract" title="Om forfatteren"><p class="title"><b>Om forfatteren</b></p><p>
  10 Lawrense Lessig (<a class="ulink" href="http://www.lessig.org" target="_top">http://www.lessig.org</a>), professor i juss
  11 og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School,
  12 er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i
  13 Creative Commons (<a class="ulink" href="http://creativecommons.org" target="_top">http://creativecommons.org</a>).
  14 Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code:
  15 And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i
  16 Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public
  17 Knowledge.  Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the
  18 Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's "e.biz
  19 25," og omtalt som en av Scientific American's "50 visjonærer".  Etter
  20 utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law
  21 School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit
  22 Court of Appeals.
  23   </p></div></div></div><hr></div><div class="dedication" title="Dedikasjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="id2762664"></a>Dedikasjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
  24 Til Eric Eldred &#8212; hvis arbeid først trakk meg til denne saken, og for
  25 hvem saken fortsetter.
  26 </p></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="preface"><a href="#preface">Forord</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-introduction">1. Introduksjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="part"><a href="#c-piracy">I. "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#creators">2. Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#mere-copyists">3. Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#catalogs">4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#pirates">5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#piracy">6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="part"><a href="#c-property">II. "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#founders">7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#recorders">8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#transformers">9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#collectors">10. Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#property-i">11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="part"><a href="#c-puzzles">III. Nøtter</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#chimera">12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#harms">13. Kapittel tolv: Skader</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="part"><a href="#c-balances">IV. Maktfordeling</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#eldred">14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#eldred-ii">15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-conclusion">16. Konklusjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-afterword">17. Etterord</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#usnow">Oss, nå</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#themsoon">Dem, snart</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-notes">18. Notater</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#c-acknowledgments">19. Takk til</a></span></dt><dt><span class="index"><a href="#id2843398">Indeks</a></span></dt></dl></div><div class="list-of-figures"><p><b>Figuroversikt</b></p><dl><dt>11.1. <a href="#fig-1331">How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
  27 the right or regulation.</a></dt><dt>11.2. <a href="#fig-1361">Law has a special role in affecting the three.</a></dt><dt>11.3. <a href="#fig-1371">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</a></dt><dt>11.4. <a href="#fig-1381">effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</a></dt><dt>11.5. <a href="#fig-1441">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</a></dt><dt>11.6. <a href="#fig-1442">"Opphavsrett" i dag.</a></dt><dt>11.7. <a href="#fig-1521">Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.</a></dt><dt>11.8. <a href="#fig-1531">Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.</a></dt><dt>11.9. <a href="#fig-1541">Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
  28 copyrighted work.</a></dt><dt>11.10. <a href="#fig-1542">Uregulert kopiering anses som "rimelig bruk".</a></dt><dt>11.11. <a href="#fig-1551">Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
  29 regulated.</a></dt><dt>11.12. <a href="#fig-1611">Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.</a></dt><dt>11.13. <a href="#fig-1612">List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</a></dt><dt>11.14. <a href="#fig-1621">E-bok av Aristoteles "Politikk"</a></dt><dt>11.15. <a href="#fig-1622">Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politikk".</a></dt><dt>11.16. <a href="#fig-1631">List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".</a></dt><dt>11.17. <a href="#fig-1641">List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".</a></dt><dt>11.18. <a href="#fig-1711">VCR/handgun cartoon.</a></dt><dt>11.19. <a href="#fig-1761">Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.</a></dt><dt>14.1. <a href="#fig-18">Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon</a></dt></dl></div><div class="list-of-tables"><p><b>tabelloversikt</b></p><dl><dt>6.1. <a href="#t1">Mønster for respons fra rett og kongress</a></dt><dt>11.1. <a href="#t2">Law status in 1790</a></dt><dt>11.2. <a href="#t3">Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory</a></dt><dt>11.3. <a href="#t4">Law status in 1975</a></dt><dt>11.4. <a href="#t5">Law status now</a></dt></dl></div><div class="colophon" title="Kolofon"><h2 class="title"><a name="id2803771"></a>Kolofon</h2><p>
  30 Du kan kjøpe en kopi av denne boken ved å klikke på en av lenkene nedenfor:
  31 </p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" type="number" compact><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.amazon.com/" target="_top">Amazon</a></p></li><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/" target="_top">B&amp;N</a></p></li><li class="listitem" style="list-style-type: number"><p><a class="ulink" href="http://www.penguin.com/" target="_top">Penguin</a></p></li></ul></div><p>
  32 Andre bøker av Lawrence Lessig
  33 </p><p>
  34 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
  35 </p><p>
  36 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
  37 </p><p>
  38 The Penguin Press, New York
  39 </p><p>
  40 Fri Kultur
  41 </p><p>
  42 Hvordan store medieaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
  43 og kontrollere kreativiteten
  44 </p><p>
  45 Lawrence Lessig
  46 </p><p>
  47 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.  375 Hudson Street
  48 New York, New York
  49 </p><p>
  50 Opphavsrettbeskyttet © Lawrence Lessig.  Alle rettigheter reservert.
  51 </p><p>
  52 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
  53 <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
  54 © 2003 by The New York Times Co.  Reprinted with permission.
  55 </p><p>
  56 Cartoon in <a class="xref" href="#fig-1711" title="Figur 11.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.">Figur 11.18, &#8220;VCR/handgun cartoon.&#8221;</a> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
  57 Media Services, Inc.  All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
  58 </p><p>
  59 Diagram in <a class="xref" href="#fig-1761" title="Figur 11.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.">Figur 11.19, &#8220;Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.&#8221;</a> courtesy of the office of FCC
  60 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
  61 </p><p>
  62 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
  63 </p><p>
  64 Lessig, Lawrence.  Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law
  65 to lock down culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
  66 </p><p>
  67 p. cm.
  68 </p><p>
  69 Includes index.
  70 </p><p>
  71 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
  72 </p><p>
  73 1. Intellectual property&#8212;United States. 2. Mass media&#8212;United
  74 States.
  75 </p><p>
  76 3. Technological innovations&#8212;United States. 4. Art&#8212;United
  77 States. I. Title.
  78 </p><p>
  79 KF2979.L47
  80 </p><p>
  81 343.7309'9&#8212;dc22
  82 </p><p>
  83 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
  84 </p><p>
  85 Printed in the United States of America
  86 </p><p>
  87 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
  88 </p><p>
  89 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
  90 </p><p>
  91 Oversatt til bokmål av Petter Reinholdtsen og Anders Hagen
  92 Jarmund. Kildefilene til oversetterprosjektet er <a class="ulink" href="https://github.com/petterreinholdtsen/free-culture-lessig" target="_top">tilgjengelig
  93 fra github</a>.  Rapporter feil med oversettelsen via github.
  94 </p><p>
  95 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this
  96 publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval
  97 system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
  98 photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission
  99 of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.  The
 100 scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via
 101 any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and
 102 punishable by law.  Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and
 103 do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
 104 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
 105 </p></div><div class="preface" title="Forord"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="preface"></a>Forord</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxpoguedavid"></a><p>
 106 David Pogue, en glimrende skribent og forfatter av utallige tekniske
 107 datarelaterte tekster, skrev dette på slutten av hans gjennomgang av min
 108 første bok, <em class="citetitle">Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace</em>:
 109 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 110 I motsetning til faktiske lover, så har ikke internett-programvare
 111 kapasiteten til å straffe.  Den påvirker ikke folk som ikke er online (og
 112 kun en veldig liten minoritet av verdens befolkning er online).  Og hvis du
 113 ikke liker systemet på internett, så kan du alltid slå av
 114 modemet.<sup>[<a name="preface01" href="#ftn.preface01" class="footnote">1</a>]</sup>
 115 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 116 Pogue var skeptisk til argumentet som er kjernen av boken &#8212; at
 117 programvaren, eller "koden", fungerte som en slags lov &#8212; og foreslo i
 118 sin anmeldelse den lykkelig tanken at hvis livet i cyberspace gikk dårlig,
 119 så kan vi alltid som med en trylleformel slå over en bryter og komme hjem
 120 igjen. Slå av modemet, koble fra datamaskinen, og eventuelle problemer som
 121 finnes <span class="emphasis"><em>den</em></span> virkeligheten ville ikke "påvirke" oss mer.
 122 </p><p>
 123
 124 Pogue kan ha hatt rett i 1999 &#8212; jeg er skeptisk, men det kan
 125 hende. Men selv om han hadde rett da, så er ikke argumentet gyldig
 126 nå. <em class="citetitle">Fri Kultur</em> er om problemene internett forårsaker
 127 selv etter at modemet er slått av.  Den er et argument om hvordan slagene
 128 som nå brer om seg i livet on-line har fundamentalt påvirket "folk som er
 129 ikke pålogget."  Det finnes ingen bryter som kan isolere oss fra
 130 internettets effekt.
 131 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2761519"></a><p>
 132 Men i motsetning til i boken <em class="citetitle">Code</em>, er argumentet her
 133 ikke så mye om internett i seg selv. Istedet er det om konsekvensen av
 134 internett for en del av vår tradisjon som er mye mer grunnleggende, og
 135 uansett hvor hardt dette er for en geek-wanna-be å innrømme, mye viktigere.
 136 </p><p>
 137 Den tradisjonen er måten vår kultur blir laget på.  Som jeg vil forklare i
 138 sidene som følger, kommer vi fra en tradisjon av "fri kultur"&#8212;ikke
 139 "fri" som i "fri bar" (for å låne et uttrykk fra stifteren av fri
 140 programvarebevegelsen<sup>[<a name="id2761510" href="#ftn.id2761510" class="footnote">2</a>]</sup>), men "fri" som i
 141 "talefrihet", "fritt marked", "frihandel", "fri konkurranse", "fri vilje" og
 142 "frie valg".  En fri kultur støtter og beskytter skapere og oppfinnere.
 143 Dette gjør den direkte ved å tildele immaterielle rettigheter.  Men det gjør
 144 den indirekte ved å begrense rekkevidden for disse rettighetene, for å
 145 garantere at neste generasjon skapere og oppfinnere forblir <span class="emphasis"><em>så fri
 146 som mulig</em></span> fra kontroll fra fortiden.  En fri kultur er ikke en
 147 kultur uten eierskap, like lite som et fritt marked er et marked der alt er
 148 gratis.  Det motsatte av fri kultur er "tillatelseskultur"&#8212;en kultur
 149 der skapere kun kan skape med tillatelse fra de mektige, eller fra skaperne
 150 fra fortiden.
 151 </p><p>
 152 Hvis vi forsto denne endringen, så tror jeg vi ville stå imot den.  Ikke
 153 "vi" på venstresiden eller "dere" på høyresiden, men vi som ikke har
 154 investert i den bestemt kulturindustrien som har definert det tjuende
 155 århundre. Enten du er på venstre eller høyresiden, hvis du i denne forstand
 156 ikke har interesser, vil historien jeg forteller her gi deg problemer. For
 157 endringene jeg beskriver påvirker verdier som begge sider av vår politiske
 158 kultur anser som grunnleggende.
 159 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2762972"></a><p>
 160 Vi så et glimt av dette tverrpolitiske raseri på forsommeren i 2003. Da FCC
 161 vurderte endringer i reglene for medieeierskap som ville slakke på
 162 begrensningene rundt mediekonsentrasjon, sendte en ekstraordinær koalisjon
 163 mer enn 700 000 brev til FCC for å motsette seg endringen.  Mens William
 164 Safire beskrev å marsjere "ubehagelig sammen med CodePink Women for Peace
 165 and the National Rifle Association, mellom liberale Olympia Snowe og
 166 konservative Ted Stevens", formulerte han  kanskje det enkleste uttrykket
 167 for hva som var på spill: konsentrasjonen av makt.  Så spurte han:
 168 <a class="indexterm" name="id2762991"></a>
 169 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 170 Høres dette ikke-konservativt ut?  Ikke for meg.  Denne konsentrasjonen av
 171 makt&#8212;politisk, selskapsmessig, pressemessig, kulturelt&#8212;bør være
 172 bannlyst av konservative.  Spredningen av makt gjennom lokal kontroll, og
 173 derigjennom oppmuntre til individuell deltagelse, er essensen i føderalismen
 174 og det største uttrykk for demokrati.<sup>[<a name="id2763014" href="#ftn.id2763014" class="footnote">3</a>]</sup>
 175 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 176 Denne idéen er et element i argumentet til <em class="citetitle">Fri
 177 Kultur</em>, selv om min fokus ikke bare er på konsentrasjonen av
 178 makt som følger av konsentrasjonen i eierskap, men mer viktig, og fordi det
 179 er mindre synlig, på konsentrasjonen av makt som er resultat av en radikal
 180 endring i det effektive virkeområdet til loven.  Loven er i endring, og
 181 endringen forandrer på hvordan vår kultur blir skapt. Den endringen bør
 182 bekymre deg&#8212;Uansett om du bryr deg om internett eller ikke, og uansett
 183 om du er til venstre for Safires eller til høyre. Inspirasjonen til tittelen
 184 og mye av argumentet i denne boken kommer fra arbeidet til Richard Stallman
 185 og Free Software Foundation. Faktisk, da jeg leste Stallmans egne tekster på
 186 nytt, spesielt essyene i <em class="citetitle">Free Software, Free Society</em>,
 187 innser jeg at alle de teoretiske innsiktene jeg utvikler her er innsikter
 188 som Stallman beskrev for tiår siden.  Man kan dermed godt argumentere for at
 189 dette verket kun er et avledet verk.
 190 </p><p>
 191
 192 Jeg godtar kritikken, hvis det faktisk er kritikk.  Arbeidet til en advokat
 193 er alltid avledede verker, og jeg mener ikke å gjøre noe mer i denne boken
 194 enn å minne en kultur om en tradisjon som alltid har vært deres egen. Som
 195 Stallman forsvarer jeg denne tradisjonen på grunnlag av verdier. Som
 196 Stallman tror jeg dette er verdiene til frihet.  Og som Stallman, tror jeg
 197 dette er verdier fra vår fortid som må forsvares i vår fremtid.  En fri
 198 kultur har vært vår fortid, men vil bare være vår fremtid hvis vi endrer
 199 retningen vi følger akkurat nå.  På samme måte som Stallmans argumenter for
 200 fri programvare, treffer argumenter for en fri kultur på forvirring som er
 201 vanskelig å unngå, og enda vanskeligere å forstå.  En fri kultur er ikke en
 202 kultur uten eierskap. Det er ikke en kultur der kunstnere ikke får
 203 betalt. En kultur uten eierskap eller en der skaperne ikke kan få betalt, er
 204 anarki, ikke frihet.  Anarki er ikke hva jeg fremmer her.
 205 </p><p>
 206 I stedet er den frie kulturen som jeg forsvarer i denne boken en balanse
 207 mellom anarki og kontroll.  En fri kultur, i likhet med et fritt marked, er
 208 fylt med eierskap.  Den er fylt med regler for eierskap og kontrakter som
 209 blir håndhevet av staten.  Men på samme måte som det frie markedet blir
 210 pervertert hvis dets eierskap blir føydalt, så kan en fri kultur bli ødelagt
 211 av ekstremisme i eierskapsrettighetene som definerer den.  Det er dette jeg
 212 frykter om vår kultur i dag.  Det er som motpol til denne ekstremismen at
 213 denne boken er skrevet.
 214 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.preface01" href="#preface01" class="para">1</a>] </sup>
 215 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," <em class="citetitle">New York
 216 Times</em>, 30. januar 2000
 217 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2761510" href="#id2761510" class="para">2</a>] </sup>
 218 Richard M. Stallman, <em class="citetitle">Fri programvare, Frie samfunn</em> 57
 219 (Joshua Gay, red. 2002).
 220 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2763014" href="#id2763014" class="para">3</a>] </sup> William Safire, "The Great Media Gulp," <em class="citetitle">New York
 221 Times</em>, 22. mai 2003.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2763021"></a>
 222 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 1. Introduksjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-introduction"></a>Kapittel 1. Introduksjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
 223 17. desember 1903, på en vindfylt strand i Nord-Carolina i såvidt under
 224 hundre sekunder, demonstrerte Wright-brødrene at et selvdrevet fartøy tyngre
 225 enn luft kunne fly.  Øyeblikket var elektrisk, og dens betydning ble alment
 226 forstått. Nesten umiddelbart, eksploderte interessen for denne nye
 227 teknologien som muliggjorde bemannet luftfart og en hærskare av oppfinnere
 228 begynte å bygge videre på den.
 229 </p><p>
 230 Da Wright-brødrene fant opp flymaskinen, hevdet loven i USA at en grunneier
 231 ble antatt å eie ikke bare overflaten på området sitt, men også alt landet
 232 under bakken, helt ned til senterpunktet i jorda, og alt volumet over
 233 bakken, "i ubestemt grad, oppover".<sup>[<a name="id2763176" href="#ftn.id2763176" class="footnote">4</a>]</sup> I
 234 mange år undret lærde over hvordan en best skulle tolke idéen om at
 235 eiendomsretten gikk helt til himmelen. Betød dette at du eide stjernene?
 236 Kunne en dømme gjess for at de regelmessig og med vilje tok seg inn på annen
 237 manns eiendom?
 238 </p><p>
 239 Så kom flymaskiner, og for første gang hadde dette prinsippet i lovverket i
 240 USA&#8212;dypt nede i grunnlaget for vår tradisjon og akseptert av de
 241 viktigste juridiske tenkerne i vår fortid&#8212;en betydning. Hvis min
 242 eiendom rekker til himmelen, hva skjer når United flyr over mitt område?
 243 Har jeg rett til å nekte dem å bruke min eiendom?  Har jeg mulighet til å
 244 inngå en eksklusiv avtale med Delta Airlines?  Kan vi gjennomføre en auksjon
 245 for å finne ut hvor mye disse rettighetene er verdt?
 246 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2763196"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2763222"></a><p>
 247 I 1945 ble disse spørsmålene en føderal sak. Da bøndene Thomas Lee og Tinie
 248 Causby i Nord Carolina begynte å miste kyllinger på grunn av lavtflygende
 249 militære fly (vettskremte kyllinger fløy tilsynelatende i låveveggene og
 250 døde), saksøkte Causbyene regjeringen for å trenge seg inn på deres
 251 eiendom. Flyene rørte selvfølgelig aldri overflaten på Causbys' eiendom. Men
 252 hvis det stemte som Blackstone, Kent, og Cola hadde sagt, at deres eiendom
 253 strakk seg "i ubestemt grad, oppover," så hadde regjeringen trengt seg inn
 254 på deres eiendom, og Causbys ønsket å sette en stopper for dette.
 255 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2763242"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2763249"></a><p>
 256 Høyesterett gikk med på å ta opp Causbys sak. Kongressen hadde vedtatt at
 257 luftfartsveiene var tilgjengelig for alle, men hvis ens eiendom virkelig
 258 rakk til himmelen, da kunne muligens kongressens vedtak ha vært i strid med
 259 grunnlovens forbud mot å "ta" eiendom uten kompensasjon.  Retten erkjente at
 260 "det er gammel doktrine etter sedvane at en eiendom rakk til utkanten av
 261 universet.", men dommer Douglas hadde ikke tålmodighet for forhistoriske
 262 doktriner.  I et enkelt avsnitt, ble hundrevis av år med
 263 eiendomslovgivningen strøket. Som han skrev på vegne av retten,
 264 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 265 [Denne] doktrinen har ingen plass i den moderne verden.  Luften er en
 266 offentlig motorvei, slik kongressen har erklært.  Hvis det ikke var
 267 tilfelle, ville hver eneste transkontinentale flyrute utsette operatørene
 268 for utallige søksmål om inntrenging på annen manns eiendom.  Idéen er i
 269 strid med sunn fornuft.  Å anerkjenne slike private krav til luftrommet
 270 ville blokkere disse motorveiene, seriøst forstyrre muligheten til kontroll
 271 og utvikling av dem i fellesskapets interesse og overføre til privat
 272 eierskap det som kun fellesskapet har et rimelig krav til.<sup>[<a name="id2763274" href="#ftn.id2763274" class="footnote">5</a>]</sup>
 273 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 274 "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft."
 275 </p><p>
 276
 277 Det er hvordan loven vanligvis fungerer.  Ikke ofte like brått eller
 278 utålmodig, men til slutt er dette hvordan loven fungerer.  Det var ikke
 279 stilen til Douglas å utbrodere.  Andre dommere ville ha skrevet mange flere
 280 sider før de nådde sin konklusjon, men for Douglas holdt det med en enkel
 281 linje: "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft.".  Men uansett om det tar flere
 282 sider eller kun noen få ord, så er det en genial egenskap med et
 283 rettspraksis-system, slik som vårt er, at loven tilpasser seg til aktuelle
 284 teknologiene.  Og mens den tilpasser seg, så endres den.  Idéer som var
 285 solide som fjell i en tidsalder knuses i en annen.
 286 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2819137"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2819144"></a><p>
 287 Eller, det er hvordan ting skjer når det ikke er noen mektige på andre siden
 288 av endringen.  Causbyene var bare bønder.  Og selv om det uten tvil var
 289 mange som dem som var lei av den økende trafikken i luften (og en håper ikke
 290 for mange kyllinger flakset seg inn i vegger), ville Causbyene i verden
 291 finne det svært hardt å samles for å stoppe idéen, og teknologien, som
 292 Wright-brødrene hadde ført til verden.  Wright-brødrene spyttet flymaskiner
 293 inn i den teknologiske meme-dammen. Idéen spredte seg deretter som et virus
 294 i en kyllingfarm. Causbyene i verden fant seg selv omringet av "det synes
 295 rimelig" gitt teknologien som Wright-brødrene hadde produsert.  De kunne stå
 296 på sine gårder, med døde kyllinger i hendene, og heve knyttneven mot disse
 297 nye teknologiene så mye de ville.  De kunne ringe sine representanter eller
 298 til og med saksøke.  Men når alt kom til alt, ville kraften i det som virket
 299 "åpenbart" for alle andre&#8212;makten til "sunn fornuft"&#8212;ville vinne
 300 frem.  Deres "personlige interesser" ville ikke få lov til å nedkjempe en
 301 åpenbar fordel for fellesskapet.
 302 </p><p>
 303 Edwin Howard Armstrong er en av USAs glemte oppfinnergenier. Han dukket opp
 304 på oppfinnerscenen etter titaner som Thomas Edison og Alexander Graham
 305 Bell.  Alle hans bidrag på området radioteknologi gjør han til kanskje den
 306 viktigste av alle enkeltoppfinnere i de første femti årene av radio.  Han
 307 var bedre utdannet enn Michael Faraday, som var bokbinderlærling da han
 308 oppdaget elektrisk induksjon i 1831.  Men han hadde like god intuisjon om
 309 hvordan radioverden virket, og ved minst tre anledninger, fant Armstrong opp
 310 svært viktig teknologier som brakte vår forståelse av radio et hopp videre.
 311 <a class="indexterm" name="id2819207"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2819215"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2819221"></a>
 312 </p><p>
 313 Dagen etter julaften i 1933, ble fire patenter utstedt til Armstrong for
 314 hans mest signifikante oppfinnelse&#8212;FM-radio.  Inntil da hadde
 315 forbrukerradioer vært amplitude-modulert (AM) radio.  Tidens teoretikere
 316 hadde sagt at frekvens-modulert (FM) radio.  De hadde rett når det gjelder
 317 et smalt bånd av spektrumet.  Men Armstrong oppdaget at frekvens-modulert
 318 radio i et vidt bånd i spektrumet leverte en forbløffende gjengivelse av
 319 lyd, med mye mindre senderstyrke og støy.
 320 </p><p>
 321 Den 5. november 1935 demonstrerte han teknologien på et møte hos institutt
 322 for radioingeniører ved Empire State-bygningen i New York City.  Han vred
 323 radiosøkeren over en rekke AM-stasjoner, inntil radioen låste seg mot en
 324 kringkasting som han hadde satt opp 27 kilometer unna.  Radioen ble helt
 325 stille, som om den var død, og så, med en klarhet ingen andre i rommet noen
 326 gang hadde hørt fra et elektrisk apparat, produserte det lyden av en
 327 opplesers stemme: "Dette er amatørstasjon W2AG ved Yonkers, New York, som
 328 opererer på frekvensmodulering ved to og en halv meter."
 329 </p><p>
 330 Publikum hørte noe ingen hadde trodd var mulig:
 331 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 332 Et glass vann ble fylt opp foran mikrofonen i Yonkers, og det hørtes ut som
 333 et glass som ble fylt opp. &#8230; Et papir ble krøllet og revet opp, og
 334 det hørtes ut som papir og ikke som en sprakende skogbrann. &#8230;
 335 Sousa-marsjer ble spilt av fra plater og en pianosolo og et gitarnummer ble
 336 utført. &#8230; Musikken ble presentert med en livaktighet som sjeldent om
 337 noen gang før hadde vært hørt fra en radio-"musikk-boks".<sup>[<a name="id2819274" href="#ftn.id2819274" class="footnote">6</a>]</sup>
 338 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 339
 340 Som vår egen sunn fornuft forteller oss, hadde Armstrong oppdaget en mye
 341 bedre radioteknologi.  Men på tidspunktet for hans oppfinnelse, jobbet
 342 Armstrong for RCA. RCA var den dominerende aktøren i det da dominerende
 343 AM-radiomarkedet. I 1935 var det tusen radiostasjoner over hele USA, men
 344 stasjonene i de store byene var alle eid av en liten håndfull selskaper.
 345
 346 </p><p>
 347 Presidenten i RCA, David Sarnoff, en venn av Armstrong, var ivrig etter å få
 348 Armstrong til å oppdage en måte å fjerne støyen fra AM-radio. Så Sarnoff var
 349 ganske spent da Armstrong fortalte ham at han hadde en enhet som fjernet
 350 støy fra "radio.".   Men da Armstrong demonstrerte sin oppfinnelse, var ikke
 351 Sarnoff fornøyd.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2819329"></a>
 352 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 353 Jeg trodde Armstrong ville finne opp et slags filter for å fjerne skurring
 354 fra AM-radioen vår. Jeg trodde ikke han skulle starte en revolusjon &#8212;
 355 starte en hel forbannet ny industri i konkurranse med RCA.<sup>[<a name="id2819234" href="#ftn.id2819234" class="footnote">7</a>]</sup>
 356 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 357 Armstrongs oppfinnelse truet RCAs AM-herredømme, så selskapet lanserte en
 358 kampanje for å knuse FM-radio. Mens FM kan ha vært en overlegen teknologi,
 359 var Sarnoff en overlegen taktiker. En forfatter beskrev det slik,
 360 <a class="indexterm" name="id2819371"></a>
 361 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 362 Kreftene til fordel for FM, i hovedsak ingeniørfaglige, kunne ikke overvinne
 363 tyngden til strategien utviklet av avdelingene for salg, patenter og juss
 364 for å undertrykke denne trusselen til selskapets posisjon.  For FM utgjorde,
 365 hvis det fikk utvikle seg uten begrensninger &#8230; en komplett endring i
 366 maktforholdene rundt radio &#8230; og muligens fjerningen av det nøye
 367 begrensede AM-systemet som var grunnlaget for RCA stigning til
 368 makt.<sup>[<a name="id2819398" href="#ftn.id2819398" class="footnote">8</a>]</sup>
 369 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 370 RCA holdt først teknologien innomhus, og insistere på at det var nødvendig
 371 med ytterligere tester. Da Armstrong, etter to år med testing, ble
 372 utålmodig, begynte RCA å bruke sin makt hos myndighetene til holde tilbake
 373 den generelle spredningen av FM-radio. I 1936, ansatte RCA den tidligere
 374 lederen av FCC og ga ham oppgaven med å sikre at FCC tilordnet
 375 radiospekteret på en måte som ville kastrere FM&#8212;hovedsakelig ved å
 376 flytte FM-radio til et annet band i spekteret. I første omgang lyktes ikke
 377 disse forsøkene.  Men mens Armstrong og nasjonen var distrahert av andre
 378 verdenskrig, begynte RCAs arbeid å bære frukter.  Like etter at krigen var
 379 over, annonserte FCC et sett med avgjørelser som ville ha en klar effekt:
 380 FM-radio ville bli forkrøplet.Lawrence lessing beskrevet det slik,
 381 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 382 Serien med slag mot kroppen som FM-radio mottok rett etter krigen, i en
 383 serie med avgjørelser manipulert gjennom FCC av de store radiointeressene,
 384 var nesten utrolige i deres kraft og underfundighet.<sup>[<a name="id2819414" href="#ftn.id2819414" class="footnote">9</a>]</sup>
 385 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2819453"></a><p>
 386 For å gjøre plass i spektrumet for RCAs nyeste satsingsområde, televisjon,
 387 skulle FM-radioens brukere flyttes til et helt nytt band i spektrumet.
 388 Sendestyrken til FM-radioene ble også redusert, og gjorde at FM ikke lenger
 389 kunne brukes for å sende programmer fra en del av landet til en annen.
 390 (Denne endringen ble sterkt støttet av AT&amp;T, på grunn av at fjerningen
 391 av FM-videresendingsstasjoner ville bety at radiostasjonene ville bli nødt
 392 til å kjøpe kablede linker fra AT&amp;T.)  Spredningen av FM-radio var
 393 dermed kvalt, i hvert fall midlertidig.
 394 </p><p>
 395 Armstrong sto imot RCAs innsats. Som svar motsto RCA Armstrongs patenter.
 396 Etter å ha bakt FM-teknologi inn i den nye standarden for TV, erklærte RCS
 397 patentene ugyldige&#8212;uten grunn og nesten femten år etter at de ble
 398 utstedet.  De nektet dermed å betale ham for bruken av patentene.  I seks år
 399 kjempet Armstrong en dyr søksmålskrig for å forsvare patentene sine.  Til
 400 slutt, samtidig som patentene utløp, tilbød RCA et forlik så lavt at det
 401 ikke engang dekket Armstrongs advokatregning.  Beseiret, knust og nå blakk,
 402 skrev Armstrong i 1954 en kort beskjed til sin kone, før han gikk ut av et
 403 vindu i trettende etasje og falt i døden.
 404 </p><p>
 405
 406 Dette er slik loven virker noen ganger.  Ikke ofte like tragisk, og sjelden
 407 med heltemodig drama, men noen ganger er det slik det virker. Fra starten
 408 har myndigheter og myndighetsorganer blitt tatt til fange. Det er mer
 409 sannsynlig at de blir fanget når en mektig interesse er truet av enten en
 410 juridisk eller teknologisk endring.  Denne mektige interessen utøver for
 411 ofte sin innflytelse hos myndighetene til å få myndighetene til å beskytte
 412 den.  Retorikken for denne beskyttelsen er naturligvis alltid med fokus på
 413 fellesskapets beste.  Realiteten er noe annet.  Idéer som kan være solide
 414 som fjell i en tidsalder, men som overlatt til seg selv, vil falle sammen i
 415 en annen, er videreført gjennom denne subtile korrupsjonen i vår politiske
 416 prosess.  RCA hadde hva Causby-ene ikke hadde: Makten til å undertrykke
 417 effekten av en teknologisk endring.
 418 </p><p>
 419 Det er ingen enkeltoppfinner av Internet.  Ei heller er det en god dato som
 420 kan brukes til å markere når det ble født.  Likevel har internettet i løpet
 421 av svært kort tid blitt en del av vanlige amerikaneres liv.  I følge the Pew
 422 Internet and American Life-prosjektet, har 58 prosent av amerikanerne hatt
 423 tilgang til internettet i 2002, opp fra 49 prosent to år
 424 tidligere.<sup>[<a name="id2819534" href="#ftn.id2819534" class="footnote">10</a>]</sup> Det tallet kan uten
 425 problemer passere to tredjedeler av nasjonen ved utgangen av 2004.
 426 </p><p>
 427 Etter hvert som internett er blitt integrert inn i det vanlige liv har ting
 428 blitt endret.  Noen av disse endringene er teknisk&#8212;internettet har
 429 gjort kommunikasjon raskere, det har redusert kostnaden med å samle inn
 430 data, og så videre.  Disse tekniske endringene er ikke fokus for denne
 431 boken.  De er viktige.  De er ikke godt forstått.  Men de er den type ting
 432 som ganske enkelt ville blir borte hvis vi alle bare slo av internettet.  De
 433 påvirker ikke folk som ikke bruker internettet, eller i det miste påvirker
 434 det ikke dem direkte.  De er et godt tema for en bok om internettet.  Men
 435 dette er ikke en bok om internettet.
 436 </p><p>
 437 I stedet er denne boken om effekten av internettet ut over internettet i seg
 438 selv.  En effekt på hvordan kultur blir skapt.  Min påstand er at
 439 internettet har ført til en viktig og ukjent endring i denne prosessen.
 440 Denne endringen vil forandre en tradisjon som er like gammel som republikken
 441 selv.  De fleste, hvis de la merke til denne endringen, ville avvise den.
 442 Men de fleste legger ikke engang merke til denne endringen som internettet
 443 har introdusert.
 444 </p><p>
 445 Vi kan få en følelse av denne endringen ved å skille mellom kommersiell og
 446 ikke-kommersiell kultur, ved å knytte lovens reguleringer til hver av dem.
 447 Med "kommersiell kultur" mener jeg den delen av vår kultur som er produsert
 448 og solgt eller produsert for å bli solgt.  Med "ikke-kommersiell kultur"
 449 mener jeg alt det andre. Da gamle menn satt rundt i parker eller på
 450 gatehjørner og fortalte historier som unger og andre lyttet til, så var det
 451 ikke-kommersiell kultur.  Da Noah Webster publiserte sin "Reader", eller
 452 Joel Barlow sin poesi, så var det kommersiell kultur.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2819599"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2819608"></a>
 453 </p><p>
 454 Fra historisk tid, og for omtrent hele vår tradisjon, har ikke-kommersiell
 455 kultur i hovedsak ikke vært regulert.  Selvfølgelig, hvis din historie var
 456 utuktig, eller hvis dine sanger forstyrret freden, kunne loven gripe inn.
 457 Men loven var aldri direkte interessert i skapingen eller spredningen av
 458 denne form for kultur, og lot denne kulturen være "fri".  Den vanlige måten
 459 som vanlige individer delte og formet deres kultur&#8212;historiefortelling,
 460 formidling av scener fra teater eller TV, delta i fan-klubber, deling av
 461 musikk, laging av kassetter&#8212;ble ikke styrt av lovverket.
 462 </p><p>
 463 Fokuset på loven var kommersiell kreativitet.  I starten forsiktig, etter
 464 hvert betraktelig, beskytter loven insentivet til skaperne ved å tildele dem
 465 en eksklusiv rett til deres kreative verker, slik at de kan selge disse
 466 eksklusive rettighetene på en kommersiell markedsplass.<sup>[<a name="id2819640" href="#ftn.id2819640" class="footnote">11</a>]</sup> Dette er også, naturligvis, en viktig del av
 467 kreativitet og kultur, og det har blitt en viktigere og viktigere del i
 468 USA.  Men det var på ingen måte dominerende i vår tradisjon.  Det var i
 469 stedet bare en del, en kontrollert del, balansert mot det frie.
 470 </p><p>
 471 Denne grove inndelingen mellom den frie og den kontrollerte har nå blitt
 472 fjernet.<sup>[<a name="id2819677" href="#ftn.id2819677" class="footnote">12</a>]</sup> Internettet har satt scenen
 473 for denne fjerningen, og pressen frem av store medieaktører har loven nå
 474 påvirket det.  For første gang i vår tradisjon, har de vanlige måtene som
 475 individer skaper og deler kultur havnet innen rekekvidde for reguleringene
 476 til loven, som har blitt utvidet til å dra inn i sitt kontrollområde den
 477 enorme mengden kultur og kreativitet som den aldri tidligere har nådd over.
 478 Teknologien som tok vare på den historiske balansen&#8212;mellom bruken av
 479 den delen av kulturen vår som var fri og bruken av vår kultur som krevde
 480 tillatelse&#8212;har blitt borte.  Konsekvensen er at vi er mindre og mindre
 481 en fri kultur, og mer og mer en tillatelseskultur.
 482 </p><p>
 483 Denne endringen blir rettferdiggjort som nødvendig for å beskytte
 484 kommersiell kreativitet.  Og ganske riktig, proteksjonisme er nøyaktig det
 485 som motiverer endringen.  Men proteksjonismen som rettferdiggjør endringene
 486 som jeg skal beskrive lenger ned er ikke den begrensede og balanserte typen
 487 som har definert loven tidligere.  Dette er ikke en proteksjonisme for å
 488 beskytte artister.  Det er i stedet en proteksjonisme for å beskytte
 489 bestemte forretningsformer.  Selskaper som er truet av potensialet til
 490 internettet for å endre måten både kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell kultur
 491 blir skapt og delt, har samlet seg for å få lovgiverne til å bruke loven for
 492 å beskytte selskapene.  Dette er historien om RCA og Armstrong, og det er
 493 drømmen til Causbyene.
 494 </p><p>
 495 For internettet har sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mulighet for mange til å
 496 delta i prosessen med å bygge og kultivere en kultur som rekker lagt utenfor
 497 lokale grenselinjer.  Den makten har endret markedsplassen for å lage og
 498 kultivere kultur generelt, og den endringen truer i neste omgang etablerte
 499 innholdsindustrier. Internettet er dermed for industriene som bygget og
 500 distribuerte innhold i det tjuende århundret hva FM-radio var for AM-radio,
 501 eller hva traileren var for jernbaneindustrien i det nittende århundret:
 502 begynnelsen på slutten, eller i hvert fall en markant endring. Digitale
 503 teknologier, knyttet til internettet, kunne produsere et mye mer
 504 konkurransedyktig og levende marked for å bygge og kultivere kultur.  Dette
 505 markedet kunne inneholde en mye videre og mer variert utvalg av skapere.
 506 Disse skaperne kunne produsere og distribuere et mye mer levende utvalg av
 507 kreativitet. Og avhengig av noen få viktige faktorer, så kunne disse
 508 skaperne tjenere mer i snitt fra dette systemet enn skaperne gjør i
 509 dag&#8212;så lenge RCA-ene av i dag ikke bruker loven til å beskytte dem
 510 selv mot denne konkurransen.
 511 </p><p>
 512 Likevel, som jeg argumenterer for i sidene som følger, er dette nøyaktig det
 513 som skjer i vår kultur i dag.  Dette som er dagens ekvivalenter til tidlig
 514 tjuende århundres radio og nittende århundres jernbaner bruker deres makt
 515 til å få loven til å beskytte dem mot dette nye, mer effektive, mer levende
 516 teknologi for å bygge kultur. De lykkes i deres plan om å gjøre om
 517 internettet før internettet gjør om på dem.
 518 </p><p>
 519 Det ser ikke slik ut for mange.  Kamphandlingene over opphavsrett og
 520 internettet er fjernt for de fleste.  For de få som følger dem, virker de i
 521 hovedsak å handle om et enklere sett med spørsmål&#8212;hvorvidt
 522 "piratvirksomhet" vil bli akseptert, og hvorvidt "eiendomsretten" vil bli
 523 beskyttet.  "Krigen" som har blitt erklært mot teknologiene til
 524 internettet&#8212;det presidenten for Motion Picture Association of America
 525 (MPAA) Jack Valenti kaller sin "egen terroristkrig"<sup>[<a name="id2819805" href="#ftn.id2819805" class="footnote">13</a>]</sup>&#8212;har blitt rammet inn som en kamp om å følge
 526 loven og respektere eiendomsretten.  For å vite hvilken side vi bør ta i
 527 denne krigen, de fleste tenker at vi kun trenger å bestemme om hvorvidt vi
 528 er for eiendomsrett eller mot den.
 529 </p><p>
 530 Hvis dette virkelig var alternativene, så ville jeg være enig med Jack
 531 Valenti og innholdsindustrien.  Jeg tror også på eiendomsretten, og spesielt
 532 på viktigheten av hva Mr. Valenti så pent kaller "kreativ eiendomsrett".
 533 Jeg tror at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at loven, riktig innstilt, bør
 534 straffe "piratvirksomhet", både på og utenfor internettet.
 535 </p><p>
 536 Men disse enkle trosoppfatninger maskerer et mye mer grunnleggende spørsmål
 537 og en mye mer dramatisk endring. Min frykt er at med mindre vi begynner å
 538 legge merke til denne endringen, så vil krigen for å befri verden fra
 539 internettets "pirater" også fjerne verdier fra vår kultur som har vært
 540 integrert til vår tradisjon helt fra starten.
 541 </p><p>
 542 Disse verdiene bygget en tradisjon som, for i hvert fall de første 180 årene
 543 av vår republikk, garanterte skaperne rettigheten til å bygge fritt på deres
 544 fortid, og beskyttet skaperne og innovatørene fra både statlig og privat
 545 kontroll.  Det første grunnlovstillegget beskyttet skaperne fra statlig
 546 kontroll.  Og som professor Neil Netanel kraftfylt argumenterer,<sup>[<a name="id2819870" href="#ftn.id2819870" class="footnote">14</a>]</sup> opphavsrettslov, skikkelig balansert, beskyttet
 547 skaperne mot privat kontroll.  Vår tradisjon var dermed hverken Sovjet eller
 548 tradisjonen til velgjørere.  I stedet skar det ut en bred manøvreringsrom
 549 hvor skapere kunne kultivere og utvide vår kultur.
 550 </p><p>
 551 Likevel har lovens respons til internettet, når det knyttes sammen til
 552 endringer i teknologien i internettet selv, ført til massiv økting av den
 553 effektive reguleringen av kreativitet i USA.  For å bygge på eller kritisere
 554 kulturen rundt oss må en spørre, som Oliver Twist, om tillatelse først.
 555 Tillatelse er, naturligvis, ofte innvilget&#8212;men det er ikke ofte
 556 innvilget til den kritiske eller den uavhengige.  Vi har bygget en slags
 557 kulturell adel.  De innen dette adelskapet har et enkelt liv, mens de på
 558 utsiden har det ikke.  Men det er adelskap i alle former som er fremmed for
 559 vår tradisjon.
 560 </p><p>
 561 Historien som følger er om denne krigen.  Er det ikke om "betydningen av
 562 teknologi" i vanlig liv.  Jeg tror ikke på guder, hverken digitale eller
 563 andre typer.  Det er heller ikke et forsøk på å demonisere noen individer
 564 eller gruppe, jeg tro heller ikke i en djevel, selskapsmessig eller på annen
 565 måte.  Det er ikke en moralsk historie.  Ei heller er det et rop om hellig
 566 krig mot en industri.
 567 </p><p>
 568 Det er i stedet et forsøk på å forstå en håpløst ødeleggende krig som er
 569 inspirert av teknologiene til internettet, men som rekker lang utenfor dens
 570 kode.  Og ved å forstå denne kampen er den en innsats for å finne veien til
 571 fred.  Det er ingen god grunn for å fortsette dagens batalje rundt
 572 internett-teknologiene.  Det vil være til stor skade for vår tradisjon og
 573 kultur hvis den får lov til å fortsette ukontrollert. Vi må forstå kilden
 574 til denne krigen.  Vi må finne en løsning snart.
 575 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2819953"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2819958"></a><p>
 576 Lik Causbyenes kamp er denne krigen, delvis, om "eiendomsrett". Eiendommen i
 577 denne krigen er ikke like håndfast som den til Causbyene, og ingen uskyldige
 578 kyllinger har så langt mistet livet.  Likevel er idéene rundt denne
 579 "eiendomsretten" like åpenbare for de fleste som Causbyenes krav om
 580 ukrenkeligheten til deres bondegård var for dem. De fleste av oss tar for
 581 gitt de uvanlig mektige krav som eierne av "immaterielle rettigheter" nå
 582 hevder.  De fleste av oss, som Causbyene, behandler disse kravene som
 583 åpenbare.  Og dermed protesterer vi, som Causbyene,, når ny teknologi griper
 584 inn i denne eiendomsretten.  Det er så klart for oss som det var fro dem at
 585 de nye teknologiene til internettet "tar seg til rette" mot legitime krav
 586 til "eiendomsrett".  Det er like klart for oss som det var for dem at loven
 587 skulle ta affære for å stoppe denne inntrengingen i annen manns eiendom.
 588 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2820001"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2820007"></a><p>
 589
 590 Og dermed, når nerder og teknologer forsvarer sin tids Armstrong og
 591 Wright-brødenes teknologi, får de lite sympati fra de fleste av oss. Sunn
 592 fornuft gjør ikke opprør.  I motsetning til saken til de uheldige Causbyene,
 593 er sunn fornuft på samme side som eiendomseierne i denne krigen.  I
 594 motsetning til hos de heldige Wright-brødrene, har internettet ikke
 595 inspirert en revolusjon til fordel for seg.
 596 </p><p>
 597 Mitt håp er å skyve denne sunne fornuften videre.  Jeg har blitt stadig mer
 598 overrasket over kraften til denne idéen om immaterielle rettigheter og, mer
 599 viktig, dets evne til å slå av kritisk tanke hos lovmakere og innbyggere.
 600 Det har aldri før i vår historie vært så mye av vår "kultur" som har vært
 601 "eid" enn det er nå.  Og likevel har aldri før konsentrasjonen av makt til å
 602 kontrollere <span class="emphasis"><em>bruken</em></span> av kulturen vært mer akseptert uten
 603 spørsmål enn det er nå.
 604 </p><p>
 605 Gåten er, hvorfor det?  Er det fordi vi fått en innsikt i sannheten om
 606 verdien og betydningen av absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur? Er det
 607 fordi vi har oppdaget at vår tradisjon med å avvise slike absolutte krav var
 608 feil?
 609 </p><p>
 610 Eller er det på grunn av at idéer om absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur
 611 gir fordeler til RCA-ene i vår tid, og passer med vår ureflekterte
 612 intuisjon?
 613 </p><p>
 614 Er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår tradisjon om fri kultur en
 615 forekomst av USA som korrigerer en feil fra sin fortid, slik vi gjorde det
 616 etter en blodig krig mot slaveri, og slik vi sakte gjør det mot
 617 forskjellsbehandling?  Eller er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår
 618 tradisjon med fri kultur nok et eksempel på at vårt politiske system er
 619 fanget av noen få mektige særinteresser?
 620 </p><p>
 621 Fører sunn fornuft til det ekstreme i dette spørsmålet på grunn av at sunn
 622 fornuft faktisk tror på dette ekstreme?  Eller står sunn fornuft i stillhet
 623 i møtet med dette ekstreme fordi, som med Armstrong versus RCA, at den mer
 624 mektige siden har sikret seg at det har et mye mer mektig synspunkt?
 625 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2820096"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2820103"></a><p>
 626
 627 Jeg forsøker ikke å være mystisk.  Mine egne synspunkter er klare. Jeg mener
 628 det var riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør mot ekstremismen til
 629 Causbyene.  Jeg mener det ville være riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør
 630 mot de ekstreme krav som gjøres i dag på vegne av "immaterielle
 631 rettigheter".  Det som loven krever i dag er mer å mer like dumt som om
 632 lensmannen skulle arrestere en flymaskin for å trenge inn på annen manns
 633 eiendom.  Men konsekvensene av den nye dumskapen vil bli mye mer
 634 dyptgripende.
 635
 636 </p><p>
 637 Basketaket som pågår akkurat nå senterer seg rundt to idéer:
 638 "piratvirksomhet" og "eiendom".  Mitt mål med denne bokens neste to deler er
 639 å utforske disse to idéene.
 640 </p><p>
 641 Metoden min er ikke den vanlige metoden for en akademiker.  Jeg ønsker ikke
 642 å pløye deg inn i et komplisert argument, steinsatt med referanser til
 643 obskure franske teoretikere&#8212;uansett hvor naturlig det har blitt for
 644 den rare sorten vi akademikere har blitt.  Jeg vil i stedet begynne hver del
 645 med en samling historier som etablerer en sammenheng der disse
 646 tilsynelatende enkle idéene kan bli fullt ut forstått.
 647 </p><p>
 648 De to delene setter opp kjernen i påstanden til denne boken: at mens
 649 internettet faktisk har produsert noe fantastisk og nytt, bidrar våre
 650 myndigheter, presset av store medieaktører for å møte dette "noe nytt" til å
 651 ødelegge noe som er svært gammelt.  I stedet for å forstå endringene som
 652 internettet kan gjøre mulig, og i stedet for å ta den tiden som trengs for å
 653 la "sunn fornuft" finne ut hvordan best svare på utfordringen, så lar vi de
 654 som er mest truet av endringene bruke sin makt til å endre loven&#8212;og
 655 viktigere, å bruke sin makt til å endre noe fundamentalt om hvordan vi
 656 alltid har fungert.
 657 </p><p>
 658 Jeg tror vi tillater dette, ikke fordi det er riktig, og heller ikke fordi
 659 de fleste av oss tror på disse endringene.  Vi tillater det på grunn av at
 660 de interessene som er mest truet er blant de mest mektige aktørene i vår
 661 deprimerende kompromitterte prosess for å utforme lover. Denne boken er
 662 historien om nok en konsekvens for denne type korrupsjon&#8212;en konsekvens
 663 for de fleste av oss forblir ukjent med.
 664 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2763176" href="#id2763176" class="para">4</a>] </sup>
 665 St. George Tucker, <em class="citetitle">Blackstone's Commentaries</em> 3 (South
 666 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
 667 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2763274" href="#id2763274" class="para">5</a>] </sup>
 668 USA mot Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. Domstolen fant at det kunne være
 669 å "ta" hvis regjeringens bruk av sitt land reelt sett hadde ødelagt verdien
 670 av eiendomen til Causby.  Dette eksemplet ble foreslått for meg i Keith
 671 Aokis flotte stykke, "(intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward
 672 a cultural Geography of Authorship", <em class="citetitle">Stanford Law
 673 Review</em> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. Se også Paul Goldstein,
 674 <em class="citetitle">Real Property</em> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press
 675 (1984)), 1112&#8211;13.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2819106"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2819102"></a>
 676 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819274" href="#id2819274" class="para">6</a>] </sup>
 677 Lawrence Lessing, <em class="citetitle">Man of High Fidelity:: Edwin Howard
 678 Armstrong</em> (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
 679 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819234" href="#id2819234" class="para">7</a>] </sup> Se "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," første
 680 elektroniske kirke i USA, hos www.webstationone.com/fecha, tilgjengelig fra
 681 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #1</a>.
 682 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819398" href="#id2819398" class="para">8</a>] </sup>Lessing, 226.
 683 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819414" href="#id2819414" class="para">9</a>] </sup>
 684 Lessing, 256.
 685 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819534" href="#id2819534" class="para">10</a>] </sup>
 686 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
 687 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American Life
 688 Project, 15. april 2003: 6, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #2</a>.
 689 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819640" href="#id2819640" class="para">11</a>] </sup>
 690 Dette er ikke det eneste formålet med opphavsrett, men det er helt klart
 691 hovedformålet med opphavsretten slik den er etablert i føderal grunnlov.
 692 Opphavsrettslovene i delstatene beskyttet historisk ikke bare kommersielle
 693 interesse når det gjaldt publikasjoner, men også personverninteresser.  Ved
 694 å gi forfattere eneretten til å publisere først, ga delstatenes
 695 opphavsrettslovene forfatterne makt til å kontrollere spredningen av fakta
 696 om seg selv. Se Samuel D. Warren og Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy",
 697 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193, 198&#8211;200.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2819288"></a>
 698 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819677" href="#id2819677" class="para">12</a>] </sup>
 699 Se Jessica Litman, <em class="citetitle">Digital Copyright</em> (New York:
 700 Prometheus bøker, 2001), kap. 13.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2819685"></a>
 701 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819805" href="#id2819805" class="para">13</a>] </sup>
 702 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates Use New Tools
 703 to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," <em class="citetitle">New York
 704 Times</em>, 17. januar 2002.
 705 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819870" href="#id2819870" class="para">14</a>] </sup>
 706 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," <em class="citetitle">Yale
 707 Law Journal</em> 106 (1996): 283.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2819879"></a>
 708 </p></div></div></div><div class="part" title='Del I. "Piratvirksomhet"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="c-piracy"></a>Del I. "Piratvirksomhet"</h1></div></div></div><div class="partintro" title='"Piratvirksomhet"'><div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxmansfield1"></a><p>
 709 Helt siden loven begynte å regulere kreative eierrettigheter, har det vært
 710 en krig mot "piratvirksomhet".  De presise konturene av dette konseptet,
 711 "piratvirksomhet", har vært vanskelig å tegne opp, men bildet av
 712 urettferdighet er enkelt å beskrive.  Som Lord Mansfield skrev i en sak som
 713 utvidet rekkevidden for engelsk opphavsrettslov til å inkludere noteark,
 714 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 715 En person kan bruke kopien til å spille den, men han har ingen rett til å
 716 robbe forfatteren for profitten, ved å lage flere kopier og distribuere
 717 etter eget forgodtbefinnende.<sup>[<a name="id2820239" href="#ftn.id2820239" class="footnote">15</a>]</sup>
 718 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2820253"></a></blockquote></div><p>
 719
 720 I dag er vi midt inne i en annen "krig" mot "piratvirksomhet". Internettet
 721 har fremprovosert denne krigen.  Internettet gjør det mulig å effektivt spre
 722 innhold.  Peer-to-peer (p2p) fildeling er blant det mest effektive av de
 723 effektive teknologier internettet muliggjør. Ved å bruke distribuert
 724 intelligens, kan p2p-systemer muliggjøre enkel spredning av innhold på en
 725 måte som ingen forestilte seg for en generasjon siden.
 726
 727 </p><p>
 728 Denne effektiviteten respekterer ikke de tradisjonelle skillene i
 729 opphavsretten. Nettverket skiller ikke mellom deling av
 730 opphavsrettsbeskyttet og ikke opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold. Dermed har det
 731 vært deling av en enorm mengde opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold.  Denne
 732 delingen har i sin tur ansporet til krigen, på grunn av at eiere av
 733 opphavsretter frykter delingen vil "frata forfatteren overskuddet."
 734 </p><p>
 735 Krigerne har snudd seg til domstolene, til lovgiverne, og i stadig større
 736 grad til teknologi for å forsvare sin "eiendom" mot denne
 737 "piratvirksomheten".  En generasjon amerikanere, advarer krigerne, blir
 738 oppdratt til å tro at "eiendom" skal være "gratis".  Glem tatoveringer, ikke
 739 tenk på kroppspiercing&#8212;våre barn blir <span class="emphasis"><em>tyver</em></span>!
 740 </p><p>
 741 Det er ingen tvil om at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at pirater bør
 742 straffes.  Men før vi roper på bødlene, bør vi sette dette
 743 "piratvirksomhets"-begrepet i en sammenheng.  For mens begrepet blir mer og
 744 mer brukt, har det i sin kjerne en ekstraordinær idé som nesten helt sikkert
 745 er feil.
 746 </p><p>
 747 Idéen høres omtrent slik ut:
 748 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 749 Kreativt arbeid har verdi.  Når jeg bruker, eller tar, eller bygger på det
 750 kreative arbeidet til andre, så tar jeg noe fra dem som har verdi.  Når jeg
 751 tar noe av verdi fra noen andre, bør jeg få tillatelse fra dem.  Å ta noe
 752 som har verdi fra andre uten tillatelse er galt.  Det er en form for
 753 piratvirksomhet.
 754 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2820352"></a><p>
 755 Dette synet går dypt i de pågående debattene.  Det er hva jussprofessor
 756 Rochelle Dreyfuss ved NYU kritiserer som "hvis verdi, så rettighet"-teorien
 757 for kreative eierrettigheter <sup>[<a name="id2820366" href="#ftn.id2820366" class="footnote">16</a>]</sup>&#8212;hvis det finnes verdi, så må noen ha rettigheten til denne
 758 verdien.  Det er perspektivet som fikk komponistenes rettighetsorganisasjon,
 759 ASCAP, til å saksøke jentespeiderne for å ikke betale for sangene som
 760 jentene sagt rundt jentespeidernes leirbål.<sup>[<a name="id2820387" href="#ftn.id2820387" class="footnote">17</a>]</sup> Det fantes "verdi" (sangene), så det måtte ha vært en
 761 "rettighet"&#8212;til og med mot jentespeiderne.
 762 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2820415"></a><p>
 763
 764 Denne idéen er helt klart en mulig forståelse om hvordan kreative
 765 eierrettigheter bør virke.  Det er helt klart et mulig design for et
 766 lovsystem som beskytter kreative eierrettigheter.  Men teorien om "hvis
 767 verdi, så rettighet" for kreative eierrettigheter har aldri vært USAs teori
 768 for kreative eierrettigheter.  It har aldri stått rot i vårt lovverk.
 769 </p><p>
 770 I vår tradisjon har immaterielle rettigheter i stedet vært et instrument.
 771 Det bygger fundamentet for et rikt kreativt samfunn, men er fortsatt servilt
 772 til verdien av kreativitet.  Dagens debatt har snudd dette helt rundt.  Vi
 773 har blitt så opptatt av å beskytte instrumentet at vi mister verdien av
 774 syne.
 775 </p><p>
 776 Kilden til denne forvirringen er et skille som loven ikke lenger bryr seg om
 777 å markere&#8212;skillet mellom å gjenpublisere noens verk på den ene siden,
 778 og bygge på og gjøre om verket på den andre.  Da opphavsretten kom var det
 779 kun publisering som ble berørt. Opphavsretten i dag regulerer begge.
 780 </p><p>
 781 Før teknologiene til internettet dukket opp, betød ikke denne begrepsmessige
 782 sammenblandingen mye.  Teknologiene for å publisere var kostbare, som betød
 783 at det meste av publisering var kommersiell. Kommersielle aktører kunne
 784 håndtere byrden pålagt av loven&#8212;til og med byrden som den bysantiske
 785 kompleksiteten som opphavsrettsloven har blitt.  Det var bare nok en kostnad
 786 ved å drive forretning.
 787 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2820469"></a><p>
 788 Men da internettet dukket opp, forsvant denne naturlige begrensningen til
 789 lovens virkeområde.  Loven kontrollerer ikke bare kreativiteten til
 790 kommersielle skapere, men effektivt sett kreativiteten til alle. Selv om
 791 utvidelsen ikke ville bety stort hvis opphavsrettsloven kun regulerte
 792 "kopiering", så betyr utvidelsen mye når loven regulerer så bredt og obskurt
 793 som den gjør.  Byrden denne loven gir oppveier nå langt fordelene den ga da
 794 den ble vedtatt&#8212;helt klart slik den påvirker ikke-kommersiell
 795 kreativitet, og i stadig større grad slik den påvirker kommersiell
 796 kreativitet.  Dermed, slik vi ser klarere i kapitlene som følger, er lovens
 797 rolle mindre og mindre å støtte kreativitet, og mer og mer å beskytte
 798 enkelte industrier mot konkurranse.  Akkurat på tidspunktet da digital
 799 teknologi kunne sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mengde med kommersiell og
 800 ikke-kommersiell kreativitet, tynger loven denne kreativiteten med sinnsykt
 801 kompliserte og vage regler og med trusselen om uanstendig harde straffer.
 802 Vi ser kanskje, som Richard Florida skriver, "Fremveksten av den kreative
 803 klasse"<sup>[<a name="id2820478" href="#ftn.id2820478" class="footnote">18</a>]</sup> Dessverre ser vi også en
 804 ekstraordinær fremvekst av reguleringer av denne kreative klassen.
 805 </p><p>
 806 Disse byrdene gir ingen mening i vår tradisjon.  Vi bør begynne med å forstå
 807 den tradisjonen litt mer, og ved å plassere dagens slag om oppførsel med
 808 merkelappen "piratvirksomhet" i sin rette sammenheng.
 809 </p><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#creators">2. Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#mere-copyists">3. Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#catalogs">4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#pirates">5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#piracy">6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2820239" href="#id2820239" class="para">15</a>] </sup>
 810
 811
 812 <em class="citetitle">Bach</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Longman</em>, 98
 813 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
 814 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2820366" href="#id2820366" class="para">16</a>] </sup>
 815
 816
 817 Se Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
 818 Pepsi Generation," <em class="citetitle">Notre Dame Law Review</em> 65 (1990):
 819 397.
 820 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2820387" href="#id2820387" class="para">17</a>] </sup>
 821
 822 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay Up,"
 823 <em class="citetitle">Wall Street Journal</em>, 21. august 1996, tilgjengelig
 824 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #3</a>; Jonathan
 825 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
 826 Speech, No One Wins," <em class="citetitle">Boston Globe</em>, 24. november
 827 2002.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2820405"></a>
 828 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2820478" href="#id2820478" class="para">18</a>] </sup>
 829
 830 I <em class="citetitle">The Rise of the Creative Class</em> (New York: Basic
 831 Books, 2002), dokumenterer Richard Florida en endring i arbeidsstokken mot
 832 kreativitetsarbeide.  Hans tekst omhandler derimot ikke direkte de juridiske
 833 vilkår som kreativiteten blir muliggjort eller hindret under.  Jeg er helt
 834 klart enig med ham i viktigheten og betydningen av denne endringen, men jeg
 835 tror også at vilkårene som disse endringene blir aktivert under er mye
 836 vanskeligere.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2820542"></a>
 837 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 2. Kapittel en: Skaperne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="creators"></a>Kapittel 2. Kapittel en: Skaperne</h2></div></div></div><p>
 838 I 1928 ble en tegnefilmfigur født.  En tidlig Mikke Mus debuterte i mai
 839 dette året, i en stille flopp ved navn <em class="citetitle">Plane Crazy</em>.
 840 I november, i Colony teateret i New York City, ble den første vidt
 841 distribuerte tegnefilmen med synkronisert lyd, <em class="citetitle">Steamboat
 842 Willy</em>, vist frem med figuren som skulle bli til Mikke Mus.
 843 </p><p>
 844 Film med synkronisert lyd hadde blitt introdusert et år tidligere i filmen
 845 <em class="citetitle">The Jazz Singer</em>.  Suksessen fikk Walt Disney til å
 846 kopiere teknikken og mikse lyd med tegnefilm.  Ingen visste hvorvidt det
 847 ville virke eller ikke, og om det fungere, hvorvidt publikum villa ha sans
 848 for det.  Men da Disney gjorde en test sommeren 1928, var resultatet
 849 entydig.  Som Disney beskriver dette første eksperimentet,
 850 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 851
 852 Et par av guttene mine kunne lese noteark, og en av dem kunne spille
 853 munnspill.  Vi stappet dem inn i et rom hvor de ikke kunne se skjermen, og
 854 gjorde det slik at lyden de spilte ble sendt videre til et rom hvor våre
 855 koner og venner var plassert for å se på bildet.
 856
 857 </p><p>
 858 Guttene brukte et note- og lydeffekt-ark.  Etter noen dårlige oppstarter,
 859 kom endelig lyd og handling i gang med et smell. Munnspilleren spilte
 860 melodien, og resten av oss i lydavdelingen slamret på tinnkasseroller og
 861 blåste på slide-fløyte til rytmen. Synkroniseringen var nesten helt riktig.
 862 </p><p>
 863 Effekten på vårt lille publikum var intet mindre enn elektrisk.  De reagerte
 864 nesten instinktivt til denne union av lyd og bevegelse.  Jeg trodde de
 865 tullet med meg.  Så de puttet meg i publikum og satte igang på nytt.  Det
 866 var grufullt, men det var fantastisk.  Og det var noe nytt!<sup>[<a name="id2820657" href="#ftn.id2820657" class="footnote">19</a>]</sup>
 867 </p></blockquote></div><p>
 868 Disneys daværende partner, og en av animasjonsverdenens mest ekstraordinære
 869 talenter, Ub Iwerks, uttalte det sterkere: "Jeg har aldri vært så begeistret
 870 i hele mitt liv. Ingenting annet har noen sinne vært like bra." <a class="indexterm" name="id2820679"></a>
 871 </p><p>
 872 Disney hadde laget noe helt nyt, basert på noe relativt nytt. Synkronisert
 873 lyd ga liv til en form for kreativitet som sjeldent hadde&#8212;unntatt fra
 874 Disneys hender&#8212;vært noe annet en fyllstoff for andre filmer.  Gjennom
 875 animasjonens tidligere historie var det Disneys oppfinnelse som satte
 876 standarden som andre måtte sloss for å oppfylle.  Og ganske ofte var Disneys
 877 store geni, hans gnist av kreativitet, bygget på arbeidet til andre.
 878 </p><p>
 879 Dette er kjent stoff.  Det du kanskje ikke vet er at 1928 også markerer en
 880 annen viktig overgang.  I samme år laget et komedie-geni (i motsetning til
 881 tegnefilm-geni) sin siste uavhengig produserte stumfilm.  Dette geniet var
 882 Buster Keaton.  Filmen var <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr</em>.
 883 </p><p>
 884 Keaton ble født inn i en vauderville-familie i 1895.  I stumfilm-æraen hadde
 885 han mestret bruken av bredpenslet fysisk komedie på en måte som tente
 886 ukontrollerbar latter fra hans publikum. <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill,
 887 Jr</em>. var en klassiker av denne typen, berømt blant film-elskere
 888 for sine utrolige stunts.  Filmen var en klassisk Keaton&#8212;fantastisk
 889 populær og blant de beste i sin sjanger.
 890 </p><p>
 891 <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr</em>. kom før Disneys tegnefilm
 892 Steamboat Willie.  Det er ingen tilfeldighet at titlene er så
 893 like. Steamboat Willie er en direkte tegneserieparodi av Steamboat
 894 Bill,<sup>[<a name="id2820750" href="#ftn.id2820750" class="footnote">20</a>]</sup> og begge bygger på en felles sang
 895 som kilde.  Det er ikke kun fra nyskapningen med synkronisert lyd i
 896 <em class="citetitle">The Jazz Singer</em> at vi får <em class="citetitle">Steamboat
 897 Willie</em>.  Det er også fra Buster Keatons nyskapning Steamboat
 898 Bill, Jr., som igjen var inspirert av sangen "Steamboat Bill", at vi får
 899 Steamboat Willie.  Og fra Steamboat Willie får vi så Mikke Mus.
 900 </p><p>
 901 Denne "låningen" var ikke unik, hverken for Disney eller for industrien.
 902 Disney apet alltid etter full-lengde massemarkedsfilmene rundt
 903 ham.<sup>[<a name="id2820803" href="#ftn.id2820803" class="footnote">21</a>]</sup> Det samme gjorde mange andre.
 904 Tidlige tegnefilmer er stappfulle av etterapninger&#8212;små variasjoner
 905 over suksessfulle temaer, gamle historier fortalt på nytt.  Nøkkelen til
 906 suksess var brilliansen i forskjellene.  Med Disney var det lyden som ga
 907 gnisten til hans animasjoner.  Senere var det kvaliteten på hans arbeide
 908 relativt til de masseproduserte tegnefilmene som han konkurrerte med.
 909 Likevel var disse bidragene bygget på toppen av fundamentet som var lånt.
 910 Disney bygget på arbeidet til andre som kom før han, og skapte noe nytt ut
 911 av noe som bare var litt gammelt.
 912 </p><p>
 913 Noen ganger var låningen begrenset, og noen ganger var den betydelig. Tenkt
 914 på eventyrene til brødrene Grimm.  Hvis du er like ubevisst som jeg var, så
 915 tror du sannsynlighvis at disse fortellingene er glade, søte historier som
 916 passer for ethvert barn ved leggetid.  Realiteten er at Grimm-eventyrene er,
 917 for oss, ganske dystre.  Det er noen sjeldne og kanskje spesielt ambisiøse
 918 foreldre som ville våge å lese disse blodige moralistiske historiene til
 919 sine barn, ved leggetid eller hvilken som helst annet tidspunkt.
 920 </p><p>
 921
 922 Disney tok disse historiene og fortalte dem på nytt på en måte som førte dem
 923 inn i en ny tidsalder. Han ga historiene liv, med både karakterer og
 924 lys. Uten å fjerne bitene av frykt og fare helt, gjorde han morsomt det som
 925 var mørkt og satte inn en ekte følelse av medfølelse der det før var
 926 frykt. Og ikke bare med verkene av brødrene Grimm.  Faktisk er katalogen
 927 over Disney-arbeid som baserer seg på arbeidet til andre ganske forbløffende
 928 når den blir samlet: <em class="citetitle">Snøhvit</em> (1937),
 929 <em class="citetitle">Fantasia</em> (1940), <em class="citetitle">Pinocchio</em>
 930 (1940), <em class="citetitle">Dumbo</em> (1941), <em class="citetitle">Bambi</em>
 931 (1942), <em class="citetitle">Song of the South</em> (1946),
 932 <em class="citetitle">Askepott</em> (1950), <em class="citetitle">Alice in
 933 Wonderland</em> (1951), <em class="citetitle">Robin Hood</em> (1952),
 934 <em class="citetitle">Peter Pan</em> (1953), <em class="citetitle">Lady og
 935 landstrykeren</em> (1955), <em class="citetitle">Mulan</em> (1998),
 936 <em class="citetitle">Tornerose</em> (1959), <em class="citetitle">101
 937 dalmatinere</em> (1961), <em class="citetitle">Sverdet i steinen</em>
 938 (1963), og <em class="citetitle">Jungelboken</em> (1967)&#8212;for ikke å nevne
 939 et nylig eksempel som vi bør kanskje glemme raskt, <em class="citetitle">Treasure
 940 Planet</em> (2003). I alle disse tilfellene, har Disney (eller
 941 Disney, Inc.) hentet kreativitet fra kultur rundt ham, blandet med
 942 kreativiteten fra sitt eget ekstraordinære talent, og deretter brent denne
 943 blandingen inn i sjelen til sin kultur. Hente, blande og brenne.
 944 </p><p>
 945 Dette er en type kreativitet.  Det er en kreativitet som vi bør huske på og
 946 feire.  Det er noen som vil si at det finnes ingen kreativitet bortsett fra
 947 denne typen.  Vi trenger ikke gå så langt for å anerkjenne dens betydning.
 948 Vi kan kalle dette "Disney-kreativitet", selv om det vil være litt
 949 misvisende.  Det er mer presist "Walt Disney-kreativitet"&#8212;en
 950 uttrykksform og genialitet som bygger på kulturen rundt oss og omformer den
 951 til noe annet.
 952 </p><p> I 1928 var kulturen som Disney fritt kunne trekke veksler på relativt
 953 fersk.  Allemannseie i 1928 var ikke veldig gammelt og var dermed ganske
 954 levende.  Gjennomsnittlig vernetid i opphavsretten var bare rundt tredve
 955 år&#8212;for den lille delen av kreative verk som faktisk var
 956 opphavsrettsbeskyttet.<sup>[<a name="id2820945" href="#ftn.id2820945" class="footnote">22</a>]</sup> Det betyr at i
 957 tredve år, i gjennomsnitt, hadde forfattere eller kreative verks
 958 opphavsrettighetsinnehaver en "eksklusiv rett" til a kontrollere bestemte
 959 typer bruk av verket.  For å bruke disse opphavsrettsbeskyttede verkene på
 960 de begrensede måtene krevde tillatelse fra opphavsrettsinnehaveren.
 961 </p><p>
 962 Når opphavsrettens vernetid er over, faller et verk i det fri og blir
 963 allemannseie.  Ingen tillatelse trengs da for å bygge på eller bruke dette
 964 verket.  Ingen tillatelse og dermed, ingen advokater. Allemannseie er en
 965 "advokat-fri sone".  Det meste av innhold fra det nittende århundre var
 966 dermed fritt tilgjengelig for Disney å bruke eller bygge på i 1928.  Det var
 967 tilgjengelig for enhver&#8212;uansett om de hadde forbindelser eller ikke,
 968 om de var rik eller ikke, om de var akseptert eller ikke&#8212;til å bruke
 969 og bygge videre på.
 970 </p><p>
 971
 972 Dette er slik det alltid har vært&#8212;inntil ganske nylig.  For
 973 mesteparten av vår historie, har allemannseiet vært like over horisonten.
 974 Fram til 1978 var den gjennomsnittlige opphavsrettslige vernetiden aldri mer
 975 enn trettito år, som gjorde at det meste av kultur fra en og en halv
 976 generasjon tidligere var tilgjengelig for enhver å bygge på uten tillatelse
 977 fra noen.  Tilsvarende for i dag ville være at kreative verker fra 1960- og
 978 1970-tallet nå ville være fritt tilgjengelig for de neste Walt Disney å
 979 bygge på uten tillatelse.  Men i dag er allemannseie presumtivt kun for
 980 innhold fra før mellomkrigstiden.
 981 </p><p>
 982 Walt Disney hadde selvfølgelig ikke monopol på "Walt Disney-kreativitet".
 983 Det har heller ikke USA.  Normen med fri kultur har, inntil nylig, og
 984 unntatt i totalitære nasjoner, vært bredt utnyttet og svært universell.
 985 </p><p>
 986 Vurder for eksempel en form for kreativitet som synes underlig for mange
 987 amerikanere, men som er overalt i japansk kultur:
 988 <em class="citetitle">manga</em>, eller tegneserier.  Japanerne er fanatiske når
 989 det gjelder tegneserier.  Over 40 prosent av publikasjoner er tegneserier,
 990 og 30 prosent av publikasjonsomsetningen stammer fra tegneserier.  De er
 991 over alt i det japanske samfunnet, tilgjengelig fra ethvert
 992 tidsskriftsutsalg, og i hendene på en stor andel av pendlere på Japans
 993 ekstraordinære system for offentlig transport.
 994 </p><p>
 995 Amerikanere har en tendens til å se ned på denne formen for kultur. Det er
 996 et lite attraktivt kjennetegn hos oss.  Vi misforstår sannsynligvis mye
 997 rundt manga, på grunn av at få av oss noen gang har lest noe som ligner på
 998 historiene i disse "grafiske historiene" forteller.  For en japaner dekker
 999 manga ethvert aspekt ved det sosiale liv.  For oss er tegneserier "menn i
1000 strømpebukser".  Og uansett er det ikke slik at T-banen i New York er full
1001 av folk som leser Joyse eller Hemingway for den saks skyld.  Folk i ulike
1002 kulturer skiller seg ut på forskjellig måter, og japanerne på dette
1003 interessante viset.
1004 </p><p>
1005 Men mitt formål her er ikke å forstå manga.  Det er å beskrive en variant av
1006 manga som fra en advokats perspektiv er ganske merkelig, men som fra en
1007 Disneys perspektiv er ganske godt kjent.
1008 </p><p>
1009
1010 Dette er fenomenet <em class="citetitle">doujinshi</em>.  Doujinshi er også
1011 tegneserier, men de er slags etterapings-tegneserier.  En rik etikk styrer
1012 de som skaper doujinshi.  Det er ikke doujinshi hvis det
1013 <span class="emphasis"><em>bare</em></span> er en kopi.  Kunstneren må gjøre et bidrag til
1014 kunsten han kopierer ved å omforme det enten subtilt eller betydelig.  En
1015 doujinshi-tegneserie kan dermed ta en massemarkeds-tegneserie og utvikle den
1016 i en annen retning&#8212;med en annen historie-linje.  Eller tegneserien kan
1017 beholde figuren som seg selv men endre litt på utseendet.  Det er ingen
1018 bestemt formel for hva som gjør en doujinshi tilstrekkelig "forskjellig".
1019 Men de må være forskjellige hvis de skal anses som ekte doujinshi.  Det er
1020 faktisk komiteer som går igjennom doujinshi for å bli med på messer, og
1021 avviser etterapninger som bare er en kopi.
1022 </p><p>
1023 Disse etterapings-tegneseriene er ikke en liten del av manga-markedet.  Det
1024 er enorme.  Mer en 33 000 "sirkler" av skapere over hele Japan som
1025 produserer disse bitene av Walt Disney-kreativitet.  Mer en 450 000 japanere
1026 samles to ganger i året, i den største offentlige samlingen i langet, for å
1027 bytte og selge dem.  Dette markedet er parallelt med det kommersielle
1028 massemarkeds-manga-markedet.  På noen måter konkurrerer det åpenbart med det
1029 markedet, men det er ingen vedvarende innsats fra de som kontrollerer det
1030 kommersielle manga-markedet for å stenge doujinshi-markedet.  Det blomstrer,
1031 på tross av konkurransen og til tross for loven.
1032 </p><p>
1033 Den mest gåtefulle egenskapen med doujinshi-markedet, for de som har
1034 juridisk trening i hvert fall, er at det overhodet tillates å eksistere.
1035 Under japansk opphavsrettslov, som i hvert fall på dette området (på
1036 papiret) speiler USAs opphavsrettslov, er doujinshi-markedet ulovlig.
1037 Doujinshi er helt klart "avledede verk".  Det er ingen generell praksis hos
1038 doujinshi-kunstnere for å sikre seg tillatelse hos manga-skaperne.  I stedet
1039 er praksisen ganske enkelt å ta og endre det andre har laget, slik Walt
1040 Disney gjorde med <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr</em>.  For både
1041 japansk og USAs lov, er å "ta" uten tillatelse fra den opprinnelige
1042 opphavsrettsinnehaver ulovlig.  Det er et brudd på opphavsretten til det
1043 opprinnelige verket å lage en kopi eller et avledet verk uten tillatelse fra
1044 den opprinnelige rettighetsinnehaveren.
1045 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxwinickjudd"></a><p>
1046 Likevel eksisterer dette illegale markedet og faktisk blomstrer i Japan, og
1047 etter manges syn er det nettopp fordi det eksisterer at japansk manga
1048 blomstrer.  Som USAs tegneserieskaper Judd Winick fortalte meg, "I
1049 amerikansk tegneseriers første dager var det ganske likt det som foregår i
1050 Japan i dag. &#8230; Amerikanske tegneserier kom til verden ved å kopiere
1051 hverandre. &#8230; Det er slik [kunstnerne] lærer å tegne&#8212;ved å se i
1052 tegneseriebøker og ikke følge streken, men ved å se på dem og kopiere dem"
1053 og bygge basert på dem.<sup>[<a name="id2821114" href="#ftn.id2821114" class="footnote">23</a>]</sup>
1054 </p><p>
1055 Amerikanske tegneserier nå er ganske annerledes, forklarer Winick, delvis på
1056 grunn av de juridiske problemene med å tilpasse tegneserier slik doujinshi
1057 får lov til.  Med for eksempel Supermann, fortalte Winick meg, "er det en
1058 rekke regler, og du må følge dem".  Det er ting som Supermann "ikke kan"
1059 gjøre.  "For en som lager tegneserier er det frustrerende å måtte begrense
1060 seg til noen parameter som er femti år gamle."
1061 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2821239"></a><p>
1062 Normen i Japan reduserer denne juridiske utfordringen.  Noen sier at det
1063 nettopp er den oppsamlede fordelen i det japanske mangamarkedet som
1064 forklarer denne reduksjonen.  Jussprofessor Salil Mehra ved Temple
1065 University hypnotiserer for eksempel med at manga-markedet aksepterer disse
1066 teoretiske bruddene fordi de får mangamarkedet til å bli rikere og mer
1067 produktivt.  Alle ville få det verre hvis doujinshi ble bannlyst, så loven
1068 bannlyser ikke doujinshi.<sup>[<a name="id2821263" href="#ftn.id2821263" class="footnote">24</a>]</sup>
1069 </p><p>
1070 Problemet med denne historien, derimot, og som Mehra helt klart erkjenner,
1071 er at mekanismen som produserer denne "hold hendene borte"-responsen ikke er
1072 forstått.  Det kan godt være at markedet som helhet gjør det bedre hvis
1073 doujinshi tillates i stedet for å bannlyse den, men det forklarer likevel
1074 ikke hvorfor individuelle opphavsrettsinnehavere ikke saksøker.  Hvis loven
1075 ikke har et generelt unntak for doujinshi, og det finnes faktisk noen
1076 tilfeller der individuelle manga-kunstnere har saksøkt doujinshi-kunstnere,
1077 hvorfor er det ikke et mer generelt mønster for å blokkere denne "frie
1078 takingen" hos doujinshi-kulturen?
1079 </p><p>
1080 Jeg var fire nydelige måneder i Japan, og jeg stilte dette spørsmål så ofte
1081 som jeg kunne.  Kanskje det beste svaret til slutt kom fra en venn i et
1082 større japansk advokatfirma. "Vi har ikke nok advokater", fortalte han meg
1083 en ettermiddag.  Det er "bare ikke nok ressurser til å tiltale tilfeller som
1084 dette".
1085 </p><p>
1086
1087 Dette er et tema vi kommer tilbake til: at lovens regulering både er en
1088 funksjon av ordene i bøkene, og kostnadene med å få disse ordene til å ha
1089 effekt.  Akkurat nå er det endel åpenbare spørsmål som presser seg frem:
1090 Ville Japan gjøre det bedre med flere advokater? Ville manga være rikere
1091 hvis doujinshi-kunstnere ble regelmessig rettsforfulgt?  Ville Japan vinne
1092 noe viktig hvis de kunne stoppe praksisen med deling uten kompensasjon?
1093 Skader piratvirksomhet ofrene for piratvirksomheten, eller hjelper den dem?
1094 Ville advokaters kamp mot denne piratvirksomheten hjelpe deres klienter,
1095 eller skade dem? La oss ta et øyeblikks pause.
1096 </p><p>
1097 Hvis du er som meg et tiår tilbake, eller som folk flest når de først
1098 begynner å tenke på disse temaene, da bør du omtrent nå være rådvill om noe
1099 du ikke hadde tenkt igjennom før.
1100 </p><p>
1101 Vi lever i en verden som feirer "eiendom".  Jeg er en av de som feierer.
1102 Jeg tror på verdien av eiendom generelt, og jeg tror også på verdien av den
1103 sære formen for eiendom som advokater kaller "immateriell
1104 eiendom".<sup>[<a name="id2821357" href="#ftn.id2821357" class="footnote">25</a>]</sup> Et stort og variert samfunn
1105 kan ikke overleve uten eiendom, og et moderne samfunn kan ikke blomstre uten
1106 immaterielle eierrettigheter.
1107 </p><p>
1108 Men det tar bare noen sekunders refleksjon for å innse at det er masse av
1109 verdi der ute som "eiendom" ikke dekker.  Jeg mener ikke "kjærlighet kan
1110 ikke kjøpes med penger" men heller, at en verdi som ganske enkelt er del av
1111 produksjonsprosessen, både for kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell produksjon.
1112 Hvis Disneys animatører hadde stjålet et sett med blyanter for å tegne
1113 Steamboat Willie, vi ville ikke nølt med å dømme det som galt&#8212;selv om
1114 det er trivielt og selv om det ikke blir oppdaget.  Men det var intet galt,
1115 i hvert fall slik loven var da, med at Disney tok fra Buster Keaton eller
1116 fra Grimm-brødrene.  Det var intet galt med å ta fra Keaton, fordi Disneys
1117 bruk ville blitt ansett som "rimelig".  Det var intet galt med å ta fra
1118 brødrene Grimm fordi deres verker var allemannseie.
1119 </p><p>
1120
1121 Dermed, selv om de tingene som Disney tok&#8212;eller mer generelt, tingene
1122 som blir tatt av enhver som utøver Walt Disney-kreativitet&#8212;er
1123 verdifulle, så anser ikke vår tradisjon det som galt å ta disse tingene.
1124 Noen ting forblir frie til å bli tatt i en fri kultur og denne friheten er
1125 bra.
1126 </p><p>
1127 Det er det samme med doujinshi-kulturen.  Hvis en doujinshi-kunstner brøt
1128 seg inn på kontoret til en forlegger, og stakk av med tusen kopier av hans
1129 siste verk&#8212;eller bare en kopi&#8212;uten å betale, så ville vi uten å
1130 nøle si at kunstneren har gjort noe galt.  I tillegg til å ha trengt seg inn
1131 på andres eiendom, ville han ha stjålet noe av verdi. Loven forbyr stjeling
1132 i enhver form, uansett hvor stort eller lite som blir tatt.
1133 </p><p>
1134 Likevel er det en åpenbar motvilje, selv blant japanske advokater, for å si
1135 at etterapende tegneseriekunstnere "stjeler".  Denne formen for Walt
1136 Disney-kreativitet anses som rimelig og riktig, selv om spesielt advokater
1137 synes det er vanskelig å forklare hvorfor.
1138 </p><p>
1139 Det er det same med tusen eksempler som dukker opp over alt med en gang en
1140 begynner å se etter dem.  Forskerne bygger på arbeidet til andre forskere
1141 uten å spørre eller betale for privilegiet. ("Unnskyld meg, professor
1142 Einstein, men kan jeg få tillatelse til å bruke din relativitetsteori til å
1143 vise at du tok feil om kvantefysikk?") Teatertropper viser frem
1144 bearbeidelser av verkene til Shakespeare uten å sikre seg noen tillatelser.
1145 (Er det <span class="emphasis"><em>noen</em></span> som tror at Shakespeare ville vært mer
1146 spredt i vår kultur om det var et sentralt rettighetsklareringskontor for
1147 Shakespeare som alle som laget Shakespeare-produksjoner måtte appellere til
1148 først?)  Og Hollywood går igjennom sykluser med en bestemt type filmer: fem
1149 astroidefilmer i slutten av 1990-tallet, to vulkankatastrofefilmer i 1997.
1150 </p><p>
1151
1152 Skapere her og overalt har alltid og til alle tider bygd på kreativiteten
1153 som eksisterte før og som omringer dem nå.  Denne byggingen er alltid og
1154 overalt i det minste delvis gjort uten tillatelse og uten å kompensere den
1155 opprinnelige skaperen.  Intet samfunn, fritt eller kontrollert, har noen
1156 gang krevd at enhver bruk skulle bli betalt for eller at tillatelse for Walt
1157 Disney-kreativitet alltid måtte skaffes.  Istedet har ethvert samfunn latt
1158 en bestemt bit av sin kultur være fritt tilgjengelig for alle å
1159 ta&#8212;frie samfunn muligens i større grad enn ufrie, men en viss grad i
1160 alle samfunn.
1161
1162 </p><p>
1163 Det vanskelige spørsmålet er derfor ikke <span class="emphasis"><em>om</em></span> en kultur
1164 er fri.  Alle kulturer er frie til en viss grad. Det vanskelige spørsmålet
1165 er i stedet "<span class="emphasis"><em>hvor</em></span> fri er denne kulturen er?" Hvor mye
1166 og hvor bredt, er kulturen fritt tilgjengelig for andre å ta, og bygge på?
1167 Er den friheten begrenset til partimedlemmer?  Til medlemmer av
1168 kongefamilien?  Til de ti største selskapene på New York-børsen?  Eller er
1169 at frihet bredt tilgjengelig? Til kunstnere generelt, uansett om de er
1170 tilknyttet til nasjonalmuseet eller ikke?  Til musikere generelt, uansett om
1171 de er hvite eller ikke? Til filmskapere generelt, uansett om de er
1172 tilknyttet et studio eller ikke?
1173 </p><p>
1174 Frie kulturer er kulturer som etterlater mye åpent for andre å bygge på.
1175 Ufrie, eller tillatelse-kulturer etterlater mye mindre.  Vår var en fri
1176 kultur. Den er på tur til å bli mindre fri.
1177 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2820657" href="#id2820657" class="para">19</a>] </sup>
1178
1179
1180 Leonard Maltin, <em class="citetitle">Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1181 Cartoons</em> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&#8211;35.
1182 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2820750" href="#id2820750" class="para">20</a>] </sup>
1183
1184
1185 Jeg er takknemlig overfor David Gerstein og hans nøyaktige historie,
1186 beskrevet på <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #4</a>.  I
1187 følge Dave Smith ved the Disney Archives, betalte Disney for å bruke
1188 musikken til fem sanger i <em class="citetitle">Steamboat Willie</em>:
1189 "Steamboat Bill," "The Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara),
1190 "Joyful Hurry No. 1" (Baron), og "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). En sjette sang, "The
1191 Turkey in the Straw," var allerede allemannseie.  Brev fra David Smith til
1192 Harry Surden, 10. juli 2003, tilgjenglig i arkivet til forfatteren.
1193 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2820803" href="#id2820803" class="para">21</a>] </sup>
1194
1195
1196 Han var også tilhenger av allmannseiet. Se Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse that
1197 Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5. mars 2002, fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #5</a>.
1198 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2820945" href="#id2820945" class="para">22</a>] </sup>
1199
1200
1201 Inntil 1976 ga opphavsrettsloven en forfatter to mulige verneperioder: en
1202 initiell periode, og en fornyingsperiode.  Jeg har beregnet
1203 "gjennomsnittlig" vernetid ved å finne vektet gjennomsnitt av de totale
1204 registreringer for et gitt år, og andelen fornyinger.  Hvis 100
1205 opphavsretter ble registrert i år 1, bare 15 av dem ble fornyet, og
1206 fornyingsvernetiden er 28 år, så er gjennomsnittlig vernetid 32,2
1207 år. Fornyingsdata og andre relevante data ligger på nettsidene tilknyttet
1208 denne boka, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
1209 #6</a>.
1210 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821114" href="#id2821114" class="para">23</a>] </sup>
1211
1212
1213 For en utmerket historie, se Scott McCloud, <em class="citetitle">Reinventing
1214 Comics</em> (New York: Perennial, 2000).
1215 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821263" href="#id2821263" class="para">24</a>] </sup>
1216
1217
1218 Se Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All
1219 the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" <em class="citetitle">Rutgers Law
1220 Review</em> 55 (2002): 155, 182. "det kan være en kollektiv økonomisk
1221 rasjonalitet som får manga- og anime-kunstnere til ikke å saksøke for
1222 opphavsrettsbrudd. Én hypotese er at alle manga-kunstnere kan være bedre
1223 stilt hvis de setter sin individuelle egeninteresse til side og bestemmer
1224 seg for ikke å forfølge sine juridiske rettigheter. Dette er essensielt en
1225 løsning på fangens dilemma."
1226 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821357" href="#id2821357" class="para">25</a>] </sup>
1227
1228 Begrepet <em class="citetitle">immateriell eiendom</em> er av relativ ny
1229 opprinnelse. Se See Siva Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
1230 Copywrongs</em>, 11 (New York: New York University Press, 2001). Se
1231 også Lawrence Lessig, <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em> (New York:
1232 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. Begrepet presist beskriver et sett med
1233 "eiendoms"-rettigheter&#8212;opphavsretter, patenter, varemerker og
1234 forretningshemmeligheter&#8212;men egenskapene til disse rettighetene er
1235 svært forskjellige.<a class="indexterm" name="id2821375"></a>
1236 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 3. Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="mere-copyists"></a>Kapittel 3. Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxphotography"></a><p>
1237 I 1839 fant Louis Daguerre opp den første praktiske teknologien for å
1238 produsere det vi ville kalle "fotografier".  Rimelig nok ble de kalt
1239 "daguerreotyper".  Prosessen var komplisert og kostbar, og feltet var dermed
1240 begrenset til profesjonelle og noen få ivrige og velstående amatører.  (Det
1241 var til og med en amerikansk Daguerre-forening som hjalp til med å regulere
1242 industrien, slik alle slike foreninger gjør, ved å holde konkurransen ned
1243 slik at prisene var høye.)  <a class="indexterm" name="id2821602"></a>
1244 </p><p>
1245 Men til tross for høye priser var etterspørselen etter daguerreotyper
1246 sterk.  Dette inspirerte oppfinnere til å finne enklere og billigere måter å
1247 lage "automatiske bilder".  William Talbot oppdaget snart en prosess for å
1248 lage "negativer".  Men da negativene var av glass, og måtte holdes fuktige,
1249 forble prosessen kostbar og tung.  På 1870-tallet ble tørrplater utviklet,
1250 noe som gjorde det enklere å skille det å ta et bilde fra å fremkalle det.
1251 Det var fortsatt plater av glass, og dermed var det fortsatt ikke en prosess
1252 som var innenfor rekkevidden til de fleste amatører. <a class="indexterm" name="id2821623"></a>
1253 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxeastmangeorge"></a><p>
1254
1255 Den teknologiske endringen som gjorde masse-fotografering mulig skjedde ikke
1256 før i 1888, og det var takket være en eneste mann. George Eastman, selv en
1257 amatørfotograf, var frustrert over den plate-baserte fotografi-teknologien.
1258 I et lysglimt av innsikt (for å si det slik), forsto Eastman at hvis filmen
1259 kunne gjøres bøyelig, så kunne den holdes på en enkel rull.  Denne rullen
1260 kunne så sendes til en fremkaller, og senke kostnadene til fotografering
1261 vesentlig.  Ved å redusere kostnadene, forventet Eastman at han dramatisk
1262 kunne utvide andelen fotografer.
1263 </p><p>
1264 Eastman utviklet bøyelig, emulsjons-belagt papirfilm og plasserte ruller med
1265 dette i små, enkle kameraer: Kodaken.  Enheten ble markedsfør med grunnlag
1266 dens enkelhet. "Du trykker på knappen og vi fikser resten."<sup>[<a name="id2821670" href="#ftn.id2821670" class="footnote">26</a>]</sup> Som han beskrev det i <em class="citetitle">The Kodak
1267 Primer</em>: <a class="indexterm" name="id2821684"></a>
1268 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1269 Prinsippet til Kodak-systemet er skillet mellom arbeidet som enhver kan
1270 utføre når en tar fotografier, fra arbeidet som kun en ekspert kan
1271 gjøre. &#8230; Vi utstyrte alle, menn, kvinner og barn, som hadde
1272 tilstrekkelig intelligens til å peke en boks i riktig retning og trykke på
1273 en knapp, med et instrument som helt fjernet fra praksisen med å fotografere
1274 nødvendigheten av uvanlig utstyr eller for den del, noe som helst spesiell
1275 kunnskap om kunstarten.  Det kan tas i bruk uten forutgående studier, uten
1276 et mørkerom og uten kjemikalier.<sup>[<a name="id2819470" href="#ftn.id2819470" class="footnote">27</a>]</sup>
1277 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1278 For $25 kunne alle ta bilder.  Det var allerede film i kameraet, og når det
1279 var brukt ble kameraet returnert til en Eastman-fabrikk hvor filmen ble
1280 fremkalt.  Etter hvert, naturligvis, ble både kostnaden til kameraet og hvor
1281 enkelt et var å bruke forbedret.  Film på rull ble dermed grunnlaget for en
1282 eksplosiv vekst i fotografering blant folket. Eastmans kamera ble lagt ut
1283 for salg i 1888, og et år senere trykket Kodak mer enn seks tusen negativer
1284 om dagen.  Fra 1888 til 1909, mens produksjonen i industrien vokste med 4,7
1285 prosent, økte salget av fotografisk utstyr og materiale med 11
1286 prosent.<sup>[<a name="id2821749" href="#ftn.id2821749" class="footnote">28</a>]</sup> Salget til Eastman Kodak i
1287 samme periode opplevde en årlig vekst på over 17 prosent.<sup>[<a name="id2821758" href="#ftn.id2821758" class="footnote">29</a>]</sup>
1288 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2821768"></a><p>
1289
1290
1291 Den virkelige betydningen av oppfinnelsen til Eastman, var derimot ikke
1292 økonomisk.  Den var sosial.  Profesjonell fotografering ga individer et
1293 glimt av steder de ellers aldri ville se. Amatørfotografering ga dem
1294 muligheten til å arkivere deres liv på en måte som de aldri hadde vært i
1295 stand til tidligere.  Som forfatter Brian Coe skriver, "For første gang
1296 tilbød fotoalbumet mannen i gata et permanent arkiv over hans familie og
1297 dens aktiviteter. &#8230; For første gang i historien fantes det en
1298 autentisk visuell oppføring av utseende og aktivitet til vanlige mennesker
1299 laget uten [skrivefør] tolkning eller forutinntatthet."<sup>[<a name="id2821700" href="#ftn.id2821700" class="footnote">30</a>]</sup>
1300 </p><p>
1301 På denne måten var Kodak-kameraet og film uttrykksteknologier. Blyanten og
1302 malepenselen var selvfølgelig også en uttrykksteknologi. Men det tok årevis
1303 med trening før de kunne bli brukt nyttig og effektiv av amatører.  Med
1304 Kodaken var uttrykk mulig mye raskere og enklere.  Barrièren for å uttrykke
1305 seg var senket.  Snobber ville fnyse over "kvaliteten", profesjonelle ville
1306 avvise den som irrelevant.  Men se et barn studere hvordan best velge
1307 bildemotiv og du får følelsen av hva slags kreativitetserfaring som Kodaken
1308 muliggjorde.  Demokratiske verktøy ga vanlige folk en måte å uttrykke dem
1309 selv på enklere enn noe annet verktøy kunne ha gjort før.
1310 </p><p>
1311 Hva krevdes for at denne teknologien skulle blomstre.  Eastmans genialitet
1312 var åpenbart en viktig del.  Men den juridiske miljøet som Eastmans
1313 oppfinnelse vokste i var også viktig.  For tidlig i historien til
1314 fotografering, var det en rekke av rettsavgjørelser som godt kunne ha endret
1315 kursen til fotograferingen betydelig.  Domstoler ble spurt om fotografen,
1316 amatør eller profesjonell, måtte ha ha tillatelse før han kunne fange og
1317 trykke hvilket som helst bilde han ønsket.  Svaret var nei.<sup>[<a name="id2821850" href="#ftn.id2821850" class="footnote">31</a>]</sup>
1318 </p><p>
1319
1320 Argumentene til fordel for å kreve tillatelser vil høres overraskende kjent
1321 ut.  Fotografen "tok" noe fra personen eller bygningen som ble
1322 fotografert&#8212;røvet til seg noe av verdi.  Noen trodde til og med at han
1323 tok målets sjel.  På samme måte som Disney ikke var fri til å ta blyantene
1324 som hans animatører brukte til å tegne Mikke, så skulle heller ikke disse
1325 fotografene være fri til å ta bilder som de fant verdi i.
1326 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2821882"></a><p>
1327 På den andre siden var et argument som også bør bør være kjent. Joda, det
1328 var kanskje noe av verdi som ble brukt.  Men borgerne burde ha rett til å
1329 fange i hvert fall de bildene som var tatt av offentlig område.  (Louis
1330 Brandeis, som senere ble høyesterettsjustitiarus, mente regelen skulle være
1331 annerledes for bilder tatt av private områder.<sup>[<a name="id2821916" href="#ftn.id2821916" class="footnote">32</a>]</sup>) Det kan være at dette betyr at fotografen får noe for ingenting.
1332 På samme måte som Disney kunne hente inspirasjon fra <em class="citetitle">Steamboat
1333 Bill, Jr</em>. eller Grimm-brødrene, så burde fotografene stå fritt
1334 til å fange et bilde uten å kompensere kilden.
1335 </p><p>
1336 Heldigvis for Mr. Eastman, og for fotografering generelt, gikk disse
1337 tidligere avgjørelsene i favør av piratene.  Generelt ble det ikke nødvendig
1338 å sikre seg tillatelse før et bilde kunne tas og deles med andre.  I stedet
1339 var det antatt at tillatelse var gitt.  Frihet var utgangspunktet.  (Loven
1340 ga etter en stund et unntak for berømte personer: kommersielle fotografer
1341 som tok bilder av berømte personer for kommersielle formål har flere
1342 begrensninger enn resten av oss.  Men i det vanlige tilfellet, kan bildet
1343 fanges uten å klarere rettighetene for a fange det.<sup>[<a name="id2821968" href="#ftn.id2821968" class="footnote">33</a>]</sup>)
1344 </p><p>
1345 Vi kan kun spekulere om hvordan fotografering ville ha utviklet seg om loven
1346 hadde slått ut den andre veien.  Hvis den hadde vært mot fotografen, da
1347 ville fotografen måttet dokumentere at tillatelse var på plass.  Kanskje
1348 Eastman Kodak også måtte ha dokumentert at tillatelse var gitt, før de
1349 utviklet filmen som bildene ble fanget på.  Tross alt, hvis tillatelse ikke
1350 var gitt, da ville Eastman Kodak ha nytt fordeler fra "tyveriet" begått av
1351 fotografer.  På samme måte som Napster nøt fordeler fra opphavsrettsbrudd
1352 utført av Napster-brukere, så ville Kodak nytt fordeler fra
1353 "bilde-rettighets"-brudd til deres fotografer.  Vi kan forestille oss at
1354 loven da krevede at en form for tillatelse ble vist frem før et selskap
1355 fremkalte bildene.  Vi kan forestille oss et system bli utviklet for å legge
1356 frem slike tillatelser.
1357 </p><p>
1358
1359
1360
1361 Men selv om vi kan tenke oss dette godkjenningssystemet, så vil det være
1362 svært vanskelig å se hvordan fotografering skulle ha blomstret slik det
1363 gjorde hvis det var bygd inn krav om godkjenning i reglene som styrte det.
1364 Fotografering ville eksistert.  Det ville ha økt sin betydning over tid.
1365 Profesjonelle ville ha fortsatt å bruke teknologien slik de
1366 gjorde&#8212;siden profesjonelle enklere kunne håndtert byrdene pålagt dem
1367 av godkjenningssystemet.  Men spredningen av fotografering til vanlige folk
1368 villa aldri ha skjedd.  Veksten det skapte kunne aldri ha skjedd.  Og det
1369 ville uten tvil aldri vært realisert en slik vekst i demokratisk
1370 uttrykksteknologi.  Hvis du kjører gjennom området Presidio i San Francisco,
1371 kan det hende du ser to gusjegule skolebusser overmalt med fargefulle og
1372 iøynefallende bilder, og logoen "Just Think!" i stedet for navnet på en
1373 skole. Men det er lite som er "bare" mentalt i prosjektene som disse bussene
1374 muliggjør.  Disse bussene er fylt med teknologi som lærer unger å fikle med
1375 film.  Ikke filmen til Eastman.  Ikke en gang filmen i din videospiller.  I
1376 stedet er det snakk om "filmen" til digitale kamera.  Just Think! er et
1377 prosjekt som gjør det mulig for unger å lage filmer, som en måte å forstå og
1378 kritisere den filmede kulturen som de finner over alt rundt seg.  Hvert år
1379 besøker disse bussene mer enn tredve skoler og gir mellom tre hundre og fire
1380 hundre barn muligheten til å lære noe om media ved å gjøre noe med media.
1381 Ved å gjøre, så tenker de.  Ved å fikle, så lærer de.
1382 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2822030"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2822040"></a><p>
1383 Disse bussene er ikke billige, men teknologien de har med seg blir billigere
1384 og billigere.  Kostnaden til et høykvalitets digitalt videosystem har falt
1385 dramatisk.  Som en analytiker omtalte det, "for fem år siden kostet et godt
1386 sanntids redigerinssystem for digital video $25 000.  I dag kan du få
1387 profesjonell kvalitet for $595."<sup>[<a name="id2822119" href="#ftn.id2822119" class="footnote">34</a>]</sup> Disse
1388 bussene er fylt med teknologi som ville kostet hundre-tusenvis av dollar for
1389 bare ti år siden.  Og det er nå mulig å forestille seg ikke bare slike
1390 busser, men klasserom rundt om i landet hvor unger kan lære mer og mer av
1391 det lærerne kaller "medie-leseferdighet" eller "mediekompetanse".
1392 </p><p>
1393
1394 "Media-leseferdighet," eller "mediekompetanse" som administrerende direktør
1395 Dave Yanofsky i Just Think!, sier det, "er evnen til &#8230; å forstå,
1396 analysere og dekonstruere mediebilder. Dets mål er å gjøre [unger] i stand
1397 til å lese hvordan mediene fungerer, hvordan de er konstruert, hvordan de
1398 blir levert, og hvordan folk bruker dem". <a class="indexterm" name="id2821789"></a>
1399 </p><p>
1400 Dette kan virke som en litt rar måte å tenke på "leseferdighet". For de
1401 fleste handler leseferdighet å kunne lese og skrive.  Faulkner, Hemingway og
1402 å legge merke til delte infinitiver er de tingene som "leseferdige" folk
1403 kjenner til.
1404 </p><p>
1405 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of television
1406 commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000 commercials
1407 generally,<sup>[<a name="id2822186" href="#ftn.id2822186" class="footnote">35</a>]</sup> it is increasingly important
1408 to understand the "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the
1409 written word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to
1410 write by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1411 constructing lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1412 </p><p>
1413 Et voksende felt av akademikere og aktivister ser denne formen for
1414 leseferdighet som avgjørende for den neste generasjonen av kultur. For selv
1415 om de som har skrevet forstår hvor vanskelig det er å skrive&#8212;hvor
1416 vanskelig det er å bestemme rekkefølge i historien, å holde på
1417 oppmerksomheten hos leseren, å forme språket slik at det er
1418 forståelig&#8212;så har få av oss en reell følelse av hvor vanskelig medier
1419 er. Eller mer fundamentalt, de færreste av av oss har en følelse for
1420 hvordan media fungerer, hvordan det holder et publikum eller leder leseren
1421 gjennom historien, hvordan det utløser følelser eller bygger opp spenningen.
1422 </p><p>
1423 Det tok filmkusten en generasjon før den kunne gjøre disse tingene bra.  Men
1424 selv da, så var kunnskapen i filmingen, ikke i å skrive om filmen.
1425 Ferdigheten kom fra erfaring med å lage en film, ikke fra å lese en bok om
1426 den.  En lærer å skrive ved å skrive, og deretter reflektere over det en har
1427 skrevet.  En lærer å skrive med bilder ved å lage dem, og deretter
1428 reflektere over det en har laget.
1429 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2822213"></a><p>
1430 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film, as
1431 Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1432 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the USC School
1433 of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was about "the placement
1434 of objects, color, &#8230; rhythm, pacing, and texture."<sup>[<a name="id2822152" href="#ftn.id2822152" class="footnote">36</a>]</sup> But as computers open up an interactive space where
1435 a story is "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1436 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1437 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.  But when he
1438 tried to design a computer game based on one of his works, it was a new
1439 craft he had to learn. How to lead people through a game without their
1440 feeling they have been led was not obvious, even to a wildly successful
1441 author.<sup>[<a name="id2822294" href="#ftn.id2822294" class="footnote">37</a>]</sup>
1442 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2822315"></a><p>
1443 Akkurat denne ferdigheten er håndverket en lærer til de som lager
1444 filmer. Som Daley skriver, "folk er svært overrasket over hvordan de blir
1445 ledet gjennom en film.  Den er perfekt konstruert for å hindre deg fra å se
1446 det, så du aner det ikke.  Hvis en som lager filmer lykkes så vet du ikke at
1447 du har vært ledet." Hvis du vet at du ble ledet igjennom en film, så har
1448 filmen feilet.
1449 </p><p>
1450 Likevel er innsatsen for å utvide leseferdigheten&#8212;til en som går ut
1451 over tekst til å ta med lyd og visuelle elementer&#8212;handler ikke om å
1452 lage bedre filmregisører.  Målet er ikke å forbedre filmyrket i det hele
1453 tatt.  I stedet, som Daley forklarer,
1454 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1455 Fra mitt perspektiv er antagelig det viktigste digitale skillet ikke om en
1456 har tilgang til en boks eller ikke.  Det er evnen til å ha kontroll over
1457 språket som boksen bruker.  I motsatt fall er det bare noen få som kan
1458 skrive i dette språket, og alle oss andre er redusert til å ikke kunne
1459 skrive.
1460 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1461 "Skrivebeskyttet." Passive mottakerne av kultur produsert andre
1462 steder. Sofapoteter. Forbrukere. Dette er medieverden fra det tjuende
1463 århundre.
1464 </p><p>
1465 Det tjueførste århundret kan bli annerledes.  Dette er et kritisk punkt: Det
1466 kan bli både lesing og skriving.  Eller i det minste lesing og bedre
1467 forståelse for håndverket å skrive.  Eller det beste, lesing og forstå
1468 verktøyene som gir skriving mulighet til å veilede eller villede.  Målet med
1469 enhver leseferdighet, og denne leseferdigheten spesielt, er å "gi folket
1470 myndighet til å velge det språket som passer for det de trenger å lage eller
1471 uttrykke".<sup>[<a name="id2822386" href="#ftn.id2822386" class="footnote">38</a>]</sup> Det gir studenter mulighet
1472 "til å kommunisere i språket til det tjueførste århundret".<sup>[<a name="id2822406" href="#ftn.id2822406" class="footnote">39</a>]</sup>
1473 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2822413"></a><p>
1474 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1475 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1476 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the Institute for
1477 Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe one particularly
1478 poignant example of a project they ran in a high school.  The high school
1479 was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles school. In all the traditional
1480 measures of success, this school was a failure. But Daley and Barish ran a
1481 program that gave kids an opportunity to use film to express meaning about
1482 something the students know something about&#8212;gun violence.
1483 </p><p>
1484 Klassen møttes fredag ettermiddag, og skapte et relativt nytt problem for
1485 skolen.  Mens utfordringen i de fleste klasser er å få ungene til å dukke
1486 opp, var utfordringen for denne klassen å holde dem unna. "Ungene dukket opp
1487 6:00, og dro igjen 05:00 på natta", sa Barish. De jobbet hardere enn i noen
1488 annen klasse for å gjøre det utdanning burde handle om&#8212;å lære hvordan
1489 de skulle uttrykke seg.
1490 </p><p>
1491 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple tools
1492 to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said this class
1493 produced a series of projects that showed something about gun violence that
1494 few would otherwise understand. This was an issue close to the lives of
1495 these students. The project "gave them a tool and empowered them to be able
1496 to both understand it and talk about it," Barish explained. That tool
1497 succeeded in creating expression&#8212;far more successfully and powerfully
1498 than could have been created using only text. "If you had said to these
1499 students, `you have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands
1500 up and gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
1501 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students can do
1502 well. Yet neither is text a form in which <span class="emphasis"><em>these</em></span> ideas
1503 can be expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its
1504 connection to this form of expression.
1505 </p><p>
1506
1507
1508
1509 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part, of
1510 course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education, Daley
1511 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing meaning." To say
1512 that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing is only about
1513 teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&#8212;and increasingly, not the
1514 most powerful part&#8212;of constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the
1515 most moving part of our interview,
1516 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
1517 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing meaning. If all
1518 you give them is text, they're not going to do it.  Because they can't. You
1519 know, you've got Johnny who can look at a video, he can play a video game,
1520 he can do graffiti all over your walls, he can take your car apart, and he
1521 can do all sorts of other things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny
1522 comes to school and you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do
1523 matters." Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
1524 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
1525 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you can
1526 do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think reflects
1527 that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw for me
1528 something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video camera and
1529 &#8230; saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and make a little
1530 movie." But instead, really help you take these elements that you
1531 understand, that are your language, and construct meaning about the
1532 topic. &#8230;
1533 </p><p>
1534 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of course, is eventually,
1535 as it has happened in all these classes, they bump up against the fact, "I
1536 need to explain this and I really need to write something." And as one of
1537 the teachers told Stephanie, they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8
1538 times, till they got it right.
1539 </p><p>
1540
1541 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They needed to say
1542 something, as opposed to just jumping through your hoops. They actually
1543 needed to use a language that they didn't speak very well. But they had come
1544 to understand that they had a lot of power with this language."
1545 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1546 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
1547 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the world
1548 shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for that week,
1549 and for weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold
1550 the story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a retelling,
1551 because we had seen the events that were described. The genius of this awful
1552 act of terrorism was that the delayed second attack was perfectly timed to
1553 assure that the whole world would be watching.
1554 </p><p>
1555 Disse gjenfortellingene ga en økende familiær følelse.  Det var musikk
1556 spesiallaget for mellom-innslagene, og avansert grafikk som blinket tvers
1557 over skjermen.  Det var en formel for intervjuer.  Det var "balanse" og
1558 seriøsitet.  Dette var nyheter koreaografert slik vi i stadig større grad
1559 forventer det, "nyheter som underholdning", selv om underholdningen er en
1560 tragedie.
1561 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2822552"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2822558"></a><p>
1562 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September 11,"
1563 those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different production as
1564 well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same events. Yet these
1565 Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some people constructed photo
1566 pages that captured images from around the world and presented them as slide
1567 shows with text. Some offered open letters. There were sound
1568 recordings. There was anger and frustration.  There were attempts to provide
1569 context. There was, in short, an extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in
1570 the sense Mike Godwin uses the term in his book <em class="citetitle">Cyber
1571 Rights</em>, around a news event that had captured the attention of
1572 the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there was also the Internet.
1573 </p><p>
1574
1575 Det er ikke så enkelt som at jeg ønsker å lovprise internettet&#8212;selv om
1576 jeg mener at folkene som støtter denne formen for tale bør lovprises.  Jeg
1577 ønsker i stedet å peke på viktigheten av denne formen for tale.  For på
1578 samme måte som en Kodak, gjør internettet folk i stand til å fange bilder.
1579 Og på samme måte som med en film laget av en av studentene på "Just
1580 Think!"-bussen, kan visuelle bilder bli blandet med lyd og tekst.
1581 </p><p>
1582 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet allows
1583 these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of people,
1584 practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
1585 tradition&#8212;not just that culture can be captured mechanically, and
1586 obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but that this
1587 mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely spread
1588 practically instantaneously.
1589 </p><p>
1590 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the same
1591 time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was just beginning
1592 to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or blog. The blog is a kind
1593 of public diary, and within some cultures, such as in Japan, it functions
1594 very much like a diary. In those cultures, it records private facts in a
1595 public way&#8212;it's a kind of electronic <em class="citetitle">Jerry
1596 Springer</em>, available anywhere in the world.
1597 </p><p>
1598 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different character.
1599 There are some who use the space simply to talk about their private
1600 life. But there are many who use the space to engage in public
1601 discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing others who are
1602 mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about the decisions they
1603 make, offering solutions to problems we all see: blogs create the sense of a
1604 virtual public meeting, but one in which we don't all hope to be there at
1605 the same time and in which conversations are not necessarily linked. The
1606 best of the blog entries are relatively short; they point directly to words
1607 used by others, criticizing with or adding to them.  They are arguably the
1608 most important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
1609 </p><p>
1610
1611 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as it
1612 does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most difficult for
1613 those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy has atrophied.  Of
1614 course we have elections, and most of the time the courts allow those
1615 elections to count. A relatively small number of people vote in those
1616 elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally professionalized
1617 and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
1618 </p><p>
1619 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy means rule by
1620 the people, but rule means something more than mere elections. In our
1621 tradition, it also means control through reasoned discourse.  This was the
1622 idea that captured the imagination of Alexis de Tocqueville, the
1623 nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the most important account of
1624 early "Democracy in America." It wasn't popular elections that fascinated
1625 him&#8212;it was the jury, an institution that gave ordinary people the
1626 right to choose life or death for other citizens.  And most fascinating for
1627 him was that the jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would
1628 impose. They deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they
1629 tried to persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
1630 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to come to
1631 an end.<sup>[<a name="id2822607" href="#ftn.id2822607" class="footnote">40</a>]</sup>
1632 </p><p>
1633 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its place,
1634 there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some are
1635 pushing to create just such an institution.<sup>[<a name="id2822695" href="#ftn.id2822695" class="footnote">41</a>]</sup> And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
1636 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or place
1637 for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
1638 </p><p>
1639 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to occur.  We,
1640 the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a strong norm
1641 against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about politics with people
1642 you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics with people you
1643 disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated, and isolated discourse
1644 becomes more extreme.<sup>[<a name="id2822719" href="#ftn.id2822719" class="footnote">42</a>]</sup> We say what our
1645 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
1646 </p><p>
1647
1648 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
1649 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they want
1650 to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.  Technologies that
1651 enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail, increase the opportunity
1652 for communication. Blogs allow for public discourse without the public ever
1653 needing to gather in a single public place.
1654 </p><p>
1655 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
1656 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
1657 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and the
1658 left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian, but
1659 there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
1660 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
1661 </p><p>
1662 Betydningene av disse bloggene er liten nå, men ikke ubetydelig. Navnet
1663 Howard Dean har i stor grad forsvunnet fra 2004-presidentvalgkampen bortsett
1664 fra hos noen få blogger.  Men selv om antallet lesere er lavt, så har det å
1665 lese dem en effekt. <a class="indexterm" name="id2822767"></a>
1666 </p><p>
1667 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
1668 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott "misspoke"
1669 at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising Thurmond's
1670 segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this story would
1671 disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight hours. It did. But he
1672 didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The bloggers kept researching
1673 the story. Over time, more and more instances of the same "misspeaking"
1674 emerged. Finally, the story broke back into the mainstream press. In the
1675 end, Lott was forced to resign as senate majority leader.<sup>[<a name="id2822786" href="#ftn.id2822786" class="footnote">43</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2822794"></a>
1676 </p><p>
1677 Denne annerledes syklusen er mulig på grunn av at et tilsvarende kommersielt
1678 press ikke eksisterer hos blogger slik det gjør hos andre kanaler.
1679 Televisjon og aviser er kommersielle aktører.  De må arbeide for å holde på
1680 oppmerksomheten.  Hvis de mister lesere, så mister de inntekter.  Som haier,
1681 må de bevege seg videre.
1682 </p><p>
1683 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they can
1684 focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a particularly
1685 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as the
1686 number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks of
1687 stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been selected by a
1688 very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
1689 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxwinerdave"></a><p>
1690
1691 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle from
1692 the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this movement and
1693 a software author for many decades, told me, another difference is the
1694 absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you have to take the
1695 conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.  "An amateur
1696 journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the conflict of
1697 interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of get it out of
1698 the way."
1699 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2822853"></a><p>
1700 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more concentrated
1701 (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more from the public
1702 than an unconcentrated media can&#8212;as CNN admitted it did after the Iraq
1703 war because it was afraid of the consequences to its own
1704 employees.<sup>[<a name="id2822668" href="#ftn.id2822668" class="footnote">44</a>]</sup> It also needs to sustain a
1705 more coherent account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
1706 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink
1707 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
1708 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer
1709 a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
1710 told her <span class="emphasis"><em>that</em></span> they were writing "the story.")
1711 </p><p> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate&#8212;"amateur" not in
1712 the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning
1713 not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much broader range
1714 of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when
1715 hundreds from across the southwest United States turned to the Internet to
1716 retell what they had seen.<sup>[<a name="id2822888" href="#ftn.id2822888" class="footnote">45</a>]</sup> And it
1717 drives readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as
1718 Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly
1719 with our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"&#8212;with all the
1720 benefits, and costs, that might entail.
1721 </p><p>
1722
1723 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
1724 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for public
1725 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
1726 "journalism" is happy about this&#8212;some journalists have been told to
1727 curtail their blogging.<sup>[<a name="id2822918" href="#ftn.id2822918" class="footnote">46</a>]</sup> But it is clear
1728 that we are still in transition. "A lot of what we are doing now is warm-up
1729 exercises," Winer told me.  There is a lot that must mature before this
1730 space has its mature effect.  And as the inclusion of content in this space
1731 is the least infringing use of the Internet (meaning infringing on
1732 copyright), Winer said, "we will be the last thing that gets shut down."
1733 </p><p>
1734 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you don't
1735 have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper." That is
1736 true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.  As more and more
1737 citizens express what they think, and defend it in writing, that will change
1738 the way people understand public issues. It is easy to be wrong and
1739 misguided in your head. It is harder when the product of your mind can be
1740 criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare human who admits that he has
1741 been persuaded that he is wrong. But it is even rarer for a human to ignore
1742 when he has been proven wrong.  The writing of ideas, arguments, and
1743 criticism improves democracy.  Today there are probably a couple of million
1744 blogs where such writing happens. When there are ten million, there will be
1745 something extraordinary to report.
1746 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2822998"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxbrownjohnseely"></a><p>
1747 John Seely Brown er sjefsforsker ved Xerox Corporation.  Hans arbeid, i
1748 følge hans eget nettsted, er "menneskelig læring og &#8230; å skape
1749 kunnskapsøkologier for å skape &#8230; innovasjon".
1750 </p><p>
1751 Brown ser dermed på disse teknologiene for digital kreativitet litt
1752 annerledes enn fra perspektivene jeg har skissert opp så langt.  Jeg er
1753 sikker på at han blir begeistret for enhver teknologi som kan forbedre
1754 demokratiet.  Men det han virkelig blir begeistret over er hvordan disse
1755 teknologiene påvirker læring.
1756 </p><p>
1757
1758 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up," he
1759 explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower engines,
1760 automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies enable a different
1761 kind of tinkering&#8212;with abstract ideas though in concrete form. The
1762 kids at Just Think! not only think about how a commercial portrays a
1763 politician; using digital technology, they can take the commercial apart and
1764 manipulate it, tinker with it to see how it does what it does. Digital
1765 technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or "free collage," as Brown calls
1766 it. Many get to add to or transform the tinkering of many others.
1767 </p><p>
1768 Det beste eksemplet i større skala så langt på denne typen fikling er fri
1769 programvare og åpen kildekode (FS/OSS).  FS/OSS er programvare der
1770 kildekoden deles ut.  Alle kan laste ned teknologien som får et
1771 FS/OSS-program til å fungere.  Og enhver som har lyst til å lære hvordan en
1772 bestemt bit av FS/OSS-teknologi fungerer kan fikle med koden.
1773 </p><p>
1774 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform," as
1775 Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you &#8230; unleash a
1776 free collage on the community, so that other people can start looking at
1777 your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can improve it."
1778 Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major
1779 apprenticeship platform."
1780 </p><p>
1781 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.  They
1782 are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the abstract, and
1783 this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're doing in your
1784 garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. &#8230; You are
1785 tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the more you
1786 improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
1787 </p><p>
1788 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
1789 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts it,
1790 "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
1791 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
1792 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
1793 text. "The Web &#8230; says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if you
1794 are visual, if you are interested in film &#8230; [then] there is a lot you
1795 can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor these
1796 multiple forms of intelligence."
1797 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2823087"></a><p>
1798
1799 Brown snakker om hva Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish Og Just Think! lærer
1800 bort: at denne fiklingen med kultur lærer såvel som den skaper. Den utvikler
1801 talenter litt anderledes, og den bygger en annen type gjenkjenning.
1802 </p><p>
1803 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.  Indeed, as
1804 we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is increasingly
1805 highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father had the right to
1806 tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that your child will have
1807 the right to tinker with the images she finds all around.  The law and,
1808 increasingly, technology interfere with a freedom that technology, and
1809 curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
1810 </p><p>
1811 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
1812 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>)  has developed a
1813 powerful argument in favor of the "right to tinker" as it applies to
1814 computer science and to knowledge in general.<sup>[<a name="id2823157" href="#ftn.id2823157" class="footnote">47</a>]</sup> But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It
1815 is about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
1816 </p><p>
1817 "Dette er uviklingen av utdanning i det tjueførste århundret er på vei",
1818 forklarer Brown.  Vi må "forstå hvordan unger som vokser opp digitalt tenker
1819 og ønsker å lære".
1820 </p><p>
1821 "Likevel", fortsatte Brown, og som balansen i denne boken vil føre bevis
1822 for, "bygger vi et juridisk system som fullstendig undertrykker den
1823 naturlige tendensen i dagens digitale unger. &#8230; We bygger en
1824 arkitektur som frigjør 60 prosent av hjernen [og] et juridisk system som
1825 stenger ned den delen av hjernen".
1826 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2823185"></a><p>
1827 Vi bygger en teknologi som tar magien til Kodak, mikser inn bevegelige
1828 bilder og lyd, og legger inn plass for kommentarer og en mulighet til å spre
1829 denne kreativiteten over alt.  Men vi bygger loven for å stenge ned denne
1830 teknologien.
1831 </p><p>
1832 "Ikke måten å drive en kultur på", sa Brewster Kahle, som vi møtte i
1833 kapittel <a class="xref" href="#collectors" title="Kapittel 10. Kapittel ni: Samlere">10</a>,
1834 kommenterte til meg i et sjeldent øyeblikk av nedstemthet.
1835 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821670" href="#id2821670" class="para">26</a>] </sup>
1836
1837
1838 Reese V. Jenkins, <em class="citetitle">Images and Enterprise</em> (Baltimore:
1839 Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1840 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2819470" href="#id2819470" class="para">27</a>] </sup>
1841
1842 Brian Coe, <em class="citetitle">The Birth of Photography</em> (New York:
1843 Taplinger Publishing, 1977), 53.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2821723"></a>
1844 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821749" href="#id2821749" class="para">28</a>] </sup>
1845
1846
1847 Jenkins, 177.
1848 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821758" href="#id2821758" class="para">29</a>] </sup>
1849
1850
1851 Basert på et diagram i Jenkins, s. 178.
1852 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821700" href="#id2821700" class="para">30</a>] </sup>
1853
1854
1855 Coe, 58.
1856 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821850" href="#id2821850" class="para">31</a>] </sup>
1857
1858
1859 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <em class="citetitle">Pavesich</em>
1860 v. <em class="citetitle">N.E. Life Ins. Co</em>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1861 <em class="citetitle">Foster-Milburn Co</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Chinn</em>,
1862 123090 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909); <em class="citetitle">Corliss</em>
1863 v. <em class="citetitle">Walker</em>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.  Dist. Ct. 1894).
1864 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821916" href="#id2821916" class="para">32</a>] </sup>
1865
1866 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1867 <em class="citetitle">Harvard Law Review</em> 4 (1890): 193.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2821924"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2821933"></a>
1868 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2821968" href="#id2821968" class="para">33</a>] </sup>
1869
1870
1871 Se Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," <em class="citetitle">Law and
1872 Contemporary Problems</em> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser,
1873 "Privacy," <em class="citetitle">California Law Review</em> 48 (1960)
1874 398&#8211;407; <em class="citetitle">White</em> mot <em class="citetitle">Samsung
1875 Electronics America, Inc</em>., 971 F.  2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992),
1876 sert. nektet, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
1877 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822119" href="#id2822119" class="para">34</a>] </sup>
1878
1879
1880 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and Software You
1881 Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst, februar 2002,
1882 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #7</a>.
1883 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822186" href="#id2822186" class="para">35</a>] </sup>
1884
1885
1886 Judith Van Evra, <em class="citetitle">Television and Child Development</em>
1887 (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family
1888 and TV Study," <em class="citetitle">Denver Post</em>, 25. mai 1997, B6.
1889 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822152" href="#id2822152" class="para">36</a>] </sup>
1890
1891 Intervju med Elizabeth Daley og Stephanie Barish, 13. desember 2002.
1892 <a class="indexterm" name="id2822270"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2822278"></a>
1893 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822294" href="#id2822294" class="para">37</a>] </sup>
1894
1895
1896 Se Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4. november
1897 2000, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
1898 #8</a>; "Timeline," 22. november 2000, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #9</a>.
1899 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822386" href="#id2822386" class="para">38</a>] </sup>
1900
1901 Intervju med Daley og Barish.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2822393"></a>
1902 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822406" href="#id2822406" class="para">39</a>] </sup>
1903
1904
1905 ibid.
1906 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822607" href="#id2822607" class="para">40</a>] </sup>
1907
1908
1909 Se for eksempel Alexis de Tocqueville, <em class="citetitle">Democracy in
1910 America</em>, bk. 1, overs.  Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
1911 2000), kap. 16.
1912 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822695" href="#id2822695" class="para">41</a>] </sup>
1913
1914
1915 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," <em class="citetitle">Journal of
1916 Political Philosophy</em> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
1917 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822719" href="#id2822719" class="para">42</a>] </sup>
1918
1919
1920 Cass Sunstein, <em class="citetitle">Republic.com</em> (Princeton: Princeton
1921 University Press, 2001), 65&#8211;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
1922 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822786" href="#id2822786" class="para">43</a>] </sup>
1923
1924
1925 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New York
1926 Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
1927 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822668" href="#id2822668" class="para">44</a>] </sup>
1928
1929
1930 Telefonintervju med David Winer, 16. april 2003.
1931 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822888" href="#id2822888" class="para">45</a>] </sup>
1932
1933
1934 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of Information
1935 Online," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
1936 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
1937 Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #10</a>.
1938 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2822918" href="#id2822918" class="para">46</a>] </sup>
1939
1940 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?"
1941 <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news
1942 organizations have been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a
1943 CNN correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war
1944 on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year
1945 Steve Olafson, a <em class="citetitle">Houston Chronicle</em> reporter, was
1946 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym, that
1947 dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")  <a class="indexterm" name="id2822950"></a>
1948 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823157" href="#id2823157" class="para">47</a>] </sup>
1949
1950
1951 Se for eksempel, Edward Felten og Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
1952 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,"
1953 <em class="citetitle">Communications of the Association for Computer
1954 Machinery</em> 43 (2000): 9.
1955 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="catalogs"></a>Kapittel 4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger</h2></div></div></div><p>
1956 Høsten 2001, ble Jesse Jordan fra Oceanside, New York, innrullert som
1957 førsteårsstudent ved Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, i Troy, New York.
1958 Hans studieprogram ved RPI var informasjonsteknologi.  Selv om han ikke var
1959 en programmerer, bestemte Jesse seg i oktober å begynne å fikle med en
1960 søkemotorteknologi som var tilgjengelig på RPI-nettverket.
1961 </p><p>
1962 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.  It
1963 offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering to
1964 information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
1965 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
1966 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to imagine
1967 and then build, a generation for the network age.
1968 </p><p>
1969 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to one
1970 another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything available on the
1971 RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network is designed to
1972 enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as more intimate
1973 access to other members of the RPI community.
1974 </p><p>
1975
1976 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google brought the
1977 Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving the quality of
1978 search on the network. Specialty search engines can do this even better. The
1979 idea of "intranet" search engines, search engines that search within the
1980 network of a particular institution, is to provide users of that institution
1981 with better access to material from that institution.  Businesses do this
1982 all the time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
1983 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
1984 </p><p>
1985 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.  Microsoft, for
1986 example, has a network file system that makes it very easy for search
1987 engines tuned to that network to query the system for information about the
1988 publicly (within that network) available content.  Jesse's search engine was
1989 built to take advantage of this technology. It used Microsoft's network file
1990 system to build an index of all the files available within the RPI network.
1991 </p><p>
1992 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.  Indeed,
1993 his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had built. His
1994 single most important improvement over those engines was to fix a bug within
1995 the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a user's computer to
1996 crash. With the engines that existed before, if you tried to access a file
1997 through a Windows browser that was on a computer that was off-line, your
1998 computer could crash. Jesse modified the system a bit to fix that problem,
1999 by adding a button that a user could click to see if the machine holding the
2000 file was still on-line.
2001 </p><p>
2002 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six months,
2003 he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By March, the system
2004 was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one million files in his
2005 directory, including every type of content that might be on users'
2006 computers.
2007 </p><p>
2008
2009 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which students
2010 could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or research; copies
2011 of information pamphlets; movie clips that students might have created;
2012 university brochures&#8212;basically anything that users of the RPI network
2013 made available in a public folder of their computer.
2014 </p><p>
2015 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the files
2016 that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that means, of
2017 course, that three quarters were not, and&#8212;so that this point is
2018 absolutely clear&#8212;Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files
2019 in their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
2020 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a university
2021 where he was studying information science, and hence, tinkering was the
2022 aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from
2023 this tinkering; he was not connected to any business that would make any
2024 money from this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2025 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2026 supposed to do.
2027 </p><p>
2028 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at RPI. The
2029 dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association of America, the
2030 RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three other students whom he
2031 didn't even know, two of them at other universities.  A few hours later,
2032 Jesse was served with papers from the suit.  As he read these papers and
2033 watched the news reports about them, he was increasingly astonished.
2034 </p><p>
2035 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything wrong. &#8230; I
2036 don't think there's anything wrong with the search engine that I ran or
2037 &#8230; what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't modified it in any way that
2038 promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the search engine
2039 in a way that would make it easier to use"&#8212;again, a <span class="emphasis"><em>search
2040 engine</em></span>, which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows
2041 filesharing system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of
2042 the RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2043 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do with
2044 music.
2045 </p><p>
2046
2047 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a network and
2048 had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They demanded that he pay
2049 them the damages for his wrong. For cases of "willful infringement," the
2050 Copyright Act specifies something lawyers call "statutory damages." These
2051 damages permit a copyright owner to claim $150,000 per infringement. As the
2052 RIAA alleged more than one hundred specific copyright infringements, they
2053 therefore demanded that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2054 </p><p>
2055 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2056 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2057 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case was
2058 different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same: huge
2059 demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.  If you
2060 added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in the United
2061 States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2062 <span class="emphasis"><em>billion</em></span>&#8212;six times the <span class="emphasis"><em>total</em></span>
2063 profit of the film industry in 2001.<sup>[<a name="id2823419" href="#ftn.id2823419" class="footnote">48</a>]</sup>
2064 </p><p>
2065 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.  An
2066 uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They demanded to
2067 know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved $12,000 from summer jobs and
2068 other employment. They demanded $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2069 </p><p>
2070 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He refused. They
2071 wanted him to agree to an injunction that would essentially make it
2072 impossible for him to work in many fields of technology for the rest of his
2073 life. He refused. They made him understand that this process of being sued
2074 was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief
2075 lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay
2076 another visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2077 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2078 </p><p>
2079
2080 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.  But
2081 Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the American
2082 legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even win. But the cost of
2083 fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be at least $250,000. If
2084 he won, he would not recover that money. If he won, he would have a piece of
2085 paper saying he had won, and a piece of paper saying he and his family were
2086 bankrupt.
2087 </p><p>
2088 Så Jesse hadde et mafia-lignende valg: $250,000 og en sjanse til å vinne,
2089 eller $12.000 og et forlik.
2090 </p><p>
2091 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.  Let's
2092 put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.  Where is the
2093 morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in scapegoatism? The
2094 RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The president of the RIAA is
2095 reported to make more than $1 million a year.  Artists, on the other hand,
2096 are not well paid. The average recording artist makes $45,900.<sup>[<a name="id2823484" href="#ftn.id2823484" class="footnote">49</a>]</sup> There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect and
2097 direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a student for
2098 running a search engine?<sup>[<a name="id2823500" href="#ftn.id2823500" class="footnote">50</a>]</sup>
2099 </p><p>
2100 23. juni overførte Jesse alle sine oppsparte midler til advokaten som jobbet
2101 for RIA.  Saken mot ham ble trukket.  Og med dette, ble unggutten som hadde
2102 fiklet med en datamaskin og blitt saksøkt for 15 millioner dollar en
2103 aktivist:
2104 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2105 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be an
2106 activist. &#8230; [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I ever
2107 foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely absurd what the
2108 RIAA has done.
2109 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2110 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As his
2111 father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2112 I. &#8230; He's not a tree hugger. &#8230; I think it's bizarre that they
2113 would pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2114 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2115 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823419" href="#id2823419" class="para">48</a>] </sup>
2116
2117
2118
2119 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks: Suit
2120 Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," <em class="citetitle">Professional Media Group
2121 LCC</em> 6 (2003): 5, tilgjengelig fra 2003 WL 55179443.
2122 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823484" href="#id2823484" class="para">49</a>] </sup>
2123
2124
2125 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2126 (27&#8211;2042&#8212;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2127 the Arts, <em class="citetitle">More Than One in a Blue Moon</em> (2000).
2128 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823500" href="#id2823500" class="para">50</a>] </sup>
2129
2130
2131 Douglas Lichtman kommer med et relatert poeng i "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2132 <em class="citetitle">Wall Street Journal</em>, 10. september 2003, A24.
2133 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="pirates"></a>Kapittel 5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#film">Film</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#radio">Radio</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
2134 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without their
2135 permission&#8212;if "if value, then right" is true&#8212;then the history of
2136 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of "big
2137 media" today&#8212;film, records, radio, and cable TV&#8212;was born of a
2138 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2139 pirates join this generation's country club&#8212;until now.
2140 </p><div class="section" title="Film"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="film"></a>Film</h2></div></div></div><p>
2141
2142 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<sup>[<a name="id2823577" href="#ftn.id2823577" class="footnote">51</a>]</sup> Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast
2143 to California in the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that
2144 patents granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls
2145 were exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2146 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative property&#8212;patents.
2147 Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property gave
2148 him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2149 </p><p>
2150 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2151 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2152 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with the
2153 license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to themselves as
2154 independents protested the trust and carried on business without submitting
2155 to the Edison monopoly. In the summer of 1909 the independent movement was
2156 in full-swing, with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2157 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2158 </p><p>
2159 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2160 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement by
2161 forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company to block
2162 the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics that have
2163 become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment,
2164 discontinued product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
2165 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all U.S. film
2166 exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent William Fox who
2167 defied the Trust even after his license was revoked.<sup>[<a name="id2823636" href="#ftn.id2823636" class="footnote">52</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2823662"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2823668"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2823674"></a>
2168 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2169 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like Fox. And
2170 no less than today, these independents were vigorously resisted.  "Shooting
2171 was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents' resulting in loss of
2172 negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life and limb frequently
2173 occurred."<sup>[<a name="id2823690" href="#ftn.id2823690" class="footnote">53</a>]</sup> That led the independents to
2174 flee the East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2175 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And
2176 the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
2177 </p><p>
2178
2179 California vokste naturligvis raskt, og effektiv håndhevelse av føderale
2180 lover spredte seg til slutt vestover.  Men fordi patenter tildeler
2181 patentinnehaveren et i sannhet "begrenset" monopol (kun sytten år på den
2182 tiden), så patentene var utgått før nok føderale lovmenn dukket opp. En ny
2183 industri var født, delvis fra piratvirksomhet mot Edison's kreative
2184 rettigheter.
2185 </p></div><div class="section" title="Innspilt musikk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="recordedmusic"></a>Innspilt musikk</h2></div></div></div><p>
2186 Plateindustrien ble født av en annen type piratvirksomhet, dog for å forstå
2187 hvordan krever at en setter seg inn i detaljer om hvordan loven regulerer
2188 musikk.
2189 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxfourneauxhenri"></a><p>
2190 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines for
2191 reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player piano), the
2192 law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of their music and
2193 the exclusive right to control public performances of their music. In other
2194 words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's 1899 hit "Happy Mose,"
2195 the law said I would have to pay for the right to get a copy of the musical
2196 score, and I would also have to pay for the right to perform it publicly.
2197 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2823771"></a><p>
2198 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph or
2199 Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear enough that I
2200 would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I performed in making
2201 this recording. And it was clear enough that I would have to pay for any
2202 public performance of the work I was recording.  But it wasn't totally clear
2203 that I would have to pay for a "public performance" if I recorded the song
2204 in my own house (even today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing
2205 their songs in the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in
2206 your brain are not&#8212;yet&#8212; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2207 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own home,
2208 it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more importantly, it
2209 wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I then made copies of
2210 those recordings.  Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively
2211 pirate someone else's song without paying its composer anything.
2212 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2823780"></a><p>
2213 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about this capacity to
2214 pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge put it, <a class="indexterm" name="id2823813"></a>
2215 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2216 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an opera. A
2217 publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and copyrights
2218 it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who cut music rolls
2219 and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the composer and publisher
2220 without any regard for [their] rights.<sup>[<a name="id2823833" href="#ftn.id2823833" class="footnote">54</a>]</sup>
2221 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2222 The innovators who developed the technology to record other people's works
2223 were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and genius of American
2224 composers,"<sup>[<a name="id2823864" href="#ftn.id2823864" class="footnote">55</a>]</sup> and the "music publishing
2225 industry" was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one
2226 pirate."<sup>[<a name="id2823875" href="#ftn.id2823875" class="footnote">56</a>]</sup> As John Philip Sousa put it,
2227 in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money out of my pieces, I
2228 want a share of it."<sup>[<a name="id2823886" href="#ftn.id2823886" class="footnote">57</a>]</sup>
2229 </p><p>
2230 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too, do the
2231 arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the player piano
2232 argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the introduction of automatic
2233 music players has not deprived any composer of anything he had before their
2234 introduction." Rather, the machines increased the sales of sheet
2235 music.<sup>[<a name="id2823904" href="#ftn.id2823904" class="footnote">58</a>]</sup> In any case, the innovators
2236 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2237 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2238 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company wrote, "is
2239 the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas musical, literary
2240 or artistic, except as defined by statute."<sup>[<a name="id2823909" href="#ftn.id2823909" class="footnote">59</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2823929"></a>
2241 </p><p>
2242
2243 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2244 <span class="emphasis"><em>and</em></span> the recording artist. Congress amended the law to
2245 make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of
2246 their music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete control
2247 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2248 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once the
2249 composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of copyright law
2250 that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer authorizes a recording of
2251 his song, others are free to record the same song, so long as they pay the
2252 original composer a fee set by the law.
2253 </p><p>
2254 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will refer
2255 to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose key
2256 terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright Act in
2257 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of recordings so long
2258 as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)  the fee set by the statute.
2259 </p><p>
2260 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham writes a
2261 novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham gives the
2262 publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge whatever he wants
2263 for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is thus set by Grisham,
2264 and copyright law ordinarily says you have no permission to use Grisham's
2265 work except with permission of Grisham.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2823983"></a>
2266 </p><p>
2267 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And thus, in
2268 effect, the law <span class="emphasis"><em>subsidizes</em></span> the recording industry
2269 through a kind of piracy&#8212;by giving recording artists a weaker right
2270 than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over
2271 their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less
2272 control are the recording industry and the public. The recording industry
2273 gets something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public
2274 gets access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2275 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2276 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would stifle
2277 follow-on creativity.<sup>[<a name="id2823602" href="#ftn.id2823602" class="footnote">60</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2824024"></a>
2278 </p><p>
2279 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2280 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2281 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary relates,
2282 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2283 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory license system
2284 must be retained. They asserted that the record industry is a
2285 half-billion-dollar business of great economic importance in the United
2286 States and throughout the world; records today are the principal means of
2287 disseminating music, and this creates special problems, since performers
2288 need unhampered access to musical material on nondiscriminatory
2289 terms. Historically, the record producers pointed out, there were no
2290 recording rights before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory
2291 license as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2292 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of recorded music,
2293 with the public being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2294 choice.<sup>[<a name="id2824056" href="#ftn.id2824056" class="footnote">61</a>]</sup>
2295 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2296 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their creative
2297 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2298 </p></div><div class="section" title="Radio"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="radio"></a>Radio</h2></div></div></div><p>
2299 Radio was also born of piracy.
2300 </p><p>
2301 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a "public
2302 performance" of the composer's work.<sup>[<a name="id2824092" href="#ftn.id2824092" class="footnote">62</a>]</sup> As
2303 I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)  an
2304 exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio station thus
2305 owes the composer money for that performance.
2306 </p><p>
2307
2308 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a copy
2309 of the <span class="emphasis"><em>composer's</em></span> work. The radio station is also
2310 performing a copy of the <span class="emphasis"><em>recording artist's</em></span> work. It's
2311 one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's
2312 choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle
2313 Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the value of the composition
2314 performed on the radio station.  And if the law were perfectly consistent,
2315 the radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work, just
2316 as it pays the composer of the music for his work.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2824158"></a>
2317
2318
2319 </p><p>
2320 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
2321 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station need
2322 only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of something for
2323 nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for free, even if it
2324 must pay the composer something for the privilege of playing the song.
2325 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxmadonna"></a><p>
2326 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.  Imagine
2327 it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize public
2328 performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your song in public,
2329 she has to get your permission.
2330 </p><p>
2331 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She then
2332 decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top hit. Under
2333 our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get some money. But
2334 Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on the sale of her CDs. The
2335 public performance of her recording is not a "protected" right. The radio
2336 station thus gets to <span class="emphasis"><em>pirate</em></span> the value of Madonna's work
2337 without paying her anything.
2338 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2824209"></a><p>
2339 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
2340 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
2341 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law ordinarily
2342 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the choice for
2343 him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take something for
2344 nothing.
2345 </p></div><div class="section" title="Kabel-TV"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="cabletv"></a>Kabel-TV</h2></div></div></div><p>
2346
2347 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
2348 </p><p>
2349
2350 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
2351 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content that
2352 they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies started
2353 selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay for what they
2354 sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing broadcasters' content, but more
2355 egregiously than anything Napster ever did&#8212; Napster never charged for
2356 the content it enabled others to give away.
2357 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2824243"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2824259"></a><p>
2358 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.  Rosel
2359 Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of "unfair and
2360 potentially destructive competition."<sup>[<a name="id2824271" href="#ftn.id2824271" class="footnote">63</a>]</sup>
2361 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable TV,
2362 but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association of
2363 Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
2364 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<sup>[<a name="id2824287" href="#ftn.id2824287" class="footnote">64</a>]</sup> As another broadcaster put it,
2365 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2366 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the only
2367 business I know of where the product that is being sold is not paid
2368 for.<sup>[<a name="id2824304" href="#ftn.id2824304" class="footnote">65</a>]</sup>
2369 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2370 Igjen, kravene til opphavsrettsinnehaverne virket rimelige nok:
2371 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2372 Alt vi ber om er en veldig enkel ting, at folk som tar vår eiendom gratis
2373 betaler for den.  Vi forsøker å stoppe piratvirksomhet og jeg kan ikke tenke
2374 på et svakere ord for å beskrive det.  Jeg tror det er sterkere ord som
2375 ville passe.<sup>[<a name="id2824332" href="#ftn.id2824332" class="footnote">66</a>]</sup>
2376 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2377 Disse var "gratispassasjerer", sa presidenten Charlton Heston i Screen
2378 Actor's Guild, som "tok lønna fra skuespillerne"<sup>[<a name="id2824349" href="#ftn.id2824349" class="footnote">67</a>]</sup>
2379 </p><p>
2380 Men igjen, det er en annen side i debatten.  Som assisterende justisminister
2381 Edwin Zimmerman sa det,
2382 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
2383 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any copyright
2384 protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright holders who are
2385 already compensated, who already have a monopoly, should be permitted to
2386 extend that monopoly. &#8230; The question here is how much compensation
2387 they should have and how far back they should carry their right to
2388 compensation.<sup>[<a name="id2823529" href="#ftn.id2823529" class="footnote">68</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2824394"></a>
2389 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2390 Opphavsrettinnehaverne tok kabelselskapene til retten. Høyesterett fant to
2391 ganger at kabelselskaper ikke skyldte opphavsrettinnehaverne noen ting.
2392 </p><p>
2393 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question of
2394 whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated." In the
2395 end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it resolved the
2396 question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable companies would
2397 have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but the price they would
2398 have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.  The price was set by law,
2399 so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto power over the emerging
2400 technologies of cable. Cable companies thus built their empire in part upon
2401 a "piracy" of the value created by broadcasters' content.
2402 </p><p>
2403 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means using value
2404 from someone else's creative property without permission from that
2405 creator&#8212;as it is increasingly described today<sup>[<a name="id2824383" href="#ftn.id2824383" class="footnote">69</a>]</sup> &#8212; then <span class="emphasis"><em>every</em></span> industry
2406 affected by copyright today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind
2407 of piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. &#8230; The list is long and
2408 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
2409 last. Every generation&#8212;until now.
2410 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823577" href="#id2823577" class="para">51</a>] </sup>
2411
2412 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2413 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
2414 Copywrongs</em>, 87&#8211;93, which details Edison's "adventures"
2415 with copyright and patent.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2823491"></a>
2416 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823636" href="#id2823636" class="para">52</a>] </sup>
2417
2418
2419 J. A. Aberdeen, <em class="citetitle">Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent
2420 Motion Picture Producers</em> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and
2421 expanded texts posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture
2422 Patents Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #11</a>. For a discussion of
2423 the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits imposed by
2424 Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
2425 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright"
2426 (September 2002), University of Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in
2427 Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 159.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823690" href="#id2823690" class="para">53</a>] </sup>
2428
2429
2430 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," <em class="citetitle">The Silents
2431 Majority</em>, arkivert på <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #12</a>.
2432 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823833" href="#id2823833" class="para">54</a>] </sup>
2433
2434 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on S. 6330
2435 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th Cong. 59, 1st
2436 sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of South Dakota,
2437 chairman), reprinted in <em class="citetitle">Legislative History of the Copyright
2438 Act</em>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2439 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2823846"></a>
2440 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823864" href="#id2823864" class="para">55</a>] </sup>
2441
2442
2443 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223 (statement of
2444 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2445 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823875" href="#id2823875" class="para">56</a>] </sup>
2446
2447
2448 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226 (statement of
2449 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2450 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823886" href="#id2823886" class="para">57</a>] </sup>
2451
2452
2453 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23 (statement of
2454 John Philip Sousa, composer).
2455 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823904" href="#id2823904" class="para">58</a>] </sup>
2456
2457
2458
2459 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&#8211;84
2460 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music Perforating
2461 Company of New York).
2462 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823909" href="#id2823909" class="para">59</a>] </sup>
2463
2464
2465 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2466 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2467 Graphophone Company Association).
2468 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823602" href="#id2823602" class="para">60</a>] </sup>
2469
2470
2471
2472 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2473 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st sess.,
2474 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted in
2475 <em class="citetitle">Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</em>,
2476 E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman
2477 Reprints, 1976).
2478 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824056" href="#id2824056" class="para">61</a>] </sup>
2479
2480
2481 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee on
2482 the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8 March
2483 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to this report.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824092" href="#id2824092" class="para">62</a>] </sup>
2484
2485 See 17 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>, sections 106 and 110. At
2486 the beginning, record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast"
2487 and other messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
2488 radio station.  Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning
2489 attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See
2490 <em class="citetitle">RCA Manufacturing
2491 Co</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Whiteman</em>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
2492 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.  Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag:
2493 Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright,"
2494 <em class="citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review</em> 70 (2003): 281.
2495 <a class="indexterm" name="id2824117"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2824125"></a>
2496 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824271" href="#id2824271" class="para">63</a>] </sup>
2497
2498
2499 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
2500 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
2501 on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)  (statement of Rosel
2502 H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
2503 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824287" href="#id2824287" class="para">64</a>] </sup>
2504
2505
2506 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
2507 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
2508 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824304" href="#id2824304" class="para">65</a>] </sup>
2509
2510
2511 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
2512 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
2513 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824332" href="#id2824332" class="para">66</a>] </sup>
2514
2515
2516 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.  Krim,
2517 president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of United
2518 Artists Television, Inc.).
2519 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824349" href="#id2824349" class="para">67</a>] </sup>
2520
2521
2522 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 209 (vitnemål fra Charlton Heston,
2523 president i Screen Actors Guild).
2524 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2823529" href="#id2823529" class="para">68</a>] </sup>
2525
2526 Copyright Law Revision&#8212;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.  Zimmerman,
2527 acting assistant attorney general).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2824355"></a>
2528 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824383" href="#id2824383" class="para">69</a>] </sup>
2529
2530
2531 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <em class="citetitle">The
2532 Engine of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&#8212;The Myth of Free
2533 Information</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #13</a>. "The threat of
2534 piracy&#8212;the use of someone else's creative work without permission or
2535 compensation&#8212;has grown with the Internet."
2536 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="piracy"></a>Kapittel 6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
2537 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in
2538 many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized
2539 taking of other people's content within a commercial context. Despite the
2540 many justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
2541 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
2542 </p><p>
2543
2544 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking" that is
2545 more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems wrong to
2546 many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this taking
2547 "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.  For the harm
2548 of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than outright copying, and
2549 the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has so often done in the
2550 past.
2551
2552 </p><div class="section" title="Piracy I"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="piracy-i"></a>Piracy I</h2></div></div></div><p>
2553 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there are
2554 businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted content,
2555 copy it, and sell it&#8212;all without the permission of a copyright
2556 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
2557 every year to physical piracy<sup>[<a name="id2824374" href="#ftn.id2824374" class="footnote">70</a>]</sup> (that
2558 works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it
2559 loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
2560 </p><p>
2561 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this book, nor
2562 in the argument that most people make when talking about the subject of this
2563 book, should draw into doubt this simple point: This piracy is wrong.
2564 </p><p>
2565 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made for
2566 it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one hundred
2567 years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign copyrights. We
2568 were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might therefore seem
2569 hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other developing nations
2570 treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our existence,
2571 treated as right.
2572 </p><p>
2573 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban the
2574 taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
2575 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works without the
2576 permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.  The copy shops
2577 in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law does protect
2578 foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops violate that law. So
2579 the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a moral wrong, but a
2580 legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal wrong, but a locally
2581 legal wrong as well.
2582 </p><p>
2583
2584 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
2585 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose not to
2586 protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a pirate nation,
2587 but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar childhood.
2588 </p><p>
2589 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are its
2590 laws regardless of their source. The international law under which these
2591 nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden of
2592 intellectual property law.<sup>[<a name="id2824584" href="#ftn.id2824584" class="footnote">71</a>]</sup> In my view,
2593 more developing nations should take advantage of that opportunity, but when
2594 they don't, then their laws should be respected. And under the laws of these
2595 nations, this piracy is wrong.
2596 </p><p>
2597 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in any
2598 case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access to
2599 American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have bought those
2600 American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any less money than they
2601 otherwise would have had.<sup>[<a name="id2824628" href="#ftn.id2824628" class="footnote">72</a>]</sup>
2602 </p><p>
2603 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many thousands
2604 of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay for the content they
2605 have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree the harm caused by such
2606 taking. Extremists in this debate love to say, "You wouldn't go into Barnes
2607 &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf without paying; why should it
2608 be any different with on-line music?" The difference is, of course, that
2609 when you take a book from Barnes &amp; Noble, it has one less book to
2610 sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3 from a computer network, there is
2611 not one less CD that can be sold.  The physics of piracy of the intangible
2612 are different from the physics of piracy of the tangible.
2613 </p><p>
2614
2615 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a property
2616 right of a very special sort, it <span class="emphasis"><em>is</em></span> a property
2617 right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to
2618 decide the terms under which content is shared. If the copyright owner
2619 doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important
2620 statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish
2621 of the copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
2622 copyrighted content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
2623 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is wrong to
2624 take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have a property
2625 system, and that system is properly balanced to the technology of a time,
2626 then it is wrong to take property without the permission of a property
2627 owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
2628 </p><p>
2629 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
2630 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal" Windows,
2631 that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.  Microsoft loses the value of
2632 the software that was taken. But it gains users who are used to life in the
2633 Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation grows more wealthy, more and more
2634 people will buy software rather than steal it. And hence over time, because
2635 that buying will benefit Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If
2636 instead of pirating Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux
2637 operating system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
2638 Microsoft.  Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2824724"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2824730"></a>
2639 <a class="indexterm" name="id2824736"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2824748"></a>
2640 </p><p>
2641 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
2642 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law students,
2643 for example, are given free access to the two largest legal databases. The
2644 companies marketing both hope the students will become so used to their
2645 service that they will want to use it and not the other when they become
2646 lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
2647 </p><p>
2648 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the alcoholic
2649 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will make it
2650 more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we ordinarily allow
2651 businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give their product
2652 away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can
2653 give its product away, as it did, for example, with Internet Explorer to
2654 fight Netscape. A property right means giving the property owner the right
2655 to say who gets access to what&#8212;at least ordinarily. And if the law
2656 properly balances the rights of the copyright owner with the rights of
2657 access, then violating the law is still wrong.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2824506"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2824773"></a>
2658 <a class="indexterm" name="id2824793"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2824800"></a>
2659 </p><p>
2660
2661
2662 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy, and I
2663 certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts at
2664 justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy is
2665 rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it steals; it
2666 doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives someone access
2667 to something that the law says he should not have.  Nothing has changed to
2668 draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy is flat out wrong.
2669 </p><p>
2670 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
2671 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or at
2672 least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the way it is
2673 increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful and productive,
2674 to produce either new content or new ways of doing business.  Neither our
2675 tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all "piracy" in that sense of
2676 the term.
2677 </p><p>
2678 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest piracy
2679 concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we need to
2680 understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before we condemn it
2681 to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
2682 </p><p>
2683 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
2684 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
2685 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable TV, no
2686 one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
2687 </p><p>
2688 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They should push
2689 us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this sharing to survive.
2690 </p></div><div class="section" title="Piracy II"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="piracy-ii"></a>Piracy II</h2></div></div></div><p>
2691
2692 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s] the
2693 author of [his] profit."<sup>[<a name="id2824868" href="#ftn.id2824868" class="footnote">73</a>]</sup> This means we
2694 must determine whether and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how
2695 strongly the law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to
2696 assure the author of his profit.
2697 </p><p>
2698 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of the
2699 Napster technology had not made any major technological innovations.  Like
2700 every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and, arguably, off the
2701 Internet as well<sup>[<a name="id2824892" href="#ftn.id2824892" class="footnote">74</a>]</sup>), Shawn Fanning and
2702 crew had simply put together components that had been developed
2703 independently.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2824921"></a>
2704 </p><p>
2705 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999, Napster
2706 amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After eighteen months,
2707 there were close to 80 million registered users of the system.<sup>[<a name="id2824934" href="#ftn.id2824934" class="footnote">75</a>]</sup> Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other
2708 services emerged to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p
2709 service. It boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are
2710 different architecturally, though not very different in function: Each
2711 enables users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
2712 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&#8212;
2713 or your 20,000 best friends.
2714 </p><p>
2715 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans have
2716 tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in September 2002
2717 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded music&#8212;28 percent of
2718 Americans older than 12.<sup>[<a name="id2824969" href="#ftn.id2824969" class="footnote">76</a>]</sup> A survey by
2719 the NPD group quoted in <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em> estimated
2720 that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to exchange content in
2721 May 2003.<sup>[<a name="id2824997" href="#ftn.id2824997" class="footnote">77</a>]</sup> The vast majority of these
2722 are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive quantity of content is
2723 being "taken" on these networks. The ease and inexpensiveness of
2724 file-sharing networks have inspired millions to enjoy music in a way that
2725 they hadn't before.
2726 </p><p>
2727 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
2728 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright infringement,
2729 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more complicated than one
2730 might think. So consider&#8212;a bit more carefully than the polarized
2731 voices around this debate usually do&#8212;the kinds of sharing that file
2732 sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
2733 </p><p>
2734
2735
2736 Fildelerne deler ulike typer innhold.  Vi kan derel disse ulike typene inn i
2737 fire typer.
2738 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="A"><li class="listitem"><p>
2739
2740 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
2741 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying the CD,
2742 these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether everyone who
2743 takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't make it available
2744 for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who
2745 would.  The latter are the target of category A: users who download instead
2746 of purchasing.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2825051"></a>
2747 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2748
2749
2750 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before purchasing
2751 it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist he's not heard
2752 of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This is a kind of
2753 targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed.  If the friend recommending
2754 the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation, then one could expect
2755 that the recommendations will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
2756 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
2757 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2758
2759
2760 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted content
2761 that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased because the
2762 transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of sharing networks is
2763 among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were part of your childhood
2764 but have long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on the
2765 network. (One friend told me that when she discovered Napster, she spent a
2766 solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She was astonished at the range and mix
2767 of content that was available.)  For content not sold, this is still
2768 technically a violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is
2769 not selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&#8212;the same
2770 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to a
2771 local collector.
2772 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
2773
2774
2775
2776
2777 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access to content
2778 that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner wants to give away.
2779 </p></li></ol></div><p>
2780 Hvordan balanserer disse ulike delingstypene?
2781 </p><p>
2782 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the perspective of
2783 the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the perspective of
2784 economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<sup>[<a name="id2825118" href="#ftn.id2825118" class="footnote">78</a>]</sup> Type B sharing is illegal but plainly
2785 beneficial. Type C sharing is illegal, yet good for society (since more
2786 exposure to music is good)  and harmless to the artist (since the work is
2787 not otherwise available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard
2788 question to answer&#8212;and certainly much more difficult than the current
2789 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
2790 </p><p>
2791 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how harmful
2792 type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood, composers
2793 complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained about radio, and
2794 broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music industry complains that
2795 type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is "devastating" the industry.
2796 </p><p>
2797 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how harmful is harder
2798 to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's practice to blame
2799 technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette recording is a
2800 good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young put it, "Rather
2801 than exploiting this new, popular technology, the labels fought
2802 it."<sup>[<a name="id2825163" href="#ftn.id2825163" class="footnote">79</a>]</sup> The labels claimed that every
2803 album taped was an album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent
2804 in 1981, the industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
2805 problem, and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
2806 </p><p>
2807 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity to enact
2808 regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record turnaround. "In
2809 the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' &#8230; was not the fault of
2810 the tapers&#8212;who did not [stop after MTV came into being]&#8212;but had
2811 to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical innovation at the
2812 major labels."<sup>[<a name="id2824639" href="#ftn.id2824639" class="footnote">80</a>]</sup>
2813 </p><p>
2814 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is wrong
2815 today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to the industry
2816 in particular, and society in general&#8212;or at least the society that
2817 inherits the tradition that gave us the film industry, the record industry,
2818 the radio industry, cable TV, and the VCR&#8212;the question is not simply
2819 whether type A sharing is harmful. The question is also
2820 <span class="emphasis"><em>how</em></span> harmful type A sharing is, and how beneficial the
2821 other types of sharing are.
2822 </p><p>
2823 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
2824 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.  The
2825 "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type A sharing
2826 exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records through sampling
2827 than they lost through substitution, then sharing networks would actually
2828 benefit music companies on balance. They would therefore have little
2829 <span class="emphasis"><em>static</em></span> reason to resist them.
2830
2831 </p><p>
2832 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because of file
2833 sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales actually suggest
2834 it might be close.
2835 </p><p>
2836 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent, from 882
2837 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<sup>[<a name="id2825258" href="#ftn.id2825258" class="footnote">81</a>]</sup> This confirms a trend over the past few years. The
2838 RIAA blames Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other
2839 causes that could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a
2840 more than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
2841 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
2842 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average price
2843 of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<sup>[<a name="id2825302" href="#ftn.id2825302" class="footnote">82</a>]</sup> Competition from other forms of media could also
2844 account for some of the decline. As Jane Black of
2845 <em class="citetitle">BusinessWeek</em> notes, "The soundtrack to the film
2846 <em class="citetitle">High Fidelity</em> has a list price of $18.98. You could
2847 get the whole movie [on DVD] for $19.99."<sup>[<a name="id2825334" href="#ftn.id2825334" class="footnote">83</a>]</sup>
2848 </p><p>
2849
2850
2851
2852 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales is
2853 because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period that the
2854 RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA estimates that 2.1
2855 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus, although 2.6 times the total
2856 number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7
2857 percent.
2858 </p><p>
2859 There are too many different things happening at the same time to explain
2860 these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable: The recording
2861 industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between downloading a song
2862 and stealing a CD?"&#8212;but their own numbers reveal the difference. If I
2863 steal a CD, then there is one less CD to sell. Every taking is a lost
2864 sale. But on the basis of the numbers the RIAA provides, it is absolutely
2865 clear that the same is not true of downloads. If every download were a lost
2866 sale&#8212;if every use of Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his]
2867 profit"&#8212;then the industry would have suffered a 100 percent drop in
2868 sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold
2869 were downloaded for free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent,
2870 then there is a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a
2871 CD."
2872 </p><p>
2873 These are the harms&#8212;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's assume,
2874 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the recording
2875 industry. What value does it produce in addition to these costs?
2876 </p><p>
2877 One benefit is type C sharing&#8212;making available content that is
2878 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially available.
2879 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of tracks that
2880 are no longer commercially available.<sup>[<a name="id2825358" href="#ftn.id2825358" class="footnote">84</a>]</sup>
2881 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
2882 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
2883 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
2884 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic sense
2885 <span class="emphasis"><em>to the company</em></span> to make it available.
2886 </p><p>
2887 In real space&#8212;long before the Internet&#8212;the market had a simple
2888 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are thousands
2889 of used book and used record stores in America today.<sup>[<a name="id2825415" href="#ftn.id2825415" class="footnote">85</a>]</sup> These stores buy content from owners, then sell the
2890 content they buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell
2891 this content, <span class="emphasis"><em>even if the content is still under
2892 copyright</em></span>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used book and
2893 record stores are commercial entities; their owners make money from the
2894 content they sell; but as with cable companies before statutory licensing,
2895 they don't have to pay the copyright owner for the content they sell.
2896 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2825462"></a><p>
2897 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used record
2898 stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the content
2899 available isn't making money from making the content available.  It is also
2900 different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a record, I don't
2901 have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone shares my 1949 recording
2902 of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs," I still have it. That difference would
2903 matter economically if the owner of the copyright were selling the record in
2904 competition to my sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that
2905 is not currently commercially available. The Internet is making it
2906 available, through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
2907 </p><p>
2908 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
2909 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may well
2910 be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
2911 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
2912 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be shut as
2913 well?
2914 </p><p>
2915
2916 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable type D
2917 sharing to occur&#8212;the sharing of content that copyright owners want to
2918 have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This sharing
2919 clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author Cory Doctorow,
2920 for example, released his first novel, <em class="citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
2921 Kingdom</em>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
2922 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
2923 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read part
2924 on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If they liked
2925 it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is type D
2926 content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then both he and
2927 society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a great book!)
2928 </p><p>
2929 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society with
2930 no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem of type A
2931 sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we lose something
2932 important in order to protect type A content.
2933 </p><p>
2934 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry understandably
2935 says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask, "How much has society
2936 gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies? What is the content that
2937 otherwise would be unavailable?"
2938 </p><p>
2939 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter, much
2940 of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good.  And
2941 like the piracy I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#pirates" title='Kapittel 5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"'>5</a>, much of this piracy is motivated by a new way of
2942 spreading content caused by changes in the technology of distribution. Thus,
2943 consistent with the tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording
2944 industry, and cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing
2945 is how best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
2946 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
2947 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be found
2948 only with time.
2949 </p><p>
2950 Men er ikke krigen bare en krig mot ulovlig deling?  Er ikke angrepsmålet
2951 bare det du kaller type A-deling?
2952 </p><p>
2953 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The effect of
2954 the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far beyond that
2955 one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the Napster case
2956 itself. When Napster told the district court that it had developed a
2957 technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified infringing
2958 material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4 percent was not
2959 good enough. Napster had to push the infringements "down to
2960 zero."<sup>[<a name="id2825571" href="#ftn.id2825571" class="footnote">86</a>]</sup>
2961 </p><p>
2962 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
2963 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to assure
2964 that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance with the
2965 law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of VCRs or 100
2966 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns are used in compliance
2967 with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.  The court's ruling means that
2968 we as a society must lose the benefits of p2p, even for the totally legal
2969 and beneficial uses they serve, simply to assure that there are zero
2970 copyright infringements caused by p2p.
2971 </p><p>
2972 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the content
2973 industry that we know today. The history of American law has been a process
2974 of balance. As new technologies changed the way content was distributed, the
2975 law adjusted, after some time, to the new technology.  In this adjustment,
2976 the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights of creators while protecting
2977 innovation. Sometimes this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes
2978 less.
2979 </p><p>
2980 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the interests
2981 of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers against the
2982 interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to composers, but
2983 also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but at a price set
2984 by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the recordings made by
2985 these recording artists, and they complained to Congress that their
2986 "creative property" was not being respected (since the radio station did not
2987 have to pay them for the creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their
2988 claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
2989 </p><p>
2990 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts rejected the
2991 claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content they rebroadcast,
2992 Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to compensation, but at a
2993 level set by the law. It likewise gave cable companies the right to the
2994 content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
2995 </p><p>
2996
2997
2998
2999 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player pianos,
3000 served two important goals&#8212;indeed, the two central goals of any
3001 copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators would have
3002 the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.  Second, the law assured
3003 that copyright holders would be paid for the content that was
3004 distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply required cable TV to pay
3005 copyright holders whatever they demanded for their content, then copyright
3006 holders associated with broadcasters would use their power to stifle this
3007 new technology, cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use
3008 broadcasters' content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized
3009 cable. Thus Congress chose a path that would assure
3010 <span class="emphasis"><em>compensation</em></span> without giving the past (broadcasters)
3011 control over the future (cable).
3012 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2825679"></a><p>
3013 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major producers and
3014 distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another technology, the
3015 video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today, VCRs) that Sony had
3016 produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's claim against Sony was
3017 relatively simple: Sony produced a device, Disney and Universal claimed,
3018 that enabled consumers to engage in copyright infringement. Because the
3019 device that Sony built had a "record" button, the device could be used to
3020 record copyrighted movies and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the
3021 copyright infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3022 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3023 </p><p>
3024
3025 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did decide to
3026 design its machine to make it very simple to record television shows. It
3027 could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct copying from a
3028 television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the machine to copy
3029 only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the line. It was clear that
3030 there were many television shows that did not grant anyone permission to
3031 copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no doubt the majority of shows would not
3032 have authorized copying. And in the face of this obvious preference, Sony
3033 could have designed its system to minimize the opportunity for copyright
3034 infringement. It did not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold
3035 it responsible for the architecture it chose.
3036 </p><p>
3037 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal champion. Valenti
3038 called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are 20, 30, 40 million of
3039 these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by millions of `tapeworms,'
3040 eating away at the very heart and essence of the most precious asset the
3041 copyright owner has, his copyright."<sup>[<a name="id2825727" href="#ftn.id2825727" class="footnote">87</a>]</sup>
3042 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and creative
3043 judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation on the
3044 after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of tapings that
3045 will adversely impact on the future of the creative community in this
3046 country. It is simply a question of basic economics and plain common
3047 sense."<sup>[<a name="id2825744" href="#ftn.id2825744" class="footnote">88</a>]</sup> Indeed, as surveys would later
3048 show, percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or
3049 more<sup>[<a name="id2825753" href="#ftn.id2825753" class="footnote">89</a>]</sup> &#8212; a use the Court would
3050 later hold was not "fair." By "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the
3051 means of an exemption from copyright infringementwithout creating a
3052 mechanism to compensate copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would
3053 "take from the owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive
3054 right to control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and
3055 thereby profit from its reproduction."<sup>[<a name="id2825661" href="#ftn.id2825661" class="footnote">90</a>]</sup>
3056 </p><p>
3057 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme Court. In
3058 the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Hollywood in
3059 its jurisdiction&#8212;leading Judge Alex Kozinski, who sits on that court,
3060 refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&#8212;held that Sony would be liable
3061 for the copyright infringement made possible by its machines. Under the
3062 Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar technology&#8212;which Jack
3063 Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry"
3064 (worse yet, it was a <span class="emphasis"><em>Japanese</em></span> Boston Strangler of the
3065 American film industry)&#8212;was an illegal technology.<sup>[<a name="id2825787" href="#ftn.id2825787" class="footnote">91</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2825812"></a>
3066 </p><p>
3067
3068 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.  And in
3069 its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of when and
3070 whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the Court wrote,
3071 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3072 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
3073 Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
3074 copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the
3075 institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
3076 competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
3077 technology.<sup>[<a name="id2825838" href="#ftn.id2825838" class="footnote">92</a>]</sup>
3078 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3079 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.  But as with
3080 the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress ignored the
3081 request. Congress was convinced that American film got enough, this "taking"
3082 notwithstanding.  If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
3083 </p><div class="table"><a name="t1"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 6.1. Mønster for respons fra rett og kongress</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Mønster for respons fra rett og kongress" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char">CASE</th><th align="char">WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</th><th align="char">RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</th><th align="char">RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Innspillinger</td><td align="char">Komponister</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Statutory license</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Radio</td><td align="char">Innspillingsartister</td><td align="char">N/A</td><td align="char">Ingenting</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Kabel-TV</td><td align="char">Kringkastere</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Statutory license</td></tr><tr><td align="char">VCR</td><td align="char">Filmskapere</td><td align="char">Ingen beskyttelse</td><td align="char">Ingenting</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
3084 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the way
3085 content was distributed.<sup>[<a name="id2825970" href="#ftn.id2825970" class="footnote">93</a>]</sup> In each case,
3086 throughout our history, that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on
3087 someone else's work.
3088 </p><p>
3089
3090 In <span class="emphasis"><em>none</em></span> of these cases did either the courts or
3091 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <span class="emphasis"><em>none</em></span> of these
3092 cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should assure that the
3093 copyright holder get all the value that his copyright created. In every
3094 case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy." In every case, Congress
3095 acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in the behavior of the "pirates."
3096 In each case, Congress allowed some new technology to benefit from content
3097 made before. It balanced the interests at stake.
3098
3099 </p><p>
3100 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that make up
3101 the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes sense. Was Walt
3102 Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators had to ask
3103 permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and spread images as
3104 a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better regulated? Is it
3105 really right that building a search engine should expose you to $15 million
3106 in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had controlled film? Should
3107 every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get permission to record a song?
3108 </p><p>
3109 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition has
3110 answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated, copyright
3111 "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible
3112 uses of his work."<sup>[<a name="id2826050" href="#ftn.id2826050" class="footnote">94</a>]</sup> Instead, the
3113 particular uses that the law regulates have been defined by balancing the
3114 good that comes from granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an
3115 exclusive right creates. And this balancing has historically been done
3116 <span class="emphasis"><em>after</em></span> a technology has matured, or settled into the mix
3117 of technologies that facilitate the distribution of content.
3118 </p><p>
3119 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the Internet is
3120 changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet (wires
3121 vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network should not
3122 become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should the law become
3123 a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists (or more accurately,
3124 distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail in the last chapter of
3125 this book, we should be securing income to artists while we allow the market
3126 to secure the most efficient way to promote and distribute content. This
3127 will require changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes
3128 should be designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
3129 public interest that innovation continue.
3130 </p><p>
3131
3132
3133 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly superior mode
3134 of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies can be ideally
3135 efficient in moving content across a widely diverse network.  Left to
3136 develop, they could make the network vastly more efficient.  Yet these
3137 "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in <em class="citetitle">The New
3138 York Times</em>, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<sup>[<a name="id2826107" href="#ftn.id2826107" class="footnote">95</a>]</sup> Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the
3139 copyright warriors raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about
3140 balance and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our
3141 content," the warriors insist, "is our <span class="emphasis"><em>property</em></span>. Why
3142 should we wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have
3143 to wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
3144 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask
3145 whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
3146 </p><p>
3147 "Det er <span class="emphasis"><em>vår eiendom</em></span>," insisterer krigerne. "og den bør
3148 være beskyttet på samme måte som all annen eiendom er beskyttet."
3149 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824374" href="#id2824374" class="para">70</a>] </sup>
3150
3151
3152 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
3153 <em class="citetitle">The Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</em>,
3154 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3155 #14</a>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3156 <em class="citetitle">Financial Times</em>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3157 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824584" href="#id2824584" class="para">71</a>] </sup>
3158
3159 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3160 <em class="citetitle">Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?</em> (New York: The New
3161 Press, 2003), 10&#8211;13, 209.  The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
3162 Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create
3163 administrative and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights,
3164 a costly proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights
3165 may lead to higher prices for staple industries such as agriculture. Critics
3166 of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens imposed upon developing
3167 countries and benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does
3168 permit governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3169 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may be
3170 able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3171 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS
3172 framework.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2823910"></a>
3173 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824628" href="#id2824628" class="para">72</a>] </sup>
3174
3175 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3176 Liebowitz, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy</em> (New York:
3177 Amacom, 2002), 144&#8211;90. "In some instances &#8230; the impact of
3178 piracy on the copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the
3179 work will be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the
3180 individual engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3181 pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2824593"></a>
3182 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824868" href="#id2824868" class="para">73</a>] </sup>
3183
3184
3185 <em class="citetitle">Bach</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Longman</em>, 98
3186 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3187 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824892" href="#id2824892" class="para">74</a>] </sup>
3188
3189 See Clayton M. Christensen, <em class="citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
3190 Revolutionary National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do
3191 Business</em> (New York: HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen
3192 examines why companies that give rise to and dominate a product area are
3193 frequently unable to come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses
3194 for their own products.  This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3195 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3196 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <em class="citetitle">Future</em>,
3197 89&#8211;92, 139.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2824638"></a>
3198 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824934" href="#id2824934" class="para">75</a>] </sup>
3199
3200
3201 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3202 <em class="citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle</em>, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock
3203 'n' Roll Suicide," <em class="citetitle">New Scientist</em>, 6 July 2002, 42;
3204 Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO, Secures New Financing,"
3205 <em class="citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle</em>, 23 May 2003, C1; "Napster's
3206 Wake-Up Call," <em class="citetitle">Economist</em>, 24 June 2000, 23; John
3207 Naughton, "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London)
3208 <em class="citetitle">Times</em>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3209 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824969" href="#id2824969" class="para">76</a>] </sup>
3210
3211
3212
3213 See Ipsos-Insight, <em class="citetitle">TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music
3214 Distribution</em> (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of
3215 Americans aged twelve and older have downloaded music off of the Internet
3216 and 30 percent have listened to digital music files stored on their
3217 computers.
3218 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824997" href="#id2824997" class="para">77</a>] </sup>
3219
3220
3221 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," <em class="citetitle">New
3222 York Times</em>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3223 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825118" href="#id2825118" class="para">78</a>] </sup>
3224
3225 Se Liebowitz, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy</em>,
3226 148&#8211;49.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2824910"></a>
3227 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825163" href="#id2825163" class="para">79</a>] </sup>
3228
3229
3230 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <em class="citetitle">Technology Evolution and the
3231 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</em> (2003), 3. This report
3232 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding practice of
3233 cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a
3234 cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping is killing music." At the
3235 time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical Assessment
3236 conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers
3237 older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.  Congress, Office
3238 of Technology Assessment, <em class="citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying: Technology
3239 Challenges the Law</em>, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3240 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&#8211;56.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2824639" href="#id2824639" class="para">80</a>] </sup>
3241
3242
3243 U.S. Congress, <em class="citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying</em>, 4.
3244 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825258" href="#id2825258" class="para">81</a>] </sup>
3245
3246
3247 See Recording Industry Association of America, <em class="citetitle">2002 Yearend
3248 Statistics</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #15</a>. A later report
3249 indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry Association of
3250 America, <em class="citetitle">Some Facts About Music Piracy</em>, 25 June 2003,
3251 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #16</a>:
3252 "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music have fallen by 26
3253 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million units in 2002 in the
3254 United States (based on units shipped).  In terms of sales, revenues are
3255 down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6 billion last year (based on
3256 U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music industry worldwide has gone from
3257 a $39 billion industry in 2000 down to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based
3258 on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3259 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825302" href="#id2825302" class="para">82</a>] </sup>
3260 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13. februar
3261 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3262 #17</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2825316"></a>
3263 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825334" href="#id2825334" class="para">83</a>] </sup>
3264
3265
3266 ibid.
3267 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825358" href="#id2825358" class="para">84</a>] </sup>
3268
3269
3270 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3271 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&#8212;Coming
3272 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
3273 the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared statement of
3274 the Future of Music Coalition), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #18</a>.
3275 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825415" href="#id2825415" class="para">85</a>] </sup>
3276
3277
3278 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3279 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3280 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <em class="citetitle">The
3281 Quiet Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</em> (2002),
3282 available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3283 #19</a>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3284 National Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3285 Results," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
3286 #20</a>.
3287 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825571" href="#id2825571" class="para">86</a>] </sup>
3288
3289
3290 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34- 35
3291 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183 MHP, available at
3292 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #21</a>. For an account
3293 of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn, <em class="citetitle">All
3294 the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</em> (New
3295 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&#8211;82.
3296 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825727" href="#id2825727" class="para">87</a>] </sup>
3297
3298
3299 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on S. 1758
3300 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess.,
3301 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion Picture Association
3302 of America, Inc.).
3303 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825744" href="#id2825744" class="para">88</a>] </sup>
3304
3305
3306 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
3307 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825753" href="#id2825753" class="para">89</a>] </sup>
3308
3309
3310 <em class="citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Sony
3311 Corp. of America</em>, 480 F. Supp. 429, (C.D. Cal., 1979).
3312 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825661" href="#id2825661" class="para">90</a>] </sup>
3313
3314
3315 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony of Jack
3316 Valenti).
3317 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825787" href="#id2825787" class="para">91</a>] </sup>
3318
3319
3320 <em class="citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Sony
3321 Corp. of America</em>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.  1981).
3322 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825838" href="#id2825838" class="para">92</a>] </sup>
3323
3324
3325 <em class="citetitle">Sony Corp. of America</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Universal City
3326 Studios, Inc</em>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
3327 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825970" href="#id2825970" class="para">93</a>] </sup>
3328
3329 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
3330 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example, was
3331 regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy Congress
3332 imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and controlling the
3333 technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (Title 17 of the
3334 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
3335 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
3336 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
3337 Lessig, <em class="citetitle">Future</em>, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to
3338 the Broadcast Flag," <em class="citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review</em>
3339 70 (2003): 293&#8211;96.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2825594"></a>
3340 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826050" href="#id2826050" class="para">94</a>] </sup>
3341
3342
3343 <em class="citetitle">Sony Corp. of America</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Universal City
3344 Studios, Inc</em>., 464 U.S. 417, (1984).
3345 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826107" href="#id2826107" class="para">95</a>] </sup>
3346
3347
3348 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software Echoes Past
3349 Efforts," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 22 September 2003, C3.
3350 </p></div></div></div></div><div class="part" title='Del II. "Eiendom"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="c-property"></a>Del II. "Eiendom"</h1></div></div></div><div class="partintro" title='"Eiendom"'><div></div><p>
3351
3352
3353
3354 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of property. It can
3355 be owned and sold, and the law protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the
3356 copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the
3357 supply and demand that partially determine the price she can get.
3358 </p><p>
3359 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a bit
3360 misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
3361 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
3362 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you put in
3363 your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I take it,
3364 you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
3365 <span class="emphasis"><em>idea</em></span> you had to put a picnic table in the
3366 backyard&#8212;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a table, and putting
3367 it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking then?
3368 </p><p>
3369 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus ideas,
3370 though that's an important difference. The point instead is that in the
3371 ordinary case&#8212;indeed, in practically every case except for a narrow
3372 range of exceptions&#8212;ideas released to the world are free. I don't take
3373 anything from you when I copy the way you dress&#8212;though I might seem
3374 weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
3375 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true when I
3376 copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea from me,
3377 receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
3378 taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<sup>[<a name="id2826183" href="#ftn.id2826183" class="footnote">96</a>]</sup>
3379 </p><p>
3380 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the reach of the
3381 law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that I won't discuss
3382 here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or expression without my
3383 permission: The law turns the intangible into property.
3384 </p><p>
3385 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&#8212;the details, in other
3386 words&#8212;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of turning the
3387 intangible into property emerged, we need to place this "property" in its
3388 proper context.<sup>[<a name="id2826228" href="#ftn.id2826228" class="footnote">97</a>]</sup>
3389 </p><p>
3390 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the preceding
3391 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright material is
3392 property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are its limits? How
3393 does it function in practice? After these stories, the significance of this
3394 true statement&#8212;"copyright material is property"&#8212; will be a bit
3395 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different from
3396 the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
3397 </p><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#founders">7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#recorders">8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#transformers">9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#collectors">10. Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#property-i">11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826183" href="#id2826183" class="para">96</a>] </sup>
3398
3399
3400 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
3401 <em class="citetitle">The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</em>, vol. 6 (Andrew
3402 A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&#8211;34.
3403 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826228" href="#id2826228" class="para">97</a>] </sup>
3404
3405
3406 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
3407 intangible.  A property right is simply a right that an individual has
3408 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach
3409 to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to
3410 which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What
3411 Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together," <em class="citetitle">Arizona Law
3412 Review</em> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
3413 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="founders"></a>Kapittel 7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</h2></div></div></div><p>
3414 William Shakespeare skrev <em class="citetitle">Romeo og Julie</em> i
3415 1595. Skuespillet ble først utgitt i 1597. Det var det ellevte store
3416 skuespillet Shakespeare hadde skrevet. Han fortsatte å skrive skuespill helt
3417 til 1613, og stykkene han skrevhar fortsatt å definere angloamerikansk
3418 kultur siden. Så dypt har verkene av en 1500-talls forfatter sunket inn i
3419 vår kultur at vi ofte ikke engang kjenner kilden. Jeg overhørte en gang noen
3420 som kommentere Kenneth Branaghs utgave av Henry V: "Jeg likte det, men
3421 Shakespeare er så full av klisjeer."
3422 </p><p>
3423
3424 I 1774, nesten 180 år etter at <em class="citetitle">Romeo og Julie</em> ble
3425 skrevet, mente mange at "opphavsretten" kun tilhørte én eneste utgiver i
3426 London, John Tonson. <sup>[<a name="id2826311" href="#ftn.id2826311" class="footnote">98</a>]</sup> Tonson var den
3427 mest fremstående av en liten gruppe utgivere kalt "the Conger"<sup>[<a name="id2826341" href="#ftn.id2826341" class="footnote">99</a>]</sup>, som kontrollerte boksalget i England gjennom hele
3428 1700-tallet. The Conger hevdet at de hadde en evigvarende rett over "kopier"
3429 av bøker de hadde fått av forfatterne. Denne evigvarende retten innebar at
3430 ingen andre kunne publisere kopier av disse bøkene. Slik ble prisen på
3431 klassiske bøker holdt oppe; alle konkurrenter som lagde bedre eller
3432 billigere utgaver, ble fjernet.
3433 </p><p>
3434 Men altså, det er noe spennende med året 1774 for alle som vet litt om
3435 opphavsretts-lovgivning. Det mest kjente året for opphavsrett er 1710, da
3436 det britiske parlamentet vedtok den første loven. Denne loven er kjent som
3437 "Statute of Anne" og sa at alle publiserte verk skulle være beskyttet i
3438 fjorten år, en periode som kunne fornyes én gang dersom forfatteren ennå
3439 levde, og at alle verk publisert i eller før 1710 skulle ha en ekstraperiode
3440 på 22 tillegsår.<sup>[<a name="id2826378" href="#ftn.id2826378" class="footnote">100</a>]</sup> På grunn av denne
3441 loven, så skulle <em class="citetitle">Rome og Julie</em> ha falt i det fri i
3442 1731. Hvordan kunne da Tonson fortsatt ha kontroll over verket i 1774?
3443 </p><p>
3444 Årsaken var ganske enkelt at engelskmennene ennå ikke hadde bestemt hva
3445 opphavsrett innebar -- faktisk hadde ingen i verden det. På den tiden da
3446 engelskmennene vedtok "Statute of Anne", var det ingen annen lovgivning om
3447 opphavsrett. Den siste loven som regulerte utgivere var lisensieringsloven
3448 av 1662, utløpt i 1695. At loven ga utgiverne monopol over publiseringen,
3449 noe som gjorde det enklere for kronen å kontrollere hva ble publisert. Men
3450 etter at det har utløpt, var det ingen positiv lov som sa at utgiverne hadde
3451 en eksklusiv rett til å trykke bøker.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2826418"></a>
3452 </p><p>
3453 At det ikke fantes noen <span class="emphasis"><em>positiv</em></span> lov, betydde ikke at
3454 det ikke fantes noen lov. Den anglo-amerikanske juridiske tradisjon ser både
3455 til lover skapt av politikere (det lovgivende statsorgen)og til lover
3456 (prejudikater) skapt av domstolene for å bestemme hvordan folket skal
3457 leve. Vi kaller politikernes lover for positiv lov og vi kaller lovene fra
3458 dommerne sedvanerett."Common law" angir bakgrunnen for de lovgivendes
3459 lovgivning; retten til lovgiving, vanligvis kan trumfe at bakgrunnen bare
3460 hvis det går gjennom en lov til å forskyve den. Og så var det virkelige
3461 spørsmålet etter lisensiering lover hadde utløpt om felles lov beskyttet
3462 opphavsretten, uavhengig av lovverket positiv.
3463 </p><p>
3464
3465 Dette spørsmålet var viktig for utgiverne eller "bokselgere," som de ble
3466 kalt, fordi det var økende konkurranse fra utenlandske utgivere, Særlig fra
3467 Skottland hvor publiseringen og eksporten av bøker til England hadde økt
3468 veldig. Denne konkurransen reduserte fortjenesten til "The Conger", som
3469 derfor krevde at parlamentet igjen skulle vedta en lov for å gi dem
3470 eksklusiv kontroll over publisering. Dette kravet resulterte i "Statute of
3471 Anne".
3472 </p><p>
3473 "Statute of Anne" ga forfatteren eller "eieren" av en bok en eksklusiv rett
3474 til å publisere denne boken. Men det var, til bokhandernes forferdelse en
3475 viktig begrensning, nemlig hvor lenge denne retten skulle vare. Etter dette
3476 gikk trykkeretten bort og verket falt i det fri og kunne trykkes av hvem som
3477 helst. Det var ihvertfall det lovgiverne hadde tenkt.
3478 </p><p>
3479 Men nå det mest interessante med dette: Hvorfor ville parlamentet begrense
3480 trykkeretten? Sprøsmålet er ikke hvorfor de bestemte seg for denne perioden,
3481 men hvorfor ville de begrense retten <span class="emphasis"><em>i det hele tatt?</em></span>
3482 </p><p>
3483 Bokhandlerne, og forfatterne som de representerte, hadde et veldig sterkt
3484 krav. Ta <em class="citetitle">romeo og Julie</em> som et eksempel: Skuespillet
3485 ble skrevet av Shakespeare. Det var hans kreativitet som brakte det til
3486 verden. Han krenket ikke noens rett da han skrev dette verket (det er en
3487 kontroversiell påstanden, men det er urelevant), og med sin egen rett skapte
3488 han verket, han gjorde det ikke noe vanskeligere for andre til å lage
3489 skuespill. Så hvorfor skulle loven tillate at noen annen kunne komme og ta
3490 Shakespeares verkuten hans, eller hans arvingers, tillatelse? Hvilke grunner
3491 finnes for å tillate at noen "stjeler" Shakespeares verk?
3492 </p><p>
3493 Svaret er todel. Først må vi se på noe spesielt med oppfatningen av
3494 opphavsrett som fantes på tidspunktet da "Statute of Anne" ble
3495 vedtatt. Deretter må vi se på noe spesielt med bokhandlerne.
3496 </p><p>
3497
3498 Først om opphavsretten. I de siste tre hundre år har vi kommet til å bruke
3499 begrepet "copyright" i stadig videre forstand. Men i 1710 var det ikke så
3500 mye et konsept som det var en bestemt rett. Opphavsretten ble født som et
3501 svært spesifikt sett med begrensninger: den forbød andre å reprodusere en
3502 bok. I 1710 var "kopi-rett" en rett til å bruke en bestemt maskin til å
3503 replikere en bestemt arbeid. Den gikk ikke utover dette svært smale
3504 formålet. Den kontrollerte ikke mer generelt hvordan et verk kunne
3505 <span class="emphasis"><em>brukes</em></span>. Idag inkluderer retten en stor samling av
3506 restriksjoner på andres frihet: den gir forfatteren eksklusiv rett til å
3507 kopiere, eksklusiv rett til å distribuere, eksklusiv rett til å fremføre, og
3508 så videre.
3509 </p><p>
3510 Så selv om f. eks. opphavsretten til Shakespeares verker var evigvarende,
3511 betydde det under den opprinnelige betydningen av begrepet at ingen kunne
3512 trykke Shakespeares arbeid uten tillatelse fra Shakespeares arvinger. Den
3513 ville ikke ha kontrollert noe mer, for eksempel om hvordan verket kunne
3514 fremføres, om verket kunne oversettes eller om Kenneth Branagh ville hatt
3515 lov til å lage filmer. "Kopi-retten" var bare en eksklusiv rett til å
3516 trykke--ikke noe mindre, selvfølgelig, men heller ikke mer.
3517 </p><p>
3518 Selv dnne begrensede retten ble møtt med skepsis av britene. De hadde hatt
3519 en lang og stygg erfaring med "eksklusive rettigheter," spesielt "enerett"
3520 gitt av kronen. Engelskmennene hadde utkjempet en borgerkrig delvis mot
3521 kronens praksis med å dele ut monopoler--spesielt monopoler for verk som
3522 allerede eksisterte. Kong Henrik VIII hadde gitt patent til å trykke Bibelen
3523 og monopol til Darcy for å lage spillkort. Det engelske parlamentet begynte
3524 å kjempe tilbake mot denne makten hos kronen. I 1656 ble "Statute of
3525 Monopolis" vedtatt for å begrense monopolene på patenter for nye
3526 oppfinnelser. Og i 1710 var parlamentet ivrig etter å håndtere det voksende
3527 monopolet på publisering.
3528 </p><p>
3529 Dermed ble "kopi-retten", når den sees på som en monopolrett, en rettighet
3530 som bør være begrenset. (Uansett hvor overbevisende påstanden om at "det er
3531 min eiendom, og jeg skal ha for alltid," prøv hvor overbevisende det er når
3532 men sier "det er mitt monopol, og jeg skal ha det for alltid.") Staten ville
3533 beskytte eneretten, men bare så lenge det gavnet samfunnet. Britene så
3534 skadene særinteresserte kunne skape; de vedtok en lov for å stoppe dem.
3535 </p><p>
3536 Dernest, om bokhandlerne. Det var ikke bare at kopiretten var et
3537 monopol. Det var også et monopol holdt av bokhandlerne. En bokhandler høres
3538 greie og ufarlige ut for oss, men slik var det ikke i syttenhundretallets
3539 England. Medlemmene i "the Conger" ble av en voksende mengde sett på som
3540 monopolister av verste sort - et verktøy for kronens undertrykkelse, de
3541 solgte Englands frihet mot å være garantert en monopolskinntekt. Men
3542 monopolistene ble kvast kritisert: Milton beskrev dem som "gamle
3543 patentholdere og monopolister i bokhandlerkunsten"; de var "menn som derfor
3544 ikke hadde  et ærlig arbeide hvor utdanning er nødvendig."<sup>[<a name="id2826620" href="#ftn.id2826620" class="footnote">101</a>]</sup>
3545 </p><p>
3546 Mange trodde at den makten bokhandlerne utøvde over spredning av kunnskap,
3547 var til skade for selve spredningen, men på dette tidspunktet viste
3548 Opplysningen viktigheten av utdannelse og kunnskap for alle. idéen om at
3549 kunnskap burde være gratis er et kjennetegn for tiden, og disse kraftige
3550 kommersielle interesser forstyrret denne idéen.
3551 </p><p>
3552 For å balansere denne makten, besluttet Parlamentet å øke konkurransen blant
3553 bokhandlerne, og den enkleste måten å gjøre det på, var å spre mengden av
3554 verdifulle bøker. Parlamentet begrenset derfor begrepet om opphavsrett, og
3555 garantert slik at verdifulle bøker ville bli frie for alle utgiver å
3556 publisere etter en begrenset periode. Slik ble det å gi eksisterende verk en
3557 periode på tjueen år et kompromiss for å bekjempe bokhandlernes
3558 makt. Begrensninger med dato var en indirekte måte å skape konkurranse
3559 mellom utgivere, og slik en skapelse og spredning av kultur.
3560 </p><p>
3561 Når 1731 (1710+21) kom, ble bokhandlerne engstelige. De så konsekvensene av
3562 mer konkurranse, og som alle konkurrenter, likte de det ikke. Først
3563 ignorerte bokhandlere ganske enkelt "Statute of Anne", og fortsatte å kreve
3564 en evigvarende rett til å kontrollere publiseringen. Men i 1735 og 1737 de
3565 prøvde å tvinge Parlamentet til å utvide periodene. Tjueen år var ikke nok,
3566 sa de; de trengte mer tid.
3567 </p><p>
3568 Parlamentet avslo kravene, Som en pamflett sa, i en vending som levere ennå
3569 idag,
3570 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3571 Jeg ser ingen grunn til å gi en utvidet perioden nå som ikke ville kunne gi
3572 utvidelser om igjen og om igjen, så fort de gamle utgår; så dersom dette
3573 lovforslaget blir vedtatt, vil effekten være: at et evig monopol blir skapt,
3574 et stort nederlag for handelen, et angrep mot kunnskapen, ingen fordel for
3575 forfatterne, men en stor avgift for folket; og alt dette kun for å øke
3576 bokhandlernes personlige rikdom.<sup>[<a name="id2826698" href="#ftn.id2826698" class="footnote">102</a>]</sup>
3577 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3578 Etter å ha mislyktes i Parlamentet gikk utgiverne til rettssalen i en rekke
3579 saker. Deres argument var enkelt og direkte: "Statute of Anne" ga
3580 forfatterne en viss beskyttelse gjennom positiv loven, men denne
3581 beskyttelsenvar ikke ment som en erstatning for felles lov. Istedet var de
3582 ment å supplere felles lov. Ifølge sedvanerett var det galt å ta en annen
3583 persons kreative eiendom og bruke den uten hans tillatelse. "Statute of
3584 Anne", hevdet bokhandlere, endret ikke dette faktum. Derfor betydde ikke det
3585 at beskyttelsen gitt av "Statute of Anne" utløp, at beskyttelsen fra
3586 sedvaneretten utløp: Ifølge sedvaneretten hadde de rett til å fordømme
3587 publiseringen av en bok, selv følgelig om "Statute of Anne" sa at de var
3588 falt i det fri. Dette, mente de, var den eneste måten å beskytte
3589 forfatterne.
3590 </p><p>
3591 Dette var et godt argument, og hadde støtte fra flere av den tidens ledende
3592 jurister. Det viste også en ekstraordinær chutzpah. Inntail da, som
3593 jusprofessor Raymond Pattetson har sagt, "var utgiverne &#8230; like
3594 bekymret for forfatterne som en gjeter for sine lam."<sup>[<a name="id2825200" href="#ftn.id2825200" class="footnote">103</a>]</sup> Bokselgerne brydde seg ikke det spor om
3595 forfatternes rettigheter. Deres bekymring var den monopolske inntekten
3596 forfatterens verk ga.
3597 </p><p>
3598 Men bokhandlernes argument ble ikke godtatt uten kamp. Helten fra denne
3599 kampen var den skotske bokselgeren Alexander Donaldson.<sup>[<a name="id2826788" href="#ftn.id2826788" class="footnote">104</a>]</sup>
3600 </p><p>
3601 Donaldson var en fremmed for Londons "the Conger". Han startet in karriere i
3602 Edinburgh i 1750. Hans forretningsidé var billige kopier av standardverk
3603 falt i det fri, ihvertfall fri ifølge "Statute of Anne".<sup>[<a name="id2826810" href="#ftn.id2826810" class="footnote">105</a>]</sup> Donaldsons forlag vokste og ble "et sentrum for
3604 litterære skotter." "Blant dem," skriver professor Mark Rose, var "den unge
3605 James Boswell som, sammen med sin venn Andrew Erskine, publiserte en hel
3606 antologi av skotsk samtidspoesi sammen med Donaldson."<sup>[<a name="id2826829" href="#ftn.id2826829" class="footnote">106</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2826837"></a>
3607 </p><p>
3608 Da Londons bokselgere prøvde å få stengt Donaldsons butikk i Skottland, så
3609 flyttet han butikken til London. Her solgte han billige utgaver av "de mest
3610 populære, engelske bøker, i kamp mot sedvanerettens rett til litterær
3611 eiendom." <sup>[<a name="id2826855" href="#ftn.id2826855" class="footnote">107</a>]</sup> Bøkene hans var mellom 30%
3612 og 50% billigere enn "the Conger"s, og han baserte sin rett til denne
3613 konkurransen på at bøkene, takket være "Statute of Anne", var falt i det
3614 fri.
3615 </p><p>
3616 Londons bokselgere begynte straks å slå ned mot "pirater" som
3617 Donaldson. Flere tiltak var vellykkede, den viktigste var den tidlig seieren
3618 i kampen mellom <em class="citetitle">Millar</em> og
3619 <em class="citetitle">Taylor</em>.
3620 </p><p>
3621 Millar var en bokhandler som i 1729 hadde kjøpt opp rettighetene til James
3622 Thomsons dikt "The Seasons". Millar hadde da full beskyttelse gjennom
3623 "Statute of Anne", men etter at denne beskyttelsen var uløpt, begynte Robert
3624 Taylor å trykke et konkurrerende bind. Millar gikk til sak, og hevdet han
3625 hadde en evig rett gjennom sedvaneretten, uansett hva "Statute of Anne"
3626 sa.<sup>[<a name="id2826901" href="#ftn.id2826901" class="footnote">108</a>]</sup>
3627 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxmansfield2"></a><p>
3628 Til moderne juristers forbløffelse, var en av, ikke bare datidens, men en av
3629 de største dommere i engelsk historie, Lord Mansfield, enig med
3630 bokhandlerne. Uansett hvilken beskyttelse "Statute of Anne" gav
3631 bokhandlerne, så sa han at den ikke fortrengte noe fra
3632 sedvaneretten. Spørsmålet var hvorvidt sedvaneretten beskyttet forfatterne
3633 mot pirater. Mansfield svar var ja: Sedvaneretten nektet Taylor å
3634 reprodusere Thomsons dikt uten Millars tillatelse. Slik gav sedvaneretten
3635 bokselgerne en evig publiseringsrett til bøker solgt til dem.
3636 </p><p>
3637
3638 Ser man på det som et spørsmål innen abstrakt jus - dersom man resonnere som
3639 om rettferdighet bare var logisk deduksjon fra de første bud - kunne
3640 Mansfields konklusjon gitt mening. Men den overså det Parlamentet hadde
3641 kjempet for i 1710: Hvordan man på best mulig vis kunne innskrenke
3642 utgivernes monopolmakt. Parlamentets strategi hadde vært å kjøpe fred
3643 gjennom å tilby en beskyttelsesperiode også for eksisterende verk, men
3644 perioden måtte være så kort at kulturen ble utsatt for konkurranse innen
3645 rimelig tid. Storbritannia skulle vokse fra den kontrollerte kulturen under
3646 kronen, inn i en fri og åpen kultur.
3647 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2826968"></a><p>
3648 Kampen for å forsvare "Statute of Anne"s begrensninger sluttet uansett ikke
3649 der, for nå kommer Donaldson.
3650 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2826983"></a><p>
3651 Millar døde kort tid etter sin seier. Boet hans solgte rettighetene over
3652 Thomsons dikt til et syndikat av utgivere, deriblant Thomas
3653 Beckett.<sup>[<a name="id2826996" href="#ftn.id2826996" class="footnote">109</a>]</sup> Da ga Donaldson ut en
3654 uautorisert utgave av Thomsons verk. Etter avgjørelsen i
3655 <em class="citetitle">Millar</em>-saken, gikk Beckett til sak mot
3656 Donaldson. Donaldson tok saken inn for Overhuset, som da fungerte som en
3657 slags høyesterett. I februar 1774 hadde dette organet muligheten til å tolke
3658 Parlamentets mening med utøpsdatoen fra seksti år før.
3659 </p><p>
3660 Rettssaken <em class="citetitle">Donaldson</em> mot
3661 <em class="citetitle">Beckett</em> fikk en enorm oppmerksomhet i hele
3662 Storbritannia. Donaldsons advokater mente at selv om det før fantes en del
3663 rettigheter i sedvaneretten, så var disse fortrengt av "Statute of
3664 Anne". Etter at "Statute of Anne" var blitt vedtatt, skulle den eneste
3665 lovlige beskyttelse for trykkerett kom derfra. Og derfor, mente de, i tråd
3666 med vilkårene i "Statute of Anne", falle i det fri så fort
3667 beskyttelsesperioden var over.
3668 </p><p>
3669 Overhuset var en merkelig institusjon. Juridiske spørsmål ble presentert for
3670 huset, og ble først stemt over av "juslorder", medlemmer av enspesiell
3671 rettslig gruppe som fungerte nesten slik som justiariusene i vår
3672 Høyesterett. Deretter, etter at "juslordene" hadde stemt, stemte resten av
3673 Overhuset.
3674 </p><p>
3675
3676 Rapportene om juslordene stemmer er uenige. På enkelte punkter ser det ut
3677 som om evigvarende beskyttelse fikk flertall. Men det er ingen tvil om
3678 hvordan resten av Overhuset stemte. Med en majoritet på to mot en (22 mot
3679 11) stemte de ned forslaget om en evig beskyttelse. Uansett hvordan man
3680 hadde tolket sedvaneretten, var nå kopiretten begrenset til en periode, og
3681 etter denne ville verket falle i det fri.
3682 </p><p>
3683 "Å falle i det fri". Før rettssaken <em class="citetitle">Donaldson</em> mot
3684 <em class="citetitle">Beckett</em> var det ingen klar oppfatning om hva å falle
3685 i det fri innebar. Før 1774 var det jo en allmenn oppfatning om at
3686 kopiretten var evigvarende. Men etter 1774 ble Public Domain født.For første
3687 gang i angloamerikansk historie var den lovlige beskyttelsen av et verk
3688 utgått, og de største verk i engelsk historie - inkludert Shakespeare,
3689 Bacon, Milton, Johnson og Bunyan - var frie.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2827093"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2827099"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2827105"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2827111"></a>
3690 <a class="indexterm" name="id2827118"></a>
3691 </p><p>
3692 Vi kan knapt forestille oss det, men denne avgjørelsen fra Overhuset fyrte
3693 opp under en svært populær og politisk reaksjon. I Skottland, hvor de fleste
3694 piratugiverne hadde holdt til, ble avgjørelsen feiret i gatene. Som
3695 <em class="citetitle">Edinburgh Advertiser</em> skrev "Ingen privatsak har noen
3696 gang fått slik oppmerksomhet fra folket, og ingen sak som har blitt prøvet i
3697 Overhuset har interessert så mange enkeltmennesker." "Stor glede i Edinburgh
3698 etter seieren over litterær eiendom: bål og *illuminations*.<sup>[<a name="id2827146" href="#ftn.id2827146" class="footnote">110</a>]</sup>
3699 </p><p>
3700 I London, ihvertfall blant utgiverne, var reaksjonen like sterk, men i
3701 motsatt retning. <em class="citetitle">Morning Chronicle</em> skrev:
3702 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3703 Gjennom denne avgjørelsen &#8230; er verdier til nesten 200 000 pund, som
3704 er blitt ærlig kjøpt gjennom allment salg, og som i går var eiendom, er nå
3705 redusert til ingenting. Bokselgerne i London og Westminster, mange av dem
3706 har solgt hus og eiendom for å kjøpe kopirettigheter, er med ett ruinerte,
3707 og mange som gjennom mange år har opparbeidet kompetanse for å brødfø
3708 familien, sitter nå uten en shilling til sine.<sup>[<a name="id2826763" href="#ftn.id2826763" class="footnote">111</a>]</sup>
3709 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3710
3711
3712 Ruinert er en overdrivelse. Men det er ingen overdrivelse å si at endringen
3713 var stor. Vedtaket fra Overhuset betydde at bokhandlerne ikke lenger kunnen
3714 kontrollere hvordan kulturen i England ville vokse og utvikle seg. Kulturen
3715 i England var etter dette <span class="emphasis"><em>fri</em></span>. Ikke i den betydning at
3716 kopiretten ble ignorert, for utgiverne hadde i en begrenset periode rett
3717 over trykkingen. Og heller ikke i den betydningen at bøker kunne stjeles,
3718 for selv etter at boken var falt i det fri, så måtte den kjøpes. Men
3719 <span class="emphasis"><em>fri</em></span> i betydningen at kulturen og dens vekst ikke lenger
3720 var kontrollert av en liten gruppe utgivere. Som alle frie markeder, ville
3721 dette markedet vokse og utvikle seg etter tilbud og etterspørsel. Den
3722 engelske kulturen ble nå formet slik flertallet Englands lesere ville at det
3723 skulle formes - gjennom valget av hva de kjøpte og skrev, gjennom valget av
3724 *memes* de gjentok og beundret. Valg i en <span class="emphasis"><em>konkurrerende
3725 sammenheng</em></span>, ikke der hvor valgene var om hvilken kultur som
3726 skulle være tilgjengelig for folket og hvor deres tilgang til den ble styrt
3727 av noen få, på tros av flertallets ønsker.
3728 </p><p>
3729 Til sist, dette var en verden hvor Parlamentet var antimonopolistisk, og
3730 holdt stand mot utgivernes krav. I en verden hvor parlamentet er lett å
3731 påvirke, vil den frie kultur være mindre beskyttet.
3732 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826311" href="#id2826311" class="para">98</a>] </sup>
3733
3734
3735 Jacob Tonson er vanligvis husket for sin omgang med 1700-tallets litterære
3736 storheter, spesielt John Dryden, og for hans kjekke"ferdige versjoner" av
3737 klassiske verk. I tillegg til <em class="citetitle">Romeo og Julie</em>, utga
3738 han en utrolig rekke liste av verk som ennå er hjertet av den engelske
3739 kanon, inkludert de samlede verk av Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, John Milton, og
3740 John Dryden. Se Keith Walker: "Jacob Tonson, Bookseller,"
3741 <em class="citetitle">American Scholar</em> 61:3 (1992): 424-31.
3742 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826341" href="#id2826341" class="para">99</a>] </sup>
3743
3744
3745 Lyman Ray Patterson, <em class="citetitle">Copyright in Historical
3746 Perspective</em> (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968),
3747 151&#8211;52.
3748 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826378" href="#id2826378" class="para">100</a>] </sup>
3749
3750 Som Siva Vaidhyanathan så pent argumenterer, er det feilaktige å kalle dette
3751 en "opphavsrettslov." Se Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
3752 Copywrongs</em>, 40.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2826389"></a>
3753 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826620" href="#id2826620" class="para">101</a>] </sup>
3754
3755
3756
3757 Philip Wittenberg, <em class="citetitle">The Protection and Marketing of Literary
3758 Property</em> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
3759 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826698" href="#id2826698" class="para">102</a>] </sup>
3760
3761
3762 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending in the
3763 House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the Eighth Year of the
3764 Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
3765 Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
3766 Copies, during the Times therein mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici
3767 Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
3768 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
3769 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2825200" href="#id2825200" class="para">103</a>] </sup>
3770
3771 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,"
3772 <em class="citetitle">Vanderbilt Law Review</em> 40 (1987): 28. For en
3773 fantastisk overbevisende fortelling, se Vaidhyanathan, 37&#8211;48.
3774 <a class="indexterm" name="id2826351"></a>
3775 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826788" href="#id2826788" class="para">104</a>] </sup>
3776
3777
3778 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <em class="citetitle">Authorship and
3779 Copyright</em> (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&#8211;69.
3780 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826810" href="#id2826810" class="para">105</a>] </sup>
3781
3782
3783 Mark Rose, <em class="citetitle">Authors and Owners</em> (Cambridge: Harvard
3784 University Press, 1993), 92.
3785 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826829" href="#id2826829" class="para">106</a>] </sup>
3786
3787
3788 Ibid., 93.
3789 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826855" href="#id2826855" class="para">107</a>] </sup>
3790
3791
3792 Lyman Ray Patterson, <em class="citetitle">Copyright in Historical
3793 Perspective</em>, 167 (quoting Borwell).
3794 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826901" href="#id2826901" class="para">108</a>] </sup>
3795
3796
3797 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
3798 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," <em class="citetitle">Wayne Law
3799 Review</em> 29 (1983): 1152.
3800 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826996" href="#id2826996" class="para">109</a>] </sup>
3801
3802
3803 Ibid., 1156.
3804 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2827146" href="#id2827146" class="para">110</a>] </sup>
3805
3806
3807 Rose, 97.
3808 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2826763" href="#id2826763" class="para">111</a>] </sup>
3809
3810
3811 ibid.
3812 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="recorders"></a>Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</h2></div></div></div><p>
3813 Jon Else er en filmskaper. Han er mest kjent for sine dokumentarer og har på
3814 ypperlig vis klart å spre sin kunst. Han er også en lærer, som meg selv, og
3815 jeg misunner den lojaliteten og beundringen hans studenter har for ham. (Ved
3816 et uhell møtte jeg to av hans studenter i et middagsselskap og han var deres
3817 Gud.)
3818 </p><p>
3819 Else arbeidet med en dokumentarfilm hvor også jeg var involvert. I en pause
3820 så fortalte han meg om hvordan det kunne være å skape film i dagens Amerika.
3821 </p><p>
3822 I 1990 arbeidet Else med en dokumentar om Wagners Ring Cycle. Fokuset var på
3823 *stagehands* på San Francisco Opera. Stagehands er spesielt morsomt og
3824 fargerikt innslag i en opera. I løpet av forestillingen oppholder de seg
3825 blant publikum og på lysloftet. De er en perfekt kontrast til kunsten på
3826 scenen.<a class="indexterm" name="id2827296"></a>
3827 </p><p>
3828
3829 Under en forestilling, filmet Else noen stagehands som spilte *checkers*. I
3830 et hjørne av rommet stod det et fjernsynsapparat. På fjernsynet, mens
3831 forestillingen pågikk og operakompaniet spilte Wagner, gikk <em class="citetitle">The
3832 Simpsons</em>. Slik Else så det, så hjalp dette tegnefilm-innslaget
3833 med å fange det spesielle med scenen.
3834 </p><p>
3835 Så noen år senere, da han endelig hadde fått ordnet den siste
3836 finansieringen, ville Else skaffe rettigheter til å bruke disse få sekundene
3837 med <em class="citetitle">The Simpson</em>. For disse få sekundene var selvsagt
3838 beskyttet av opphavsretten, og for å bruke beskyttet materiale må man ha
3839 tillatelse fra eieren, dersom det ikke er "rimelig bruk" eller det
3840 foreligger spesielle avtaler.
3841 </p><p>
3842 Else kontaktet <em class="citetitle">Simpson</em>-skaper Matt Groenings kontor
3843 for å få tillatelse. Og Groening gav ham det. Det var tross alt kun snakk om
3844 fire og et halvt sekund på et lite fjernsyn, bakerst i et hjørne av
3845 rommet. Hvordan kunne det skade? Groening var glad for å få ha det med i
3846 filmen, men han ba Else om å kontakte Gracie Films, firmaet som produserer
3847 programmet.<a class="indexterm" name="id2827357"></a>
3848 </p><p>
3849 Gracie Films sa også at det var greit, men de, slik som Groening, ønsket å
3850 være forsiktige, og ba Else om å kontakte Fox, konsernet som eide Gracie. Og
3851 Else kontaktet Fox og forklarte situasjonen; at det var snakk om et klipp i
3852 hjørnet i bakgrunnen i ett rom i filmen. Matt Groening hadde allerede gitt
3853 sin tillatelse, sa Else. Han ville bare få det avklart med Fox.<a class="indexterm" name="id2827378"></a>
3854 </p><p>
3855 Deretter, fortalte Else: "skjedde to ting. Først oppdaget vi &#8230; at
3856 Matt Groening ikke eide sitt eget verk &#8212; ihvertfall at noen [hos Fox]
3857 trodde at han ikke eide sitt eget verk." Som det andre krevde Fox "ti tusen
3858 dollar i lisensavgift for disse fire og et halvt sekundene med &#8230;
3859 fullstendig tilfeldig <em class="citetitle">Simpson</em> som var i et hjørne i
3860 ett opptak."
3861 </p><p>
3862 Ellers var sikker på at det var en feil. Han fikk tak i noen som han trodde
3863 var nestleder for lisensiering, Rebecca Herrera. Han forklarte for henne at
3864 "det må være en feil her &#8230; Vi ber deg om en utdanningssats på dette."
3865 Og de hadde fått utdanningssats, fortalte Herrera. Kort tid etter ringte
3866 Else igjen for å få dette bekreftet.
3867 </p><p>
3868
3869 "Jeg måtte være sikker på at jeg hadde riktige opplysninger foran meg," sa
3870 han. "Ja, du har riktige opplysninger," sa hun. Det ville koste $10 000 å
3871 bruke dette lille klippet av <em class="citetitle">The Simpson</em>, plassert
3872 bakerst i et hjørne i en scene i en dokumentar om Wagners Ring Cycle. Som om
3873 det ikke var nok, forbløffet Herrera Else med å si "Og om du siterer meg,
3874 vil du høre fra våre advokater." En av Herreras assistenter fortalte Else at
3875 "De bryr seg ikke i det heletatt. Alt de vil ha er pengene."
3876 </p><p>
3877 Men Else hadde ikke penger til å kjøpe lisens for klippet. Så å gjenskape
3878 denne delen av virkeligheten, lå langt utenfor hans budsjett. Like før
3879 dokumentaren skulle slippes, redigerte Else inn et annet klipp på
3880 fjernsynet, et klipp fra en av hans andre filmer <em class="citetitle">The Day After
3881 Trinity</em> fra ti år tidligere. <a class="indexterm" name="id2827455"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2827461"></a>
3882 </p><p>
3883 Det er ingen tvil om at noen, enten det er er Matt Groening eller Fox, eier
3884 rettighetene til <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>. Rettighetene er deres
3885 eiendom. For å bruke beskyttet mteriale, kreves det ofte at men får
3886 tillatelse fra eieren eller eierne. Dersom Else ønsket å bruke
3887 <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em> til noe hvor loven gir verket
3888 beskyttelse, så må han innhente tillatelse fra eieren før han kan bruke
3889 det. Og i et fritt markes er det eieren som bestemmer hvor mye han/hun vil
3890 ta for hvilken som helst bruk (hvor loven krever tillatelse fra eier).
3891 </p><p>
3892 For eksempel "offentlig fremvisning"* av <em class="citetitle">The Simpson</em>
3893 er en form for bruk hvor loven gir eieren kontroll. Dersom du velger ut dine
3894 favorittepisoder, leier en kinosal og selger billetter til "Mine
3895 <em class="citetitle">Simpson</em>-favoritter", så må du ha tillatelse fra
3896 rettighetsinnhaveren (eieren). Og eieren kan (med rette, slik jeg ser det)
3897 kreve hvor mye han vil; $10ellr $1 000 000. Det er hans rett ifølge loven.
3898 </p><p>
3899 Men når jurister hører denne historien om Jon Else og Fox, så er deres
3900 første tanke "rimelig bruk".<sup>[<a name="id2827518" href="#ftn.id2827518" class="footnote">112</a>]</sup> Elses bruk
3901 av 4,5 sekunder med et indirekte klipp av en
3902 <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em>-episode er et klart eksempel på "rimelig
3903 bruk" av <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>&#8212; og "rimelig bruk" krever
3904 ingen tillatelse fra noen.
3905 </p><p>
3906
3907
3908 Så jeg spurte Else om hvorfor han ikke bare stolte på "fair use". Og her er
3909 hans svar:
3910 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
3911 <em class="citetitle">Simpsons</em>-fiaskoen lærte meg om hvor stor avstand det
3912 var mellom det jurister finner urelevant på en abstrakt måte, og hva som er
3913 knusende relevant på en konkret måte for oss som prøver å lage og kringkaste
3914 dokumentarer. Jeg tvilte aldri på at dette helt klart var "rimelig bruk",
3915 men jeg kunne ikke stole på konseptet på noen konkret måte. Og dette er
3916 grunnen:
3917 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
3918
3919
3920 Før våre filmer kan kringkastes, krever nettverket at vi kjøper en "Errors
3921 and Omissions"-forsikring. Den krever en detailjert "visual cue sheet" med
3922 alle kilder og lisens-status på alle scener i filmen. De har et smalt syn på
3923 "fair use", og å påstå at noe er nettopp det kan forsinke, og i verste fall
3924 stoppe, prosessen.
3925 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3926
3927 Jeg skulle nok aldri ha bedt om Matt Groenings tillatelse. Men jeg visste
3928 (ihvertfall fra rykter) at Fox tidligere hadde brukt å jakte på og stoppe
3929 ulisensiert bruk av <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>, på samme måte som
3930 George Lucas var veldig ivrig på å forfølge bruken av <em class="citetitle">Star
3931 Wars</em>. Så jeg bestemte meg for å følge boka, og trodde at vi
3932 kulle få til en gratis, i alle fall rimelig, avtale for fire sekunders bruk
3933 av <em class="citetitle">The Simpsons</em>. Som en dokumentarskaper, arbeidende
3934 på randen av utryddelse, var det siste jeg ønsket en juridisk strid, selv
3935 for å forsvare et prinsipp.
3936 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3937
3938
3939
3940 Jeg snakket faktisk med en av dine kolleger på Stanford Law School &#8230;
3941 som bekreftet at dette var rimelig bruk. Han bekreftet også at Fox ville
3942 "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your life", uavhengig av
3943 sannheten i mine krav. Han gjorde det klart at alt ville koke ned til hvem
3944 som hadde flest jurister og dypest lommer, jeg eller dem.
3945
3946 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
3947
3948
3949 Spørsmålet om "fair use" dukker om regel opp helt mot slutten av prosjektet,
3950 når vi nærmer oss siste frist og er tomme for penger.
3951 </p></li></ol></div></blockquote></div><p>
3952 I teorien betyr "fair use" at du ikke trenger tillatelse. Teorien støtter
3953 derfor den frie kultur og arbeider mot tillatelseskulturen. Men i praksis
3954 fungerer "fair use" helt annerledes. Men de uklare linjene i lovverket, samt
3955 de fryktelige konsekvensene dersom man tar feil, gjør at mange kunstnere
3956 ikke stoler på "fair use". Loven har en svært god hensikt, men praksisen har
3957 ikke fulgt opp.
3958 </p><p>
3959 Dette eksempelet viser hvor langt denne loven har kommet fra sine
3960 syttenhundretalls røtter. Loven som skulle beskytte utgiverne mot
3961 urettferdig piratkonkurranse, hadde utviklet seg til et sverd som slo ned på
3962 _all_ bruk, transformativ* eller ikke.
3963 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2827518" href="#id2827518" class="para">112</a>] </sup>
3964
3965
3966 Ønsker du å lese en flott redegjørelse om hvordan dette er "fair use", og
3967 hvordan advokatene ikke anerkjenner det, så les Richard A. Posner og William
3968 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
3969 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> " (utkast arkivert hos forfatteren),
3970 University of Chicago Law School, 5. august 2003.
3971 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="transformers"></a>Kapittel 9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2827706"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2827712"></a><p>
3972 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc.  Starwave was an
3973 innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop
3974 digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave
3975 began investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
3976 anticipation of the power of networks.
3977 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2827727"></a><p>
3978 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by the
3979 emerging market for CD-ROM technology&#8212;not to distribute film, but to
3980 do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.  In 1993, he
3981 launched an initiative to develop a product to build retrospectives on the
3982 work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was Clint Eastwood. The
3983 idea was to showcase all of the work of Eastwood, with clips from his films
3984 and interviews with figures important to his career.
3985 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2827735"></a><p>
3986 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and as a
3987 director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood, asking him
3988 about his career. Because Starwave produced those interviews, it was free to
3989 include them on the CD.
3990 </p><p>
3991
3992
3993 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so Starwave
3994 wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career: posters,
3995 scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood made. Most of his
3996 career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was relatively easy to get
3997 permission for that content.
3998 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2827770"></a><p>
3999 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our goal was
4000 that we were going to have a clip from every one of Eastwood's films," Alben
4001 told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No one had ever really done
4002 this before," Alben explained. "No one had ever tried to do this in the
4003 context of an artistic look at an actor's career."
4004 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2827785"></a><p>
4005 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.  Slade asked,
4006 "Well, what will it take?"
4007 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2827796"></a><p>
4008 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from everyone who
4009 appears in these films, and the music and everything else that we want to
4010 use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go for it."<sup>[<a name="id2827808" href="#ftn.id2827808" class="footnote">113</a>]</sup>
4011 </p><p>
4012 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what clearing
4013 those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films could have a claim
4014 to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD- ROMs had not been specified
4015 in the contracts for the actors, so there was no clear way to know just what
4016 Starwave was to do.
4017 </p><p>
4018 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious pride in his
4019 resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his tale, Alben
4020 recounted just what they did:
4021 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4022 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.  We made some
4023 artistic decisions about what film clips to include&#8212;of course we were
4024 going to use the "Make my day" clip from <em class="citetitle">Dirty
4025 Harry</em>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's
4026 wiggling under the gun and you need to get his permission.  And then you
4027 have to decide what you are going to pay him.
4028 </p><p>
4029
4030
4031 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate for
4032 the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of less than
4033 a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the rate at the time
4034 was about $600.  So we had to identify the people&#8212;some of them were
4035 hard to identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
4036 crashing through the glass&#8212;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And
4037 then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we
4038 just started calling people.
4039 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2827869"></a><p>
4040 Some actors were glad to help&#8212;Donald Sutherland, for example, followed
4041 up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.  Others were
4042 dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask, "Hey, can I pay you $600
4043 or maybe if you were in two films, you know, $1,200?" And they would say,
4044 "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love to get $1,200." And some of course were a
4045 bit difficult (estranged ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and
4046 his team had cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint
4047 Eastwood's career.
4048 </p><p>
4049 It was one <span class="emphasis"><em>year</em></span> later&#8212;"and even then we weren't
4050 sure whether we were totally in the clear."
4051 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2827906"></a><p>
4052 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and the
4053 only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive project for
4054 the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
4055 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4056 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their hands
4057 and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's the music,
4058 there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the actors." But we
4059 just broke it down. We just put it into its constituent parts and said,
4060 "Okay, there's this many actors, this many directors, &#8230; this many
4061 musicians," and we just went at it very systematically and cleared the
4062 rights.
4063 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4064
4065
4066
4067 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood loved it,
4068 and it sold very well.
4069 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2827942"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2827947"></a><p>
4070 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to take a
4071 year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
4072 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is nothing so
4073 useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
4074 all."<sup>[<a name="id2827960" href="#ftn.id2827960" class="footnote">114</a>]</sup> Did it make sense, I asked Alben,
4075 that this is the way a new work has to be made?
4076 </p><p>
4077 For, as he acknowledged, "very few &#8230; have the time and resources, and
4078 the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be made. Does
4079 it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what anybody really
4080 thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that you would have to
4081 go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
4082 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4083 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie, he or she
4084 gets paid very well. &#8230; And then when 30 seconds of that performance
4085 is used in a new product that is a retrospective of somebody's career, I
4086 don't think that that person &#8230; should be compensated for that.
4087 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4088 Or at least, is this <span class="emphasis"><em>how</em></span> the artist should be
4089 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of
4090 statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use
4091 of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
4092 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit
4093 permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of
4094 the creative process could be made to be more clean?
4095 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4096
4097 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
4098 mechanism&#8212;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
4099 subject to estranged former spouses&#8212;you'd see a lot more of this work,
4100 because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a retrospective of
4101 someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with lots of media from that
4102 person's career. You'd build in a cost as the producer of one of these
4103 things. You'd build in a cost of paying X dollars to the talent that
4104 performed. But it would be a known cost. That's the thing that trips
4105 everybody up and makes this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If
4106 you knew I have a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to
4107 cost me X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get investments
4108 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I want
4109 a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going to cost
4110 me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for money," then
4111 it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
4112 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2828042"></a><p>
4113 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
4114 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access that
4115 the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a year, how long
4116 would it take someone else? And how much creativity is never made just
4117 because the costs of clearing the rights are so high? These costs are the
4118 burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a Republican hat for a moment, and
4119 get angry for a bit. The government defines the scope of these rights, and
4120 the scope defined determines how much it's going to cost to negotiate
4121 them. (Remember the idea that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the
4122 pilot purchasing flythrough rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles
4123 to San Francisco.)  These rights might well have once made sense; but as
4124 circumstances change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a
4125 well-trained, regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and
4126 ask, "Does this still make sense?"
4127 </p><p>
4128
4129 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only a
4130 few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
4131 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I was
4132 asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer from an
4133 L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a friend, Robert
4134 Fairbank, had produced.
4135 </p><p>
4136 Videoen var en glimrende sammenstilling av filmer fra hver periode i det
4137 tjuende århundret, rammet inn rundt idéen om en episode i TV-serien
4138 <em class="citetitle">60 Minutes</em>. Utførelsen var perfekt, ned til seksti
4139 minutter stoppeklokken. Dommerne elsket enhver minutt av den.
4140 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2828102"></a><p>
4141 Da lysene kom på, kikket jeg over til min medpaneldeltager, David Nimmer,
4142 kanskje den ledende opphavsrettakademiker og utøver i nasjonen. Han hadde en
4143 forbauset uttrykk i ansiktet sitt, mens han tittet ut over rommet med over
4144 250 godt underholdte dommere. Med en en illevarslende tone, begynte han sin
4145 tale med et spørsmål: "Vet dere hvor mange føderale lover som nettopp brutt
4146 i dette rommet?"
4147 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2828122"></a><p>
4148 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this film
4149 hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the rights to
4150 these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law.  Of course,
4151 it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for this
4152 violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle of federal marshals
4153 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point: A year before
4154 anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two years before another
4155 member of our panel, David Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth
4156 Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that
4157 the law would not be friendly to the capacities that this technology would
4158 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
4159 couldn't easily do them legally.
4160 </p><p>
4161 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone building
4162 a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut and paste
4163 architecture of the Internet created&#8212;in a second you can find just
4164 about any image you want; in another second, you can have it planted in your
4165 presentation.
4166 </p><p>
4167 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and its
4168 archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never before
4169 imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on computers
4170 around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes images of
4171 politicians and blends them with music to create biting political
4172 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of the most biting
4173 criticism of the record industry that there is through the mixing of Flash!
4174 and music.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2828150"></a>
4175 </p><p>
4176 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators wanted
4177 to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
4178 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is never
4179 made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the clearance
4180 rules, it doesn't get released.
4181 </p><p>
4182 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of rights so
4183 that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or mix as they
4184 see fit. We could even make this change without necessarily requiring that
4185 the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the system could simply
4186 make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate artists without requiring
4187 an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for example, that says "the
4188 royalty owed the copyright owner of an unregistered work for the derivative
4189 reuse of his work will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in
4190 escrow for the copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could
4191 benefit from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
4192 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he registers
4193 the work.
4194 </p><p>
4195 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be for
4196 objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made; which if
4197 made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.  What reason
4198 would anyone have to oppose it?
4199 </p><p>
4200
4201 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers,
4202 the comic genius of <em class="citetitle">Saturday Night Live</em> and Austin
4203 Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works would work
4204 together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the agreement, DreamWorks
4205 "will acquire the rights to existing motion picture hits and classics, write
4206 new storylines and&#8212;with the use of stateof-the-art digital
4207 technology&#8212;insert Myers and other actors into the film, thereby
4208 creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
4209 </p><p>
4210 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained, "Film
4211 Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing films and
4212 allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap artists have been
4213 doing this for years with music and now we are able to take that same
4214 concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is quoted as saying, "If
4215 anyone can create a way to bring old films to new audiences, it is Mike."
4216 </p><p>
4217 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if you
4218 don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point about this
4219 announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage remains under
4220 copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks announcement is just this: It
4221 is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is free to sample. Any general freedom
4222 to build upon the film archive of our culture, a freedom in other contexts
4223 presumed for us all, is now a privilege reserved for the funny and
4224 famous&#8212;and presumably rich.
4225 </p><p>
4226 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
4227 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use." Much
4228 of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would rely upon so
4229 weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason that the
4230 privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the legal rights
4231 for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.  These costs
4232 mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to defend your fair
4233 use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions so you don't have to
4234 rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative process is a process of
4235 paying lawyers&#8212;again a privilege, or perhaps a curse, reserved for the
4236 few.
4237 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2827808" href="#id2827808" class="para">113</a>] </sup>
4238
4239 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
4240 publicity&#8212;rights an artist has to control the commercial exploitation
4241 of his image.  But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix, Burn" creativity, as
4242 this chapter evinces.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2827737"></a>
4243 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2827960" href="#id2827960" class="para">114</a>] </sup>
4244
4245
4246 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
4247 <em class="citetitle">Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services
4248 Acquisition</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #22</a>.
4249 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 10. Kapittel ni: Samlere"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="collectors"></a>Kapittel 10. Kapittel ni: Samlere</h2></div></div></div><p>
4250 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&#8212;computer codes designed to "spider,"
4251 or automatically search the Internet and copy content&#8212;began running
4252 across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based information
4253 onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San Francisco's
4254 Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet, they started
4255 again. Over and over again, once every two months, these bits of code took
4256 copies of the Internet and stored them.
4257 </p><p>
4258 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of copies. And
4259 at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive that these
4260 copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the world. Using a
4261 technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could enter a Web page, and
4262 see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well as when those pages
4263 changed.
4264 </p><p>
4265 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have appreciated.  In
4266 the dystopia described in <em class="citetitle">1984</em>, old newspapers were
4267 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved of
4268 by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
4269 </p><p>
4270
4271
4272 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was no way
4273 ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the story that was
4274 printed on the date published on the paper.
4275 </p><p>
4276 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today, there's no
4277 way for you to know whether the content you are reading is the same as the
4278 content you read before. The page may seem the same, but the content could
4279 easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's library&#8212;constantly
4280 updated, without any reliable memory.
4281 </p><p>
4282 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and the
4283 Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet was. You have
4284 the power to see what you remember. More importantly, perhaps, you also have
4285 the power to find what you don't remember and what others might prefer you
4286 forget.<sup>[<a name="id2828321" href="#ftn.id2828321" class="footnote">115</a>]</sup>
4287 </p><p>
4288 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
4289 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction of your
4290 hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to Bull Connor's
4291 water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public library and look at the
4292 newspapers. Those papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they
4293 exist in paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back
4294 and remember&#8212;not just what it is convenient to remember, but remember
4295 something close to the truth.
4296 </p><p>
4297 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to repeat
4298 it. That's not quite correct. We <span class="emphasis"><em>all</em></span> forget
4299 history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we
4300 forget. More directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
4301 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it, for
4302 schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this
4303 knowedge.
4304 </p><p>
4305
4306 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
4307 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the quintessentially
4308 transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more important in forming and
4309 reforming society, it becomes more and more important to maintain in some
4310 historical form. It's just bizarre to think that we have scads of archives
4311 of newspapers from tiny towns around the world, yet there is but one copy of
4312 the Internet&#8212;the one kept by the Internet Archive.
4313 </p><p>
4314 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
4315 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
4316 researcher.  In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
4317 success.  It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
4318 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The Internet
4319 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie of the
4320 Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion pages, and it
4321 was growing at about a billion pages a month.
4322 </p><p>
4323 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in human
4324 history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty terabytes of
4325 material"&#8212;and was "ten times larger than the Library of Congress." And
4326 this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set out to build. In
4327 addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been constructing the Television
4328 Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more ephemeral than the
4329 Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture was constructed through
4330 television, only a tiny proportion of that culture is available for anyone
4331 to see today. Three hours of news are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt
4332 University&#8212;thanks to a specific exemption in the copyright law. That
4333 content is indexed, and is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But
4334 other than that, [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you
4335 were Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
4336 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
4337 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4338
4339 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown? Remember
4340 that back and forth surreal experience of a politician interacting with a
4341 fictional television character? If you were a graduate student wanting to
4342 study that, and you wanted to get those original back and forth exchanges
4343 between the two, the <em class="citetitle">60 Minutes</em> episode that came out
4344 after it &#8230; it would be almost impossible. &#8230; Those materials
4345 are almost unfindable. &#8230;
4346 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4347 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded in
4348 newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is recorded
4349 on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world where researchers
4350 trying to understand the effect of media on nineteenthcentury America will
4351 have an easier time than researchers trying to understand the effect of
4352 media on twentieth-century America?
4353 </p><p>
4354 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
4355 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
4356 libraries.  These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
4357 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once the
4358 copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
4359 </p><p>
4360 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of Congress
4361 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long as such
4362 deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to borrow back the
4363 deposits&#8212;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915 alone, there were
4364 more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back." Thus, when the
4365 copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any library. The copy
4366 exists&#8212;if it exists at all&#8212;in the library archive of the film
4367 company.<sup>[<a name="id2828386" href="#ftn.id2828386" class="footnote">116</a>]</sup>
4368 </p><p>
4369 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts were
4370 originally not copyrighted&#8212;there was no way to capture the broadcasts,
4371 so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled capturing,
4372 broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law required they make a
4373 copy of each broadcast for the work to be "copyrighted." But those copies
4374 were simply kept by the broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the
4375 government didn't demand them.  The content of this part of American culture
4376 is practically invisible to anyone who would look.
4377 </p><p>
4378
4379 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and his
4380 allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty stations from
4381 around the world and hit the Record button. After September 11, Kahle,
4382 working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations from around the
4383 world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their coverage during the week
4384 of September 11 available free on-line.  Anyone could see how news reports
4385 from around the world covered the events of that day.
4386 </p><p>
4387 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
4388 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning films
4389 other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted), Kahle
4390 established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize 1,300 films in
4391 this archive and post those films on the Internet to be downloaded for
4392 free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells copies of these films as
4393 stock footage. What he has discovered is that after he made a significant
4394 chunk available for free, his stock footage sales went up
4395 dramatically. People could easily find the material they wanted to use. Some
4396 downloaded that material and made films on their own. Others purchased
4397 copies to enable other films to be made.  Either way, the archive enabled
4398 access to this important part of our culture.  Want to see a copy of the
4399 "Duck and Cover" film that instructed children how to save themselves in the
4400 middle of nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film
4401 in a few minutes&#8212;for free.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2828492"></a>
4402 </p><p>
4403 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
4404 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
4405 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law doesn't
4406 require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in an archive
4407 by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
4408 </p><p>
4409 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to this
4410 content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His aim is
4411 to ensure competition in access to this important part of our culture.  Not
4412 during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but during a
4413 second life that all creative property has&#8212;a noncommercial life.
4414 </p><p>
4415
4416 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit of
4417 creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
4418 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial market
4419 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
4420 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
4421 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial market,
4422 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
4423 </p><p>
4424 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our tradition has
4425 always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers the news every
4426 day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is used to wrap fish
4427 or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive of knowledge
4428 about our history. In this second life, the content can continue to inform
4429 even if that information is no longer sold.
4430 </p><p>
4431 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print very
4432 quickly (the average today is after about a year<sup>[<a name="id2828591" href="#ftn.id2828591" class="footnote">117</a>]</sup>). After it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores
4433 without the copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where
4434 many get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are
4435 thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely important to
4436 the spread and stability of culture.
4437 </p><p>
4438 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for creative
4439 property does not hold true with the most important components of popular
4440 culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
4441 these&#8212;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&#8212;there is no
4442 guarantee of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've
4443 replaced libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture,
4444 what's accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
4445 Beyond that, culture disappears.
4446 </p><p>
4447
4448 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this so. It
4449 would have been insanely expensive to collect and make accessible all
4450 television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily
4451 high. So even though the law in principle would have restricted the ability
4452 of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the real restriction was
4453 economics. The market made it impossibly difficult to do anything about this
4454 ephemeral culture; the law had little practical effect.
4455 </p><p>
4456 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is that
4457 for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
4458 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or distributed
4459 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all books
4460 published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
4461 moving images and sound.
4462 </p><p>
4463 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
4464 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but we are
4465 for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As Kahle
4466 describes,
4467 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4468 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
4469 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of movies,
4470 &#8230; and about one to two million movies [distributed] during the
4471 twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different titles of
4472 books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in this room and
4473 be able to be afforded by a small company.  So we're at a turning point in
4474 our history. Universal access is the goal. And the opportunity of leading a
4475 different life, based on this, is &#8230; thrilling. It could be one of the
4476 things humankind would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of
4477 Alexandria, putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
4478 press.
4479 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4480
4481 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
4482 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
4483 libraries or archives could be. <span class="emphasis"><em>When</em></span> the commercial
4484 life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it
4485 does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and
4486 culture, remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
4487 it; some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
4488 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
4489 become unimaginable for much of our past&#8212;a future
4490 <span class="emphasis"><em>for</em></span> our past. The technology of digital arts could make
4491 the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
4492 </p><p>
4493 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
4494 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to call
4495 these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem, the
4496 "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also someone's
4497 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that Kahle and
4498 others would exercise.
4499 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2828321" href="#id2828321" class="para">115</a>] </sup>
4500
4501
4502 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White House
4503 changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press release
4504 stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later changed,
4505 without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." E-mail from
4506 Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
4507 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2828386" href="#id2828386" class="para">116</a>] </sup>
4508
4509
4510 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
4511 Library of Congress," <em class="citetitle">Film Library Quarterly</em> 13
4512 nos. 2&#8211;3 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <em class="citetitle">Nitrate Won't Wait: A
4513 History of Film Preservation in the United States</em> ( Jefferson,
4514 N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
4515 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2828591" href="#id2828591" class="para">117</a>] </sup>
4516
4517
4518 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord, Bar
4519 Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," <em class="citetitle">Chicago
4520 Tribune</em>, 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published
4521 between 1927 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony
4522 Reese, "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,"
4523 <em class="citetitle">Boston College Law Review</em> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
4524 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="property-i"></a>Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#beginnings">Opphav</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#together">Sammen</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
4525 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association of
4526 America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
4527 administration&#8212;literally. The famous picture of Johnson's swearing-in
4528 on Air Force One after the assassination of President Kennedy has Valenti in
4529 the background. In his almost forty years of running the MPAA, Valenti has
4530 established himself as perhaps the most prominent and effective lobbyist in
4531 Washington.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2828701"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2828745"></a>
4532 </p><p>
4533 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
4534 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal was to
4535 defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.  The
4536 organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
4537 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its board is
4538 made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major producers and
4539 distributors of motion picture and television programs in the United States:
4540 Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth
4541 Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Warner Brothers.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2828764"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2828770"></a>
4542 <a class="indexterm" name="id2828776"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2828783"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2828789"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2828795"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2828801"></a>
4543 </p><p>
4544
4545
4546 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before him has
4547 had as much influence over that organization, or over Washington. As a
4548 Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important political skill of a
4549 Southerner&#8212;the ability to appear simple and slow while hiding a
4550 lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays the simple, humble
4551 man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four books, who finished high
4552 school at the age of fifteen and flew more than fifty combat missions in
4553 World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When Valenti went to Washington, he mastered
4554 the city in a quintessentially Washingtonian way.
4555 </p><p>
4556 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our culture
4557 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting the MPAA rating
4558 system, it has probably avoided a great deal of speech-regulating harm. But
4559 there is an aspect to the organization's mission that is both the most
4560 radical and the most important. This is the organization's effort,
4561 epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine the meaning of "creative
4562 property."
4563 </p><p>
4564 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy perfectly:
4565 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
4566 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
4567 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men and
4568 women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central theme which
4569 animates this entire debate: <span class="emphasis"><em>Creative property owners must be
4570 accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other property
4571 owners in the nation</em></span>. That is the issue.  That is the
4572 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
4573 debates to follow must rest.<sup>[<a name="id2828857" href="#ftn.id2828857" class="footnote">118</a>]</sup>
4574 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4575
4576 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
4577 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The "central
4578 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this: "Creative
4579 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protections resident in
4580 all other property owners in the nation." There are no second-class
4581 citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should be no second-class
4582 property owners.
4583 </p><p>
4584 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated with
4585 such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we use
4586 elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a claim
4587 made by <span class="emphasis"><em>anyone</em></span> who is serious in this debate than this
4588 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is
4589 perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and
4590 scope of "creative property." His views have <span class="emphasis"><em>no</em></span>
4591 reasonable connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull
4592 of his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
4593 Washington.
4594 </p><p>
4595 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and precise
4596 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<sup>[<a name="id2828909" href="#ftn.id2828909" class="footnote">119</a>]</sup> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that "creative
4597 property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and protection resident
4598 in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were
4599 given the same rights as all other property owners, that would effect a
4600 radical, and radically undesirable, change in our tradition.
4601 </p><p>
4602 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for our
4603 tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry that is
4604 instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British overturned in
4605 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a powerful few would
4606 exercise powerful control over how our creative culture would develop.
4607 </p><p>
4608
4609 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you that,
4610 historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to convince
4611 you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our history.  We have
4612 always treated rights in creative property differently from the rights
4613 resident in all other property owners. They have never been the same. And
4614 they should never be the same, because, however counterintuitive this may
4615 seem, to make them the same would be to fundamentally weaken the opportunity
4616 for new creators to create.  Creativity depends upon the owners of
4617 creativity having less than perfect control.
4618 </p><p>
4619 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful of
4620 the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric notwithstanding, in
4621 assuring that the new can displace them. No organization does. No person
4622 does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)  But what's good for the MPAA is
4623 not necessarily good for America. A society that defends the ideals of free
4624 culture must preserve precisely the opportunity for new creativity to
4625 threaten the old.  To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally
4626 wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
4627 Constitution itself.
4628 </p><p>
4629 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly did
4630 they love property that they built into the Constitution an important
4631 requirement. If the government takes your property&#8212;if it condemns your
4632 house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&#8212;it is required,
4633 under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you "just compensation"
4634 for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a
4635 certain sense, sacred. It cannot <span class="emphasis"><em>ever</em></span> be taken from the
4636 property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
4637 </p><p>
4638
4639 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what Valenti
4640 calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the power to
4641 create "creative property," the Constitution <span class="emphasis"><em>requires</em></span>
4642 that after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
4643 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
4644 Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
4645 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not have any
4646 obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
4647 Constitution that requires compensation for your land requires that you lose
4648 your "creative property" right without any compensation at all.
4649 </p><p>
4650 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of property
4651 are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be treated
4652 differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in our
4653 tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be accorded
4654 the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is effectively
4655 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
4656 </p><p>
4657 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.  There
4658 was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.  The
4659 Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be appointed
4660 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college to
4661 produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it did in
4662 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be the first to
4663 admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected some of those
4664 mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should reject as well. So
4665 my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
4666 </p><p>
4667 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at least
4668 try to understand <span class="emphasis"><em>why</em></span>. Why did the framers, fanatical
4669 property types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be
4670 given the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
4671 creative property there must be a public domain?
4672 </p><p>
4673 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the history of
4674 these "creative property" rights, and the control that they enabled.  Once
4675 we see clearly how differently these rights have been defined, we will be in
4676 a better position to ask the question that should be at the core of this
4677 war: Not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> creative property should be protected,
4678 but how. Not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> we will enforce the rights the law
4679 gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
4680 ought to be. Not <span class="emphasis"><em>whether</em></span> artists should be paid, but
4681 whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
4682 control how culture develops.
4683 </p><p>
4684
4685
4686
4687 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about how
4688 property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way than the
4689 narrow language of the law allows. In <em class="citetitle">Code and Other Laws of
4690 Cyberspace</em>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
4691 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks how
4692 four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the
4693 right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
4694 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1331"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.1. How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
4695 the right or regulation.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4696 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or group
4697 that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each case
4698 throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.  For
4699 simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)  The ovals represent
4700 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&#8212; either
4701 constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious constraint
4702 (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening punishments after the
4703 fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for example, you
4704 willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song from her latest CD
4705 and posting it on the Web, you can be punished with a $150,000 fine. The
4706 fine is an ex post punishment for violating an ex ante rule. It is imposed
4707 by the state.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2828816"></a>
4708 </p><p>
4709 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an individual
4710 for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is imposed by a
4711 community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be no law against
4712 spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished if you spit on the
4713 ground while standing in line at a movie. The punishment might not be harsh,
4714 though depending upon the community, it could easily be more harsh than many
4715 of the punishments imposed by the state. The mark of the difference is not
4716 the severity of the rule, but the source of the enforcement.
4717 </p><p>
4718 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected through
4719 conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you do N. These
4720 constraints are obviously not independent of law or norms&#8212;it is
4721 property law that defines what must be bought if it is to be taken legally;
4722 it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But given a set of norms,
4723 and a background of property and contract law, the market imposes a
4724 simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or group might behave.
4725 </p><p>
4726 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
4727 "architecture"&#8212;the physical world as one finds it&#8212;is a
4728 constraint on behavior.  A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get
4729 across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community
4730 to integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
4731 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with the
4732 market, architecture effects its constraint through simultaneous
4733 conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing contracts,
4734 or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
4735 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces
4736 this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
4737 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
4738 </p><p>
4739
4740
4741
4742 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is obvious:
4743 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by
4744 another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.
4745 </p><p>
4746 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the effective
4747 freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any particular thing, we
4748 have to consider how these four modalities interact.  Whether or not there
4749 are other constraints (there may well be; my claim is not about
4750 comprehensiveness), these four are among the most significant, and any
4751 regulator (whether controlling or freeing)  must consider how these four in
4752 particular interact.
4753 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxdrivespeed"></a><p>
4754 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high speed. That
4755 freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say how fast you
4756 can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in part restricted
4757 by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most rational drivers;
4758 governors in buses, as another example, set the maximum rate at which the
4759 driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel
4760 efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly
4761 constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not
4762 constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
4763 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The same
4764 norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
4765 </p><p>
4766
4767 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear: While
4768 these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a special role
4769 in affecting the three.<sup>[<a name="id2829250" href="#ftn.id2829250" class="footnote">120</a>]</sup> The law, in
4770 other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a
4771 particular modality.  Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on
4772 gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to drive more slowly. The law
4773 might be used to mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty
4774 of driving rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize
4775 reckless driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be
4776 more strict&#8212;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
4777 limit, for example&#8212;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
4778 driving.
4779 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2829270"></a><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1361"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.2. Law has a special role in affecting the three.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1361.png" alt="Law has a special role in affecting the three."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4780 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To understand
4781 the effective protection of liberty or protection of property at any
4782 particular moment, we must track these changes over time. A restriction
4783 imposed by one modality might be erased by another. A freedom enabled by one
4784 modality might be displaced by another.<sup>[<a name="id2829314" href="#ftn.id2829314" class="footnote">121</a>]</sup>
4785 </p><div class="section" title="Hvorfor Hollywood har rett"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="hollywood"></a>Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</h2></div></div></div><p>
4786 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just how,
4787 Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress and the
4788 courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that rallying makes
4789 sense.
4790 </p><p>
4791 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the Internet:
4792 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1371"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.3. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4793
4794
4795 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
4796 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on those
4797 who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by technologies
4798 that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture) and expensive to
4799 copy and share content (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by
4800 norms we all recognize&#8212;kids, for example, taping other kids'
4801 records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but
4802 the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
4803 this form of infringement.
4804 </p><p>
4805 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and p2p
4806 sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically, as does
4807 the constraint of the market. And as both the market and architecture relax
4808 the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The happy balance (for the
4809 warriors, at least) of life before the Internet becomes an effective state
4810 of anarchy after the Internet.
4811 </p><p>
4812
4813 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
4814 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
4815 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of protection
4816 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq after the fall
4817 of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the looting that
4818 results.
4819 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1381"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.4. effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1381.png" alt="effective state of anarchy after the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
4820 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
4821 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce Department
4822 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995, this mix of
4823 regulatory modalities had already been identified and the strategy to
4824 respond already mapped. In response to the changes the Internet had
4825 effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should strengthen intellectual
4826 property law, (2) businesses should adopt innovative marketing techniques,
4827 (3) technologists should push to develop code to protect copyrighted
4828 material, and (4) educators should educate kids to better protect copyright.
4829 </p><p>
4830
4831 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&#8212;if it was to
4832 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
4833 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry to
4834 push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life you have
4835 as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if something comes
4836 along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a flood plain have no
4837 hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild (and rebuild again) when a
4838 flood (architecture) wipes away their property (law). Farmers have no
4839 hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when a virus
4840 (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to
4841 the government to bail them out when imports (market) wipe out the
4842 U.S. steel industry.
4843 </p><p>
4844 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's campaign
4845 to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a technological
4846 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the changing
4847 technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the content
4848 industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown describes it, its
4849 "architecture of revenue."
4850 </p><p>
4851 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
4852 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because technology
4853 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't follow that the
4854 government should intervene to support that old way of doing
4855 business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20 percent of
4856 their traditional film market to the emerging technologies of digital
4857 cameras.<sup>[<a name="id2829511" href="#ftn.id2829511" class="footnote">122</a>]</sup> Does anyone believe the
4858 government should ban digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have
4859 weakened the freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban
4860 trucks from roads <span class="emphasis"><em>for the purpose of</em></span> protecting the
4861 railroads? Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
4862 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring commercial
4863 comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that
4864 this change has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
4865 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
4866 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch to only
4867 ten channels within an hour?)
4868 </p><p>
4869 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.  In a free
4870 society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and free trade,
4871 the government's role is not to support one way of doing business against
4872 others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect them against loss. If
4873 the government did this generally, then we would never have any progress. As
4874 Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in 1991, in a memo criticizing software
4875 patents, "established companies have an interest in excluding future
4876 competitors."<sup>[<a name="id2829560" href="#ftn.id2829560" class="footnote">123</a>]</sup> And relative to a
4877 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and FM
4878 radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight not only the
4879 market but also the government is a world in which competitors with new
4880 ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and increasingly
4881 concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under Brezhnev.
4882 <a class="indexterm" name="id2829580"></a>
4883 </p><p>
4884 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
4885 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the government
4886 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to guarantee that
4887 that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the duty of policy
4888 makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they create, in response
4889 to the request of those hurt by changing technology, are changes that
4890 preserve the incentives and opportunities for innovation and change.
4891 </p><p>
4892 In the context of laws regulating speech&#8212;which include, obviously,
4893 copyright law&#8212;that duty is even stronger. When the industry
4894 complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in a
4895 way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be especially
4896 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government to get into
4897 the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and dangers of that
4898 game are precisely why our framers created the First Amendment to our
4899 Constitution: "Congress shall make no law &#8230; abridging the freedom of
4900 speech." So when Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge"
4901 the freedom of speech, it should ask&#8212; carefully&#8212;whether such
4902 regulation is justified.
4903 </p><p>
4904
4905 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether the changes
4906 that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are "justified." My argument
4907 is about their effect. For before we get to the question of justification, a
4908 hard question that depends a great deal upon your values, we should first
4909 ask whether we understand the effect of the changes the content industry
4910 wants.
4911 </p><p>
4912 Her kommer metaforen som vil forklare argumentet.
4913 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxddt"></a><p>
4914 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss chemist Paul
4915 Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work demonstrating the
4916 insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the insecticide was widely
4917 used around the world to kill disease-carrying pests. It was also used to
4918 increase farm production.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2829657"></a>
4919 </p><p>
4920 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
4921 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
4922 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
4923 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2829674"></a><p>
4924 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <em class="citetitle">Silent Spring</em>,
4925 which argued that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having
4926 unintended environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
4927 reproduce.  Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2829690"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2829697"></a>
4928 </p><p>
4929 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did not aim
4930 to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems produced
4931 another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than the problems that
4932 were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the problems DDT caused were
4933 worse than the problems it solved, at least when considering the other, more
4934 environmentally friendly ways to solve the problems that DDT was meant to
4935 solve.
4936 </p><p>
4937
4938 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James Boyle
4939 appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
4940 culture.<sup>[<a name="id2829726" href="#ftn.id2829726" class="footnote">124</a>]</sup> His point, and the point I
4941 want to develop in the balance of this chapter, is not that the aims of
4942 copyright are flawed. Or that authors should not be paid for their work. Or
4943 that music should be given away "for free." The point is that some of the
4944 ways in which we might protect authors will have unintended consequences for
4945 the cultural environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And
4946 just as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
4947 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
4948 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
4949 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware of
4950 our actions' effects on the environment.
4951 </p><p>
4952 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly this
4953 effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic effect on
4954 the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But there should
4955 also be little doubt that when you add together the changes in copyright law
4956 over time, plus the change in technology that the Internet is undergoing
4957 just now, the net effect of these changes will not be only that copyrighted
4958 work is effectively protected. Also, and generally missed, the net effect of
4959 this massive increase in protection will be devastating to the environment
4960 for creativity.
4961 </p><p>
4962 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences for free
4963 culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will be lost.
4964 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2829770"></a></div><div class="section" title="Opphav"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="beginnings"></a>Opphav</h2></div></div></div><p>
4965 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
4966 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
4967 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English aim to
4968 avoid overly powerful publishers.
4969 </p><p>
4970 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to Congress in
4971 a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I, section
4972 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
4973 </p><p>
4974
4975 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
4976 by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
4977 to their respective Writings and Discoveries.  We can call this the
4978 "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does not say. It does not say
4979 Congress has the power to grant "creative property rights." It says that
4980 Congress has the power <span class="emphasis"><em>to promote progress</em></span>. The grant
4981 of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of
4982 enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
4983 </p><p>
4984 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw in
4985 chapter <a class="xref" href="#founders" title="Kapittel 7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne">7</a>, the
4986 English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few would not
4987 exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
4988 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers followed
4989 the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the English, the framers
4990 reinforced that objective, by requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors"
4991 only.
4992 </p><p>
4993 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
4994 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
4995 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built a
4996 structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them short. To
4997 prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the federal
4998 government from establishing a church. To prevent concentrating power in the
4999 federal government, they built structures to reinforce the power of the
5000 states&#8212;including the Senate, whose members were at the time selected
5001 by the states, and an electoral college, also selected by the states, to
5002 select the president. In each case, a <span class="emphasis"><em>structure</em></span> built
5003 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to prevent
5004 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
5005 </p><p>
5006 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
5007 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
5008 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
5009 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210 years
5010 since they first struck its design.
5011 </p><p>
5012
5013 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes in
5014 technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a particular
5015 concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we started here:
5016 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1441"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.5. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1331.png" alt="Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5017 Vi kommer til å ende opp her:
5018 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1442"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.6. "Opphavsrett" i dag.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1442.png" alt='"Opphavsrett" i dag.'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5019
5020 La meg forklare hvordan.
5021
5022 </p></div><div class="section" title="Loven: Varighet"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="lawduration"></a>Loven: Varighet</h2></div></div></div><p>
5023 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it faced
5024 the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that the English
5025 had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws protecting creative
5026 property, and some believed that these laws simply supplemented common law
5027 rights that already protected creative authorship.<sup>[<a name="id2829928" href="#ftn.id2829928" class="footnote">125</a>]</sup> This meant that there was no guaranteed public
5028 domain in the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
5029 common law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work published in
5030 the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
5031 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public domain
5032 to reprint and distribute works.
5033 </p><p>
5034 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
5035 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
5036 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.  Just
5037 as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the copyrights for
5038 all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any state copyrights
5039 expired as well.
5040 </p><p>
5041 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a federal
5042 copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If the author was
5043 alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could opt to renew the
5044 copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not renew the copyright, his
5045 work passed into the public domain.
5046 </p><p>
5047 Selv om det ble skapt mange verker i USA i de første 10 årene til
5048 republikken, så ble kun 5 prosent av verkene registrert under det føderale
5049 opphavsrettsregimet.  Av alle verker skapt i USA både før 1790 og fra 1790
5050 fram til 1800, så ble 95 prosent øyeblikkelig allemannseie (public
5051 domain). Resten ble allemannseie etter maksimalt 20 år, og som oftest etter
5052 14 år.<sup>[<a name="id2829994" href="#ftn.id2829994" class="footnote">126</a>]</sup>
5053 </p><p>
5054
5055 Dette fornyelsessystemet var en avgjørende del av det amerikanske systemet
5056 for opphavsrett.  Det sikret at maksimal vernetid i opphavsretten bare ble
5057 gitt til verker der det var ønsket. Etter den første perioden på fjorten år,
5058 hvis forfatteren ikke så verdien av å fornye sin opphavsrett, var det heller
5059 ikke verdt det for samfunnet å håndheve opphavsretten.
5060 </p><p>
5061 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
5062 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small minority of
5063 them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the balance allowed their
5064 work to pass into the public domain.<sup>[<a name="id2830061" href="#ftn.id2830061" class="footnote">127</a>]</sup>
5065 </p><p>
5066 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work has an
5067 actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall out of
5068 print after one year.<sup>[<a name="id2830089" href="#ftn.id2830089" class="footnote">128</a>]</sup> When that
5069 happens, the used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the
5070 books are no longer <span class="emphasis"><em>effectively</em></span> controlled by
5071 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time is to
5072 sell the books as used books; that use&#8212;because it does not involve
5073 publication&#8212;is effectively free.
5074 </p><p>
5075 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
5076 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28 years to
5077 a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright from 14 years to
5078 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic, the term increased once
5079 again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal term of 14 years to 28 years,
5080 setting a maximum term of 56 years.
5081 </p><p>
5082 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
5083 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress has
5084 extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty years,
5085 Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the extensions
5086 of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.  In 1976,
5087 Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.  And in 1998,
5088 in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress extended the term
5089 of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
5090 </p><p>
5091
5092 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing of
5093 works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the public
5094 domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five years, or 70
5095 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years after the Sonny
5096 Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the public domain, zero
5097 copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue of the expiration of a
5098 copyright term.
5099 </p><p>
5100 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
5101 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the framers
5102 established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright owner to
5103 renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of renewal meant
5104 that works that no longer needed copyright protection would pass more
5105 quickly into the public domain. The works remaining under protection would
5106 be those that had some continuing commercial value.
5107 </p><p>
5108 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For all works
5109 created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&#8212;the maximum
5110 term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty years. For
5111 corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992, Congress
5112 abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created before 1978. All
5113 works still under copyright would be accorded the maximum term then
5114 available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term was ninety-five years.
5115 </p><p>
5116 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to assure
5117 that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public domain. And
5118 indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is even possible to
5119 put works into the public domain. The public domain is orphaned by these
5120 changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement that terms be "limited,"
5121 we have no evidence that anything will limit them.
5122 </p><p>
5123 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
5124 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to renew
5125 their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright in 1973 was
5126 just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal requirement, the
5127 average term of copyright is now the maximum term.  In thirty years, then,
5128 the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95 years.<sup>[<a name="id2830184" href="#ftn.id2830184" class="footnote">129</a>]</sup>
5129 </p></div><div class="section" title="Loven: Virkeområde"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="lawscope"></a>Loven: Virkeområde</h2></div></div></div><p>
5130 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.  The
5131 scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those changes are not
5132 necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent of the changes if we're
5133 to keep this debate in context.
5134 </p><p>
5135 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps, charts,
5136 and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
5137 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave the
5138 author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That means
5139 someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the work without
5140 the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted by a copyright
5141 was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right did not extend to
5142 what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not, therefore, interfere
5143 with the right of someone other than the author to translate a copyrighted
5144 book, or to adapt the story to a different form (such as a drama based on a
5145 published book).
5146 </p><p>
5147 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright today
5148 are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the right covers
5149 practically any creative work that is reduced to a tangible form. It covers
5150 music as well as architecture, drama as well as computer programs. It gives
5151 the copyright owner of that creative work not only the exclusive right to
5152 "publish" the work, but also the exclusive right of control over any
5153 "copies" of that work. And most significant for our purposes here, the right
5154 gives the copyright owner control over not only his or her particular work,
5155 but also any "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In
5156 this way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
5157 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way on the
5158 initial creative work.
5159 </p><p>
5160
5161 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
5162 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
5163 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition to the
5164 renewal requirement, for most of the history of American copyright law,
5165 there was a requirement that a work be registered before it could receive
5166 the protection of a copyright. There was also a requirement that any
5167 copyrighted work be marked either with that famous © or the word
5168 <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright</em></span>. And for most of the history of American
5169 copyright law, there was a requirement that works be deposited with the
5170 government before a copyright could be secured.
5171 </p><p>
5172 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible understanding
5173 that for most works, no copyright was required. Again, in the first ten
5174 years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible for copyright were never
5175 copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the norm: Most works apparently didn't
5176 need copyright, so registration narrowed the regulation of the law to the
5177 few that did. The same reasoning justified the requirement that a work be
5178 marked as copyrighted&#8212;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright
5179 was being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
5180 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
5181 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the original
5182 author.
5183 </p><p>
5184 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when we
5185 decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement that you
5186 register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is automatic; the
5187 copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with a ©; and the
5188 copyright exists whether or not you actually make a copy available for
5189 others to copy.
5190 </p><p>
5191 Vurder et praktisk eksempel for å forstå omfanget av disse forskjellene.
5192 </p><p>
5193 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who actually
5194 copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you against another
5195 publisher's taking your book and republishing it without your
5196 permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers so as to prevent
5197 that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were 174 publishers in the
5198 United States.<sup>[<a name="id2830309" href="#ftn.id2830309" class="footnote">130</a>]</sup> The Copyright Act was
5199 thus a tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative
5200 market in the United States&#8212;publishers.
5201 </p><p>
5202
5203
5204 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem by
5205 hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act was totally
5206 unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made a play based upon
5207 it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of those activities were
5208 regulated by the original copyright act. These creative activities remained
5209 free, while the activities of publishers were restrained.
5210 </p><p>
5211 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
5212 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail, every
5213 note to your spouse, every doodle, <span class="emphasis"><em>every</em></span> creative act
5214 that's reduced to a tangible form&#8212;all of this is automatically
5215 copyrighted.  There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection
5216 follows the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
5217 </p><p>
5218 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of fair use
5219 exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they copy it to
5220 republish it or to share an excerpt.
5221 </p><p>
5222 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would control
5223 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of today
5224 that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative rights."
5225 If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your book without
5226 permission. No one can translate it without permission.  CliffsNotes can't
5227 make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All of these derivative
5228 uses of your original work are controlled by the copyright holder. The
5229 copyright, in other words, is now not just an exclusive right to your
5230 writings, but an exclusive right to your writings and a large proportion of
5231 the writings inspired by them.
5232 </p><p>
5233 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our framers,
5234 though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this expansion was
5235 created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower copyright.  If I write a
5236 book, can you change one word and then claim a copyright in a new and
5237 different book? Obviously that would make a joke of the copyright, so the
5238 law was properly expanded to include those slight modifications as well as
5239 the verbatim original work.
5240 </p><p>
5241
5242 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within a free
5243 culture&#8212;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the law
5244 applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
5245 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone else's
5246 work. But whatever <span class="emphasis"><em>that</em></span> wrong is, transforming someone
5247 else's work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
5248 all&#8212;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
5249 protect derivative rights at all.<sup>[<a name="id2830390" href="#ftn.id2830390" class="footnote">131</a>]</sup>
5250 Whether or not you go that far, it seems plain that whatever wrong is
5251 involved is fundamentally different from the wrong of direct piracy.
5252 </p><p>
5253 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I can
5254 go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I can go to
5255 court and get an injunction against your transformative use of my
5256 book.<sup>[<a name="id2830436" href="#ftn.id2830436" class="footnote">132</a>]</sup> These two different uses of my
5257 creative work are treated the same.
5258 </p><p>
5259 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should you be
5260 able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from it without
5261 paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature called "Mickey
5262 Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to
5263 trade on the value that Disney originally created?
5264 </p><p>
5265 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
5266 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower: simply to
5267 make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the rights
5268 originally granted.
5269 </p></div><div class="section" title="Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="lawreach"></a>Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde</h2></div></div></div><p>
5270 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
5271 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users, and
5272 authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making copies,
5273 and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<sup>[<a name="id2830487" href="#ftn.id2830487" class="footnote">133</a>]</sup>
5274 </p><p>
5275
5276
5277 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
5278 <span class="emphasis"><em>copy</em></span>right law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's
5279 argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative property" deserves the
5280 "same rights" as all other property, it is the <span class="emphasis"><em>obvious</em></span>
5281 that we need to be most careful about. For while it may be obvious that in
5282 the world before the Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright
5283 law, upon reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the
5284 Internet, copies should <span class="emphasis"><em>not</em></span> be the trigger for
5285 copyright law. More precisely, they should not <span class="emphasis"><em>always</em></span>
5286 be the trigger for copyright law.
5287 </p><p>
5288 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this very
5289 slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the Internet
5290 should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which the law of
5291 copyright automatically applies,<sup>[<a name="id2830548" href="#ftn.id2830548" class="footnote">134</a>]</sup>
5292 because it is clear that the current reach of copyright was never
5293 contemplated, much less chosen, by the legislators who enacted copyright
5294 law.
5295 </p><p>
5296 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely empty
5297 circle.
5298 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1521"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.7. Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1521.png" alt="Alle potensielle bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5299
5300
5301 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent all
5302 its potential <span class="emphasis"><em>uses</em></span>. Most of these uses are unregulated
5303 by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a book,
5304 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone the book,
5305 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a book, that act
5306 is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that after the first sale
5307 of a book, the copyright owner can impose no further conditions on the
5308 disposition of the book). If you sleep on the book or use it to hold up a
5309 lamp or let your puppy chew it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright
5310 law, because those acts do not make a copy.
5311 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1531"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.8. Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1531.png" alt="Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5312 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated by
5313 copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It is
5314 therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands at
5315 the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
5316 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
5317 diagram on next page).
5318 </p><p>
5319 Til slutt er det en tynn skive av ellers regulert kopierings-bruk som
5320 forblir uregluert på grunn av at loven anser dette som "rimelig bruk".
5321 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1541"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.9. Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
5322 copyrighted work.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1541.png" alt="Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5323 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats as
5324 unregulated because public policy demands that they remain unregulated.  You
5325 are free to quote from this book, even in a review that is quite negative,
5326 without my permission, even though that quoting makes a copy. That copy
5327 would ordinarily give the copyright owner the exclusive right to say whether
5328 the copy is allowed or not, but the law denies the owner any exclusive right
5329 over such "fair uses" for public policy (and possibly First Amendment)
5330 reasons.
5331 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1542"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.10. Uregulert kopiering anses som "rimelig bruk".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1542.png" alt='Uregulert kopiering anses som "rimelig bruk".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p> </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1551"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.11. Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
5332 regulated.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1551.png" alt="Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5333
5334
5335 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
5336 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
5337 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
5338 </p><p>
5339 Enter the Internet&#8212;a distributed, digital network where every use of a
5340 copyrighted work produces a copy.<sup>[<a name="id2830494" href="#ftn.id2830494" class="footnote">135</a>]</sup> And
5341 because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a digital
5342 network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were
5343 presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated. No longer is
5344 there a set of presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom
5345 associated with a copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the
5346 copyright, because each use also makes a copy&#8212;category 1 gets sucked
5347 into category 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
5348 copyrighted work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
5349 burden of this shift.
5350 </p><p>
5351
5352 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
5353 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be no
5354 plausible <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright</em></span>-related argument that the copyright
5355 owner could make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
5356 nothing to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
5357 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
5358 use&#8212;reading&#8212; could be regulated by copyright law because none of
5359 those uses produced a copy.
5360 </p><p>
5361 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different set of
5362 rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book only once or
5363 only once a month, then <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright law</em></span> would aid the
5364 copyright owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
5365 accidental feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
5366 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says you
5367 may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or any portion
5368 of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to
5369 the copyright owner's wish.
5370 </p><p>
5371 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim just now is
5372 not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim is only to make
5373 clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other points also become
5374 clear:
5375 </p><p>
5376 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker ever
5377 intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the presumptively
5378 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no evidence at all that
5379 policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed our policy here to
5380 shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of free culture before the
5381 Internet.
5382 </p><p>
5383 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of transformative
5384 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong in
5385 commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
5386 <span class="emphasis"><em>any</em></span> transformation you make of creative work using a
5387 machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with
5388 a story and releasing it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a
5389 requirement of justification.  However troubling the expansion with respect
5390 to copying a particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect
5391 to transformative uses of creative work.
5392 </p><p>
5393
5394 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary burden
5395 on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.  If a
5396 copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read a book
5397 on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a violation of
5398 my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation about whether I
5399 have a fair use right to read, because before the Internet, reading did not
5400 trigger the application of copyright law and hence the need for a fair use
5401 defense. The right to read was effectively protected before because reading
5402 was not regulated.
5403 </p><p>
5404 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for free
5405 culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights depend upon fair
5406 use&#8212;never even addressing the earlier question about the expansion in
5407 effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in fair use makes sense
5408 when the vast majority of uses are <span class="emphasis"><em>unregulated</em></span>. But
5409 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the protections of
5410 fair use are not enough.
5411 </p><p>
5412 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was in the
5413 business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available to video
5414 stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
5415 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put the
5416 trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
5417 </p><p>
5418 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began to
5419 think about the Internet as another way to distribute these previews.  The
5420 idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by giving on-line
5421 stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can
5422 read a few pages of a book before you buy the book, so, too, you would be
5423 able to sample a bit from the movie on-line before you bought it.
5424 </p><p>
5425
5426 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors that it
5427 intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet (rather than
5428 sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two years later, Disney
5429 told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video Pipeline asked Disney to
5430 talk about the matter&#8212;he had built a business on distributing this
5431 content as a way to help sell Disney films; he had customers who depended
5432 upon his delivering this content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video
5433 Pipeline stopped the distribution immediately.  Video Pipeline thought it
5434 was within their "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So
5435 they filed a lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in
5436 fact their rights.
5437 </p><p>
5438 Disney countersued&#8212;for $100 million in damages. Those damages were
5439 predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully infringed" on
5440 Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of willful infringement, it
5441 can award damages not on the basis of the actual harm to the copyright
5442 owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the statute. Because Video
5443 Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of Disney movies to enable
5444 video stores to sell copies of those movies, Disney was now suing Video
5445 Pipeline for $100 million.
5446 </p><p>
5447 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
5448 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
5449 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim in
5450 court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
5451 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
5452 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
5453 Disney's permission.
5454 </p><p>
5455 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
5456 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
5457 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control how
5458 people got access to their content. Once a video was in the marketplace, the
5459 "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he wished,
5460 including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the entire
5461 movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to
5462 centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
5463 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
5464 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
5465 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
5466 </p><p>
5467
5468
5469 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for control
5470 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say you
5471 can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.  But
5472 the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble
5473 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.  Competition
5474 protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does
5475 not even question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger
5476 when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
5477 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you read
5478 a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But in a
5479 competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this happening
5480 are quite slight.
5481 </p><p>
5482 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
5483 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
5484 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
5485 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private owners
5486 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
5487 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
5488 </p></div><div class="section" title="Arkitektur og lov: Makt"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="lawforce"></a>Arkitektur og lov: Makt</h2></div></div></div><p>
5489 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a second
5490 important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
5491 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
5492 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
5493 </p><p>
5494 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
5495 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.  The law,
5496 meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human, trained in the
5497 tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that tradition embraced,
5498 who said whether and how the law would restrict your freedom.
5499 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2830996"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxmarxbrothers"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxwarnerbrothers"></a><p>
5500 Det er en berømt historie om en kamp mellom Marx-brødrene (the Marx
5501 Brothers) og Warner Brothers.  Marx-brødrene planla å lage en parodi av
5502 <em class="citetitle">Casablanca</em>. Warner Brothers protesterte.  De skrev et
5503 ufint brev til Marx-brødrene og advarte dem om at det ville få seriøse
5504 juridiske konsekvenser hvis de gikk videre med sin plan.<sup>[<a name="id2831043" href="#ftn.id2831043" class="footnote">136</a>]</sup>
5505 </p><p>
5506 Dette fikk Marx-brødrene til å svare tilbake med samme mynt.  De advarte
5507 Warner Brothers om at Marx-brødrene "var brødre lenge før dere var
5508 det".<sup>[<a name="id2831064" href="#ftn.id2831064" class="footnote">137</a>]</sup> Marx-brødrene eide derfor ordet
5509 <em class="citetitle">Brothers</em>, og hvis Warner Brothers insisterte på å
5510 forsøke å kontrollere <em class="citetitle">Casablanca</em>, så ville
5511 Marx-brødrene insistere på kontroll over <em class="citetitle">Brothers</em>.
5512 </p><p>
5513 Det var en absurd og hul trussel, selvfølgelig, fordi Warner Brothers, på
5514 samme måte som Marx-brødrene, visste at ingen domstol noensinne ville
5515 håndheve et slikt dumt krav. Denne ekstremismen var irrelevant for de ekte
5516 friheter som alle (inkludert Warner Brothers) nøt godt av.
5517 </p><p>
5518 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on the
5519 Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a machine:
5520 Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by the copyright
5521 owner, get built into the technology that delivers copyrighted content. It
5522 is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem with code regulations
5523 is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code would not get the humor of the
5524 Marx Brothers. The consequence of that is not at all funny.
5525 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2831131"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2831139"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxadobeebookreader"></a><p>
5526 La oss se på livet til min Adobe eBook Reader.
5527 </p><p>
5528 En ebok er en bok levert i elektronisk form.  En Adobe eBook er ikke en bok
5529 som Adobe har publisert.  Adobe produserer kun programvaren som utgivere
5530 bruker å levere e-bøker.  Den bidrar med teknologien, og utgiveren leverer
5531 innholdet ved hjelp av teknologien.
5532 </p><p>
5533 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook Reader.
5534 </p><p>
5535
5536 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this e-book
5537 library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the public domain:
5538 <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em>, for example, is in the public domain.
5539 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My own book
5540 <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em> is not yet within the public
5541 domain.  Consider <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em> first. If you click on
5542 my e-book copy of <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em>, you'll see a fancy
5543 cover, and then a button at the bottom called Permissions.
5544 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1611"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.12. Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1611.png" alt="Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5545 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the permissions
5546 that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
5547 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1612"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.13. List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1612.png" alt="List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5548
5549
5550 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the clipboard
5551 of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far, I've copied no
5552 text to the clipboard.)  I also have the permission to print ten pages from
5553 the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the permission to use the Read Aloud
5554 button to hear <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em> read aloud through the
5555 computer.
5556 </p><p>
5557 Her er e-boken for et annet allemannseid verk (inkludert oversettelsen):
5558 Aristoteles <em class="citetitle">Politikk</em>  <a class="indexterm" name="id2831264"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2831270"></a>
5559 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1621"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.14. E-bok av Aristoteles "Politikk"</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1621.png" alt='E-bok av Aristoteles "Politikk"'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5560 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted at
5561 all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear the book.
5562 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1622"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.15. Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politikk".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1622.png" alt='Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politikk".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5563 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the original
5564 e-book version of my last book, <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em>:
5565 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1631"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.16. List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1631.png" alt='List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".'></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5566 Ingen kopiering, ingen utskrift, og våg ikke å prøve å lytte til denne
5567 boken!
5568 </p><p>
5569 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&#8212; as if
5570 the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.  For works
5571 under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have the power&#8212;up
5572 to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not under copyright, there
5573 is no such copyright power.<sup>[<a name="id2831349" href="#ftn.id2831349" class="footnote">138</a>]</sup> When my
5574 e-book of <em class="citetitle">Middlemarch</em> says I have the permission to
5575 copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten days, what that
5576 really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control
5577 how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would
5578 enable.
5579 </p><p>
5580 The control comes instead from the code&#8212;from the technology within
5581 which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are permissions,
5582 they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal with. When a
5583 teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she knows (unless
5584 she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but will suffer a
5585 punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the
5586 permission to make ten copies of the text into the computer's memory, that
5587 means that after I've made ten copies, the computer will not make any
5588 more. The same with the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook
5589 Reader will not print any more pages.  It's the same with the silly
5590 restriction that says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my
5591 book aloud&#8212;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
5592 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply won't
5593 read aloud.
5594 </p><p>
5595
5596 These are <span class="emphasis"><em>controls</em></span>, not permissions. Imagine a world
5597 where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried
5598 to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
5599 <a class="indexterm" name="id2831404"></a>
5600 </p><p>
5601 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
5602 <span class="emphasis"><em>law</em></span> as copyright <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span>. The
5603 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified by
5604 courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that are coded
5605 by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into the law are
5606 always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are built into the
5607 technology have no similar built-in check.
5608 </p><p>
5609 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the controls
5610 built into the technology? Software used to be sold with technologies that
5611 limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those were trivial
5612 protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these protections
5613 as well?
5614 </p><p>
5615 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe eBook
5616 Reader.
5617 </p><p>
5618 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
5619 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free on the
5620 Adobe site was a copy of <em class="citetitle">Alice's Adventures in
5621 Wonderland</em>.  This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet
5622 when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
5623 <a class="indexterm" name="id2831455"></a>
5624 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1641"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.17. List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1641.png" alt="List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in Wonderland&quot;."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5625
5626
5627 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to copy,
5628 not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the "permissions"
5629 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
5630 </p><p>
5631 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.  For the
5632 text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read Aloud button;
5633 it said you did not have the permission to read the book aloud. That led
5634 some people to think that Adobe was restricting the right of parents, for
5635 example, to read the book to their children, which seemed, to say the least,
5636 absurd.
5637 </p><p>
5638 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying to
5639 restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only restricting
5640 the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book read aloud. But
5641 the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would Adobe thus agree that a
5642 consumer was free to use software to hack around the restrictions built into
5643 the eBook Reader? If some company (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to
5644 disable the technological protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a
5645 blind person, say, could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe
5646 agree that such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer
5647 because the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
5648 </p><p>
5649 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most innovative
5650 companies developing strategies to balance open access to content with
5651 incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's technology enables
5652 control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this control.  That incentive
5653 is understandable, yet what it creates is often crazy.
5654 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2831528"></a><p>
5655 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite story
5656 of mine that makes the same point.
5657 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxaibo"></a><p>
5658 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo learns tricks,
5659 cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity and that doesn't
5660 leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
5661 </p><p>
5662
5663 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world have set up
5664 clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web site to enable
5665 information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set up aibopet.com
5666 (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site), and on that site he
5667 provided information about how to teach an Aibo to do tricks in addition to
5668 the ones Sony had taught it.
5669 </p><p>
5670 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.  You
5671 teach a computer how to do something by programming it differently.  So to
5672 say that aibopet.com was giving information about how to teach the dog to do
5673 new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com was giving information to users
5674 of the Aibo pet about how to hack their computer "dog" to make it do new
5675 tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
5676 </p><p>
5677 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
5678 <em class="citetitle">hack</em> has a particularly unfriendly
5679 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror
5680 movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them,
5681 <em class="citetitle">hack</em> is a much more positive
5682 term. <em class="citetitle">Hack</em> just means code that enables the program
5683 to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy a
5684 new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer doesn't
5685 run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be happy
5686 to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a driver to enable
5687 the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
5688 </p><p>
5689 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a community like
5690 to challenge themselves and others with increasingly difficult
5691 tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
5692 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
5693 ethically.
5694 </p><p>
5695 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program and
5696 offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to dance
5697 jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever bit of
5698 tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature than Sony had
5699 built.
5700 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2831624"></a><p>
5701
5702 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the United
5703 States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience, is it
5704 permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We forget that
5705 stories about the backcountry still flow across much of the world. So let's
5706 just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime anywhere (anymore) to
5707 dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog to dance jazz. Nor should it
5708 be a crime (though we don't have a lot to go on here) to teach your robot
5709 dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a completely legal activity. One imagines
5710 that the owner of aibopet.com thought, <span class="emphasis"><em>What possible problem could
5711 there be with teaching a robot dog to dance?</em></span>
5712 </p><p>
5713 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&#8212; not
5714 literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic named Ed
5715 Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic is well known and
5716 respected. He was hired by the government in the Microsoft case to test
5717 Microsoft's claims about what could and could not be done with its own
5718 code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his brilliance and his
5719 coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft lawyers, Ed Felten stood his
5720 ground. He was not about to be bullied into being silent about something he
5721 knew very well.
5722 </p><p>
5723 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<sup>[<a name="id2831669" href="#ftn.id2831669" class="footnote">139</a>]</sup> He and a group of colleagues were working on a
5724 paper to be submitted at conference.  The paper was intended to describe the
5725 weakness in an encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
5726 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
5727 </p><p>
5728 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content owners to
5729 exercise much better control over their content than the Internet, as it
5730 originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI hoped to develop a
5731 standard that would allow the content owner to say "this music cannot be
5732 copied," and have a computer respect that command.  The technology was to be
5733 part of a "trusted system" of control that would get content owners to trust
5734 the system of the Internet much more.
5735 </p><p>
5736 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.  In
5737 exchange for providing contestants with the code to an SDMI-encrypted bit of
5738 content, contestants were to try to crack it and, if they did, report the
5739 problems to the consortium.
5740 </p><p>
5741
5742
5743 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and the
5744 team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption systems
5745 would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team thought it
5746 worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
5747 </p><p>
5748 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
5749 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not just
5750 because it is the law, but also because it is a really great idea. A
5751 strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to encourage a wide
5752 range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in turn, to improve the
5753 systems or people or ideas criticized.
5754 </p><p>
5755 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper describing
5756 the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free music, or
5757 building and deploying this technology. The paper was an academic essay,
5758 unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the weakness in the
5759 SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently constituted, succeed.
5760 </p><p>
5761 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they then
5762 received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the aibopet.com
5763 hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony wrote:
5764 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5765 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent AIBO-ware's
5766 copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the anti-circumvention
5767 provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
5768 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5769 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system of
5770 encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter from an
5771 RIAA lawyer that read:
5772 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5773
5774 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the Public
5775 Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by the
5776 Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions under the
5777 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
5778 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5779 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the spread
5780 of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made spreading such
5781 information an offense.
5782 </p><p>
5783 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear about
5784 cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively dead; the
5785 response was to find technologies that might compensate.  These new
5786 technologies would be copyright protection technologies&#8212; technologies
5787 to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted material. They
5788 were designed as <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span> to modify the original
5789 <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span> of the Internet, to reestablish some protection
5790 for copyright owners.
5791 </p><p>
5792 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this code
5793 designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
5794 <span class="emphasis"><em>legal code</em></span> intended to buttress <span class="emphasis"><em>software
5795 code</em></span> which itself was intended to support the <span class="emphasis"><em>legal
5796 code of copyright</em></span>.
5797 </p><p>
5798 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to the
5799 extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did not end at
5800 the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated devices that were
5801 designed to circumvent copyright protection measures. It was designed to ban
5802 those devices, whether or not the use of the copyrighted material made
5803 possible by that circumvention would have been a copyright violation.
5804 </p><p>
5805
5806 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
5807 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to dance
5808 jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted material. But
5809 as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did not enable
5810 subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that aibopet.com's hack
5811 was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet fair use is not a defense
5812 to the DMCA. The question is not whether the use of the copyrighted material
5813 was a copyright violation. The question is whether a copyright protection
5814 system was circumvented.
5815 </p><p>
5816 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the same line
5817 of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a copyright protection
5818 system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer suggested, Felten himself was
5819 distributing a circumvention technology.  Thus, even though he was not
5820 himself infringing anyone's copyright, his academic paper was enabling
5821 others to infringe others' copyright.
5822 </p><p>
5823 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in 1981 by
5824 Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that the VCR could
5825 be banned because it was a copyright-infringing technology: It enabled
5826 consumers to copy films without the permission of the copyright owner. No
5827 doubt there were uses of the technology that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
5828 "<em class="citetitle">Mr. Rogers</em>," for example, had testified in that case
5829 that he wanted people to feel free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
5830 <a class="indexterm" name="id2831911"></a>
5831 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5832 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
5833 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that it's
5834 a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show them
5835 at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all of this
5836 new technology that allows people to tape the "Neighborhood" off-the-air,
5837 and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood" because that's what I produce, that
5838 they then become much more active in the programming of their family's
5839 television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by
5840 others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always been "You are an
5841 important person just the way you are. You can make healthy decisions."
5842 Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a
5843 person to be more active in the control of his or her life, in a healthy
5844 way, is important.<sup>[<a name="id2831938" href="#ftn.id2831938" class="footnote">140</a>]</sup>
5845 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5846
5847
5848 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were some uses
5849 that were illegal, the court held the companies producing the VCR
5850 responsible.
5851 </p><p>
5852 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to the DMCA.
5853 <a class="indexterm" name="id2831971"></a>
5854 </p><p>
5855 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
5856 </p><p>
5857 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright circumvention
5858 technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for different
5859 ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive pirating of
5860 copyrighted material&#8212;a bad end. Or they can be used to enable the use
5861 of particular copyrighted materials in ways that would be considered fair
5862 use&#8212;a good end.
5863 </p><p>
5864
5865 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most would agree
5866 such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target practice or to
5867 protect against an intruder. At least some would say that such a use would
5868 be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good and bad uses.
5869 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1711"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1711.png" alt="VCR/handgun cartoon."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
5870 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world where guns
5871 are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and circumvention
5872 technologies) are illegal. Flash: <span class="emphasis"><em>No one ever died from copyright
5873 circumvention</em></span>. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
5874 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but permits
5875 guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2832030"></a>
5876 </p><p>
5877 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are changing the
5878 balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright owners restrict
5879 fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would attempt to evade the
5880 restrictions on fair use that they impose through code. Technology becomes a
5881 means by which fair use can be erased; the law of the DMCA backs up that
5882 erasing.
5883 </p><p>
5884 This is how <span class="emphasis"><em>code</em></span> becomes <span class="emphasis"><em>law</em></span>. The
5885 controls built into the technology of copy and access protection become
5886 rules the violation of which is also a violation of the law. In this way,
5887 the code extends the law&#8212;increasing its regulation, even if the
5888 subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute
5889 fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the
5890 law; code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&#8212;at
5891 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the nasty
5892 letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
5893 </p><p>
5894 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and law
5895 that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is the ease
5896 with which infringements of the law can be detected. For contrary to the
5897 rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the Internet, no one
5898 knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing technologies deployed on
5899 the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who committed a legal wrong. The
5900 technologies of the Internet are open to snoops as well as sharers, and the
5901 snoops are increasingly good at tracking down the identity of those who
5902 violate the rules.
5903 </p><p>
5904
5905
5906 For example, imagine you were part of a <em class="citetitle">Star Trek</em> fan
5907 club. You gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of
5908 fan fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
5909 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then simply
5910 continue it.<sup>[<a name="id2832096" href="#ftn.id2832096" class="footnote">141</a>]</sup>
5911 </p><p>
5912 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated activity.
5913 No matter what happened inside your club room, you would never be interfered
5914 with by the copyright police. You were free in that space to do as you
5915 wished with this part of our culture. You were allowed to build on it as you
5916 wished without fear of legal control.
5917 </p><p>
5918 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
5919 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
5920 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would quickly find
5921 your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon the ownership of the
5922 series that you're depicting, could well inspire a lawyer's threat. And
5923 ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely costly indeed.  The law of
5924 copyright is extremely efficient. The penalties are severe, and the process
5925 is quick.
5926 </p><p>
5927 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change in the
5928 ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts the law's
5929 balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at which you
5930 traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just one step before
5931 the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you transmitted. That
5932 is, in effect, what is happening here.
5933 </p></div><div class="section" title="Marked: Konsentrasjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="marketconcentration"></a>Marked: Konsentrasjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
5934
5935 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&#8212;tripled in the past
5936 thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as well&#8212;from
5937 regulating only publishers to now regulating just about everyone. And
5938 copyright's reach has changed, as every action becomes a copy and hence
5939 presumptively regulated. And as technologists find better ways to control
5940 the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly enforced through
5941 technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is easier to find and
5942 easier to control. This regulation of the creative process, which began as a
5943 tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the market for creative work, has
5944 become the single most important regulator of creativity there is. It is a
5945 massive expansion in the scope of the government's control over innovation
5946 and creativity; it would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth
5947 to copyright's control.
5948 </p><p>
5949 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it weren't
5950 for one more change that we must also consider. This is a change that is in
5951 some sense the most familiar, though its significance and scope are not well
5952 understood. It is the one that creates precisely the reason to be concerned
5953 about all the other changes I have described.
5954 </p><p>
5955 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.  In
5956 the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone a radical
5957 alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the media.  Before
5958 this change happened, the different forms of media were owned by separate
5959 media companies. Now, the media is increasingly owned by only a few
5960 companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC announced in June 2003,
5961 most expect that within a few years, we will live in a world where just
5962 three companies control more than percent of the media.
5963 </p><p>
5964 Det er her to sorter endringer: omfanget av konsentrasjon, og dens natur.
5965 </p><p>
5966 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John McCain
5967 summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media ownership, "five
5968 companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<sup>[<a name="id2832220" href="#ftn.id2832220" class="footnote">142</a>]</sup> The five recording labels of Universal Music Group,
5969 BMG, Sony Music Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8
5970 percent of the U.S. music market.<sup>[<a name="id2832233" href="#ftn.id2832233" class="footnote">143</a>]</sup> The
5971 "five largest cable companies pipe programming to 74 percent of the cable
5972 subscribers nationwide."<sup>[<a name="id2832246" href="#ftn.id2832246" class="footnote">144</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2832256"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2832262"></a>
5973 <a class="indexterm" name="id2832268"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2832274"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2832280"></a>
5974 </p><p>
5975
5976 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation, the
5977 nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
5978 seventy-five stations. Today <span class="emphasis"><em>one</em></span> company owns more than
5979 1,200 stations.  During that period of consolidation, the total number of
5980 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two largest
5981 broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's revenues. Overall, just
5982 four companies control 90 percent of the nation's radio advertising
5983 revenues.
5984 </p><p>
5985 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well.  Today, there are
5986 six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than there were
5987 eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the nation's
5988 circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in the United
5989 States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all film revenue. The
5990 ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent of all cable
5991 revenue. This is a market far from the free press the framers sought to
5992 protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well protected&#8212; by the
5993 market.
5994 </p><p>
5995 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious change is in
5996 the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows put it in a recent
5997 article about Rupert Murdoch, <a class="indexterm" name="id2832312"></a>
5998 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
5999 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system unmatched in its
6000 integration. They supply content&#8212;Fox movies &#8230; Fox TV shows
6001 &#8230; Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus newspapers and books. They
6002 sell the content to the public and to advertisers&#8212;in newspapers, on
6003 the broadcast network, on the cable channels. And they operate the physical
6004 distribution system through which the content reaches the
6005 customers. Murdoch's satellite systems now distribute News Corp. content in
6006 Europe and Asia; if Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that
6007 system will serve the same function in the United States.<sup>[<a name="id2832336" href="#ftn.id2832336" class="footnote">145</a>]</sup>
6008 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6009 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not just large
6010 companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies owning as many
6011 outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this pattern better than a
6012 thousand words could do:
6013 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-1761"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 11.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/1761.png" alt="Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap."></div></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
6014
6015
6016 Betyr denne konsentrasjonen noe?  Påvirker det hva som blir laget, eller hva
6017 som blir distribuert?  Eller er det bare en mer effektiv måte å produsere og
6018 distribuere innhold?
6019 </p><p>
6020 Mitt syn var at konsentrasjonen ikke betød noe.  Jeg tenkte det ikke var noe
6021 mer enn en mer effektiv finansiell struktur.  Men nå, etter å ha lest og
6022 hørt på en haug av skapere prøve å overbevise meg om det motsatte, har jeg
6023 begynt å endre mening.
6024 </p><p>
6025 Her er en representativ historie som kan foreslå hvorfor denne integreringen
6026 er viktig.
6027 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2832416"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2832422"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2832428"></a><p>
6028 I 1969 laget Norman Lear en polit for <em class="citetitle">All in the
6029 Family</em>.  Han tok piloten til ABC, og nettverket likte det ikke.
6030 Da sa til Lear at det var for på kanten.  Gjør det om igjen. Lear lagde
6031 piloten på nytt, mer på kanten enn den første.  ABC ble fra seg.  Du får
6032 ikke med deg poenget, fortalte de Lear.  Vi vil ha det mindre på kanten,
6033 ikke mer.
6034 </p><p>
6035 I stedet for å føye seg, to Lear ganske enkelt serien sin til noen andre.
6036 CBS var glad for å ha seriene, og ABC kunne ikke stoppe Lear fra å gå til
6037 andre.  Opphavsretten som Lear hadde sikret uavhengighet fra
6038 nettverk-kontroll.<sup>[<a name="id2832462" href="#ftn.id2832462" class="footnote">146</a>]</sup>
6039 </p><p>
6040
6041
6042
6043 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade the
6044 networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law required a
6045 separation between the networks and the content producers; that separation
6046 would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992, because of these rules,
6047 the vast majority of prime time television&#8212;75 percent of it&#8212;was
6048 "independent" of the networks.
6049 </p><p>
6050 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.  After
6051 that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.  In 1985, there were
6052 twenty-five independent television production studios; in 2002, only five
6053 independent television studios remained. "In 1992, only 15 percent of new
6054 series were produced for a network by a company it controlled. Last year,
6055 the percentage of shows produced by controlled companies more than
6056 quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16 new series were produced
6057 independently of conglomerate control, last year there was one."<sup>[<a name="id2832492" href="#ftn.id2832492" class="footnote">147</a>]</sup> In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was
6058 owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and
6059 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week produced by network
6060 studios increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television
6061 hours per week produced by independent studios decreased 63%."<sup>[<a name="id2832545" href="#ftn.id2832545" class="footnote">148</a>]</sup>
6062 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2832552"></a><p>
6063 Today, another Norman Lear with another <em class="citetitle">All in the
6064 Family</em> would find that he had the choice either to make the show
6065 less edgy or to be fired: The content of any show developed for a network is
6066 increasingly owned by the network.
6067 </p><p>
6068 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership of
6069 those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As Barry
6070 Diller said to Bill Moyers, <a class="indexterm" name="id2832574"></a>
6071 <a class="indexterm" name="id2832580"></a>
6072 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
6073 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on their
6074 channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes through their
6075 controlled distribution system, then what you get is fewer and fewer actual
6076 voices participating in the process. [We u]sed to have dozens and dozens of
6077 thriving independent production companies producing television programs. Now
6078 you have less than a handful.<sup>[<a name="id2832599" href="#ftn.id2832599" class="footnote">149</a>]</sup>
6079 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6080 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such large
6081 and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.  Increasingly
6082 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from networks like
6083 this is increasingly tailored to the message the network wants to
6084 convey. This is not the communist party, though from the inside, it must
6085 feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question without risk of
6086 consequence&#8212;not necessarily banishment to Siberia, but punishment
6087 nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are quashed. This is not
6088 the environment for a democracy.
6089 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2832623"></a><p>
6090 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
6091 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
6092 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
6093 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.  The
6094 same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media companies
6095 would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<sup>[<a name="id2832651" href="#ftn.id2832651" class="footnote">150</a>]</sup> Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not,
6096 sprint. Yet if the field is only open to the giants, there will be far too
6097 little sprinting.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2832679"></a>
6098 </p><p>
6099 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media market to say
6100 with certainty what concentration and integration will do. The efficiencies
6101 are important, and the effect on culture is hard to measure.
6102 </p><p>
6103 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly suggest
6104 the concern.
6105 </p><p>
6106 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
6107 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
6108 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
6109 </p><p>
6110
6111 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to any
6112 position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound mistake. I
6113 am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once wrecked by
6114 drugs&#8212;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all quite legal. I
6115 believe this war is a profound mistake because the collateral damage from it
6116 is so great as to make waging the war insane.  When you add together the
6117 burdens on the criminal justice system, the desperation of generations of
6118 kids whose only real economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the
6119 queering of constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance
6120 this war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
6121 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the local
6122 drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal benefit in
6123 reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
6124 </p><p>
6125 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it is
6126 through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we depend
6127 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about these issues.
6128 </p><p>
6129 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched a
6130 media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced scores
6131 of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In one series
6132 (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing the idea of
6133 legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral damage from the
6134 war. One advances an argument in favor of drug legalization. The other
6135 responds in a powerful and effective way against the argument of the
6136 first. In the end, the first guy changes his mind (hey, it's
6137 television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on the pro-legalization
6138 campaign.
6139 </p><p>
6140 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
6141 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
6142 </p><p>
6143 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
6144 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
6145 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
6146 war. Can you do it?
6147 </p><p>
6148
6149 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
6150 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in the
6151 world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your message will be
6152 heard then?
6153 </p><p>
6154 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
6155 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
6156 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
6157 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First Amendment, but
6158 the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to choose what they
6159 run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media will refuse one side of a
6160 crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.  And the courts will
6161 defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<sup>[<a name="id2832791" href="#ftn.id2832791" class="footnote">151</a>]</sup>
6162 </p><p>
6163 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&#8212;if we lived in a
6164 media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media throws
6165 that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control access to the
6166 media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which political
6167 positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in an obvious
6168 and important way, concentration matters. You might like the positions the
6169 handful of companies selects. But you should not like a world in which a
6170 mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
6171 </p></div><div class="section" title="Sammen"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="together"></a>Sammen</h2></div></div></div><p>
6172 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the copyright
6173 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In the abstract,
6174 it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No sane sort who is
6175 not an anarchist could disagree.
6176 </p><p>
6177
6178 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&#8212; when we
6179 recognize how it might now interact with both technology and markets to mean
6180 that the effective constraint on the liberty to cultivate our culture is
6181 dramatically different&#8212;the claim begins to seem less innocent and
6182 obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to supplement the law's control,
6183 and (2) the power of concentrated markets to weaken the opportunity for
6184 dissent, if strictly enforcing the massively expanded "property" rights
6185 granted by copyright fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture
6186 to cultivate and build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this
6187 property should be redefined.
6188 </p><p>
6189 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish copyright
6190 or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total mistake,
6191 disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within our culture
6192 today.
6193 </p><p>
6194 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
6195 notwithstanding.  And these massive shifts in the effective power of
6196 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
6197 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
6198 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether
6199 another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that increases
6200 copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
6201 adjustment to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
6202 regulation&#8212;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
6203 </p><p>
6204 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of constant
6205 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and geeks now
6206 flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a short period of
6207 time, as the technologies of distribution and creation have changed and as
6208 lobbyists have pushed for more control by copyright holders. Changes in the
6209 past in response to changes in technology suggest that we may well need
6210 similar changes in the future. And these changes have to be
6211 <span class="emphasis"><em>reductions</em></span> in the scope of copyright, in response to
6212 the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the market enable.
6213 </p><p>
6214
6215 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that we
6216 see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add together
6217 the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and changing technology,
6218 together they produce an astonishing conclusion: <span class="emphasis"><em>Never in our
6219 history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the development of
6220 our culture than now</em></span>.
6221 </p><p>
6222 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were perpetual, they
6223 affected only that precise creative work. Not when only publishers had the
6224 tools to publish, for the market then was much more diverse. Not when there
6225 were only three television networks, for even then, newspapers, film
6226 studios, radio stations, and publishers were independent of the
6227 networks. <span class="emphasis"><em>Never</em></span> has copyright protected such a wide
6228 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
6229 remotely as long. This form of regulation&#8212;a tiny regulation of a tiny
6230 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding&#8212;is now a
6231 massive regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
6232 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the
6233 most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
6234 known.<sup>[<a name="id2832995" href="#ftn.id2832995" class="footnote">152</a>]</sup>
6235 </p><p>
6236 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
6237 </p><p>
6238 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
6239 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have distinguished
6240 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now combine these two
6241 distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes that copyright law has
6242 undergone.  In 1790, the law looked like this:
6243 </p><div class="table"><a name="t2"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 11.1. Law status in 1790</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Law status in 1790" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Publiser</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6244
6245 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by copyright
6246 law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as copyright attached
6247 only with registration, and only those who intended to benefit commercially
6248 would register, copying through publishing of noncommercial work was also
6249 free.
6250 </p><p>
6251 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
6252 </p><div class="table"><a name="t3"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 11.2. Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Publiser</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6253 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&#8212;if published,
6254 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time, means if offered
6255 commercially. But noncommercial publishing and transformation were still
6256 essentially free.
6257 </p><p>
6258 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after this
6259 change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the technology of
6260 copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law expanded.  Thus by 1975,
6261 as photocopying machines became more common, we could say the law began to
6262 look like this:
6263 </p><div class="table"><a name="t4"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 11.3. Law status in 1975</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Law status in 1975" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Kopier</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">©/Fri</td><td align="char">Fri</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6264 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say, copy
6265 machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial market
6266 remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital technologies,
6267 especially in the context of a digital network, means that the law now looks
6268 like this:
6269 </p><div class="table"><a name="t5"></a><p class="title"><b>Tabell 11.4. Law status now</b></p><div class="table-contents"><table summary="Law status now" border="1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align="char"> </th><th align="char">Kopier</th><th align="char">TRANSFORM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align="char">Kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr><tr><td align="char">Ikke-kommersiell</td><td align="char">©</td><td align="char">©</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class="table-break"><p>
6270
6271 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most creativity was
6272 not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&#8212; commercial or
6273 not, transformative or not&#8212;with the same rules designed to regulate
6274 commercial publishers.
6275 </p><p>
6276 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation that does
6277 no good. So the question that we should be asking just now is whether
6278 extending the regulations of copyright law into each of these domains
6279 actually does any good.
6280 </p><p>
6281 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.  But I
6282 also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when regulating (as it
6283 regulates just now) noncommercial copying and, especially, noncommercial
6284 transformation. And increasingly, for the reasons sketched especially in
6285 chapters <a class="xref" href="#recorders" title="Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne">8</a> and
6286 <a class="xref" href="#transformers" title="Kapittel 9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere">9</a>, one might
6287 well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
6288 transformation.  More commercial transformative work would be created if
6289 derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
6290 </p><p>
6291 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of course
6292 copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any property, the
6293 state ought to protect it. But first impressions notwithstanding,
6294 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<sup>[<a name="id2833357" href="#ftn.id2833357" class="footnote">153</a>]</sup>)  has been crafted to balance the important need to
6295 give authors and artists incentives with the equally important need to
6296 assure access to creative work. This balance has always been struck in light
6297 of new technologies.  And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
6298 did not control <span class="emphasis"><em>at all</em></span> the freedom of others to build
6299 upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
6300 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free
6301 culture.
6302 </p><p>
6303
6304 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important limits on
6305 the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very birth of
6306 "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by granting
6307 copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story of chapter
6308 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar concern that is
6309 increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair use right
6310 become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding statutory rights
6311 where markets might stifle innovation is another familiar limit on the
6312 property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And granting archives and
6313 libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property notwithstanding, is
6314 a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free
6315 cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But the nature of the
6316 property that builds a free culture is very different from the extremist
6317 vision that dominates the debate today.
6318 </p><p>
6319 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In response
6320 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
6321 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing and
6322 distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed in a way
6323 that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property right that
6324 is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or was intended to
6325 be. The property right that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted
6326 toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened
6327 in a world in which creation requires permission and creativity must check
6328 with a lawyer.
6329 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2828857" href="#id2828857" class="para">118</a>] </sup>
6330
6331
6332 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.  4794,
6333 H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcommittee on
6334 Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee
6335 on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd
6336 sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
6337 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2828909" href="#id2828909" class="para">119</a>] </sup>
6338
6339
6340 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
6341 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
6342 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
6343 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
6344 ordinary meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman,
6345 <em class="citetitle">Private Property and the Constitution</em> (New Haven:
6346 Yale University Press, 1977), 26&#8211;27.
6347 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2829250" href="#id2829250" class="para">120</a>] </sup>
6348
6349
6350 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6351 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6352 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right
6353 self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the other three is
6354 more timidly expressed.  See Lawrence Lessig, <em class="citetitle">Code: And Other
6355 Laws of Cyberspace</em> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&#8211;95;
6356 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," <em class="citetitle">Journal of Legal
6357 Studies</em>, June 1998.
6358 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2829314" href="#id2829314" class="para">121</a>] </sup>
6359
6360 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6361 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6362 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6363 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6364 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6365 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss
6366 of freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries
6367 of ordinary life.  I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view,
6368 which depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6369 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of
6370 liberty. As I argued in <em class="citetitle">Code</em>, we come from a long
6371 tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question
6372 of what the government did when.  John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6373 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of
6374 government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, <em class="citetitle">On Liberty</em>
6375 (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.  John R. Commons famously
6376 defended the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the
6377 market; John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and
6378 Warren J. Samuels, eds., <em class="citetitle">John R. Commons: Selected
6379 Essays</em> (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with
6380 Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical disabilities
6381 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making access
6382 to those places easier; 42 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>,
6383 section 12101 (2000).  Each of these interventions to change existing
6384 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of those
6385 interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the effective
6386 liberty that each of these groups might face.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2829362"></a>
6387 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2829511" href="#id2829511" class="para">122</a>] </sup>
6388
6389
6390 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6391 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #23</a>. For a more recent
6392 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6393 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6 October 2003, available at
6394 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #24</a>.
6395 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2829560" href="#id2829560" class="para">123</a>] </sup>
6396
6397
6398 Fred Warshofsky, <em class="citetitle">The Patent Wars</em> (New York: Wiley,
6399 1994), 170&#8211;71.
6400 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2829726" href="#id2829726" class="para">124</a>] </sup>
6401
6402
6403 Se for eksempel James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6404 Environmentalism for the Net?" <em class="citetitle">Duke Law Journal</em> 47
6405 (1997): 87.
6406 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2829928" href="#id2829928" class="para">125</a>] </sup>
6407
6408 William W. Crosskey, <em class="citetitle">Politics and the Constitution in the History
6409 of the United States</em> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953),
6410 vol. 1, 485&#8211;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6411 Law of the Land,' <span class="emphasis"><em>the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6412 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</em></span>" (emphasis
6413 added).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2829944"></a>
6414 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2829994" href="#id2829994" class="para">126</a>] </sup>
6415
6416
6417 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790 to
6418 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <em class="citetitle">A
6419 History of Book Publishing in the United States</em>, vol. 1,
6420 <em class="citetitle">The Creation of an Industry, 1630&#8211;1865</em> (New
6421 York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000 imprints recorded before 1790, only
6422 twelve were copyrighted under the 1790 act; William J. Maher,
6423 <em class="citetitle">Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension and the Copyright Law of
6424 1790 in Historical Context</em>, 7&#8211;10 (2002), available at
6425 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #25</a>.  Thus, the
6426 overwhelming majority of works fell immediately into the public domain. Even
6427 those works that were copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly,
6428 because the term of copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was
6429 fourteen years, with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen
6430 years. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2830061" href="#id2830061" class="para">127</a>] </sup>
6431
6432
6433 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For instance, of
6434 the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were renewed in 1910. For
6435 a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
6436 "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright," <em class="citetitle">Studies on
6437 Copyright</em>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1963),
6438 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William M. Landes and
6439 Richard A.  Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6440 <em class="citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review</em> 70 (2003): 471,
6441 498&#8211;501, and accompanying figures.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2830089" href="#id2830089" class="para">128</a>] </sup>
6442
6443
6444 Se Ringer, kap. 9, n. 2.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2830184" href="#id2830184" class="para">129</a>] </sup>
6445
6446
6447 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the first
6448 year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never more than
6449 thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and Posner,
6450 "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6451 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2830309" href="#id2830309" class="para">130</a>] </sup>
6452
6453
6454 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of
6455 American Literature," 29 <em class="citetitle">New York University Journal of
6456 International Law and Politics</em> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth,
6457 ed., Federal Copyright Records, 1790&#8211;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6458
6459 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2830390" href="#id2830390" class="para">131</a>] </sup>
6460
6461 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," <em class="citetitle">Legal
6462 Affairs</em>, julu/august 2003,tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #26</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2830417"></a>
6463 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2830436" href="#id2830436" class="para">132</a>] </sup>
6464
6465
6466 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument about
6467 the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective of the
6468 First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See Jed
6469 Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,"
6470 <em class="citetitle">Yale Law Journal</em> 112 (2002): 1&#8211;60 (see
6471 especially pp. 53&#8211;59).
6472 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2830487" href="#id2830487" class="para">133</a>] </sup>
6473
6474
6475 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6476 regulates more than "copies"&#8212;a public performance of a copyrighted
6477 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't make
6478 a copy; 17 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>, section 106(4). And it
6479 certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 <em class="citetitle">United States
6480 Code</em>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the existing law
6481 (which regulates "copies;" 17 <em class="citetitle">United States Code</em>,
6482 section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6483 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2830548" href="#id2830548" class="para">134</a>] </sup>
6484
6485
6486 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends, we
6487 should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for its
6488 extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the basis of
6489 arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6490 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2830494" href="#id2830494" class="para">135</a>] </sup>
6491
6492
6493 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather
6494 that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not
6495 make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be
6496 designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies
6497 remain.
6498 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2831043" href="#id2831043" class="para">136</a>] </sup>
6499
6500
6501 Se David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," <em class="citetitle">Law and
6502 Contemporary Problems</em> 44 (1981): 172&#8211;73.
6503 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2831064" href="#id2831064" class="para">137</a>] </sup>
6504
6505 Ibid. Se også Vaidhyanathan, <em class="citetitle">Copyrights and
6506 Copywrongs</em>, 1&#8211;3.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2831055"></a>
6507 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2831349" href="#id2831349" class="para">138</a>] </sup>
6508
6509
6510 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
6511 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
6512 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
6513 obligation (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
6514 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would not
6515 necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
6516 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2831669" href="#id2831669" class="para">139</a>] </sup>
6517
6518 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
6519 <em class="citetitle">Science</em> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play
6520 Dead: Sony Muzzles the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,"
6521 <em class="citetitle">American Prospect</em>, January 2002; "Court Dismisses
6522 Computer Scientists' Challenge to DMCA," <em class="citetitle">Intellectual Property
6523 Litigation Reporter</em>, 11 December 2001; Bill Holland, "Copyright
6524 Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," <em class="citetitle">Billboard</em>, May
6525 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com, April 2001;
6526 Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked Questions about
6527 <em class="citetitle">Felten and USENIX</em> v. <em class="citetitle">RIAA</em>
6528 Legal Case," available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
6529 #27</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2831707"></a>
6530 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2831938" href="#id2831938" class="para">140</a>] </sup>
6531
6532
6533 <em class="citetitle">Sony Corporation of America</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Universal
6534 City Studios, Inc</em>., 464 U.S. 417, 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers
6535 never changed his view about the VCR. See James Lardner, <em class="citetitle">Fast
6536 Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of the VCR</em>
6537 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&#8211;71.
6538 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832096" href="#id2832096" class="para">141</a>] </sup>
6539
6540
6541 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
6542 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," <em class="citetitle">Loyola of Los
6543 Angeles Entertainment Law Journal</em> 17 (1997): 651.
6544 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832220" href="#id2832220" class="para">142</a>] </sup>
6545
6546
6547 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
6548 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)  (statement
6549 of Senator John McCain).  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832233" href="#id2832233" class="para">143</a>] </sup>
6550
6551
6552 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to Slide,"
6553 <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 23 December 2002.
6554 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832246" href="#id2832246" class="para">144</a>] </sup>
6555
6556
6557 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," <em class="citetitle">Charleston
6558 Gazette</em>, 31 May 2003.
6559 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832336" href="#id2832336" class="para">145</a>] </sup>
6560
6561 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," <em class="citetitle">Atlantic Monthly</em>
6562 (September 2003): 89.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2832352"></a>
6563 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832462" href="#id2832462" class="para">146</a>] </sup>
6564
6565
6566 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center Forum,
6567 "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis, Missouri, 3 April
6568 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #28</a>; for the Lear story,
6569 not included in the prepared remarks, see <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #29</a>).
6570 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832492" href="#id2832492" class="para">147</a>] </sup>
6571
6572
6573 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
6574 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
6575 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union and
6576 the Consumer Federation of America), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #30</a>. Kimmelman quotes
6577 Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West, in her Remarks
6578 at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February 2003.
6579 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832545" href="#id2832545" class="para">148</a>] </sup>
6580
6581
6582 ibid.
6583 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832599" href="#id2832599" class="para">149</a>] </sup>
6584
6585
6586 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," <em class="citetitle">Now with Bill
6587 Moyers</em>, Bill Moyers, 25 April 2003, redigert avskrift
6588 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
6589 #31</a>.
6590 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832651" href="#id2832651" class="para">150</a>] </sup>
6591
6592
6593 Clayton M. Christensen, <em class="citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
6594 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do
6595 Business</em> (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
6596 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean
6597 Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and
6598 Market Concepts in Technological Evolution," <em class="citetitle">Research
6599 Policy</em> 14 (1985): 235&#8211;51. For a more recent study, see
6600 Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan, <em class="citetitle">Creative Destruction: Why
6601 Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market&#8212;and How to
6602 Successfully Transform Them</em> (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
6603 2001).  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832791" href="#id2832791" class="para">151</a>] </sup>
6604
6605 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
6606 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
6607 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
6608 policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
6609 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
6610 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and returned
6611 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.  These
6612 restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for example,
6613 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection
6614 from TV Networks," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 13 March 2003,
6615 C4.  Outside of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC
6616 or the courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general
6617 overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
6618 Advertising on Television and Radio," <em class="citetitle">Yale Law and Policy
6619 Review</em> 6 (1988): 449&#8211;79, and for a more recent summary of
6620 the stance of the FCC and the courts, see <em class="citetitle">Radio-Television News
6621 Directors Association</em> v. <em class="citetitle">FCC</em>, 184 F. 3d
6622 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
6623 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
6624 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel
6625 buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni
6626 Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #32</a>. The ground was that
6627 the criticism was "too controversial." <a class="indexterm" name="id2832839"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2832847"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2832853"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2832860"></a>
6628 <a class="indexterm" name="id2832866"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2832872"></a>
6629 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2832995" href="#id2832995" class="para">152</a>] </sup>
6630
6631 Siva Vaidhyanathan fanger et lignende poeng i hans "fire kapitulasjoner" for
6632 opphavsrettsloven i den digitale tidsalder. Se Vaidhyanathan, 159&#8211;60.
6633 <a class="indexterm" name="id2832817"></a>
6634 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2833357" href="#id2833357" class="para">153</a>] </sup>
6635
6636 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist movement
6637 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance public
6638 and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of Property,"
6639 in <em class="citetitle">Nomos XXII: Property</em>, J. Roland Pennock and John
6640 W.  Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2833369"></a>
6641 </p></div></div></div></div><div class="part" title="Del III. Nøtter"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="c-puzzles"></a>Del III. Nøtter</h1></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#chimera">12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#harms">13. Kapittel tolv: Skader</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="chimera"></a>Kapittel 12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxchimera"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxwells"></a><a class="indexterm" name="idxtcotb"></a><p>
6642 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez
6643 trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in
6644 the Peruvian Andes.<sup>[<a name="id2833494" href="#ftn.id2833494" class="footnote">154</a>]</sup> The valley is
6645 extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate,
6646 slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent
6647 fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an
6648 opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed
6649 Man is King." So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a
6650 king.
6651 </p><p>
6652 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of sight
6653 to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are "blind."
6654 They don't have the word <em class="citetitle">blind</em>. They think he's just
6655 thick.  Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
6656 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to
6657 control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
6658 understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute,
6659 and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
6660 </p><p>
6661
6662
6663 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
6664 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his affection,
6665 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in the whole of
6666 creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's description of what he
6667 sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies, and she listened to his
6668 description of the stars and the mountains and her own sweet white-lit
6669 beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells
6670 tells us, and "she could only half understand, but she was mysteriously
6671 delighted."
6672 </p><p>
6673 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted" love,
6674 the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her father instructs,
6675 "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything right." They take
6676 Nunez to the village doctor.
6677 </p><p>
6678 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain is
6679 affected," he reports.
6680 </p><p>
6681 "What affects it?" the father asks.  "Those queer things that are called the
6682 eyes &#8230; are diseased &#8230; in such a way as to affect his brain."
6683 </p><p>
6684 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty that in
6685 order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple and easy
6686 surgical operation&#8212;namely, to remove these irritant bodies [the
6687 eyes]."
6688 </p><p>
6689
6690 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform Nunez
6691 of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.  (You'll have
6692 to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I believe in free
6693 culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)  It sometimes happens
6694 that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
6695 "chimera." A chimera is a single creature with two sets of DNA. The DNA in
6696 the blood, for example, might be different from the DNA of the skin. This
6697 possibility is an underused plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows
6698 with 100 percent certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at
6699 the scene. &#8230;"
6700 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2833596"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2833604"></a><p>
6701 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were impossible.  A
6702 single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of DNA is that it is
6703 the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two individuals have
6704 the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person can have two different
6705 sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of a "person" should reflect this
6706 reality.
6707 </p><p>
6708 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
6709 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not unfairly
6710 enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing with a
6711 chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is p2p file
6712 sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.  One side
6713 says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
6714 records&#8212;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
6715 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
6716 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just send
6717 the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant respects,
6718 just like what every executive in every recording company no doubt did as a
6719 kid: sharing music.
6720 </p><p>
6721 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is on a
6722 p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then sure, my
6723 friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of "friends" beyond
6724 recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can get access. Whether or
6725 not sharing my music with my best friend is what "we have always been
6726 allowed to do," we have not always been allowed to share music with "our ten
6727 thousand best friends."
6728 </p><p>
6729 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking into
6730 a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out with it,"
6731 that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally) releases a
6732 new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free copy to
6733 take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2833629"></a>
6734 </p><p>
6735
6736
6737
6738 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD from
6739 Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a CD from
6740 Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and something to show on
6741 my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note that when I take a
6742 CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that might be imposed on me, under
6743 California law, at least, is $1,000.  According to the RIAA, by contrast, if
6744 I download a ten-song CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
6745 </p><p>
6746 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that it
6747 is both&#8212;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It is
6748 a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side asserts, we
6749 need to begin to think about how we should respond to this chimera. What
6750 rules should govern it?
6751 </p><p>
6752 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We could,
6753 with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a felony. We
6754 could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages just because
6755 file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get universities to
6756 monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no computer is used to commit
6757 this crime. These responses might be extreme, but each of them has either
6758 been proposed or actually implemented.<sup>[<a name="id2833713" href="#ftn.id2833713" class="footnote">155</a>]</sup>
6759
6760 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2833796"></a><p>
6761 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act as
6762 though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be no
6763 copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making copyrighted
6764 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip: regulated, if
6765 at all, by social norms but not by law.
6766 </p><p>
6767 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.  Rather than
6768 embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace something that
6769 recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book with a sketch of a
6770 system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter is to show just how
6771 awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
6772 <span class="emphasis"><em>either</em></span> extreme would be worse than a reasonable
6773 alternative.  But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
6774 of the two extremes.
6775 </p><p>
6776
6777
6778
6779 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the middle of
6780 the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land grab is
6781 occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give content holders
6782 a kind of control over our culture that they have never had before. And in
6783 this extremism, many an opportunity for new innovation and new creativity
6784 will be lost.
6785 </p><p>
6786 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My focus
6787 instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war will also
6788 kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so broadly among our
6789 citizens, and we have just begun to see the innovation that this power will
6790 unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the passing of one cycle of
6791 innovation around technologies to distribute content. The law is responsible
6792 for this passing. As the vice president for global public policy at one of
6793 these new innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
6794 protection for copyrighted material,
6795 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
6796 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted material,
6797 and we want to protect those rights.
6798 </p><p>
6799 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the major
6800 labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright interests, nor is it
6801 necessarily the best. It is simply too early to answer that question. Market
6802 forces operating naturally may very well produce a totally different
6803 industry model.
6804 </p><p>
6805 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make with
6806 respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the market for
6807 digital media and the manner in which digital media are distributed. This in
6808 turn will directly influence the options that are available to consumers,
6809 both in terms of the ease with which they will be able to access digital
6810 media and the equipment that they will require to do so. Poor choices made
6811 this early in the game will retard the growth of this market, hurting
6812 everyone's interests.<sup>[<a name="id2833881" href="#ftn.id2833881" class="footnote">156</a>]</sup>
6813 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6814 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal, one of "the
6815 major labels." Its position on these matters has now changed.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2833911"></a>
6816 </p><p>
6817 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash piracy. It
6818 will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will kill
6819 opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
6820 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2833494" href="#id2833494" class="para">154</a>] </sup>
6821
6822
6823 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
6824 <em class="citetitle">The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</em>, Michael
6825 Sherborne, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
6826 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2833713" href="#id2833713" class="para">155</a>] </sup>
6827
6828 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
6829 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, "Copyright
6830 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available at
6831 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #33</a>. Reps. John
6832 Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill
6833 that would treat unauthorized on-line copying as a felony offense with
6834 punishments ranging as high as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
6835 "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy," <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles
6836 Times</em>, 17 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #34</a>. Civil penalties are
6837 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
6838 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
6839 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer, see
6840 <em class="citetitle">RIAA</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Verizon Internet Services (In
6841 re. Verizon Internet Services)</em>, 240 F.  Supp. 2d 24
6842 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
6843 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful arsenal
6844 in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from $12,000 to
6845 $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on university
6846 networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98 billion the RIAA
6847 could seek should the matter proceed to court. See Elizabeth Young,
6848 "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com, August 2003, available
6849 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #35</a>. For an
6850 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
6851 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer identities,
6852 see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students,"
6853 <em class="citetitle">Boston Globe</em>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #36</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2833780"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2833788"></a>
6854 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2833881" href="#id2833881" class="para">156</a>] </sup>
6855
6856
6857 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
6858 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
6859 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, House
6860 Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter Harter,
6861 vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards, EMusic.com), available
6862 in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony File.  </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 13. Kapittel tolv: Skader"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="harms"></a>Kapittel 13. Kapittel tolv: Skader</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
6863 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has launched
6864 a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
6865 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both direct
6866 and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these damages will be
6867 suffered most by our own people.
6868 </p><p>
6869 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
6870 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to extend
6871 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war justified?
6872 </p><p>
6873 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the first
6874 time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the power of
6875 the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in our
6876 history.
6877 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2833959"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2833965"></a><p>
6878 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on the
6879 side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims of control
6880 in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical rejection of "piracy"
6881 still has play.
6882 </p><p>
6883
6884
6885 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to describe
6886 just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite confident
6887 the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The first two
6888 protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in the wings to fight
6889 today's monopolists of culture.
6890 </p><div class="section" title="Constraining Creators"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="constrain"></a>Constraining Creators</h2></div></div></div><p>
6891 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital technologies.
6892 These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture and share
6893 content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what humans have done
6894 since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and communicate. But capturing and
6895 sharing through digital technology is different. The fidelity and power are
6896 different. You could send an e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on
6897 Comedy Central, or you could send the clip. You could write an essay about
6898 the inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
6899 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
6900 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could weave
6901 together a string&#8212;a mash-up&#8212; of songs from your favorite artists
6902 in a collage and make it available on the Net.
6903 </p><p>
6904 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
6905 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture, and in
6906 part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but it explodes
6907 the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology of digital
6908 "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily diverse
6909 creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that creativity is
6910 applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of citizens to use
6911 technology to express and criticize and contribute to the culture all
6912 around.
6913 </p><p>
6914
6915 Teknologien har dermed gitt oss en mulighet til å gjøre noe med kultur som
6916 bare har vært mulig for enkeltpersoner i små grupper, isolert fra andre
6917 grupper. Forestill deg en gammel mann som forteller en historie til en
6918 samling med naboer i en liten landsby.  Forestill deg så den samme
6919 historiefortellingen utvidet til å nå over hele verden.
6920 </p><p>
6921 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In the
6922 current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for a
6923 moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web sites that
6924 offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites that catalog
6925 cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound to criticize
6926 politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles on remote
6927 topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative work spread
6928 across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this work is
6929 presumptively illegal.
6930 </p><p>
6931 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the examples of
6932 extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to proliferate. It is
6933 impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed and what's not, and at the
6934 same time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly harsh.  The
6935 four students who were threatened by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3
6936 was just one) were threatened with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search
6937 engines that permitted songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&#8212;which
6938 defrauded investors of $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in
6939 market capitalization of over $200 billion&#8212;received a fine of a mere
6940 $750 million.<sup>[<a name="id2834070" href="#ftn.id2834070" class="footnote">157</a>]</sup> And under legislation
6941 being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who negligently removes the
6942 wrong leg in an operation would be liable for no more than $250,000 in
6943 damages for pain and suffering.<sup>[<a name="id2834106" href="#ftn.id2834106" class="footnote">158</a>]</sup> Can
6944 common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where the maximum fine for
6945 downloading two songs off the Internet is more than the fine for a doctor's
6946 negligently butchering a patient? <a class="indexterm" name="id2834142"></a>
6947 </p><p>
6948 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely high
6949 penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either never
6950 be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this creative
6951 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys "pirates." We
6952 make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public domain, because the
6953 boundaries of the public domain are designed to be unclear. It never pays to
6954 do anything except pay for the right to create, and hence only those who can
6955 pay are allowed to create. As was the case in the Soviet Union, though for
6956 very different reasons, we will begin to see a world of underground
6957 art&#8212;not because the message is necessarily political, or because the
6958 subject is controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is
6959 legally fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
6960 States.<sup>[<a name="id2833696" href="#ftn.id2833696" class="footnote">159</a>]</sup> In what does their "illegality"
6961 consist? In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that
6962 is critical or reflective.
6963 </p><p>
6964 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the changing
6965 law. I described that change in detail in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>. But an even bigger part has to do with
6966 the increasing ease with which infractions can be tracked. As users of
6967 file-sharing systems discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for
6968 copyright owners to get courts to order Internet service providers to reveal
6969 who has what content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a
6970 list of the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that
6971 anyone could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
6972 </p><p>
6973 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether his painting
6974 infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day painter, using the
6975 tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web, must worry all the
6976 time. Images are all around, but the only safe images to use in the act of
6977 creation are those purchased from Corbis or another image farm. And in
6978 purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free market in pencils; we needn't
6979 worry about its effect on creativity. But there is a highly regulated,
6980 monopolized market in cultural icons; the right to cultivate and transform
6981 them is not similarly free.
6982 </p><p>
6983 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I described
6984 in chapter <a class="xref" href="#recorders" title="Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne">8</a>, in
6985 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have been
6986 lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was fair use, and
6987 hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a use.
6988 </p><p>
6989
6990
6991
6992 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend
6993 your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system for
6994 defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&#8212;in practically
6995 every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers too
6996 slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the justice
6997 underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich.
6998 For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides itself
6999 on the rule of law.
7000 </p><p>
7001 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
7002 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law should
7003 allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system has become
7004 that anyone actually believes this. The rules that publishers impose upon
7005 writers, the rules that film distributors impose upon filmmakers, the rules
7006 that newspapers impose upon journalists&#8212; these are the real laws
7007 governing creativity. And these rules have little relationship to the "law"
7008 with which judges comfort themselves.
7009 </p><p>
7010 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful infringement of
7011 a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of dollars to even defend
7012 against a copyright infringement claim, and which would never return to the
7013 wrongfully accused defendant anything of the costs she suffered to defend
7014 her right to speak&#8212;in that world, the astonishingly broad regulations
7015 that pass under the name "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in
7016 that world, it takes a studied blindness for people to continue to believe
7017 they live in a culture that is free.
7018 </p><p>
7019 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
7020 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7021
7022 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people are
7023 being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
7024 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still won't
7025 get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made &#8230; you're not going to
7026 get it distributed in the mainstream media unless you've got a little note
7027 from a lawyer saying, "This has been cleared." You're not even going to get
7028 it on PBS without that kind of permission. That's the point at which they
7029 control it.
7030 </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="section" title="Constraining Innovators"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="innovators"></a>Constraining Innovators</h2></div></div></div><p>
7031 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty story&#8212;creativity
7032 quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada yada. Maybe that doesn't get you
7033 going. Maybe you think there's enough weird art out there, and enough
7034 expression that is critical of what seems to be just about everything.  And
7035 if you think that, you might think there's little in this story to worry
7036 you.
7037 </p><p>
7038 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.  Indeed,
7039 it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme promarket
7040 ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special one at that, 188
7041 pages into a book like this), then you can see this other aspect by
7042 substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of "free culture." The
7043 point is the same, even if the interests affecting culture are more
7044 fundamental.
7045 </p><p>
7046 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the same
7047 charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of course,
7048 concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&#8212;at a minimum, we
7049 need rules of property and contract, and courts to enforce both. Likewise,
7050 in this culture debate, everyone concedes that at least some framework of
7051 copyright is also required. But both perspectives vehemently insist that
7052 just because some regulation is good, it doesn't follow that more regulation
7053 is better. And both perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which
7054 regulation simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect
7055 themselves against the competitors of tomorrow.
7056 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2834338"></a><p>
7057
7058 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory strategy
7059 that I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>. The consequence of this massive threat of liability
7060 tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is that innovators who want to
7061 innovate in this space can safely innovate only if they have the sign-off
7062 from last generation's dominant industries.  That lesson has been taught
7063 through a series of cases that were designed and executed to teach venture
7064 capitalists a lesson. That lesson&#8212;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry
7065 calls a "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&#8212;has been
7066 learned.
7067 </p><p>
7068 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning I told in
7069 <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em> and which has progressed in a way
7070 that even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
7071 </p><p>
7072 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com.  MP3.com was
7073 keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to facilitate new
7074 ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to facilitate new ways to
7075 create content. Unlike the major labels, MP3.com offered creators a venue to
7076 distribute their creativity, without demanding an exclusive engagement from
7077 the creators.
7078 </p><p>
7079 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
7080 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
7081 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
7082 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie Raitt. And
7083 so on.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2834407"></a>
7084 </p><p>
7085 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
7086 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this preference
7087 data. In January 2000, the company launched a service called
7088 my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would sign into an
7089 account and then insert into her computer a CD. The software would identify
7090 the CD, and then give the user access to that content.  So, for example, if
7091 you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then wherever you were&#8212;at work or at
7092 home&#8212;you could get access to that music once you signed into your
7093 account. The system was therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
7094 </p><p>
7095
7096 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But that
7097 opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the my.mp3.com
7098 service was to give users access to their own content, and as a by-product,
7099 by seeing the content they already owned, to discover the kind of content
7100 the users liked.
7101 </p><p>
7102 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000 CDs to
7103 a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who uploaded the music,
7104 but that would have taken a great deal of time, and would have produced a
7105 product of questionable quality.) It therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a
7106 store, and started the process of making copies of those CDs. Again, it
7107 would not serve the content from those copies to anyone except those who
7108 authenticated that they had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while
7109 this was 50,000 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers
7110 something they had already bought.
7111 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxvivendiuniversal"></a><p>
7112 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels, headed
7113 by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled with four of
7114 the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found MP3.com to have been
7115 guilty of willful infringement with respect to the fifth. Applying the law
7116 as it is, the judge imposed a fine against MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com
7117 then settled with the remaining plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over
7118 $54 million. Vivendi purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
7119 </p><p>
7120 Den delen av historien har jeg fortalt før.  Nå kommer konklusjonen.
7121 </p><p>
7122 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
7123 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they had a
7124 good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be considered
7125 legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it should have been
7126 obvious that the courts would find this behavior illegal; therefore, this
7127 lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had dared to suggest that the law
7128 was less restrictive than the labels demanded.
7129 </p><p>
7130
7131 Den åpenbare hensikten med dette søksmålet (som ble avsluttet med et forlik
7132 for et uspesifisert beløp like etter at saken ikke lenger fikk
7133 pressedekning), var å sende en melding som ikke kan misforstås til advokater
7134 som gir råd til klienter på dette området: Det er ikke bare dine klienter
7135 som får lide hvis innholdsindustrien retter sine våpen mot dem.  Det får
7136 også du.  Så de av dere som tror loven burde være mindre restriktiv bør
7137 innse at et slikt syn på loven vil koste deg og ditt firma dyrt.
7138 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2834511"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2834519"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2834526"></a><p>
7139 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003, Universal
7140 and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the venture capital firm
7141 (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of its development, its
7142 cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner (Hank Barry).<sup>[<a name="id2834539" href="#ftn.id2834539" class="footnote">160</a>]</sup> The claim here, as well, was that the VC should
7143 have recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
7144 industry should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
7145 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim
7146 of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
7147 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at risk
7148 not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.  Your investment
7149 buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.  So extreme has the
7150 environment become that even car manufacturers are afraid of technologies
7151 that touch content. In an article in <em class="citetitle">Business 2.0</em>,
7152 Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW: <a class="indexterm" name="id2834578"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2834584"></a>
7153 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><a class="indexterm" name="id2834594"></a><p>
7154 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in the car,
7155 there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW engineers in Germany
7156 had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via the car's built-in sound system,
7157 but that the company's marketing and legal departments weren't comfortable
7158 with pushing this forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are
7159 sold in the United States with bona fide MP3 players. &#8230; <sup>[<a name="id2834302" href="#ftn.id2834302" class="footnote">161</a>]</sup>
7160 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7161 Dette er verden til mafiaen&#8212;fylt med "penger eller livet"-trusler, som
7162 ikke er regulert av domstolene men av trusler som loven gir
7163 rettighetsinnehaver mulighet til å komme med. Det er et system som åpenbart
7164 og nødvendigvis vil kvele ny innovasjon. Det er vanskelig nok å starte et
7165 selskap. Det blir helt umulig hvis selskapet er stadig truet av søksmål.
7166 </p><p>
7167
7168
7169
7170 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
7171 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
7172 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
7173 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and by
7174 embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law imposes, that
7175 uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more conservative than is
7176 right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking tickets, we'd not
7177 only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much less driving. The same
7178 principle applies to innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this
7179 uncertain and unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation
7180 and much less creativity.
7181 </p><p>
7182 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
7183 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
7184 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
7185 systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
7186 industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
7187 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant competition.
7188 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of competition.
7189 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect of too
7190 much control in the market is to produce an overregulatedregulated market.
7191 </p><p>
7192
7193 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is the
7194 first important way in which the changes I have described will burden
7195 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&#8212;a culture in
7196 which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again, I am not
7197 antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I am certainly
7198 not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its limits. And
7199 leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the high costs that
7200 our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an
7201 embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our profession should
7202 therefore do everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at
7203 least do everything it can to limit the reach of the law where the law is
7204 not doing any good. The transaction costs buried within a permission culture
7205 are enough to bury a wide range of creativity.  Someone needs to do a lot of
7206 justifying to justify that result.  The uncertainty of the law is one burden
7207 on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more directly. This is
7208 the effort by many in the content industry to use the law to directly
7209 regulate the technology of the Internet so that it better protects their
7210 content.
7211 </p><p>
7212 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
7213 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the Internet's
7214 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this feature is a
7215 "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content distributors have
7216 a harder time controlling the distribution of content.  One obvious response
7217 to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet less efficient. If the
7218 Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says, we should break the
7219 kneecaps of the Internet.
7220 </p><p>
7221 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of the
7222 content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that would
7223 require computers to determine whether the content they access is protected
7224 or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<sup>[<a name="id2834733" href="#ftn.id2834733" class="footnote">162</a>]</sup> Congress has already launched proceedings to
7225 explore a mandatory "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device
7226 capable of transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would
7227 disable the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast
7228 flag. Other members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers
7229 from liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
7230 copyright violators and disable their machines.<sup>[<a name="id2834756" href="#ftn.id2834756" class="footnote">163</a>]</sup>
7231 </p><p>
7232
7233 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the code, why
7234 not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any regulation of technical
7235 infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular technology of the
7236 day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on the technology, but
7237 will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly those requirements.
7238 </p><p>
7239 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by Intel,
7240 tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
7241 impose.<sup>[<a name="id2834779" href="#ftn.id2834779" class="footnote">164</a>]</sup> Their argument was obviously
7242 not that copyright should not be protected. Instead, they argued, any
7243 protection should not do more harm than good.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2834790"></a>
7244 </p><p>
7245 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
7246 innovation&#8212;again, a story that will be quite familiar to the free
7247 market crowd.
7248 </p><p>
7249 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form of
7250 regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.  When
7251 done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done wrong, it is
7252 regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
7253 </p><p>
7254 As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, despite this feature of copyright as regulation, and
7255 subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica Litman in her book
7256 <em class="citetitle">Digital Copyright</em>,<sup>[<a name="id2834825" href="#ftn.id2834825" class="footnote">165</a>]</sup> overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter 10
7257 details, when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a
7258 balance to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
7259 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as in the
7260 case of the VCR) has been another.
7261 </p><p>
7262 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed with the
7263 rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between the claims of a
7264 new technology and the legitimate rights of content creators, both the
7265 courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions that will have the
7266 effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
7267 </p><p>
7268 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<sup>[<a name="id2834860" href="#ftn.id2834860" class="footnote">166</a>]</sup> It has been mirrored in the responses threatened
7269 and actually implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
7270 here.<sup>[<a name="id2834896" href="#ftn.id2834896" class="footnote">167</a>]</sup> But there is one example that
7271 captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the demise of Internet
7272 radio.
7273 </p><p>
7274
7275
7276 As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#pirates" title='Kapittel 5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"'>5</a>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording artist
7277 doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she is also the
7278 composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a version of "Happy
7279 Birthday"&#8212;to memorialize her famous performance before President
7280 Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&#8212; then whenever that recording was
7281 played on the radio, the current copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would
7282 get some money, whereas Marilyn Monroe would not.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2834945"></a>
7283 </p><p>
7284 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some sense. The
7285 justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The recording artist
7286 thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio station was making it
7287 more likely that her records would be purchased.  Thus, the recording artist
7288 got something, even if only indirectly.  Probably this reasoning had less to
7289 do with the result than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists
7290 were quite good at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require
7291 compensation to the recording artists.
7292 </p><p>
7293 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a technology to
7294 stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast travels
7295 across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.  Thus, I can
7296 "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting in San
7297 Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a regular radio
7298 station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
7299 </p><p>
7300 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there are
7301 potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could tune in
7302 to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture for broadcast
7303 radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of broadcasters and clear
7304 broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore be more competitive
7305 than regular radio; it could provide a wider range of selections. And
7306 because the potential audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche
7307 stations could easily develop and market their content to a relatively large
7308 number of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
7309 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
7310 </p><p>
7311
7312
7313
7314 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an improvement
7315 potentially vastly more significant than the FM improvement over AM, since
7316 not only is the technology better, so, too, is the competition. Indeed,
7317 there is a direct parallel between the fight to establish FM radio and the
7318 fight to protect Internet radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's
7319 struggle to enable FM radio,
7320 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7321 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the shortwaves,
7322 thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in the crowded
7323 longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of stations would be
7324 limited only by economics and competition rather than by technical
7325 restrictions. &#8230; Armstrong likened the situation that had grown up in
7326 radio to that following the invention of the printing press, when
7327 governments and ruling interests attempted to control this new instrument of
7328 mass communications by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was
7329 broken only when it became possible for men freely to acquire printing
7330 presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention
7331 as the printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
7332 shackles.<sup>[<a name="id2834610" href="#ftn.id2834610" class="footnote">168</a>]</sup>
7333 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7334 This potential for FM radio was never realized&#8212;not because Armstrong
7335 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated the power of
7336 "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<sup>[<a name="id2834801" href="#ftn.id2834801" class="footnote">169</a>]</sup> to retard the growth of this competing technology.
7337 </p><p>
7338 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For again, there
7339 is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of Internet radio
7340 stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are those imposed by the
7341 law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first question we should ask is,
7342 what copyright rules would govern Internet radio?
7343 </p><p>
7344
7345 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a new
7346 industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very powerful
7347 lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon of Internet
7348 radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt a different rule
7349 for Internet radio than the rule that applies to terrestrial radio. While
7350 terrestrial radio does not have to pay our hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when
7351 it plays her hypothetical recording of "Happy Birthday" on the air,
7352 <span class="emphasis"><em>Internet radio does</em></span>. Not only is the law not neutral
7353 toward Internet radio&#8212;the law actually burdens Internet radio more
7354 than it burdens terrestrial radio.
7355 </p><p>
7356 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor William Fisher
7357 estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree popular music to
7358 (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four hours a day, the total
7359 artist fees that radio station would owe would be over $1 million a
7360 year.<sup>[<a name="id2835088" href="#ftn.id2835088" class="footnote">170</a>]</sup> A regular radio station
7361 broadcasting the same content would pay no equivalent fee.
7362 </p><p>
7363 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
7364 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
7365 would have to collect the following data from <span class="emphasis"><em>every listening
7366 transaction</em></span>:
7367 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
7368 navn på tjenesten,
7369 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7370 kanalen til programmet (AM/FM-stasjoner bruker stasjons-ID);
7371 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7372 type program (fra arkivet/i løkke/direkte);
7373 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7374 dato for sending;
7375 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7376 tidspunkt for sending;
7377 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7378 tidssone til opprinnelsen for sending;
7379 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7380 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
7381 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7382 varigheten av sending (til nærmeste sekund):
7383 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7384 lydinnspilling-tittel;
7385 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7386 ISRC-kode for opptaket;
7387 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7388 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of
7389 compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of
7390 the track;
7391 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7392 spillende plateartist;
7393 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7394 tittel på album i butikker;
7395 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7396 plateselskap;
7397 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7398 UPC-koden for albumet i butikker;
7399 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7400 katalognummer;
7401 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7402 informasjon om opphavsrettsinnehaver;
7403 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7404 musikksjanger for kanal eller programmet (stasjonsformat);
7405 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7406 navn på tjenesten eller selskap;
7407 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7408 kanal eller program;
7409 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7410 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
7411 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7412 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
7413 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7414 time zone where the signal was received (user);
7415 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7416 unik bruker-identifikator;
7417 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
7418 landet til brukeren som mottok sendingene.
7419 </p></li></ol></div><p>
7420 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting requirements,
7421 pending further study. And he also changed the original rates set by the
7422 arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the basic difference
7423 between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains: Internet radio has to
7424 pay a <span class="emphasis"><em>type of copyright fee</em></span> that terrestrial radio does
7425 not.
7426 </p><p>
7427 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the economic
7428 consequences from Internet radio that would justify these differences? Was
7429 the motive to protect artists against piracy?
7430 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2835304"></a><p>
7431 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious to
7432 everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public Policy at
7433 Real Networks, told me,
7434 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7435
7436 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented some testimony
7437 about what they thought a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, and
7438 it was much higher. It was ten times higher than what radio stations pay to
7439 perform the same songs for the same period of time. And so the attorneys
7440 representing the webcasters asked the RIAA, &#8230; "How do you come up
7441 with a rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
7442 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and that
7443 should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so high, you're
7444 going to drive the small webcasters out of business. &#8230;"
7445 </p><p>
7446 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an industry
7447 with thousands of webcasters, <span class="emphasis"><em>we think it should be an industry
7448 with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a high rate and it's a
7449 stable, predictable market</em></span>." (Emphasis added.)
7450 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7451 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so that
7452 this platform of potentially immense competition, which would cause the
7453 diversity and range of content available to explode, would not cause pain to
7454 the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right or the left, who
7455 should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is practically no one, on
7456 either the right or the left, who is doing anything effective to prevent it.
7457 </p></div><div class="section" title="Corrupting Citizens"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="corruptingcitizens"></a>Corrupting Citizens</h2></div></div></div><p>
7458 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
7459 dinosaurs a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
7460 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
7461 </p><p>
7462 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was important
7463 to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation corrupts
7464 citizens and weakens the rule of law.
7465 </p><p>
7466
7467 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with every war
7468 of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very large number
7469 of citizens. According to <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em>, 43
7470 million Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<sup>[<a name="id2835392" href="#ftn.id2835392" class="footnote">171</a>]</sup> According to the RIAA, the behavior of those 43 million Americans
7471 is a felony. We thus have a set of rules that transform 20 percent of
7472 America into criminals. As the RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the
7473 Napsters and Kazaas of the world, but against students building search
7474 engines, and increasingly against ordinary users downloading content, the
7475 technologies for sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal
7476 use. It is an arms race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side
7477 inviting a more extreme response by the other.
7478 </p><p>
7479 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American legal
7480 system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it knew that in
7481 Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The threat of having to
7482 pay either all the money in the world in damages ($15,000,000) or almost all
7483 the money in the world to defend against paying all the money in the world
7484 in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)  led Jordan to choose to pay all the
7485 money he had in the world ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same
7486 strategy animates the RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
7487 2003, the RIAA sued 261 individuals&#8212;including a twelve-year-old girl
7488 living in public housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what
7489 file sharing was.<sup>[<a name="id2835079" href="#ftn.id2835079" class="footnote">172</a>]</sup> As these scapegoats
7490 discovered, it will always cost more to defend against these suits than it
7491 would cost to simply settle. (The twelve year old, for example, like Jesse
7492 Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000 to settle the case.) Our law is an
7493 awful system for defending rights. It is an embarrassment to our
7494 tradition. And the consequence of our law as it is, is that those with the
7495 power can use the law to quash any rights they oppose.
7496 </p><p>
7497 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just something
7498 more extreme than anything we've seen before. We experimented with alcohol
7499 prohibition, at a time when the per capita consumption of alcohol was 1.5
7500 gallons per capita per year. The war against drinking initially reduced that
7501 consumption to just 30 percent of its preprohibition levels, but by the end
7502 of prohibition, consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
7503 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast number
7504 were criminals.<sup>[<a name="id2835466" href="#ftn.id2835466" class="footnote">173</a>]</sup> We have launched a war
7505 on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated narcotics that 7
7506 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<sup>[<a name="id2835479" href="#ftn.id2835479" class="footnote">174</a>]</sup> That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
7507 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast majority
7508 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex tax system
7509 that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.<sup>[<a name="id2835496" href="#ftn.id2835496" class="footnote">175</a>]</sup> We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an
7510 endless array of ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a
7511 result, a huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
7512 <a class="indexterm" name="id2835512"></a>
7513 </p><p>
7514 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
7515 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
7516 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told a
7517 class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students who
7518 have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and sometimes
7519 drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven cars. These
7520 are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the norm. And then we,
7521 as law professors, are supposed to teach them how to behave
7522 ethically&#8212;how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds separate, or
7523 honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that your case is
7524 over. Generations of Americans&#8212;more significantly in some parts of
7525 America than in others, but still, everywhere in America today&#8212;can't
7526 live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a
7527 certain degree of illegality.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2835431"></a>
7528 </p><p>
7529 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law more
7530 severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how to make
7531 that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense depends, in part, at
7532 least, upon whether the costs of the law, both intended and collateral,
7533 outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and collateral, do outweigh
7534 the benefits, then the law ought to be changed.  Alternatively, if the costs
7535 of the existing system are much greater than the costs of an alternative,
7536 then we have a good reason to consider the alternative.
7537 </p><p>
7538
7539
7540
7541 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
7542 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
7543 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But that
7544 wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the week. A
7545 society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
7546 </p><p>
7547 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations, but
7548 that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends upon people
7549 obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we as citizens
7550 experience violating the law, the less we respect the law. Obviously, in
7551 most cases, the important issue is the law, not respect for the law. I don't
7552 care whether the rapist respects the law or not; I want to catch and
7553 incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether my students respect the
7554 law. And I do care if the rules of law sow increasing disrespect because of
7555 the extreme of regulation they impose.  Twenty million Americans have come
7556 of age since the Internet introduced this different idea of "sharing." We
7557 need to be able to call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not
7558 "felons."
7559 </p><p>
7560 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
7561 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
7562 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be asking is
7563 not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be whether this
7564 particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve the proper
7565 ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to assure that artists
7566 get paid without transforming forty-three million Americans into felons?
7567 Does it make sense if there are other ways to assure that artists get paid
7568 without transforming America into a nation of felons?
7569 </p><p>
7570 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
7571 </p><p>
7572
7573 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces of
7574 plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought.  The law
7575 protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a copyright
7576 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used record store
7577 and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the recordings is free.
7578 </p><p>
7579 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of phonograph
7580 records that is effectively free. Because these recordings were made without
7581 copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy, or "rip," music from my
7582 records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed, Apple Corporation went so far as
7583 to suggest that "freedom" was a right: In a series of commercials, Apple
7584 endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn" capacities of digital technologies.
7585 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2835627"></a><p>
7586 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large process
7587 at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing them in one
7588 archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful program called
7589 Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music: Bach, Baroque,
7590 Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others&#8212;the potential is
7591 endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists, these technologies
7592 help build a creativity with play lists that is itself independently
7593 valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and meaningful in their own
7594 right.
7595 </p><p>
7596 This use is enabled by unprotected media&#8212;either CDs or records.  But
7597 unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens (or so
7598 the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair return
7599 from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to experiment with
7600 technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These technologies, for
7601 example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or they might enable spy
7602 programs to identify ripped content on people's machines.
7603 </p><p>
7604
7605 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of your
7606 own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker circles,
7607 and get technology to disable the technologies that protect the
7608 content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that doesn't
7609 bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people, these
7610 protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving use of
7611 CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to the world
7612 where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of plastic or were
7613 part of a massively complex "digital rights management" system.
7614 </p><p>
7615 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination of the
7616 ability to freely move content, then these technologies to interfere with
7617 the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what if there were
7618 another way to assure that artists are paid, without locking down any
7619 content? What if, in other words, a different system could assure
7620 compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom to move content
7621 easily?
7622 </p><p>
7623 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer a
7624 version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now, the only
7625 point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system achieved
7626 the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright system achieved,
7627 but left consumers and creators much more free, then we'd have a very good
7628 reason to pursue this alternative&#8212;namely, freedom.  The choice, in
7629 other words, would not be between property and piracy; the choice would be
7630 between different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
7631 </p><p>
7632 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without turning
7633 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature of this
7634 alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for producing
7635 and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today control the vast
7636 majority of the distribution of content in the world, would no longer
7637 exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go the way of the
7638 horse-drawn buggy.
7639 </p><p>
7640 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
7641 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this new form
7642 of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree million Americans
7643 as criminals and their own survival.
7644 </p><p>
7645 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not understandable
7646 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack Valenti is charming;
7647 but not so charming as to justify giving up a tradition as deep and
7648 important as our tradition of free culture.  There's one more aspect to this
7649 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and follows
7650 directly from any war of prohibition.  As Electronic Frontier Foundation
7651 attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that
7652 "arises whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
7653 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
7654 <a class="indexterm" name="id2835740"></a>
7655 </p><p>
7656 "Hvis du kan behandle noen som en antatt lovbryter," forklarer von Lohmann,
7657 <a class="indexterm" name="id2835753"></a>
7658 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7659 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections evaporate to
7660 one degree or another. &#8230; If you're a copyright infringer, how can you
7661 hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright infringer, how can
7662 you hope to be secure against seizures of your computer? How can you hope to
7663 continue to receive Internet access? &#8230; Our sensibilities change as
7664 soon as we think, "Oh, well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker."
7665 Well, what this campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
7666 percentage of the American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
7667 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7668 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public into
7669 criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
7670 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
7671 </p><p>
7672 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
7673 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over the
7674 names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
7675 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a judge,
7676 and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of an Internet
7677 user is revealed.
7678 </p><p>
7679
7680 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy to
7681 sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have downloaded
7682 copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've seen, the
7683 potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a family's computer
7684 is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the family could be liable
7685 for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop the RIAA from suing a number of
7686 these families, just as they had sued Jesse Jordan.<sup>[<a name="id2835804" href="#ftn.id2835804" class="footnote">176</a>]</sup>
7687
7688 </p><p>
7689 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the RIAA. A
7690 report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the RIAA had adopted
7691 to track Napster users.<sup>[<a name="id2835845" href="#ftn.id2835845" class="footnote">177</a>]</sup> Using a
7692 sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a
7693 fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those
7694 MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
7695 </p><p>
7696 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a friend gives a
7697 CD to your daughter&#8212;a collection of songs just like the cassettes you
7698 used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does your daughter, where
7699 these songs came from. But she copies these songs onto her computer. She
7700 then takes her computer to college and connects it to a college network, and
7701 if the college network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she
7702 hasn't properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to
7703 do that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as
7704 a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning to
7705 deploy,<sup>[<a name="id2835695" href="#ftn.id2835695" class="footnote">178</a>]</sup> your daughter can lose the
7706 right to use the university's computer network.  She can, in some cases, be
7707 expelled.
7708 </p><p>
7709 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire a
7710 lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead that
7711 she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that they came
7712 from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes her. But the
7713 university might not believe her. It might treat this "contraband" as
7714 presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students have already
7715 learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in the middle of wars of
7716 prohibition. This war is no different.  Says von Lohmann, <a class="indexterm" name="id2835939"></a>
7717 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
7718 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million Americans
7719 that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a situation where the
7720 civil liberties of those people are very much in peril in a general
7721 matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where you could randomly
7722 choose any person off the street and be confident that they were committing
7723 an unlawful act that could put them on the hook for potential felony
7724 liability or hundreds of millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly
7725 we all speed, but speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely
7726 forfeit civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
7727 closest analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has eroded
7728 all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many Americans as
7729 criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of
7730 magnitude larger number of Americans than drug use. &#8230; If forty to
7731 sixty million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
7732 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
7733 million of them.
7734 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7735 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under the
7736 law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&#8212; securing
7737 rights to authors&#8212;without these millions being considered "criminals,"
7738 who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is American, a constant war
7739 on our own people or a concerted effort through our democracy to change our
7740 law?
7741 </p></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834070" href="#id2834070" class="para">157</a>] </sup>
7742
7743 See Lynne W. Jeter, <em class="citetitle">Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at
7744 WorldCom</em> (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204;
7745 for details of the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins
7746 U.S. District Court Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
7747 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #37</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2834093"></a>
7748 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834106" href="#id2834106" class="para">158</a>] </sup>
7749  The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
7750 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For an
7751 overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,' Say
7752 Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #38</a>, and "Senate Turns Back
7753 Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #39</a>. President Bush has
7754 continued to urge tort reform in recent months.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2834130"></a>
7755 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2833696" href="#id2833696" class="para">159</a>] </sup>
7756
7757
7758
7759 Se Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," <em class="citetitle">Wired</em>,
7760 7. juli 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #40</a>. For en oversikt over
7761 utstillingen, se <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7762 #41</a>.
7763 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834539" href="#id2834539" class="para">160</a>] </sup>
7764
7765
7766 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," <em class="citetitle">Los
7767 Angeles Times</em>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the
7768 effects on innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The
7769 Music Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
7770 at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #42</a>.  See also
7771 Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles
7772 Times</em>, 28 May 2001.
7773 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834302" href="#id2834302" class="para">161</a>] </sup>
7774
7775 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," <em class="citetitle">Business
7776 2.0</em>, 16. juni 2003, tilgjengelig via <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #43</a>. Jeg er Dr. Mohammad
7777 Al-Ubaydli takknemlig mot for dette eksemplet.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2834626"></a>
7778 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834733" href="#id2834733" class="para">162</a>] </sup>
7779
7780 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and the
7781 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School (2003),
7782 33&#8211;35, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7783 #44</a>.
7784 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834756" href="#id2834756" class="para">163</a>] </sup>
7785
7786
7787 GartnerG2, 26&#8211;27.
7788 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834779" href="#id2834779" class="para">164</a>] </sup>
7789
7790
7791 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes, February
7792 2002 (Entertainment).
7793 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834825" href="#id2834825" class="para">165</a>] </sup>
7794
7795 Jessica Litman, <em class="citetitle">Digital Copyright</em> (Amherst, N.Y.:
7796 Prometheus Books, 2001).  <a class="indexterm" name="id2834832"></a>
7797 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834860" href="#id2834860" class="para">166</a>] </sup>
7798
7799
7800 The only circuit court exception is found in <em class="citetitle">Recording Industry
7801 Association of America (RIAA)</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Diamond Multimedia
7802 Systems</em>, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of
7803 appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player
7804 were not liable for contributory copyright infringement for a device that is
7805 unable to record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function
7806 is to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard drive).
7807 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
7808 <em class="citetitle">Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
7809 Inc</em>. v. <em class="citetitle">Grokster, Ltd</em>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
7810 1029 (C.D.  Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
7811 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
7812 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
7813 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834896" href="#id2834896" class="para">167</a>] </sup>
7814
7815 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
7816 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
7817 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
7818 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In August
7819 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
7820 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
7821 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
7822 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
7823 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act,
7824 which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
7825 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
7826 World," 27 June 2003, 33&#8211;34, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #44</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2834904"></a>
7827 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834610" href="#id2834610" class="para">168</a>] </sup>
7828
7829
7830 Lessing, 239.
7831 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2834801" href="#id2834801" class="para">169</a>] </sup>
7832
7833
7834 Ibid., 229.
7835 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2835088" href="#id2835088" class="para">170</a>] </sup>
7836
7837 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright Arbitration
7838 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example offered by
7839 Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw (Stanford), 3 July
7840 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain submitted
7841 testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.  See Jonathan
7842 Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
7843 Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #45</a>.  For an excellent
7844 analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry
7845 Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," <em class="citetitle">Antitrust
7846 Bulletin</em> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these
7847 are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected
7848 from digital entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is
7849 done in the name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the
7850 play of powerful interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral
7851 way." <a class="indexterm" name="id2835118"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2835127"></a>
7852 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2835392" href="#id2835392" class="para">171</a>] </sup>
7853
7854 Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew Internet
7855 and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #46</a>.  The Pew Internet and
7856 American Life Project reported that 37 million Americans had downloaded
7857 music files from the Internet by early 2001.
7858 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2835079" href="#id2835079" class="para">172</a>] </sup>
7859
7860
7861 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,"
7862 <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles Times</em>, 10 September 2003, Business.
7863 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2835466" href="#id2835466" class="para">173</a>] </sup>
7864
7865
7866 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
7867 Prohibition," <em class="citetitle">American Economic Review</em> 81, no. 2
7868 (1991): 242.
7869 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2835479" href="#id2835479" class="para">174</a>] </sup>
7870
7871
7872 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government Reform
7873 Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of John
7874 P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
7875 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2835496" href="#id2835496" class="para">175</a>] </sup>
7876
7877
7878 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax Compliance,"
7879 <em class="citetitle">Journal of Economic Literature</em> 36 (1998): 818 (survey
7880 of compliance literature).
7881 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2835804" href="#id2835804" class="para">176</a>] </sup>
7882
7883
7884 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single Mother in
7885 Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants," <em class="citetitle">Washington
7886 Post</em>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull
7887 Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File
7888 Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being Sued,"
7889 <em class="citetitle">Orlando Sentinel Tribune</em>, 30 August 2003, C1;
7890 Jefferson Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," <em class="citetitle">USA
7891 Today</em>, 15 September 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No
7892 Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>,
7893 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a Criminal?"
7894 <em class="citetitle">Toronto Star</em>, 18 September 2003, P7.
7895 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2835845" href="#id2835845" class="para">177</a>] </sup>
7896
7897
7898 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses Some
7899 Methods Used," CNN.com, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #47</a>.
7900 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2835695" href="#id2835695" class="para">178</a>] </sup>
7901
7902
7903 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
7904 <em class="citetitle">Boston Globe</em>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank
7905 Ahrens, "Four Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File
7906 Sharing at Colleges," <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, 4 April 2003,
7907 E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,"
7908 <em class="citetitle">Christian Science Monitor</em>, 2 September 2003, 20;
7909 Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two
7910 Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible," <em class="citetitle">Chicago
7911 Tribune</em>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy
7912 Guns on Universities," <em class="citetitle">Internet News</em>, 30 January
7913 2003, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
7914 #48</a>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman Orientation
7915 This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing,"
7916 <em class="citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle</em>, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid,
7917 Letters Are Weapons at Universities," <em class="citetitle">USA Today</em>, 26
7918 September 2000, 3D.
7919 </p></div></div></div></div><div class="part" title="Del IV. Maktfordeling"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h1 class="title"><a name="c-balances"></a>Del IV. Maktfordeling</h1></div></div></div><div class="partintro" title="Maktfordeling"><div></div><p>
7920 Så her er bildet: Du står på siden av veien. Bilen din er på brann. Du er
7921 sint og opprørt fordi du delvis bidro til å starte brannen. Nå vet du ikke
7922 hvordan du slokker den.  Ved siden av deg er en bøtte, fylt med
7923 bensin. Bensin vil åpenbart ikke slukke brannen.
7924 </p><p>
7925 Mens du tenker over situasjonen, kommer noen andre forbi.  I panikk griper
7926 hun bøtta, og før du har hatt sjansen til å be henne stoppe&#8212;eller før
7927 hun forstår hvorfor hun bør stoppe&#8212;er bøtten i svevet.  Bensinen er på
7928 tur mot den brennende bilen.  Og brannen som bensinen kommer til å fyre opp
7929 vil straks sette fyr på alt i omgivelsene.
7930 </p><p>
7931 En krig om opphavsrett pågår over alt&#8212; og vi fokuserer alle på feil
7932 ting.  Det er ingen tvil om at dagens teknologier truer eksisterende
7933 virksomheter.  Uten tvil kan de true artister.  Men teknologier endrer seg.
7934 Industrien og teknologer har en rekke måter å bruke teknologi til å beskytte
7935 dem selv mot dagens trusler på Internet.  Dette er en brann som overlatt til
7936 seg selv vil brenne ut.
7937 </p><p>
7938
7939
7940 Likevel er ikke besluttningstagere villig til å la denne brannen i fred.
7941 Ladet med masse penger fra lobbyister er de lystne på å gå i mellom for å
7942 fjerne problemet slik de oppfatter det.  Men problemet slik de oppfatter det
7943 er ikke den reelle trusselen som denne kulturen står med ansiktet mot.  For
7944 mens vi ser på denne lille brannen i hjørnet er det en massiv endring i
7945 hvordan kultur blir skapt som pågår over alt.
7946 </p><p>
7947 På en eller annen måte må vi klare å snu oppmerksomheten mot dette mer
7948 viktige og fundametale problemet.  Vi må finne en måte å unngå å helle
7949 bensin på denne brannen.
7950 </p><p>
7951 Vi har ikke funne denne måten ennå.  Istedet synes vi å være fanget i en
7952 enklere og sort-hvit tenkning.  Uansett hvor mange folk som presser på for å
7953 gjøre rammen for debatten litt bredere, er det dette enkle sort-hvit-synet
7954 som består.  Vi kjører sakte forbi og stirrer på brannen når vi i stedet
7955 burde holde øynene på veien.
7956 </p><p>
7957 Denne utfordringen har vært livet mitt de siste årene.  Det har også vært
7958 min falitt.  I de to neste kapittlene, beskriver jeg en liten innsats, så
7959 langt uten suksess, på å finne en måte å endre fokus på denne debatten.  Vi
7960 må forstå disse mislyktede forsøkene hvis vi skal forstå hva som kreves for
7961 å lykkes.
7962 </p><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#eldred">14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></span></dt><dt><span class="chapter"><a href="#eldred-ii">15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></span></dt></dl></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="eldred"></a>Kapittel 14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred</h2></div></div></div><p>
7963 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
7964 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least one
7965 did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in
7966 New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
7967 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would make this
7968 nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
7969 </p><p>
7970 It didn't work&#8212;at least for his daughters. They didn't find Hawthorne
7971 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave birth to a
7972 hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a library of public
7973 domain works by scanning these works and making them available for free.
7974 </p><p>
7975
7976 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain works,
7977 though even a copy would have been of great value to people across the world
7978 who can't get access to printed versions of these works. Instead, Eldred was
7979 producing derivative works from these public domain works. Just as Disney
7980 turned Grimm into stories more accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred
7981 transformed Hawthorne, and many others, into a form more
7982 accessible&#8212;technically accessible&#8212;today.
7983 </p><p>
7984 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same source
7985 as Disney's. Hawthorne's <em class="citetitle">Scarlet Letter</em> had passed
7986 into the public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
7987 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover Press
7988 and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and produce printed
7989 editions, which they sell in bookstores across the country. Others, such as
7990 Disney, take these stories and turn them into animated cartoons, sometimes
7991 successfully (<em class="citetitle">Cinderella</em>), sometimes not
7992 (<em class="citetitle">The Hunchback of Notre Dame</em>, <em class="citetitle">Treasure
7993 Planet</em>). These are all commercial publications of public domain
7994 works.
7995 </p><p>
7996 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of public
7997 domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally thousands of
7998 others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have discovered this
7999 platform of expression and now use it to share works that are, by law, free
8000 for the taking. This has produced what we might call the "noncommercial
8001 publishing industry," which before the Internet was limited to people with
8002 large egos or with political or social causes. But with the Internet, it
8003 includes a wide range of individuals and groups dedicated to spreading
8004 culture generally.<sup>[<a name="id2836183" href="#ftn.id2836183" class="footnote">179</a>]</sup>
8005 </p><p>
8006 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's collection
8007 of poems <em class="citetitle">New Hampshire</em> was slated to pass into the
8008 public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
8009 library.  But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, in 1998, for the
8010 eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the terms of existing
8011 copyrights&#8212;this time by twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add
8012 any works more recent than 1923 to his collection until 2019.  Indeed, no
8013 copyrighted work would pass into the public domain until that year (and not
8014 even then, if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same
8015 period, more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
8016 </p><p>
8017
8018
8019 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), enacted in
8020 memory of the congressman and former musician Sonny Bono, who, his widow,
8021 Mary Bono, says, believed that "copyrights should be forever."<sup>[<a name="id2836237" href="#ftn.id2836237" class="footnote">180</a>]</sup>
8022
8023 </p><p>
8024 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
8025 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
8026 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a second law
8027 passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act of publishing
8028 would make Eldred a felon&#8212;whether or not anyone complained. This was a
8029 dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer to undertake.
8030 </p><p>
8031 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
8032 constitutional scholar whose first passion was constitutional
8033 interpretation.  And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
8034 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as importantly
8035 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
8036 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8037 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science &#8230; by
8038 securing for limited Times to Authors &#8230; exclusive Right to their
8039 &#8230; Writings. &#8230;
8040 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8041 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting clause of
8042 Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause granting power
8043 to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do something&#8212;for
8044 example, to regulate "commerce among the several states" or "declare War."
8045 But here, the "something" is something quite specific&#8212;to "promote
8046 &#8230; Progress"&#8212;through means that are also specific&#8212; by
8047 "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
8048 </p><p>
8049 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of extending
8050 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me about this was, if
8051 Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then the Constitution's
8052 requirement that terms be "limited" will have no practical effect. If every
8053 time a copyright is about to expire, Congress has the power to extend its
8054 term, then Congress can achieve what the Constitution plainly
8055 forbids&#8212;perpetual terms "on the installment plan," as Professor Peter
8056 Jaszi so nicely put it.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2836262"></a>
8057 </p><p>
8058 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember sitting
8059 late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious consideration
8060 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's practice of extending
8061 existing terms. That failure may in part be why Congress seemed so
8062 untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the practice had become so
8063 lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that copyright owners will be willing
8064 to pay a great deal of money to see their copyright terms extended. And so
8065 Congress is quite happy to keep this gravy train going.
8066 </p><p>
8067 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
8068 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
8069 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the beneficiaries
8070 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce it to
8071 act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can do. Why
8072 not limit its actions to those things it must do&#8212;and those things that
8073 pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
8074 </p><p>
8075 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one of the
8076 very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to make money one
8077 hundred years after it was created. The Estate of Robert Frost is a good
8078 example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry continues to be extraordinarily
8079 valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate benefits greatly from any extension
8080 of copyright, since no publisher would pay the estate any money if the poems
8081 Frost wrote could be published by anyone for free.
8082 </p><p>
8083 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from three of
8084 Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems is about to
8085 expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.  Your financial
8086 adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim report:
8087 </p><p>
8088
8089 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B, and C
8090 will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be receiving
8091 the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of those works.
8092 </p><p>
8093 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that could change
8094 this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the terms of copyright
8095 by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily valuable to us. So we
8096 should hope this bill passes."
8097 </p><p>
8098 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something about it?"
8099 </p><p>
8100 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute to the
8101 campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that they support
8102 the bill."
8103 </p><p>
8104 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want to know
8105 whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much would we get if this
8106 extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How much is it worth?"
8107 </p><p>
8108 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue to get
8109 at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the `discount
8110 rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent), then this law
8111 would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
8112 </p><p>
8113 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the correct
8114 conclusion:
8115 </p><p>
8116 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than $1,000,000 in
8117 campaign contributions if we were confident those contributions would assure
8118 that the bill was passed?"
8119 </p><p>
8120 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to contribute up
8121 to the `present value' of the income you expect from these copyrights. Which
8122 for us means over $1,000,000."
8123 </p><p>
8124
8125 You quickly get the point&#8212;you as the member of the board and, I trust,
8126 you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every beneficiary
8127 in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same choice: If they
8128 can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights, they will benefit
8129 greatly from that extension. And so each time copyrights are about to
8130 expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get the copyright term
8131 extended.
8132 </p><p>
8133 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation can be
8134 bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in the world to
8135 buy further extensions of copyright.
8136 </p><p>
8137 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
8138 Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved real. Ten of the
8139 thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House received the maximum
8140 contribution from Disney's political action committee; in the Senate, eight
8141 of the twelve sponsors received contributions.<sup>[<a name="id2836448" href="#ftn.id2836448" class="footnote">181</a>]</sup> The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over $1.5 million
8142 lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more than $200,000 in
8143 campaign contributions.<sup>[<a name="id2836463" href="#ftn.id2836463" class="footnote">182</a>]</sup> Disney is
8144 estimated to have contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in
8145 the cycle.<sup>[<a name="id2836478" href="#ftn.id2836478" class="footnote">183</a>]</sup>
8146
8147 </p><p>
8148 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least, it need not
8149 be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this reality about the
8150 never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term was central to my
8151 thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed to interpreting and
8152 applying the Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the
8153 power to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
8154 constitutional requirement that terms be "limited." If they could extend it
8155 once, they would extend it again and again and again.
8156 </p><p>
8157
8158 It was also my judgment that <span class="emphasis"><em>this</em></span> Supreme Court would
8159 not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
8160 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power of
8161 Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the power
8162 granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional scholars, the most
8163 famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's decision in 1995 to
8164 strike down a law that banned the possession of guns near schools.
8165 </p><p>
8166 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted powers very
8167 broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
8168 only "commerce among the several states" (aka "interstate commerce"), the
8169 Supreme Court had interpreted that power to include the power to regulate
8170 any activity that merely affected interstate commerce.
8171 </p><p>
8172 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was no
8173 limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every activity, when
8174 considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.  A Constitution
8175 designed to limit Congress's power was instead interpreted to impose no
8176 limit.
8177 </p><p>
8178 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed that in
8179 <em class="citetitle">United States</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>. The
8180 government had argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
8181 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values,
8182 and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government
8183 whether there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce
8184 under the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there was
8185 not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then that
8186 activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the government
8187 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
8188 </p><p>
8189 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments," the
8190 Chief Justice wrote.<sup>[<a name="id2836567" href="#ftn.id2836567" class="footnote">184</a>]</sup> If anything
8191 Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be considered interstate
8192 commerce, then there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in
8193 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> was reaffirmed five years later in
8194 <em class="citetitle">United States</em>
8195 v. <em class="citetitle">Morrison</em>.<sup>[<a name="id2836594" href="#ftn.id2836594" class="footnote">185</a>]</sup>
8196 </p><p>
8197
8198 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
8199 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<sup>[<a name="id2836614" href="#ftn.id2836614" class="footnote">186</a>]</sup>
8200 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should yield the
8201 conclusion that Congress can't extend an existing term. If Congress could
8202 extend an existing term, then there would be no "stopping point" to
8203 Congress's power over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that
8204 there is such a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to
8205 grant copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
8206 term of existing copyrights.
8207 </p><p>
8208 <span class="emphasis"><em>If</em></span>, that is, the principle announced in
8209 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> stood for a principle.  Many believed the
8210 decision in <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> stood for politics&#8212;a
8211 conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its
8212 power over Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
8213 rejected that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
8214 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
8215 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides
8216 cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring.  I was
8217 not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine
8218 Justices were going to be petty politicians.
8219 </p><p>
8220 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the argument in
8221 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> was not about. By insisting on the
8222 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
8223 piracy.  Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
8224 piracy&#8212;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work
8225 and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was
8226 just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
8227 already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had gotten
8228 the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In exchange for
8229 a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new work. But now
8230 these entities were using their power&#8212;expressed through the power of
8231 lobbyists' money&#8212;to get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That
8232 twenty-year dollop would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was
8233 fighting a piracy that affects us all.
8234 </p><p>
8235 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief before the
8236 Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association wrote that the public
8237 domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<sup>[<a name="id2836694" href="#ftn.id2836694" class="footnote">187</a>]</sup> But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our
8238 constitutional system, our law requires it. Some may not like the
8239 Constitution's requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a
8240 pirate's charter.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2836718"></a>
8241 </p><p>
8242 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on copyright as a
8243 way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily influence the
8244 development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric Eldred discovered,
8245 we have set up a system that assures that copyright terms will be repeatedly
8246 extended, and extended, and extended. We have created the perfect storm for
8247 the public domain. Copyrights have not expired, and will not expire, so long
8248 as Congress is free to be bought to extend them again.
8249 </p><p>
8250 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being extended.
8251 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too valuable for
8252 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from copyright
8253 extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's.  Forget Mickey
8254 Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from the 1920s and 1930s
8255 that have continuing commercial value. The real harm of term extension comes
8256 not from these famous works. The real harm is to the works that are not
8257 famous, not commercially exploited, and no longer available as a result.
8258 </p><p>
8259 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to 1942)
8260 affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 2 percent of that
8261 work has any continuing commercial value. It was the copyright holders for
8262 that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.  But the law and its effect were
8263 not limited to that 2 percent. The law extended the terms of copyright
8264 generally.<sup>[<a name="id2836768" href="#ftn.id2836768" class="footnote">188</a>]</sup>
8265
8266 </p><p>
8267
8268 Think practically about the consequence of this extension&#8212;practically,
8269 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal work. In 1930,
8270 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those books were still in
8271 print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you wanted to make available
8272 to the world in your iArchive project the remaining 9,873. What would you
8273 have to do?
8274 </p><p>
8275 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were still
8276 under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are not
8277 on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the titles and
8278 authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration and renewal
8279 records for works published in 1930. That will produce a list of books still
8280 under copyright.
8281 </p><p>
8282 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate the
8283 current copyright owners. How would you do that?
8284 </p><p>
8285 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright owners
8286 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be thousands and
8287 thousands of government monopolies without there being at least a list?
8288 </p><p>
8289 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in 1959, of
8290 the person who registered the copyright. But just think practically about
8291 how impossibly difficult it would be to track down thousands of such
8292 records&#8212;especially since the person who registered is not necessarily
8293 the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
8294 </p><p>
8295 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the apologists for
8296 the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright owners?"
8297 </p><p>
8298 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <span class="emphasis"><em>are</em></span> plenty
8299 of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles
8300 to cars.  And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty
8301 good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in
8302 your backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a
8303 pretty good way to know who owns what tangible property.
8304 </p><p>
8305
8306 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who owns the house
8307 by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see a car, there is
8308 ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the car. If you see a
8309 bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a house, it's fairly
8310 easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you happen to see a baseball
8311 lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look around for a second for some
8312 kids playing ball. If you don't see any kids, then okay: Here's a bit of
8313 property whose owner we can't easily determine. It is the exception that
8314 proves the rule: that we ordinarily know quite well who owns what property.
8315 </p><p>
8316 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.  The
8317 library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've already
8318 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors' names, of
8319 course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or passed down in an
8320 estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who owns what, you would have to
8321 hire a private detective. The bottom line: The owner cannot easily be
8322 located. And in a regime like ours, in which it is a felony to use such
8323 property without the property owner's permission, the property isn't going
8324 to be used.
8325 </p><p>
8326 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be digitized,
8327 and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the consequence for other
8328 creative works is much more dire.
8329 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2836902"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2836908"></a><p>
8330 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios, which
8331 owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a direct
8332 beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were made between
8333 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <em class="citetitle">The Lucky
8334 Dog</em>, is currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made
8335 after 1923 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee
8336 controls the exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal
8337 of money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
8338 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent films."<sup>[<a name="id2836930" href="#ftn.id2836930" class="footnote">189</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2836946"></a>
8339 </p><p>
8340 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in this
8341 culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme Court that
8342 the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left standing, destroy
8343 a whole generation of American film.
8344 </p><p>
8345
8346 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has any
8347 continuing commercial value. The rest&#8212;to the extent it survives at
8348 all&#8212;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that some of this work
8349 not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be valuable by the owners of
8350 the vaults. For this to occur, however, the commercial benefit from the work
8351 must exceed the costs of making the work available for distribution.
8352 </p><p>
8353 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.  For most
8354 of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very high; digital
8355 technology has lowered these costs substantially. While it cost more than
8356 $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white film in 1993, it can now
8357 cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of mm film.<sup>[<a name="id2836983" href="#ftn.id2836983" class="footnote">190</a>]</sup>
8358
8359 </p><p>
8360 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most important.
8361 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
8362 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
8363 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
8364 locate the copyright owner.
8365 </p><p>
8366 Or more accurately, <span class="emphasis"><em>owners</em></span>. As we've seen, there isn't
8367 only a single copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't
8368 a single person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
8369 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
8370 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
8371 exceptionally high.
8372 </p><p>
8373 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
8374 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
8375 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when she
8376 does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you have
8377 made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
8378 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
8379 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way, you
8380 have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have to
8381 talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
8382 </p><p>
8383
8384 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed these
8385 costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the benefit would
8386 outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old films, Agee
8387 argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until the copyright
8388 expires.
8389 </p><p>
8390 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will have
8391 expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and nitrate stock
8392 dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal canisters in which
8393 they are now stored will be filled with nothing more than dust.
8394 </p><p>
8395 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has
8396 continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a
8397 crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright
8398 creates incentives to produce and distribute the creative work. For that
8399 tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of free expression."
8400 </p><p>
8401 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the creative
8402 work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've indicated, most books
8403 go out of print within one year. The same is true of music and
8404 film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.  And when a
8405 creative work falls out of favor with the commercial distributors, the
8406 commercial life ends.
8407 </p><p>
8408 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't keep
8409 libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and we don't
8410 have archives of films because we expect people to choose between spending
8411 Friday night watching new movies and spending Friday night watching a 1930
8412 news documentary. The noncommercial life of culture is important and
8413 valuable&#8212;for entertainment but also, and more importantly, for
8414 knowledge. To understand who we are, and where we came from, and how we have
8415 made the mistakes that we have, we need to have access to this history.
8416 </p><p>
8417
8418 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.  In
8419 this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in this
8420 context do no good.
8421 </p><p>
8422 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of our
8423 history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
8424 <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright-related use</em></span> that would be inhibited by an
8425 exclusive right.  When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a
8426 publisher.  But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a
8427 used book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
8428 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
8429 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
8430 </p><p>
8431 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring a
8432 film&#8212;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&#8212;were so high,
8433 it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains
8434 of a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
8435 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the end
8436 of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
8437 </p><p>
8438 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most of our
8439 history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works that lost
8440 their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works would not have
8441 interfered with anything.
8442 </p><p>
8443 But this situation has now changed.
8444 </p><p>
8445 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital technologies
8446 is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.  Digital
8447 technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access to all sorts
8448 of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now imagine digitizing
8449 it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once a film goes out of
8450 distribution, we could digitize it and make it available to everyone,
8451 forever. Digital technologies give new life to copyrighted material after it
8452 passes out of its commercial life. It is now possible to preserve and assure
8453 universal access to this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
8454 </p><p>
8455
8456
8457 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing this
8458 digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
8459 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires permission
8460 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other aspect of
8461 our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these things
8462 available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want to
8463 explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
8464 radically different context.
8465 </p><p>
8466 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
8467 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law gets in
8468 the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
8469 <span class="emphasis"><em>copyright</em></span> purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to
8470 enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
8471 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright
8472 is serving no purpose <span class="emphasis"><em>at all</em></span> related to the spread of
8473 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
8474 expression. Copyright is a brake.
8475 </p><p>
8476 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for Brewster
8477 Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.  So won't
8478 Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading culture widely?"
8479 </p><p>
8480 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
8481 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble offered
8482 to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that eliminate the need
8483 for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a library is to serve
8484 what "the market" would demand. But if you think the role of a library is
8485 bigger than this&#8212;if you think its role is to archive culture, whether
8486 there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture or not&#8212;then we
8487 can't count on the commercial market to do our library work for us.
8488 </p><p>
8489 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We should
8490 rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable culture. My
8491 message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the market is not
8492 doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the freedom to fill the
8493 gaps. As one researcher calculated for American culture, 94 percent of the
8494 films, books, and music produced between and 1946 is not commercially
8495 available. However much you love the commercial market, if access is a
8496 value, then 6 percent is a failure to provide that value.<sup>[<a name="id2837220" href="#ftn.id2837220" class="footnote">191</a>]</sup>
8497
8498 </p><p>
8499 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
8500 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the Sonny
8501 Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two central claims
8502 that we made were (1) that extending existing terms violated the
8503 Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that extending terms by
8504 another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
8505 </p><p>
8506 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an argument.  A
8507 panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also dismissed our
8508 claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But that decision at
8509 least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative judges on that
8510 court. That dissent gave our claims life.
8511 </p><p>
8512 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that copyrights
8513 be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as it was simple:
8514 If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no "stopping point" to
8515 Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The power to extend existing
8516 terms means Congress is not required to grant terms that are "limited."
8517 Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to interpret the term "limited
8518 Times" to give it meaning. And the best interpretation, Judge Sentelle
8519 argued, would be to deny Congress the power to extend existing terms.
8520 </p><p>
8521 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to hear the
8522 case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for important
8523 cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a whole, where
8524 the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
8525 </p><p>
8526
8527 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.  This
8528 time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
8529 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the most
8530 liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had overstepped its
8531 bounds.
8532 </p><p>
8533 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the Supreme
8534 Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It hears about one
8535 hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand appeals.) And it
8536 practically never reviews a decision that upholds a statute when no other
8537 court has yet reviewed the statute.
8538 </p><p>
8539 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by granting our
8540 petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument was set for October of
8541 2002. The summer would be spent writing briefs and preparing for argument.
8542 </p><p>
8543 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
8544 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we lost
8545 the appeal. And if you know something more than just the minimum, you
8546 probably think there was no way this case could have been won. After our
8547 defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and
8548 supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed
8549 cause. And none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail
8550 from my client, Eric Eldred.
8551 </p><p>
8552 Men min klient og disse vennene tok feil. Denne saken kunne vært vunnet. Det
8553 burde ha vært vunnet.  Og uansett hvor hardt jeg prøver å fortelle den
8554 historien til meg selv, kan jeg aldri unnslippe troen på at det er min feil
8555 at vi ikke vant.
8556 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2837349"></a><p>
8557
8558 Feil ble gjort tidlig, skjønt den ble først åpenbart på slutten. Vår sak
8559 hadde støtte hos en ekstraordinær advokat, Geoffrey Stewart, helt fra
8560 starten, og hos advokatfirmaet hadde han flyttet til, Jones, Day, Reavis og
8561 Pogue. Jones Day mottok mye press fra sine opphavsrettsbeskyttende klienter
8562 på grunn av sin støtte til oss.  De ignorert dette presset (noe veldig få
8563 advokatfirmaer noen sinne ville gjøre), og ga alt de hadde gjennom hele
8564 saken.
8565 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2837372"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2837378"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2837384"></a><p>
8566 Det var tre viktige advokater på saken fra Jones DaY. Geoff Stewart var den
8567 først, men siden ble Dan Bromberg og Don Ayer ganske involvert. Bromberg og
8568 Ayer spesielt hadde en felles oppfatning om hvordan denne saken ville bli
8569 vunnet: vi ville bare vinne, fortalte de gjentatte ganger til meg, hvis vi
8570 få problemet til å virke "viktig" for Høyesterett. Det måtte synes som om
8571 dramatisk skade ble gjort til ytringsfriheten og fri kultur, ellers ville de
8572 aldri stemt mot "de mektigste mediaselskapene i verden".
8573 </p><p>
8574 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act was a
8575 dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still think it
8576 is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based on how
8577 important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be "right" as
8578 in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be that
8579 way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the framers of
8580 our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the CTEA was
8581 unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful interpretation of what
8582 the First Amendment means would yield the conclusion that the power to
8583 extend existing copyright terms is unconstitutional, I was not persuaded
8584 that we had to sell our case like soap.  Just as a law that bans the
8585 swastika is unconstitutional not because the Court likes Nazis but because
8586 such a law would violate the Constitution, so too, in my view, would the
8587 Court decide whether Congress's law was constitutional based on the
8588 Constitution, not based on whether they liked the values that the framers
8589 put in the Constitution.
8590 </p><p>
8591 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and the harm
8592 caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review? There was no
8593 reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they weren't convinced that
8594 this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we didn't need to persuade them
8595 that this law was bad, we needed to show why it was unconstitutional.
8596 </p><p>
8597
8598 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter and in
8599 which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced that the Court
8600 would not hear our arguments if it thought these were just the arguments of
8601 a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was not about to launch into a
8602 new field of judicial review if it seemed that this field of review was
8603 simply the preference of a small political minority.  Although my focus in
8604 the case was not to demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to
8605 demonstrate that it was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument
8606 against a background of briefs that covered the full range of political
8607 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
8608 <span class="emphasis"><em>law</em></span> and not politics, then, we tried to gather the
8609 widest range of credible critics&#8212;credible not because they were rich
8610 and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated that this law
8611 was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
8612 </p><p>
8613 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
8614 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very beginning.
8615 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In November 1998,
8616 she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the Republican Congress for
8617 allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you sometimes wonder why bills
8618 that create a financial windfall to narrow special interests slide easily
8619 through the intricate legislative process, while bills that benefit the
8620 general public seem to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial
8621 documented, was the power of money.  Schlafly enumerated Disney's
8622 contributions to the key players on the committees. It was money, not
8623 justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control,
8624 Schlafly argued.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2837491"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2837497"></a>
8625 </p><p>
8626 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief supporting
8627 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the core claim in
8628 the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of existing copyrights,
8629 there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.  That strong
8630 conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
8631 </p><p>
8632 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as it
8633 gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free Software
8634 Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux possible). They
8635 included a powerful brief about the costs of uncertainty by Intel. There
8636 were two law professors' briefs, one by copyright scholars and one by First
8637 Amendment scholars. There was an exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the
8638 world's experts in the history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there
8639 was a new brief by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
8640 <a class="indexterm" name="id2837526"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2837535"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2837541"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2837547"></a>
8641 </p><p>
8642 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal argument,
8643 there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and archives, including
8644 the Internet Archive, the American Association of Law Libraries, and the
8645 National Writers Union.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2837561"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2837568"></a>
8646 </p><p>
8647 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the argument I've
8648 already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that unless the law
8649 was struck, a whole generation of American film would disappear. The other
8650 made the economic argument absolutely clear.
8651 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2837583"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2837589"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2837596"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2837602"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2837608"></a><p>
8652 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including five
8653 Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Milton
8654 Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as the list of
8655 Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political spectrum. Their
8656 conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible claim that extending the
8657 terms of existing copyrights would do anything to increase incentives to
8658 create. Such extensions were nothing more than "rent-seeking"&#8212;the
8659 fancy term economists use to describe special-interest legislation gone
8660 wild.
8661 </p><p>
8662 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered to
8663 write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with us from
8664 the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we added three
8665 lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan Morrison, a
8666 lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had made constitutional
8667 history with a series of seminal victories in the Supreme Court defending
8668 individual rights; my colleague and dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued
8669 many cases in the Court, and who had advised us early on about a First
8670 Amendment strategy; and finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
8671 <a class="indexterm" name="id2837619"></a>
8672 </p><p>
8673 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
8674 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give media
8675 companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried was the only
8676 one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up for something he
8677 believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer in the Supreme
8678 Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that limited Congress's power
8679 in the context of the Commerce Clause. And while he had argued many
8680 positions in the Supreme Court that I personally disagreed with, his joining
8681 the cause was a vote of confidence in our argument.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2837675"></a>
8682 </p><p>
8683 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of friends, as
8684 well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included historians or
8685 economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were written
8686 exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and copyright holders.
8687 </p><p>
8688 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain from the
8689 law. The congressmen were not surprising either&#8212;they were defending
8690 their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of contributions such power
8691 induced. And of course it was not surprising that the copyright holders
8692 would defend the idea that they should continue to have the right to control
8693 who did what with content they wanted to control.
8694 </p><p>
8695 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was better for the
8696 Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to Dr. Seuss's work&#8212; better
8697 than allowing it to fall into the public domain&#8212;because if this
8698 creativity were in the public domain, then people could use it to "glorify
8699 drugs or to create pornography."<sup>[<a name="id2837706" href="#ftn.id2837706" class="footnote">192</a>]</sup> That
8700 was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection"
8701 of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license
8702 <em class="citetitle">Porgy and Bess</em> to anyone who refuses to use African
8703 Americans in the cast.<sup>[<a name="id2837731" href="#ftn.id2837731" class="footnote">193</a>]</sup> That's their
8704 view of how this part of American culture should be controlled, and they
8705 wanted this law to help them effect that control.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2837744"></a>
8706 </p><p>
8707 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this debate.
8708 When Congress decides to extend the term of existing copyrights, Congress is
8709 making a choice about which speakers it will favor.  Famous and beloved
8710 copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate and Dr. Seuss, come to
8711 Congress and say, "Give us twenty years to control the speech about these
8712 icons of American culture. We'll do better with them than anyone else."
8713 Congress of course likes to reward the popular and famous by giving them
8714 what they want. But when Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak
8715 in a certain way, that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally
8716 meant to block.
8717 </p><p>
8718 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA mean
8719 that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
8720 copyrights&#8212;extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
8721 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
8722 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.  Between
8723 February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing for this
8724 case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
8725 </p><p>
8726 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we called
8727 "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest." The Conservatives
8728 included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice
8729 Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had been the most consistent in
8730 limiting Congress's power. They were the five who had supported the
8731 <em class="citetitle">Lopez/Morrison</em> line of cases that said that an
8732 enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's powers had
8733 limits.
8734 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2837794"></a><p>
8735
8736 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
8737 Congress's power. These four&#8212;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
8738 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&#8212;had repeatedly argued that the
8739 Constitution gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement
8740 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
8741 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four justices
8742 were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed with, they
8743 were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
8744 </p><p>
8745 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to her
8746 general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of gender are
8747 involved), she had been particularly deferential in the context of
8748 intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an excellent and
8749 well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from the same
8750 intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with the writings
8751 of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this context to do as it
8752 wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
8753 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2837829"></a><p>
8754 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
8755 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly favored
8756 deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were also very
8757 sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly believed, there was a
8758 very important free speech argument against these retrospective extensions.
8759 </p><p>
8760 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
8761 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest judges
8762 on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just means that no
8763 simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he had consistently argued
8764 for limits in the context of intellectual property generally. We were fairly
8765 confident he would recognize limits here.
8766 </p><p>
8767 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus had to be:
8768 on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these five and
8769 get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single overriding argument
8770 that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives' most important
8771 jurisprudential innovation&#8212;the argument that Judge Sentelle had relied
8772 upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power must be interpreted so
8773 that its enumerated powers have limits.
8774 </p><p>
8775
8776 This then was the core of our strategy&#8212;a strategy for which I am
8777 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
8778 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> case, under the government's argument here,
8779 Congress would always have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If
8780 anything was plain about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was
8781 that this power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
8782 Court to reconcile <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> with
8783 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce was
8784 limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright be
8785 limited.
8786 </p><p>
8787 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has done
8788 it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government claimed that
8789 from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
8790 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say that
8791 practice is unconstitutional.
8792 </p><p>
8793 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We certainly
8794 agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in and in 1909. And of
8795 course, in 1962, Congress began extending existing terms
8796 regularly&#8212;eleven times in forty years.
8797 </p><p>
8798
8799 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress extended
8800 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.  It then
8801 extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare extensions
8802 are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending existing
8803 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that restraint was
8804 now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there was no reason to
8805 expect that cycle would end. This Court had not hesitated to intervene where
8806 Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.  There was no reason it
8807 couldn't intervene here.  Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in
8808 October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
8809 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to help in
8810 the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where wannabe justices
8811 fire questions at wannabe winners.
8812 </p><p>
8813 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a single
8814 point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to the
8815 power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that terms would be
8816 effectively unlimited; going with us would give Congress a clear line to
8817 follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots were an effective practice; I
8818 found ways to take every question back to this central idea.
8819 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2837941"></a><p>
8820 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the skeptic. He
8821 had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor General Charles
8822 Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme Court. And in his review
8823 of the moot, he let his concern speak: <a class="indexterm" name="id2837954"></a>
8824 </p><p>
8825 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be willing
8826 to upset this practice that the government says has been a consistent
8827 practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see the
8828 harm&#8212;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they don't see
8829 that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
8830 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2837963"></a><p>
8831
8832 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but he didn't
8833 understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the right
8834 thing&#8212;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
8835 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court does the
8836 right thing&#8212;not because of politics but because it is right. As I
8837 listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood his
8838 point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.  Let the
8839 politicians learn to see that it was also good.  The night before the
8840 argument, a line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The
8841 case had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
8842 culture. Hundreds stood in line for the chance to see the
8843 proceedings. Scores spent the night on the Supreme Court steps so that they
8844 would be assured a seat.
8845 </p><p>
8846 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can ask for
8847 seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for my
8848 parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get a seat in a
8849 special section reserved for them. And senators and congressmen have a
8850 special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of course, the press
8851 has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on the Court. As we
8852 entered that morning, there was no place that was not taken. This was an
8853 argument about intellectual property law, yet the halls were filled. As I
8854 walked in to take my seat at the front of the Court, I saw my parents
8855 sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table, I saw Jack Valenti sitting
8856 in the special section ordinarily reserved for family of the Justices.
8857 </p><p>
8858 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began where I
8859 intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's power. This
8860 was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether those enumerated
8861 powers had any limit.
8862 </p><p>
8863 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.  The history
8864 was bothering her.
8865 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8866 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often through the years,
8867 and if you are right, don't we run the risk of upsetting previous extensions
8868 of time? I mean, this seems to be a practice that began with the very first
8869 act.
8870 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8871 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face of
8872 what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again was to
8873 emphasize limits on Congress's power.
8874 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8875
8876 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in mind,
8877 then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their words that gives
8878 effect to what they had in mind, and the answer is yes.
8879 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8880 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen where the
8881 Court was going. The first was a question by Justice Kennedy, who observed,
8882 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8883 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that the '76 act,
8884 too, should have been declared void, and that we might leave it alone
8885 because of the disruption, is that for all these years the act has impeded
8886 progress in science and the useful arts.  I just don't see any empirical
8887 evidence for that.
8888 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8889 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a student, I
8890 answered,
8891 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8892 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.  Nothing
8893 in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical assertion about
8894 impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a structural limit necessary
8895 to assure that what would be an effectively perpetual term not be permitted
8896 under the copyright laws.
8897 </p></blockquote></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2838103"></a><p>
8898 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right answer
8899 was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any number of
8900 briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And here was the
8901 place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a softball; my answer
8902 was a swing and a miss.
8903 </p><p>
8904 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
8905 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>
8906 ruling, and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
8907 </p><p>
8908
8909 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all sympathetic.
8910 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
8911
8912
8913 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8914 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the right to copy
8915 verbatim other people's books, don't you?
8916 </p><p>
8917 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that should be in the
8918 public domain and would be in the public domain but for a statute that
8919 cannot be justified under ordinary First Amendment analysis or under a
8920 proper reading of the limits built into the Copyright Clause.
8921 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8922 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument; for now the
8923 Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia asked Solicitor
8924 General Olson,
8925 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
8926 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited time
8927 would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely the
8928 argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited time which is
8929 extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited time.
8930 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8931 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.  Olson's
8932 flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed to the
8933 academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if this were the
8934 first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright and Patent Clause
8935 power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I closed by pointing out the
8936 long history of the Court imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of
8937 the Copyright and Patent Clause&#8212; indeed, the very first case striking
8938 a law of Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon
8939 the Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
8940 Court to my side.
8941 </p><p>
8942
8943 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I wished I
8944 could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had answered
8945 differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me optimistic.
8946 </p><p>
8947 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit? Over
8948 and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was precisely the
8949 answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not imagine how the Court
8950 could understand that the government believed Congress's power was unlimited
8951 under the terms of the Copyright Clause, and sustain the government's
8952 argument. The solicitor general had made my argument for me. No matter how
8953 often I tried, I could not understand how the Court could find that
8954 Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
8955 Copyright Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe
8956 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&#8212;in
8957 particular, the Conservatives&#8212;would feel itself constrained by the
8958 rule of law that it had established elsewhere.
8959 </p><p>
8960 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office and
8961 missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the
8962 message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
8963 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
8964 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
8965 </p><p>
8966 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the phone off
8967 the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat down to see where I
8968 had been wrong in my reasoning.
8969 </p><p>
8970 My <span class="emphasis"><em>reasoning</em></span>. Here was a case that pitted all the money
8971 in the world against <span class="emphasis"><em>reasoning</em></span>. And here was the last
8972 naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
8973 </p><p>
8974 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would distinguish the
8975 principle in this case from the principle in
8976 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case
8977 was not even cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did
8978 not even appear in the Court's opinion.
8979 </p><p>
8980
8981
8982
8983 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.  Consistent
8984 with her view that Congress's power was not limited generally, she had found
8985 Congress's power not limited here.
8986 </p><p>
8987 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&#8212;for her, and for Justice
8988 Souter. Neither believes in <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>. It would be too
8989 much to expect them to write an opinion that recognized, much less
8990 explained, the doctrine they had worked so hard to defeat.
8991 </p><p>
8992 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I was
8993 reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile limited
8994 powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the Progress
8995 Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could reconcile the two
8996 simply <span class="emphasis"><em>by not addressing the argument</em></span>. There was no
8997 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.  There was
8998 therefore no principle that followed from the <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>
8999 case: In that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this
9000 context it would not.
9001 </p><p>
9002 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values they
9003 would respect? By what right did they&#8212;the silent five&#8212;get to
9004 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the values
9005 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that I said I
9006 hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue here was
9007 important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I might hate a
9008 system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional values that it
9009 will respect, that is the system we have.
9010 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2838294"></a><p>
9011 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's opinion
9012 was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
9013 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension of
9014 terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had governed in the
9015 context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court discounted the
9016 parallel&#8212;without explaining how the very same words in the Progress
9017 Clause could come to mean totally different things depending upon whether
9018 the words were about patents or copyrights.  The Court let Justice Stevens's
9019 charge go unanswered.
9020 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2838313"></a><p>
9021
9022
9023 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever written, was
9024 external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of copyrights has
9025 become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said that under the
9026 current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8 percent of the value of a
9027 perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the actual number was
9028 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the point was clear: If the
9029 Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and the existing term was so
9030 long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
9031 </p><p>
9032 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But because
9033 neither believed in the <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> case, neither was
9034 willing to push it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was
9035 decided without anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried
9036 from Judge Sentelle. It was <em class="citetitle">Hamlet</em> without the
9037 Prince.
9038 </p><p>
9039 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when depression
9040 gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure the
9041 depression. This anger was of two sorts.
9042 </p><p>
9043 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been one
9044 thing for them to have explained why the principle of
9045 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> didn't apply in this case. That wouldn't have
9046 been a very convincing argument, I don't believe, having read it made by
9047 others, and having tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been
9048 an act of integrity.  These justices in particular have repeatedly said that
9049 the proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&#8212;to
9050 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in light
9051 of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
9052 <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was
9053 their "originalism" now?
9054 </p><p>
9055
9056 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain what the
9057 framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they did; they joined
9058 an opinion that never once tried to explain how the structure of that clause
9059 would affect the interpretation of Congress's power. And they joined an
9060 opinion that didn't even try to explain why this grant of power could be
9061 unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause would be limited. In short, they had
9062 joined an opinion that did not apply to, and was inconsistent with, their
9063 own method for interpreting the Constitution. This opinion may well have
9064 yielded a result that they liked. It did not produce a reason that was
9065 consistent with their own principles.
9066 </p><p>
9067 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with myself.  For I
9068 had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of the law as
9069 it is.
9070 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2838424"></a><p>
9071 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for idealism
9072 about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.  Most have a
9073 much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this case would be won
9074 based on whether I could convince the Justices that the framers' values were
9075 important, I fought the idea, because I didn't want to believe that that is
9076 how this Court decides. I insisted on arguing this case as if it were a
9077 simple application of a set of principles.  I had an argument that followed
9078 in logic. I didn't need to waste my time showing it should also follow in
9079 popularity.
9080 </p><p>
9081
9082 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I can see
9083 a hundred places where the answers could have taken the conversation in
9084 different directions, where the truth about the harm that this unchecked
9085 power will cause could have been made clear to this Court. Justice Kennedy
9086 in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically, corrected his
9087 question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown the First
9088 Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the question to make the
9089 logical point. I had shown them how they could strike this law of Congress
9090 if they wanted to. There were a hundred places where I could have helped
9091 them want to, yet my stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have
9092 stood before hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion
9093 in that effort to persuade; but I refused to stand before this audience and
9094 try to persuade with the passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis
9095 on which a court should decide the issue.
9096 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2838466"></a><p>
9097 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it have
9098 been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or Kathleen
9099 Sullivan? <a class="indexterm" name="id2838477"></a>
9100 </p><p>
9101 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court was not
9102 ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It would take
9103 a great deal more to show our society why our framers were right. And when
9104 we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
9105 </p><p>
9106 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in doing
9107 anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have little
9108 reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had stepped
9109 down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could have
9110 persuaded.
9111 </p><p>
9112 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
9113 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
9114 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case
9115 was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
9116 not be raised until it is.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2838508"></a>
9117 </p><p>
9118
9119 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and publicly,
9120 that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have been persuaded,
9121 then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that here again Peter
9122 was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in a way that would do
9123 some good or they were not ready to hear this case in a way that would do
9124 some good. Either way, the decision to bring this case&#8212;a decision I
9125 had made four years before&#8212;was wrong.  While the reaction to the Sonny
9126 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's
9127 decision was mixed.  No one, at least in the press, tried to say that
9128 extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over
9129 ideas. Where the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had
9130 been skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
9131 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was
9132 attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful
9133 law. <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em> wrote in its editorial,
9134 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
9135 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are seeing
9136 the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of copyright
9137 perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment, one that should
9138 not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on the entire creative
9139 output of humanity is one of the reasons we live in a time of such fruitful
9140 creative ferment.
9141 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9142 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of hilarious
9143 images&#8212;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view of the
9144 case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page (<a class="xref" href="#fig-18" title="Figur 14.1. Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon">Figur 14.1, &#8220;Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon&#8221;</a>). The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But
9145 the punch in the face felt exactly like that.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2838568"></a>
9146 </p><div class="figure"><a name="fig-18"></a><p class="title"><b>Figur 14.1. Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon</b></p><div class="figure-contents"><div><img src="images/18.png" alt="Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon"></div><a class="indexterm" name="id2838588"></a></div></div><br class="figure-break"><p>
9147 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the quote from
9148 <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em>. That "grand experiment" we call
9149 the "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey, I
9150 shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in our
9151 Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I fathered, the
9152 Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A better lawyer would
9153 have made them see differently.
9154 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836183" href="#id2836183" class="para">179</a>] </sup>
9155
9156
9157 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
9158 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world of
9159 noncommercial pornographers&#8212;people who were distributing porn but were
9160 not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution.  Such a
9161 class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the costs of
9162 distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got
9163 special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the
9164 Communications Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
9165 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
9166 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial publishers
9167 after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the world before the
9168 Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at least as important to
9169 protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect noncommercial pornographers.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836237" href="#id2836237" class="para">180</a>] </sup>
9170
9171
9172 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to
9173 last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
9174 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
9175 copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is
9176 also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one
9177 day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress," 144
9178 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
9179 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836448" href="#id2836448" class="para">181</a>] </sup>
9180
9181 Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse
9182 Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
9183 <em class="citetitle">Chicago Tribune</em>, 17. oktober 1998, 22.
9184 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836463" href="#id2836463" class="para">182</a>] </sup>
9185
9186 Se Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information Age,"
9187 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9188 #49</a>.
9189 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836478" href="#id2836478" class="para">183</a>] </sup>
9190
9191
9192 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
9193 <em class="citetitle">Congressional Quarterly This Week</em>, 8. august 1990,
9194 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9195 #50</a>.
9196 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836567" href="#id2836567" class="para">184</a>] </sup>
9197
9198 <em class="citetitle">United States</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Lopez</em>, 514
9199 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
9200 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836594" href="#id2836594" class="para">185</a>] </sup>
9201
9202
9203 <em class="citetitle">United States</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Morrison</em>, 529
9204 U.S. 598 (2000).
9205 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836614" href="#id2836614" class="para">186</a>] </sup>
9206
9207
9208 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
9209 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the context of
9210 the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the government
9211 would allow the government unending power to regulate commerce&#8212;the
9212 limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The same point is true in
9213 the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's
9214 interpretation would allow the government unending power to regulate
9215 copyrights&#8212;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
9216 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836694" href="#id2836694" class="para">187</a>] </sup>
9217
9218
9219 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
9220 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S.
9221 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #51</a>.
9222 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836768" href="#id2836768" class="para">188</a>] </sup>
9223
9224 The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
9225 Congressional Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal
9226 ranges. See Brief of Petitioners, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9227 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 7, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #52</a>.
9228 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836930" href="#id2836930" class="para">189</a>] </sup>
9229
9230
9231 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
9232 <em class="citetitle">Los Angeles Times</em>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld,
9233 "Classic Movies, Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today
9234 on Striking Down Copyright Extension," <em class="citetitle">Orlando Sentinel
9235 Tribune</em>, 9 October 2002.
9236 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836983" href="#id2836983" class="para">190</a>] </sup>
9237
9238
9239 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
9240 Petitoners, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9241 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618),
9242 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by the
9243 Internet Archive, <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9244 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #53</a>.
9245 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2837220" href="#id2837220" class="para">191</a>] </sup>
9246
9247
9248 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20 December
9249 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
9250 #54</a>.
9251 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2837706" href="#id2837706" class="para">192</a>] </sup>
9252
9253
9254 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
9255 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, 537 U.S.  (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
9256 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2837731" href="#id2837731" class="para">193</a>] </sup>
9257
9258
9259 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins
9260 the Fray," <em class="citetitle">New York Times</em>, 28 March 1998, B7.
9261 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="eldred-ii"></a>Kapittel 15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</h2></div></div></div><p>
9262 The day <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> was decided, fate would have it that I
9263 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
9264 <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em> was denied&#8212;meaning the case was really
9265 finally over&#8212;fate would have it that I was giving a speech to
9266 technologists at Disney World.)  This was a particularly long flight to my
9267 least favorite city. The drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because
9268 of traffic, so I opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
9269 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2838630"></a><p>
9270 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
9271 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head the same
9272 advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is important. And
9273 alternating with that command was the question of Justice Kennedy: "For all
9274 these years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts. I
9275 just don't see any empirical evidence for that." And so, having failed in
9276 the argument of constitutional principle, finally, I turned to an argument
9277 of politics.
9278 </p><p>
9279
9280 <em class="citetitle">The New York Times</em> published the piece. In it, I
9281 proposed a simple fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the
9282 copyright owner would be required to register the work and pay a small
9283 fee. If he paid the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of
9284 copyright. If he did not, the work passed into the public domain.
9285 </p><p>
9286 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.  Eric
9287 Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as he said
9288 early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
9289 </p><p>
9290 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this is either
9291 the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright Term Deregulation
9292 Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear and obvious: Remove
9293 copyright where it is doing nothing except blocking access and the spread of
9294 knowledge. Leave it for as long as Congress allows for those works where its
9295 worth is at least $1. But for everything else, let the content go.
9296 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2838686"></a><p>
9297 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed it in
9298 an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters expressing
9299 support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people can see the
9300 copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican might say, here
9301 government regulation is simply getting in the way of innovation and
9302 creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the government is
9303 blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no good reason. Indeed,
9304 there is no real difference between Democrats and Republicans on this
9305 issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm of the present system.
9306 </p><p>
9307 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
9308 requirement.  For one of the hardest things about the current system for
9309 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to look
9310 for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not required, since
9311 marking content is not required, since no formality at all is required, it
9312 is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask permission to use
9313 or license their work. This system would lower these costs, by establishing
9314 at least one registry where copyright owners could be identified.
9315 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2838719"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2838726"></a><p>
9316
9317 As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, formalities in copyright law were removed in 1976,
9318 when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning any formal requirement
9319 before a copyright is granted.<sup>[<a name="id2838743" href="#ftn.id2838743" class="footnote">194</a>]</sup> The
9320 Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural rights
9321 don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American tradition
9322 that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were to be
9323 protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the dignity of
9324 the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not upon the
9325 special favor of the government.
9326 </p><p>
9327 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is absurd
9328 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a world
9329 without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread "Walt Disney
9330 creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to know what's
9331 protected and what's not.
9332 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2838796"></a><p>
9333 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin in
9334 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne Convention in 1908,
9335 to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as the
9336 abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated because the
9337 stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was as if a Charles
9338 Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
9339 <em class="citetitle">i</em> or cross a <em class="citetitle">t</em> resulted in the
9340 loss of widows' only income.
9341 </p><p>
9342 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
9343 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
9344 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
9345 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities totally,
9346 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more equitable system
9347 of registration.
9348 </p><p>
9349 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration in the
9350 nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was also a
9351 hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save the
9352 starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory burden
9353 imposed upon creators.
9354 </p><p>
9355
9356 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was a moral
9357 claim as well. There was no reason that creative property should be a
9358 second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table, his rights
9359 over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the government.  He has
9360 a property right over the table "naturally," and he can assert that right
9361 against anyone who would steal the table, whether or not he has informed the
9362 government of his ownership of the table.
9363 </p><p>
9364 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
9365 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative property
9366 being second-class property. The argument in favor of formalities turns upon
9367 the special problems that creative property presents.  The law of
9368 formalities responds to the special physics of creative property, to assure
9369 that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
9370 </p><p>
9371 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just because
9372 you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is to be
9373 effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just because
9374 you must register the car with the state and tag it with a license.  In both
9375 of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important reason to secure
9376 registration&#8212;both because it makes the markets more efficient and
9377 because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without a registration
9378 system for land, landowners would perpetually have to guard their
9379 property. With registration, they can simply point the police to a
9380 deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would be much
9381 easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden to sell a
9382 stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but those
9383 burdens produce a much better system of protection for property generally.
9384 </p><p>
9385 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
9386 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
9387 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
9388 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
9389 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
9390 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property with
9391 confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is the author
9392 and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in a world without
9393 formalities. Complex, expensive, <span class="emphasis"><em>lawyer</em></span> transactions
9394 take their place.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2838899"></a>
9395 </p><p>
9396 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono Act that we
9397 tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it didn't "get."
9398 Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no way easily to
9399 build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright terms were, as Justice
9400 Story said they would be, "short," then this wouldn't matter much. For
9401 fourteen years, under the framers' system, a work would be presumptively
9402 controlled. After fourteen years, it would be presumptively uncontrolled.
9403 </p><p>
9404 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the inability to
9405 know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a huge and obvious
9406 burden on the creative process. If the only way a library can offer an
9407 Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a lawyer to clear the rights
9408 to every image and sound, then the copyright system is burdening creativity
9409 in a way that has never been seen before <span class="emphasis"><em>because there are no
9410 formalities</em></span>.
9411 </p><p>
9412 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If it is
9413 worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the longer
9414 term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how to get your
9415 permission if they want to use your work. And you will get the benefit of an
9416 extended copyright term.
9417 </p><p>
9418 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
9419 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
9420 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public domain
9421 where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a movie based
9422 on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
9423 </p><p>
9424 Noen bekymrer seg over byrden på forfattere. Gjør ikke byrden med å
9425 registrere verket at beløpet $1 egentlig er misvisende?  Er ikke
9426 ekstraarbeidet verdt mer enn $1? Er ikke dette det virkelige problemet med
9427 registrering?
9428 </p><p>
9429
9430 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
9431 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no doubt
9432 because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
9433 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must address
9434 the real problem of <span class="emphasis"><em>governments</em></span> standing at the core of
9435 any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
9436 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it was
9437 Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
9438 registration.  The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click registration
9439 fifty years after a work was published. Based upon historical data, that
9440 system would move up to 98 percent of commercial work, commercial work that
9441 no longer had a commercial life, into the public domain within fifty
9442 years. What do you think?
9443 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2838986"></a><p>
9444 Da Steve Forbes støttet idéen, begynte enkelte i Washington å følge
9445 med. Mange kontaktet meg med tips til representanter som kan være villig til
9446 å introdusere en Eldred-lov. og jeg hadde noen få som foreslo direkte at de
9447 kan være villige til å ta det første skrittet.
9448 </p><p>
9449 En representant, Zoe Lofgren fra California, gikk så langt som å få
9450 lovforslaget utarbeidet. Utkastet løste noen problemer med internasjonal
9451 lov. Det påla de enklest mulige forutsetninger på innehaverne av
9452 opphavsretter. I mai 2003 så det ut som om loven skulle være introdusert.
9453 16. mai, postet jeg på Eldred Act-bloggen, "vi er nære".  Det oppstod en
9454 generell reaksjon i blogg-samfunnet om at noe godt kunne skje her.
9455 <a class="indexterm" name="id2839018"></a>
9456 </p><p>
9457 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and the
9458 MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give the view of
9459 the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti informed the
9460 congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred Act. The reasons are
9461 embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their thinness shows something clear
9462 about what this debate is really about.
9463 </p><p>
9464
9465 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central concept
9466 in the proposed bill"&#8212;that copyrights be renewed. That was true, but
9467 irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred long before the
9468 Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.  Second, they argued that
9469 the proposal would harm poor copyright owners&#8212;apparently those who
9470 could not afford the $1 fee. Third, they argued that Congress had determined
9471 that extending a copyright term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in
9472 the case of the small percentage of work covered by copyright law that is
9473 still commercially valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal
9474 would not cut off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth,
9475 the MPAA argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
9476 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are certainly
9477 less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright whose owner is
9478 not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the copyright to a story
9479 underlying a film were to pass into the public domain. But what risk is
9480 that? If it is in the public domain, then the film is a valid derivative
9481 use.
9482 </p><p>
9483 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to do
9484 this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are thousands of
9485 copyright owners who don't even know they have a copyright to give. Whether
9486 they are free to give away their copyright or not&#8212;a controversial
9487 claim in any case&#8212;unless they know about a copyright, they're not
9488 likely to.
9489 </p><p>
9490 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law reacting to
9491 changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.  In the other,
9492 common sense was delayed. The difference between the two stories was the
9493 power of the opposition&#8212;the power of the side that fought to defend
9494 the status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
9495 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
9496 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
9497 </p><p>
9498 Jeg brukte disse to tilfellene som en måte å ramme inn krigen som denne
9499 boken har handlet om.  For her er det også en ny teknologi som tvinger loven
9500 til å reagere.  Og her bør vi også spørre, er loven i tråd med eller i strid
9501 med sunn fornuft.  Hvis sunn fornuft støtter loven, hva forklarer denne
9502 sunne fornuften?
9503 </p><p>
9504
9505
9506
9507 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the copyright
9508 owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and harmful, and the
9509 law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is p2p sharing, it is easy
9510 to understand why the law backs the owners still: Much of this sharing is
9511 wrong, even if much is harmless. When the issue is copyright terms for the
9512 Mickey Mouses of the world, it is possible still to understand why the law
9513 favors Hollywood: Most people don't recognize the reasons for limiting
9514 copyright terms; it is thus still possible to see good faith within the
9515 resistance.
9516 </p><p>
9517 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred Act,
9518 then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked selfinterest
9519 driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary range of content that
9520 is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with any copyright owner's desire
9521 to exercise continued control over his content. It would simply liberate
9522 what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark Content" that fills archives around the
9523 world. So when the warriors oppose a change like this, we should ask one
9524 simple question: <a class="indexterm" name="id2839124"></a>
9525 </p><p>
9526 Hva ønsker denne industrien egentlig?
9527 </p><p>
9528 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So the
9529 effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about protecting
9530 <span class="emphasis"><em>their</em></span> content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an
9531 effort to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is
9532 another step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
9533 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
9534 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require
9535 <span class="emphasis"><em>their</em></span> permission first.
9536 </p><p>
9537 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side is. The
9538 most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as its aim not
9539 the protection of "property" but the rejection of a tradition.  Their aim is
9540 not simply to protect what is theirs. <span class="emphasis"><em>Their aim is to assure that
9541 all there is is what is theirs</em></span>.
9542 </p><p>
9543
9544 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not hard
9545 to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public domain
9546 tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA feared the
9547 competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public domain connected to
9548 a public that now has the means to create with it and to share its own
9549 creation.
9550 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2839178"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2839184"></a><p>
9551 Det som er vanskelig å forstå er hvorfor folket innehar dette synet. Det er
9552 som om loven gjorde at flymaskiner tok seg inn på annen manns eiendom.  MPAA
9553 står side om side med Causbyene og krever at deres fjerne og ubrukelige
9554 eierrettigheter blir respektert, slik at disse fjerne og glemte
9555 opphavsrettsinnehaverne kan blokkere fremgangen til andre.
9556 </p><p>
9557 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
9558 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so long
9559 as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of the
9560 Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission society." The
9561 past can be cultivated only if you can identify the owner and gain
9562 permission to build upon his work. The future will be controlled by this
9563 dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
9564 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2838743" href="#id2838743" class="para">194</a>] </sup>
9565
9566
9567 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
9568 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
9569 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
9570 author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act, every text
9571 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
9572 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any formality."
9573 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article 5(2) of
9574 the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue to impose
9575 some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as a condition
9576 of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
9577 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.  Copies of
9578 books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in the British
9579 Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar of Authors where
9580 the author's true name can be filed in the case of anonymous or pseudonymous
9581 works. Paul Goldstein, <em class="citetitle">International Intellectual Property Law,
9582 Cases and Materials</em> (New York: Foundation Press, 2001),
9583 153&#8211;54.  </p></div></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 16. Konklusjon"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-conclusion"></a>Kapittel 16. Konklusjon</h2></div></div></div><p>
9584 Det er mer enn trettifem millioner mennesker over hele verden med
9585 AIDS-viruset. Tjuefem millioner av dem bor i Afrika sør for Sahara.  Sytten
9586 millioner har allerede dødd.  Sytten millioner afrikanere er prosentvis
9587 proporsjonalt med syv millioner amerikanere.  Viktigere er det at dette er
9588 17 millioner afrikanere.
9589 </p><p>
9590 Det finnes ingen kur for AIDS, men det finnes medisiner som kan hemme
9591 sykdommens utvikling.  Disse antiretrovirale terapiene er fortsatt
9592 eksperimentelle, men de har hatt en dramatisk effekt allerede.  I USA øker
9593 AIDS-pasienter som regelmessig tar en cocktail av disse medisinene sin
9594 levealder med ti til tjue år. For noen gjøre medisinene sykdommen nesten
9595 usynlig.
9596 </p><p>
9597 Disse medisinene er dyre.  Da de ble først introdusert i USA, kostet de
9598 mellom $10 000 og $15 000 pr. person hvert år.  I dag koster noen av dem $25
9599 000 pr. år.  Med disse prisene har, selvfølgelig, ingen afrikansk stat  råd
9600 til medisinen for det store flertall av sine innbyggere: $15 000 er tredve
9601 ganger brutto nasjonalprodukt pr. innbygger i Zimbabwe.  Med slike priser er
9602 disse medisinene fullstendig utilgjengelig.<sup>[<a name="id2839271" href="#ftn.id2839271" class="footnote">195</a>]</sup>
9603 </p><p>
9604
9605
9606 Disse prisene er ikke høye fordi ingrediensene til medisinene er dyre.
9607 Disse prisene er høye fordi medisinene er beskyttet av patenter.
9608 Farmasiselskapene som produserer disse livreddende blandingene nyter minst
9609 tjue års monopol på sine oppfinnelser.  De bruker denne monopolmakten til å
9610 hente ut så mye de kan fra markedet.  Ved hjelp av denne makten holder de
9611 prisene høye.
9612 </p><p>
9613 Det er mange som er skeptiske til patenter, spesielt patenter på
9614 medisiner. Det er ikke jeg. Faktisk av alle forskningsområder som kan være
9615 støttet av patenter, er forskning på medisiner, etter min mening, det
9616 klareste tilfelle der patenter er nødvendig. Patenter gir et farmasøytiske
9617 firma en viss forsikring om at hvis det lykkes i å finne opp et nytt
9618 medikament som kan behandle en sykdom, vil det kunne tjene tilbake
9619 investeringen og mer til. Dette ber sosialt et ekstremt verdifullt
9620 insentiv. Jeg er den siste personen som vil argumentere for at loven skal
9621 avskaffe dette, i det minste uten andre endringer.
9622 </p><p>
9623 Men det er én ting å støtte patenter, selv patenter på medisiner. Det er en
9624 annen ting å avgjøre hvordan en best skal håndtere en krise. Og i det
9625 afrikanske ledere begynte å erkjenne ødeleggelsen AIDS brakte, begynte de å
9626 se etter måter å importere HIV-medisiner til kostnader betydelig under
9627 markedspris.
9628 </p><p>
9629 I 1997 forsøkte Sør-Afrika seg på en tilnærming.  Landet vedtok en lov som
9630 tillot import av patenterte medisiner som hadde blitt produsert og solgt i
9631 en annen nasjons marked med godkjenning fra patenteieren.  For eksempel,
9632 hvis medisinen var solgt i India, så kunne den bli importert inn til Afrika
9633 fra India.  Dette kalles "parallellimport" og er generelt tillatt i
9634 internasjonal handelslovgivning, og spesifikt tillatt i den europeiske
9635 union.<sup>[<a name="id2839348" href="#ftn.id2839348" class="footnote">196</a>]</sup>
9636 </p><p>
9637 Men USA var imot lovendringen.  Og de nøyde seg ikke med å være imot. Som
9638 International Intellectual Property Association karakteriserte det,
9639 "Myndighetene i USA presset Sør-Afrika &#8230; til å ikke tillate tvungen
9640 lisensiering eller parallellimport"<sup>[<a name="id2836288" href="#ftn.id2836288" class="footnote">197</a>]</sup>
9641 Gjennom kontoret til USAs handelsrepresentant (USTR), ba myndighetene
9642 Sør-Afrika om å endre loven&#8212;og for å legge press bak den
9643 forespørselen, listet USTR i 1998 opp Sør-Afrika som et land som burde
9644 vurderes for handelsrestriksjoner.  Samme år gikk mer enn førti
9645 farmasiselskaper til retten for å utfordre myndighetenes handlinger. USA
9646 fikk selskap av andre myndigheter fra EU.  Deres påstand, og påstanden til
9647 farmasiselskapene, var at Sør-Afrika brøt sine internasjonale forpliktelser
9648 ved å diskriminere mot en bestemt type patenter&#8212;farmasøytiske
9649 patenter.  Kravet fra disse myndighetene, med USA i spissen, var at
9650 Sør-Afrika skulle respektere disse patentene på samme måte som alle andre
9651 patenter, uavhengig av eventuell effekt på behandlingen av AIDS i
9652 Sør-Afrika.<sup>[<a name="id2839414" href="#ftn.id2839414" class="footnote">198</a>]</sup>
9653 </p><p>
9654 Vi bør sette intervensjonen til USA i sammenheng.  Det er ingen tvil om at
9655 patenter ikke er den viktigste årsaken til at Afrikanere ikke har tilgang
9656 til medisiner.  Fattigdom og den totale mangel på effektivt helsevesen betyr
9657 mer. Men uansett om patenter er en viktigste grunnen eller ikke, så har
9658 prisen på medisiner en effekt på etterspørselen, og patenter påvirker
9659 prisen. Så uansett, massiv eller marginal, så var det en effekt av våre
9660 myndigheters intervensjon for å stoppe flyten av medisiner inn til Afrika.
9661 </p><p>
9662 Ved å stoppe flyten av HIV-behandling til Afrika, sikret ikke myndighetene i
9663 USA medisiner til USA borgere. Dette er ikke som hvete (hvis de spise det så
9664 kan ikke vi spise det). Det som USA i effekt intervenerte for å stoppe, var
9665 flyten av kunnskap: Informasjon om hvordan en kan ta kjemikalier som finnes
9666 i Afrika og gjøre disse kjemikaliene om til medisiner som kan redde 15 til
9667 30 millioner liv.
9668 </p><p>
9669 Intervensjonen fra USA ville heller ikke beskytte fortjenesten til
9670 medisinselskapene i USA&#8212; i hvert fall ikke betydelig.  Det var jo ikke
9671 slik at disse landene hadde mulighet til å kjøpe medisinene til de prisene
9672 som medisinselskapene forlangte.  Igjen var afrikanerne for fattige til å ha
9673 råd til disse medisinene til de tilbudte prisene.  Å blokkere for
9674 parallellimport av disse medisinene ville ikke øke salget til de amerikanske
9675 selskapene betydelig.
9676 </p><p>
9677 I stedet var argumentet til fordel for restriksjoner på denne flyten av
9678 informasjon, som var nødvendig for å redde millioner av liv, et argument om
9679 eiendoms ukrenkelighet.<sup>[<a name="id2839508" href="#ftn.id2839508" class="footnote">199</a>]</sup>  Det var på
9680 grunn av at "intellektuell eiendom" ville bli krenket at disse medisinene
9681 ikke skulle flomme inn til Afrika.  Det var prinsippet om viktigheten av
9682 "intellektuell eiendom" som fikk disse myndighetsaktørene til å intervenere
9683 mot Sør-Afrikas mottiltak mot AIDS.
9684 </p><p>
9685 La oss ta et skritt tilbake for et øyeblikk.  En gang om tredve år vil våre
9686 barn se tilbake på oss og spørre, hvordan kunne vi la dette skje?  Hvordan
9687 kunne vi tillate å gjennomføre en politikk hvis direkte kostnad var få 15
9688 til 30 millioner afrikanere til å dø raskere, og hvis eneste virkelige
9689 fordel var å opprettholde "ukrenkeligheten" til en idé?  Hva slags
9690 berettigelse kan noen sinne eksistere for en politikk som resulterer i så
9691 mange døde?  Hva slags galskap er det egentlig som tillater at så mange dør
9692 for slik en abstraksjon?
9693 </p><p>
9694 Noen skylder på farmasiselskapene.  Det gjør ikke jeg.  De er selskaper, og
9695 deres ledere er lovpålagt å tjene penger for selskapene.  De presser på for
9696 en bestemt patentpolitikk, ikke på grunn av idealer, men fordi det er dette
9697 som gjør at de tjener mest penger.  Og dette gjør kun at de tjener mest
9698 penger på grunn av en slags korrupsjon i vårt politiske system&#8212; en
9699 korrupsjon som farmasiselskapene helt klart ikke er ansvarlige for.
9700 </p><p>
9701 Denne korrupsjonen er våre egne politikeres manglende integritet.  For
9702 medisinprodusentene ville elske&#8212;sier de selv, og jeg tror dem &#8212;
9703 å selge sine medisiner så billig som de kan til land i Afrika og andre
9704 steder. Det er utfordringer de må løse å sikre at medisinene ikke kommer
9705 tilbake til USA, men dette er bare teknologiske utfordring. De kan bli
9706 overvunnet.
9707 </p><p>
9708
9709 Et annet problem kan derimot ikke løses. Det er frykten for at en politiker
9710 som skal vise seg og kaller inn lederne hos medisinprodusentene til høring i
9711 senatet eller representantenes hus og spør, "hvordan har det seg at du kan
9712 selge HIV-medisinen i Afrika for bare $1 pr. pille, mens samme pille koster
9713 en amerikansker $1500?" Da det ikke finnes et "kjapt svar" på det
9714 spørsmålet, ville effekten bli regulering av priser i Amerika.
9715 Medisinprodusentene unngår dermed denne spiralen ved å sikre at det første
9716 steget ikke tas.  De forsterker idéen om at eierrettigheter skal være
9717 ukrenkelige.  De legger seg på en rasjonell strategi i en irrasjonell
9718 omgivelse, med den utilsiktede konsekvens at kanskje millioner dør.  Og den
9719 rasjonelle strategien rammes dermed inn ved hjel av dette
9720 ideal&#8212;helligheten til en idé som kalles "immaterielle rettigheter".
9721 </p><p>
9722 Så når du konfronteres av ditt barns sunne fornuft, hva vil du si?  Når den
9723 sunne fornuften hos en generasjon endelig gjør opprør mot hva vi har gjort,
9724 hvordan vil vi rettferdiggjøre det?  Hva er argumentet?
9725 </p><p>
9726 En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk støtte til
9727 patentsystemet uten å måtte nå alle overalt på nøyaktig samme måte. På samme
9728 måte som en fornuftig opphavsrettspolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk
9729 støtte til et opphavsretts-system uten å måtte regulere spredningen av
9730 kultur perfekt og for alltid.  En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for
9731 og gi sterk støtte til et patentsystem uten å måtte blokkere spredning av
9732 medisiner til et land som uansett ikke er rikt nok til å ha råd til
9733 markedsprisen.  En fornuftig politikk kan en dermed si kunne være en
9734 balansert politikk.  For det meste av vår historie har både opphavsrett- og
9735 patentpolitikken i denne forstand vært balansert.
9736 </p><p>
9737
9738 Men vi som kultur har mistet denne følelsen for balanse.  Vi har mistet det
9739 kritiske blikket som hjelper oss til å se forskjellen mellom sannhet og
9740 ekstremisme.  En slags eiendomsfundamentalisme, uten grunnlag i vår
9741 tradisjon, hersker nå i vår kultur&#8212;sært, og med konsekvenser mer
9742 alvorlig for spredningen av idéer og kultur enn nesten enhver annen politisk
9743 enkeltavgjørelse vi som demokrati kan fatte.  En enkel idé blender oss, og
9744 under dekke av mørket skjer mye som de fleste av oss ville avvist hvis vi
9745 hadde fulgt med.  Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om eierskap til idéer at
9746 vi ikke engang legger merke til hvor uhyrlig det er å nekte tilgang til
9747 idéer for et folk som dør uten dem.  Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om
9748 eiendom til kulturen at vi ikke engang stiller spørsmål ved når kontrollen
9749 over denne eiendommen fjerner vår evne, som folk, til å utvikle vår kultur
9750 demokratisk.  Blindhet blir vår sunne fornuft, og utfordringen for enhver
9751 som vil gjenvinne retten til å dyrke vår kultur er å finne en måte å få
9752 denne sunne fornuften til å åpne sine øyne.
9753 </p><p>
9754 Så langt sover sunn fornuft.  Det er intet opprør.  Sunn fornuft ser ennå
9755 ikke hva det er å gjøre opprør mot.  Ekstremismen som nå dominerer denne
9756 debatten resonerer med idéer som virker naturlige, og resonansen er
9757 forsterket av våre moderne RCA-ene.  De fører en frenetisk krig for å
9758 bekjempe "piratvirksomhet" og knuser kreativitetskultur.  De forsvarer idéen
9759 om "kreativt eierskap", mens de endrer ekte skapere til moderne
9760 leilendinger.  De blir fornærmet av idéen om at rettigheter skulle være
9761 balanserte, selv om hver av hovedaktørene i denne innholdskrigen selv hadde
9762 fordeler av et mer balansert ideal.  Hykleriet rår.  Men i en by som
9763 Washington blir ikke hykleriet en gang lagt merke til.  Mektige lobbyister,
9764 kompliserte problemer og MTV-oppmerksomhetsspenn gir en "perfekt storm" for
9765 fri kultur.
9766 </p><p>
9767 I august 2003 brøt en kamp ut i USA om en avgjørelse fra World Intellectual
9768 Property Organiation om å avlyse et møte.<sup>[<a name="id2839633" href="#ftn.id2839633" class="footnote">200</a>]</sup> På forespørsel fra en lang rekke med interressenter hadde WIPO
9769 bestemt å avholde et møte for å diskutere "åpne og samarbeidende prosjekter
9770 for å skape goder for felleskapet".  Disse prosjektene som hadde lyktes i å
9771 produsere goder for fellesskapet uten å basere seg eksklusivt på bruken av
9772 proprietære immaterielle rettigheter.  Eksempler inkluderer internettet og
9773 verdensveven, begge som ble utviklet på grunnlag av protokoller i
9774 allemannseie.  Det hadde med en begynnende trend for å støtte åpne
9775 akademiske tidsskrifter, og inkluderte Public Library of Science-prosjektet
9776 som jeg beskriver i etterordet.  Det inkluderte et prosjekt for a utvikle
9777 enkeltnukleotidforskjeller (SNPs), som er antatt å få stor betydning i
9778 biomedisinsk forskning.  (Dette ideelle prosjektet besto av et konsortium av
9779 Wellcome Trust og farmasøytiske og teknologiske selskaper, inkludert
9780 Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
9781 Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, og
9782 Searle.)  Det inkluderte Globalt posisjonssystem (GPS) som Ronald Reagen
9783 frigjorde tidlig på 1980-tallet.  Og det inkluderte "åpen kildekode og fri
9784 programvare". <a class="indexterm" name="id2839810"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2839819"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2839825"></a>
9785 </p><p>
9786 Formålet med møtet var å vurdere denne rekken av prosjekter fra et felles
9787 perspektiv: at ingen av disse prosjektene hadde som grunnlag immateriell
9788 ekstremisme. I stedet, hos alle disse, ble immaterielle rettigheter
9789 balansert med avtaler om å holde tilgang åpen, eller for å legge
9790 begrensninger på hvordan proprietære krav kan bli brukt.
9791 </p><p>
9792 Dermed var, fra perspektivet i denne boken, denne konferansen
9793 ideell.<sup>[<a name="id2839850" href="#ftn.id2839850" class="footnote">201</a>]</sup> Prosjektene innenfor temaet var
9794 både kommersielle og ikkekommersielle verker.  De involverte i hovedsak
9795 vitenskapen, men fra mange perspektiver.  Og WIPO var et ideelt sted for
9796 denne diskusjonen, siden WIPO var den fremstående internasjonale aktør som
9797 drev med immaterielle rettighetsspørsmål.
9798 </p><p>
9799
9800 Faktisk fikk jeg en gang offentlig kjeft for å ikke anerkjenne dette faktum
9801 om WIPO.  I februar 2003 leverte jeg et hovedinnlegg på en forberedende
9802 konferanse for World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).  På en
9803 pressekonferanse før innlegget, ble jeg spurt hva jeg skulle snakke om.  Jeg
9804 svarte at jeg skulle snakke litt om viktigheten av balanse rundt
9805 immaterielle verdier for utviklingen av informasjonssamfunnet.  Ordstyreren
9806 på arrangementet avbrøt meg da brått for å informere meg og journalistene
9807 tilstede at ingen spørsmål rundt immaterielle verdier ville bli diskutert av
9808 WSIS, da slike spørsmål kun skulle diskuteres i WIPO.  I innlegget jeg hadde
9809 forberedt var temaet om immaterielle verdier en forholdvis liten del av det
9810 hele.  Men etter denne forbløffende uttalelsen, gjorde jeg immaterielle
9811 verdier til hovedfokus for mitt innlegg.  Det var ikke mulig å snakke om et
9812 "informasjonssamfunn" uten at en også snakket om andelen av informasjon og
9813 kultur som ikke er vernet av opphavsretten.  Mitt innlegg gjorde ikke min
9814 overivrige moderator veldig glad.  Og hun hadde uten tvil rett i at omfanget
9815 til vern av immaterielle rettigheter normalt hørte inn under WIPO.  Men
9816 etter mitt syn, kunne det ikke bli for mye diskusjon om hvor mye
9817 immaterielle rettigheter som trengs, siden etter mitt syn, hadde selve ideen
9818 om en balanse rundt immaterielle rettigheter hadde gått tapt.
9819 </p><p>
9820 Så uansett om WSIS kan diskutere balanse i intellektuell eiendom eller ikke,
9821 så hadde jeg trodd det var tatt for gitt at WIPO kunne og burde.  Og dermed
9822 møtet om "åpne og samarbeidende prosjekter for å skape fellesgoder" virker å
9823 passe perfekt for WIPOs agenda.
9824 </p><p>
9825 Men det er ett prosjekt i listen som er svært kontroversielt, i hvert fall
9826 blant lobbyister. Dette prosjektet er "åpen kildekode og fri
9827 programvare". Microsoft spesielt er skeptisk til diskusjon om emnet. Fra
9828 deres perspektiv, ville en konferanse for å diskutere åpen kildekode og fri
9829 programvare være som en konferanse for å diskutere Apples operativsystem.
9830 Både åpen kildekode og fri programvare konkurrerer med Microsofts
9831 programvare.  Og internasjonalt har mange myndigheter begynt å utforske krav
9832 om at de skal bruke åpen kildekode eller fri programvare, i stedet for
9833 "proprietær programvare," til sine egne interne behov.
9834 </p><p>
9835 Jeg mener ikke å gå inn i den debatten her.  Det er viktig kun for å gjøre
9836 det klart at skillet ikke er mellom kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell
9837 programvare.  Det er mange viktige selskaper som er fundamentalt avhengig av
9838 fri programvare, der IBM er den mest fremtredende.  IBM har i stadig større
9839 grad skiftet sitt fokus til GNU/Linux-operativsystemet, det mest berømte
9840 biten av "fri programvare"&#8212;og IBM er helt klart en kommersiell
9841 aktør. Dermed er det å støtte "fri programvare" ikke å motsette seg
9842 kommersielle aktører.  Det er i stedet å støtte en måte å drive
9843 programvareutvikling som er forskjellig fra Microsofts.<sup>[<a name="id2839691" href="#ftn.id2839691" class="footnote">202</a>]</sup> <a class="indexterm" name="id2840003"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2840010"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2840016"></a>
9844 <a class="indexterm" name="id2840022"></a>
9845 </p><p>
9846
9847 Mer viktig for våre formål, er at å støtte "åpen kildekode og fri
9848 programvare" ikke er å motsette seg opphavsrett. "Åpen kildekode og fri
9849 programvare" er ikke programvare uten opphavsrettslig vern. Istedet, på
9850 samme måte som programvare fra Microsoft, insisterer opphavsrettsinnehaverne
9851 av fri programvare ganske sterkt at vilkårene i deres programvarelisens blir
9852 respektert av de som tar i bruk fri programvare.  Vilkårene i den lisensen
9853 er uten tvil forskjellig fra vilkårene i en proprietær programvarelisens.
9854 For eksempel krever fri programvare lisensiert med den generelle offentlige
9855 lisensen (GPL), at kildekoden for programvare gjøres tilgjengelig for alle
9856 som endrer og videredistribuerer programvaren.  Men dette kravet er kun
9857 effektivt hvis opphavsrett råder over programvare.  Hvis opphavsretten ikke
9858 råder over programvare, så kunne ikke fri programvare pålegge slike krav på
9859 de som tar i bruk programvaren.  Den er dermed like avhengig av
9860 opphavsrettsloven som Microsoft.
9861 </p><p>
9862 Det er dermed forståelig at Microsoft, som utviklere av proprietær
9863 programvare, gikk imot et slikt WIPO-møte, og like fullt forståelig at de
9864 bruker sine lobbyister til å få USAs myndigheter til å gå imot møtet.  Og
9865 ganske riktig, det er akkurat dette som i følge rapporter hadde skjedd.  I
9866 følge Jonathan Krim i <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, lyktes
9867 Microsofts lobbyister i å få USAs myndigheter til å legge ned veto mot et
9868 slikt møte.<sup>[<a name="id2840086" href="#ftn.id2840086" class="footnote">203</a>]</sup> Og uten støtte fra USA ble
9869 møtet avlyst.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2840101"></a>
9870 </p><p>
9871 Jeg klandrer ikke Microsoft for å gjøre det de kan for å fremme sine egne
9872 interesser i samsvar med loven. Og lobbyvirksomhet mot myndighetene er
9873 åpenbart i samsvar med loven. Det er ikke noe overraskende her med deres
9874 lobbyvirksomhet, og ikke veldig overraskende at den mektigste
9875 programvareprodusenten i USA har lyktes med sin lobbyvirksomhet.
9876 </p><p>
9877 Det som var overraskende var USAs regjerings begrunnelse for å være imot
9878 møtet.  Igjen, sitert av Krim, forklarte Lois Boland, direktør for
9879 internasjonale forbindelser ved USAs patent og varemerkekontor, at
9880 "programvare med åpen kildekode går imot til formålet til WIPO, som er å
9881 fremme immaterielle rettigheter.".  Hun skal i følge sitatet ha sagt, "Å
9882 holde et møte som har som formål å fraskrive seg eller frafalle slike
9883 rettigheter synes for oss å være i strid med formålene til WIPO."
9884 </p><p>
9885 Disse utsagnene er forbløffende på flere nivåer.
9886 </p><p>
9887 For det første er de ganske enkelt ikke riktige.  Som jeg beskrev, er det
9888 meste av åpen kildekode og fri programvare fundamentalt avhengig av den
9889 immaterielle retten kalt "opphavsrett".  Uten den vil begrensningene
9890 definert av disse lisensene ikke fungere. Dermed er det å si at de "går
9891 imot" formålet om å fremme immaterielle rettigheter å avsløre en
9892 ekstraordinær mangel på forståelse&#8212;den type feil som er tilgivelig hos
9893 en førsteårs jusstudent, men pinlig fra en høyt plassert statstjenestemann
9894 som håndterer utfordringer rundt immaterielle rettigheter.
9895 </p><p>
9896 For det andre, hvem har noen gang hevdet at WIPOs eksklusive mål var å
9897 "fremme" immaterielle rettigheter maksimalt?  Som jeg fikk kjeft om på den
9898 forberedende konferansen til WSIS, skal WIPO vurdere ikke bare hvordan best
9899 beskytte immaterielle rettigheter, men også hva som er den beste balansen
9900 rundt immaterielle rettigheter.  Som enhver økonom og advokat vet, er det
9901 vanskelige spørsmålet i immaterielle rettighetsjuss å finne den balansen.
9902 Men at det skulle være en grense, trodde jeg, var ubestridt.  Man ønsker å
9903 spørre Ms. Boland om generelle medisiner (medisiner basert på medisiner med
9904 patenter som er utløpt) i strid med WIPOs oppdrag?  Svekker allemannseie
9905 immaterielle rettigheter?  Ville det vært bedre om internettets protokoller
9906 hadde vært patentert?
9907 </p><p>
9908 For det tredje, selv om en tror at formålet med WIPO var å maksimere
9909 immaterielle rettigheter, så innehas immaterielle rettigheter, i vår
9910 tradisjon, av individer og selskaper.  De får bestemme hva som skal gjøres
9911 med disse rettighetene, igjen fordi det er <span class="emphasis"><em>de</em></span> som eier
9912 rettighetene. Hvis de ønsker å "frafalle" eller "frasi" seg sine
9913 rettigheter, så er det helt etter boka i vår tradisjon.  Når Bill Gates gir
9914 bort mer enn $20 milliarder til gode formål, så er ikke det uforenelig med
9915 målene til eiendomssystemet.  Det er heller tvert i mot, akkurat hva
9916 eiendomssysstemet er ment å oppnå, at individer har retten til å bestemme
9917 hva de vil gjøre med <span class="emphasis"><em>sin</em></span> eiendom.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2840230"></a>
9918 </p><p>
9919
9920 Når Ms. Boland sier at det er noe galt med et møte "som har som sitt formål
9921 å fraskrive eller frafalle slike rettigheter", så sier hun at WIPO har en
9922 interesse i å påvirke valgene til enkeltpersoner som eier immaterielle
9923 rettigheter.  At på en eller annen WIPOs oppdrag bør være å stoppe individer
9924 fra å "fraskrive" eller "frafalle" seg sine immaterielle rettigheter.  At
9925 interessen til WIPO ikke bare er  maksimale immaterielle rettigheter, men
9926 også at de skal utøves på den mest ekstreme og restriktive mulig måten.
9927 </p><p>
9928 Det er en historie om akkurat et slikt eierskapssystem som er velkjent i den
9929 anglo-amerikansk tradisjon.  Det kalles "føydalisme". Under føydalismen var
9930 eiendommer ikke bare kontrollert av et relativt lite antall individer og
9931 aktører.  Men det føydale systemet hadde en sterk interesse i å sikre at
9932 landeier i systemet ikke svekke føydalismen ved å frigjøre folkene og
9933 eiendomene som de kontrollerte til det frie markedet.  Føydalismen var
9934 avhengig av maksimal kontroll og konsentrasjon.  Det sloss mot enhver frihet
9935 som kunne forstyrre denne kontrollen.
9936 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2840270"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2840276"></a><p>
9937 Som Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite beskriver, dette er nøyaktig det valget
9938 vi nå gjør om immaterielle rettigheter.<sup>[<a name="id2840289" href="#ftn.id2840289" class="footnote">204</a>]</sup>
9939 Vi kommer til å få et informasjonssamfunn.  Så mye er sikkert.  Vårt eneste
9940 valg nå er hvorvidt dette informasjonssamfunnet skal være
9941 <span class="emphasis"><em>fritt</em></span> eller <span class="emphasis"><em>føydalt</em></span>.  Trenden er
9942 mot det føydale.
9943 </p><p>
9944 Da denne bataljen brøt ut, blogget jeg om dette.  En heftig debatt brøt ut i
9945 kommentarfeltet.  Ms. Boland hadde en rekke støttespillere som forsøkte å
9946 vise hvorfor hennes kommentarer ga mening.  Men det var spesielt en
9947 kommentar som gjorde meg trist.  En anonym kommentator skrev,
9948 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
9949
9950 George, du misforstår Lessig: Han snakker bare om verden slik den burde være
9951 ("målet til WIPO, og målet til enhver regjering, bør være å fremme den
9952 riktige balansen for immaterielle rettigheter, ikke bare å fremme
9953 immaterielle rettigheter"), ikke som den er.  Hvis vi snakket om verden slik
9954 den er, så har naturligvis Boland ikke sagt noe galt.  Men i verden slik
9955 Lessig vil at den skal være, er det åpenbart at hun har sagt noe galt.  En
9956 må alltid være oppmerksom på forskjellen mellom Lessigs og vår verden.
9957 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9958 Jeg gikk glipp av ironien først gangen jeg leste den. Jeg lese den raskt og
9959 trodde forfatteren støttet idéen om at det våre myndigheter burde gjøre var
9960 å søke balanse. (Min kritikk av Ms Boland, selvfølgelig, var ikke om
9961 hvorvidt hun søkte balanse eller ikke; min kritikk var at hennes kommentarer
9962 avslørte en feil kun en førsteårs jusstudent burde kunne gjøre. Jeg har noen
9963 illusjon om ekstremismen hos våre myndigheter, uansett om de er
9964 republikanere eller demokrater. Min eneste tilsynelatende illusjon er
9965 hvorvidt våre myndigheter bør snakke sant eller ikke.)
9966 </p><p>
9967 Det var derimot åpenbart at den som postet meldingen ikke støttet idéen.  I
9968 stedet latterliggjorde forfatteren selve idéen om at i den virkelig verden
9969 skulle "målet" til myndighetene være "å fremme den riktige balanse" for
9970 immaterielle rettigheter.  Det var åpenbart tåpelig for ham.  Og det
9971 avslørte åpenbart, trodde han, min egen tåpelige utopisme.  "Typisk for en
9972 akademiker", kunne forfatteren like gjerne ha fortsatt.
9973 </p><p>
9974 Jeg forstår kritikken av akademisk utopisme.  Jeg mener også at utopisme er
9975 tåpelig, og jeg vil være blant de første til å gjøre narr av de absurde
9976 urealistiske idealer til akademikere gjennom historien (og ikke bare i vårt
9977 eget lands historie).
9978 </p><p>
9979 Men når det har blitt dumt å anta at rollen til våre myndigheter bør være å
9980 "oppnå balanse", da kan du regne meg blant de dumme, for det betyr at dette
9981 faktisk har blitt ganske seriøst.  Hvis det bør være åpenbart for alle at
9982 myndighetene ikke søker å oppnå balanse, at myndighetene ganske enkelt et
9983 verktøy for de mektigste lobbyistene, at ideen om å forvente bedre av
9984 myndighetene er absurd, at ideen om å kreve at myndighetene snakker sant og
9985 ikke lyver bare er naiv, hva har da vi, det mektigste demokratiet i verden,
9986 blitt?
9987 </p><p>
9988
9989 Det kan være galskap å forvente at en mektig myndigshetsperson skal si
9990 sannheten. Det kan være galskap å tro at myndighetenes politikk skal gjøre
9991 mer enn å tjene de mektigste interesser. Det kan være galskap å argumentere
9992 for å bevare en tradisjon som har vært en del av vår tradisjon for
9993 mesteparten av vår historie&#8212;fri kultur.
9994 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2840414"></a><p>
9995 Hvis dette er galskap, så la det være mer gærninger.  Snart. Det finnes
9996 øyeblikk av håp i denne kampen. Og øyeblikk som overrasker. Da FCC vurderte
9997 mindre strenge eierskapsregler, som ville ytterligere konsentrere
9998 medieeierskap, dannet det seg en en ekstraordinær koalisjon på tvers av
9999 partiene for å bekjempe endringen. For kanskje første gang i historien
10000 organiserte interesser så forskjellige som NRA, ACLU, moveon.org, William
10001 Safire, Ted Turner og Codepink Women for Piece seg for å protestere på denne
10002 endringen i FCC-reglene.  Så mange som 700 000 brev ble sendt til FCC med
10003 krav om flere høringer og et annet resultat.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2840435"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2840442"></a>
10004 </p><p>
10005 Disse protestene stoppet ikke FCC, men like etter stemte en bred koalisjon i
10006 senatet for å reversere avgjørelsen i FCC. De fiendtlige høringene som ledet
10007 til avstemmingen avslørte hvor mektig denne bevegelsen hadde blitt.  Det var
10008 ingen betydningsfull støtte for FCCs avgjørelse, mens det var bred og
10009 vedvarende støtte for å bekjempe ytterligere konsentrasjon i media.
10010 </p><p>
10011 Men selv denne bevegelsen går glipp av en viktig brikke i puslespillet.  Å
10012 være stor er ikke ille i seg selv. Frihet er ikke truet bare på grunn av at
10013 noen blir veldig rik, eller på grunn av at det bare er en håndfull store
10014 aktører.  Den dårlige kvaliteten til Big Macs eller Quartar Punders betyr
10015 ikke at du ikke kan få en god hamburger andre steder.
10016 </p><p>
10017 Faren med mediekonsentrasjon kommer ikke fra selve konsentrasjonen, men
10018 kommer fra føydalismen som denne konsentrasjonen fører til når den kobles
10019 til endringer i opphavsretten. Det er ikke kun at det er noen mektige
10020 selskaper som styrer en stadig voksende andel av mediene. Det er at denne
10021 konsentrasjonen kan påkalle en like oppsvulmet rekke
10022 rettigheter&#8212;eiendomsrettigheter i en historisk ekstrem form&#8212;som
10023 gjør størrelsen ille.
10024 </p><p>
10025 Det er derfor betydningsfullt at så mange vil kjempe for å kreve konkurranse
10026 og økt mangfold. Likevel, hvis kampanjen blir forstått til å kun gjelde
10027 størrelse, så er ikke det veldig overraskende. Vi amerikanere har en lang
10028 historie med å slåss mot "stort", klokt eller ikke. At vi kan være motivert
10029 til å slåss mot "store" igjen ikke noe nytt.
10030 </p><p>
10031 Det ville vært noe nytt, og noe veldig viktig, hvis like mange kan være med
10032 på en kampanje for å bekjempe økende ekstremisme bygget inn i idéen om
10033 "intellektuell eiendom".  Ikke fordi balanse er fremmed for vår
10034 tradisjon. Jeg argumenterer for at balanse er vår tradisjon.  Men fordi
10035 evnen til å tenke kritisk på omfanget av alt som kalles "eiendom" ikke er
10036 lenger er godt trent i denne tradisjonen.
10037 </p><p>
10038 Hvis vi var Akilles, så ville dette være vår hæl. Dette ville være stedet
10039 for våre tragedie.
10040 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2840534"></a><p>
10041 Mens jeg skriver disse avsluttende ordene, er nyhetene fylt med historier om
10042 at RIAA saksøker nesten tre hundre individer.<sup>[<a name="id2840547" href="#ftn.id2840547" class="footnote">205</a>]</sup>  Eminem har nettopp blitt saksøkt for å ha "samplet" noen andres
10043 musikk.<sup>[<a name="id2840593" href="#ftn.id2840593" class="footnote">206</a>]</sup>  Historien om hvordan Bob Dylan
10044 har "stjålet" fra en japansk forfatter har nettopp gått verden
10045 over.<sup>[<a name="id2840611" href="#ftn.id2840611" class="footnote">207</a>]</sup>  En på innsiden i
10046 Hollywood&#8212;som insisterer på at han må forbli anonym&#8212;rapporterer
10047 "en utrolig samtale med disse studiofolkene.  De har fantastisk [gammelt]
10048 innhold som de ville elske å bruke, men det kan de ikke på grunn av at de
10049 først må klarere rettighetene.  De har hauger med ungdommer som kunne gjøre
10050 fantastiske ting med innholdet, men det vil først kreve hauger med advokater
10051 for å klarere det først".  Kongressrepresentanter snakker om å gi datavirus
10052 politimyndighet for å ta ned datamaskiner som antas å bryte loven.
10053 Universiteter truer med å utvise ungdommer som bruker en datamaskin for å
10054 dele innhold.
10055 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2840627"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2840651"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2840658"></a><a class="indexterm" name="id2840664"></a><p>
10056
10057 I mens på andre siden av Atlanteren har BBC nettopp annonsert at de vil
10058 bygge opp et "kreativt arkiv" som britiske borgere kan laste ned BBC-innhold
10059 fra, og rippe, mikse og brenne det ut.<sup>[<a name="id2840681" href="#ftn.id2840681" class="footnote">208</a>]</sup>
10060 Og i Brasil har kulturministeren, Gilberto Gil, i seg selv en folkehelt i
10061 brasiliansk musikk, slått seg sammen med Creative Commons for å gi ut
10062 innhold og frie lisenser i dette latinamerikanske landet.<sup>[<a name="id2840702" href="#ftn.id2840702" class="footnote">209</a>]</sup>  Jeg har fortalt en mørk historie.  Sannheten er
10063 mer blandet.  En teknologi har gitt oss mer frihet.  Sakte begynner noen å
10064 forstå at denne friheten trenger ikke å bety anarki.  Vi kan få med oss fri
10065 kultur inn i det tjueførste århundre, uten at artister taper og uten at
10066 potensialet for digital teknologi blir knust.  Det vil kreve omtanke, og
10067 viktigere, det vil kreve at noen omforme RCAene av i dag til Causbyere.
10068 </p><p>
10069
10070 Sunn fornuft må gjøre opprør. Den må handle for å frigjøre kulturen. Og
10071 snart, hvis dette potensialet skal noen gang bli realisert.
10072
10073
10074
10075 </p><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2839271" href="#id2839271" class="para">195</a>] </sup>
10076
10077 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
10078 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
10079 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10080 #55</a>. I følge en pressemelding fra verdens helseorganisasjon sendt ut
10081 9. juli 2002, mottar kun 320 000 av de 6 millioner som trenger medisiner i
10082 utviklingsland dem de trenger&#8212;og halvparten av dem er i Brasil.
10083 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2839348" href="#id2839348" class="para">196</a>] </sup>
10084
10085 Se Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: <em class="citetitle">Who
10086 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</em> (New York: The New Press, 2003),
10087 37.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2839357"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2839365"></a>
10088 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2836288" href="#id2836288" class="para">197</a>] </sup>
10089
10090
10091 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <em class="citetitle">Patent
10092 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a
10093 Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property Organization</em>
10094 (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #56</a>. For a firsthand
10095 account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing Before the
10096 Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House
10097 Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22
10098 July 1999), 150&#8211;57 (statement of James Love).
10099 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2839414" href="#id2839414" class="para">198</a>] </sup>
10100
10101
10102 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <em class="citetitle">Patent
10103 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, en
10104 rapport forberedt for the World Intellectual Property
10105 Organization</em> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15.  </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2839508" href="#id2839508" class="para">199</a>] </sup>
10106
10107
10108
10109 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's Needs at
10110 Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," <em class="citetitle">San Francisco
10111 Chronicle</em>, 24 May 1999, A1, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #57</a> ("compulsory licenses
10112 and gray markets pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property
10113 protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
10114 Access to Essential Medicines," <em class="citetitle">Foreign Policy in
10115 Focus</em> 4:23 (August 1999), available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #58</a> (describing
10116 U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the
10117 HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property
10118 Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," <em class="citetitle">Widener Law Symposium
10119 Journal</em> (Spring 2001): 175.
10120
10121 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2839633" href="#id2839633" class="para">200</a>] </sup>
10122
10123 Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," <em class="citetitle">Washington
10124 Post</em>, august 2003, E1, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #59</a>; William New, "Global
10125 Group's Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," <em class="citetitle">National
10126 Journal's Technology Daily</em>, 19. august 2003, tilgjengelig  fra
10127 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #60</a>; William New,
10128 "U.S. Official Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," <em class="citetitle">National
10129 Journal's Technology Daily</em>, 19. august 2003, tilgjengelig fra
10130 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #61</a>.
10131 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2839850" href="#id2839850" class="para">201</a>] </sup>
10132
10133 Jeg bør nevne at jeg var en av folkene som ba WIPO om dette møtet.
10134 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2839691" href="#id2839691" class="para">202</a>] </sup>
10135
10136
10137 Microsofts posisjon om åpen kildekode og fri programvare er mer
10138 sofistikert.  De har flere ganger forklart at de har ikke noe problem med
10139 programvare som er "åpen kildekode" eller programvare som er allemannseie.
10140 Microsofts prinsipielle motstand er mot "fri programvare" lisensiert med en
10141 "copyleft"-lisens, som betyr at lisensen krever at de som lisensierer skal
10142 adoptere same vilkår for ethvert avledet verk.  Se Bradford L. Smith, "The
10143 Future of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,"
10144 <em class="citetitle">Government Policy Toward Open Source Software</em>
10145 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
10146 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
10147 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10148 #62</a>. Se også Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
10149 <em class="citetitle">The Commercial Software Model</em>, diskusjon ved New York
10150 University Stern School of Business (3. mai 2001), tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #63</a>.
10151 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2840086" href="#id2840086" class="para">203</a>] </sup>
10152
10153
10154 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #64</a>.
10155 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2840289" href="#id2840289" class="para">204</a>] </sup>
10156
10157 Se Drahos with Braithwaite, <em class="citetitle">Information Feudalism</em>,
10158 210&#8211;20.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2839408"></a>
10159 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2840547" href="#id2840547" class="para">205</a>] </sup>
10160
10161
10162 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, september 2003,
10163 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10164 #65</a>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8
10165 september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #66</a>; Soni Sangha og Phyllis
10166 Furman sammen med Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song, N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among
10167 261 Cited as Sharers," <em class="citetitle">New York Daily News</em>,
10168 9. september 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets;
10169 Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10170 <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, 10. september 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
10171 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," <em class="citetitle">Wired News</em>,
10172 10. september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #67</a>.
10173 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2840593" href="#id2840593" class="para">206</a>] </sup>
10174
10175
10176 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued &#8230; by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
10177 17. september 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #68</a>.
10178 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2840611" href="#id2840611" class="para">207</a>] </sup>
10179
10180
10181
10182 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for Dylan
10183 Songs," Kansascity.com, 9. juli 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #69</a>.
10184
10185 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2840681" href="#id2840681" class="para">208</a>] </sup>
10186
10187 "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," pressemelding fra BBC,
10188 24. august 2003, tilgjengelig  fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #70</a>.
10189 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2840702" href="#id2840702" class="para">209</a>] </sup>
10190
10191
10192 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6. august 2003,
10193 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
10194 #71</a>.
10195 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 17. Etterord"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-afterword"></a>Kapittel 17. Etterord</h2></div></div></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse</b></p><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#usnow">Oss, nå</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="section"><a href="#themsoon">Dem, snart</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="section"><a href="#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></span></dt><dt><span class="section"><a href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><p>
10196
10197
10198
10199 I hvert fall noen av de som har lest helt hit vil være enig med meg om at
10200 noe må gjøres for å endre retningen vi holder.  Balansen i denne boken
10201 kartlegger hva som kan gjøres.
10202 </p><p>
10203 Jeg deler dette kartet i to deler: det som enhver kan gjøre nå, og det som
10204 krever hjelp fra lovgiverne.  Hvis det er en lærdom vi kan trekke fra
10205 historien om å endre på sunn fornuft, så er det at det krever å endre
10206 hvordan mange mennesker tenker på den aktuelle saken.
10207 </p><p>
10208 Det betyr at denne bevegelsen må starte i gatene.  Det må rekrutteres et
10209 signifikant antall foreldre, lærere, bibliotekarer, skapere, forfattere,
10210 musikere, filmskapere, forskere&#8212;som alle må fortelle denne historien
10211 med sine egne ord, og som kan fortelle sine naboer hvorfor denne kampen er
10212 så viktig.
10213 </p><p>
10214 Når denne bevegelsen har hatt sin effekt i gatene, så er det et visst håp om
10215 at det kan ha effekt i Washington.  Vi er fortsatt et demokrati. Hva folk
10216 mener betyr noe.  Ikke så mye som det burde, i hvert fall når en RCA står
10217 imot, men likevel, det betyr noe.  Og dermed vil jeg skissere, i den andre
10218 delen som følger, endringer som kongressen kunne gjøre for å bedre sikre en
10219 fri kultur.
10220 </p><div class="section" title="Oss, nå"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="usnow"></a>Oss, nå</h2></div></div></div><p>
10221 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far has
10222 been framed at the extremes&#8212;as a grand either/or: either property or
10223 anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is
10224 the choice, then the warriors should win.
10225 </p><p>
10226 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are extremes in
10227 this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There are those who
10228 believe in maximal copyright&#8212;"All Rights Reserved"&#8212; and those
10229 who reject copyright&#8212;"No Rights Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved"
10230 sorts believe that you should ask permission before you "use" a copyrighted
10231 work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able
10232 to do with content as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or
10233 not.
10234 </p><p>
10235
10236 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
10237 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
10238 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
10239 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
10240 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
10241 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively unprotected.
10242 </p><p>
10243 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite equal)
10244 by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this book. Through
10245 legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's design, copyright
10246 holders have been able to change the essential character of the environment
10247 of the original Internet. If the original architecture made the effective
10248 default "no rights reserved," the future architecture will make the
10249 effective default "all rights reserved." The architecture and law that
10250 surround the Internet's design will increasingly produce an environment
10251 where all use of content requires permission.  The "cut and paste" world
10252 that defines the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and
10253 paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
10254 </p><p>
10255 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&#8212;neither "all
10256 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&#8212;
10257 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content as
10258 they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of freedoms
10259 that we could just take for granted before.
10260 </p><div class="section" title="Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="examples"></a>Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</h3></div></div></div><p>
10261 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
10262 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before the
10263 Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about our lives
10264 that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore and browsed
10265 through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need to worry about
10266 explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of
10267 your browsing habits was assured.
10268 </p><p>
10269 Hva gjorde at det var sikret?
10270 </p><p>
10271 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, your privacy was
10272 assured because of an inefficient architecture for gathering data and hence
10273 a market constraint (cost) on anyone who wanted to gather that data. If you
10274 were a suspected spy for North Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your
10275 privacy would not be assured.  But that's because the CIA would (we hope)
10276 find it valuable enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But
10277 for most of us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly
10278 inefficient architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust
10279 amount of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
10280 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many places,
10281 not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs
10282 that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
10283 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2840930"></a><p>
10284 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular has
10285 become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you browse the
10286 pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked at. You know this
10287 because at the side of the page, there's a list of "recently viewed"
10288 pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net and the function of
10289 cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the data than not. The friction
10290 has disappeared, and hence any "privacy" protected by the friction
10291 disappears, too.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2840948"></a>
10292 </p><p>
10293 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry about
10294 libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that people
10295 should have the "right" to browse in a library without the government
10296 knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties, too), then this
10297 change in the technology of monitoring might concern you. If it becomes
10298 simple to gather and sort who does what in electronic spaces, then the
10299 friction-induced privacy of yesterday disappears.
10300 </p><p>
10301
10302 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy" on the
10303 Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what friction
10304 before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what friction
10305 did.<sup>[<a name="id2840974" href="#ftn.id2840974" class="footnote">210</a>]</sup> And whether you're in favor of
10306 those laws or not, it is the pattern that is important here. We must take
10307 affirmative steps to secure a kind of freedom that was passively provided
10308 before. A change in technology now forces those who believe in privacy to
10309 affirmatively act where, before, privacy was given by default.
10310 </p><p>
10311 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
10312 movement. When computers with software were first made available
10313 commercially, the software&#8212;both the source code and the
10314 binaries&#8212; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data
10315 General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
10316 about controlling their software.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2841012"></a>
10317 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2841023"></a><p>
10318 Dette var verden Richard Stallman ble født inn i, og mens han var forsker
10319 ved MIT, lærte han til å elske samfunnet som utviklet seg når en var fri til
10320 å utforske og fikle med programvaren som kjørte på datamaskiner. Av den
10321 smarte sorten selv, og en talentfull programmerer, begynte Stallman å basere
10322 seg frihet til å legge til eller endre på andre personers arbeid.
10323 </p><p>
10324 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In a
10325 math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that someone
10326 offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a theorem, you could
10327 take what someone else did and change it. In a classics department, if you
10328 believed a colleague's translation of a recently discovered text was flawed,
10329 you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you
10330 should be free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
10331 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like anything
10332 else?
10333 </p><p>
10334 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue for
10335 computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from one system
10336 to another, it became economically attractive (at least in the view of some)
10337 to hide the code of your program. So, too, as companies started selling
10338 peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just take your printer driver
10339 and copy it, then that would make it easier for me to sell a printer to the
10340 market than it was for you.
10341 </p><p>
10342
10343 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the early
10344 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.  The world of
10345 free software had been erased by a change in the economics of computing. And
10346 as he believed, if he did nothing about it, then the freedom to change and
10347 share software would be fundamentally weakened.
10348 </p><p>
10349 Derfor, i 1984, startet Stallmann på et prosjekt for å bygge et fritt
10350 operativsystem, slik i hvert fall en flik av fri programvare skulle
10351 overleve.  Dette var starten på GNU-prosjektet, som "Linux"-kjernen til
10352 Linus Torvalds senere ble lagt til i for å produsere
10353 GNU/Linux-operativsystemet. <a class="indexterm" name="id2841092"></a>
10354 <a class="indexterm" name="id2841099"></a>
10355 </p><p>
10356 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of software
10357 that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free Software
10358 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the source code
10359 for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone building upon
10360 GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free as well. This would
10361 assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code would develop that
10362 remained free for others to build upon. His fundamental goal was freedom;
10363 innovative creative code was a byproduct.
10364 </p><p>
10365 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now do for
10366 privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that was taken
10367 for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses that bind
10368 copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a space where free
10369 software would survive. He was actively protecting what before had been
10370 passively guaranteed.
10371 </p><p>
10372 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates with
10373 the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and scientific
10374 journals are produced.
10375 </p><a class="indexterm" name="idxacademocjournals"></a><p>
10376
10377 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
10378 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them to
10379 libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
10380 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
10381 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
10382 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
10383 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
10384 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
10385 service.  Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and anyone is
10386 free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free to
10387 charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme Court
10388 opinion through their respective services.
10389 </p><p>
10390 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
10391 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive for
10392 people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.  The law has
10393 agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed to flourish. And if
10394 there's nothing wrong with selling the public domain, then there could be
10395 nothing wrong, in principle, with selling access to material that is not in
10396 the public domain.
10397 </p><p>
10398 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data was
10399 through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to browse this
10400 data except by paying for a subscription?
10401 </p><p>
10402 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
10403 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
10404 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to the
10405 library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts because the
10406 library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand the risks of a
10407 certain treatment could research those risks by reading all available
10408 articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a function of the
10409 institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of paper journals
10410 (architecture)&#8212;namely, that it was very hard to control access to a
10411 paper journal.
10412 </p><p>
10413 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding that
10414 libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This means
10415 that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries begin to
10416 disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing technology
10417 and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
10418 </p><p>
10419 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to restore the
10420 freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science (PLoS), for
10421 example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making scientific research
10422 available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors of scientific work submit
10423 that work to the Public Library of Science.  That work is then subject to
10424 peer review. If accepted, the work is then deposited in a public, electronic
10425 archive and made permanently available for free. PLoS also sells a print
10426 version of its work, but the copyright for the print journal does not
10427 inhibit the right of anyone to redistribute the work for free.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2841242"></a>
10428 </p><p>
10429 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for granted
10430 before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.  There's no
10431 doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional publishers and
10432 their efforts to make money from the exclusive distribution of content. But
10433 competition in our tradition is presumptively a good&#8212;especially when
10434 it helps spread knowledge and science.
10435 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2841253"></a></div><div class="section" title="Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="oneidea"></a>Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</h3></div></div></div><a class="indexterm" name="idxcc"></a><p>
10436 Den samme strategien kan brukes på kultur, som et svar på den økende
10437 kontrollen som gjennomføres gjennom lov og teknologi.
10438 </p><p>
10439 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation
10440 established in Massachusetts, but with its home at Stanford University. Its
10441 aim is to build a layer of <span class="emphasis"><em>reasonable</em></span> copyright on top
10442 of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to
10443 build upon other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express
10444 the freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags, tied
10445 to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this
10446 possible.
10447 </p><p>
10448
10449 <span class="emphasis"><em>Simple</em></span>&#8212;which means without a middleman, or
10450 without a lawyer.  By developing a free set of licenses that people can
10451 attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content
10452 that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
10453 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers automatically
10454 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three expressions
10455 together&#8212;a legal license, a human-readable description, and
10456 machine-readable tags&#8212;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
10457 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
10458 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal that
10459 the person associated with the license believes in something different than
10460 the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the CC mark, which does
10461 not mean that copyright is waived, but that certain freedoms are given.
10462 </p><p>
10463 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their precise
10464 contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The creator can choose a
10465 license that permits any use, so long as attribution is given. She can
10466 choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.  She can choose a
10467 license that permits any use so long as the same freedoms are given to other
10468 uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is
10469 made. Or any use at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so
10470 long as full copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
10471 </p><p>
10472 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
10473 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional fair
10474 use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way that
10475 subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
10476 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content, governed by
10477 a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build upon. Voluntary
10478 choice of individuals and creators will make this content available. And
10479 that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a public domain.
10480 </p><p>
10481 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons.  And of
10482 course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
10483 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from many is
10484 that we are not interested only in talking about a public domain or in
10485 getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our aim is to build a
10486 movement of consumers and producers of content ("content conducers," as
10487 attorney Mia Garlick calls them)  who help build the public domain and, by
10488 their work, demonstrate the importance of the public domain to other
10489 creativity.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2841388"></a>
10490 </p><p>
10491 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
10492 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture are
10493 produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written centuries
10494 ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have imagined. The
10495 rules may well have made sense against a background of technologies from
10496 centuries ago, but they do not make sense against the background of digital
10497 technologies. New rules&#8212;with different freedoms, expressed in ways so
10498 that humans without lawyers can use them&#8212;are needed. Creative Commons
10499 gives people a way effectively to begin to build those rules.
10500 </p><p>
10501 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some participate
10502 to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example, is a science
10503 fiction author. His first novel, <em class="citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
10504 Kingdom</em>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
10505 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
10506 </p><p>
10507 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher reasoned
10508 like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)  those who will buy
10509 Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2) those who may never
10510 hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for free on the
10511 Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book instead of buying
10512 it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)  will download Cory's book, like
10513 it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.  If there are more
10514 (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line
10515 will probably <span class="emphasis"><em>increase</em></span> sales of Cory's book.
10516 </p><p>
10517 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that conclusion.
10518 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the publisher had
10519 expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was a total success.
10520 </p><p>
10521 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content was
10522 confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner, who wrote a
10523 book about the free software movement titled <em class="citetitle">Free for
10524 All</em>, made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a
10525 Creative Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
10526 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
10527 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as well.
10528 <a class="indexterm" name="id2841461"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2841469"></a>
10529 </p><p>
10530 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
10531 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the Commons. There
10532 are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other reasons. Many who use
10533 the "sampling license" do so because anything else would be
10534 hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are free, for commercial
10535 or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from the licensed work; they
10536 are just not free to make full copies of the licensed work available to
10537 others. This is consistent with their own art&#8212;they, too, sample from
10538 others. Because the <span class="emphasis"><em>legal</em></span> costs of sampling are so high
10539 (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
10540 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow" Public
10541 Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so high<sup>[<a name="id2841485" href="#ftn.id2841485" class="footnote">211</a>]</sup>), these artists release into the creative
10542 environment content that others can build upon, so that their form of
10543 creativity might grow.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2841517"></a>
10544 </p><p>
10545 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
10546 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
10547 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is, you
10548 are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved" model. Good
10549 for you, but many do not. Many believe that however appropriate that rule is
10550 for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate description of how most
10551 creators view the rights associated with their content. The Creative Commons
10552 license expresses this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the
10553 chance to say it to others.
10554 </p><p>
10555
10556 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over 1 million
10557 objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next step is
10558 partnerships with middleware content providers to help them build into their
10559 technologies simple ways for users to mark their content with Creative
10560 Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and celebrate creators who
10561 build content based upon content set free.
10562 </p><p>
10563 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not mere
10564 arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first step to
10565 showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
10566 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve this
10567 rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary steps are
10568 possible.
10569 </p><p>
10570 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by individuals and
10571 creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the creative field. The
10572 project does not compete with copyright; it complements it. Its aim is not
10573 to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it easier for authors and
10574 creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and cheaply. That
10575 difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread more easily.
10576 </p><a class="indexterm" name="id2841571"></a></div></div><div class="section" title="Dem, snart"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="themsoon"></a>Dem, snart</h2></div></div></div><p>
10577 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will also
10578 take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before the
10579 politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.  But
10580 that also means that we have time to build awareness around the changes that
10581 we need.
10582 </p><p>
10583 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general, and
10584 one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each is a
10585 step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way to our
10586 end.
10587 </p><div class="section" title="1. Flere formaliteter"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="formalities"></a>1. Flere formaliteter</h3></div></div></div><p>
10588 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
10589 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.  If
10590 you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
10591 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
10592 </p><p>
10593
10594
10595 These are all formalities associated with property. They are requirements
10596 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
10597 </p><p>
10598 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a copyright,
10599 regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You don't have to
10600 register. You don't even have to mark your content. The default is control,
10601 and "formalities" are banished.
10602 </p><p>
10603 Why?
10604 </p><p>
10605 As I suggested in chapter <a class="xref" href="#property-i" title='Kapittel 11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"'>11</a>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a good
10606 one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities imposed a burden
10607 on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it was progress when the
10608 law relaxed the formal requirements that a copyright owner must bear to
10609 protect and secure his work. Those formalities were getting in the way.
10610 </p><p>
10611 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
10612 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that burdens
10613 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with
10614 whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the creative work of
10615 others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&#8212; there is no
10616 simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the massive increase in
10617 the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is a necessary step for
10618 any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the <span class="emphasis"><em>lack</em></span>
10619 of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
10620 </p><p>
10621 The law should therefore change this requirement<sup>[<a name="id2841676" href="#ftn.id2841676" class="footnote">212</a>]</sup>&#8212;but it should not change it by going back to the old, broken
10622 system. We should require formalities, but we should establish a system that
10623 will create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
10624 </p><p>
10625 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work, registering
10626 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally, the first of
10627 these three was something the copyright owner did; the second two were
10628 something the government did. But a revised system of formalities would
10629 banish the government from the process, except for the sole purpose of
10630 approving standards developed by others.
10631 </p><div class="section" title="Registrering og fornying"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="registration"></a>Registrering og fornying</h4></div></div></div><p>
10632 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with the
10633 Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
10634 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
10635 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the burden
10636 of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.  And as
10637 the Copyright Office is not a main target of government policymaking, the
10638 office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus, when people who
10639 know something about the process hear this idea about formalities, their
10640 first reaction is panic&#8212;nothing could be worse than forcing people to
10641 deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
10642 </p><p>
10643 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition of
10644 extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer think
10645 innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.  Just because
10646 there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't follow that the
10647 government must actually administer the role. Instead, we should be creating
10648 incentives for private parties to serve the public, subject to standards
10649 that the government sets.
10650 </p><p>
10651 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.  There
10652 are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.  Domain name
10653 owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their registration
10654 alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net), there is a central
10655 registry. The actual registrations are, however, performed by many competing
10656 registrars. That competition drives the cost of registering down, and more
10657 importantly, it drives the ease with which registration occurs up.
10658 </p><p>
10659
10660 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
10661 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry, but
10662 it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should establish a
10663 database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
10664 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete with
10665 one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for registering and
10666 renewing copyrights. That competition would substantially lower the burden
10667 of this formality&#8212;while producing a database of registrations that
10668 would facilitate the licensing of content.
10669 </p></div><div class="section" title="Merking"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a name="marking"></a>Merking</h4></div></div></div><p>
10670 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
10671 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh punishment for
10672 failing to comply with a regulatory rule&#8212;akin to imposing the death
10673 penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.  Here again,
10674 there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be enforced in this
10675 way. And more importantly, there is no reason a marking requirement needs to
10676 be enforced uniformly across all media.
10677 </p><p>
10678 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is copyrighted
10679 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also makes it easy
10680 to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use the work.
10681 </p><p>
10682 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was that
10683 different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't clear
10684 how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A new
10685 marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing the
10686 differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to evolve as
10687 technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special signal from the
10688 failure to mark&#8212;not the loss of the copyright, but the loss of the
10689 right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
10690 </p><p>
10691
10692 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work to be
10693 published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that failure need
10694 not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could instead be that
10695 anyone has the right to use this work, until the copyright owner complains
10696 and demonstrates that it is his work and he doesn't give
10697 permission.<sup>[<a name="id2841799" href="#ftn.id2841799" class="footnote">213</a>]</sup> The meaning of an unmarked
10698 work would therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
10699 complain, then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
10700 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.  This
10701 would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark their work.
10702 </p><p>
10703 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be marked. Here
10704 again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies evolve. The best way
10705 to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the Copyright Office's role to
10706 that of approving standards for marking content that have been crafted
10707 elsewhere.
10708 </p><p>
10709 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
10710 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The Copyright
10711 Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could be made. The
10712 Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it judged preferable,
10713 and it would base that choice <span class="emphasis"><em>solely</em></span> upon the
10714 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the registration
10715 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to innovate; but we
10716 would count on the government to keep the product of innovation in line with
10717 its other important functions.
10718 </p><p>
10719 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration requirements.
10720 If photographs were marked by author and year, there would be little reason
10721 not to allow a photographer to reregister, for example, all photographs
10722 taken in a particular year in one quick step. The aim of the formality is
10723 not to burden the creator; the system itself should be kept as simple as
10724 possible.
10725 </p><p>
10726 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing system
10727 does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to make things
10728 unclear.
10729 </p><p>
10730 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
10731 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.  It
10732 would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it would be
10733 simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular kind of content;
10734 it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew that assertion at
10735 the appropriate time.
10736 </p></div></div><div class="section" title="2. Kortere vernetid"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="shortterms"></a>2. Kortere vernetid</h3></div></div></div><p>
10737 Vernetiden i opphavsretten har gått fra fjorten år til nittifem år der
10738 selskap har forfatterskapet , og livstiden til forfatteren pluss sytti år
10739 for individuelle forfattere.
10740 </p><p>
10741 In <em class="citetitle">The Future of Ideas</em>, I proposed a
10742 seventy-five-year term, granted in five-year increments with a requirement
10743 of renewal every five years.  That seemed radical enough at the time. But
10744 after we lost <em class="citetitle">Eldred</em>
10745 v. <em class="citetitle">Ashcroft</em>, the proposals became even more
10746 radical. <em class="citetitle">The Economist</em> endorsed a proposal for a
10747 fourteen-year copyright term.<sup>[<a name="id2841930" href="#ftn.id2841930" class="footnote">214</a>]</sup> Others
10748 have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
10749 </p><p>
10750 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in copyright's
10751 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four principles
10752 that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
10753 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
10754
10755
10756 <span class="emphasis"><em>Keep it short:</em></span> The term should be as long as necessary
10757 to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
10758 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
10759 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
10760 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal regulations
10761 when it no longer benefits an author.
10762 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10763
10764
10765
10766 <span class="emphasis"><em>Gjør det enkelt:</em></span> Skillelinjen mellom verker uten
10767 opphavsrettslig vern og innhold som er beskyttet må forbli klart.  Advokater
10768 liker uklarheten som "rimelig bruk" og forskjellen mellom "idéer" og
10769 "uttrykk" har.  Denne type lovverk gir dem en masse arbeid.  Men de som
10770 skrev grunnloven hadde en enklere idé: vernet versus ikke vernet. Verdien av
10771 korte vernetider er at det er lite behov for å bygge inn unntak i
10772 opphavsretten når vernetiden holdes kort.  En klar og aktiv "advokat-fri
10773 sone" gjør komplesiteten av "rimelig bruk" og "idé/uttrykk" mindre nødvendig
10774 å håndtere.
10775
10776 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10777
10778 <span class="emphasis"><em>Keep it alive:</em></span> Copyright should have to be renewed.
10779 Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be
10780 required to signal periodically that he wants the protection continued. This
10781 need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly
10782 protection has to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes
10783 for a veteran to apply for a pension.<sup>[<a name="id2842018" href="#ftn.id2842018" class="footnote">215</a>]</sup>
10784 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't require
10785 authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
10786 <a class="indexterm" name="id2842037"></a>
10787 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10788
10789
10790 <span class="emphasis"><em>Keep it prospective:</em></span> Whatever the term of copyright
10791 should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once
10792 given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the
10793 law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
10794 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got fewer
10795 authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct
10796 that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we
10797 will not increase the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can
10798 increase the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
10799 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
10800 increasing their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.  What's
10801 not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do about that now.  </p></li></ol></div><p>
10802 Disse endringene vil sammen gi en <span class="emphasis"><em>gjennomsnittlig</em></span>
10803 opphavsrettslig vernetid som er mye kortere enn den gjeldende vernetiden.
10804 Frem til 1976 var gjennomsnittlig vernetid kun 32.2 år.  Vårt mål bør være
10805 det samme.
10806 </p><p>
10807 Uten tvil vil ekstremistene kalle disse idéene "radikale". (Tross alt, så
10808 kaller jeg dem "ekstremister".) Men igjen, vernetiden jeg anbefalte var
10809 lengre enn vernetiden under Richard Nixon. hvor "radikalt" kan det være å be
10810 om en mer sjenerøs opphavsrettighet enn da Richard Nixon var president?
10811 </p></div><div class="section" title="3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="freefairuse"></a>3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</h3></div></div></div><p>
10812 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally granted
10813 property owners the right to control their property from the ground to the
10814 heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property rights quickly
10815 changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional challenge.  It made no sense
10816 anymore to grant that much control, given the emergence of that new
10817 technology.
10818 </p><p>
10819 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive right"
10820 to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive right to "their
10821 writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that are
10822 sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
10823 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the right to
10824 release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
10825 </p><p>
10826 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it expanded the
10827 exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control translations and
10828 dramatizations of a work.<sup>[<a name="id2842132" href="#ftn.id2842132" class="footnote">216</a>]</sup> The courts
10829 have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This
10830 expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
10831 Benjamin Kaplan.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2842147"></a>
10832 </p><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
10833 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a large range
10834 of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense the oddity of
10835 accepting such an enlargement of copyright while yet intoning the
10836 abracadabra of idea and expression.<sup>[<a name="id2842163" href="#ftn.id2842163" class="footnote">217</a>]</sup>
10837 </p></blockquote></div><p>
10838 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
10839 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
10840 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that a
10841 copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.  Consider
10842 each limitation in turn.
10843 </p><p>
10844 <span class="emphasis"><em>Term:</em></span> If Congress wants to grant a derivative right,
10845 then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect
10846 John Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at
10847 least I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that
10848 right to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
10849 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
10850 after the creative work is done.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2842193"></a>
10851 </p><p>
10852 <span class="emphasis"><em>Scope:</em></span> Likewise should the scope of derivative rights
10853 be narrowed.  Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are
10854 important.  Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines
10855 around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
10856 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses, perhaps
10857 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer makes
10858 sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the creative
10859 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses
10860 into the machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does
10861 to the creative process. Smothers it.
10862 </p><p>
10863 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the Clint
10864 Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for foreseeable
10865 derivative rights&#8212;turning a book into a movie, or a poem into a
10866 musical score&#8212;it doesn't make sense to require negotiation for the
10867 unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much more sense.
10868 </p><p>
10869 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are protected, and
10870 the presumption should be that other uses are not protected.  This is the
10871 reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul Goldstein.<sup>[<a name="id2842236" href="#ftn.id2842236" class="footnote">218</a>]</sup> His view is that the law should be written so that
10872 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
10873 </p><p>
10874 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
10875 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of the
10876 Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the incentives
10877 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a strong
10878 copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
10879 </p><p>
10880
10881 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection beyond the
10882 part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon certain statutory
10883 conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great deal of culture
10884 to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights regime, that reuse
10885 would earn artists more income.
10886 </p></div><div class="section" title="4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="liberatemusic"></a>4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</h3></div></div></div><p>
10887 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't be
10888 fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most people,
10889 most pressing&#8212;music. There is no other policy issue that better
10890 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing of
10891 music.
10892 </p><p>
10893 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the Internet's
10894 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more powerfully than any
10895 other single application. It was the Internet's killer app&#8212;possibly in
10896 two senses of that word. It no doubt was the application that drove demand
10897 for bandwidth. It may well be the application that drives demand for
10898 regulations that in the end kill innovation on the network.
10899 </p><p>
10900 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
10901 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed, performed,
10902 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving an exclusive
10903 right to a composer to control public performances of his work, and to a
10904 performing artist to control copies of her performance.
10905 </p><p>
10906 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
10907 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course, that's not
10908 all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter <a class="xref" href="#piracy" title='Kapittel 6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"'>6</a>, they enable four
10909 different kinds of sharing:
10910 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="A"><li class="listitem"><p>
10911
10912
10913 Det er noen som bruker delingsnettverk som erstatninger for å kjøpe CDer.
10914 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10915
10916
10917 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample, on the way to
10918 purchasing CDs.
10919 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10920
10921
10922
10923
10924 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk til å få tilgang til innhold som
10925 ikke lenger er i salg, men fortsatt er vernet av opphavsrett eller som ville
10926 ha vært altfor vanskelig å få kjøpt via nettet.
10927 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
10928
10929
10930 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk for å få tilgang til innhold som
10931 ikke er opphavsrettsbeskyttet, eller for å få tilgang som
10932 opphavsrettsinnehaveren åpenbart går god for.
10933 </p></li></ol></div><p>
10934 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It must
10935 avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The eagerness
10936 with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover, should depend upon
10937 the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net effect of sharing is
10938 actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is significantly
10939 weakened.
10940 </p><p>
10941 As I said in chapter <a class="xref" href="#piracy" title='Kapittel 6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"'>6</a>, the actual harm caused by sharing is controversial.  For
10942 the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is real. I assume,
10943 in other words, that type A sharing is significantly greater than type B,
10944 and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
10945 </p><p>
10946 Uansett, det er et avgjørende faktum om den gjeldende teknologiske
10947 omgivelsen som vi må huske på hvis vi skal forstå hvordan loven bør reagere.
10948 </p><p>
10949 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
10950 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
10951 content.  It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of
10952 content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and
10953 slow&#8212;we in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at
10954 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and
10955 down. Although wireless access is growing, most of us still get access
10956 across wires. Most only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The
10957 idea of the always on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
10958 </p><p>
10959
10960 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to the
10961 Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should not make
10962 policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should make policy on
10963 the basis of where the technology is going. The question should not be, how
10964 should the law regulate sharing in this world? The question should be, what
10965 law will we require when the network becomes the network it is clearly
10966 becoming? That network is one in which every machine with electricity is
10967 essentially on the Net; where everywhere you are&#8212;except maybe the
10968 desert or the Rockies&#8212;you can instantaneously be connected to the
10969 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service,
10970 where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
10971 </p><p>
10972 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that give
10973 you access to content on the fly&#8212;such as Internet radio, content that
10974 is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the critical
10975 point: When it is <span class="emphasis"><em>extremely</em></span> easy to connect to services
10976 that give access to content, it will be <span class="emphasis"><em>easier</em></span> to
10977 connect to services that give you access to content than it will be to
10978 download and store content <span class="emphasis"><em>on the many devices you will have for
10979 playing content</em></span>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
10980 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
10981 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially is. Content
10982 services will compete with content sharing, even if the services charge
10983 money for the content they give access to. Already cell-phone services in
10984 Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell phones (enhanced with plugs
10985 for headphones). The Japanese are paying for this content even though "free"
10986 content is available in the form of MP3s across the Web.<sup>[<a name="id2842481" href="#ftn.id2842481" class="footnote">219</a>]</sup>
10987
10988 </p><p>
10989
10990 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
10991 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
10992 sharing&#8212;to the extent there is a real problem&#8212;is a problem that
10993 will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to the
10994 Internet.  And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy makers today
10995 to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology that will be gone
10996 tomorrow.  The question should not be how to regulate the Internet to
10997 eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve that problem away). The question
10998 instead should be how to assure that artists get paid, during this
10999 transition between twentieth-century models for doing business and
11000 twenty-first-century technologies.
11001 </p><p>
11002 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems" here
11003 to solve. Let's start with type D content&#8212;uncopyrighted content or
11004 copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The "problem" with this
11005 content is to make sure that the technology that would enable this kind of
11006 sharing is not rendered illegal. You can think of it this way: Pay phones
11007 are used to deliver ransom demands, no doubt.  But there are many who need
11008 to use pay phones who have nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to
11009 ban pay phones in order to eliminate kidnapping.
11010 </p><p>
11011 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was, at
11012 one time, published and is no longer available. It may be unavailable
11013 because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the record label he
11014 signed with to carry his work. Or it may be unavailable because the work is
11015 forgotten. Either way, the aim of the law should be to facilitate the access
11016 to this content, ideally in a way that returns something to the artist.
11017 </p><p>
11018 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of print,
11019 it may still be available in libraries and used book stores. But libraries
11020 and used book stores don't pay the copyright owner when someone reads or
11021 buys an out-of-print book. That makes total sense, of course, since any
11022 other system would be so burdensome as to eliminate the possibility of used
11023 book stores' existing. But from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of
11024 his content without his being compensated is less than ideal.
11025 </p><p>
11026 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
11027 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of the
11028 music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial providers would
11029 be free, under this rule, to "share" that content, even though the sharing
11030 involved making a copy. The copy here would be incidental to the trade; in a
11031 context where commercial publishing has ended, trading music should be as
11032 free as trading books.
11033 </p><p>
11034
11035
11036
11037 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would ensure
11038 that artists get something from the trade of their work. For example, if the
11039 law set a low statutory rate for the commercial sharing of content that was
11040 not offered for sale by a commercial publisher, and if that rate were
11041 automatically transferred to a trust for the benefit of the artist, then
11042 businesses could develop around the idea of trading this content, and
11043 artists would benefit from this trade.
11044 </p><p>
11045 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep works
11046 available commercially. Works that are available commercially would not be
11047 subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect the right to charge
11048 whatever they want for content if they kept the work commercially
11049 available. But if they don't keep it available, and instead, the computer
11050 hard disks of fans around the world keep it alive, then any royalty owed for
11051 such copying should be much less than the amount owed a commercial
11052 publisher.
11053 </p><p>
11054 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is hard only
11055 because the extent of the problem will change over time, as the technologies
11056 for gaining access to content change. The law's solution should be as
11057 flexible as the problem is, understanding that we are in the middle of a
11058 radical transformation in the technology for delivering and accessing
11059 content.
11060 </p><p>
11061 Så her er en løsning som i første omgang kan virke veldig undelig for begge
11062 sider i denne krigen, men som jeg tror vil gi mer mening når en får tenkt
11063 seg om.
11064 </p><p>
11065 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic claim of
11066 the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)  has harmed a
11067 set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to be protected,
11068 then the content industry should be compensated for that harm. Just as the
11069 technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions of Americans, or the
11070 technology of asbestos caused grave illness to thousands of miners, so, too,
11071 has the technology of digital networks harmed the interests of the content
11072 industry.
11073 </p><p>
11074
11075
11076 Jeg elsker internett, så jeg liker ikke å sammenligne det med tobakk eller
11077 asbest.  Men analogien er rimelig når en ser det fra lovens perspektiv. Og
11078 det foreslår en rimelig respons: I stedet for å forsøke å ødelegge internett
11079 eller p2p-teknologien som i dag skader innholdsleverandører på internett, så
11080 bør vi finne en relativt enkel måte å kompensere de som blir skadelidende.
11081 </p><p>
11082 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been floated by
11083 Harvard law professor William Fisher.<sup>[<a name="id2842644" href="#ftn.id2842644" class="footnote">220</a>]</sup>
11084 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
11085 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission would
11086 (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to
11087 evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once
11088 the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
11089 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the basis of
11090 those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The compensation would
11091 be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
11092 </p><p>
11093 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
11094 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
11095 <em class="citetitle">Promises to Keep</em>. The modification that I would make
11096 is relatively simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing
11097 copyright system.  I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim
11098 of the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
11099 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at facilitating
11100 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal after a period of
11101 years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free exchange of content,
11102 supported through a taxation system, then it can be continued. If this form
11103 of protection is no longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the
11104 old system of controlling access.
11105 </p><p>
11106
11107 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim is
11108 not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the system
11109 supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But the aims of
11110 semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes I described were
11111 accomplished&#8212;in particular, the limits on derivative uses. A system
11112 that simply charges for access would not greatly burden semiotic democracy
11113 if there were few limitations on what one was allowed to do with the content
11114 itself.
11115 </p><p>
11116 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of "harm" to
11117 an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation would be
11118 outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This background system
11119 to compensate would also not need to interfere with innovative proposals
11120 such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted when Apple launched the
11121 MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being easier than free is. This has
11122 proven correct: Apple has sold millions of songs at even the very high price
11123 of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents, the cost is the equivalent of a per-song
11124 CD price, though the labels have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's
11125 move was countered by Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a
11126 song. And no doubt there will be a great deal of competition to offer and
11127 sell music on-line.
11128 </p><p>
11129 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free" music
11130 from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known for thirty
11131 years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than that, there is
11132 nothing impossible at all about "competing with free." Indeed, if anything,
11133 the competition spurs the competitors to offer new and better products. This
11134 is precisely what the competitive market was to be about. Thus in Singapore,
11135 though piracy is rampant, movie theaters are often luxurious&#8212;with
11136 "first class" seats, and meals served while you watch a movie&#8212;as they
11137 struggle and succeed in finding ways to compete with "free."
11138 </p><p>
11139 Dette konkurranseregimet, med en sikringsmekanisme å sikre at kunstnere ikke
11140 taper, ville bidra mye til nyskapning innen levering av
11141 innhold. Konkurransen ville fortsette å redusere type-A-deling.  Det ville
11142 inspirere en ekstraordinær rekke av nye innovatører&#8212;som ville ha
11143 retten til a bruke innhold, og ikke lenger frykte usikre og barbarisk
11144 strenge straffer fra loven.
11145 </p><p>
11146 Oppsummert, så er dette mitt forslag:
11147 </p><p>
11148
11149
11150
11151 Internett er i endring. Vi bør ikke regulere en teknologi i endring. Vi bør
11152 i stedet regulere for å minimere skaden påført interesser som er berørt av
11153 denne teknologiske endringen, samtidig vi muliggjør, og oppmuntrer, den mest
11154 effektive teknologien vi kan lage.
11155 </p><p>
11156 Vi kan minimere skaden og samtidig maksimere fordelen med innovasjon ved å
11157 </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><p>
11158
11159
11160 garantere retten til å engasjere seg i type-D-deling;
11161 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
11162
11163
11164 tillate ikke-kommersiell type-C-deling uten erstatningsansvar, og
11165 kommersiell type-C-deling med en lav og fast rate fastsatt ved lov.
11166 </p></li><li class="listitem"><p>
11167
11168
11169 mens denne overgangen pågår, skattlegge og kompensere for type-A-deling, i
11170 den grad faktiske skade kan påvises.
11171 </p></li></ol></div><p>
11172 Men hva om "piratvirksomheten" ikke forsvinner?  Hva om det finnes et
11173 konkurranseutsatt marked som tilbyr innhold til en lav kostnad, men et
11174 signifikant antall av forbrukere fortsetter å "ta" innhold uten å betale?
11175 Burde loven gjøre noe da?
11176 </p><p>
11177 Ja, det bør den.  Men, nok en gang, hva den bør gjøre avhenger hvordan
11178 realitetene utvikler seg. Disse endringene fjerner kanskje ikke all
11179 type-A-deling. Men det virkelige spørmålet er ikke om de eliminerer deling i
11180 abstrakt betydning.  Det virkelige spørsmålet er hvilken effekt det har på
11181 markedet.  Er det bedre (a) å ha en teknologi som er 95 prosent sikker og
11182 gir et marked av størrelse <em class="citetitle">x</em>, eller (b) å ha en
11183 teknologi som er 50 prosent sikker, og som gir et marked som er fem ganger
11184 større enn <em class="citetitle">x</em>?  Mindre sikker kan gi mer uautorisert
11185 deling, men det vil sannsynligvis også gi et mye større marked for
11186 autorisert deling. Det viktigste er å sikre kunstneres kompensasjon uten å
11187 ødelegge internettet.  Når det er på plass, kan det hende det er riktig å
11188 finne måter å spore opp de smålige piratene.
11189 </p><p>
11190
11191 Men vi er langt unna å spikke problemet ned til dette delsettet av
11192 type-A-delere.  Og vårt fokus inntil er der bør ikke være å finne måter å
11193 ødelegge internettet.  Var fokus inntil vi er der bør være hvordan sikre at
11194 artister får betalt, mens vi beskytter rommet for nyskapning og kreativitet
11195 som internettet er.
11196 </p></div><div class="section" title="5. Spark en masse advokater"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="firelawyers"></a>5. Spark en masse advokater</h3></div></div></div><p>
11197 Jeg er en advokat. Jeg lever av å utdanne advokater. Jeg tror på loven. Jeg
11198 tror på opphavsrettsloven. Jeg har faktisk viet livet til å jobbe med loven,
11199 ikke fordi det er mye penger å tjene, men fordi det innebærer idealer som
11200 jeg elsker å leve opp til.
11201 </p><p>
11202 Likevel har mye av denne boken vært kritikk av advokater, eller rollen
11203 advokater har spilt i denne debatten.  Loven taler om idealer, mens det er
11204 min oppfatning av vår yrkesgruppe er blitt for knyttet til klienten.  Og i
11205 en verden der rike klienter har sterke synspunkter vil uviljen hos vår
11206 yrkesgruppe til å stille spørsmål med eller protestere mot dette sterke
11207 synet ødelegge loven.
11208 </p><p>
11209 Indisiene for slik bøyning er overbevisene.  Jeg er angrepet som en
11210 "radikal" av mange innenfor yrket, og likevel er meningene jeg argumenterer
11211 for nøyaktig de meningene til mange av de mest moderate og betydningsfulle
11212 personene i historien til denne delen av loven. Mange trodde for eksempel at
11213 vår utfordring til lovforslaget om å utvide opphavsrettens vernetid var
11214 galskap.  Mens bare tredve år siden mente den dominerende foreleser og
11215 utøver i opphavsrettsfeltet, Melville Nimmer, at den var
11216 åpenbar.<sup>[<a name="id2843033" href="#ftn.id2843033" class="footnote">221</a>]</sup>
11217
11218 </p><p>
11219 Min kritikk av rollen som advokater har spilt i denne debatten handler
11220 imidlertid ikke bare om en profesjonell skjevhet. Det handler enda viktigere
11221 om vår manglende evne til å faktisk ta inn over oss hva loven koster.
11222 </p><p>
11223 Økonomer er forventet å være gode til å forstå utgifter og inntekter.  Men
11224 som oftest antar økonomene uten peiling på hvordan det juridiske systemet
11225 egentlig fungerer, at transaksjonskostnaden i det juridiske systemet er
11226 lav.<sup>[<a name="id2843067" href="#ftn.id2843067" class="footnote">222</a>]</sup>  De ser et system som har
11227 eksistert i hundrevis av år, og de antar at det fungerer slik grunnskolens
11228 samfunnsfagsundervisning lærte dem at det fungerer.
11229 </p><p>
11230
11231
11232 Men det juridiske systemet fungerer ikke. Eller for å være mer nøyaktig, det
11233 fungerer kun for de med mest ressurser.  Det er ikke fordi systemet er
11234 korrupt. Jeg tror overhodet ikke vårt juridisk system (på føderalt nivå, i
11235 hvert fall) er korrupt. Jeg mener ganske enkelt at på grunn av at kostnadene
11236 med vårt juridiske systemet er så hårreisende høyt vil en praktisk talt
11237 aldri oppnå rettferdighet.
11238 </p><p>
11239 Disse kostnadene forstyrrer fri kultur på mange vis.  En advokats tid
11240 faktureres hos de største firmaene for mer enn $400 pr. time. Hvor mye tid
11241 bør en slik advokat bruke på å lese sakene nøye, eller undersøke obskure
11242 rettskilder.  Svaret er i økende grad: svært lite. Jussen er avhengig av
11243 nøye formulering og utvikling av doktrine, men nøye formulering og utvikling
11244 av doktrine er avhengig av nøyaktig arbeid.  Men nøyaktig arbeid koster for
11245 mye, bortsett fra i de mest høyprofilerte og kostbare sakene.
11246 </p><p>
11247 Kostbarheten, klomsetheten og tilfeldigheten til dette systemet håner vår
11248 tradisjon. Og advokater, såvel som akademikere, bør se det som sin plikt å
11249 endre hvordan loven praktiseres&#8212; eller bedre, endre loven slik at den
11250 fungerer. Det er galt at systemet fungerer godt bare for den øverste
11251 1-prosenten av klientene.  Det kan gjøres radikalt mer effektivt, og billig,
11252 og dermed radikalt mer rettferdig.
11253 </p><p>
11254 Men inntil en slik reform er gjennomført, bør vi som samfunn holde lover
11255 unna områder der vi vet den bare vil skade.  Og det er nettopp det loven
11256 altfor ofte vil gjøre hvis for mye av vår kultur er lovregulert.
11257 </p><p>
11258 Tenk på de fantastiske tingene ditt barn kan gjøre eller lage med digital
11259 teknologi&#8212;filmen, musikken, web-siden, bloggen. Eller tenk på de
11260 fantastiske tingene ditt fellesskap kunne få til med digital
11261 teknologi&#8212;en wiki, oppsetting av låve, kampanje til å endre noe. Tenk
11262 på alle de kreative tingene, og tenk deretter på kald sirup helt inn i
11263 maskinene. Dette er hva et hvert regime som krever tillatelser fører
11264 til. Dette er virkeligheten slik den var i Brezhnevs Russland.
11265 </p><p>
11266
11267 Loven bør regulere i visse områder av kulturen&#8212;men det bør regulere
11268 kultur bare der reguleringen bidrar positivt. Likevel tester advokater
11269 sjeldent sin kraft, eller kraften som de fremmer, mot dette enkle pragmatisk
11270 spørsmålet: "vil det bidra positivt?".  Når de blir utfordret om det
11271 utvidede rekkevidden til loven, er advokat-svaret, "Hvorfor ikke?"
11272 </p><p>
11273 Vi burde spørre: "Hvorfor?". Vis meg hvorfor din regulering av kultur er
11274 nødvendig og vis meg hvordan reguleringen bidrar positivt.  Før du kan vise
11275 meg begge, holde advokatene din unna.
11276 </p></div></div><div class="footnotes"><br><hr width="100" align="left"><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2840974" href="#id2840974" class="para">210</a>] </sup>
11277
11278
11279
11280 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
11281 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," <em class="citetitle">Stanford
11282 Technology Law Review</em> 1 (2001): par. 6&#8211;18, available at
11283 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #72</a> (describing
11284 examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey
11285 Rosen, <em class="citetitle">The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an
11286 Anxious Age</em> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
11287 between technology and privacy).</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2841485" href="#id2841485" class="para">211</a>] </sup>
11288
11289
11290 <em class="citetitle">Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
11291 Culture Wars</em> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
11292 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #72</a>.
11293 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2841676" href="#id2841676" class="para">212</a>] </sup>
11294
11295
11296 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
11297 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
11298 by other countries as well.</p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2841799" href="#id2841799" class="para">213</a>] </sup>
11299
11300
11301 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not solved
11302 here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated system
11303 than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
11304 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2841930" href="#id2841930" class="para">214</a>] </sup>
11305
11306
11307
11308 "A Radical Rethink," <em class="citetitle">Economist</em>, 366:8308 (25. januar
11309 2003): 15, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11310 #74</a>.
11311 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2842018" href="#id2842018" class="para">215</a>] </sup>
11312
11313
11314 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
11315 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001), tilgjengelig
11316 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #75</a>.
11317 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2842132" href="#id2842132" class="para">216</a>] </sup>
11318
11319
11320 Benjamin Kaplan, <em class="citetitle">An Unhurried View of Copyright</em> (New
11321 York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 32.
11322 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2842163" href="#id2842163" class="para">217</a>] </sup>
11323
11324 Ibid., 56.
11325 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2842236" href="#id2842236" class="para">218</a>] </sup>
11326
11327 Paul Goldstein, <em class="citetitle">Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the
11328 Celestial Jukebox</em> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003),
11329 187&#8211;216.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2840985"></a>
11330 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2842481" href="#id2842481" class="para">219</a>] </sup>
11331
11332
11333 For eksempel, se, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3 April
11334 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11335 #76</a>.
11336 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2842644" href="#id2842644" class="para">220</a>] </sup>
11337
11338 William Fisher, <em class="citetitle">Digital Music: Problems and
11339 Possibilities</em> (sist revidert: 10. oktober 2000), tilgjengelig
11340 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #77</a>; William
11341 Fisher, <em class="citetitle">Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
11342 Entertainment</em> (kommer) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
11343 2004), kap. 6, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #78</a>. Professor Netanel har
11344 foreslått en relatert ide som ville gjøre at opphavsretten ikke gjelder
11345 ikke-kommersiell deling fra og ville etablere kompenasjon til kunstnere for
11346 å balansere eventuelle tap. Se Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
11347 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," tilgjengelig fra
11348 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #79</a>. For andre
11349 forslag, se Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back Broadband?"
11350 <em class="citetitle">Washington Post</em>, 8. january 2002, A17; Philip
11351 S. Corwin på vegne av Sharman Networks, Et brev til Senator Joseph R. Biden,
11352 Jr., leder i the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26. februar. 2002,
11353 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11354 #80</a>; Serguei Osokine, <em class="citetitle">A Quick Case for Intellectual
11355 Property Use Fee (IPUF)</em>, 3. mars 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #81</a>; Jefferson Graham,
11356 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," <em class="citetitle">USA
11357 Today</em>, 13. mai 2002, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #82</a>; Steven M. Cherry,
11358 "Getting Copyright Right," IEEE Spectrum Online, 1. juli 2002, tilgjengelig
11359 fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #83</a>; Declan
11360 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27. august 2002,
11361 tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link
11362 #84</a>.  Forslaget fra Fisher er ganske likt forslaget til Richard
11363 Stallman når det gjelder DAT.  I motsetning til Fishers forslag, ville
11364 Stallmanns forslag ikke betale kunstnere proposjonalt, selv om mer populære
11365 artister ville få mer betalt enn mindre populære.  Slik det er typisk med
11366 Stallman, la han fram sitt forslag omtrent ti år før dagens debatt. Se
11367 <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #85</a>.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2842759"></a> <a class="indexterm" name="id2842768"></a>
11368 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2843033" href="#id2843033" class="para">221</a>] </sup>
11369
11370
11371 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer Memorial
11372 Lecture), <em class="citetitle">UCLA law Review</em> 48 (2001): 1057,
11373 1069&#8211;70.
11374 </p></div><div class="footnote"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2843067" href="#id2843067" class="para">222</a>] </sup>
11375
11376 Et godt eksempel er arbeidet til professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz bør få
11377 ros for sin nøye gjennomgang av data om opphavsrettsbrudd, som fikk ham til
11378 å stille spørsmål med sin egen uttalte posisjon&#8212;to ganger.  I starten
11379 predicated han at nedlasting ville påføre industrien vesentlig skade.  Han
11380 endret så sitt syn etter i lys av dataene, og han har siden endret sitt syn
11381 på nytt.  Sammenlign Stan J. Liebowitz, <em class="citetitle">Rethinking the Network
11382 Economy: The True Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace</em> (New
11383 York: Amacom, 2002), (gikk igjennom hans originale syn men uttrykte skepsis)
11384 med Stan J.  Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?"
11385 artikkelutkast, juni 2003, tilgjengelig fra <a class="ulink" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target="_top">link #86</a>.  Den nøye analysen til
11386 Liebowitz er ekstremt verdifull i sin estimering av effekten av
11387 fildelingsteknologi.  Etter mitt syn underestimerer han forøvrig kostnaden
11388 til det juridiske system.  Se, for eksempel,
11389 <em class="citetitle">Rethinking</em>, 174&#8211;76.  <a class="indexterm" name="id2843043"></a>
11390 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 18. Notater"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-notes"></a>Kapittel 18. Notater</h2></div></div></div><p>
11391 I denne teksten er det referanser til lenker på verdensveven.  Og som alle
11392 som har forsøkt å bruke nettet vet, så vil disse lenkene være svært
11393 ustabile.  Jeg har forsøkt å motvirke denne ustabiliteten ved å omdirigere
11394 lesere til den originale kilden gjennom en nettside som hører til denne
11395 boken.  For hver lenke under, så kan du gå til http://free-culture.cc/notes
11396 og finne den originale kilden ved å klikke på nummeret etter #-tegnet.  Hvis
11397 den originale lenken fortsatt er i live, så vil du bli omdirigert til den
11398 lenken.  Hvis den originale lenken har forsvunnet, så vil du bli omdirigert
11399 til en passende referanse til materialet.
11400 </p></div><div class="chapter" title="Kapittel 19. Takk til"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="c-acknowledgments"></a>Kapittel 19. Takk til</h2></div></div></div><p>
11401 Denne boken er produktet av en lang og så langt mislykket kamp som begynte
11402 da jeg leste om Eric Eldreds krig for å sørge for at bøker forble
11403 frie. Eldreds innsats bidro til å lansere en bevegelse, fri
11404 kultur-bevegelsen, og denne boken er tilegnet ham.
11405 </p><p>
11406 Jeg fikk veiledning på ulike steder fra venner og akademikere, inkludert
11407 Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner, Mark Rose og
11408 Kathleen Sullivan. Og jeg fikk korreksjoner og veiledning fra mange
11409 fantastiske studenter ved Stanford Law School og Stanford University. Det
11410 inkluderer Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James P. Fellers, Christopher
11411 Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman, Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn,
11412 Brian-Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng og Erica Platt. Jeg er særlig takknemlig
11413 overfor Catherine Crump og Harry Surden, som hjalp til med å styre deres
11414 forskning og til Laura Lynch, som briljant håndterte hæren de samlet, samt
11415 bidro med sitt egen kritisk blikk på mye av dette.
11416 </p><p>
11417
11418 Yuko Noguchi hjalp meg å forstå lovene i Japan, så vel som Japans
11419 kultur. Jeg er henne takknemlig, og til de mange i Japan som hjalp meg med
11420 forundersøkelsene til denne boken: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto
11421 Misaki, Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata og Yoshihiro
11422 Yonezawa.  Jeg er også takknemlig til professor Nobuhiro Nakayama og Tokyo
11423 University Business Law Center, som ga meg muligheten til å bruke tid i
11424 Japan, og Tadashi Shiraishi og Kiyokazu Yamagami for deres generøse hjelp
11425 mens jeg var der.
11426 </p><p>
11427 Dette er de tradisjonelle former for hjelp som akademikere regelmessig
11428 trekker på. Men i tillegg til dem, har Internett gjort det mulig å motta råd
11429 og korrigering fra mange som jeg har aldri møtt.  Blant de som har svart med
11430 svært nyttig råd etter forespørsler om boken på bloggen min er Dr. Muhammed
11431 Al-Ubaydli, David Gerstein og Peter Dimauro, I tillegg en lang liste med de
11432 som hadde spesifikke ideer om måter å utvikle mine argumenter på.  De
11433 inkluderte Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
11434 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
11435 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
11436 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred
11437 Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.  Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer,
11438 Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg,
11439 Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink,"
11440 Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," og Richard Yanco. (jeg beklager hvis jeg gikk
11441 glipp av noen, med datamaskiner kommer feil og en krasj i e-postsystemet
11442 mitt gjorde at jeg mistet en haug med flotte svar.)
11443 </p><p>
11444 Richard Stallman og Michael Carroll har begge lest hele boken i utkast, og
11445 hver av dem har bidratt med svært nyttige korreksjoner og råd. Michael hjalp
11446 meg å se mer tydelig betydningen av regulering for avledede verker . Og
11447 Richard korrigerte en pinlig stor mengde feil.  Selv om mitt arbeid er
11448 delvis inspirert av Stallmans, er han ikke enig med meg på vesentlige steder
11449 i denne boken.
11450 </p><p>
11451 Til slutt, og for evig, er jeg Bettina takknemlig, som alltid har insistert
11452 på at det ville være endeløs lykke utenfor disse kampene, og som alltid har
11453 hatt rett.  Denne trege eleven er som alltid takknemlig for hennes
11454 evigvarende tålmodighet og kjærlighet.
11455 </p></div><div class="index" title="Indeks"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a name="id2843398"></a>Indeks</h2></div></div></div><div class="index"><div class="indexdiv"><h3>Symboler</h3><dl><dt>"copyleft" licenses, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>"Country of the Blind, The" (Wells), <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>A</h3><dl><dt>ABC, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Adobe eBook Reader, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>Adromeda, <a class="indexterm" href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></dt><dt>Agee, Michael, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Aibo robothund, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>akademiske tidsskrifter, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Akerlof, George, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Alben, Alex, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>alcohol prohibition, <a class="indexterm" href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></dt><dt>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll), <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>All in the Family, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Allen, Paul, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt><dt>Amazon, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>American Association of Law Libraries, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>American Graphophone Company, <a class="indexterm" href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></dt><dt>Anello, Douglas, <a class="indexterm" href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></dt><dt>Aristoteles, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>Arrow, Kenneth, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>artister</dt><dd><dl><dt>publicity rights on images of, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt></dl></dd><dt>ASCAP, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2820198">"Piratvirksomhet"</a></dt><dt>AT&amp;T, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Ayer, Don, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>B</h3><dl><dt>Bacon, Francis, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Barish, Stephanie, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Barlow, Joel, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Barry, Hank, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Beatles, <a class="indexterm" href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></dt><dt>Beckett, Thomas, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Bell, Alexander Graham, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Berlin Act (1908), <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>Berman, Howard L., <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Bern-konvensjonen (1908), <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>Bernstein, Leonard, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></dt><dt>Betamax, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></dt><dt>Black, Jane, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></dt><dt>BMG, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>BMW, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Boies, David, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt><dt>Bolling, Ruben, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Braithwaite, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Brandeis, Louis D., <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Breyer, Stephen, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Bromberg, Dan, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Brown, John Seely, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Buchanan, James, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Bunyan, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Burdick, Quentin, <a class="indexterm" href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></dt><dt>Bush, George W., <a class="indexterm" href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>C</h3><dl><dt>Camp Chaos, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt><dt>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel), <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Carson, Rachel, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></dt><dt>Casablanca, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>Causby, Thomas Lee, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Causby, Tinie, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>CBS, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>chimeras, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></dt><dt>Christensen, Clayton M., <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Clark, Kim B., <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>CNN, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Coase, Ronald, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>CodePink Women in Peace, <a class="indexterm" href="#preface">Forord</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Coe, Brian, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Comcast, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Commons, John R., <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Conrad, Paul, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>Conyers, John, Jr., <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></dt><dt>cookies, Internet, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Creative Commons, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></dt><dt>Crichton, Michael, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Crosskey, William W., <a class="indexterm" href="#lawduration">Loven: Varighet</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>D</h3><dl><dt>Daguerre, Louis, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Daley, Elizabeth, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>dataspill, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Day After Trinity, The, <a class="indexterm" href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></dt><dt>DDT, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></dt><dt>Dean, Howard, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Diller, Barry, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Disney, Inc., <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Drahos, Peter, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Dreyfuss, Rochelle, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2820198">"Piratvirksomhet"</a></dt><dt>Drucker, Peter, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt><dt>Dylan, Bob, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>E</h3><dl><dt>Eagle Forum, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Eastman, George, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Edison, Thomas, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Elektronisk forpost-stiftelsen (EFF), <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></dt><dt>EMI, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Erskine, Andrew, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>F</h3><dl><dt>Fallows, James, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Fanning, Shawn, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></dt><dt>Faraday, Michael, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Fisher, William, <a class="indexterm" href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></dt><dt>Florida, Richard, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2820198">"Piratvirksomhet"</a></dt><dt>Forbes, Steve, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>fotografering, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Fourneaux, Henri, <a class="indexterm" href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></dt><dt>Fox, William, <a class="indexterm" href="#film">Film</a></dt><dt>Free for All (Wayner), <a class="indexterm" href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></dt><dt>Fried, Charles, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Friedman, Milton, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>G</h3><dl><dt>Garlick, Mia, <a class="indexterm" href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></dt><dt>Gates, Bill, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>General Film Company, <a class="indexterm" href="#film">Film</a></dt><dt>Gershwin, George, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Gil, Gilberto, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>GNU/Linux-operativsystemet, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Goldstein, Paul, <a class="indexterm" href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></dt><dt>Gracie Films, <a class="indexterm" href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></dt><dt>Grisham, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>H</h3><dl><dt>Hand, Learned, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a></dt><dt>Hummer, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>I</h3><dl><dt>IBM, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Intel, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Internet Explorer, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></dt><dt>Iwerks, Ub, <a class="indexterm" href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>J</h3><dl><dt>Jaszi, Peter, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Johnson, Lyndon, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Johnson, Samuel, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>K</h3><dl><dt>Kaplan, Benjamin, <a class="indexterm" href="#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk</a></dt><dt>Kelly, Kevin, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>Kennedy, John F., <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Kittredge, Alfred, <a class="indexterm" href="#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk</a></dt><dt>kjørehastighet, begrensninger på, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman), <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Kozinski, Alex, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a></dt><dt>Krim, Jonathan, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>L</h3><dl><dt>Laurel and Hardy Films, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>law schools, <a class="indexterm" href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></dt><dt>Leaphart, Walter, <a class="indexterm" href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></dt><dt>Lear, Norman, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>legal realist movement, <a class="indexterm" href="#together">Sammen</a></dt><dt>Licensing Act (1662), <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Liebowitz, Stan, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater</a></dt><dt>Linux-operativsystemet, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Litman, Jessica, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Lofgren, Zoe, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>Lott, Trent, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Lovett, Lyle, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II</a></dt><dt>Lucky Dog, The, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>M</h3><dl><dt>Madonna, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2820198">"Piratvirksomhet"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2820198">"Piratvirksomhet"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Marijuana Policy Project, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Marx Brothers, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>McCain, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>MGM, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Microsoft</dt><dd><dl><dt>Windows operating system of, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></dt></dl></dd><dt>Milton, John, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Movie Archive, <a class="indexterm" href="#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere</a></dt><dt>Moyers, Bill, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Müller, Paul Hermann, <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>N</h3><dl><dt>Nashville Songwriters Association, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>National Writers Union, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>NBC, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Needleman, Rafe, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Netanel, Neil Weinstock, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken&#8212;igjen</a></dt><dt>Netscape, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></dt><dt>Nimmer, David, <a class="indexterm" href="#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>P</h3><dl><dt>Paramount Pictures, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Picker, Randal C., <a class="indexterm" href="#film">Film</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#radio">Radio</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-ii">Piracy II</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>PLoS (Public Library of Science), <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Pogue, David, <a class="indexterm" href="#preface">Forord</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#preface">Forord</a></dt><dt>Politikk, (Aristotles), <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>S</h3><dl><dt>Safire, William, <a class="indexterm" href="#preface">Forord</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>San Francisco Opera, <a class="indexterm" href="#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne</a></dt><dt>Sarnoff, David, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Schlafly, Phyllis, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt><dt>Shakespeare, William, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a></dt><dt>Silent Sprint (Carson), <a class="indexterm" href="#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett</a></dt><dt>Sony Pictures Entertainment, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt><dt>Stallman, Richard, <a class="indexterm" href="#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler</a></dt><dt>Steward, Geoffrey, <a class="indexterm" href="#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>T</h3><dl><dt>Talbot, William, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Turner, Ted, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-conclusion">Konklusjon</a></dt><dt>Twentieth Century Fox, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>U</h3><dl><dt>Universal Music Group, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>Universal Pictures, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>V</h3><dl><dt>Vaidhyanathan, Siva, <a class="indexterm" href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#film">Film</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#together">Sammen</a></dt><dt>veterans' pensions, <a class="indexterm" href="#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid</a></dt><dt>Vivendi Universal, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#innovators">Constraining Innovators</a></dt><dt>von Lohmann, Fred, <a class="indexterm" href="#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>W</h3><dl><dt>Warner Brothers, <a class="indexterm" href="#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt</a></dt><dt>Warner Music Group, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Warren, Samuel D., <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Wayner, Peter, <a class="indexterm" href="#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé</a></dt><dt>Webster, Noah, <a class="indexterm" href="#c-introduction">Introduksjon</a></dt><dt>Wells, H. G., <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera</a></dt><dt>Windows, <a class="indexterm" href="#piracy-i">Piracy I</a></dt><dt>Winer, Dave, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt><dt>Winick, Judd, <a class="indexterm" href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne</a></dt><dt>WJOA, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt><dt>Worldcom, <a class="indexterm" href="#constrain">Constraining Creators</a></dt><dt>WRC, <a class="indexterm" href="#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>Y</h3><dl><dt>Yanofsky, Dave, <a class="indexterm" href="#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"</a></dt></dl></div><div class="indexdiv"><h3>Z</h3><dl><dt>Zimmerman, Edwin, <a class="indexterm" href="#cabletv">Kabel-TV</a></dt><dt>Zittrain, Jonathan, <a class="indexterm" href="#id2820198">"Piratvirksomhet"</a>, <a class="indexterm" href="#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde</a></dt></dl></div></div></div></div></body></html>