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16 <!--
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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
26 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
27
28 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
29
30 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
31
32 <authorgroup>
33 <author>
34 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
35 <surname>Lessig</surname>
36 </author>
37 </authorgroup>
38
39 <copyright>
40 <year>2004</year>
41 <holder>
42 Lawrence Lessig. This version of Free Culture is licensed under a
43 Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
44 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
45 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
46 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
47 </holder>
48 </copyright>
49
50 <abstract>
51 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
52 <para>
53 LAWRENCE LESSIG
54 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
55 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
56 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
57 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
58 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
59 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
60 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
61 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
62 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
63 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
64 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
65 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
66 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
67 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
68 Appeals.
69 </para>
70 </abstract>
71 </bookinfo>
72
73 <colophon>
74 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
75
76 <para>
77 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
78 </para>
79 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
83 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
84 </itemizedlist>
85 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
86
87 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
88 <para>
89 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
90 </para>
91 <para>
92 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
93 </para>
94 <para>
95 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
96 </para>
97
98 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
99 <para>
100 THE PENGUIN PRESS
101 </para>
102 <para>
103 NEW YORK
104 </para>
105
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
107 <para>
108 FREE CULTURE
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
115 </para>
116
117 <para>
118 LAWRENCE LESSIG
119 </para>
120
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
122 <para>
123 THE PENGUIN PRESS
124 </para>
125 <para>
126 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
127 York, New York
128 </para>
129 <para>
130 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
131 </para>
132 <para>
133 All rights reserved
134 </para>
135 <para>
136 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
137 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
138 Reprinted with permission.
139 </para>
140 <para>
141 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
142 </para>
143 <para>
144 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
145 </para>
146 <para>
147 Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
148 </para>
149 <para>
150 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
151 </para>
152 <para>
153 Lessig, Lawrence.
154 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
155 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
156 </para>
157 <para>
158 p. cm.
159 </para>
160 <para>
161 Includes index.
162 </para>
163 <para>
164 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
165 </para>
166 <para>
167 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
168 </para>
169 <para>
170 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
171 </para>
172 <para>
173 KF2979.L47
174 </para>
175 <para>
176 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
177 </para>
178 <para>
179 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
180 </para>
181 <para>
182 Printed in the United States of America
183 </para>
184 <para>
185 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
186 </para>
187 <para>
188 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
189 </para>
190
191 <para>
192 &translationblock;
193 </para>
194
195 <para>
196 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
197 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
198 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
199 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
200 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
201 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
202 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
203 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
204 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
205 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
206 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
207 </para>
208 </colophon>
209
210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
211 <dedication>
212 <para>
213 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
214 it continues still.
215 </para>
216
217 <para>
218 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
219 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
220 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
221 </figure>
222 </para>
223 </dedication>
224
225 <toc id="toc"></toc>
226
227 <lot>
228 <title>List of figures</title>
229 </lot>
230
231 <!--
232 c PREFACE xiii
233 c INTRODUCTION
234 c "PIRACY"
235 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
236 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
237 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
238 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
239 2 Film
240 2 Recorded Music
241 2 Radio
242 2 Cable TV
243 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
244 2 Piracy I
245 2 Piracy II
246 c "PROPERTY"
247 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
248 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
249 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
250 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
251 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
252 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
253 2 Beginnings
254 2 Law: Duration
255 2 Law: Scope
256 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
257 2 Architecture and Law: Force
258 2 Market: Concentration
259 2 Together
260 c PUZZLES
261 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
262 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
263 2 Constraining Creators
264 2 Constraining Innovators
265 2 Corrupting Citizens
266 c BALANCES
267 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
268 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
269 c CONCLUSION
270 c AFTERWORD
271 1 Us, Now
272 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
273 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
274 1 Them, Soon
275 2 1. More Formalities
276 3 Registration and Renewal
277 3 Marking
278 2 2. Shorter Terms
279 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
280 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
281 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 c NOTES
283 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
284 c INDEX
285 -->
286
287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
288
289 <preface id="preface">
290 <title>PREFACE</title>
291 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
292 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
293 </indexterm>
294 <para>
295 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
296 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
297 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
298 </para>
299 <blockquote>
300 <para>
301 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
302 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
303 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
304 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
305 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
306 </para></footnote>
307 </para>
308 </blockquote>
309 <para>
310 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
311 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
312 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
313 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
314 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
315 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
316 </para>
317 <para>
318 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
319 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
320 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
322 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
323 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
324 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
325 </para>
326 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
327 <para>
328 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
329 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
330 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
331 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
332 </para>
333 <para>
334 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
335 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
336 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
337 free software movement<footnote>
338 <para>
339 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
340 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
341 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
342 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
343 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
344 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
345 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
346 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
347 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
348 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
349 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
350 or of creators from the past.
351 </para>
352 <para>
353 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
354 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
355 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
356 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
357 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
358 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
359 culture deem fundamental.
360 </para>
361 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
362 <para>
363 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
364 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
365 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
366 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
367 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
368 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
369 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
370 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
371 he asked,
372 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
373 </para>
374 <blockquote>
375 <para>
376 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
377 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
378 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
379 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
380 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
381 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
382 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
383 </para></footnote>
384 </para>
385 </blockquote>
386 <para>
387 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
388 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
389 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
390 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
391 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
392 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
393 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
394 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
395 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
396 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
397 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
398 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
399 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
400 that this work is "merely" derivative.
401 </para>
402 <para>
403 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
404 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
405 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
406 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
407 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
408 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
409 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
410 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
411
412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
413 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
414 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
415 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
416 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
417 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
418 what I advance here.
419 </para>
420 <para>
421 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
422 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
423 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
424 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
425 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
426 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
427 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
428 book is written.
429 </para>
430
431 </preface>
432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
433
434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
435 <chapter id="c-introduction">
436 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
437 <para>
438 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
439 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
440 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
441 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
442 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
443 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
444 </para>
445 <para>
446 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
447 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
448 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
449 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
450 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
451 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
452 </para></footnote>
453 For many
454 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
455 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
456 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
457 </para>
458 <para>
459 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
460 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
461 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
462 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
463 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
464 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
465 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
466 </para>
467 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
468 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
469 <para>
470 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
471 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
472 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
473 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
474 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
475 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
476 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
477 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
478 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
479 </para>
480 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
481 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
482 <para>
483 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
484 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
485 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
486 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
487 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
488 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
489 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
490 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
491 </para>
492 <blockquote>
493 <para>
494 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
495 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
496 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
497 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
498 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
499 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
500 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
501 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
502 <para>
503 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
504 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
505 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
506 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
507 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
508 Authorship," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
509 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
510 1112&ndash;13.
511 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
512 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
513 </para></footnote>
514 </para>
515 </blockquote>
516 <para>
517 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
518 </para>
519 <para>
520 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
521 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
522 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
524 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
525 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
526 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
527 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
528 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
529 </para>
530 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
532 <para>
533 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
534 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
535 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
536 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
537 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
538 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
539 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
540 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
541 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
542 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
543 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
544 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
545 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
546 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
547 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
548 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
549 </para>
550 <para>
551 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
552 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
553 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
554 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
555 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
556 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
557 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
558 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
559 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
560 understanding of radio.
561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
562 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
563 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
564 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
565 </para>
566 <para>
567 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
568 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
569 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
570 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
571 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
572 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
573 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
574 much less transmitter power and static.
575 </para>
576 <para>
577 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
578 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
579 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
580 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
581 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
582 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
583 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
584 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
585 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
586 </para>
587 <para>
588 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
589 </para>
590 <blockquote>
591 <para>
592 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
593 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
594 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
595 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
596 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
597 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
598 box."<footnote><para>
599 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
600 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
601 </para></footnote>
602 </para>
603 </blockquote>
604 <para>
605 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
606 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
607 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
608 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
609 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
610 a handful of networks.
611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
612 </para>
613 <para>
614 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
615 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
616 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
617 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
618 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
619 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
620 </para>
621 <blockquote>
622 <para>
623 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
624 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
625 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
626 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
627 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
628 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
629
630 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
631 </para></footnote>
632 </para>
633 </blockquote>
634 <para>
635 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
636 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
637 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
638 described,
639 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
640 </para>
641 <blockquote>
642 <para>
643 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
644 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
645 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
646 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
647 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
648 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
649 </para></footnote>
650 </para>
651 </blockquote>
652 <para>
653 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
654 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
655 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
656 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
657 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
658 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
659 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
660 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
661 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
662 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
663 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
664 </para>
665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
666 <blockquote>
667 <para>
668 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
669 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
670 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
671 deviousness.<footnote><para>
672 Lessing, 256.
673 </para></footnote>
674 </para>
675 </blockquote>
676 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
677 <para>
678 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
679 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
680 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
681 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
682 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
683 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
684 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
685 least temporarily.
686 </para>
687 <para>
688 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
689 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
690 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
691 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
692 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
693 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
694 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
695 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
696 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
697 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
698 </para>
699 <para>
700 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
701 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
702 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
703 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
704 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
705 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
706 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
707 course always public spirited; the reality is something
708 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
709 to themselves, would crumble in
710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
711 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
712 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
713 effect of technological change.
714 </para>
715 <para>
716 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
717 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
718 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
719 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
720 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
721 before.<footnote><para>
722 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
723 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
724 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
725 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
726 </para></footnote>
727 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
728 of 2004.
729 </para>
730 <para>
731 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
732 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
733 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
734 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
735 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
736 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
737 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
738 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
739 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
740 </para>
741 <para>
742 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
743 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
744 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
745 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
746 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
747 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
748 has introduced.
749 </para>
750 <para>
751 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
752 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
753 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
754 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
755 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
756 parks or on
757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
758 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
759 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
760 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
761 </para>
762 <para>
763 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
764 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
765 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
766 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
767 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
768 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
769 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
770 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
771 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
772 </para>
773 <para>
774 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
775 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
776 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
777 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
778 marketplace.<footnote>
779 <para>
780 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
781 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
782 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
783 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
784 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
785 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
786 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
787 198&ndash;200.
788 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
789 </para></footnote>
790 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
791 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
792 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
793 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
794 </para>
795 <para>
796 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
797 been erased.<footnote><para>
798 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
799 2001), ch. 13.
800 </para></footnote>
801 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
802 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
803 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
804 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
805 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
806 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
807 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
808 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
809 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
810 culture, more and more a permission culture.
811 </para>
812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
813 <para>
814 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
815 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
816 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
817 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
818 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
819 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
820 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
821 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
822 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
823 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
824 Causbys.
825 </para>
826 <para>
827 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
828 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
829 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
830 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
831 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
832 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
833 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
834 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
835 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
836 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
837 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
838 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
839 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
840 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
841 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
842 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
843 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
844 </para>
845 <para>
846 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
847 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
848 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
849 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
850 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
851 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
852 remakes them.
853 </para>
854 <para>
855 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
857 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
858 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
859 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
860 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
861 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
862 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
863 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
864 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
865 Times, 17 January 2002.
866 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
867 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
868 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
869 against it.
870 </para>
871 <para>
872 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
873 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
874 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
875 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
876 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
877 Internet.
878 </para>
879 <para>
880 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
881 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
882 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
883 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
884 </para>
885 <para>
886 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
887 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
888 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
889 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
890 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
891 <para>
892 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
893 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
894 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
895 </para></footnote>
896 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
897 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
898 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
899 could cultivate and extend our culture.
900 </para>
901 <para>
902 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
903 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
904 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
905 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
906 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
907 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
908 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
909 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
910 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
911 </para>
912 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
913 <para>
914 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
915 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
916 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
917 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
918 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
919 against an industry.
920 </para>
921 <para>
922 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
923 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
924 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
925 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
926 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
927 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
928 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
929 </para>
930 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
931 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
932 <para>
933 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
934 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
935 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
936 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
937 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
938 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
939 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
940 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
941 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
942 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
943 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
944 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
945 trespass.
946 </para>
947 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
948 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
949 <para>
950 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
951 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
952 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
953 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
954 war. Unlike
955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
956 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
957 on its side.
958 </para>
959 <para>
960 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
961 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
962 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
963 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
964 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
965 been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses of
966 culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
967 </para>
968 <para>
969 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
970 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
971 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
972 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
973 </para>
974 <para>
975 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
976 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
977 </para>
978 <para>
979 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
980 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
981 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
982 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
983 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
984 </para>
985 <para>
986 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
987 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
988 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
989 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
990 view?
991 </para>
992 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
993 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
994 <para>
995 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
996 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
997 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
998 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
999 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1000 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1001 this silliness will be much more profound.
1002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1003 </para>
1004 <para>
1005 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1006 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1007 ideas.
1008 </para>
1009 <para>
1010 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1011 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1012 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1013 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1014 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1015 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1016 </para>
1017 <para>
1018 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1019 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1020 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1021 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1022 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1023 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1024 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1025 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1026 fundamental about who we have always been.
1027 </para>
1028 <para>
1029 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1030 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1031 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1032 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1033 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1034 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1035 </para>
1036 </chapter>
1037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1038 <chapter id="c-piracy">
1039 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1040
1041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1042 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1043 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1044 </indexterm>
1045 <para>
1046 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1047 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1048 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1049 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1050 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1051 </para>
1052 <blockquote>
1053 <para>
1054 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1055 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1056 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1057 <!-- f1 -->
1058 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1059 </para></footnote>
1060 </para>
1061 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1062 </blockquote>
1063 <para>
1064 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1065 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1066 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1067 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1068 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1069 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1071 </para>
1072 <para>
1073 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1074 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1075 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1076 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1077 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1078 profit."
1079 </para>
1080 <para>
1081 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1082 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1083 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1084 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1085 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1086 </para>
1087 <para>
1088 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1089 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1090 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1091 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1092 </para>
1093 <para>
1094 The idea goes something like this:
1095 </para>
1096 <blockquote>
1097 <para>
1098 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1099 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1100 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1101 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1102 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1103 piracy.
1104 </para>
1105 </blockquote>
1106 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1107 <para>
1108 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1109 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1110 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1111 <!-- f2 -->
1112 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1113 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1114 </para></footnote>
1115 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1116 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1117 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1118 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1119 <!-- f3 -->
1120 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1121 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1122 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1123 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1124 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1125 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1126 </para></footnote>
1127 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1128 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1129 </para>
1130 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1131 <para>
1132 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1133 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1135 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1136 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1137 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1138 </para>
1139 <para>
1140 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1141 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1142 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1143 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1144 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1145 </para>
1146 <para>
1147 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1148 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1149 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1150 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1151 copyright law today regulates both.
1152 </para>
1153 <para>
1154 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1155 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1156 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1157 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1158 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1159 more expense of doing business.
1160 </para>
1161 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1162 <para>
1163 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1164 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1165 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1166 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1167 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1168 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1169 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1170 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1171 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1172 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1173 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1174 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1175 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1176 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1177 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1179 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1180 <para>
1181 <!-- f4 -->
1182 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1183 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1184 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1185 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1186 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1187 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1188 enabled are much more tenuous.
1189 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1190 </para></footnote>
1191 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1192 this creative class.
1193 </para>
1194 <para>
1195 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1196 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1197 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1198 </para>
1199
1200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1201 <sect1 id="creators">
1202 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1203 <para>
1204 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1205 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1206 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1207 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1208 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1209 </para>
1210 <para>
1211 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1212 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1213 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1214 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1215 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1216 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1217 </para>
1218 <blockquote>
1219 <para>
1220 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1221 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1222 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1223 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1225 </para>
1226 <para>
1227 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1228 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1229 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1230 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1231 synchronization was pretty close.
1232 </para>
1233 <para>
1234 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1235 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1236 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1237 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1238 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1239 <!-- f1 -->
1240 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1241 Cartoons (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1242 </para></footnote>
1243 </para>
1244 </blockquote>
1245 <para>
1246 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1247 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1248 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1249 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1250 </para>
1251 <para>
1252 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1253 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1254 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1255 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1256 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1257 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1258 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1259 </para>
1260 <para>
1261 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1262 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1263 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1264 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1265 </para>
1266 <para>
1267 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1268 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1269 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1270 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1271 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1272 genre.
1273 </para>
1274 <para>
1275 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1277 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1278 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1279 <!-- f2 -->
1280 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1281 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1282 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1283 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1284 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1285 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1286 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1287 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1288 </para></footnote>
1289 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1290 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1291 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1292 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1293 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1294 Mouse.
1295 </para>
1296 <para>
1297 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1298 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1299 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1300 <!-- f3 -->
1301 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1302 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1303 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1304 </para></footnote>
1305 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1306 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1307 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1308 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1309 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1310 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1311 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1312 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1313 old.
1314 </para>
1315 <para>
1316 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1317 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1318 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1319 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1320 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1321 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1322 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1323 </para>
1324 <para>
1325 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1326 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1327 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1328 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1329 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1330 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1331 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1332 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1333 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1334 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1336 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1337 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1338 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1339 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1340 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1341 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1342 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1343 </para>
1344 <para>
1345 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1346 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1347 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1348 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1349 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1350 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1351 culture around us and makes it something different.
1352 </para>
1353 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1354 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1355 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1356 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1357 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1358 <!-- f4 -->
1359 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1360 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1361 determining
1362 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1363 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1364 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1365 average
1366 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1367 Web site associated with this book, available at
1368 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1369 </para></footnote>
1370 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1371 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1372 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1373 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1374 </para>
1375 <para>
1376 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1377 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1378 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1379 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1380 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1381 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1382 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1383 </para>
1384 <para>
1385 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1386 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1387 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1388 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1389
1390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1391 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1392 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1393 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1394 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1395 content from before the Great Depression.
1396 </para>
1397 <para>
1398 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1399 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1400 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1401 universal.
1402 </para>
1403 <para>
1404 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1405 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1406 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1407 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1408 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1409 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1410 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1411 </para>
1412 <para>
1413 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1414 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1415 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1416 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1417 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1418 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1419 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1420 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1421 interestingly different way.
1422 </para>
1423 <para>
1424 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1425 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1426 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1427 </para>
1428 <para>
1429 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1430 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1431 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1432 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1434 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1435 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1436 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1437 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1438 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1439 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1440 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1441 </para>
1442 <para>
1443 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1444 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1445 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1446 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1447 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1448 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1449 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1450 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1451 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1452 </para>
1453 <para>
1454 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1455 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1456 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1457 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1458 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1459 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1460 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1461 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1462 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1463 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1464 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1465 original copyright owner's permission.
1466 </para>
1467 <para>
1468 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1469 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1470 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1471 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1472 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1473
1474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1475 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1476 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1477 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1478 <!-- f5 -->
1479 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1480 York: Perennial, 2000).
1481 </para></footnote>
1482 </para>
1483 <para>
1484 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1485 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1486 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1487 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1488 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1489 which are fifty years old."
1490 </para>
1491 <para>
1492 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1493 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1494 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1495 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1496 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1497 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1498 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1499 <!-- f6 -->
1500 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1501 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1502 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1503 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1504 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1505 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1506 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1507 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1508 </para></footnote>
1509 </para>
1510 <para>
1511 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1512 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1513 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1514 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1515 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1516 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1517 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1518 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1519 culture?
1520 </para>
1521 <para>
1522 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1523 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1524 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1525 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1526 to prosecute cases like this."
1527 </para>
1528 <para>
1529 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1530 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1531 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1532 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1534 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1535 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1536 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1537 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1538 their clients or hurt them?
1539 Let's pause for a moment.
1540 </para>
1541 <para>
1542 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1543 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1544 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1545 </para>
1546 <para>
1547 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1548 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1549 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1550 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1551 <!-- f7 -->
1552 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See
1553 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1554 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas
1555 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1556 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1557 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1558 very different.
1559 </para></footnote>
1560 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1561 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1562 property.
1563 </para>
1564 <para>
1565 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1566 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1567 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1568 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1569 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1570 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1571 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1572 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1573 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1574 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1575 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1576 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1577 the public domain.
1578 </para>
1579 <para>
1580 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1581 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1582 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1583
1584 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1585 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1586 freedom is good.
1587 </para>
1588 <para>
1589 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1590 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1591 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1592 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1593 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1594 form, whether large or small.
1595 </para>
1596 <para>
1597 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1598 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1599 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1600 particular find it hard to say why.
1601 </para>
1602 <para>
1603 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1604 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1605 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1606 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1607 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1608 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1609 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1610 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1611 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1612 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1613 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1614 films in 1997.
1615 </para>
1616 <para>
1617 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1618 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1619 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1620 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1621 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1622 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1623 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1624 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1626 </para>
1627 <para>
1628 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1629 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1630 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1631 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1632 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1633 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1634 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1635 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1636 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1637 </para>
1638 <para>
1639 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1640 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1641 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1642 </para>
1643
1644 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1645 </sect1>
1646 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1647 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1648 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1649 <para>
1650 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1651 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1652 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1653 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1654 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1655 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1656 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1657 </para>
1658 <para>
1659 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1660 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1661 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1662 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1663 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1664 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1665 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1666 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1667 amateurs.
1668 </para>
1669 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1670 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1671 </indexterm>
1672 <para>
1673 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1674 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1676 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1677 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1678 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1679 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1680 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1681 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1682 population of photographers.
1683 </para>
1684 <para>
1685 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1686 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1687 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1688 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1689 <!-- f1 -->
1690 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1691 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1692 </para>
1693 <blockquote>
1694 <para>
1695 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1696 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1697 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1698 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1699 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1700 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1701 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1702 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1703 chemicals.<footnote>
1704 <para>
1705 <!-- f2 -->
1706 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1707 1977), 53.
1708 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1709 </para></footnote>
1710 </para>
1711 </blockquote>
1712 <para>
1713 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1714 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1715 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1716 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1717 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1718 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1719 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1720 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1721 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1722 percent.<footnote><para>
1723 <!-- f3 -->
1724 Jenkins, 177.
1725 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1726 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1727 <!-- f4 -->
1728 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1729 </para></footnote>
1730 </para>
1731 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1732 <para>
1733
1734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1735 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1736 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1737 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1738 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1739 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1740 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1741 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1742 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1743 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1744 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1745 <!-- f5 -->
1746 Coe, 58.
1747 </para></footnote>
1748 </para>
1749 <para>
1750 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1751 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1752 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1753 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1754 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1755 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1756 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1757 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1758 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1759 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1760 have before.
1761 </para>
1762 <para>
1763 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1764 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1765 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1766 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1767 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1768 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1769 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1770 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1771 <!-- f6 -->
1772 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1773 </para></footnote>
1774 </para>
1775 <para>
1776 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1777 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1778 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1779 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1780 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1781 draw
1782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1783 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1784 that they thought valuable.
1785 </para>
1786 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1787 <para>
1788 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1789 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1790 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1791 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1792 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1793 <para>
1794 <!-- f7 -->
1795 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1796 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1797 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1798 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1799 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1800 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1801 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1802 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1803 </para>
1804 <para>
1805 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1806 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1807 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1808 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1809 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1810 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1811 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1812 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1813 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1814 <!-- f8 -->
1815 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1816 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1817 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1818 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1819 (1993).
1820 </para></footnote>)
1821 </para>
1822 <para>
1823 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1824 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1825 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1826 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1827 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1828 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1829 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1830 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1831 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1832 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1833 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1834 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1835 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1836 </para>
1837 <para>
1838
1839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1840 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1841 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1842 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1843 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1844 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1845 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1846 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1847 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1848 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1849 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1850 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1851 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1852 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1853 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1854 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1855 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1856 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1857 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1858 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1859 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1860 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1861 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1862 learn.
1863 </para>
1864 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1865 <para>
1866 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1867 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1868 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1869 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1870 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1871 <!-- f9 -->
1872 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1873 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1874 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1875 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1876 </para></footnote>
1877 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1878 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1879 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1880 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1881 </para>
1882 <para>
1883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1884 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1885 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1886 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1887 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1888 the way people access it."
1889 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
1890 </para>
1891 <para>
1892 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1893 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1894 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1895 about.
1896 </para>
1897 <para>
1898 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1899 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1900 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1901 <!-- f10 -->
1902 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1903 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1904 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1905 </para></footnote>
1906 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1907 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1908 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1909 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1910 (at least at first) terrible media.
1911 </para>
1912 <para>
1913 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1914 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1915 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
1916 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1917 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
1918 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1919 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1920 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1921 </para>
1922 <para>
1923 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1924 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1925 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1926 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1927 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1928 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1929 </para>
1930 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1931 <para>
1932 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1933 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1934 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1935
1936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1937 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1938 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1939 texture."<footnote>
1940 <para>
1941 <!-- f11 -->
1942 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1943 2002.
1944 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1945 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1946 </para></footnote>
1947 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1948 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1949 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1950 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1951 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1952 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1953 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1954 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1955 <!-- f12 -->
1956 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1957 November 2000, available at
1958 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1959 available at
1960 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1961 </para></footnote>
1962 </para>
1963 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1964 <para>
1965 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1966 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1967 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1968 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1969 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1970 </para>
1971 <para>
1972 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1973 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1974 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1975 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1976 </para>
1977 <blockquote>
1978 <para>
1979 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1980 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1981 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1982 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1983 being read-only.
1984 </para>
1985 </blockquote>
1986 <para>
1987 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1988 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1989 twentieth century.
1990 </para>
1991 <para>
1992 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
1993 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1994 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
1995 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
1996 literacy,
1997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1998 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1999 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2000 express."<footnote>
2001 <para>
2002 <!-- f13 -->
2003 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2004 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2005 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2006 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2007 <!-- f14 -->
2008 Ibid.
2009 </para></footnote>
2010 </para>
2011 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2012 <para>
2013 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2014 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2015 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2016 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2017 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2018 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2019 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2020 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2021 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2022 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2023 </para>
2024 <para>
2025 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2026 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2027 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2028 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2029 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2030 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2031 </para>
2032 <para>
2033 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2034 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2035 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2036 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2037 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2038 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2039 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2040 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2041 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2042 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2043 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2044 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2045 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2046 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2047 to this form of expression.
2048 </para>
2049 <para>
2050
2051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2052 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2053 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2054 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2055 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2056 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2057 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2058 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2059 our interview,
2060 </para>
2061 <blockquote>
2062 <para>
2063 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2064 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2065 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2066 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2067 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2068 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2069 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2070 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2071 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2072 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2073 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2074 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2075 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2076 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2077 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2078 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2079 about the topic. . . .
2080 </para>
2081 <para>
2082 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2083 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2084 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2085 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2086 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2087 </para>
2088 <para>
2089 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2090 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2091 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2093 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2094 had a lot of power with this language."
2095 </para>
2096 </blockquote>
2097 <para>
2098 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2099 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2100 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2101 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2102 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2103 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2104 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2105 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2106 world would be watching.
2107 </para>
2108 <para>
2109 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2110 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2111 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2112 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2113 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2114 entertainment is tragedy.
2115 </para>
2116 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2117 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2118 <para>
2119 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2120 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2121 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2122 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2123 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2124 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2125 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2126 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2127 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2128 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2129 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2130 was also the Internet.
2131 </para>
2132 <para>
2133 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2134 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2135 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2136 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2137 movie
2138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2139 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2140 with sound or text.
2141 </para>
2142 <para>
2143 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2144 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2145 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2146 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2147 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2148 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2149 spread practically instantaneously.
2150 </para>
2151 <para>
2152 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2153 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2154 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2155 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2156 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2157 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2158 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2159 </para>
2160 <para>
2161 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2162 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2163 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2164 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2165 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2166 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2167 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2168 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2169 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2170 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2171 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2172 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2173 </para>
2174 <para>
2175 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2176 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2177 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2178 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2179 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2180 people vote
2181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2182 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2183 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2184 </para>
2185 <para>
2186 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2187 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2188 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2189 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2190 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2191 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2192 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2193 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2194 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2195 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2196 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2197 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2198 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2199 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2200 <!-- f15 -->
2201 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2202 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2203 </para></footnote>
2204 </para>
2205 <para>
2206 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2207 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2208 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2209 <!-- f16 -->
2210 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2211 Political Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2212 </para></footnote>
2213 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2214 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2215 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2216 </para>
2217 <para>
2218 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2219 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2220 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2221 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2222 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2223 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2224 <!-- f17 -->
2225 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2226 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2227 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2228 little beyond what our friends say.
2229 </para>
2230 <para>
2231 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2232 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2233 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2234 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2235 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2236
2237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2238 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2239 place.
2240 </para>
2241 <para>
2242 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2243 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2244 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2245 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2246 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2247 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2248 </para>
2249 <para>
2250 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2251 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2252 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2253 is having an effect.
2254 </para>
2255 <para>
2256 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2257 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2258 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2259 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2260 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2261 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2262 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2263 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2264 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2265 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2266 <!-- f18 -->
2267 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2268 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2269 </para></footnote>
2270 </para>
2271 <para>
2272 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2273 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2274 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2275 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2276 on.
2277 </para>
2278 <para>
2279 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2280 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2281 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2282 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2283 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2284 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2285 peer-generated rankings.
2286 </para>
2287 <para>
2288 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2290 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2291 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2292 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2293 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2294 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2295 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2296 get it out of the way."
2297 </para>
2298 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2299 <para>
2300 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2301 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2302 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2303 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2304 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2305 <!-- f19 -->
2306 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2307 </para></footnote>
2308 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2309 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2310 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2311 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2312 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2313 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2314 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2315 </para>
2316 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2317 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2318 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2319 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2320 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2321 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2322 had seen.<footnote><para>
2323 <!-- f20 -->
2324 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2325 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2326 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2327 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2328 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2329 </para></footnote>
2330 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2331 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2332 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2333 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2334 </para>
2335 <para>
2336 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2337 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2338 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2339 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2340 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2341 <para>
2342 <!-- f21 -->
2343 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2344 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2345 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2346 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2347 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2348 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2349 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2350 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2351 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2352 </para></footnote>
2353 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2354
2355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2356 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2357 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2358 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2359 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2360 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2361 </para>
2362 <para>
2363 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2364 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2365 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2366 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2367 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2368 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2369 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2370 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2371 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2372 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2373 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2374 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2375 extraordinary to report.
2376 </para>
2377 <para>
2378 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2379 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2380 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2381 </para>
2382 <para>
2383 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2384 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2385 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2386 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2387 affect learning.
2388 </para>
2389 <para>
2390 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2391 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2392 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2393 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2394 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2395 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2397 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2398 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2399 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2400 the tinkering of many others.
2401 </para>
2402 <para>
2403 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2404 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2405 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2406 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2407 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2408 </para>
2409 <para>
2410 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2411 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2412 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2413 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2414 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2415 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2416 </para>
2417 <para>
2418 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2419 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2420 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2421 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2422 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2423 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2424 learn.
2425 </para>
2426 <para>
2427 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2428 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2429 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2430 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2431 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2432 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2433 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2434 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2435 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2436 </para>
2437 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2438 <para>
2439 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2440 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2441
2442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2443 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2444 kind of recognition.
2445 </para>
2446 <para>
2447 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2448 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2449 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2450 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2451 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2452 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2453 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2454 </para>
2455 <para>
2456 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2457 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2458 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2459 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2460 general.<footnote><para>
2461 <!-- f22 -->
2462 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2463 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2464 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2465 </para></footnote>
2466 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2467 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2468 </para>
2469 <para>
2470 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2471 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2472 and want to learn."
2473 </para>
2474 <para>
2475 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2476 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2477 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2478 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2479 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2480 </para>
2481 <para>
2482 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2483 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2484 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2485 the law to close down that technology.
2486 </para>
2487 <para>
2488 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2489 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2490 </para>
2491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2492 </sect1>
2493 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2494 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2495 <para>
2496 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2497 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2498 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2499 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2500 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2501 </para>
2502 <para>
2503 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2504 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2505 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2506 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2507 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2508 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2509 </para>
2510 <para>
2511 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2512 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2513 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2514 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2515 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2516 </para>
2517 <para>
2518 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2520 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2521 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2522 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2523 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2524 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2525 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2526 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2527 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2528 </para>
2529 <para>
2530 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2531 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2532 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2533 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2534 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2535 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2536 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2537 </para>
2538 <para>
2539 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2540 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2541 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2542 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2543 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2544 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2545 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2546 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2547 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2548 on-line.
2549 </para>
2550 <para>
2551 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2552 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2553 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2554 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2555 be on users' computers.
2556 </para>
2557 <para>
2558 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2559 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2560 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2561 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2563 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2564 computer.
2565 </para>
2566 <para>
2567 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2568 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2569 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2570 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2571 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2572 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2573 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2574 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2575 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2576 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2577 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2578 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2579 supposed to do.
2580 </para>
2581 <para>
2582 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2583 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2584 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2585 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2586 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2587 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2588 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2589 </para>
2590 <para>
2591 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2592 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2593 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2594 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2595 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2596 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2597 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2598 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2599 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2600 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2601 </para>
2602 <para>
2603 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2604 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2606 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2607 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2608 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2609 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2610 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2611 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2612 </para>
2613 <para>
2614 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2615 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2616 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2617 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2618 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2619 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2620 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2621 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2622 <!-- f1 -->
2623 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2624 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2625 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2626 </para></footnote>
2627 </para>
2628 <para>
2629 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2630 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2631 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2632 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2633 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2634 </para>
2635 <para>
2636 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2637 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2638 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2639 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2640 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2641 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2642 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2643 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2644 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2645 </para>
2646 <para>
2647 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2648 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2649 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2650 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2651 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2653 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2654 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2655 </para>
2656 <para>
2657 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2658 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2659 </para>
2660 <para>
2661 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2662 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2663 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2664 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2665 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2666 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2667 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2668 <!-- f2 -->
2669 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2670 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2671 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2672 </para></footnote>
2673 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2674 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2675 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2676 <!-- f3 -->
2677 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2678 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2679 </para></footnote>
2680 </para>
2681 <para>
2682 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2683 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2684 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2685 activist:
2686 </para>
2687 <blockquote>
2688 <para>
2689 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2690 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2691 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2692 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2693 </para>
2694 </blockquote>
2695 <para>
2696 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2697 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2698 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2699 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2700 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2701 </para>
2702 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2703 </sect1>
2704 <sect1 id="pirates">
2705 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2706 <para>
2707 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2708 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2709 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2710 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2711 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2712 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2713 </para>
2714 <sect2 id="film">
2715 <title>Film</title>
2716 <para>
2717 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2718 <!-- f1 -->
2719 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2720 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2721 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2722 </para></footnote>
2723 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2724 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2725 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2726 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2727 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2728 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2729 this creative property
2730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2731 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2732 </para>
2733 <para>
2734 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2735 </para>
2736 <blockquote>
2737 <para>
2738 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2739 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2740 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2741 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2742 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2743 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2744 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2745 </para>
2746 <para>
2747 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2748 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2749 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2750 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2751 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2752 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2753 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2754 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2755 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2756 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2757 <!-- f2 -->
2758 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2759 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2760 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2761 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2762 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2763 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2764 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2765 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2766 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2767 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2768 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2769 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2770 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2771 </para>
2772 </blockquote>
2773 <para>
2774 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2775 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2776 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2777 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2778 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2779 <!-- f3 -->
2780 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2781 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2782 </para></footnote>
2783 That led the independents to flee the East
2784 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2785 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2786 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2787 did just that.
2788 </para>
2789 <para>
2790 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2791 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2792 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2793
2794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2795 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2796 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2797 Edison's creative property.
2798 </para>
2799 </sect2>
2800 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2801 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2802 <para>
2803 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2804 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2805 </para>
2806 <para>
2807 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2808 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2809 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2810 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2811 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2812 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2813 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2814 right to perform it publicly.
2815 </para>
2816 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2817 <para>
2818 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2819 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2820 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2821 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2822 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2823 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2824 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2825 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2826 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2827 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2828 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2829 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2830 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2831 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2832 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2833 its composer anything.
2834 </para>
2835 <para>
2836 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2838 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2839 put it,
2840 </para>
2841 <blockquote>
2842 <para>
2843 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2844 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2845 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2846 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2847 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2848 rights.<footnote><para>
2849 <!-- f4 -->
2850 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2851 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2852 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2853 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2854 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2855 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2856 </para></footnote>
2857 </para>
2858 </blockquote>
2859 <para>
2860 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2861 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2862 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2863 <!-- f5 -->
2864 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2865 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2866 </para></footnote>
2867 and the "music publishing industry"
2868 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2869 <!-- f6 -->
2870 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2871 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2872 </para></footnote>
2873 As John Philip
2874 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2875 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2876 <!-- f7 -->
2877 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2878 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2879 </para></footnote>
2880 </para>
2881 <para>
2882 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2883 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2884 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2885 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2886 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2887 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2888 <!-- f8 -->
2889
2890 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2891 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2892 Perforating Company of New York).
2893 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2894 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2895 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2896 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2897 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2898 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2899 statute."<footnote><para>
2900 <!-- f9 -->
2901 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2902 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2903 Graphophone Company Association).
2904 </para></footnote>
2905 </para>
2906 <para>
2907 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and the
2908 recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that composers
2909 would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their music. But
2910 rather than simply granting the composer complete control over the
2911 right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2912 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once
2913 the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2914
2915 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2916 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2917 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2918 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2919 </para>
2920 <para>
2921 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2922 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2923 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2924 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2925 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2926 the fee set by the statute.
2927 </para>
2928 <para>
2929 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2930 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2931 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2932 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2933 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2934 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2935 Grisham.
2936 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2937 </para>
2938 <para>
2939 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2940 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2941 kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2942 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2943 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2944 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2945 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2946 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2947 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2948 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2949 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2950 creativity.<footnote><para>
2951 <!-- f10 -->
2952 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2953 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2954 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2955 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2956 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2957 </para></footnote>
2958 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2959 </para>
2960 <para>
2961 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2962 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2963 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2964 relates,
2965 </para>
2966 <blockquote>
2967 <para>
2968 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2970 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2971 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2972 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
2973 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
2974 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
2975 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
2976 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
2977 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
2978 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
2979 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
2980 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2981 choice.<footnote><para>
2982 <!-- f11 -->
2983 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2984 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2985 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2986 this report.</para></footnote>
2987 </para>
2988 </blockquote>
2989 <para>
2990 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2991 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2992 </para>
2993 </sect2>
2994 <sect2 id="radio">
2995 <title>Radio</title>
2996 <para>
2997 Radio was also born of piracy.
2998 </para>
2999 <para>
3000 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3001 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3002 <!-- f12 -->
3003 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3004 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3005 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3006 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3007 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3008 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3009 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3010 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3011 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 281.
3012 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3013 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3014 </para></footnote>
3015 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3016 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3017 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3018 </para>
3019 <para>
3020 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3021 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3022 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3023 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3024 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3025 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3026 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3027 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3028 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3029
3030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3031 </para>
3032 <para>
3033 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3034 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3035 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3036 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3037 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3038 of playing the song.
3039 </para>
3040 <para>
3041 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3042 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3043 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3044 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3045 </para>
3046 <para>
3047 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3048 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3049 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3050 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3051 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3052 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3053 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3054 </para>
3055 <para>
3056 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3057 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3058 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3059 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3060 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3061 to take something for nothing.
3062 </para>
3063 </sect2>
3064 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3065 <title>Cable TV</title>
3066 <para>
3067
3068 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3069 </para>
3070 <para>
3071 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3072 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3073 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3074 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3076 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3077 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3078 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3079 give away.
3080 </para>
3081 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3082 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3083 <para>
3084 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3085 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3086 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3087 <!-- f13 -->
3088 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3089 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3090 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3091 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3092 Commission).
3093 </para></footnote>
3094 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3095 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3096 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3097 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3098 <!-- f14 -->
3099 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3100 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3101 </para></footnote>
3102 As another broadcaster put it,
3103 </para>
3104 <blockquote>
3105 <para>
3106 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3107 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3108 paid for.<footnote><para>
3109 <!-- f15 -->
3110 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3111 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3112 </para></footnote>
3113 </para>
3114 </blockquote>
3115 <para>
3116 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3117 </para>
3118 <blockquote>
3119 <para>
3120 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3121 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3122 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3123 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3124 <!-- f16 -->
3125 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3126 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3127 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3128 </para></footnote>
3129 </para>
3130 </blockquote>
3131 <para>
3132 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3133 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3134 compensation."<footnote><para>
3135 <!-- f17 -->
3136 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3137 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3138 </para></footnote>
3139 </para>
3140 <para>
3141 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3142 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3143 </para>
3144 <blockquote>
3145 <para>
3146 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3147 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3148 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3149 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3150
3151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3152 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3153 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3154 <!-- f18 -->
3155 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3156 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3157 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3158 </para></footnote>
3159 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3160 </para>
3161 </blockquote>
3162 <para>
3163 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3164 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3165 </para>
3166 <para>
3167 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3168 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3169 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3170 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3171 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3172 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3173 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3174 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3175 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3176 created by broadcasters' content.
3177 </para>
3178 <para>
3179 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3180 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3181 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3182 today<footnote><para>
3183 <!-- f19 -->
3184 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3185 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3186 Information, available at
3187 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3188 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3189 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3190 </para></footnote>
3191 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3192 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3193 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3194 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3195 generation&mdash;until now.
3196 </para>
3197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3198 </sect2>
3199 </sect1>
3200 <sect1 id="piracy">
3201 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3202 <para>
3203 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3204 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3205 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3206 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3207 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3208 should stop it.
3209 </para>
3210 <para>
3211 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3212 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3213 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3214 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3215 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3216 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3217 has so often done in the past.
3218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3219 </para>
3220 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3221 <title>Piracy I</title>
3222 <para>
3223 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3224 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3225 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3226 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3227 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3228 <!-- f1 -->
3229 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3230 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3231
3232 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3233 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3234 </para></footnote>
3235 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3236 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3237 worldwide to piracy.
3238 </para>
3239 <para>
3240 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3241 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3242 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3243 This piracy is wrong.
3244 </para>
3245 <para>
3246 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3247 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3248 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3249 foreign
3250 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3251 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3252 developing
3253 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3254 existence, treated as right.
3255 </para>
3256 <para>
3257 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3258 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3259 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3260 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3261 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3262 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3263 violate
3264 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3265 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3266 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3267 </para>
3268 <para>
3269 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3270 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3272 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3273 pirate
3274 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3275 childhood.
3276 </para>
3277 <para>
3278 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3279 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3280 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3281 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3282 <!-- f2 -->
3283 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3284 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3285 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3286 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3287 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3288 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3289 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3290 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3291 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3292 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3293 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3294 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3295 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3296 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3297 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3298 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3299 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3300 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3301 is wrong.
3302 </para>
3303 <para>
3304 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3305 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3306 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3307 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3308 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3309 <!-- f3 -->
3310 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3311 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3312 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the
3313 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3314 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3315 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3316 pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3317 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3318 </para></footnote>
3319 </para>
3320 <para>
3321 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3322 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3323 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3324 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3325 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3326 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3327 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3328 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3329 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3330 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3331 piracy of the tangible.
3332 </para>
3333 <para>
3334 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3335 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3336 property
3337 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3338 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3339 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3340 licenses
3341 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3342 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3343 copyrighted
3344 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3345
3346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3347 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3348 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3349 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3350 technology
3351 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3352 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3353 </para>
3354 <para>
3355 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3356 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3357 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3358 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3359 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3360 nation
3361 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3362 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3363 benefit
3364 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3365 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3366 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3367 Microsoft.
3368 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3369 </para>
3370 <para>
3371 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3372 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3373 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3374 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3375 become
3376 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3377 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3378 </para>
3379 <para>
3380 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3381 alcoholic
3382 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3383 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3384 ordinarily
3385 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3386 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3387 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3388 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3389 giving
3390 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3391 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3392 copyright
3393 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3394 wrong.
3395 </para>
3396 <para>
3397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3398 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3399 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3400 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3401 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3402 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3403 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3404 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3405 is flat out wrong.
3406 </para>
3407 <para>
3408 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3409 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3410 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3411 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3412 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3413 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3414 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3415 </para>
3416 <para>
3417 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3418 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3419 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3420 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3421 </para>
3422 <para>
3423 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3424 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3425 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3426 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3427 </para>
3428 <para>
3429 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3430 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3431 sharing
3432 to survive.
3433 </para>
3434 </sect2>
3435 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3436 <title>Piracy II</title>
3437 <para>
3438 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3439 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3440 <!-- f4 -->
3441 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3442 </para></footnote>
3443 This means we must determine whether
3444 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3446 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3447 author of his profit.
3448 </para>
3449 <para>
3450 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3451 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3452 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3453 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3454 <!-- f5 -->
3455 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3456 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3457 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3458 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3459 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3460 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3461 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3462 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3463 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3464 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3465 put together components that had been developed independently.
3466 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3467 </para>
3468 <para>
3469 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3470 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3471 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3472 system.<footnote><para>
3473 <!-- f6 -->
3474 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3475 Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3476 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3477 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3478 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3479 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3480 </para></footnote>
3481 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3482 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3483 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3484 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3485 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3486 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3487 or your 20,000 best friends.
3488 </para>
3489 <para>
3490 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3491 Americans
3492 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3493 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3494 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3495 <!-- f7 -->
3496 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3497 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3498 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3499 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3500 </para></footnote>
3501 A survey by the NPD
3502 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3503 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3504 <!-- f8 -->
3505 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3506 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3507 </para></footnote>
3508 The vast
3509 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3510 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3511 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3512 enjoy
3513 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3514 </para>
3515 <para>
3516 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3517 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3518 infringement,
3519 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3520 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3521 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3522 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3523 </para>
3524 <para>
3525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3526 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3527 different kinds into four types.
3528 </para>
3529 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3530 <listitem><para>
3531 <!-- A. -->
3532 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3533 purchasing
3534 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3535 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3536 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3537 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3538 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3539 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3540 instead
3541 of purchasing.
3542 </para></listitem>
3543 <listitem><para>
3544 <!-- B. -->
3545 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3546 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3547 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3548 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3549 succeed.
3550 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3551 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3552 recommendations
3553 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3554 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3555 </para></listitem>
3556 <listitem><para>
3557 <!-- C. -->
3558 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3559 copyrighted
3560 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3561 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3562 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3563 rewarding
3564 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3565 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3566 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3567 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3568 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3569 available.)
3570 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3571 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3572 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3573 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3574 a local collector.
3575 </para></listitem>
3576 <listitem><para>
3577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3578 <!-- D. -->
3579 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3580 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3581 wants to give away.
3582 </para></listitem>
3583 </orderedlist>
3584 <para>
3585 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3586 </para>
3587 <para>
3588 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3589 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3590 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3591 harmful.<footnote><para>
3592 <!-- f9 -->
3593 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3594 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3595 </para></footnote>
3596 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3597 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3598 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3599 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3600 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3601 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3602 </para>
3603 <para>
3604 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3605 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3606 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3607 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3608 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3609 "devastating" the industry.
3610 </para>
3611 <para>
3612 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3613 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3614 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3615 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3616 &amp; Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3617 technology, the labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3618 <!-- f10 -->
3619 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the
3620 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report
3621 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3622 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3623 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3624 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3625 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3626 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3627 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3628 Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law,
3629 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3630 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3631 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3632 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3633 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3634 regulating technology was the answer.
3635 </para>
3636 <para>
3637 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3638 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3639 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3640 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3642 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3643 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3644 <!-- f11 -->
3645 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3646 </para></footnote>
3647 </para>
3648 <para>
3649 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3650 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3651 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3652 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3653 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3654 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3655 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3656 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3657 </para>
3658 <para>
3659 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3660 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3661 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3662 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3663 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3664 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3665 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3666 </para>
3667 <para>
3668 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3669 because
3670 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3671 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3672 </para>
3673 <para>
3674 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3675 percent,
3676 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3677 <!-- f12 -->
3678 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3679 available at
3680 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3681 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3682 25 June 2003, available at
3683 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3684 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3685 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3686 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3687 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3688 music
3689 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3690 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3691 </para></footnote>
3692 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3693 Internet
3694 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3695 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3696 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3697 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3698 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3699 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3700 <!-- f13 -->
3701 <para>
3702 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3703 February 2003, available at
3704 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3705 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3706 </para>
3707 </footnote>
3708 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3709 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3710 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3711 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3712 <!-- f14 -->
3713 Ibid.
3714 </para></footnote>
3715 </para>
3716 <para>
3717
3718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3719 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3720 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3721 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3722 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3723 although
3724 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3725 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3726 </para>
3727 <para>
3728 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3729 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3730 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3731 between
3732 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3733 numbers
3734 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3735 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3736 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3737 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3738 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3739 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3740 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3741 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3742 between
3743 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3744 </para>
3745 <para>
3746 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3747 assume,
3748 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3749 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3750 costs?
3751 </para>
3752 <para>
3753 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3754 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3755 available.
3756 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3757 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3758 <!-- f15 -->
3759 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3760 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3761 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3762 Committee
3763 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3764 statement
3765 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3766 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3767 </para></footnote>
3768 And while it's
3769 conceivable
3770 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3771 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3772 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3773 distributor
3774 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3775 make it available.
3776 </para>
3777 <para>
3778 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3780 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3781 thousands
3782 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3783 <!-- f16 -->
3784 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3785 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3786 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3787 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3788 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3789 National
3790 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3791 Results,"
3792 available at
3793 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3794 </para></footnote>
3795 These
3796 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3797 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3798 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3799 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3800 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3801 companies
3802 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3803 owner for the content they sell.
3804 </para>
3805 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3806 <para>
3807 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3808 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3809 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3810 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3811 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3812 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3813 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3814 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3815 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3816 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3817 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3818 </para>
3819 <para>
3820 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3821 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3822 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3823 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3824 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3825 shut as well?
3826 </para>
3827 <para>
3828 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3829 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3830 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3831 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3832 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3833 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3834
3835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3836 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3837 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3838 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3839 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3840 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3841 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3842 great book!)
3843 </para>
3844 <para>
3845 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3846 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3847 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3848 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3849 </para>
3850 <para>
3851 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3852 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3853 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3854 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3855 unavailable?"
3856 </para>
3857 <para>
3858 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3859 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3860 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3861 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3862 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3863 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3864 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3865 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3866 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3867 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3868 found only with time.
3869 </para>
3870 <para>
3871 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3872 just what you call type A sharing?"
3873 </para>
3874 <para>
3875 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3876 effect
3877 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3878 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3879 Napster
3880 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3881 developed
3882 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3884 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3885 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3886 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3887 <!-- f17 -->
3888 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3889 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3890 MHP, available at
3891 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3892 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3893 Fanning's
3894 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3895 </para></footnote>
3896 </para>
3897 <para>
3898 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3899 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3900 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3901 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3902 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3903 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3904 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3905 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3906 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3907 </para>
3908 <para>
3909 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3910 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3911 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3912 content
3913 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3914 technology.
3915 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3916 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3917 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3918 </para>
3919 <para>
3920 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3921 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3922 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3923 composers,
3924 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3925 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3926 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3927 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3928 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3929 broadcast),
3930 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3931 </para>
3932 <para>
3933 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3934 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3935 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3936 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3937 companies
3938 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3939 </para>
3940 <para>
3941
3942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3943 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3944 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3945 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3946 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3947 Second,
3948 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3949 content
3950 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3951 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3952 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3953 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3954 Congress
3955 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3956 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3957 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3958 control
3959 over the future (cable).
3960 </para>
3961 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3962 <para>
3963 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3964 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3965 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3966 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3967 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3968 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3969 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3970 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3971 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3972 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3973 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3974 </para>
3975 <para>
3976 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3977 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3978 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3979 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3980 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3981 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3982 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3983 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3985 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3986 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
3987 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
3988 for the architecture it chose.
3989 </para>
3990 <para>
3991 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
3992 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
3993 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
3994 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
3995 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
3996 copyright."<footnote><para>
3997 <!-- f18 -->
3998 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
3999 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4000 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4001 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4002 </para></footnote>
4003 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4004 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4005 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4006 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4007 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4008 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4009 <!-- f19 -->
4010 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4011 </para></footnote>
4012 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4013 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4014 <!-- f20 -->
4015 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4016 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4017 </para></footnote>
4018 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4019 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4020 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4021 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4022 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4023 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4024 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4025 <!-- f21 -->
4026 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4027 of Jack Valenti).
4028 </para></footnote>
4029 </para>
4030 <para>
4031 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4032 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4033 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4034 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4035 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4036 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4037 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4038 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4039 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4040 technology.<footnote><para>
4041 <!-- f22 -->
4042 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4043 1981).
4044 </para></footnote>
4045 </para>
4046 <para>
4047 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4048
4049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4050 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4051 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4052 Court wrote,
4053 </para>
4054 <blockquote>
4055 <para>
4056 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4057 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4058 market
4059 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4060 authority
4061 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4062 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4063 implicated
4064 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4065 <!-- f23 -->
4066 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4067 </para></footnote>
4068 </para>
4069 </blockquote>
4070 <para>
4071 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4072 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4073 Congress
4074 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4075 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4076 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4077 </para>
4078
4079 <table id="t1">
4080 <title>Table</title>
4081 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4082 <thead>
4083 <row>
4084 <entry>CASE</entry>
4085 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4086 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4087 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4088 </row>
4089 </thead>
4090 <tbody>
4091 <row>
4092 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4093 <entry>Composers</entry>
4094 <entry>No protection</entry>
4095 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4096 </row>
4097 <row>
4098 <entry>Radio</entry>
4099 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4100 <entry>N/A</entry>
4101 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4102 </row>
4103 <row>
4104 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4105 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4106 <entry>No protection</entry>
4107 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4108 </row>
4109 <row>
4110 <entry>VCR</entry>
4111 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4112 <entry>No protection</entry>
4113 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4114 </row>
4115 </tbody>
4116 </tgroup>
4117 </table>
4118
4119 <para>
4120 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4121 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4122 <!-- f24 -->
4123 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4124 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4125 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4126 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4127 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4128 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4129 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4130 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4131 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4132 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4133 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4134 </para></footnote>
4135 In each case, throughout our history,
4136 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4137 work.
4138 </para>
4139 <para>
4140 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4141 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4142 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4143 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4144 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4145 legitimacy
4146 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4147 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4148 the interests at stake.
4149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4150 </para>
4151 <para>
4152 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4153 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4154 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4155 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4156 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4157 regulated?
4158 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4159 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4160 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4161 permission to record a song?
4162 </para>
4163 <para>
4164 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4165 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4166 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4167 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4168 <!-- f25 -->
4169 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4170 (1984).
4171 </para></footnote>
4172 Instead, the particular uses that the
4173 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4174 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4175 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4176 technology
4177 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4178 the distribution of content.
4179 </para>
4180 <para>
4181 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4182 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4183 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4184 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4185 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4186 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4187 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4188 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4189 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4190 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4191 protection
4192 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4193 continue.
4194 </para>
4195 <para>
4196
4197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4198 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4199 superior
4200 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4201 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4202 network.
4203 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4204 efficient.
4205 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4206 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4207 <!-- f26 -->
4208 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4209 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4210 </para></footnote>
4211 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4212 warriors
4213 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4214 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4215 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4216 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4217 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4218 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4219 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4220 </para>
4221 <para>
4222 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4223 just as any other property is protected."
4224 </para>
4225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4226 </sect2>
4227 </sect1>
4228 </chapter>
4229 <chapter id="c-property">
4230 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4231 <para>
4232
4233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4234 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4235 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4236 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4237 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4238 the price she can get.
4239 </para>
4240 <para>
4241 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4242 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4243 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4244 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4245 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4246 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4247 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4248 going
4249 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4250 thing I am taking then?
4251 </para>
4252 <para>
4253 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4254 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4256 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4257 narrow
4258 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4259 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4260 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4261 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4262 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4263 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4264 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4265 <!-- f1 -->
4266 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4267 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4268 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4269 </para></footnote>
4270 </para>
4271 <para>
4272 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4273 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4274 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4275 expression
4276 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4277 property.
4278 </para>
4279 <para>
4280 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4281 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4282 turning
4283 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4284 "property"
4285 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4286 <!-- f2 -->
4287 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4288 intangible.
4289 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4290 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4291 physical
4292 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4293 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4294 Property?
4295 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4296 373, 429 n. 241.
4297 </para></footnote>
4298 </para>
4299 <para>
4300 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4301 preceding
4302 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4303 material
4304 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4305 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4306 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4307 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4308 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4309 us draw.
4310 </para>
4311
4312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4313 <sect1 id="founders">
4314 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4315 <para>
4316 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4317 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4318 Shakespeare
4319 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4320 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4321 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4322 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4323 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4324 adaptation
4325 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4326 </para>
4327 <para>
4328 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4329 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4330 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4331 <!-- f1 -->
4332 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4333 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4334 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4335 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4336 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4337 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4338 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4339 </para></footnote>
4340 Tonson was the
4341 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4342 <!-- f2 -->
4343 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4344 Vanderbilt
4345 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4346 </para></footnote>
4347 who
4348 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4349 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4350 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4352 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4353 copyright.
4354 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4355 produce
4356 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4357 </para>
4358 <para>
4359 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4360 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4361 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4362 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4363 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4364 renewable
4365 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4366 published
4367 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4368 <!-- f3 -->
4369 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4370 "copyright
4371 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4372 </para></footnote>
4373 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4374 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4375 </para>
4376 <para>
4377 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4378 "copyright"
4379 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4380 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4381 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4382 expired
4383 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4384 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4385 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4386 publishers,
4387 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4388 </para>
4389 <para>
4390 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4391 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4392 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4393 govern
4394 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4395 "positive
4396 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4397 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4398 legislature,
4399 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4400 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4401 expired
4402 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4403 independent
4404 of any positive law.
4405 </para>
4406 <para>
4407 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4408 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4409 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4410 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4411
4412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4413 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4414 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4415 ultimately
4416 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4417 </para>
4418 <para>
4419 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4420 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4421 however,
4422 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4423 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4424 "expired,"
4425 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4426 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4427 </para>
4428 <para>
4429 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4430 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4431 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4432 </para>
4433 <para>
4434 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4435 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4436 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4437 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4438 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4439 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4440 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4441 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4442 reason
4443 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4444 </para>
4445 <para>
4446 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4447 special
4448 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4449 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4450 "booksellers."
4451 </para>
4452 <para>
4453 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4454 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4455 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4456 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4457 others
4458 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4459 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4460 beyond
4461 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4463 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4464 restrictions
4465 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4466 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4467 perform, and so on.
4468 </para>
4469 <para>
4470 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4471 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4472 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4473 permission
4474 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4475 anything,
4476 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4477 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4478 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4479 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4480 </para>
4481 <para>
4482 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4483 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4484 especially
4485 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4486 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4487 monopolies&mdash;especially
4488 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4489 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4490 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4491 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4492 Monopolies,
4493 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4494 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4495 publishing.
4496 </para>
4497 <para>
4498 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4499 naturally
4500 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4501 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4502 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4503 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4504 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4505 specialinterest
4506 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4507 </para>
4508 <para>
4509 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4510 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4511 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4512 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4514 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4515 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4516 themselves
4517 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4518 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4519 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4520 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4521 <!-- f4 -->
4522 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4523 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4524 </para></footnote>
4525 </para>
4526 <para>
4527 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4528 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4529 Enlightenment
4530 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4531 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4532 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4533 that idea.
4534 </para>
4535 <para>
4536 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4537 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4538 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4539 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4540 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4541 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4542 compromise
4543 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4544 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4545 construction and spread of culture.
4546 </para>
4547 <para>
4548 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4549 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4550 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4551 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4552 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4553 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4554 they said; they needed more time.
4555 </para>
4556 <para>
4557 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4558 words that echo today,
4559 </para>
4560 <blockquote>
4561 <para>
4562 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4563 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4565 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4566 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4567 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4568 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4569 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4570 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4571 <!-- f5 -->
4572 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4573 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4574 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4575 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4576 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4577 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4578 al., 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4579 </para></footnote>
4580 </para>
4581 </blockquote>
4582 <para>
4583 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4584 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4585 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4586 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4587 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4588 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4589 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4590 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4591 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4592 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4593 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4594 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4595 way to protect authors.
4596 </para>
4597 <para>
4598 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4599 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4600 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4601 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4602 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4603 <!-- f6 -->
4604 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4605 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4606 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4607 </para></footnote>
4608 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4609 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4610 </para>
4611 <para>
4612 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4613 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4614 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4615 <!-- f7 -->
4616 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4617 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4618 </para></footnote>
4619 </para>
4620 <para>
4621 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4622 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4623 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4624 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4625 <!-- f8 -->
4626 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4627 1993), 92.
4628 </para></footnote>
4629 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4630 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4631 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4632 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4633 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4634 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4635 <!-- f9 -->
4636 Ibid., 93.
4637 </para></footnote>
4638 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4639 </para>
4640 <para>
4641 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4642 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4643 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4644 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4645 Property."<footnote><para>
4646 <!-- f10 -->
4647 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4648 Borwell).
4649 </para></footnote>
4650 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4651 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4652 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4653 </para>
4654 <para>
4655 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4656 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4657 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4658 </para>
4659 <para>
4660 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4661 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4662 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4663 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4664 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4665 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4666 <!-- f11 -->
4667 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4668 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29
4669 (1983): 1152.
4670 </para></footnote>
4671 </para>
4672 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4673 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4674 </indexterm>
4675 <para>
4676 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4677 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4678 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4679 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4680 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4681 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4682 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4683 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4684 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4685 </para>
4686 <para>
4687 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4688 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4689 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4690 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4691 with in 1710: How best to limit
4692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4693 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4694 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4695 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4696 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4697 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4698 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4699 </para>
4700 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4701 <para>
4702 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4703 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4704 </para>
4705 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4706 <para>
4707 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4708 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4709 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4710 <!-- f12 -->
4711 Ibid., 1156.
4712 </para></footnote>
4713 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4714 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4715 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4716 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4717 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4718 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4719 </para>
4720 <para>
4721 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4722 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4723 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4724 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4725 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4726 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4727 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4728 statute were no longer protected.
4729 </para>
4730 <para>
4731 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4732 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4733 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4734 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4735 House of Lords generally voted.
4736 </para>
4737 <para>
4738 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4739 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4741 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4742 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4743 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4744 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4745 passed into the public domain.
4746 </para>
4747 <para>
4748 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4749 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4750 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4751 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4752 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4753 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4754 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4755 legal restraint.
4756 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4757 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4758 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4759 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4760 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4761 </para>
4762 <para>
4763 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4764 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4765 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4766 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4767 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4768 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4769 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4770 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4771 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4772 <!-- f13 -->
4773 Rose, 97.
4774 </para></footnote>
4775 </para>
4776 <para>
4777 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4778 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4779 reported:
4780 </para>
4781 <blockquote>
4782 <para>
4783 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4784 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4785 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4786 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4787 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4788 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4789 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4790 successors.<footnote><para>
4791 <!-- f14 -->
4792 Ibid.
4793 </para></footnote>
4794 </para>
4795 </blockquote>
4796 <para>
4797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4798 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4799 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4800 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4801 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4802 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4803 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4804 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4805 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4806 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4807 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4808 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4809 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4810 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4811 readers chose to let it develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought
4812 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4813 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4814 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4815 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4816 </para>
4817 <para>
4818 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4819 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4820 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4821 protected.
4822 </para>
4823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4824 </sect1>
4825 <sect1 id="recorders">
4826 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4827 <para>
4828 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4829 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4830 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4831 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4832 He was their god.)
4833 </para>
4834 <para>
4835 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4836 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4837 today.
4838 </para>
4839 <para>
4840 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4841 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4842 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4843 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4844 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4845 stage.
4846 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4847 </para>
4848 <para>
4849 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4850 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4851 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4852 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4854 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4855 about the scene.
4856 </para>
4857 <para>
4858 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4859 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4860 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4861 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4862 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4863 </para>
4864 <para>
4865 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4866 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4867 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4868 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4869 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4870 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4871 </para>
4872 <para>
4873 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4874 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4875 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4876 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4877 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4878 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4879 </para>
4880 <para>
4881 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4882 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4883 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4884 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4885 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4886 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4887 </para>
4888 <para>
4889 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4890 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4891 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4892 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4893 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4894 confirm what he had been told.
4895 </para>
4896 <para>
4897 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4898 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4899 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4900 about
4901
4902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4903 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4904 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4905 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4906 the money."
4907 </para>
4908 <para>
4909 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4910 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4911 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4912 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4913 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4914 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4915 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4916 </para>
4917 <para>
4918 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4919 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4920 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4921 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4922 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4923 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4924 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4925 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4926 says the owner gets to control.
4927 </para>
4928 <para>
4929 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4930 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4931 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4932 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4933 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4934 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4935 by the law.
4936 </para>
4937 <para>
4938 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4939 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4940 <!-- f1 -->
4941 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4942 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4943 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4944 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4945 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4946 </para></footnote>
4947 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4948 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use does
4949 not require the permission of anyone.
4950 </para>
4951 <para>
4952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4953 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4954 </para>
4955 <blockquote>
4956 <para>
4957 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4958 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4959 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4960 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4961 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4962 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4963 </para>
4964 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4965 <listitem><para>
4966 <!-- 1. -->
4967 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4968 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4969 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4970 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4971 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4972 </para></listitem>
4973 <listitem><para>
4974 <!-- 2. -->
4975 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4976 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4977 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
4978 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
4979 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4980 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
4981 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4982 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4983 principle.
4984 </para></listitem>
4985 <listitem><para>
4986 <!-- 3. -->
4987 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4988 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4989 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4990 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4991 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4992 pockets, me or them.
4993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4994 </para></listitem>
4995 <listitem><para>
4996 <!-- 4. -->
4997 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
4998 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
4999 money.
5000 </para></listitem>
5001 </orderedlist>
5002 </blockquote>
5003 <para>
5004 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5005 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5006 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5007 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5008 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5009 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5010 </para>
5011 <para>
5012 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5013 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5014 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5015 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5016 not.
5017 </para>
5018 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5019 </sect1>
5020 <sect1 id="transformers">
5021 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5022 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5023 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5024 <para>
5025 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5026 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5027 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5028 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5029 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5030 </para>
5031 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5032 <para>
5033 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5034 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5035 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5036 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5037 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5038 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5039 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5040 important to his career.
5041 </para>
5042 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5043 <para>
5044 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5045 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5046 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5047 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5048 </para>
5049 <para>
5050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5051 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5052 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5053 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5054 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5055 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5056 </para>
5057 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5058 <para>
5059 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5060 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5061 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5062 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5063 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5064 actor's career."
5065 </para>
5066 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5067 <para>
5068 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5069 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5070 </para>
5071 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5072 <para>
5073 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5074 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5075 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5076 for it."<footnote>
5077 <para>
5078 <!-- f1 -->
5079 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5080 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5081 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5082 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5083 <indexterm>
5084 <primary>artists</primary>
5085 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5086 </indexterm>
5087 </para></footnote>
5088 </para>
5089 <para>
5090 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5091 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5092 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5093 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5094 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5095 </para>
5096 <para>
5097 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5098 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5099 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5100 </para>
5101 <blockquote>
5102 <para>
5103 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5104 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5105 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5106 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5107 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5108 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5109 </para>
5110 <para>
5111 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5112 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5113 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5114 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5115 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5116 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5117 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5118 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5119 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5120 started calling people.
5121 </para>
5122 </blockquote>
5123 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5124 <para>
5125 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5126 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5127 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5128 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5129 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5130 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5131 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5132 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5133 career.
5134 </para>
5135 <para>
5136 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5137 were totally in the clear."
5138 </para>
5139 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5140 <para>
5141 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5142 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5143 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5144 </para>
5145 <blockquote>
5146 <para>
5147 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5148 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5149 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5150 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5151 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5152 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5153 systematically and cleared the rights.
5154 </para>
5155 </blockquote>
5156 <para>
5157
5158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5159 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5160 loved it, and it sold very well.
5161 </para>
5162 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5163 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5164 <para>
5165 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5166 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5167 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5168 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5169 at all."<footnote><para>
5170 <!-- f2 -->
5171 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5172 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5173 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5174 </para></footnote>
5175 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5176 has to be made?
5177 </para>
5178 <para>
5179 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5180 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5181 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5182 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5183 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5184 </para>
5185 <blockquote>
5186 <para>
5187 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5188 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5189 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5190 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5191 compensated for that.
5192 </para>
5193 </blockquote>
5194 <para>
5195 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5196 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5197 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5198 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5199 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5200 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5201 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5202 </para>
5203 <blockquote>
5204 <para>
5205 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5206 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5207 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5208 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5210 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5211 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5212 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5213 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5214 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5215 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5216 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5217 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5218 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5219 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5220 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5221 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5222 </para>
5223 </blockquote>
5224 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5225 <para>
5226 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5227 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5228 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5229 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5230 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5231 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5232 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5233 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5234 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5235 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5236 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5237 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5238 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5239 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5240 "Does this still make sense?"
5241 </para>
5242 <para>
5243 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5244 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5245 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5246 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5247
5248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5249 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5250 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5251 </para>
5252 <para>
5253 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5254 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5255 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5256 judges loved every minute of it.
5257 </para>
5258 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5259 <para>
5260 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5261 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5262 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5263 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5264 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5265 were just violated in this room?"
5266 </para>
5267 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5268 <para>
5269 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5270 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5271 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5272 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5273 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5274 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5275 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5276 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5277 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5278 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5279 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5280 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5281 couldn't easily do them legally.
5282 </para>
5283 <para>
5284 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5285 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5286 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5287 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5288 planted in your presentation.
5289 </para>
5290 <para>
5291 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5293 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5294 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5295 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5296 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5297 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5298 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5299 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5300 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5301 </para>
5302 <para>
5303 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5304 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5305 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5306 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5307 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5308 </para>
5309 <para>
5310 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5311 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5312 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5313 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5314 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5315 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5316 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5317 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5318 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5319 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5320 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5321 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5322 registers the work.
5323 </para>
5324 <para>
5325 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5326 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5327 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5328 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5329 </para>
5330 <para>
5331 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5332 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5334 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5335 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5336 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5337 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5338 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5339 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5340 entertainment."
5341 </para>
5342 <para>
5343 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5344 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5345 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5346 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5347 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5348 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5349 new audiences, it is Mike."
5350 </para>
5351 <para>
5352 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5353 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5354 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5355 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5356 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5357 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5358 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5359 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5360 </para>
5361 <para>
5362 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5363 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5364 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5365 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5366 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5367 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5368 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5369 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5370 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5371 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5372 curse, reserved for the few.
5373 </para>
5374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5375 </sect1>
5376 <sect1 id="collectors">
5377 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5378 <para>
5379 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5380 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5381 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5382 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5383 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5384 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5385 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5386 </para>
5387 <para>
5388 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5389 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5390 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5391 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5392 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5393 well as when those pages changed.
5394 </para>
5395 <para>
5396 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5397 appreciated. In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5398 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5399 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5400 reports.
5401 </para>
5402 <para>
5403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5404 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5405 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5406 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5407 </para>
5408 <para>
5409 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5410 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5411 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5412 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5413 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5414 </para>
5415 <para>
5416 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5417 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5418 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5419 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5420 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5421 <!-- f1 -->
5422 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5423 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5424 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5425 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5426 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5427 </para></footnote>
5428 </para>
5429 <para>
5430 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5431 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5432 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5433 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5434 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5435 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5436 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5437 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5438 truth.
5439 </para>
5440 <para>
5441 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5442 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5443 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5444 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5445 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5446 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5447 presumes this knowedge.
5448 </para>
5449 <para>
5450 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5451 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5452 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5453 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5455 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5456 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5457 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5458 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5459 </para>
5460 <para>
5461 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5462 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5463 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5464 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5465 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5466 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5467 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5468 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5469 </para>
5470 <para>
5471 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5472 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5473 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5474 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5475 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5476 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5477 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5478 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5479 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5480 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5481 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5482 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5483 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5484 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5485 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5486 </para>
5487 <blockquote>
5488 <para>
5489 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5490 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5491 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5492 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5493 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5494
5495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5496 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5497 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5498 </para>
5499 </blockquote>
5500 <para>
5501 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5502 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5503 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5504 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5505 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5506 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5507 </para>
5508 <para>
5509 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5510 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5511 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5512 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5513 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5514 work.
5515 </para>
5516 <para>
5517 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5518 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5519 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5520 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5521 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5522 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5523 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5524 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5525 <!-- f2 -->
5526 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5527 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5528 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5529 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5530 Co., 1992), 36.
5531 </para></footnote>
5532 </para>
5533 <para>
5534 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5535 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5536 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5537 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5538 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5539 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5540 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5541 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5542 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5543 </para>
5544 <para>
5545 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5547 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5548 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5549 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5550 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5551 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5552 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5553 events of that day.
5554 </para>
5555 <para>
5556 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5557 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5558 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5559 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5560 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5561 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5562 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5563 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5564 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5565 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5566 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5567 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5568 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5569 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5570 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5571 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5572 </para>
5573 <para>
5574 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5575 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5576 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5577 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5578 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5579 to find them.
5580 </para>
5581 <para>
5582 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5583 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5584 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5585 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5586 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5587 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5588 </para>
5589 <para>
5590 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5591 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5592 life, if the
5593
5594 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5595 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5596 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5597 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5598 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5599 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5600 </para>
5601 <para>
5602 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5603 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5604 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5605 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5606 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5607 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5608 longer sold.
5609 </para>
5610 <para>
5611 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5612 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5613 <!-- f3 -->
5614 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5615 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5616 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5617 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5618 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5619 College Law Review 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5620 </para></footnote>). After
5621 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5622 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5623 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5624 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5625 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5626 </para>
5627 <para>
5628 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5629 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5630 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5631 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5632 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5633 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5634 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5635 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5636 disappears.
5637 </para>
5638 <para>
5639 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5640 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5641 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5642 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5643 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5644 generally, the
5645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5646 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5647 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5648 little practical effect.
5649 </para>
5650 <para>
5651 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5652 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5653 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5654 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5655 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5656 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5657 </para>
5658 <para>
5659 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5660 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5661 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5662 Kahle describes,
5663 </para>
5664 <blockquote>
5665 <para>
5666 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5667 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5668 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5669 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5670 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5671 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5672 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5673 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5674 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5675 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5676 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5677 </para>
5678 </blockquote>
5679 <para>
5680 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5681 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5682 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5683 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5684 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5685 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5686 it;
5687 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5688 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5689 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5690 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5691 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5692 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5693 </para>
5694 <para>
5695 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5696 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5697 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5698 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5699 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5700 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5701 </para>
5702 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5703 </sect1>
5704 <sect1 id="property-i">
5705 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5706 <para>
5707 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5708 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5709 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5710 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5711 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5712 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5713 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5714 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5715 </para>
5716 <para>
5717 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5718 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5719 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5720 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5721 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5722 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5723 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5724 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5725 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5726 Warner Brothers.
5727 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5728 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5729 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5730 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5731 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5732 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5733 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5734 </para>
5735 <para>
5736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5737 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5738 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5739 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5740 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5741 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5742 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5743 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5744 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5745 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5746 Washingtonian way.
5747 </para>
5748 <para>
5749 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5750 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5751 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5752 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5753 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5754 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5755 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5756 </para>
5757 <para>
5758 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5759 perfectly:
5760 </para>
5761 <blockquote>
5762 <para>
5763 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5764 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5765 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5766 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5767 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5768 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5769 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5770 debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5771 <!-- f1 -->
5772 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5773 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5774 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5775 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5776 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5777 Valenti).
5778 </para></footnote>
5779 </para>
5780 </blockquote>
5781 <para>
5782 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5783 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5784 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5785 this:
5786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5787 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5788 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5789 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5790 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5791 </para>
5792 <para>
5793 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5794 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5795 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5796 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5797 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5798 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5799 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5800 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5801 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5802 Washington.
5803 </para>
5804 <para>
5805 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5806 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5807 <!-- f2 -->
5808 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5809 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5810 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5811 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5812 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5813 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5814 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5815 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5816 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5817 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5818 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5819 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5820 in our tradition.
5821 </para>
5822 <para>
5823 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5824 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5825 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5826 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5827 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5828 culture would develop.
5829 </para>
5830 <para>
5831 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5832 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5833 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5834 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5835 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5836 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5837 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5838 the same would be to
5839
5840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5841 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5842 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5843 perfect control.
5844 </para>
5845 <para>
5846 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5847 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5848 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5849 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5850 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5851 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5852 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5853 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5854 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5855 Constitution itself.
5856 </para>
5857 <para>
5858 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5859 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5860 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5861 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5862 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5863 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5864 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5865 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5866 government pays for the privilege.
5867 </para>
5868 <para>
5869 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5870 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5871 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5872 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5873 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5874 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5875 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5876 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5877 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5878 compensation for your land
5879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5880 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5881 compensation at all.
5882 </para>
5883 <para>
5884 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5885 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5886 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5887 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5888 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5889 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5890 itself.
5891 </para>
5892 <para>
5893 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5894 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5895 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5896 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5897 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5898 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5899 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5900 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5901 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5902 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5903 </para>
5904 <para>
5905 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5906 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5907 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5908 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5909 creative property there must be a public domain?
5910 </para>
5911 <para>
5912 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5913 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5914 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5915 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5916 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5917 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5918 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5919 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5920 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5921 control how culture develops.
5922 </para>
5923 <para>
5924
5925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5926 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5927 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5928 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5929 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5930 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5931 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5932 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5933 </para>
5934 <figure id="fig-1331">
5935 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5936 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5937 </figure>
5938 <para>
5939 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5940 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5941 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5942 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5943 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5944 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5945 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5946 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5947 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5948 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5949 Web, you can be punished
5950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5951 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5952 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5953 </para>
5954 <para>
5955 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5956 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5957 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5958 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5959 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5960 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5961 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5962 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5963 the source of the enforcement.
5964 </para>
5965 <para>
5966 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5967 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5968 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5969 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5970 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5971 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5972 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5973 individual or group might behave.
5974 </para>
5975 <para>
5976 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5977 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
5978 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5979 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5980 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5981 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5982 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5983 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5984 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5985 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
5986 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5987 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5988 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5989 </para>
5990 <para>
5991
5992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
5993 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
5994 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
5995 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
5996 undermined by another.
5997 </para>
5998 <para>
5999 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6000 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6001 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6002 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6003 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6004 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6005 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6006 </para>
6007 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6008 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6009 </indexterm>
6010 <para>
6011 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6012 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6013 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6014 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6015 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6016 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6017 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6018 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6019 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6020 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6021 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6022 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6023 </para>
6024 <para>
6025 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6026 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6027 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6028 <!-- f3 -->
6029 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6030 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6031 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6032 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6033 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6034 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6035 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6036 June 1998.
6037 </para></footnote>
6038 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6039 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6040 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6041 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6042 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6043 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6044 used to require that other laws be more
6045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6046 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6047 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6048 driving.
6049 </para>
6050 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6051
6052 <figure id="fig-1361">
6053 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6054 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6055 </figure>
6056 <para>
6057 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6058 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6059 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6060 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6061 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6062 another.<footnote>
6063 <para>
6064 <!-- f4 -->
6065 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6066 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6067 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6068 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6069 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6070 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6071 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6072 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6073 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6074 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6075 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6076 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6077 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6078 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6079 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6080 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6081 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6082 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6083 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6084 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6085 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6086 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6087 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6088 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6089 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6090 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6091 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6092 of these groups might face.
6093 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6094 </para></footnote>
6095 </para>
6096 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6097 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6098 <para>
6099 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6100 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6101 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6102 rallying makes sense.
6103 </para>
6104 <para>
6105 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6106 Internet:
6107 </para>
6108 <figure id="fig-1371">
6109 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6110 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6111 </figure>
6112 <para>
6113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6114 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6115 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6116 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6117 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6118 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6119 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6120 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6121 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6122 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6123 this form of infringement.
6124 </para>
6125 <para>
6126 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6127 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6128 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6129 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6130 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6131 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6132 </para>
6133 <para>
6134 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6135 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6136 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6137 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6138 Iraq
6139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6140 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6141 looting that results.
6142 </para>
6143 <figure id="fig-1381">
6144 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6145 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6146 </figure>
6147 <para>
6148 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6149 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6150 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6151 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6152 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6153 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6154 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6155 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6156 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6157 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6158 </para>
6159 <para>
6160 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6161 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6162 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6163 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6164 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6165 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6166 life. Homeowners living in a
6167
6168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6169 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6170 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6171 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6172 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6173 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6174 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6175 </para>
6176 <para>
6177 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6178 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6179 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6180 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6181 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6182 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6183 </para>
6184 <para>
6185 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6186 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6187 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6188 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6189 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6190 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6191 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6192 <!-- f5 -->
6193 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6194 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6195 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6196 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6197 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6198 October 2003, available at
6199 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6200 </para></footnote>
6201
6202 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6203 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6204 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6205 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6206 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6207 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6208 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6209 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6210 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6211 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6212 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6213 </para>
6214 <para>
6215 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6216 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6217 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6219 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6220 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6221 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6222 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6223 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6224 <!-- f6 -->
6225 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6226 </para></footnote>
6227 And relative to a
6228 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6229 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6230 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6231 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6232 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6233 Brezhnev.
6234 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6235 </para>
6236 <para>
6237 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6238 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6239 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6240 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6241 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6242 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6243 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6244 opportunities for innovation and change.
6245 </para>
6246 <para>
6247 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6248 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6249 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6250 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6251 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6252 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6253 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6254 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6255 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6256 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6257 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6258 regulation is justified.
6259 </para>
6260 <para>
6261 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6263 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6264 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6265 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6266 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6267 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6268 </para>
6269 <para>
6270 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6271 </para>
6272 <para>
6273 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6274 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6275 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6276 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6277 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6278 </para>
6279 <para>
6280 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6281 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6282 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6283 </para>
6284 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6285 <para>
6286 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6287 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6288 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6289 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6290 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6291 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6292 </para>
6293 <para>
6294 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6295 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6296 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6297 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6298 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6299 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6300 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6301 </para>
6302 <para>
6303 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6304 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6305 culture.<footnote><para>
6306 <!-- f7 -->
6307 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6308 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6309 </para></footnote>
6310 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6311 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6312 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6313 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6314 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6315 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6317 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6318 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6319 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6320 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6321 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6322 </para>
6323 <para>
6324 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6325 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6326 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6327 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6328 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6329 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6330 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6331 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6332 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6333 </para>
6334 <para>
6335 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6336 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6337 be lost.
6338 </para>
6339 </sect2>
6340 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6341 <title>Beginnings</title>
6342 <para>
6343 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6344 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6345 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6346 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6347 </para>
6348 <para>
6349 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6350 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6351 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6352 </para>
6353 <para>
6354 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6355 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6356 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6357
6358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6359 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6360 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6361 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6362 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6363 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6364 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6365 </para>
6366 <para>
6367 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6368 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6369 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6370 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6371 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6372 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6373 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6374 </para>
6375 <para>
6376 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6377 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6378 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6379 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6380 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6381 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6382 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6383 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6384 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6385 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6386 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6387 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6388 power.
6389 </para>
6390 <para>
6391 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6392 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6393 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6394 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6395 years since they first struck its design.
6396 </para>
6397 <para>
6398 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6399 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6401 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6402 started here:
6403 </para>
6404 <figure id="fig-1441">
6405 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6406 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6407 </figure>
6408 <para>
6409 We will end here:
6410 </para>
6411 <figure id="fig-1442">
6412 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6413 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6414 </figure>
6415 <para>
6416 Let me explain how.
6417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6418 </para>
6419 </sect2>
6420 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6421 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6422 <para>
6423 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6424 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6425 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6426 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6427 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6428 authorship.<footnote>
6429 <para>
6430 <!-- f8 -->
6431 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6432 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6433 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6434 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6435 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6436 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6437 </para></footnote>
6438 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6439 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6440 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6441 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6442 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6443 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6444 </para>
6445 <para>
6446 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6447 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6448 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6449 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6450 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6451 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6452 </para>
6453 <para>
6454 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6455 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6456 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6457 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6458 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6459 </para>
6460 <para>
6461 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6462 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6463 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6464 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6465 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6466 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6467 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6468 <!-- f9 -->
6469 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6470 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6471 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6472 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6473 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6474 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6475 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6476 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6477 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6478 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6479 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6480 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6481 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6482 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6483 </para>
6484 <para>
6485 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6486 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6488 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6489 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6490 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6491 copyright, either.
6492 </para>
6493 <para>
6494 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6495 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6496 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6497 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6498 domain.<footnote><para>
6499 <!-- f10 -->
6500 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6501 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6502 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6503 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6504 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6505 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6506 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6507 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6508 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6509 </para>
6510 <para>
6511 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6512 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6513 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6514 <!-- f11 -->
6515 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6516 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6517 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6518 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6519 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6520 effectively free.
6521 </para>
6522 <para>
6523 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6524 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6525 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6526 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6527 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6528 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6529 </para>
6530 <para>
6531 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6532 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6533 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6534 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6535 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6536 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6537 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6538 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6539 </para>
6540 <para>
6541 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6542 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6543 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6544 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6545
6546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6547 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6548 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6549 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6550 </para>
6551 <para>
6552 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6553 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6554 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6555 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6556 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6557 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6558 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6559 value.
6560 </para>
6561 <para>
6562 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6563 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6564 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6565 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6566 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6567 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6568 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6569 was ninety-five years.
6570 </para>
6571 <para>
6572 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6573 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6574 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6575 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6576 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6577 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6578 them.
6579 </para>
6580 <para>
6581 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6582 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6583 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6584 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6585 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6586 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6587 years.<footnote><para>
6588 <!-- f12 -->
6589 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6590 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6591 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6592 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6593 </para></footnote>
6594 </para>
6595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6596 </sect2>
6597 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6598 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6599 <para>
6600 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6601 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6602 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6603 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6604 </para>
6605 <para>
6606 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6607 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6608 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6609 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6610 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6611 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6612 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6613 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6614 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6615 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6616 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6617 </para>
6618 <para>
6619 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6620 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6621 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6622 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6623 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6624 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6625 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6626 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6627 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6628 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6629 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6630 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6631 on the initial creative work.
6632 </para>
6633 <para>
6634 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6635 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6636 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6637 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6638 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6639 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6640 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6641 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6642 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6643 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6644 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6645 </para>
6646 <para>
6647 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6648 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6649 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6650 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6651 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6652 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6653 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6654 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6655 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6656 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6657 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6658 original author.
6659 </para>
6660 <para>
6661 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6662 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6663 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6664 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6665 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6666 copy available for others to copy.
6667 </para>
6668 <para>
6669 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6670 differences.
6671 </para>
6672 <para>
6673 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6674 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6675 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6676 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6677 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6678 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6679 <!-- f13 -->
6680 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6681 Creation
6682 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6683 International
6684 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6685 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6686 </para></footnote>
6687 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6688 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6689 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6690 </para>
6691 <para>
6692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6693 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6694 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6695 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6696 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6697 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6698 creative
6699 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6700 restrained.
6701 </para>
6702 <para>
6703 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6704 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6705 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6706 reduced
6707 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6708 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6709 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6710 </para>
6711 <para>
6712 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6713 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6714 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6715 </para>
6716 <para>
6717 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6718 control
6719 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6720 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6721 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6722 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6723 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6724 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6725 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6726 exclusive
6727 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6728 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6729 </para>
6730 <para>
6731 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6732 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6733 expansion
6734 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6735 copyright.
6736 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6737 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6738 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6739 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6740 </para>
6741 <para>
6742
6743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6744 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6745 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6746 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6747 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6748 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6749 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6750 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6751 protect
6752 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6753 <!-- f14 -->
6754 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6755 2003, available at
6756 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6757 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6758 </para></footnote>
6759 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6760 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6761 the wrong of direct piracy.
6762 </para>
6763 <para>
6764 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6765 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6766 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6767 transformative
6768 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6769 <!-- f15 -->
6770 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6771 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6772 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6773 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6774 Constitutionality,"
6775 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6776 </para></footnote>
6777 These two different uses of my creative work are
6778 treated the same.
6779 </para>
6780 <para>
6781 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6782 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6783 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6784 creates
6785 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6786 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6787 originally created?
6788 </para>
6789 <para>
6790 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6791 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6792 simply
6793 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6794 rights originally granted.
6795 </para>
6796 </sect2>
6797 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6798 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6799 <para>
6800 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6801 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6802 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6803 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6804 <!-- f16 -->
6805 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6806 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6807 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6808 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6809 sometimes
6810 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6811 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6812 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6813 </para></footnote>
6814 </para>
6815 <para>
6816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6817 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6818 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6819 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6820 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6821 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6822 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6823 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6824 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6825 trigger for copyright law.
6826 </para>
6827 <para>
6828 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6829 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6830 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6831 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6832 <!-- f17 -->
6833 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6834 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6835 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6836 basis
6837 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6838 </para></footnote>
6839 because it is clear that the
6840 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6841 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6842 </para>
6843 <para>
6844 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6845 empty circle.
6846 </para>
6847 <figure id="fig-1521">
6848 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6849 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6850 </figure>
6851 <para>
6852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6853 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6854 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6855 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6856 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6857 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6858 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6859 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6860 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6861 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6862 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6863 not make a copy.
6864 </para>
6865 <figure id="fig-1531">
6866 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6867 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6868 </figure>
6869 <para>
6870 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6871 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6872 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6873 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6874 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6875 diagram on next page).
6876 </para>
6877 <para>
6878 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6879 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6880 </para>
6881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6882 <figure id="fig-1541">
6883 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6884 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6885 </figure>
6886 <para>
6887 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6888 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6889 unregulated.
6890 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6891 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6892 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6893 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6894 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6895 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6896 </para>
6897 <figure id="fig-1542">
6898 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6899 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6900 </figure>
6901 <para> </para>
6902 <figure id="fig-1551">
6903 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6904 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6905 </figure>
6906 <para>
6907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6908 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6909 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6910 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6911 </para>
6912 <para>
6913 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6914 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6915 <!-- f18 -->
6916 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6917 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6918 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6919 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6920 </para></footnote>
6921 And because of this single,
6922 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6923 category
6924 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6925 unregulated
6926 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6927 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6928 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6929 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6930 category
6931 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6932 copyrighted
6933 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6934 burden of this shift.
6935 </para>
6936 <para>
6937 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6938 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6939 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6940 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6941 nothing
6942 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6944 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6945 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6946 produced
6947 a copy.
6948 </para>
6949 <para>
6950 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6951 different
6952 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6953 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6954 copyright
6955 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6956 accidental
6957 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6958 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6959 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6960 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6961 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6962 </para>
6963 <para>
6964 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6965 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6966 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6967 points also become clear:
6968 </para>
6969 <para>
6970 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6971 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6972 presumptively
6973 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6974 evidence
6975 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6976 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
6977 free culture before the Internet.
6978 </para>
6979 <para>
6980 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6981 transformative
6982 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
6983 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
6984 transformation
6985 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
6986 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
6987 releasing
6988 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
6989 justification.
6990 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
6991 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
6992 transformative
6993 uses of creative work.
6994 </para>
6995 <para>
6996 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
6997
6998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
6999 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7000 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7001 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7002 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7003 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7004 Internet,
7005 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7006 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7007 protected
7008 before because reading was not regulated.
7009 </para>
7010 <para>
7011 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7012 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7013 depend
7014 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7015 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7016 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7017 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7018 protections
7019 of fair use are not enough.
7020 </para>
7021 <para>
7022 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7023 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7024 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7025 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7026 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7027 </para>
7028 <para>
7029 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7030 began
7031 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7032 previews.
7033 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7034 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7035 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7036 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7037 before
7038 you bought it.
7039 </para>
7040 <para>
7041 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7042 distributors
7043 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7044 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7045 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7047 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7048 business
7049 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7050 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7051 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7052 immediately.
7053 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7054 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7055 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7056 </para>
7057 <para>
7058 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7059 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7060 infringed"
7061 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7062 willful
7063 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7064 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7065 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7066 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7067 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7068 </para>
7069 <para>
7070 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7071 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7072 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7073 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7074 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7075 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7076 Disney's permission.
7077 </para>
7078 <para>
7079 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7080 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7081 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7082 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7083 marketplace,
7084 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7085 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7086 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7087 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7088 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7089 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7090 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7091 </para>
7092 <para>
7093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7094 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7095 control
7096 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7097 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7098 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7099 Noble
7100 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7101 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7102 argument
7103 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7104 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7105 exercising
7106 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7107 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7108 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7109 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7110 </para>
7111 <para>
7112 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7113 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7114 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7115 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7116 owners
7117 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7118 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7119 </para>
7120 </sect2>
7121 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7122 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7123 <para>
7124 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7125 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7126 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7127 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7128 </para>
7129 <para>
7130 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7131 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7132 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7133 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7134 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7135 your freedom.
7136 </para>
7137 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7138 <para>
7139 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7140 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7142 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7143 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7144 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7145 <!-- f19 -->
7146 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7147 Contemporary
7148 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7149 </para></footnote>
7150 </para>
7151 <para>
7152 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7153 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7154 you were."<footnote><para>
7155 <!-- f20 -->
7156 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7157 </para></footnote>
7158 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7159 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7160 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7161 </para>
7162 <para>
7163 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7164 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7165 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7166 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7167 </para>
7168 <para>
7169 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7170 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7171 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7172 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7173 copyrighted
7174 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7175 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7176 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7177 that is not at all funny.
7178 </para>
7179 <para>
7180 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7181 </para>
7182 <para>
7183 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7184 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7185 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7186 technology,
7187 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7188 </para>
7189 <para>
7190 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7191 Reader.
7192 </para>
7193 <para>
7194 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7195 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7196 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7197 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7198 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7199 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7201 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7202 called Permissions.
7203 </para>
7204 <figure id="fig-1611">
7205 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7206 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7207 </figure>
7208 <para>
7209 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7210 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7211 </para>
7212 <figure id="fig-1612">
7213 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7214 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7215 </figure>
7216 <para>
7217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7218 According to my eBook
7219 Reader, I have the permission
7220 to copy to the clipboard of the
7221 computer ten text selections
7222 every ten days. (So far, I've
7223 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7224 I also have the permission to
7225 print ten pages from the book
7226 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7227 the permission to use the Read
7228 Aloud button to hear
7229 Middlemarch
7230 read aloud through the
7231 computer.
7232 </para>
7233 <para>
7234 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7235 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7236 </para>
7237 <figure id="fig-1621">
7238 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7239 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7240 </figure>
7241 <para>
7242 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7243 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7244 the book.
7245 </para>
7246 <figure id="fig-1622">
7247 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7248 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7249 </figure>
7250 <para>
7251 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7252 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7253 </para>
7254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7255 <figure id="fig-1631">
7256 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7257 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7258 </figure>
7259 <para>
7260 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7261 </para>
7262 <para>
7263 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7264 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7265 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7266 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7267 under
7268 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7269 <!-- f21 -->
7270 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7271 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7272 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7273 obligation
7274 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7275 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7276 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7277 </para></footnote>
7278 When my e-book of
7279 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7280 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7281 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7282 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7283 </para>
7284 <para>
7285 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7286 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7287 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7288 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7289 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7290 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7291 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7292 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7293 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7294 restrictions:
7295 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7296 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7297 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7298 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7299 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7300 </para>
7301 <para>
7302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7303 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7304 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7305 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7306 </para>
7307 <para>
7308 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7309 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7310 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7311 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7312 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7313 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7314 </para>
7315 <para>
7316 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7317 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7318 technologies
7319 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7320 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7321 protections as well?
7322 </para>
7323 <para>
7324 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7325 eBook Reader.
7326 </para>
7327 <para>
7328 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7329 public
7330 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7331 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7332 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7333 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7334 </para>
7335 <figure id="fig-1641">
7336 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7337 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7338 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7339 </figure>
7340 <para>
7341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7342 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7343 allowed
7344 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7345 "permissions"
7346 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7347 </para>
7348 <para>
7349 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7350 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7351 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7352 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7353 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7354 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7355 </para>
7356 <para>
7357 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7358 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7359 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7360 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7361 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7362 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7363 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7364 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7365 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7366 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7367 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7368 </para>
7369 <para>
7370 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7371 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7372 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7373 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7374 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7375 often crazy.
7376 </para>
7377 <para>
7378 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7379 story of mine that makes the same point.
7380 </para>
7381 <indexterm id="idxaibo" class='startofrange'>
7382 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7383 </indexterm>
7384 <para>
7385 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7386 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7387 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7388 </para>
7389 <para>
7390 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7391 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7392 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7394 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7395 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7396 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7397 </para>
7398 <para>
7399 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7400 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7401 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7402 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7403 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7404 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7405 </para>
7406 <para>
7407 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7408 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7409 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7410 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7411 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7412 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7413 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7414 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7415 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7416 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7417 </para>
7418 <para>
7419 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7420 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7421 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7422 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7423 ethically.
7424 </para>
7425 <para>
7426 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7427 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7428 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7429 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7430 than Sony had built.
7431 </para>
7432 <indexterm startref="idxaibo" class='endofrange'/>
7433 <para>
7434 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7435 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7436 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7437 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7438 the
7439
7440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7441 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7442 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7443 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7444 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7445 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7446 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7447 dog to dance?
7448 </para>
7449 <para>
7450 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7451 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7452 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7453 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7454 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7455 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7456 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7457 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7458 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7459 </para>
7460 <para>
7461 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7462 <!-- f22 -->
7463 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7464 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7465 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7466 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7467 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7468 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7469 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7470 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7471 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7472 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7473 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7474 </para></footnote>
7475 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7476 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7477 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7478 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7479 </para>
7480 <para>
7481 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7482 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7483 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7484 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7485 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7486 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7487 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7488 Internet much more.
7489 </para>
7490 <para>
7491 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7492 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7493 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7494 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7495 </para>
7496 <para>
7497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7498 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7499 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7500 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7501 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7502 </para>
7503 <para>
7504 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7505 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7506 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7507 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7508 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7509 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7510 </para>
7511 <para>
7512 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7513 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7514 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7515 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7516 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7517 constituted, succeed.
7518 </para>
7519 <para>
7520 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7521 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7522 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7523 wrote:
7524 </para>
7525 <blockquote>
7526 <para>
7527 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7528 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7529 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7530 </para>
7531 </blockquote>
7532 <para>
7533 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7534 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7535 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7536 </para>
7537 <blockquote>
7538 <para>
7539 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7541 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7542 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7543 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7544 </para>
7545 </blockquote>
7546 <para>
7547 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7548 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7549 spreading such information an offense.
7550 </para>
7551 <para>
7552 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7553 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7554 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7555 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7556 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7557 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7558 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7559 </para>
7560 <para>
7561 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7562 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7563 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7564 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7565 </para>
7566 <para>
7567 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7568 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7569 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7570 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7571 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7572 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7573 have been a copyright violation.
7574 </para>
7575 <para>
7576 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7577 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7578 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7579 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7580 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7581 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7582 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7584 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7585 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7586 </para>
7587 <para>
7588 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7589 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7590 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7591 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7592 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7593 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7594 </para>
7595 <para>
7596 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7597 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7598 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7599 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7600 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7601 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7602 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7603 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7604 </para>
7605 <blockquote>
7606 <para>
7607 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7608 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7609 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7610 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7611 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7612 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7613 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7614 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7615 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7616 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7617 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7618 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7619 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7620 important.<footnote><para>
7621 <!-- f23 -->
7622 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7623 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7624 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7625 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7626 </para></footnote>
7627 </para>
7628 </blockquote>
7629 <para>
7630 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7631 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7632 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7633 the VCR responsible.
7634 </para>
7635 <para>
7636 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7637 the DMCA.
7638 </para>
7639 <para>
7640 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7641 </para>
7642 <para>
7643 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7644 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7645 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7646 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7647 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7648 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7649 </para>
7650 <para>
7651 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7653 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7654 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7655 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7656 and bad uses.
7657 </para>
7658 <figure id="fig-1711">
7659 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7660 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7661 </figure>
7662 <para>
7663 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7664 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7665 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7666 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7667 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7668 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7669 </para>
7670 <para>
7671 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7672 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7673 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7674 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7675 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7676 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7677 </para>
7678 <para>
7679 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7680 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7681 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7682 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7683 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7684 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7685 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7686 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7687 </para>
7688 <para>
7689 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7690 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7691 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7692 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7693 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7694 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7695 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7696 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7697 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7698 </para>
7699 <para>
7700
7701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7702 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7703 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7704 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7705 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7706 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7707 <!-- f24 -->
7708 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7709 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7710 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7711 </para></footnote>
7712 </para>
7713 <para>
7714 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7715 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7716 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7717 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7718 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7719 </para>
7720 <para>
7721 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7722 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7723 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7724 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7725 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7726 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7727 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7728 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7729 </para>
7730 <para>
7731 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7732 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7733 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7734 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7735 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7736 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7737 </para>
7738 </sect2>
7739 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7740 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7741 <para>
7742 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7743 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7744 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7745 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7746 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7747 find better ways
7748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7749 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7750 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7751 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7752 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7753 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7754 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7755 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7756 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7757 control.
7758 </para>
7759 <para>
7760 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7761 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7762 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7763 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7764 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7765 </para>
7766 <para>
7767 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7768 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7769 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7770 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7771 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7772 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7773 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7774 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7775 of the media.
7776 </para>
7777 <para>
7778 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7779 nature.
7780 </para>
7781 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7782 <para>
7783 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7784 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7785 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7786 <!-- f25 -->
7787 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7788 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7789 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7790 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7791 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7792 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7793 <!-- f26 -->
7794 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7795 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7796 </para></footnote>
7797 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7798 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7799 <!-- f27 -->
7800 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7801 31 May 2003.
7802 </para></footnote>
7803 </para>
7804 <para>
7805 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7806 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7808 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7809 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7810 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7811 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7812 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7813 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7814 </para>
7815 <para>
7816 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7817 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7818 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7819 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7820 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7821 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7822 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7823 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7824 protected&mdash; by the market.
7825 </para>
7826 <para>
7827 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7828 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7829 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7830 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7831 </para>
7832 <blockquote>
7833 <para>
7834 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7835 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7836 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7837 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7838 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7839 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7840 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7841 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7842 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7843 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7844 <!-- f28 -->
7845 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7846 2003): 89.
7847 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7848 </para></footnote>
7849 </para>
7850 </blockquote>
7851 <para>
7852 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7853 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7854 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7855 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7856 </para>
7857 <figure id="fig-1761">
7858 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7859 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7860 </figure>
7861 <para>
7862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7863 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7864 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7865 distribute content?
7866 </para>
7867 <para>
7868 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7869 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7870 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7871 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7872 </para>
7873 <para>
7874 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7875 integration may matter.
7876 </para>
7877 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7878 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7879 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7880 <para>
7881 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7882 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7883 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7884 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7885 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7886 </para>
7887 <para>
7888 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7889 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7890 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7891 control.<footnote><para>
7892 <!-- f29 -->
7893 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7894 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7895 Missouri,
7896 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7897 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7898 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7899 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7900 </para></footnote>
7901 </para>
7902 <para>
7903
7904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7905 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7906 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7907 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7908 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7909 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7910 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7911 networks.
7912 </para>
7913 <para>
7914 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7915 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7916 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7917 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7918 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7919 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7920 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7921 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7922 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7923 <!-- f30 -->
7924 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7925 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7926 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7927 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7928 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7929 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7930 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7931 2003.
7932 </para></footnote>
7933 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7934 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7935 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7936 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7937 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7938 63%."<footnote><para>
7939 <!-- f31 -->
7940 Ibid.
7941 </para></footnote>
7942 </para>
7943 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7944 <para>
7945 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7946 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7947 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7948 owned by the network.
7949 </para>
7950 <para>
7951 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7952 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7953 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7954 </para>
7955 <blockquote>
7956 <para>
7957 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7958 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7959 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7960 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7962 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7963 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7964 handful.<footnote><para>
7965 <!-- f32 -->
7966 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7967 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7968 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7969 </para></footnote>
7970 </para>
7971 </blockquote>
7972 <para>
7973 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7974 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7975 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7976 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7977 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7978 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
7979 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
7980 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
7981 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
7982 democracy.
7983 </para>
7984 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
7985 <para>
7986 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
7987 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
7988 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
7989 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
7990 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
7991 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
7992 <!-- f33 -->
7993 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
7994 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
7995 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
7996 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
7997 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
7998 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy 14 (1985):
7999 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8000 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8001 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them
8002 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8003
8004 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8005 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8006 sprinting.
8007 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8008 </para>
8009 <para>
8010 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8011 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8012 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8013 measure.
8014 </para>
8015 <para>
8016 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8017 suggest the concern.
8018 </para>
8019 <para>
8020 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8021 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8022 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8023 </para>
8024 <para>
8025 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8026 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8027 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8028
8029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8030 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8031 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8032 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8033 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8034 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8035 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8036 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8037 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8038 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8039 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8040 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8041 outweigh these costs.
8042 </para>
8043 <para>
8044 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8045 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8046 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8047 these issues.
8048 </para>
8049 <para>
8050 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8051 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8052 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8053 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8054 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8055 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8056 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8057 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8058 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8059 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8060 </para>
8061 <para>
8062 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8063 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8064 </para>
8065 <para>
8066 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8067 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8068 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8069 war. Can you do it?
8070 </para>
8071 <para>
8072 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8074 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8075 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8076 message will be heard then?
8077 </para>
8078 <para>
8079 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8080 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8081 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8082 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8083 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8084 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8085 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8086 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8087 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8088 <!-- f34 -->
8089 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8090 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8091 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8092 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8093 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8094 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8095 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8096 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8097 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8098 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8099 York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8100 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8101 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8102 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8103 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8104 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8105 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
8106 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8107 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8108 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8109 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8110 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8111 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8112 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8113 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8114 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8115 </para></footnote>
8116 </para>
8117 <para>
8118 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8119 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8120 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8121 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8122 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8123 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8124 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8125 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8126 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8127 </para>
8128 </sect2>
8129 <sect2 id="together">
8130 <title>Together</title>
8131 <para>
8132 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8133 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8134 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8135 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8136 </para>
8137 <para>
8138 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8139 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8140 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8141 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8142 to seem
8143
8144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8145 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8146 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8147 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8148 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8149 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8150 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8151 be redefined.
8152 </para>
8153 <para>
8154 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8155 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8156 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8157 our culture today.
8158 </para>
8159 <para>
8160 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8161 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8162 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8163 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8164 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8165 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8166 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8167 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8168 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8169 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8170 </para>
8171 <para>
8172 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8173 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8174 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8175 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8176 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8177 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8178 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8179 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8180 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8181 technology and the market enable.
8182 </para>
8183 <para>
8184 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8185 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8187 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8188 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8189 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8190 the development of our culture than now.
8191 </para>
8192 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8193 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8194 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8195 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8196 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8197 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8198 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8199 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny
8200 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8201 founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8202 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8203 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8204 culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
8205 <!-- f35 -->
8206 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8207 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8208 </para></footnote>
8209 </para>
8210 <para>
8211 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8212 </para>
8213 <para>
8214 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8215 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8216 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8217 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8218 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8219 </para>
8220
8221 <table id="t2">
8222 <title></title>
8223 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8224 <thead>
8225 <row>
8226 <entry></entry>
8227 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8228 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8229 </row>
8230 </thead>
8231 <tbody>
8232 <row>
8233 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8234 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8235 <entry>Free</entry>
8236 </row>
8237 <row>
8238 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8239 <entry>Free</entry>
8240 <entry>Free</entry>
8241 </row>
8242 </tbody>
8243 </tgroup>
8244 </table>
8245
8246 <para>
8247 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8248 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8249 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8250
8251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8252 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8253 noncommercial work was also free.
8254 </para>
8255 <para>
8256 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8257 </para>
8258
8259 <table id="t3">
8260 <title></title>
8261 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8262 <thead>
8263 <row>
8264 <entry></entry>
8265 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8266 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8267 </row>
8268 </thead>
8269 <tbody>
8270 <row>
8271 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8272 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8273 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8274 </row>
8275 <row>
8276 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8277 <entry>Free</entry>
8278 <entry>Free</entry>
8279 </row>
8280 </tbody>
8281 </tgroup>
8282 </table>
8283
8284 <para>
8285 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8286 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8287 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8288 transformation were still essentially free.
8289 </para>
8290 <para>
8291 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8292 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8293 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8294 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8295 we could say the law began to look like this:
8296 </para>
8297
8298 <table id="t4">
8299 <title></title>
8300 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8301 <thead>
8302 <row>
8303 <entry></entry>
8304 <entry>COPY</entry>
8305 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8306 </row>
8307 </thead>
8308 <tbody>
8309 <row>
8310 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8311 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8312 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8313 </row>
8314 <row>
8315 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8316 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8317 <entry>Free</entry>
8318 </row>
8319 </tbody>
8320 </tgroup>
8321 </table>
8322
8323 <para>
8324 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8325 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8326 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8327 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8328 that the law now looks like this:
8329 </para>
8330
8331 <table id="t5">
8332 <title></title>
8333 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8334 <thead>
8335 <row>
8336 <entry></entry>
8337 <entry>COPY</entry>
8338 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8339 </row>
8340 </thead>
8341 <tbody>
8342 <row>
8343 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8344 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8345 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8346 </row>
8347 <row>
8348 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8349 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8350 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8351 </row>
8352 </tbody>
8353 </tgroup>
8354 </table>
8355
8356 <para>
8357 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8358 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8359 creativity&mdash;
8360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8361 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8362 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8363 </para>
8364 <para>
8365 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8366 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8367 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8368 these domains actually does any good.
8369 </para>
8370 <para>
8371 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8372 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8373 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8374 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8375 reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8376 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8377 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8378 rights were more sharply restricted.
8379 </para>
8380 <para>
8381 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8382 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8383 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8384 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8385 property rights<footnote><para>
8386 <!-- f36 -->
8387 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8388 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8389 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8390 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8391 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8392 Press, 1980).
8393 </para></footnote>)
8394 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8395 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8396 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8397 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8398 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8399 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8400 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8401 free culture.
8402 </para>
8403 <para>
8404 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8405 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8406 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8407 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8408 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8409 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8410 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8411 chapter 7). Adding
8412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8413 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8414 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8415 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8416 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8417 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8418 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8419 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8420 dominates the debate today.
8421 </para>
8422 <para>
8423 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8424 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8425 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8426 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8427 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8428 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8429 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8430 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8431 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8432 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8433 lawyer.
8434 </para>
8435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8436 </sect2>
8437 </sect1>
8438 </chapter>
8439 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8440 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8441 <para></para>
8442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8443 <sect1 id="chimera">
8444 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8445 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8446 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8447 </indexterm>
8448 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8449 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8450 </indexterm>
8451 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8452 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8453 </indexterm>
8454
8455 <para>
8456 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8457 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8458 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8459 <!-- f1. -->
8460 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8461 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8462 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8463 </para></footnote>
8464 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8465 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8466 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8467 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8468 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8469 villagers to explore life as a king.
8470 </para>
8471 <para>
8472 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8473 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8474 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8475 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8476 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8477 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8478 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8479 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8480 alone!'"
8481 </para>
8482 <para>
8483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8484 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8485 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8486 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8487 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8488 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8489 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8490 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8491 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8492 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8493 </para>
8494 <para>
8495 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8496 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8497 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8498 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8499 </para>
8500 <para>
8501 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8502 is affected," he reports.
8503 </para>
8504 <para>
8505 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8506 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8507 his brain."
8508 </para>
8509 <para>
8510 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8511 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8512 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8513 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8514 </para>
8515 <para>
8516 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8517 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8518 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8519 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8520 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8521 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8522 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8523 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8524
8525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8526 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8527 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8528 scene. . . ."
8529 </para>
8530 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8531 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8532 <para>
8533 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8534 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8535 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8536 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8537 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8538 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8539 </para>
8540 <para>
8541 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8542 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8543 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8544 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8545 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8546 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8547 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8548 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8549 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8550 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8551 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8552 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8553 </para>
8554 <para>
8555 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8556 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8557 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8558 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8559 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8560 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8561 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8562 </para>
8563 <para>
8564 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8565 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8566 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8567 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8568 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8569 from Tower.
8570 </para>
8571 <para>
8572
8573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8574 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8575 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8576 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8577 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8578 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8579 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8580 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8581 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8582 </para>
8583 <para>
8584 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8585 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8586 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8587 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8588 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8589 </para>
8590 <para>
8591 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8592 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8593 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8594 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8595 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8596 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8597 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8598 implemented.<footnote><para>
8599 <!-- f2. -->
8600 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8601 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8602 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003,
8603 available at
8604 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8605 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8606 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8607 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8608 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8609 Stakes on Piracy," Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8610 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8611 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8612 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8613 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8614 through a family computer, see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In
8615 re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8616 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8617 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8618 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8619 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8620 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8621 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8622 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8623 August 2003, available at
8624 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8625 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8626 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8627 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8628 Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8629 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8630 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8631 </para></footnote>
8632
8633 </para>
8634 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8635 <para>
8636 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8637 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8638 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8639 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8640 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8641 </para>
8642 <para>
8643 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8644 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8645 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8646 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8647 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8648 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8649 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8650 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8651 </para>
8652 <para>
8653
8654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8655 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8656 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8657 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8658 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8659 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8660 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8661 </para>
8662 <para>
8663 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8664 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8665 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8666 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8667 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8668 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8669 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8670 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8671 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8672 protection for copyrighted material,
8673 </para>
8674 <blockquote>
8675 <para>
8676 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8677 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8678 </para>
8679 <para>
8680 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8681 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8682 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8683 answer
8684 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8685 well produce a totally different industry model.
8686 </para>
8687 <para>
8688 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8689 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8690 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8691 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8692 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8693 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8694 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8695 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8696 interests.<footnote><para>
8697 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8698 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8699 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8700 Protection,
8701 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8702 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8703 EMusic.com),
8704 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8705 Congressional
8706 Testimony File.
8707 </para></footnote>
8708 </para>
8709 </blockquote>
8710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8711 <para>
8712 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8713 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8714 changed.
8715 </para>
8716 <para>
8717 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8718 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8719 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8720 </para>
8721
8722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8723 </sect1>
8724 <sect1 id="harms">
8725 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8726 <para>
8727
8728 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8729 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8730 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8731 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8732 prohibition,
8733 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8734 </para>
8735 <para>
8736 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8737 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8738 extend
8739 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8740 justified?
8741 </para>
8742 <para>
8743 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8744 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8745 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8746 our history.
8747 </para>
8748 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8749 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8750 <para>
8751 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8752 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8753 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8754 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8755 </para>
8756 <para>
8757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8758 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8759 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8760 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8761 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8762 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8763 </para>
8764 <sect2 id="constrain">
8765 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8766 <para>
8767 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8768 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8769 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8770 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8771 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8772 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8773 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8774 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8775 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8776 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8777 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8778 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8779 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8780 </para>
8781 <para>
8782 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8783 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8784 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8785 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8786 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8787 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8788 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8789 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8790 the culture all around.
8791 </para>
8792 <para>
8793 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8794 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8795
8796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8797
8798 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8799 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8800 storytelling extended across the globe.
8801 </para>
8802 <para>
8803 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8804 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8805 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8806 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8807 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8808 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8809 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8810 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8811 work is presumptively illegal.
8812 </para>
8813 <para>
8814 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8815 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8816 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8817 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8818 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8819 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8820 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8821 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8822 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8823 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8824 million.<footnote><para>
8825 <!-- f1. -->
8826 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8827 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8828 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8829 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8830 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8831 </para></footnote>
8832 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8833 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8834 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8835 suffering.<footnote>
8836 <para>
8837 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8838 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8839 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8840 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8841 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8842 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8843 available at
8844 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8845 recent months.
8846 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8847 </para></footnote>
8848 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8849 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8850 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8851 </para>
8852 <para>
8853 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8854 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8855 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8856 creative
8857 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8858 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8859 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8860
8861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8862 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8863 create,
8864 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8865 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8866 begin
8867 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8868 necessarily
8869 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8870 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8871 "illegal
8872 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8873 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
8874 available
8875 at
8876 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8877 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8878 </para></footnote>
8879 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8880 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8881 critical or reflective.
8882 </para>
8883 <para>
8884 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8885 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
8886 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8887 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8888 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8889 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8890 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8891 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8892 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8893 </para>
8894 <para>
8895 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8896 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8897 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8898 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8899 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8900 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8901 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8902 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8903 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8904 </para>
8905 <para>
8906 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8907 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
8908 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8909 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8910 law regulates such a use.
8911 </para>
8912 <para>
8913
8914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8915 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8916 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8917 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8918 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8919 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8920 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8921 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8922 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8923 </para>
8924 <para>
8925 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8926 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8927 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8928 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8929 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8930 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8931 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8932 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8933 comfort themselves.
8934 </para>
8935 <para>
8936 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8937 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8938 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8939 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8940 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8941 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8942 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8943 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8944 culture that is free.
8945 </para>
8946 <para>
8947 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8948 </para>
8949 <blockquote>
8950 <para>
8951 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8952 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8953 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8954 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8955 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8957 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8958 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8959 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8960 </para>
8961 </blockquote>
8962 </sect2>
8963 <sect2 id="innovators">
8964 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
8965 <para>
8966 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8967 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8968 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8969 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8970 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8971 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8972 </para>
8973 <para>
8974 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8975 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8976 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8977 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8978 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8979 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8980 affecting culture are more fundamental.
8981 </para>
8982 <para>
8983 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
8984 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
8985 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
8986 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
8987 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
8988 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
8989 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
8990 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
8991 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
8992 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
8993 against the competitors of tomorrow.
8994 </para>
8995 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
8996 <para>
8997 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
8998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
8999 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9000 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9001 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9002 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9003 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9004 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9005 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9006 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9007 </para>
9008 <para>
9009 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9010 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9011 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9012 </para>
9013 <para>
9014 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9015 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9016 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9017 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9018 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9019 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9020 </para>
9021 <para>
9022 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9023 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9024 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9025 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9026 Raitt. And so on.
9027 </para>
9028 <para>
9029 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9030 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9031 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9032 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9033 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9034 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9035 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9036 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9037 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9038 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9039 </para>
9040 <para>
9041 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9042 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9043
9044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9045 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9046 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9047 the kind of content the users liked.
9048 </para>
9049 <para>
9050 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9051 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9052 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9053 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9054 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9055 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9056 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9057 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9058 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9059 they had already bought.
9060 </para>
9061 <para>
9062 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9063 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9064 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9065 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9066 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9067 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9068 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9069 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9070 </para>
9071 <para>
9072 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9073 </para>
9074 <para>
9075 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9076 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9077 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9078 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9079 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9080 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9081 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9082 demanded.
9083 </para>
9084 <para>
9085 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9086 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9087 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9088 clients in this
9089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9090 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9091 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9092 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9093 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9094 </para>
9095 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9096 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9097 <para>
9098 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9099 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9100 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9101 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9102 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9103 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9104 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9105 innovation
9106 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9107 Revolution
9108 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9109 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9110 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9111 Times, 28 May 2001.
9112 </para></footnote>
9113 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9114 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9115 industry
9116 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9117 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9118 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9119 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9120 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9121 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9122 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9123 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9124 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9125 </para>
9126 <blockquote>
9127 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9128 <para>
9129 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9130 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9131 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9132 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9133 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9134 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9135 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9136 <para>
9137 <!-- f5. -->
9138 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9139 2003, available at
9140 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9141 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9142 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9143 </para></footnote>
9144 </para>
9145 </blockquote>
9146 <para>
9147 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9148 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9149 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9150 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9151 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9152 constantly threatened by litigation.
9153 </para>
9154 <para>
9155
9156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9157 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9158 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9159 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9160 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9161 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9162 imposes,
9163 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9164 conservative
9165 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9166 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9167 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9168 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9169 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9170 </para>
9171 <para>
9172 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9173 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9174 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9175 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9176 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9177 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9178 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9179 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9180 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9181 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9182 </para>
9183 <para>
9184 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9185 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9186 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9187 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9188 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9189 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9190 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9191 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9192 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9193 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9194 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9195 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9197 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9198 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9199 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9200 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9201 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9202 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9203 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9204 </para>
9205 <para>
9206 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9207 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9208 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9209 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9210 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9211 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9212 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9213 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9214 </para>
9215 <para>
9216 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9217 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9218 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9219 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9220 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9221 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9222 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9223 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9224 </para></footnote>
9225
9226 Congress
9227 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9228 "broadcast
9229 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9230 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9231 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9232 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9233 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9234 violators
9235 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9236 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9237 </para></footnote>
9238
9239 </para>
9240 <para>
9241 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9242 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9243 regulation
9244 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9245 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9246
9247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9248 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9249 those requirements.
9250 </para>
9251 <para>
9252 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9253 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9254 impose.<footnote><para>
9255 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9256 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9257 </para></footnote>
9258 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9259 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9260 harm than good.
9261 </para>
9262 <para>
9263 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9264 innovation&mdash;again,
9265 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9266 crowd.
9267 </para>
9268 <para>
9269 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9270 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9271 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9272 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9273 </para>
9274 <para>
9275 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9276 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9277 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9278 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9279 2001).
9280 </para></footnote>
9281 overall this history of copyright
9282 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9283 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9284 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9285 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9286 </para>
9287 <para>
9288 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9289 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9290 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9291 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9292 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9293 </para>
9294 <para>
9295 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9296 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9297 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9298 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9299 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9300 copyright
9301 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9302 music
9303 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9304 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9305 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9306 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9307 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9308 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9309 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9310 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9311 </para></footnote>
9312 It has been
9313 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9314 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9315 <!-- f11. -->
9316 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9317 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9318 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9319 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9320 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9321 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9322 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9323 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9324 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9325 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9326 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9327 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9328 available at
9329 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9330 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9331 </para></footnote>
9332 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9333 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9334 </para>
9335 <para>
9336
9337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9338 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9339 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless
9340 he or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9341 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9342 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9343 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9344 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9345 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9346 </para>
9347 <para>
9348 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9349 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9350 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9351 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9352 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9353 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9354 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9355 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9356 recording artists.
9357 </para>
9358 <para>
9359 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9360 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9361 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9362 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9363 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9364 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9365 metropolitan area.
9366 </para>
9367 <para>
9368 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9369 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9370 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9371 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9372 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9373 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9374 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9375 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9376 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9377 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9378 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9379 </para>
9380 <para>
9381
9382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9383 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9384 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9385 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9386 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9387 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9388 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9389 FM radio,
9390 </para>
9391 <blockquote>
9392 <para>
9393 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9394 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9395 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9396 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9397 than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation
9398 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9399 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9400 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9401 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9402 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9403 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9404 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9405 shackles.<footnote><para>
9406 <!-- f12. -->
9407 Lessing, 239.
9408 </para></footnote>
9409 </para>
9410 </blockquote>
9411 <para>
9412 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9413 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9414 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9415 legislation"<footnote><para>
9416 <!-- f13. -->
9417 Ibid., 229.
9418 </para></footnote>
9419 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9420 </para>
9421 <para>
9422 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9423 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9424 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9425 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9426 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9427 radio?
9428 </para>
9429 <para>
9430 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9431 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9432
9433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9434 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9435 phenomenon
9436 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9437 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9438 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9439 hypothetical
9440 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9441 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9442 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9443 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9444 </para>
9445 <para>
9446 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9447 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9448 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9449 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9450 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9451 <para>
9452 <!-- f14. -->
9453 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9454 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9455 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9456 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9457 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9458 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9459 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9460 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9461 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9462 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9463 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9464 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9465 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9466 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9467 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9468 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9469 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9470 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9471 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9472 </para></footnote>
9473 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9474 equivalent fee.
9475 </para>
9476 <para>
9477 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9478 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9479 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9480 </para>
9481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9482 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9483 <listitem><para>
9484 name of the service;
9485 </para></listitem>
9486 <listitem><para>
9487 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9488 </para></listitem>
9489 <listitem><para>
9490 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9491 </para></listitem>
9492 <listitem><para>
9493 date of transmission;
9494 </para></listitem>
9495 <listitem><para>
9496 time of transmission;
9497 </para></listitem>
9498 <listitem><para>
9499 time zone of origination of transmission;
9500 </para></listitem>
9501 <listitem><para>
9502 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9503 </para></listitem>
9504 <listitem><para>
9505 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9506 </para></listitem>
9507 <listitem><para>
9508 sound recording title;
9509 </para></listitem>
9510 <listitem><para>
9511 ISRC code of the recording;
9512 </para></listitem>
9513 <listitem><para>
9514 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9515 </para></listitem>
9516 <listitem><para>
9517 featured recording artist;
9518 </para></listitem>
9519 <listitem><para>
9520 retail album title;
9521 </para></listitem>
9522 <listitem><para>
9523 recording label;
9524 </para></listitem>
9525 <listitem><para>
9526 UPC code of the retail album;
9527 </para></listitem>
9528 <listitem><para>
9529 catalog number;
9530 </para></listitem>
9531 <listitem><para>
9532 copyright owner information;
9533 </para></listitem>
9534 <listitem><para>
9535 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9536 </para></listitem>
9537 <listitem><para>
9538 name of the service or entity;
9539 </para></listitem>
9540 <listitem><para>
9541 channel or program;
9542 </para></listitem>
9543 <listitem><para>
9544 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9545 </para></listitem>
9546 <listitem><para>
9547 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9548 </para></listitem>
9549 <listitem><para>
9550 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9551 </para></listitem>
9552 <listitem><para>
9553 Unique User identifier;
9554 </para></listitem>
9555 <listitem><para>
9556 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9557 </para></listitem>
9558 </orderedlist>
9559
9560 <para>
9561 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9562 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9563 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9564 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9565 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9566 does not.
9567 </para>
9568 <para>
9569 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9570 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9571 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9572 </para>
9573 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9574 <para>
9575 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9576 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9577 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9578 </para>
9579 <blockquote>
9580 <para>
9581 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9582 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9583 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9584 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9585 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9586 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9587
9588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9589 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9590 Because
9591 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9592 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9593 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9594 of business. . . ."
9595 </para>
9596 <para>
9597 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9598 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9599 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9600 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9601 </para>
9602 </blockquote>
9603 <para>
9604 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9605 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9606 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9607 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9608 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9609 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9610 effective to prevent it.
9611 </para>
9612 </sect2>
9613 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9614 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9615 <para>
9616 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9617 dinosaurs
9618 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9619 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9620 </para>
9621 <para>
9622 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9623 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9624 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9625 </para>
9626 <para>
9627 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9628 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9629 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9630 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9631 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9632 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9633 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9634 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9635 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9636 </para></footnote>
9637 According to the RIAA,
9638 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9639 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9640
9641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9642 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9643 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9644 increasingly
9645 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9646 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9647 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9648 extreme
9649 response by the other.
9650 </para>
9651 <para>
9652 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9653 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9654 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9655 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9656 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9657 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9658 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9659 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9660 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9661 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9662 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9663 was.<footnote><para>
9664 <!-- f16. -->
9665 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9666 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9667 </para></footnote>
9668 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9669 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9670 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9671 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9672 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9673 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9674 they oppose.
9675 </para>
9676 <para>
9677 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9678 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9679 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9680 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9681 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9682 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9683 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9684 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9685 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9686 <!-- f17. -->
9687 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9688 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9689 </para></footnote>
9690 We have
9691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9692 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9693 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9694 <!-- f18. -->
9695 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9696 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9697 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9698 </para></footnote>
9699 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9700 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9701 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9702 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9703 cheat.<footnote><para>
9704 <!-- f19. -->
9705 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9706 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9707 compliance literature).
9708 </para></footnote>
9709 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9710 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9711 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9712 </para>
9713 <para>
9714 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9715 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9716 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9717 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9718 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9719 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9720 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9721 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9722 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9723 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9724 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9725 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9726 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9727 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9728 degree of illegality.
9729 </para>
9730 <para>
9731 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9732 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9733 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9734 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9735 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9736 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9737 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9738 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9739 to consider the alternative.
9740 </para>
9741 <para>
9742
9743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9744 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9745 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9746 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9747 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9748 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9749 </para>
9750 <para>
9751 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9752 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9753 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9754 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9755 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9756 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9757 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9758 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9759 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9760 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9761 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9762 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9763 </para>
9764 <para>
9765 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9766 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9767 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9768 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9769 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9770 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9771 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9772 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9773 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9774 a nation of felons?
9775 </para>
9776 <para>
9777 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9778 </para>
9779 <para>
9780 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9781 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9782 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9783 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9784 used
9785
9786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9787 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9788 recordings is free.
9789 </para>
9790 <para>
9791 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9792 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9793 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9794 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9795 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9796 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9797 capacities of digital technologies.
9798 </para>
9799 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9800 <para>
9801 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9802 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9803 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9804 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9805 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9806 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9807 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9808 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9809 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9810 </para>
9811 <para>
9812 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9813 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9814 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9815 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9816 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9817 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9818 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9819 on people's machines.
9820 </para>
9821 <para>
9822 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9823 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9824 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9825 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9826 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9827 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9828
9829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9830 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9831 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9832 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9833 management" system.
9834 </para>
9835 <para>
9836 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9837 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9838 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9839 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9840 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9841 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9842 freedom to move content easily?
9843 </para>
9844 <para>
9845 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9846 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9847 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9848 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9849 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9850 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9851 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9852 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9853 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9854 </para>
9855 <para>
9856 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9857 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9858 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9859 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9860 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9861 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9862 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9863 </para>
9864 <para>
9865 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9866 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9867 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9868 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9869 </para>
9870 <para>
9871 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9872 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9873
9874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9875
9876 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9877 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9878 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9879 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9880 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9881 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9882 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9883 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9884 generally.
9885 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9886 </para>
9887 <para>
9888 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9889 explains,
9890 </para>
9891 <blockquote>
9892 <para>
9893 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9894 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9895 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9896 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9897 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9898 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9899 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9900 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9901 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9902 </para>
9903 </blockquote>
9904 <para>
9905 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9906 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9907 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9908 </para>
9909 <para>
9910 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9911 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9912 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9913 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9914 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9915 an Internet user is revealed.
9916 </para>
9917 <para>
9918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9919 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9920 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9921 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9922 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9923 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9924 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9925 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9926 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9927 <!-- f20. -->
9928 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9929 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9930 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9931 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9932 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9933 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9934 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
9935 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9936 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9937 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
9938 </para></footnote>
9939
9940 </para>
9941 <para>
9942 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9943 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9944 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9945 <!-- f21. -->
9946 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9947 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9948 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9949 </para></footnote>
9950 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9951 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9952 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9953 </para>
9954 <para>
9955 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9956 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
9957 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9958 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9959 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9960 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9961 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9962 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9963 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
9964 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
9965 to deploy,<footnote><para>
9966 <!-- f22. -->
9967 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
9968 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
9969 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
9970 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
9971 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
9972 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
9973 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
9974 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
9975 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
9976 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9977 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
9978 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
9979 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
9980 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
9981 </para></footnote>
9982 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
9983 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
9984 </para>
9985 <para>
9986 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
9987 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
9988 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
9989 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
9990 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
9991 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
9992 college students
9993
9994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
9995 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
9996 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
9997 Says von Lohmann,
9998 </para>
9999 <blockquote>
10000 <para>
10001 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10002 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10003 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10004 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10005 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10006 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10007 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10008 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10009 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10010 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10011 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10012 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10013 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10014 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10015 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10016 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10017 million of them.
10018 </para>
10019 </blockquote>
10020 <para>
10021 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10022 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10023 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10024 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10025 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10026 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10027 </para>
10028
10029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10030 </sect2>
10031 </sect1>
10032 </chapter>
10033 <chapter id="c-balances">
10034 <title>BALANCES</title>
10035
10036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10037 <para>
10038 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10039 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10040 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10041 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10042 </para>
10043 <para>
10044 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10045 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10046 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10047 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10048 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10049 everything around.
10050 </para>
10051 <para>
10052 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10053 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10054 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10055 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10056 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10057 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10058 </para>
10059 <para>
10060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10061 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10062 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10063 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10064 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10065 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10066 made that is happening all around.
10067 </para>
10068 <para>
10069 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10070 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10071 gasoline onto this fire.
10072 </para>
10073 <para>
10074 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10075 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10076 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10077 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10078 </para>
10079 <para>
10080 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10081 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10082 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10083 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10084 success will require.
10085 </para>
10086
10087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10088 <sect1 id="eldred">
10089 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10090 <para>
10091 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10092 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10093 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10094 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10095 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10096 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10097 come alive.
10098 </para>
10099 <para>
10100 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10101 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10102 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10103 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10104 them available for free.
10105 </para>
10106 <para>
10107 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10108 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10109 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10110 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10111 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10113 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10114 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10115 accessible&mdash;today.
10116 </para>
10117 <para>
10118 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10119 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10120 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10121 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10122 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10123 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10124 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10125 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10126 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10127 commercial publications of public domain works.
10128 </para>
10129 <para>
10130 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10131 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10132 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10133 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10134 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10135 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10136 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10137 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10138 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10139 generally.<footnote><para>
10140 <!-- f1. -->
10141 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10142 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10143 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10144 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10145 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10146 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10147 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10148 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10149 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10150 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10151 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10152 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10153 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10154 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10155 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10156 </para>
10157 <para>
10158 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10159 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10160 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10161 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10162 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10163 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10164 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10165 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10166 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10167 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10168 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10169 </para>
10170 <para>
10171
10172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10173 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10174 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10175 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10176 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10177 <!-- f2. -->
10178 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10179 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10180 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10181 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10182 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10183 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10184 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10185 </para></footnote>
10186
10187 </para>
10188 <para>
10189 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10190 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10191 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10192 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10193 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10194 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10195 to undertake.
10196 </para>
10197 <para>
10198 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10199 constitutional
10200 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10201 interpretation.
10202 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10203 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10204 importantly
10205 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10206 </para>
10207 <blockquote>
10208 <para>
10209 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10210 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10211 their . . . Writings. . . .
10212 </para>
10213 </blockquote>
10214 <para>
10215 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10216 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10217 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10218 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10219 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10220 specific&mdash;to "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that
10221 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10222 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10223 </para>
10224 <para>
10225 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10226 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10227 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10228 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10230 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10231 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10232 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10233 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10234 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10235 </para>
10236 <para>
10237 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10238 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10239 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10240 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10241 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10242 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10243 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10244 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10245 this gravy train going.
10246 </para>
10247 <para>
10248 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10249 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10250 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10251 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10252 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10253 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10254 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10255 </para>
10256 <para>
10257 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10258 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10259 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10260 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10261 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10262 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10263 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10264 published by anyone for free.
10265 </para>
10266 <para>
10267 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10268 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10269 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10270 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10271 report:
10272 </para>
10273 <para>
10274 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10275
10276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10277 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10278 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10279 those works.
10280 </para>
10281 <para>
10282 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10283 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10284 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10285 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10286 </para>
10287 <para>
10288 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10289 about it?"
10290 </para>
10291 <para>
10292 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10293 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10294 they support the bill."
10295 </para>
10296 <para>
10297 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10298 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10299 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10300 much is it worth?"
10301 </para>
10302 <para>
10303 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10304 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10305 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10306 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10307 </para>
10308 <para>
10309 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10310 correct conclusion:
10311 </para>
10312 <para>
10313 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10314 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10315 contributions
10316 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10317 </para>
10318 <para>
10319 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10320 contribute
10321 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10322 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10323 </para>
10324 <para>
10325 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10326 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10327 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10328 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10330 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10331 copyrights
10332 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10333 the copyright term extended.
10334 </para>
10335 <para>
10336 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10337 legislation
10338 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10339 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10340 </para>
10341 <para>
10342 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10343 Copyright
10344 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10345 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10346 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10347 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10348 contributions.<footnote><para>
10349 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10350 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10351 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10352 </para></footnote>
10353 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10354 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10355 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10356 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10357 Age," available at
10358 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10359 </para></footnote>
10360 Disney is estimated to have
10361 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10362 cycle.<footnote><para>
10363 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10364 Congressional
10365 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10366 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10367 </para></footnote>
10368
10369 </para>
10370 <para>
10371 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10372 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10373 reality
10374 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10375 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10376 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10377 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10378 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10379 "limited."
10380 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10381 and again.
10382 </para>
10383 <para>
10384 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10385 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10386 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10387 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10388 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10389 scholars,
10390 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10391
10392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10393 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10394 guns near schools.
10395 </para>
10396 <para>
10397 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10398 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10399 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10400 "interstate
10401 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10402 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10403 interstate
10404 commerce.
10405 </para>
10406 <para>
10407 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10408 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10409 activity,
10410 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10411 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10412 interpreted
10413 to impose no limit.
10414 </para>
10415 <para>
10416 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10417 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10418 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10419 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10420 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10421 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10422 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10423 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10424 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10425 government
10426 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10427 </para>
10428 <para>
10429 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10430 arguments,"
10431 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10432 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10433 </para></footnote>
10434 If anything Congress says is interstate
10435 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10436 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10437 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10438 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10439 </para></footnote>
10440
10441 </para>
10442 <para>
10443 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10444 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10445 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10446 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10447 context
10448 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10449 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10450 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10451 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10452 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10453 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10454 </para></footnote>
10455 And if it is applied to the
10456 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10457 Congress
10458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10459 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10460 existing
10461 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10462 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10463 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10464 copyrights
10465 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10466 existing copyrights.
10467 </para>
10468 <para>
10469 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10470 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10471 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10472 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10473 rejected
10474 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10475 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10476 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10477 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10478 boring.
10479 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10480 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10481 </para>
10482 <para>
10483 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10484 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10485 Constitution's
10486 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10487 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10488 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10489 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10490 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10491 already
10492 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10493 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10494 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10495 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10496 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10497 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10498 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10499 </para>
10500 <para>
10501 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10502
10503 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10504 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10505 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10506 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10507 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10508 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10509 </para></footnote>
10510 But
10511 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10512 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10513 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10514 </para>
10515 <para>
10516 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10517 copyright
10518 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10519 influence
10520 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10521 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10522 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10523 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10524 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10525 bought to extend them again.
10526 </para>
10527 <para>
10528 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10529 extended.
10530 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10531 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10532 society
10533 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10534 Disney's.
10535 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10536 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10537 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10538 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10539 exploited,
10540 and no longer available as a result.
10541 </para>
10542 <para>
10543 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10544 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10545 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10546 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10547 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10548 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10549 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10550 Congressional
10551 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10552 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10553 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10554 </para></footnote>
10555
10556 </para>
10557 <para>
10558 Think practically about the consequence of this
10559 extension&mdash;practically,
10560 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10561
10562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10563 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10564 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10565 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10566 remaining
10567 9,873. What would you have to do?
10568 </para>
10569 <para>
10570 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10571 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10572 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10573 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10574 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10575 list of books still under copyright.
10576 </para>
10577 <para>
10578 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10579 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10580 </para>
10581 <para>
10582 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10583 owners
10584 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10585 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10586 being at least a list?
10587 </para>
10588 <para>
10589 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10590 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10591 practically
10592 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10593 thousands
10594 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10595 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10596 </para>
10597 <para>
10598 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10599 apologists
10600 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10601 owners?"
10602 </para>
10603 <para>
10604 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10605 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10606 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10607 suggesting
10608 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10609 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10610 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10611 </para>
10612 <para>
10613 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10614 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10615 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10616
10617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10618 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10619 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10620 happen
10621 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10622 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10623 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10624 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10625 know quite well who owns what property.
10626 </para>
10627 <para>
10628 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10629 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10630 already
10631 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10632 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10633 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10634 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10635 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10636 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10637 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10638 </para>
10639 <para>
10640 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10641 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10642 consequence
10643 for other creative works is much more dire.
10644 </para>
10645 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10646 <para>
10647 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10648 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10649 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10650 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10651 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10652 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10653 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10654 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10655 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10656 films."<footnote><para>
10657 <!-- f11. -->
10658 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10659 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10660 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10661 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10662 </para></footnote>
10663
10664 </para>
10665 <para>
10666 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10667 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10668 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10669 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10670 </para>
10671 <para>
10672 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10673
10674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10675 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10676 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10677 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10678 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10679 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10680 work available for distribution.
10681 </para>
10682 <para>
10683 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10684 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10685 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10686 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10687 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10688 mm film.<footnote><para>
10689 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10690 Supporting
10691 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10692 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10693 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10694 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10695 </para></footnote>
10696
10697 </para>
10698 <para>
10699 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10700 important.
10701 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10702 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10703 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10704 locate the copyright owner.
10705 </para>
10706 <para>
10707 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10708 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10709 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10710 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10711 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10712 exceptionally
10713 high.
10714 </para>
10715 <para>
10716 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10717 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10718 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10719 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10720 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10721 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10722 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10723 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10724 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10725 </para>
10726 <para>
10727 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10728
10729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10730 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10731 benefit
10732 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10733 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10734 the copyright expires.
10735 </para>
10736 <para>
10737 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10738 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10739 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10740 canisters
10741 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10742 than dust.
10743 </para>
10744 <para>
10745 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10746 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10747 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10748 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10749 creative
10750 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10751 free expression."
10752 </para>
10753 <para>
10754 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10755 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10756 indicated,
10757 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10758 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10759 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10760 distributors,
10761 the commercial life ends.
10762 </para>
10763 <para>
10764 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10765 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10766 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10767 between
10768 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10769 Friday
10770 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10771 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10772 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10773 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10774 have, we need to have access to this history.
10775 </para>
10776 <para>
10777 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10778
10779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10780 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10781 this context do no good.
10782 </para>
10783 <para>
10784 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10785 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10786 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10787 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10788 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10789 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10790 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10791 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10792 </para>
10793 <para>
10794 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10795 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10796 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10797 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10798 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10799 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10800 market didn't have more to offer.
10801 </para>
10802 <para>
10803 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10804 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10805 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10806 would not have interfered with anything.
10807 </para>
10808 <para>
10809 But this situation has now changed.
10810 </para>
10811 <para>
10812 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10813 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10814 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10815 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10816 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10817 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10818 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10819 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10820 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10821 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10822 </para>
10823 <para>
10824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10825 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10826 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10827 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10828 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10829 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10830 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10831 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10832 written for a radically different context.
10833 </para>
10834 <para>
10835 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10836 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10837 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10838 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10839 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10840 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10841 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10842 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10843 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10844 </para>
10845 <para>
10846 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10847 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10848 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10849 culture widely?"
10850 </para>
10851 <para>
10852 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10853 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10854 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10855 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10856 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10857 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10858 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10859 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10860 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10861 </para>
10862 <para>
10863 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10864 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10865 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10866 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10867
10868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10869 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10870 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10871 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10872 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10873 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10874 <!-- f13. -->
10875 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10876 December 2002, available at
10877 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10878 </para></footnote>
10879
10880 </para>
10881 <para>
10882 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10883 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10884 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10885 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10886 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10887 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10888 </para>
10889 <para>
10890 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10891 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10892 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10893 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10894 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10895 </para>
10896 <para>
10897 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10898 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10899 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10900 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10901 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10902 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10903 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10904 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10905 power to extend existing terms.
10906 </para>
10907 <para>
10908 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10909 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10910 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10911 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10912 </para>
10913 <para>
10914 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10915 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10916
10917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10918 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10919 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10920 overstepped its bounds.
10921 </para>
10922 <para>
10923 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10924 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10925 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10926 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10927 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10928 </para>
10929 <para>
10930 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10931 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10932 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10933 briefs and preparing for argument.
10934 </para>
10935 <para>
10936 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10937 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10938 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10939 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10940 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10941 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10942 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10943 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10944 </para>
10945 <para>
10946 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10947 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10948 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10949 mistake lost it.
10950 </para>
10951 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10952 <para>
10953 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10954 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10955 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10956 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10957 heat
10958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10959 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10960 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10961 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10962 </para>
10963 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
10964 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
10965 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10966 <para>
10967 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
10968 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
10969 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
10970 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
10971 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
10972 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
10973 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
10974 most powerful media companies in the world."
10975 </para>
10976 <para>
10977 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
10978 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
10979 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
10980 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
10981 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
10982 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
10983 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
10984 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
10985 interpretation
10986 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
10987 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
10988 unconstitutional,
10989 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
10990 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
10991 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
10992 Constitution,
10993 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
10994 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
10995 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
10996 </para>
10997 <para>
10998 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
10999 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11000 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11001 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11002 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11003 why it was unconstitutional.
11004 </para>
11005 <para>
11006 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11007
11008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11009 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11010 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11011 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11012 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11013 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11014 minority.
11015 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11016 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11017 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11018 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11019 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11020 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11021 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11022 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11023 </para>
11024 <para>
11025 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11026 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11027 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11028 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11029 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11030 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11031 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11032 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11033 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11034 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11035 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11036 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11037 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11038 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11039 </para>
11040 <para>
11041 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11042 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11043 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11044 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11045 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11046 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11047 </para>
11048 <para>
11049 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11050 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11051
11052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11053 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11054 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11055 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11056 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11057 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11058 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11059 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11060 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11061 </para>
11062 <para>
11063 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11064 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11065 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11066 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11067 </para>
11068 <para>
11069 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11070 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11071 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11072 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11073 clear.
11074 </para>
11075 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11076 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11077 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11078 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11079 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11080 <para>
11081 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11082 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11083 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11084 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11085 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11086 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11087 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11088 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11089 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11090 </para>
11091 <para>
11092 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11093 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11094 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11095 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11096 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11097 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11098 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11099 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11100
11101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11102 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11103 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11104 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11105 </para>
11106 <para>
11107 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11108 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11109 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11110 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11111 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11112 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11113 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11114 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11115 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11116 confidence in our argument.
11117 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11118 </para>
11119 <para>
11120 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11121 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11122 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11123 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11124 copyright holders.
11125 </para>
11126 <para>
11127 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11128 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11129 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11130 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11131 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11132 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11133 wanted to control.
11134 </para>
11135 <para>
11136 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11137 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11138 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11139 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11140 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11141 pornography."<footnote><para>
11142 <!-- f14. -->
11143 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11144 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11145 </para></footnote>
11146 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11147 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11148 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11149 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11150 <!-- f15. -->
11151 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11152 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11153 </para></footnote>
11154 That's
11155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11156 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11157 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11158 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11159 </para>
11160 <para>
11161 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11162 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11163 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11164 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11165 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11166 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11167 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11168 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11169 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11170 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11171 </para>
11172 <para>
11173 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11174 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11175 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11176 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11177 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11178 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11179 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11180 </para>
11181 <para>
11182 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11183 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11184 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11185 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11186 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11187 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11188 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11189 powers had limits.
11190 </para>
11191 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11192 <para>
11193 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11194 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11195 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11196 the Constitution
11197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11198 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11199 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11200 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11201 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11202 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11203 </para>
11204 <para>
11205 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11206 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11207 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11208 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11209 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11210 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11211 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11212 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11213 sense.
11214 </para>
11215 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11216 <para>
11217 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11218 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11219 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11220 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11221 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11222 these retrospective extensions.
11223 </para>
11224 <para>
11225 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11226 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11227 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11228 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11229 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11230 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11231 </para>
11232 <para>
11233 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11234 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11235 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11236 overriding
11237 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11238 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11239 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11240 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11241 </para>
11242 <para>
11243 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11244 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11245
11246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11247 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11248 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11249 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11250 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11251 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11252 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11253 copyright be limited.
11254 </para>
11255 <para>
11256 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11257 Congress
11258 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11259 government
11260 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11261 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11262 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11263 </para>
11264 <para>
11265 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11266 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11267 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11268 existing
11269 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11270 </para>
11271 <para>
11272 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11273 extended
11274 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11275 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11276 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11277 existing
11278 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11279 restraint
11280 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11281 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11282 hesitated
11283 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11284 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11285 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11286 arrived
11287 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11288 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11289
11290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11291 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11292 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11293 </para>
11294 <para>
11295 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11296 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11297 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11298 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11299 Congress
11300 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11301 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11302 this central idea.
11303 </para>
11304 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11305 <para>
11306 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11307 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11308 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11309 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11310 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11311 </para>
11312 <para>
11313 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11314 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11315 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11316 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11317 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11318 </para>
11319 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11320 <para>
11321 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11322 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11323 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11324 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11325 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11326 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11327 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11328 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11329 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11330 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11331 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11332
11333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11334 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11335 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11336 </para>
11337 <para>
11338 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11339 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11340 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11341 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11342 congressmen
11343 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11344 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11345 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11346 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11347 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11348 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11349 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11350 family of the Justices.
11351 </para>
11352 <para>
11353 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11354 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11355 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11356 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11357 </para>
11358 <para>
11359 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11360 The history was bothering her.
11361 </para>
11362 <blockquote>
11363 <para>
11364 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11365 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11366 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11367 practice that began with the very first act.
11368 </para>
11369 </blockquote>
11370 <para>
11371 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11372 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11373 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11374 </para>
11375 <blockquote>
11376 <para>
11377 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11378 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11380 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11381 is yes.
11382 </para>
11383 </blockquote>
11384 <para>
11385 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11386 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11387 Kennedy, who observed,
11388 </para>
11389 <blockquote>
11390 <para>
11391 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11392 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11393 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11394 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11395 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11396 </para>
11397 </blockquote>
11398 <para>
11399 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11400 student,
11401 I answered,
11402 </para>
11403 <blockquote>
11404 <para>
11405 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11406 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11407 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11408 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11409 effectively
11410 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11411 </para>
11412 </blockquote>
11413 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11414 <para>
11415 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11416 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11417 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11418 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11419 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11420 </para>
11421 <para>
11422 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11423 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11424 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11425 </para>
11426 <para>
11427 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11428 sympathetic.
11429 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11430
11431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11432 </para>
11433 <blockquote>
11434 <para>
11435 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11436 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11437 </para>
11438 <para>
11439 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11440 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11441 domain
11442 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11443 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11444 into the Copyright Clause.
11445 </para>
11446 </blockquote>
11447 <para>
11448 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11449 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11450 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11451 </para>
11452 <blockquote>
11453 <para>
11454 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11455 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11456 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11457 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11458 time.
11459 </para>
11460 </blockquote>
11461 <para>
11462 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11463 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11464 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11465 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11466 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11467 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11468 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11469 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11470 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11471 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11472 Court to my side.
11473 </para>
11474 <para>
11475 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11476 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11477
11478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11479 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11480 optimistic.
11481 </para>
11482 <para>
11483 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11484 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11485 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11486 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11487 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11488 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11489 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11490 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11491 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11492 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11493 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11494 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11495 law that it had established elsewhere.
11496 </para>
11497 <para>
11498 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11499 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11500 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11501 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11502 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11503 </para>
11504 <para>
11505 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11506 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11507 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11508 </para>
11509 <para>
11510 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the world
11511 against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor, scouring
11512 the pages, looking for reasoning.
11513 </para>
11514 <para>
11515 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11516 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11517 Lopez. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11518 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11519 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11520 </para>
11521 <para>
11522
11523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11524 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11525 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11526 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11527 </para>
11528 <para>
11529 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11530 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11531 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11532 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11533 </para>
11534 <para>
11535 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11536 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11537 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11538 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11539 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11540 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11541 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11542 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context
11543 it would not.
11544 </para>
11545 <para>
11546 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11547 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11548 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11549 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11550 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11551 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11552 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11553 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11554 the system we have.
11555 </para>
11556 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11557 <para>
11558 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11559 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11560 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11561 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11562 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11563 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11564 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11565 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11566 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11567 </para>
11568 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11569 <para>
11570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11571 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11572 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11573 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11574 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11575 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11576 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11577 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11578 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11579 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11580 </para>
11581 <para>
11582 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11583 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11584 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11585 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11586 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11587 </para>
11588 <para>
11589 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11590 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11591 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11592 </para>
11593 <para>
11594 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11595 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11596 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11597 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11598 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11599 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11600 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11601 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11602 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11603 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11604 "originalism" now?
11605 </para>
11606 <para>
11607 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11608 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11609 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11610 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11611
11612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11613 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11614 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11615 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11616 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11617 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11618 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11619 own principles.
11620 </para>
11621 <para>
11622 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11623 myself.
11624 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11625 the law as it is.
11626 </para>
11627 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11628 <para>
11629 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11630 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11631 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11632 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11633 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11634 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11635 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11636 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11637 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11638 </para>
11639 <para>
11640 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11641 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11642 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11643 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11644 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11645 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11646 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11647 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11648 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11649 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11650 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11651 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11652 effort to persuade; but I
11653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11654 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11655 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11656 should decide the issue.
11657 </para>
11658 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11659 <para>
11660 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11661 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11662 Kathleen Sullivan?
11663 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11664 </para>
11665 <para>
11666 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11667 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11668 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11669 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11670 </para>
11671 <para>
11672 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11673 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11674 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11675 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11676 have persuaded.
11677 </para>
11678 <para>
11679 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11680 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11681 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11682 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11683 issue should not be raised until it is.
11684 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11685 </para>
11686 <para>
11687 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11688 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11689 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11690 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11691 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11692 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11693 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11694 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11695 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11696 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11697 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11698
11699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11700 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11701 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11702 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11703 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11704 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11705 </para>
11706 <blockquote>
11707 <para>
11708 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11709 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11710 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11711 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11712 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11713 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11714 </para>
11715 </blockquote>
11716 <para>
11717 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11718 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11719 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11720 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11721 in the face felt exactly like that.
11722 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11723 </para>
11724 <para>
11725 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11726 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11727 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11728 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11729 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11730 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11731 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11732 </para>
11733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11734 </sect1>
11735 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11736 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11737 <para>
11738 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11739 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11740 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11741 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11742 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11743 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11744 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11745 </para>
11746 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11747 <para>
11748 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11749 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11750 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11751 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11752 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11753 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11754 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11755 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11756 </para>
11757 <para>
11758 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11759 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11760 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11761 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11762 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11763 the work passed into the public domain.
11764 </para>
11765 <para>
11766 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11767 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11768 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11769 </para>
11770 <para>
11771 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11772 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11773 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11774 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11775 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11776 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11777 everything else, let the content go.
11778 </para>
11779 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11780 <para>
11781 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11782 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11783 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11784 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11785 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11786 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11787 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11788 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11789 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11790 the stupid harm of the present system.
11791 </para>
11792 <para>
11793 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11794 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11795 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11796 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11797 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11798 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11799 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11800 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11801 where copyright owners could be identified.
11802 </para>
11803 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11804 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11805 <para>
11806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11807 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11808 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11809 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11810 <!-- f1. -->
11811 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11812 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11813 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11814 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11815 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11816 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11817 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11818 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11819 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11820 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11821 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11822 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11823 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11824 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11825 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11826 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11827 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11828 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11829 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11830 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11831 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11832 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11833 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11834 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11835 </para>
11836 <para>
11837 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11838 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11839 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11840 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11841 know what's protected and what's not.
11842 </para>
11843 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11844 <para>
11845 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11846 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11847 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11848 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11849 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11850 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11851 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11852 in the loss of widows' only income.
11853 </para>
11854 <para>
11855 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11856 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11857 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11858 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11859 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11860 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11861 </para>
11862 <para>
11863 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11864 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11865 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11866 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11867 burden
11868 imposed upon creators.
11869 </para>
11870 <para>
11871 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11872 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11873
11874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11875 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11876 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11877 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11878 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11879 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11880 table.
11881 </para>
11882 <para>
11883 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11884 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11885 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11886 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11887 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11888 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11889 spread.
11890 </para>
11891 <para>
11892 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11893 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11894 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11895 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11896 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11897 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11898 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11899 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11900 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11901 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11902 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11903 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11904 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11905 system of protection for property generally.
11906 </para>
11907 <para>
11908 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11909 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11910 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11911 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11912 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11913 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11914 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11915 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11916
11917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11918 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11919 take their place.
11920 </para>
11921 <para>
11922 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11923 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11924 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11925 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11926 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11927 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11928 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11929 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11930 </para>
11931 <para>
11932 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11933 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11934 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11935 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11936 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11937 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11938 seen before because there are no formalities.
11939 </para>
11940 <para>
11941 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11942 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11943 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11944 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11945 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11946 </para>
11947 <para>
11948 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11949 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11950 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11951 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11952 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
11953 </para>
11954 <para>
11955 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11956 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11957 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
11958 registration?
11959 </para>
11960 <para>
11961 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
11962 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
11963 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
11964
11965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
11966 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
11967 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
11968 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
11969 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
11970 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
11971 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
11972 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
11973 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
11974 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
11975 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
11976 </para>
11977 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11978 <para>
11979 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
11980 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
11981 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
11982 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
11983 </para>
11984 <para>
11985 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
11986 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
11987 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
11988 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
11989 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
11990 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
11991 something good might happen here.
11992 </para>
11993 <para>
11994 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
11995 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
11996 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
11997 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
11998 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
11999 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12000 </para>
12001 <para>
12002 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12003 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12004 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12006 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12007 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12008 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12009 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12010 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12011 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12012 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12013 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12014 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12015 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12016 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12017 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12018 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12019 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12020 film is a valid derivative use.
12021 </para>
12022 <para>
12023 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12024 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12025 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12026 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12027 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12028 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12029 </para>
12030 <para>
12031 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12032 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12033 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12034 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12035 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12036 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12037 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12038 threat.
12039 </para>
12040 <para>
12041 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12042 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12043 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12044 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12045 sense?
12046 </para>
12047 <para>
12048
12049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12050 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12051 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12052 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12053 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12054 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12055 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12056 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12057 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12058 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12059 </para>
12060 <para>
12061 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12062 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12063 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12064 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12065 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12066 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12067 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12068 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12069 </para>
12070 <para>
12071 What does this industry really want?
12072 </para>
12073 <para>
12074 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12075 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12076 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12077 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12078 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12079 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12080 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12081 permission first.
12082 </para>
12083 <para>
12084 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12085 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12086 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12087 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12088 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12089 </para>
12090 <para>
12091 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12092 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12093
12094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12095 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12096 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12097 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12098 and to share its own creation.
12099 </para>
12100 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12101 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12102 <para>
12103 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12104 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12105 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12106 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12107 block the progress of others.
12108 </para>
12109 <para>
12110 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12111 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12112 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12113 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12114 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12115 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12116 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12117 </para>
12118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12119 </sect1>
12120 </chapter>
12121 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12122 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12123 <para>
12124 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12125 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12126 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12127 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12128 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12129 </para>
12130 <para>
12131 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12132 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12133 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12134 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12135 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12136 the disease almost invisible.
12137 </para>
12138 <para>
12139 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12140 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12141 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12142 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12143 population:
12144 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12145 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12146 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12147 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12148 available at
12149 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12150 release
12151 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12152 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12153 </para></footnote>
12154 </para>
12155 <para>
12156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12157 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12158 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12159 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12160 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12161 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12162 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12163 </para>
12164 <para>
12165 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12166 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12167 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12168 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12169 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12170 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12171 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12172 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12173 changes.
12174 </para>
12175 <para>
12176 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12177 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12178 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12179 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12180 costs significantly below the market price.
12181 </para>
12182 <para>
12183 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12184 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12185 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12186 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12187 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12188 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12189 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12190 <para>
12191 <!-- f2. -->
12192 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12193 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12194 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12195 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12196 </para></footnote>
12197 </para>
12198 <para>
12199 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12200 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12201 Association
12202 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12203 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12204 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12205 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12206 Prepared
12207 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12208 2000), 14, available at
12209 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12210 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12211 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12212 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12213 (statement of James Love).
12214 </para></footnote>
12215 Through the
12216 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12217 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12218 request,
12219 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12221 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12222 began
12223 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12224 government's
12225 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12226 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12227 companies,
12228 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12229 international
12230 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12231 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12232 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12233 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12234 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12235 <!-- f4. -->
12236 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12237 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12238 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12239 Organization (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12240 </para>
12241 <para>
12242 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12243 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12244 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12245 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12246 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12247 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12248 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12249 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12250 </para>
12251 <para>
12252 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12253 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12254 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12255 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12256 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12257 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12258 </para>
12259 <para>
12260 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12261 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12262 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12263 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12264 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12265 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12266 by U.S. companies.
12267 </para>
12268 <para>
12269 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12270 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12271 argument
12272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12273 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12274 <!-- f5. -->
12275 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12276 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12277 May 1999, A1, available at
12278 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12279 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12280 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12281 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12282 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12283 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12284 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12285 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12286 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12287 Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12289 </para></footnote>
12290 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12291 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12292 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12293 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12294 </para>
12295 <para>
12296 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12297 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12298 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12299 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12300 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12301 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12302 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12303 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12304 </para>
12305 <para>
12306 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12307 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12308 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12309 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12310 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12311 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12312 </para>
12313 <para>
12314 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12315 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12316 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12317 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12318 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12319 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12320 </para>
12321 <para>
12322 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12323 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12324 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12325 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12326 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12327 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12328 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12329 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12331 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12332 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12333 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12334 idea called "intellectual property."
12335 </para>
12336 <para>
12337 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12338 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12339 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12340 What is the argument?
12341 </para>
12342 <para>
12343 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12344 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12345 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12346 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12347 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12348 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12349 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12350 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12351 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12352 were balanced in just this sense.
12353 </para>
12354 <para>
12355 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12356 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12357 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12358 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12359 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12360 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12361 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12362 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12363 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12364 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12365 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12366 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12367 our
12368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12369 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12370 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12371 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12372 this common sense open its eyes.
12373 </para>
12374 <para>
12375 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12376 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12377 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12378 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12379 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12380 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12381 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12382 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12383 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12384 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12385 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12386 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12387 </para>
12388 <para>
12389 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12390 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12391 meeting.<footnote><para>
12392 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12393 August 2003, E1, available at
12394 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12395 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12396 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12397 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12398 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12399 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12400 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12401 </para></footnote>
12402 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12403 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12404 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12405 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12406 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12407 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12408 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12409 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12410 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12411 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12412 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12413 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12414 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12416 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12417 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12418 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12419 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12420 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12421 </para>
12422 <para>
12423 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12424 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12425 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12426 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12427 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12428 </para>
12429 <para>
12430 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12431 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12432 meeting.
12433 </para></footnote>
12434 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12435 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12436 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12437 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12438 property issues.
12439 </para>
12440 <para>
12441 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12442 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12443 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12444 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12445 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12446 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12447 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12448 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12449 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12450 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12451 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12452 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12453 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12454 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12455 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12456 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12457 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12458 stuff of
12459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12460 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12461 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12462 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12463 </para>
12464 <para>
12465 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12466 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12467 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12468 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12469 </para>
12470 <para>
12471 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12472 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12473 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12474 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12475 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12476 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12477 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12478 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12479 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12480 </para>
12481 <para>
12482 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12483 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12484 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12485 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12486 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12487 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12488 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12489 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12490 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12491 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12492 <!-- f8. -->
12493 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12494 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12495 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12496 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12497 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12498 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12499 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," Government Policy
12500 Toward Open Source Software (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12501 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12502 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12503 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12504 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, The Commercial Software
12505 Model, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12506 May 2001), available at
12507 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12508 </para></footnote>
12509 </para>
12510 <para>
12511 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12512 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12513 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12514 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12515 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12516 by
12517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12518 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12519 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12520 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12521 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12522 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12523 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12524 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12525 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12526 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12527 </para>
12528 <para>
12529 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12530 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12531 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12532 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12533 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12534 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12535 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12536 <!-- f9. -->
12537 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12538 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12539 </para></footnote>
12540 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12541 </para>
12542 <para>
12543 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12544 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12545 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12546 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12547 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12548 its lobbying efforts.
12549 </para>
12550 <para>
12551 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12552 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12553 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12554 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12555 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12556 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12557 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12558 goals of WIPO."
12559 </para>
12560 <para>
12561 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12562 </para>
12563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12564 <para>
12565 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12566 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12567 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12568 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12569 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12570 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12571 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12572 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12573 </para>
12574 <para>
12575 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12576 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12577 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12578 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12579 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12580 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12581 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12582 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12583 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12584 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12585 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12586 </para>
12587 <para>
12588 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12589 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12590 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12591 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12592 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12593 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12594 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12595 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12596 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12597 right to decide what to do with their property.
12598 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12599 </para>
12600 <para>
12601 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12602 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12603 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12604 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12605 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12606 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12607 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12608 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12609 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12610 way possible.
12611 </para>
12612 <para>
12613 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12614 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12615 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12616 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12617 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12618 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12619 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12620 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12621 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12622 that control.
12623 </para>
12624 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12625 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12626 <para>
12627 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12628 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12629 <!-- f10. -->
12630 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12631 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12632 </para></footnote>
12633 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12634 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12635 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12636 </para>
12637 <para>
12638 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12639 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12640 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12641 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12642 </para>
12643 <blockquote>
12644 <para>
12645 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12646 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12647 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12648 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12649 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12650 say anything wrong. But in the world
12651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12652 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12653 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12654 </para>
12655 </blockquote>
12656 <para>
12657 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12658 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12659 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12660 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12661 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12662 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12663 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12664 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12665 </para>
12666 <para>
12667 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12668 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12669 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12670 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12671 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12672 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12673 </para>
12674 <para>
12675 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12676 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12677 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12678 our own country's history).
12679 </para>
12680 <para>
12681 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12682 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12683 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12684 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12685 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12686 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12687 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12688 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12689 democracy in the world, become?
12690 </para>
12691 <para>
12692 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12693 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12694 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12696 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12697 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12698 </para>
12699 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12700 <para>
12701 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12702 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12703 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12704 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12705 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12706 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12707 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12708 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12709 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12710 hearings and a different result.
12711 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12712 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12713 </para>
12714 <para>
12715 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12716 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12717 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12718 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12719 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12720 concentration in the media.
12721 </para>
12722 <para>
12723 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12724 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12725 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12726 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12727 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12728 </para>
12729 <para>
12730 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12731 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12732 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12733 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12734 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12735 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12736 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12737 </para>
12738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12739 <para>
12740 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12741 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12742 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12743 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12744 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12745 </para>
12746 <para>
12747 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12748 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12749 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12750 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12751 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12752 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12753 </para>
12754 <para>
12755 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12756 of our tragedy.
12757 </para>
12758 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12759 <para>
12760 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12761 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12762 <!-- f11. -->
12763 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12764 2003, available at
12765 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12766 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12767 2003, available at
12768 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12769 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12770 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12771 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12772 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12773 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12774 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12775 available at
12776 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12777 </para></footnote>
12778 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12779 music.<footnote><para>
12780 <!-- f12. -->
12781 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12782 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12783 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12784 </para></footnote>
12785 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12786 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12787 <!-- f13. -->
12788 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12789 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12790 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12792 </para></footnote>
12793 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12794 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12795 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12796 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12797 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12798 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12799 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12800 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12801 kids who use a computer to share content.
12802 </para>
12803 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12804 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12805 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12806 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12807 <para>
12808 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12809 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12810 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12811 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12812 24 August 2003, available at
12813 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12814 </para></footnote>
12815 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12816 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12817 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12818 country.<footnote><para>
12819 <!-- f15. -->
12820 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12821 available at
12822 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12823 </para></footnote>
12824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12825 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12826 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12827 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12828 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12829 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12830 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12831 day into the Causbys.
12832 </para>
12833 <para>
12834 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12835 potential is ever to be realized.
12836
12837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12838
12839 </para>
12840 </chapter>
12841 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12842 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12843 <para>
12844
12845 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12846 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12847 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12848 maps what might be done.
12849 </para>
12850 <para>
12851 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12852 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12853 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12854 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12855 </para>
12856 <para>
12857 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12858 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12859 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12860 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12861 is so important.
12862 </para>
12863 <para>
12864 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12865 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12866 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12867 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12868 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12869 </para>
12870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12871
12872 <sect1 id="usnow">
12873 <title>US, NOW</title>
12874 <para>
12875 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12876 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12877 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12878 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12879 </para>
12880 <para>
12881 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12882 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12883 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12884 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12885 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12886 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12887 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12888 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12889 </para>
12890 <para>
12891 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12892 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12893 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12894 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12895 the
12896
12897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12898 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12899 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12900 unprotected.
12901 </para>
12902 <para>
12903 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12904 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12905 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12906 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12907 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12908 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12909 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12910 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12911 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12912 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12913 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12914 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12915 </para>
12916 <para>
12917 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12918 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12919 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12920 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12921 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12922 before.
12923 </para>
12924
12925 <sect2 id="examples">
12926 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12927 <para>
12928 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12929 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12930 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12931 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12932 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12933 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12934 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12935 assured.
12936 </para>
12937 <para>
12938 What made it assured?
12939 </para>
12940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12941 <para>
12942 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12943 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12944 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12945 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12946 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12947 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12948 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12949 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12950 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12951 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12952 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12953 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12954 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12955 </para>
12956 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
12957 <para>
12958 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12959 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
12960 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
12961 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
12962 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
12963 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
12964 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
12965 protected by the friction disappears, too.
12966 </para>
12967 <para>
12968 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
12969 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
12970 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
12971 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
12972 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
12973 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
12974 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
12975 disappears.
12976 </para>
12977 <para>
12978 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
12979 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
12980 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
12981 friction did.<footnote><para>
12982 <!-- f1. -->
12983
12984 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
12985 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
12986 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
12987
12988 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
12989 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
12990 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
12991 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
12992 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
12993 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
12994 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
12995
12996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
12997 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
12998 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
12999 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13000 </para>
13001 <para>
13002 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13003 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13004 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13005 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13006 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13007 care much about controlling their software.
13008 </para>
13009 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13010 <para>
13011 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13012 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13013 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13014 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13015 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13016 people's work.
13017 </para>
13018 <para>
13019 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13020 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13021 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13022 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13023 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13024 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13025 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13026 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13027 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13028 anything else?
13029 </para>
13030 <para>
13031 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13032 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13033 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13034 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13035 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13036 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13037 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13038 </para>
13039 <para>
13040 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13041 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13043 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13044 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13045 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13046 fundamentally weakened.
13047 </para>
13048 <para>
13049 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13050 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13051 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13052 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13053 </para>
13054 <para>
13055 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13056 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13057 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13058 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13059 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13060 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13061 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13062 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13063 byproduct.
13064 </para>
13065 <para>
13066 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13067 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13068 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13069 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13070 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13071 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13072 </para>
13073 <para>
13074 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13075 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13076 scientific journals are produced.
13077 </para>
13078 <para>
13079 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13080 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13081 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13082 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13083 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13084 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13085 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13086 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13087 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13088 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13089 and Westlaw are also free
13090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13091 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13092 Court opinion through their respective services.
13093 </para>
13094 <para>
13095 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13096 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13097 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13098 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13099 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13100 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13101 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13102 </para>
13103 <para>
13104 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13105 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13106 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13107 </para>
13108 <para>
13109 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13110 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13111 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13112 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13113 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13114 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13115 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13116 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13117 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13118 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13119 </para>
13120 <para>
13121 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13122 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13123 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13124 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13125 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13126 granted before.
13127 </para>
13128 <para>
13129 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13130 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13131 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13132 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13134 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13135 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13136 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13137 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13138 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13139 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13140 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13141 </para>
13142 <para>
13143 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13144 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13145 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13146 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13147 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13148 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13149 and science.
13150 </para>
13151
13152 </sect2>
13153 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13154 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13155 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13156 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13157 </indexterm>
13158 <para>
13159 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13160 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13161 </para>
13162 <para>
13163 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13164 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13165 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13166 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13167 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13168 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13169 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13170 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13171 </para>
13172 <para>
13173 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13174 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13175 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13176 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13177 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13178 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13179 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13180 description, and
13181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13182 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13183 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13184 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13185 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13186 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13187 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13188 certain freedoms are given.
13189 </para>
13190 <para>
13191 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13192 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13193 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13194 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13195 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13196 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13197 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13198 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13199 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13200 </para>
13201 <para>
13202 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13203 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13204 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13205 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13206 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13207 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13208 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13209 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13210 a public domain.
13211 </para>
13212 <para>
13213 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13214 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13215 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13216 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13217 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13218 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13220 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13221 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13222 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13223 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13224 </para>
13225 <para>
13226 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13227 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13228 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13229 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13230 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13231 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13232 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13233 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13234 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13235 to begin to build those rules.
13236 </para>
13237 <para>
13238 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13239 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13240 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13241 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13242 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13243 </para>
13244 <para>
13245 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13246 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13247 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13248 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13249 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13250 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13251 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13252 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13253 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13254 sales of Cory's book.
13255 </para>
13256 <para>
13257 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13258 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13259 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13260 was a total success.
13261 </para>
13262 <para>
13263 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13264 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13266 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13267 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13268 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13269 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13270 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13271 well.
13272 </para>
13273 <para>
13274 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13275 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13276 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13277 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13278 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13279 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13280 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13281 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13282 with their own art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13283 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13284 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13285 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13286 because the legal costs are so high<footnote><para>
13287 <!-- f2. -->
13288
13289 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13290 Culture Wars (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13291 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13292 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13293 </para></footnote>),
13294 these artists release into the creative environment content
13295 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13296 </para>
13297 <para>
13298 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13299 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13300 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13301 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13302 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13303 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13304 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13305 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13306 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13307 say it to others.
13308 </para>
13309 <para>
13310 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13311 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13312 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13313 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13314
13315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13316 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13317 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13318 </para>
13319 <para>
13320 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13321 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13322 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13323 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13324 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13325 steps are possible.
13326 </para>
13327 <para>
13328 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13329 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13330 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13331 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13332 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13333 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13334 creativity to spread more easily.
13335 </para>
13336 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13337
13338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13339 </sect2>
13340 </sect1>
13341 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13342 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13343 <para>
13344 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13345 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13346 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13347 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13348 changes that we need.
13349 </para>
13350 <para>
13351 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13352 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13353 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13354 to our end.
13355 </para>
13356
13357 <sect2 id="formalities">
13358 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13359 <para>
13360 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13361 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13362 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13363 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13364 </para>
13365 <para>
13366 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13367 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13368 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13369 protected.
13370 </para>
13371 <para>
13372 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13373 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13374 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13375 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13376 </para>
13377 <para>
13378 Why?
13379 </para>
13380 <para>
13381 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13382 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13383 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13384 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13385 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13386 formalities were getting in the way.
13387 </para>
13388 <para>
13389 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13390 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13391 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13392 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13393 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13394 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13395 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13396 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13397 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13398 they otherwise could speak.
13399 </para>
13400 <para>
13401 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13402 <!-- f1. -->
13403 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13404 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13405 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13406 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13407 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13408 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13409 </para>
13410 <para>
13411 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13412 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13413 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13414 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13415 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13416 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13417 developed by others.
13418 </para>
13419
13420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13421
13422 <sect3 id="registration">
13423 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13424 <para>
13425 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13426 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13427 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13428 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13429 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13430 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13431 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13432 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13433 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13434 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13435 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13436 </para>
13437 <para>
13438 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13439 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13440 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13441 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13442 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13443 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13444 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13445 </para>
13446 <para>
13447 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13448 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13449 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13450 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13451 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13452 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13453 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13454 with which registration occurs up.
13455 </para>
13456 <para>
13457 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13458 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13459 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13460 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13461 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13462 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13463 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13464 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13465 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13467 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13468 </para>
13469
13470 </sect3>
13471 <sect3 id="marking">
13472 <title>MARKING</title>
13473 <para>
13474 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13475 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13476 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13477 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13478 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13479 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13480 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13481 uniformly across all media.
13482 </para>
13483 <para>
13484 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13485 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13486 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13487 use the work.
13488 </para>
13489 <para>
13490 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13491 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13492 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13493 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13494 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13495 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13496 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13497 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13498 </para>
13499 <para>
13500 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13501 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13502 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13503 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13504 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13505 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13506 <!-- f2. -->
13507 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13508 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13509 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13510 </para></footnote>
13511 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13512 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13513 stop using the work in any new
13514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13515 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13516 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13517 their work.
13518 </para>
13519 <para>
13520 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13521 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13522 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13523 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13524 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13525 </para>
13526 <para>
13527 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13528 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13529 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13530 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13531 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13532 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13533 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13534 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13535 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13536 </para>
13537 <para>
13538 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13539 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13540 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13541 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13542 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13543 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13544 </para>
13545 <para>
13546 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13547 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13548 make things unclear.
13549 </para>
13550 <para>
13551 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13552 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13553 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13554 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13555 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13556 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13557 </para>
13558
13559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13560 </sect3>
13561 </sect2>
13562 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13563 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13564 <para>
13565 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13566 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13567 natural authors.
13568 </para>
13569 <para>
13570 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13571 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13572 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13573 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13574 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13575 term.<footnote><para>
13576 <!-- f3. -->
13577 "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13578 available at
13579 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13580 </para></footnote>
13581 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13582 </para>
13583 <para>
13584 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13585 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13586 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13587 terms.
13588 </para>
13589 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13590 <listitem><para>
13591 <!-- (1) -->
13592 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13593 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13594 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13595 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13596 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13597 regulations when it no longer benefits an author. </para></listitem>
13598 <listitem><para>
13599 <!-- (2) -->
13600 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13601 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13602 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13603 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13604 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13605 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13606 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13607 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13608 navigate.
13609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13610 </para></listitem>
13611 <listitem><para>
13612 <!-- (3) -->
13613 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13614 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13615 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13616 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13617 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13618 veteran to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13619 <!-- f4. -->
13620 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13621 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13622 available at
13623 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13624 </para></footnote>
13625 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13626 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13627 single form.
13628 </para></listitem>
13629 <listitem><para>
13630 <!-- (4) -->
13631 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13632 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13633 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to
13634 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13635 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13636 fewer authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13637 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13638 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13639 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13640 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13641 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13642 not increase their creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done,
13643 and there's nothing we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13644 </orderedlist>
13645 <para>
13646 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13647 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13648 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13649 </para>
13650 <para>
13651 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13652 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13653 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13654 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13655 </para>
13656
13657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13658
13659 </sect2>
13660 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13661 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13662 <para>
13663 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13664 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13665 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13666 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13667 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13668 the emergence of that new technology.
13669 </para>
13670 <para>
13671 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13672 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13673 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13674 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13675 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13676 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13677 though that movie is not "my writing."
13678 </para>
13679 <para>
13680 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13681 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13682 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13683 <!-- f5. -->
13684 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13685 University Press, 1967), 32.
13686 </para></footnote>
13687 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13688 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13689 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13690 </para>
13691 <blockquote>
13692 <para>
13693 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13694 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13695 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13696 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13697 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13698 </para></footnote>
13699 </para>
13700 </blockquote>
13701 <para>
13702 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13703 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13704 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13705 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13706 Consider each limitation in turn.
13707 </para>
13708 <para>
13709 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13710 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13711
13712 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13713 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13714 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13715 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13716 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13717 after the creative work is done.
13718 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13719 </para>
13720 <para>
13721 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13722 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13723 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13724 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13725 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13726 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13727 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13728 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13729 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13730 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13731 </para>
13732 <para>
13733 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13734 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13735 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13736 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13737 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13738 much more sense.
13739 </para>
13740 <para>
13741 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13742 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13743 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13744 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13745 <para>
13746 <!-- f7. -->
13747 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13748 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13749 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13750 </para></footnote>
13751 His view is that the law should be written so that
13752 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13753 </para>
13754 <para>
13755 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13756 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13757 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13758 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13759 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13760 </para>
13761 <para>
13762 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13764 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13765 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13766 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13767 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13768 </para>
13769 </sect2>
13770
13771 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13772 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13773 <para>
13774 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13775 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13776 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13777 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13778 battles around the sharing of music.
13779 </para>
13780 <para>
13781 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13782 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13783 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13784 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13785 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13786 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13787 innovation on the network.
13788 </para>
13789 <para>
13790 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13791 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13792 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13793 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13794 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13795 </para>
13796 <para>
13797 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13798 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13799 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13800 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13801 </para>
13802 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13803 <listitem><para>
13804 <!-- A. -->
13805 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13806 for purchasing CDs.
13807 </para></listitem>
13808 <listitem><para>
13809 <!-- B. -->
13810 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13811 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13812 </para></listitem>
13813 <listitem><para>
13814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13815 <!-- C. -->
13816 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13817 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13818 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13819 </para></listitem>
13820 <listitem><para>
13821 <!-- D. -->
13822 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13823 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13824 owner plainly endorses.
13825 </para></listitem>
13826 </orderedlist>
13827 <para>
13828 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13829 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13830 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13831 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13832 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13833 significantly weakened.
13834 </para>
13835 <para>
13836 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13837 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13838 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13839 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13840 networks.
13841 </para>
13842 <para>
13843 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13844 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13845 should respond.
13846 </para>
13847 <para>
13848 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13849 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13850 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13851 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13852 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13853 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13854 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13855 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13856 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13857 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13858 </para>
13859 <para>
13860 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13861 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13862 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13864 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13865 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13866 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13867 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13868 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13869 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13870 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13871 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13872 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13873 </para>
13874 <para>
13875 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13876 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
13877 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13878 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13879 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13880 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13881 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13882 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13883 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13884 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13885 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13886 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13887 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13888 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13889 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13890 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13891 <!-- f8. -->
13892 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13893 April 2002, available at
13894 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13895 </para></footnote>
13896
13897 </para>
13898 <para>
13899 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13900 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13901 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13902 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13903 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13904 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13905 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13906 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13907 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13908 artists get paid, during
13909
13910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13911 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13912 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13913 </para>
13914 <para>
13915 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13916 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13917 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13918 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13919 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13920 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13921 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13922 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13923 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13924 </para>
13925 <para>
13926 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13927 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13928 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13929 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13930 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13931 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13932 way that returns something to the artist.
13933 </para>
13934 <para>
13935 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13936 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13937 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13938 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13939 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13940 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13941 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13942 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13943 </para>
13944 <para>
13945 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13946 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13947 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13948 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13949 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13950 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13951 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13952 </para>
13953 <para>
13954
13955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13956 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
13957 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
13958 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
13959 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
13960 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
13961 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
13962 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
13963 trade.
13964 </para>
13965 <para>
13966 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
13967 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
13968 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
13969 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
13970 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
13971 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
13972 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
13973 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
13974 </para>
13975 <para>
13976 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
13977 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
13978 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
13979 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
13980 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
13981 delivering and accessing content.
13982 </para>
13983 <para>
13984 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
13985 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
13986 </para>
13987 <para>
13988 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
13989 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
13990 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
13991 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
13992 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
13993 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
13994 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
13995 harmed the interests of the content industry.
13996 </para>
13997 <para>
13998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
13999 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14000 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14001 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14002 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14003 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14004 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14005 </para>
14006 <para>
14007 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14008 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14009 <para>
14010 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14011 10 October 2000), available at
14012 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14013 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14014 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14015 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14016 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14017 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14018 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14019 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14020 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14021 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14022 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14023 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14024 available at
14025 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14026 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14027 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14028 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14029 2002, available at
14030 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14031 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14032 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14033 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14034 2002, available at
14035 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14036 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14037 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14038 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14039 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14040 debate by about a decade. See
14041 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14042 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14043 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14044 </para></footnote>
14045 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14046 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14047 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14048 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14049 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14050 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14051 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14052 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14053 tax.
14054 </para>
14055 <para>
14056 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14057 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14058 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14059 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14060 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14061 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14062 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14063 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14064 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14065 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14066 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14067 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14068 controlling access.
14069 </para>
14070 <para>
14071 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14072 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14073 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14074 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14075 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14076 limits on derivative
14077
14078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14079 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14080 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14081 allowed to do with the content itself.
14082 </para>
14083 <para>
14084 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14085 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14086 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14087 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14088 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14089 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14090 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14091 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14092 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14093 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14094 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14095 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14096 on-line.
14097 </para>
14098 <para>
14099 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14100 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14101 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14102 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14103 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14104 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14105 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14106 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14107 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14108 finding ways to compete with "free."
14109 </para>
14110 <para>
14111 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14112 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14113 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14114 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14115 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14116 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14117 the law.
14118 </para>
14119 <para>
14120 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14121 </para>
14122 <para>
14123
14124 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14125 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14126 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14127 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14128 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14129 create.
14130 </para>
14131 <para>
14132 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14133 by
14134 </para>
14135 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14136 <listitem><para>
14137 <!-- 1. -->
14138 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14139 </para></listitem>
14140 <listitem><para>
14141 <!-- 2. -->
14142 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14143 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14144 statute;
14145 </para></listitem>
14146 <listitem><para>
14147 <!-- 3. -->
14148 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14149 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14150 </para></listitem>
14151 </orderedlist>
14152 <para>
14153 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14154 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14155 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14156 something then?
14157 </para>
14158 <para>
14159 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14160 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14161 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14162 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14163 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14164 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14165 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14166 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14167 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14168 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14169 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14170 pirates.
14171 </para>
14172 <para>
14173 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14174 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14175 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14176
14177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14178 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14179 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14180 </para>
14181 </sect2>
14182
14183 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14184 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14185 <para>
14186 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14187 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14188 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14189 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14190 </para>
14191 <para>
14192 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14193 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14194 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14195 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14196 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14197 strong view queers the law.
14198 </para>
14199 <para>
14200 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14201 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14202 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14203 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14204 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14205 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14206 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14207 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14208 <!-- f10. -->
14209 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14210 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14211 </para></footnote>
14212
14213 </para>
14214 <para>
14215 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14216 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14217 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14218 </para>
14219 <para>
14220 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14221 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14222 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14223 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14224 <!-- f11. -->
14225 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14226 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14227 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14228 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14229 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14230 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14231 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14232 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14233 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14234 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14235 available at
14236 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14237 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14238 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14239 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14240 Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14241 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14242 </para></footnote>
14243 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14244 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14245 them it works.
14246 </para>
14247 <para>
14248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14249 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14250 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14251 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14252 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14253 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14254 practically never be done.
14255 </para>
14256 <para>
14257 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14258 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14259 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14260 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14261 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14262 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14263 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14264 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14265 </para>
14266 <para>
14267 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14268 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14269 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14270 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14271 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14272 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14273 </para>
14274 <para>
14275 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14276 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14277 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14278 its review.
14279 </para>
14280 <para>
14281 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14282 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14283 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14284 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14285 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14286 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14287 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14288 </para>
14289 <para>
14290 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14291 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14292
14293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14294 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14295 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14296 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14297 </para>
14298 <para>
14299 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14300 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14301 keep your lawyers away.
14302 </para>
14303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14304 </sect2>
14305 </sect1>
14306 </chapter>
14307 <chapter id="c-notes">
14308 <title>NOTES</title>
14309 <para>
14310 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14311 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14312 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14313 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14314 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14315 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14316 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14317 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14318 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14319 the material.
14320 </para>
14321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14322
14323 </chapter>
14324 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14325 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14326 <para>
14327 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14328 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14329 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14330 to him that this book is dedicated.
14331 </para>
14332 <para>
14333 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14334 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14335 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14336 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14337 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14338 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14339 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14340 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14341 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14342 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14343 critical eye on much of this.
14344 </para>
14345 <para>
14346 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14347 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14348 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14349 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14351 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14352 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14353 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14354 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14355 </para>
14356 <para>
14357 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14358 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14359 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14360 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14361 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14362 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14363 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14364 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14365 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14366 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14367 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14368 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14369 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14370 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14371 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14372 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14373 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14374 a bunch of great replies.)
14375 </para>
14376 <para>
14377 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14378 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14379 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14380 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14381 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14382 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14383 throughout this book.
14384 </para>
14385 <para>
14386 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14387 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14388 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14389 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14390 </para>
14391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14392
14393 </chapter>
14394 </book>