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16 <!--
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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
26 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
27
28 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
29
30 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
31
32 <authorgroup>
33 <author>
34 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
35 <surname>Lessig</surname>
36 </author>
37 </authorgroup>
38
39 <copyright>
40 <year>2004</year>
41 <holder>
42 Lawrence Lessig. This version of Free Culture is licensed under a
43 Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
44 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
45 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
46 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
47 </holder>
48 </copyright>
49
50 <abstract>
51 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
52 <para>
53 LAWRENCE LESSIG
54 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
55 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
56 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
57 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
58 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
59 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
60 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
61 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
62 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
63 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
64 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
65 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
66 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
67 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
68 Appeals.
69 </para>
70 </abstract>
71 </bookinfo>
72
73 <colophon>
74 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
75
76 <para>
77 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
78 </para>
79 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
83 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
84 </itemizedlist>
85 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
86
87 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
88 <para>
89 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
90 </para>
91 <para>
92 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
93 </para>
94 <para>
95 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
96 </para>
97
98 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
99 <para>
100 THE PENGUIN PRESS
101 </para>
102 <para>
103 NEW YORK
104 </para>
105
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
107 <para>
108 FREE CULTURE
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
115 </para>
116
117 <para>
118 LAWRENCE LESSIG
119 </para>
120
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
122 <para>
123 THE PENGUIN PRESS
124 </para>
125 <para>
126 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
127 York, New York
128 </para>
129 <para>
130 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
131 </para>
132 <para>
133 All rights reserved
134 </para>
135 <para>
136 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
137 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
138 Reprinted with permission.
139 </para>
140 <para>
141 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
142 </para>
143 <para>
144 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
145 </para>
146 <para>
147 Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
148 </para>
149 <para>
150 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
151 </para>
152 <para>
153 Lessig, Lawrence.
154 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
155 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
156 </para>
157 <para>
158 p. cm.
159 </para>
160 <para>
161 Includes index.
162 </para>
163 <para>
164 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
165 </para>
166 <para>
167 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
168 </para>
169 <para>
170 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
171 </para>
172 <para>
173 KF2979.L47
174 </para>
175 <para>
176 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
177 </para>
178 <para>
179 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
180 </para>
181 <para>
182 Printed in the United States of America
183 </para>
184 <para>
185 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
186 </para>
187 <para>
188 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
189 </para>
190
191 <para>
192 &translationblock;
193 </para>
194
195 <para>
196 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
197 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
198 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
199 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
200 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
201 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
202 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
203 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
204 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
205 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
206 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
207 </para>
208 </colophon>
209
210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
211 <dedication>
212 <para>
213 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
214 it continues still.
215 </para>
216
217 <para>
218 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
219 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
220 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
221 </figure>
222 </para>
223 </dedication>
224
225 <toc id="toc"></toc>
226
227 <lot>
228 <title>List of figures</title>
229 </lot>
230
231 <!--
232 c PREFACE xiii
233 c INTRODUCTION
234 c "PIRACY"
235 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
236 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
237 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
238 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
239 2 Film
240 2 Recorded Music
241 2 Radio
242 2 Cable TV
243 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
244 2 Piracy I
245 2 Piracy II
246 c "PROPERTY"
247 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
248 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
249 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
250 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
251 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
252 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
253 2 Beginnings
254 2 Law: Duration
255 2 Law: Scope
256 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
257 2 Architecture and Law: Force
258 2 Market: Concentration
259 2 Together
260 c PUZZLES
261 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
262 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
263 2 Constraining Creators
264 2 Constraining Innovators
265 2 Corrupting Citizens
266 c BALANCES
267 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
268 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
269 c CONCLUSION
270 c AFTERWORD
271 1 Us, Now
272 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
273 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
274 1 Them, Soon
275 2 1. More Formalities
276 3 Registration and Renewal
277 3 Marking
278 2 2. Shorter Terms
279 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
280 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
281 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 c NOTES
283 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
284 c INDEX
285 -->
286
287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
288
289 <preface id="preface">
290 <title>PREFACE</title>
291 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
292 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
293 </indexterm>
294 <para>
295 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
296 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
297 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
298 </para>
299 <blockquote>
300 <para>
301 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
302 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
303 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
304 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
305 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
306 </para></footnote>
307 </para>
308 </blockquote>
309 <para>
310 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
311 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
312 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
313 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
314 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
315 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
316 </para>
317 <para>
318 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
319 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
320 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
322 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
323 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
324 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
325 </para>
326 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
327 <para>
328 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
329 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
330 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
331 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
332 </para>
333 <para>
334 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
335 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
336 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
337 free software movement<footnote>
338 <para>
339 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
340 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
341 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
342 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
343 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
344 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
345 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
346 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
347 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
348 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
349 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
350 or of creators from the past.
351 </para>
352 <para>
353 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
354 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
355 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
356 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
357 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
358 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
359 culture deem fundamental.
360 </para>
361 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
362 <para>
363 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
364 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
365 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
366 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
367 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
368 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
369 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
370 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
371 he asked,
372 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
373 </para>
374 <blockquote>
375 <para>
376 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
377 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
378 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
379 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
380 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
381 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
382 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
383 </para></footnote>
384 </para>
385 </blockquote>
386 <para>
387 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
388 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
389 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
390 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
391 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
392 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
393 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
394 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
395 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
396 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
397 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
398 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
399 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
400 that this work is "merely" derivative.
401 </para>
402 <para>
403 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
404 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
405 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
406 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
407 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
408 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
409 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
410 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
411
412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
413 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
414 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
415 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
416 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
417 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
418 what I advance here.
419 </para>
420 <para>
421 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
422 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
423 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
424 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
425 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
426 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
427 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
428 book is written.
429 </para>
430
431 </preface>
432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
433
434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
435 <chapter id="c-introduction">
436 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
437 <para>
438 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
439 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
440 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
441 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
442 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
443 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
444 </para>
445 <para>
446 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
447 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
448 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
449 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
450 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
451 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
452 </para></footnote>
453 For many
454 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
455 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
456 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
457 </para>
458 <para>
459 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
460 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
461 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
462 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
463 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
464 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
465 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
466 </para>
467 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
468 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
469 <para>
470 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
471 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
472 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
473 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
474 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
475 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
476 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
477 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
478 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
479 </para>
480 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
481 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
482 <para>
483 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
484 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
485 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
486 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
487 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
488 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
489 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
490 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
491 </para>
492 <blockquote>
493 <para>
494 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
495 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
496 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
497 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
498 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
499 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
500 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
501 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
502 <para>
503 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
504 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
505 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
506 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
507 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
508 Authorship," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
509 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
510 1112&ndash;13.
511 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
512 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
513 </para></footnote>
514 </para>
515 </blockquote>
516 <para>
517 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
518 </para>
519 <para>
520 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
521 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
522 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
524 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
525 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
526 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
527 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
528 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
529 </para>
530 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
532 <para>
533 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
534 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
535 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
536 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
537 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
538 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
539 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
540 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
541 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
542 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
543 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
544 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
545 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
546 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
547 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
548 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
549 </para>
550 <para>
551 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
552 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
553 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
554 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
555 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
556 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
557 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
558 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
559 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
560 understanding of radio.
561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
562 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
563 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
564 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
565 </para>
566 <para>
567 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
568 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
569 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
570 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
571 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
572 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
573 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
574 much less transmitter power and static.
575 </para>
576 <para>
577 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
578 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
579 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
580 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
581 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
582 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
583 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
584 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
585 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
586 </para>
587 <para>
588 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
589 </para>
590 <blockquote>
591 <para>
592 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
593 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
594 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
595 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
596 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
597 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
598 box."<footnote><para>
599 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
600 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
601 </para></footnote>
602 </para>
603 </blockquote>
604 <para>
605 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
606 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
607 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
608 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
609 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
610 a handful of networks.
611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
612 </para>
613 <para>
614 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
615 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
616 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
617 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
618 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
619 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
620 </para>
621 <blockquote>
622 <para>
623 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
624 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
625 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
626 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
627 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
628 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
629
630 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
631 </para></footnote>
632 </para>
633 </blockquote>
634 <para>
635 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
636 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
637 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
638 described,
639 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
640 </para>
641 <blockquote>
642 <para>
643 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
644 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
645 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
646 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
647 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
648 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
649 </para></footnote>
650 </para>
651 </blockquote>
652 <para>
653 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
654 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
655 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
656 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
657 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
658 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
659 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
660 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
661 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
662 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
663 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
664 </para>
665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
666 <blockquote>
667 <para>
668 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
669 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
670 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
671 deviousness.<footnote><para>
672 Lessing, 256.
673 </para></footnote>
674 </para>
675 </blockquote>
676 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
677 <para>
678 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
679 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
680 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
681 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
682 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
683 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
684 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
685 least temporarily.
686 </para>
687 <para>
688 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
689 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
690 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
691 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
692 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
693 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
694 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
695 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
696 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
697 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
698 </para>
699 <para>
700 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
701 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
702 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
703 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
704 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
705 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
706 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
707 course always public spirited; the reality is something
708 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
709 to themselves, would crumble in
710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
711 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
712 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
713 effect of technological change.
714 </para>
715 <para>
716 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
717 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
718 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
719 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
720 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
721 before.<footnote><para>
722 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
723 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
724 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
725 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
726 </para></footnote>
727 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
728 of 2004.
729 </para>
730 <para>
731 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
732 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
733 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
734 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
735 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
736 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
737 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
738 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
739 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
740 </para>
741 <para>
742 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
743 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
744 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
745 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
746 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
747 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
748 has introduced.
749 </para>
750 <para>
751 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
752 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
753 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
754 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
755 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
756 parks or on
757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
758 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
759 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
760 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
761 </para>
762 <para>
763 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
764 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
765 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
766 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
767 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
768 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
769 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
770 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
771 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
772 </para>
773 <para>
774 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
775 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
776 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
777 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
778 marketplace.<footnote>
779 <para>
780 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
781 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
782 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
783 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
784 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
785 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
786 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
787 198&ndash;200.
788 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
789 </para></footnote>
790 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
791 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
792 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
793 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
794 </para>
795 <para>
796 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
797 been erased.<footnote><para>
798 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
799 2001), ch. 13.
800 </para></footnote>
801 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
802 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
803 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
804 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
805 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
806 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
807 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
808 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
809 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
810 culture, more and more a permission culture.
811 </para>
812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
813 <para>
814 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
815 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
816 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
817 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
818 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
819 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
820 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
821 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
822 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
823 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
824 Causbys.
825 </para>
826 <para>
827 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
828 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
829 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
830 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
831 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
832 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
833 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
834 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
835 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
836 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
837 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
838 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
839 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
840 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
841 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
842 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
843 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
844 </para>
845 <para>
846 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
847 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
848 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
849 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
850 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
851 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
852 remakes them.
853 </para>
854 <para>
855 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
857 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
858 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
859 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
860 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
861 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
862 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
863 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
864 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
865 Times, 17 January 2002.
866 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
867 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
868 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
869 against it.
870 </para>
871 <para>
872 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
873 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
874 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
875 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
876 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
877 Internet.
878 </para>
879 <para>
880 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
881 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
882 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
883 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
884 </para>
885 <para>
886 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
887 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
888 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
889 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
890 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
891 <para>
892 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
893 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
894 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
895 </para></footnote>
896 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
897 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
898 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
899 could cultivate and extend our culture.
900 </para>
901 <para>
902 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
903 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
904 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
905 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
906 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
907 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
908 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
909 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
910 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
911 </para>
912 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
913 <para>
914 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
915 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
916 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
917 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
918 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
919 against an industry.
920 </para>
921 <para>
922 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
923 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
924 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
925 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
926 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
927 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
928 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
929 </para>
930 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
931 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
932 <para>
933 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
934 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
935 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
936 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
937 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
938 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
939 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
940 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
941 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
942 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
943 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
944 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
945 trespass.
946 </para>
947 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
948 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
949 <para>
950 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
951 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
952 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
953 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
954 war. Unlike
955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
956 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
957 on its side.
958 </para>
959 <para>
960 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
961 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
962 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
963 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
964 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
965 been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses of
966 culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
967 </para>
968 <para>
969 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
970 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
971 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
972 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
973 </para>
974 <para>
975 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
976 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
977 </para>
978 <para>
979 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
980 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
981 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
982 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
983 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
984 </para>
985 <para>
986 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
987 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
988 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
989 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
990 view?
991 </para>
992 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
993 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
994 <para>
995 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
996 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
997 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
998 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
999 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1000 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1001 this silliness will be much more profound.
1002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1003 </para>
1004 <para>
1005 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1006 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1007 ideas.
1008 </para>
1009 <para>
1010 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1011 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1012 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1013 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1014 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1015 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1016 </para>
1017 <para>
1018 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1019 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1020 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1021 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1022 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1023 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1024 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1025 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1026 fundamental about who we have always been.
1027 </para>
1028 <para>
1029 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1030 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1031 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1032 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1033 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1034 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1035 </para>
1036 </chapter>
1037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1038 <chapter id="c-piracy">
1039 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1040
1041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1042 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1043 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1044 </indexterm>
1045 <para>
1046 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1047 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1048 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1049 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1050 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1051 </para>
1052 <blockquote>
1053 <para>
1054 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1055 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1056 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1057 <!-- f1 -->
1058 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1059 </para></footnote>
1060 </para>
1061 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1062 </blockquote>
1063 <para>
1064 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1065 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1066 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1067 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1068 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1069 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1071 </para>
1072 <para>
1073 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1074 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1075 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1076 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1077 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1078 profit."
1079 </para>
1080 <para>
1081 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1082 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1083 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1084 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1085 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1086 </para>
1087 <para>
1088 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1089 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1090 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1091 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1092 </para>
1093 <para>
1094 The idea goes something like this:
1095 </para>
1096 <blockquote>
1097 <para>
1098 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1099 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1100 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1101 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1102 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1103 piracy.
1104 </para>
1105 </blockquote>
1106 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1107 <para>
1108 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1109 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1110 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1111 <!-- f2 -->
1112 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1113 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1114 </para></footnote>
1115 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1116 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1117 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1118 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1119 <!-- f3 -->
1120 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1121 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1122 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1123 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1124 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1125 </para></footnote>
1126 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1127 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1128 </para>
1129 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1130 <para>
1131 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1132 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1134 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1135 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1136 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1137 </para>
1138 <para>
1139 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1140 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1141 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1142 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1143 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1144 </para>
1145 <para>
1146 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1147 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1148 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1149 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1150 copyright law today regulates both.
1151 </para>
1152 <para>
1153 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1154 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1155 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1156 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1157 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1158 more expense of doing business.
1159 </para>
1160 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1161 <para>
1162 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1163 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1164 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1165 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1166 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1167 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1168 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1169 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1170 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1171 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1172 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1173 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1174 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1175 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1176 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1178 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1179 <para>
1180 <!-- f4 -->
1181 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1182 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1183 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1184 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1185 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1186 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1187 enabled are much more tenuous.
1188 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1189 </para></footnote>
1190 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1191 this creative class.
1192 </para>
1193 <para>
1194 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1195 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1196 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1197 </para>
1198
1199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1200 <sect1 id="creators">
1201 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1202 <para>
1203 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1204 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1205 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1206 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1207 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1208 </para>
1209 <para>
1210 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1211 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1212 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1213 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1214 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1215 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1216 </para>
1217 <blockquote>
1218 <para>
1219 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1220 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1221 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1222 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1224 </para>
1225 <para>
1226 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1227 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1228 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1229 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1230 synchronization was pretty close.
1231 </para>
1232 <para>
1233 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1234 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1235 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1236 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1237 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1238 <!-- f1 -->
1239 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1240 Cartoons (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1241 </para></footnote>
1242 </para>
1243 </blockquote>
1244 <para>
1245 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1246 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1247 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1248 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1249 </para>
1250 <para>
1251 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1252 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1253 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1254 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1255 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1256 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1257 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1258 </para>
1259 <para>
1260 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1261 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1262 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1263 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1264 </para>
1265 <para>
1266 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1267 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1268 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1269 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1270 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1271 genre.
1272 </para>
1273 <para>
1274 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1276 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1277 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1278 <!-- f2 -->
1279 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1280 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1281 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1282 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1283 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1284 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1285 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1286 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1287 </para></footnote>
1288 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1289 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1290 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1291 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1292 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1293 Mouse.
1294 </para>
1295 <para>
1296 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1297 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1298 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1299 <!-- f3 -->
1300 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1301 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1302 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1303 </para></footnote>
1304 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1305 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1306 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1307 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1308 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1309 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1310 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1311 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1312 old.
1313 </para>
1314 <para>
1315 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1316 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1317 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1318 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1319 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1320 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1321 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1322 </para>
1323 <para>
1324 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1325 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1326 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1327 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1328 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1329 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1330 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1331 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1332 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1333 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1335 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1336 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1337 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1338 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1339 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1340 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1341 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1342 </para>
1343 <para>
1344 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1345 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1346 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1347 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1348 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1349 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1350 culture around us and makes it something different.
1351 </para>
1352 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1353 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1354 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1355 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1356 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1357 <!-- f4 -->
1358 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1359 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1360 determining
1361 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1362 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1363 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1364 average
1365 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1366 Web site associated with this book, available at
1367 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1368 </para></footnote>
1369 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1370 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1371 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1372 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1373 </para>
1374 <para>
1375 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1376 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1377 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1378 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1379 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1380 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1381 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1382 </para>
1383 <para>
1384 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1385 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1386 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1387 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1388
1389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1390 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1391 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1392 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1393 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1394 content from before the Great Depression.
1395 </para>
1396 <para>
1397 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1398 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1399 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1400 universal.
1401 </para>
1402 <para>
1403 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1404 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1405 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1406 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1407 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1408 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1409 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1410 </para>
1411 <para>
1412 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1413 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1414 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1415 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1416 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1417 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1418 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1419 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1420 interestingly different way.
1421 </para>
1422 <para>
1423 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1424 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1425 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1426 </para>
1427 <para>
1428 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1429 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1430 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1431 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1433 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1434 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1435 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1436 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1437 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1438 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1439 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1440 </para>
1441 <para>
1442 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1443 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1444 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1445 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1446 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1447 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1448 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1449 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1450 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1451 </para>
1452 <para>
1453 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1454 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1455 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1456 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1457 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1458 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1459 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1460 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1461 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1462 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1463 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1464 original copyright owner's permission.
1465 </para>
1466 <para>
1467 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1468 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1469 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1470 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1471 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1472
1473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1474 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1475 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1476 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1477 <!-- f5 -->
1478 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1479 York: Perennial, 2000).
1480 </para></footnote>
1481 </para>
1482 <para>
1483 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1484 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1485 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1486 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1487 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1488 which are fifty years old."
1489 </para>
1490 <para>
1491 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1492 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1493 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1494 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1495 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1496 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1497 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1498 <!-- f6 -->
1499 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1500 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1501 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1502 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1503 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1504 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1505 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1506 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1507 </para></footnote>
1508 </para>
1509 <para>
1510 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1511 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1512 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1513 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1514 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1515 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1516 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1517 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1518 culture?
1519 </para>
1520 <para>
1521 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1522 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1523 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1524 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1525 to prosecute cases like this."
1526 </para>
1527 <para>
1528 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1529 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1530 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1531 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1533 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1534 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1535 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1536 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1537 their clients or hurt them?
1538 Let's pause for a moment.
1539 </para>
1540 <para>
1541 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1542 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1543 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1544 </para>
1545 <para>
1546 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1547 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1548 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1549 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1550 <!-- f7 -->
1551 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See
1552 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1553 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas
1554 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1555 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1556 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1557 very different.
1558 </para></footnote>
1559 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1560 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1561 property.
1562 </para>
1563 <para>
1564 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1565 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1566 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1567 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1568 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1569 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1570 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1571 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1572 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1573 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1574 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1575 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1576 the public domain.
1577 </para>
1578 <para>
1579 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1580 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1581 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1582
1583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1584 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1585 freedom is good.
1586 </para>
1587 <para>
1588 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1589 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1590 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1591 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1592 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1593 form, whether large or small.
1594 </para>
1595 <para>
1596 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1597 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1598 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1599 particular find it hard to say why.
1600 </para>
1601 <para>
1602 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1603 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1604 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1605 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1606 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1607 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1608 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1609 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1610 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1611 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1612 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1613 films in 1997.
1614 </para>
1615 <para>
1616 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1617 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1618 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1619 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1620 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1621 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1622 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1623 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1625 </para>
1626 <para>
1627 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1628 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1629 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1630 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1631 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1632 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1633 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1634 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1635 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1636 </para>
1637 <para>
1638 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1639 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1640 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1641 </para>
1642
1643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1644 </sect1>
1645 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1646 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1647 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1648 <para>
1649 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1650 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1651 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1652 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1653 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1654 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1655 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1656 </para>
1657 <para>
1658 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1659 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1660 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1661 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1662 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1663 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1664 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1665 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1666 amateurs.
1667 </para>
1668 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1669 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1670 </indexterm>
1671 <para>
1672 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1673 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1675 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1676 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1677 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1678 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1679 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1680 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1681 population of photographers.
1682 </para>
1683 <para>
1684 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1685 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1686 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1687 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1688 <!-- f1 -->
1689 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1690 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1691 </para>
1692 <blockquote>
1693 <para>
1694 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1695 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1696 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1697 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1698 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1699 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1700 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1701 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1702 chemicals.<footnote>
1703 <para>
1704 <!-- f2 -->
1705 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1706 1977), 53.
1707 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1708 </para></footnote>
1709 </para>
1710 </blockquote>
1711 <para>
1712 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1713 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1714 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1715 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1716 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1717 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1718 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1719 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1720 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1721 percent.<footnote><para>
1722 <!-- f3 -->
1723 Jenkins, 177.
1724 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1725 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1726 <!-- f4 -->
1727 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1728 </para></footnote>
1729 </para>
1730 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1731 <para>
1732
1733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1734 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1735 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1736 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1737 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1738 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1739 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1740 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1741 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1742 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1743 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1744 <!-- f5 -->
1745 Coe, 58.
1746 </para></footnote>
1747 </para>
1748 <para>
1749 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1750 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1751 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1752 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1753 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1754 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1755 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1756 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1757 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1758 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1759 have before.
1760 </para>
1761 <para>
1762 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1763 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1764 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1765 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1766 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1767 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1768 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1769 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1770 <!-- f6 -->
1771 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1772 </para></footnote>
1773 </para>
1774 <para>
1775 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1776 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1777 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1778 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1779 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1780 draw
1781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1782 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1783 that they thought valuable.
1784 </para>
1785 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1786 <para>
1787 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1788 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1789 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1790 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1791 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1792 <para>
1793 <!-- f7 -->
1794 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1795 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1796 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1797 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1798 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1799 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1800 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1801 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1802 </para>
1803 <para>
1804 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1805 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1806 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1807 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1808 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1809 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1810 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1811 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1812 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1813 <!-- f8 -->
1814 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1815 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1816 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1817 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1818 (1993).
1819 </para></footnote>)
1820 </para>
1821 <para>
1822 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1823 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1824 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1825 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1826 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1827 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1828 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1829 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1830 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1831 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1832 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1833 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1834 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1835 </para>
1836 <para>
1837
1838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1839 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1840 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1841 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1842 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1843 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1844 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1845 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1846 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1847 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1848 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1849 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1850 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1851 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1852 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1853 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1854 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1855 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1856 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1857 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1858 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1859 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1860 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1861 learn.
1862 </para>
1863 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1864 <para>
1865 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1866 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1867 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1868 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1869 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1870 <!-- f9 -->
1871 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1872 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1873 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1874 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1875 </para></footnote>
1876 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1877 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1878 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1879 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1880 </para>
1881 <para>
1882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1883 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1884 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1885 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1886 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1887 the way people access it."
1888 </para>
1889 <para>
1890 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1891 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1892 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1893 about.
1894 </para>
1895 <para>
1896 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1897 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1898 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1899 <!-- f10 -->
1900 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1901 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1902 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1903 </para></footnote>
1904 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1905 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1906 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1907 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1908 (at least at first) terrible media.
1909 </para>
1910 <para>
1911 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1912 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1913 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
1914 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1915 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
1916 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1917 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1918 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1919 </para>
1920 <para>
1921 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1922 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1923 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1924 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1925 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1926 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1927 </para>
1928 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1929 <para>
1930 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1931 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1932 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1933
1934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1935 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1936 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1937 texture."<footnote>
1938 <para>
1939 <!-- f11 -->
1940 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1941 2002.
1942 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1943 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1944 </para></footnote>
1945 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1946 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1947 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1948 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1949 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1950 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1951 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1952 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1953 <!-- f12 -->
1954 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1955 November 2000, available at
1956 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1957 available at
1958 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1959 </para></footnote>
1960 </para>
1961 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1962 <para>
1963 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1964 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1965 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1966 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1967 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1968 </para>
1969 <para>
1970 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1971 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1972 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1973 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1974 </para>
1975 <blockquote>
1976 <para>
1977 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1978 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1979 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1980 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1981 being read-only.
1982 </para>
1983 </blockquote>
1984 <para>
1985 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1986 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1987 twentieth century.
1988 </para>
1989 <para>
1990 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
1991 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1992 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
1993 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
1994 literacy,
1995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1996 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1997 appropriate language for what they need to create or
1998 express."<footnote>
1999 <para>
2000 <!-- f13 -->
2001 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2002 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2003 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2004 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2005 <!-- f14 -->
2006 Ibid.
2007 </para></footnote>
2008 </para>
2009 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2010 <para>
2011 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2012 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2013 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2014 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2015 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2016 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2017 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2018 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2019 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2020 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2021 </para>
2022 <para>
2023 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2024 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2025 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2026 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2027 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2028 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2029 </para>
2030 <para>
2031 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2032 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2033 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2034 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2035 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2036 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2037 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2038 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2039 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2040 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2041 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2042 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2043 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2044 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2045 to this form of expression.
2046 </para>
2047 <para>
2048
2049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2050 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2051 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2052 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2053 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2054 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2055 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2056 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2057 our interview,
2058 </para>
2059 <blockquote>
2060 <para>
2061 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2062 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2063 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2064 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2065 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2066 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2067 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2068 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2069 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2070 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2071 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2072 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2073 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2074 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2075 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2076 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2077 about the topic. . . .
2078 </para>
2079 <para>
2080 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2081 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2082 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2083 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2084 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2085 </para>
2086 <para>
2087 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2088 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2089 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2091 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2092 had a lot of power with this language."
2093 </para>
2094 </blockquote>
2095 <para>
2096 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2097 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2098 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2099 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2100 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2101 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2102 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2103 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2104 world would be watching.
2105 </para>
2106 <para>
2107 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2108 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2109 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2110 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2111 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2112 entertainment is tragedy.
2113 </para>
2114 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2115 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2116 <para>
2117 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2118 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2119 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2120 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2121 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2122 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2123 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2124 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2125 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2126 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2127 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2128 was also the Internet.
2129 </para>
2130 <para>
2131 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2132 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2133 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2134 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2135 movie
2136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2137 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2138 with sound or text.
2139 </para>
2140 <para>
2141 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2142 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2143 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2144 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2145 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2146 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2147 spread practically instantaneously.
2148 </para>
2149 <para>
2150 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2151 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2152 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2153 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2154 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2155 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2156 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2157 </para>
2158 <para>
2159 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2160 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2161 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2162 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2163 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2164 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2165 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2166 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2167 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2168 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2169 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2170 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2171 </para>
2172 <para>
2173 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2174 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2175 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2176 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2177 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2178 people vote
2179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2180 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2181 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2182 </para>
2183 <para>
2184 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2185 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2186 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2187 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2188 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2189 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2190 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2191 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2192 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2193 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2194 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2195 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2196 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2197 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2198 <!-- f15 -->
2199 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2200 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2201 </para></footnote>
2202 </para>
2203 <para>
2204 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2205 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2206 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2207 <!-- f16 -->
2208 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2209 Political Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2210 </para></footnote>
2211 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2212 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2213 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2214 </para>
2215 <para>
2216 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2217 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2218 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2219 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2220 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2221 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2222 <!-- f17 -->
2223 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2224 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2225 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2226 little beyond what our friends say.
2227 </para>
2228 <para>
2229 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2230 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2231 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2232 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2233 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2234
2235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2236 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2237 place.
2238 </para>
2239 <para>
2240 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2241 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2242 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2243 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2244 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2245 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2246 </para>
2247 <para>
2248 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2249 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2250 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2251 is having an effect.
2252 </para>
2253 <para>
2254 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2255 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2256 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2257 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2258 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2259 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2260 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2261 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2262 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2263 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2264 <!-- f18 -->
2265 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2266 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2267 </para></footnote>
2268 </para>
2269 <para>
2270 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2271 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2272 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2273 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2274 on.
2275 </para>
2276 <para>
2277 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2278 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2279 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2280 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2281 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2282 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2283 peer-generated rankings.
2284 </para>
2285 <para>
2286 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2288 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2289 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2290 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2291 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2292 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2293 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2294 get it out of the way."
2295 </para>
2296 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2297 <para>
2298 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2299 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2300 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2301 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2302 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2303 <!-- f19 -->
2304 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2305 </para></footnote>
2306 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2307 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2308 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2309 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2310 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2311 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2312 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2313 </para>
2314 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2315 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2316 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2317 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2318 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2319 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2320 had seen.<footnote><para>
2321 <!-- f20 -->
2322 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2323 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2324 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2325 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2326 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2327 </para></footnote>
2328 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2329 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2330 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2331 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2332 </para>
2333 <para>
2334 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2335 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2336 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2337 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2338 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2339 <para>
2340 <!-- f21 -->
2341 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2342 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2343 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2344 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2345 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2346 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2347 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2348 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2349 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2350 </para></footnote>
2351 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2352
2353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2354 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2355 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2356 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2357 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2358 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2359 </para>
2360 <para>
2361 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2362 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2363 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2364 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2365 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2366 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2367 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2368 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2369 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2370 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2371 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2372 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2373 extraordinary to report.
2374 </para>
2375 <para>
2376 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2377 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2378 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2379 </para>
2380 <para>
2381 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2382 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2383 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2384 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2385 affect learning.
2386 </para>
2387 <para>
2388 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2389 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2390 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2391 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2392 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2393 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2395 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2396 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2397 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2398 the tinkering of many others.
2399 </para>
2400 <para>
2401 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2402 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2403 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2404 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2405 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2406 </para>
2407 <para>
2408 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2409 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2410 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2411 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2412 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2413 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2414 </para>
2415 <para>
2416 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2417 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2418 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2419 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2420 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2421 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2422 learn.
2423 </para>
2424 <para>
2425 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2426 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2427 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2428 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2429 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2430 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2431 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2432 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2433 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2434 </para>
2435 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2436 <para>
2437 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2438 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2439
2440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2441 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2442 kind of recognition.
2443 </para>
2444 <para>
2445 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2446 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2447 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2448 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2449 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2450 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2451 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2452 </para>
2453 <para>
2454 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2455 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2456 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2457 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2458 general.<footnote><para>
2459 <!-- f22 -->
2460 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2461 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2462 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2463 </para></footnote>
2464 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2465 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2466 </para>
2467 <para>
2468 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2469 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2470 and want to learn."
2471 </para>
2472 <para>
2473 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2474 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2475 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2476 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2477 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2478 </para>
2479 <para>
2480 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2481 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2482 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2483 the law to close down that technology.
2484 </para>
2485 <para>
2486 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2487 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2488 </para>
2489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2490 </sect1>
2491 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2492 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2493 <para>
2494 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2495 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2496 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2497 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2498 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2499 </para>
2500 <para>
2501 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2502 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2503 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2504 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2505 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2506 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2507 </para>
2508 <para>
2509 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2510 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2511 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2512 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2513 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2514 </para>
2515 <para>
2516 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2518 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2519 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2520 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2521 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2522 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2523 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2524 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2525 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2526 </para>
2527 <para>
2528 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2529 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2530 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2531 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2532 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2533 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2534 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2535 </para>
2536 <para>
2537 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2538 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2539 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2540 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2541 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2542 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2543 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2544 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2545 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2546 on-line.
2547 </para>
2548 <para>
2549 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2550 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2551 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2552 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2553 be on users' computers.
2554 </para>
2555 <para>
2556 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2557 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2558 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2559 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2561 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2562 computer.
2563 </para>
2564 <para>
2565 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2566 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2567 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2568 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2569 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2570 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2571 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2572 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2573 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2574 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2575 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2576 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2577 supposed to do.
2578 </para>
2579 <para>
2580 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2581 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2582 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2583 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2584 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2585 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2586 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2587 </para>
2588 <para>
2589 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2590 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2591 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2592 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2593 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2594 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2595 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2596 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2597 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2598 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2599 </para>
2600 <para>
2601 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2602 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2604 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2605 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2606 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2607 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2608 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2609 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2610 </para>
2611 <para>
2612 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2613 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2614 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2615 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2616 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2617 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2618 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2619 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2620 <!-- f1 -->
2621 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2622 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2623 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2624 </para></footnote>
2625 </para>
2626 <para>
2627 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2628 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2629 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2630 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2631 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2632 </para>
2633 <para>
2634 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2635 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2636 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2637 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2638 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2639 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2640 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2641 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2642 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2643 </para>
2644 <para>
2645 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2646 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2647 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2648 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2649 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2651 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2652 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2653 </para>
2654 <para>
2655 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2656 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2657 </para>
2658 <para>
2659 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2660 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2661 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2662 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2663 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2664 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2665 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2666 <!-- f2 -->
2667 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2668 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2669 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2670 </para></footnote>
2671 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2672 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2673 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2674 <!-- f3 -->
2675 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2676 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2677 </para></footnote>
2678 </para>
2679 <para>
2680 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2681 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2682 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2683 activist:
2684 </para>
2685 <blockquote>
2686 <para>
2687 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2688 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2689 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2690 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2691 </para>
2692 </blockquote>
2693 <para>
2694 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2695 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2696 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2697 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2698 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2699 </para>
2700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2701 </sect1>
2702 <sect1 id="pirates">
2703 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2704 <para>
2705 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2706 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2707 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2708 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2709 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2710 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2711 </para>
2712 <sect2 id="film">
2713 <title>Film</title>
2714 <para>
2715 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2716 <!-- f1 -->
2717 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2718 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2719 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2720 </para></footnote>
2721 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2722 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2723 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2724 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2725 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2726 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2727 this creative property
2728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2729 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2730 </para>
2731 <para>
2732 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2733 </para>
2734 <blockquote>
2735 <para>
2736 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2737 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2738 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2739 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2740 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2741 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2742 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2743 </para>
2744 <para>
2745 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2746 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2747 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2748 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2749 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2750 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2751 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2752 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2753 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2754 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2755 <!-- f2 -->
2756 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2757 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2758 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2759 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2760 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2761 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2762 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2763 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2764 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2765 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2766 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2767 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2768 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2769 </para>
2770 </blockquote>
2771 <para>
2772 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2773 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2774 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2775 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2776 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2777 <!-- f3 -->
2778 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2779 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2780 </para></footnote>
2781 That led the independents to flee the East
2782 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2783 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2784 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2785 did just that.
2786 </para>
2787 <para>
2788 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2789 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2790 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2791
2792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2793 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2794 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2795 Edison's creative property.
2796 </para>
2797 </sect2>
2798 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2799 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2800 <para>
2801 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2802 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2803 </para>
2804 <para>
2805 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2806 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2807 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2808 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2809 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2810 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2811 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2812 right to perform it publicly.
2813 </para>
2814 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2815 <para>
2816 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2817 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2818 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2819 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2820 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2821 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2822 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2823 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2824 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2825 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2826 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2827 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2828 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2829 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2830 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2831 its composer anything.
2832 </para>
2833 <para>
2834 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2836 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2837 put it,
2838 </para>
2839 <blockquote>
2840 <para>
2841 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2842 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2843 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2844 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2845 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2846 rights.<footnote><para>
2847 <!-- f4 -->
2848 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2849 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2850 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2851 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2852 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2853 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2854 </para></footnote>
2855 </para>
2856 </blockquote>
2857 <para>
2858 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2859 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2860 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2861 <!-- f5 -->
2862 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2863 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2864 </para></footnote>
2865 and the "music publishing industry"
2866 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2867 <!-- f6 -->
2868 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2869 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2870 </para></footnote>
2871 As John Philip
2872 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2873 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2874 <!-- f7 -->
2875 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2876 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2877 </para></footnote>
2878 </para>
2879 <para>
2880 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2881 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2882 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2883 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2884 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2885 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2886 <!-- f8 -->
2887
2888 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2889 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2890 Perforating Company of New York).
2891 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2892 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2893 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2894 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2895 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2896 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2897 statute."<footnote><para>
2898 <!-- f9 -->
2899 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2900 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2901 Graphophone Company Association).
2902 </para></footnote>
2903 </para>
2904 <para>
2905 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and the
2906 recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that composers
2907 would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their music. But
2908 rather than simply granting the composer complete control over the
2909 right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2910 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once
2911 the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2912
2913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2914 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2915 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2916 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2917 </para>
2918 <para>
2919 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2920 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2921 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2922 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2923 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2924 the fee set by the statute.
2925 </para>
2926 <para>
2927 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2928 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2929 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2930 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2931 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2932 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2933 Grisham.
2934 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2935 </para>
2936 <para>
2937 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2938 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2939 kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2940 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2941 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2942 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2943 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2944 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2945 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2946 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2947 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2948 creativity.<footnote><para>
2949 <!-- f10 -->
2950 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2951 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2952 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2953 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2954 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2955 </para></footnote>
2956 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2957 </para>
2958 <para>
2959 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2960 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2961 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2962 relates,
2963 </para>
2964 <blockquote>
2965 <para>
2966 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2968 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2969 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2970 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
2971 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
2972 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
2973 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
2974 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
2975 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
2976 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
2977 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
2978 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2979 choice.<footnote><para>
2980 <!-- f11 -->
2981 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2982 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2983 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2984 this report.</para></footnote>
2985 </para>
2986 </blockquote>
2987 <para>
2988 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2989 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2990 </para>
2991 </sect2>
2992 <sect2 id="radio">
2993 <title>Radio</title>
2994 <para>
2995 Radio was also born of piracy.
2996 </para>
2997 <para>
2998 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
2999 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3000 <!-- f12 -->
3001 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3002 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3003 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3004 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3005 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3006 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3007 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3008 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3009 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 281.
3010 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3011 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3012 </para></footnote>
3013 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3014 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3015 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3016 </para>
3017 <para>
3018 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3019 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3020 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3021 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3022 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3023 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3024 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3025 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3026 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3027
3028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3029 </para>
3030 <para>
3031 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3032 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3033 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3034 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3035 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3036 of playing the song.
3037 </para>
3038 <para>
3039 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3040 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3041 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3042 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3043 </para>
3044 <para>
3045 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3046 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3047 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3048 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3049 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3050 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3051 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3052 </para>
3053 <para>
3054 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3055 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3056 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3057 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3058 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3059 to take something for nothing.
3060 </para>
3061 </sect2>
3062 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3063 <title>Cable TV</title>
3064 <para>
3065
3066 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3067 </para>
3068 <para>
3069 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3070 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3071 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3072 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3074 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3075 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3076 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3077 give away.
3078 </para>
3079 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3080 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3081 <para>
3082 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3083 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3084 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3085 <!-- f13 -->
3086 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3087 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3088 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3089 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3090 Commission).
3091 </para></footnote>
3092 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3093 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3094 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3095 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3096 <!-- f14 -->
3097 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3098 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3099 </para></footnote>
3100 As another broadcaster put it,
3101 </para>
3102 <blockquote>
3103 <para>
3104 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3105 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3106 paid for.<footnote><para>
3107 <!-- f15 -->
3108 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3109 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3110 </para></footnote>
3111 </para>
3112 </blockquote>
3113 <para>
3114 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3115 </para>
3116 <blockquote>
3117 <para>
3118 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3119 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3120 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3121 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3122 <!-- f16 -->
3123 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3124 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3125 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3126 </para></footnote>
3127 </para>
3128 </blockquote>
3129 <para>
3130 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3131 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3132 compensation."<footnote><para>
3133 <!-- f17 -->
3134 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3135 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3136 </para></footnote>
3137 </para>
3138 <para>
3139 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3140 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3141 </para>
3142 <blockquote>
3143 <para>
3144 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3145 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3146 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3147 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3148
3149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3150 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3151 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3152 <!-- f18 -->
3153 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3154 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3155 </para></footnote>
3156 </para>
3157 </blockquote>
3158 <para>
3159 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3160 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3161 </para>
3162 <para>
3163 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3164 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3165 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3166 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3167 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3168 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3169 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3170 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3171 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3172 created by broadcasters' content.
3173 </para>
3174 <para>
3175 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3176 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3177 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3178 today<footnote><para>
3179 <!-- f19 -->
3180 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3181 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3182 Information, available at
3183 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3184 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3185 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3186 </para></footnote>
3187 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3188 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3189 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3190 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3191 generation&mdash;until now.
3192 </para>
3193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3194 </sect2>
3195 </sect1>
3196 <sect1 id="piracy">
3197 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3198 <para>
3199 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3200 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3201 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3202 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3203 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3204 should stop it.
3205 </para>
3206 <para>
3207 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3208 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3209 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3210 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3211 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3212 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3213 has so often done in the past.
3214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3215 </para>
3216 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3217 <title>Piracy I</title>
3218 <para>
3219 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3220 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3221 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3222 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3223 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3224 <!-- f1 -->
3225 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3226 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3227
3228 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3229 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3230 </para></footnote>
3231 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3232 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3233 worldwide to piracy.
3234 </para>
3235 <para>
3236 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3237 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3238 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3239 This piracy is wrong.
3240 </para>
3241 <para>
3242 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3243 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3244 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3245 foreign
3246 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3247 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3248 developing
3249 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3250 existence, treated as right.
3251 </para>
3252 <para>
3253 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3254 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3255 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3256 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3257 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3258 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3259 violate
3260 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3261 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3262 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3263 </para>
3264 <para>
3265 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3266 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3268 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3269 pirate
3270 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3271 childhood.
3272 </para>
3273 <para>
3274 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3275 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3276 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3277 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3278 <!-- f2 -->
3279 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3280 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3281 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3282 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3283 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3284 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3285 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3286 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3287 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3288 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3289 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3290 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3291 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3292 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3293 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3294 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3295 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3296 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3297 is wrong.
3298 </para>
3299 <para>
3300 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3301 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3302 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3303 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3304 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3305 <!-- f3 -->
3306 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3307 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3308 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3309 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3310 instance
3311 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3312 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3313 </para></footnote>
3314 </para>
3315 <para>
3316 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3317 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3318 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3319 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3320 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3321 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3322 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3323 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3324 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3325 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3326 piracy of the tangible.
3327 </para>
3328 <para>
3329 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3330 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3331 property
3332 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3333 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3334 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3335 licenses
3336 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3337 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3338 copyrighted
3339 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3340
3341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3342 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3343 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3344 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3345 technology
3346 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3347 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3348 </para>
3349 <para>
3350 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3351 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3352 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3353 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3354 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3355 nation
3356 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3357 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3358 benefit
3359 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3360 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3361 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3362 Microsoft.
3363 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3364 </para>
3365 <para>
3366 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3367 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3368 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3369 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3370 become
3371 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3372 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3373 </para>
3374 <para>
3375 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3376 alcoholic
3377 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3378 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3379 ordinarily
3380 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3381 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3382 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3383 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3384 giving
3385 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3386 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3387 copyright
3388 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3389 wrong.
3390 </para>
3391 <para>
3392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3393 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3394 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3395 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3396 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3397 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3398 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3399 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3400 is flat out wrong.
3401 </para>
3402 <para>
3403 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3404 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3405 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3406 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3407 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3408 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3409 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3410 </para>
3411 <para>
3412 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3413 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3414 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3415 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3416 </para>
3417 <para>
3418 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3419 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3420 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3421 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3422 </para>
3423 <para>
3424 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3425 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3426 sharing
3427 to survive.
3428 </para>
3429 </sect2>
3430 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3431 <title>Piracy II</title>
3432 <para>
3433 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3434 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3435 <!-- f4 -->
3436 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3437 </para></footnote>
3438 This means we must determine whether
3439 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3441 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3442 author of his profit.
3443 </para>
3444 <para>
3445 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3446 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3447 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3448 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3449 <!-- f5 -->
3450 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3451 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3452 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3453 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3454 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3455 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3456 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3457 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3458 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3459 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3460 put together components that had been developed independently.
3461 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3462 </para>
3463 <para>
3464 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3465 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3466 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3467 system.<footnote><para>
3468 <!-- f6 -->
3469 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3470 Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3471 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3472 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3473 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3474 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3475 </para></footnote>
3476 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3477 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3478 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3479 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3480 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3481 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3482 or your 20,000 best friends.
3483 </para>
3484 <para>
3485 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3486 Americans
3487 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3488 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3489 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3490 <!-- f7 -->
3491 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3492 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3493 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3494 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3495 </para></footnote>
3496 A survey by the NPD
3497 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3498 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3499 <!-- f8 -->
3500 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3501 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3502 </para></footnote>
3503 The vast
3504 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3505 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3506 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3507 enjoy
3508 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3509 </para>
3510 <para>
3511 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3512 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3513 infringement,
3514 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3515 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3516 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3517 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3518 </para>
3519 <para>
3520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3521 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3522 different kinds into four types.
3523 </para>
3524 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3525 <listitem><para>
3526 <!-- A. -->
3527 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3528 purchasing
3529 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3530 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3531 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3532 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3533 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3534 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3535 instead
3536 of purchasing.
3537 </para></listitem>
3538 <listitem><para>
3539 <!-- B. -->
3540 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3541 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3542 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3543 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3544 succeed.
3545 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3546 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3547 recommendations
3548 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3549 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3550 </para></listitem>
3551 <listitem><para>
3552 <!-- C. -->
3553 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3554 copyrighted
3555 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3556 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3557 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3558 rewarding
3559 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3560 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3561 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3562 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3563 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3564 available.)
3565 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3566 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3567 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3568 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3569 a local collector.
3570 </para></listitem>
3571 <listitem><para>
3572 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3573 <!-- D. -->
3574 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3575 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3576 wants to give away.
3577 </para></listitem>
3578 </orderedlist>
3579 <para>
3580 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3581 </para>
3582 <para>
3583 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3584 perspective
3585 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3586 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3587 <!-- f9 -->
3588 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3589 </para></footnote>
3590 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3591 illegal,
3592 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3593 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3594 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3595 certainly
3596 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3597 suggests.
3598 </para>
3599 <para>
3600 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3601 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3602 Hollywood,
3603 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3604 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3605 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3606 that is "devastating" the industry.
3607 </para>
3608 <para>
3609 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3610 harmful
3611 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3612 practice
3613 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3614 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3615 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3616 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3617 <!-- f10 -->
3618 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3619 Industry's
3620 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3621 industry's
3622 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3623 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3624 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3625 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3626 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3627 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3628 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3629 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3630 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3631 </para></footnote>
3632 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3633 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3634 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3635 problem,
3636 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3637 </para>
3638 <para>
3639 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3640 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3641 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3642 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3644 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3645 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3646 <!-- f11 -->
3647 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3648 </para></footnote>
3649 </para>
3650 <para>
3651 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3652 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3653 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3654 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3655 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3656 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3657 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3658 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3659 </para>
3660 <para>
3661 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3662 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3663 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3664 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3665 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3666 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3667 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3668 </para>
3669 <para>
3670 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3671 because
3672 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3673 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3674 </para>
3675 <para>
3676 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3677 percent,
3678 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3679 <!-- f12 -->
3680 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3681 available at
3682 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3683 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3684 25 June 2003, available at
3685 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3686 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3687 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3688 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3689 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3690 music
3691 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3692 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3693 </para></footnote>
3694 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3695 Internet
3696 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3697 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3698 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3699 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3700 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3701 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3702 <!-- f13 -->
3703 <para>
3704 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3705 February 2003, available at
3706 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3707 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3708 </para>
3709 </footnote>
3710 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3711 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3712 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3713 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3714 <!-- f14 -->
3715 Ibid.
3716 </para></footnote>
3717 </para>
3718 <para>
3719
3720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3721 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3722 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3723 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3724 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3725 although
3726 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3727 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3728 </para>
3729 <para>
3730 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3731 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3732 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3733 between
3734 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3735 numbers
3736 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3737 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3738 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3739 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3740 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3741 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3742 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3743 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3744 between
3745 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3746 </para>
3747 <para>
3748 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3749 assume,
3750 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3751 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3752 costs?
3753 </para>
3754 <para>
3755 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3756 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3757 available.
3758 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3759 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3760 <!-- f15 -->
3761 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3762 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3763 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3764 Committee
3765 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3766 statement
3767 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3768 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3769 </para></footnote>
3770 And while it's
3771 conceivable
3772 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3773 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3774 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3775 distributor
3776 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3777 make it available.
3778 </para>
3779 <para>
3780 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3782 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3783 thousands
3784 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3785 <!-- f16 -->
3786 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3787 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3788 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3789 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3790 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3791 National
3792 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3793 Results,"
3794 available at
3795 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3796 </para></footnote>
3797 These
3798 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3799 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3800 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3801 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3802 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3803 companies
3804 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3805 owner for the content they sell.
3806 </para>
3807 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3808 <para>
3809 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3810 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3811 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3812 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3813 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3814 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3815 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3816 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3817 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3818 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3819 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3820 </para>
3821 <para>
3822 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3823 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3824 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3825 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3826 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3827 shut as well?
3828 </para>
3829 <para>
3830 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3831 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3832 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3833 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3834 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3835 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3836
3837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3838 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3839 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3840 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3841 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3842 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3843 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3844 great book!)
3845 </para>
3846 <para>
3847 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3848 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3849 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3850 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3851 </para>
3852 <para>
3853 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3854 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3855 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3856 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3857 unavailable?"
3858 </para>
3859 <para>
3860 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3861 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3862 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3863 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3864 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3865 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3866 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3867 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3868 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3869 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3870 found only with time.
3871 </para>
3872 <para>
3873 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3874 just what you call type A sharing?"
3875 </para>
3876 <para>
3877 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3878 effect
3879 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3880 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3881 Napster
3882 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3883 developed
3884 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3886 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3887 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3888 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3889 <!-- f17 -->
3890 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3891 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3892 MHP, available at
3893 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3894 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3895 Fanning's
3896 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3897 </para></footnote>
3898 </para>
3899 <para>
3900 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3901 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3902 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3903 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3904 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3905 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3906 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3907 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3908 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3909 </para>
3910 <para>
3911 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3912 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3913 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3914 content
3915 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3916 technology.
3917 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3918 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3919 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3920 </para>
3921 <para>
3922 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3923 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3924 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3925 composers,
3926 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3927 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3928 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3929 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3930 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3931 broadcast),
3932 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3933 </para>
3934 <para>
3935 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3936 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3937 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3938 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3939 companies
3940 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3941 </para>
3942 <para>
3943
3944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3945 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3946 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3947 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3948 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3949 Second,
3950 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3951 content
3952 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3953 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3954 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3955 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3956 Congress
3957 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3958 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3959 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3960 control
3961 over the future (cable).
3962 </para>
3963 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3964 <para>
3965 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3966 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3967 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3968 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3969 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3970 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3971 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3972 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3973 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3974 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3975 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3976 </para>
3977 <para>
3978 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3979 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3980 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3981 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3982 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3983 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3984 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3985 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3987 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3988 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
3989 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
3990 for the architecture it chose.
3991 </para>
3992 <para>
3993 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
3994 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
3995 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
3996 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
3997 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
3998 copyright."<footnote><para>
3999 <!-- f18 -->
4000 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4001 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4002 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4003 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4004 </para></footnote>
4005 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4006 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4007 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4008 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4009 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4010 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4011 <!-- f19 -->
4012 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4013 </para></footnote>
4014 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4015 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4016 <!-- f20 -->
4017 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4018 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4019 </para></footnote>
4020 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4021 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4022 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4023 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4024 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4025 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4026 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4027 <!-- f21 -->
4028 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4029 of Jack Valenti).
4030 </para></footnote>
4031 </para>
4032 <para>
4033 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4034 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4035 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4036 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4037 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4038 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4039 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4040 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4041 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4042 technology.<footnote><para>
4043 <!-- f22 -->
4044 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4045 1981).
4046 </para></footnote>
4047 </para>
4048 <para>
4049 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4050
4051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4052 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4053 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4054 Court wrote,
4055 </para>
4056 <blockquote>
4057 <para>
4058 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4059 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4060 market
4061 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4062 authority
4063 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4064 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4065 implicated
4066 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4067 <!-- f23 -->
4068 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4069 </para></footnote>
4070 </para>
4071 </blockquote>
4072 <para>
4073 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4074 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4075 Congress
4076 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4077 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4078 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4079 </para>
4080
4081 <table id="t1">
4082 <title>Table</title>
4083 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4084 <thead>
4085 <row>
4086 <entry>CASE</entry>
4087 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4088 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4089 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4090 </row>
4091 </thead>
4092 <tbody>
4093 <row>
4094 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4095 <entry>Composers</entry>
4096 <entry>No protection</entry>
4097 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4098 </row>
4099 <row>
4100 <entry>Radio</entry>
4101 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4102 <entry>N/A</entry>
4103 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4104 </row>
4105 <row>
4106 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4107 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4108 <entry>No protection</entry>
4109 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4110 </row>
4111 <row>
4112 <entry>VCR</entry>
4113 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4114 <entry>No protection</entry>
4115 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4116 </row>
4117 </tbody>
4118 </tgroup>
4119 </table>
4120
4121 <para>
4122 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4123 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4124 <!-- f24 -->
4125 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4126 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4127 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4128 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4129 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4130 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4131 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4132 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4133 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4134 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4135 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4136 </para></footnote>
4137 In each case, throughout our history,
4138 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4139 work.
4140 </para>
4141 <para>
4142 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4143 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4144 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4145 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4146 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4147 legitimacy
4148 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4149 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4150 the interests at stake.
4151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4152 </para>
4153 <para>
4154 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4155 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4156 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4157 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4158 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4159 regulated?
4160 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4161 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4162 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4163 permission to record a song?
4164 </para>
4165 <para>
4166 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4167 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4168 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4169 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4170 <!-- f25 -->
4171 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4172 (1984).
4173 </para></footnote>
4174 Instead, the particular uses that the
4175 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4176 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4177 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4178 technology
4179 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4180 the distribution of content.
4181 </para>
4182 <para>
4183 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4184 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4185 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4186 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4187 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4188 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4189 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4190 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4191 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4192 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4193 protection
4194 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4195 continue.
4196 </para>
4197 <para>
4198
4199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4200 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4201 superior
4202 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4203 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4204 network.
4205 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4206 efficient.
4207 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4208 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4209 <!-- f26 -->
4210 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4211 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4212 </para></footnote>
4213 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4214 warriors
4215 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4216 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4217 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4218 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4219 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4220 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4221 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4222 </para>
4223 <para>
4224 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4225 just as any other property is protected."
4226 </para>
4227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4228 </sect2>
4229 </sect1>
4230 </chapter>
4231 <chapter id="c-property">
4232 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4233 <para>
4234
4235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4236 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4237 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4238 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4239 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4240 the price she can get.
4241 </para>
4242 <para>
4243 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4244 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4245 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4246 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4247 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4248 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4249 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4250 going
4251 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4252 thing I am taking then?
4253 </para>
4254 <para>
4255 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4256 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4258 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4259 narrow
4260 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4261 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4262 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4263 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4264 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4265 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4266 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4267 <!-- f1 -->
4268 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4269 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4270 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4271 </para></footnote>
4272 </para>
4273 <para>
4274 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4275 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4276 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4277 expression
4278 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4279 property.
4280 </para>
4281 <para>
4282 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4283 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4284 turning
4285 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4286 "property"
4287 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4288 <!-- f2 -->
4289 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4290 intangible.
4291 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4292 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4293 physical
4294 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4295 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4296 Property?
4297 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4298 373, 429 n. 241.
4299 </para></footnote>
4300 </para>
4301 <para>
4302 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4303 preceding
4304 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4305 material
4306 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4307 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4308 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4309 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4310 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4311 us draw.
4312 </para>
4313
4314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4315 <sect1 id="founders">
4316 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4317 <para>
4318 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4319 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4320 Shakespeare
4321 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4322 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4323 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4324 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4325 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4326 adaptation
4327 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4328 </para>
4329 <para>
4330 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4331 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4332 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4333 <!-- f1 -->
4334 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4335 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4336 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4337 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4338 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4339 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4340 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4341 </para></footnote>
4342 Tonson was the
4343 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4344 <!-- f2 -->
4345 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4346 Vanderbilt
4347 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4348 </para></footnote>
4349 who
4350 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4351 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4352 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4354 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4355 copyright.
4356 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4357 produce
4358 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4359 </para>
4360 <para>
4361 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4362 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4363 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4364 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4365 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4366 renewable
4367 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4368 published
4369 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4370 <!-- f3 -->
4371 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4372 "copyright
4373 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4374 </para></footnote>
4375 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4376 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4377 </para>
4378 <para>
4379 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4380 "copyright"
4381 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4382 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4383 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4384 expired
4385 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4386 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4387 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4388 publishers,
4389 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4390 </para>
4391 <para>
4392 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4393 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4394 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4395 govern
4396 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4397 "positive
4398 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4399 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4400 legislature,
4401 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4402 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4403 expired
4404 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4405 independent
4406 of any positive law.
4407 </para>
4408 <para>
4409 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4410 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4411 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4412 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4413
4414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4415 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4416 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4417 ultimately
4418 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4419 </para>
4420 <para>
4421 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4422 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4423 however,
4424 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4425 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4426 "expired,"
4427 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4428 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4429 </para>
4430 <para>
4431 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4432 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4433 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4434 </para>
4435 <para>
4436 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4437 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4438 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4439 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4440 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4441 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4442 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4443 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4444 reason
4445 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4446 </para>
4447 <para>
4448 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4449 special
4450 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4451 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4452 "booksellers."
4453 </para>
4454 <para>
4455 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4456 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4457 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4458 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4459 others
4460 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4461 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4462 beyond
4463 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4464 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4465 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4466 restrictions
4467 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4468 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4469 perform, and so on.
4470 </para>
4471 <para>
4472 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4473 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4474 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4475 permission
4476 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4477 anything,
4478 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4479 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4480 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4481 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4482 </para>
4483 <para>
4484 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4485 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4486 especially
4487 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4488 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4489 monopolies&mdash;especially
4490 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4491 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4492 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4493 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4494 Monopolies,
4495 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4496 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4497 publishing.
4498 </para>
4499 <para>
4500 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4501 naturally
4502 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4503 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4504 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4505 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4506 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4507 specialinterest
4508 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4509 </para>
4510 <para>
4511 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4512 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4513 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4514 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4515 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4516 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4517 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4518 themselves
4519 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4520 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4521 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4522 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4523 <!-- f4 -->
4524 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4525 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4526 </para></footnote>
4527 </para>
4528 <para>
4529 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4530 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4531 Enlightenment
4532 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4533 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4534 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4535 that idea.
4536 </para>
4537 <para>
4538 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4539 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4540 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4541 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4542 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4543 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4544 compromise
4545 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4546 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4547 construction and spread of culture.
4548 </para>
4549 <para>
4550 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4551 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4552 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4553 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4554 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4555 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4556 they said; they needed more time.
4557 </para>
4558 <para>
4559 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4560 words that echo today,
4561 </para>
4562 <blockquote>
4563 <para>
4564 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4565 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4567 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4568 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4569 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4570 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4571 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4572 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4573 <!-- f5 -->
4574 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4575 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4576 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4577 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4578 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4579 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4580 al., 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4581 </para></footnote>
4582 </para>
4583 </blockquote>
4584 <para>
4585 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4586 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4587 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4588 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4589 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4590 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4591 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4592 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4593 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4594 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4595 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4596 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4597 way to protect authors.
4598 </para>
4599 <para>
4600 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4601 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4602 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4603 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4604 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4605 <!-- f6 -->
4606 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4607 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4608 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4609 </para></footnote>
4610 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4611 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4612 </para>
4613 <para>
4614 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4615 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4616 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4617 <!-- f7 -->
4618 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4619 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4620 </para></footnote>
4621 </para>
4622 <para>
4623 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4624 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4625 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4626 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4627 <!-- f8 -->
4628 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4629 1993), 92.
4630 </para></footnote>
4631 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4633 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4634 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4635 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4636 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4637 <!-- f9 -->
4638 Ibid., 93.
4639 </para></footnote>
4640 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4641 </para>
4642 <para>
4643 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4644 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4645 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4646 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4647 Property."<footnote><para>
4648 <!-- f10 -->
4649 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4650 Borwell).
4651 </para></footnote>
4652 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4653 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4654 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4655 </para>
4656 <para>
4657 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4658 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4659 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4660 </para>
4661 <para>
4662 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4663 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4664 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4665 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4666 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4667 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4668 <!-- f11 -->
4669 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4670 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29
4671 (1983): 1152.
4672 </para></footnote>
4673 </para>
4674 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4675 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4676 </indexterm>
4677 <para>
4678 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4679 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4680 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4681 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4682 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4683 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4684 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4685 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4686 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4687 </para>
4688 <para>
4689 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4690 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4691 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4692 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4693 with in 1710: How best to limit
4694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4695 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4696 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4697 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4698 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4699 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4700 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4701 </para>
4702 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4703 <para>
4704 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4705 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4706 </para>
4707 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4708 <para>
4709 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4710 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4711 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4712 <!-- f12 -->
4713 Ibid., 1156.
4714 </para></footnote>
4715 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4716 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4717 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4718 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4719 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4720 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4721 </para>
4722 <para>
4723 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4724 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4725 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4726 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4727 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4728 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4729 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4730 statute were no longer protected.
4731 </para>
4732 <para>
4733 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4734 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4735 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4736 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4737 House of Lords generally voted.
4738 </para>
4739 <para>
4740 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4741 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4743 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4744 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4745 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4746 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4747 passed into the public domain.
4748 </para>
4749 <para>
4750 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4751 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4752 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4753 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4754 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4755 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4756 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4757 legal restraint.
4758 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4759 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4760 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4761 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4762 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4763 </para>
4764 <para>
4765 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4766 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4767 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4768 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4769 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4770 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4771 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4772 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4773 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4774 <!-- f13 -->
4775 Rose, 97.
4776 </para></footnote>
4777 </para>
4778 <para>
4779 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4780 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4781 reported:
4782 </para>
4783 <blockquote>
4784 <para>
4785 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4786 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4787 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4788 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4789 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4790 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4791 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4792 successors.<footnote><para>
4793 <!-- f14 -->
4794 Ibid.
4795 </para></footnote>
4796 </para>
4797 </blockquote>
4798 <para>
4799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4800 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4801 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4802 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4803 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4804 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4805 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4806 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4807 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4808 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4809 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4810 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4811 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4812 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4813 readers chose to let it develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought
4814 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4815 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4816 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4817 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4818 </para>
4819 <para>
4820 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4821 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4822 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4823 protected.
4824 </para>
4825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4826 </sect1>
4827 <sect1 id="recorders">
4828 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4829 <para>
4830 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4831 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4832 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4833 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4834 He was their god.)
4835 </para>
4836 <para>
4837 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4838 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4839 today.
4840 </para>
4841 <para>
4842 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4843 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4844 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4845 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4846 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4847 stage.
4848 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4849 </para>
4850 <para>
4851 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4852 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4853 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4854 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4856 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4857 about the scene.
4858 </para>
4859 <para>
4860 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4861 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4862 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4863 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4864 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4865 </para>
4866 <para>
4867 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4868 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4869 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4870 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4871 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4872 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4873 </para>
4874 <para>
4875 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4876 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4877 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4878 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4879 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4880 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4881 </para>
4882 <para>
4883 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4884 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4885 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4886 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4887 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4888 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4889 </para>
4890 <para>
4891 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4892 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4893 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4894 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4895 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4896 confirm what he had been told.
4897 </para>
4898 <para>
4899 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4900 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4901 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4902 about
4903
4904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4905 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4906 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4907 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4908 the money."
4909 </para>
4910 <para>
4911 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4912 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4913 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4914 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4915 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4916 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4917 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4918 </para>
4919 <para>
4920 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4921 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4922 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4923 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4924 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4925 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4926 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4927 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4928 says the owner gets to control.
4929 </para>
4930 <para>
4931 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4932 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4933 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4934 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4935 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4936 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4937 by the law.
4938 </para>
4939 <para>
4940 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4941 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4942 <!-- f1 -->
4943 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4944 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4945 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4946 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4947 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4948 </para></footnote>
4949 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4950 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use does
4951 not require the permission of anyone.
4952 </para>
4953 <para>
4954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4955 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4956 </para>
4957 <blockquote>
4958 <para>
4959 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4960 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4961 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4962 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4963 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4964 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4965 </para>
4966 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4967 <listitem><para>
4968 <!-- 1. -->
4969 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4970 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4971 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4972 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4973 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4974 </para></listitem>
4975 <listitem><para>
4976 <!-- 2. -->
4977 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4978 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4979 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
4980 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
4981 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4982 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
4983 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4984 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4985 principle.
4986 </para></listitem>
4987 <listitem><para>
4988 <!-- 3. -->
4989 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4990 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4991 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4992 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4993 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4994 pockets, me or them.
4995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4996 </para></listitem>
4997 <listitem><para>
4998 <!-- 4. -->
4999 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5000 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5001 money.
5002 </para></listitem>
5003 </orderedlist>
5004 </blockquote>
5005 <para>
5006 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5007 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5008 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5009 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5010 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5011 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5012 </para>
5013 <para>
5014 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5015 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5016 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5017 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5018 not.
5019 </para>
5020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5021 </sect1>
5022 <sect1 id="transformers">
5023 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5024 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5025 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5026 <para>
5027 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5028 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5029 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5030 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5031 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5032 </para>
5033 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5034 <para>
5035 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5036 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5037 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5038 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5039 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5040 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5041 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5042 important to his career.
5043 </para>
5044 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5045 <para>
5046 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5047 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5048 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5049 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5050 </para>
5051 <para>
5052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5053 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5054 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5055 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5056 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5057 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5058 </para>
5059 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5060 <para>
5061 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5062 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5063 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5064 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5065 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5066 actor's career."
5067 </para>
5068 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5069 <para>
5070 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5071 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5072 </para>
5073 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5074 <para>
5075 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5076 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5077 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5078 for it."<footnote>
5079 <para>
5080 <!-- f1 -->
5081 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5082 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5083 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5084 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5085 <indexterm>
5086 <primary>artists</primary>
5087 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5088 </indexterm>
5089 </para></footnote>
5090 </para>
5091 <para>
5092 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5093 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5094 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5095 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5096 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5097 </para>
5098 <para>
5099 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5100 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5101 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5102 </para>
5103 <blockquote>
5104 <para>
5105 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5106 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5107 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5108 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5109 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5110 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5111 </para>
5112 <para>
5113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5114 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5115 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5116 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5117 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5118 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5119 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5120 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5121 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5122 started calling people.
5123 </para>
5124 </blockquote>
5125 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5126 <para>
5127 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5128 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5129 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5130 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5131 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5132 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5133 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5134 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5135 career.
5136 </para>
5137 <para>
5138 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5139 were totally in the clear."
5140 </para>
5141 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5142 <para>
5143 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5144 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5145 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5146 </para>
5147 <blockquote>
5148 <para>
5149 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5150 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5151 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5152 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5153 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5154 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5155 systematically and cleared the rights.
5156 </para>
5157 </blockquote>
5158 <para>
5159
5160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5161 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5162 loved it, and it sold very well.
5163 </para>
5164 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5165 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5166 <para>
5167 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5168 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5169 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5170 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5171 at all."<footnote><para>
5172 <!-- f2 -->
5173 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5174 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5175 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5176 </para></footnote>
5177 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5178 has to be made?
5179 </para>
5180 <para>
5181 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5182 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5183 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5184 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5185 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5186 </para>
5187 <blockquote>
5188 <para>
5189 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5190 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5191 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5192 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5193 compensated for that.
5194 </para>
5195 </blockquote>
5196 <para>
5197 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5198 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5199 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5200 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5201 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5202 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5203 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5204 </para>
5205 <blockquote>
5206 <para>
5207 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5208 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5209 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5210 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5212 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5213 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5214 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5215 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5216 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5217 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5218 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5219 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5220 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5221 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5222 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5223 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5224 </para>
5225 </blockquote>
5226 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5227 <para>
5228 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5229 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5230 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5231 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5232 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5233 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5234 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5235 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5236 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5237 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5238 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5239 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5240 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5241 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5242 "Does this still make sense?"
5243 </para>
5244 <para>
5245 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5246 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5247 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5248 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5249
5250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5251 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5252 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5253 </para>
5254 <para>
5255 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5256 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5257 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5258 judges loved every minute of it.
5259 </para>
5260 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5261 <para>
5262 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5263 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5264 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5265 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5266 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5267 were just violated in this room?"
5268 </para>
5269 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5270 <para>
5271 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5272 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5273 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5274 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5275 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5276 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5277 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5278 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5279 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5280 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5281 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5282 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5283 couldn't easily do them legally.
5284 </para>
5285 <para>
5286 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5287 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5288 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5289 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5290 planted in your presentation.
5291 </para>
5292 <para>
5293 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5295 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5296 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5297 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5298 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5299 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5300 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5301 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5302 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5303 </para>
5304 <para>
5305 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5306 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5307 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5308 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5309 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5310 </para>
5311 <para>
5312 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5313 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5314 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5315 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5316 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5317 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5318 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5319 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5320 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5321 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5322 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5323 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5324 registers the work.
5325 </para>
5326 <para>
5327 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5328 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5329 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5330 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5331 </para>
5332 <para>
5333 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5334 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5336 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5337 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5338 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5339 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5340 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5341 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5342 entertainment."
5343 </para>
5344 <para>
5345 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5346 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5347 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5348 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5349 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5350 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5351 new audiences, it is Mike."
5352 </para>
5353 <para>
5354 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5355 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5356 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5357 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5358 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5359 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5360 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5361 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5362 </para>
5363 <para>
5364 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5365 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5366 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5367 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5368 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5369 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5370 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5371 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5372 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5373 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5374 curse, reserved for the few.
5375 </para>
5376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5377 </sect1>
5378 <sect1 id="collectors">
5379 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5380 <para>
5381 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5382 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5383 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5384 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5385 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5386 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5387 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5388 </para>
5389 <para>
5390 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5391 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5392 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5393 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5394 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5395 well as when those pages changed.
5396 </para>
5397 <para>
5398 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5399 appreciated. In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5400 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5401 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5402 reports.
5403 </para>
5404 <para>
5405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5406 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5407 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5408 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5409 </para>
5410 <para>
5411 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5412 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5413 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5414 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5415 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5416 </para>
5417 <para>
5418 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5419 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5420 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5421 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5422 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5423 <!-- f1 -->
5424 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5425 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5426 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5427 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5428 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5429 </para></footnote>
5430 </para>
5431 <para>
5432 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5433 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5434 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5435 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5436 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5437 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5438 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5439 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5440 truth.
5441 </para>
5442 <para>
5443 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5444 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5445 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5446 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5447 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5448 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5449 presumes this knowedge.
5450 </para>
5451 <para>
5452 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5453 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5454 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5455 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5457 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5458 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5459 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5460 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5461 </para>
5462 <para>
5463 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5464 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5465 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5466 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5467 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5468 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5469 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5470 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5471 </para>
5472 <para>
5473 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5474 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5475 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5476 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5477 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5478 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5479 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5480 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5481 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5482 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5483 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5484 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5485 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5486 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5487 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5488 </para>
5489 <blockquote>
5490 <para>
5491 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5492 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5493 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5494 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5495 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5496
5497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5498 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5499 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5500 </para>
5501 </blockquote>
5502 <para>
5503 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5504 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5505 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5506 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5507 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5508 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5509 </para>
5510 <para>
5511 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5512 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5513 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5514 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5515 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5516 work.
5517 </para>
5518 <para>
5519 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5520 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5521 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5522 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5523 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5524 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5525 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5526 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5527 <!-- f2 -->
5528 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5529 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5530 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5531 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5532 Co., 1992), 36.
5533 </para></footnote>
5534 </para>
5535 <para>
5536 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5537 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5538 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5539 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5540 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5541 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5542 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5543 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5544 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5545 </para>
5546 <para>
5547 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5549 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5550 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5551 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5552 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5553 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5554 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5555 events of that day.
5556 </para>
5557 <para>
5558 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5559 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5560 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5561 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5562 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5563 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5564 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5565 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5566 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5567 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5568 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5569 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5570 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5571 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5572 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5573 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5574 </para>
5575 <para>
5576 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5577 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5578 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5579 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5580 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5581 to find them.
5582 </para>
5583 <para>
5584 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5585 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5586 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5587 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5588 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5589 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5590 </para>
5591 <para>
5592 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5593 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5594 life, if the
5595
5596 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5597 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5598 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5599 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5600 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5601 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5602 </para>
5603 <para>
5604 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5605 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5606 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5607 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5608 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5609 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5610 longer sold.
5611 </para>
5612 <para>
5613 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5614 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5615 <!-- f3 -->
5616 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5617 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5618 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5619 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5620 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5621 College Law Review 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5622 </para></footnote>). After
5623 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5624 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5625 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5626 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5627 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5628 </para>
5629 <para>
5630 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5631 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5632 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5633 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5634 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5635 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5636 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5637 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5638 disappears.
5639 </para>
5640 <para>
5641 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5642 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5643 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5644 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5645 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5646 generally, the
5647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5648 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5649 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5650 little practical effect.
5651 </para>
5652 <para>
5653 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5654 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5655 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5656 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5657 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5658 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5659 </para>
5660 <para>
5661 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5662 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5663 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5664 Kahle describes,
5665 </para>
5666 <blockquote>
5667 <para>
5668 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5669 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5670 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5671 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5672 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5673 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5674 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5675 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5676 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5677 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5678 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5679 </para>
5680 </blockquote>
5681 <para>
5682 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5683 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5684 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5685 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5686 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5687 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5688 it;
5689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5690 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5691 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5692 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5693 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5694 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5695 </para>
5696 <para>
5697 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5698 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5699 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5700 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5701 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5702 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5703 </para>
5704 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5705 </sect1>
5706 <sect1 id="property-i">
5707 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5708 <para>
5709 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5710 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5711 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5712 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5713 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5714 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5715 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5716 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5717 </para>
5718 <para>
5719 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5720 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5721 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5722 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5723 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5724 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5725 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5726 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5727 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5728 Warner Brothers.
5729 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5730 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5731 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5732 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5733 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5734 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5735 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5736 </para>
5737 <para>
5738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5739 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5740 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5741 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5742 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5743 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5744 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5745 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5746 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5747 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5748 Washingtonian way.
5749 </para>
5750 <para>
5751 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5752 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5753 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5754 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5755 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5756 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5757 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5758 </para>
5759 <para>
5760 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5761 perfectly:
5762 </para>
5763 <blockquote>
5764 <para>
5765 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5766 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5767 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5768 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5769 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5770 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5771 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5772 debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5773 <!-- f1 -->
5774 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5775 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5776 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5777 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5778 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5779 Valenti).
5780 </para></footnote>
5781 </para>
5782 </blockquote>
5783 <para>
5784 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5785 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5786 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5787 this:
5788 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5789 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5790 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5791 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5792 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5793 </para>
5794 <para>
5795 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5796 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5797 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5798 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5799 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5800 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5801 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5802 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5803 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5804 Washington.
5805 </para>
5806 <para>
5807 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5808 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5809 <!-- f2 -->
5810 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5811 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5812 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5813 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5814 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5815 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5816 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5817 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5818 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5819 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5820 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5821 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5822 in our tradition.
5823 </para>
5824 <para>
5825 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5826 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5827 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5828 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5829 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5830 culture would develop.
5831 </para>
5832 <para>
5833 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5834 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5835 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5836 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5837 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5838 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5839 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5840 the same would be to
5841
5842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5843 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5844 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5845 perfect control.
5846 </para>
5847 <para>
5848 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5849 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5850 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5851 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5852 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5853 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5854 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5855 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5856 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5857 Constitution itself.
5858 </para>
5859 <para>
5860 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5861 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5862 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5863 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5864 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5865 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5866 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5867 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5868 government pays for the privilege.
5869 </para>
5870 <para>
5871 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5872 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5873 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5874 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5875 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5876 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5877 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5878 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5879 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5880 compensation for your land
5881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5882 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5883 compensation at all.
5884 </para>
5885 <para>
5886 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5887 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5888 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5889 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5890 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5891 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5892 itself.
5893 </para>
5894 <para>
5895 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5896 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5897 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5898 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5899 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5900 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5901 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5902 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5903 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5904 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5905 </para>
5906 <para>
5907 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5908 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5909 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5910 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5911 creative property there must be a public domain?
5912 </para>
5913 <para>
5914 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5915 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5916 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5917 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5918 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5919 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5920 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5921 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5922 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5923 control how culture develops.
5924 </para>
5925 <para>
5926
5927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5928 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5929 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5930 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5931 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5932 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5933 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5934 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5935 </para>
5936 <figure id="fig-1331">
5937 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5938 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5939 </figure>
5940 <para>
5941 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5942 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5943 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5944 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5945 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5946 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5947 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5948 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5949 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5950 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5951 Web, you can be punished
5952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5953 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5954 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5955 </para>
5956 <para>
5957 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5958 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5959 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5960 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5961 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5962 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5963 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5964 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5965 the source of the enforcement.
5966 </para>
5967 <para>
5968 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5969 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5970 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5971 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5972 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5973 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5974 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5975 individual or group might behave.
5976 </para>
5977 <para>
5978 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5979 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
5980 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5981 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5982 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5983 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5984 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5985 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5986 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5987 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
5988 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5989 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5990 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5991 </para>
5992 <para>
5993
5994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
5995 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
5996 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
5997 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
5998 undermined by another.
5999 </para>
6000 <para>
6001 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6002 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6003 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6004 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6005 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6006 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6007 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6008 </para>
6009 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6010 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6011 </indexterm>
6012 <para>
6013 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6014 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6015 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6016 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6017 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6018 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6019 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6020 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6021 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6022 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6023 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6024 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6025 </para>
6026 <para>
6027 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6028 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6029 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6030 <!-- f3 -->
6031 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6032 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6033 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6034 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6035 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6036 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6037 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6038 June 1998.
6039 </para></footnote>
6040 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6041 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6042 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6043 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6044 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6045 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6046 used to require that other laws be more
6047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6048 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6049 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6050 driving.
6051 </para>
6052 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6053
6054 <figure id="fig-1361">
6055 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6056 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6057 </figure>
6058 <para>
6059 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6060 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6061 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6062 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6063 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6064 another.<footnote>
6065 <para>
6066 <!-- f4 -->
6067 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6068 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6069 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6070 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6071 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6072 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6073 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6074 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6075 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6076 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6077 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6078 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6079 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6080 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6081 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6082 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6083 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6084 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6085 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6086 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6087 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6088 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6089 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6090 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6091 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6092 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6093 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6094 of these groups might face.
6095 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6096 </para></footnote>
6097 </para>
6098 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6099 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6100 <para>
6101 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6102 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6103 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6104 rallying makes sense.
6105 </para>
6106 <para>
6107 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6108 Internet:
6109 </para>
6110 <figure id="fig-1371">
6111 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6112 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6113 </figure>
6114 <para>
6115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6116 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6117 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6118 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6119 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6120 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6121 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6122 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6123 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6124 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6125 this form of infringement.
6126 </para>
6127 <para>
6128 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6129 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6130 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6131 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6132 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6133 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6134 </para>
6135 <para>
6136 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6137 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6138 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6139 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6140 Iraq
6141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6142 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6143 looting that results.
6144 </para>
6145 <figure id="fig-1381">
6146 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6147 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6148 </figure>
6149 <para>
6150 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6151 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6152 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6153 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6154 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6155 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6156 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6157 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6158 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6159 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6160 </para>
6161 <para>
6162 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6163 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6164 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6165 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6166 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6167 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6168 life. Homeowners living in a
6169
6170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6171 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6172 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6173 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6174 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6175 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6176 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6177 </para>
6178 <para>
6179 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6180 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6181 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6182 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6183 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6184 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6185 </para>
6186 <para>
6187 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6188 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6189 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6190 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6191 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6192 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6193 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6194 <!-- f5 -->
6195 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6196 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6197 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6198 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6199 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6200 October 2003, available at
6201 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6202 </para></footnote>
6203
6204 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6205 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6206 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6207 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6208 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6209 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6210 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6211 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6212 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6213 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6214 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6215 </para>
6216 <para>
6217 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6218 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6219 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6221 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6222 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6223 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6224 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6225 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6226 <!-- f6 -->
6227 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6228 </para></footnote>
6229 And relative to a
6230 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6231 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6232 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6233 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6234 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6235 Brezhnev.
6236 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6237 </para>
6238 <para>
6239 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6240 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6241 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6242 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6243 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6244 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6245 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6246 opportunities for innovation and change.
6247 </para>
6248 <para>
6249 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6250 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6251 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6252 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6253 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6254 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6255 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6256 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6257 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6258 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6259 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6260 regulation is justified.
6261 </para>
6262 <para>
6263 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6265 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6266 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6267 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6268 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6269 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6270 </para>
6271 <para>
6272 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6273 </para>
6274 <para>
6275 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6276 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6277 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6278 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6279 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6280 </para>
6281 <para>
6282 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6283 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6284 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6285 </para>
6286 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6287 <para>
6288 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6289 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6290 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6291 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6292 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6293 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6294 </para>
6295 <para>
6296 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6297 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6298 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6299 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6300 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6301 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6302 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6303 </para>
6304 <para>
6305 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6306 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6307 culture.<footnote><para>
6308 <!-- f7 -->
6309 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6310 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6311 </para></footnote>
6312 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6313 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6314 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6315 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6316 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6317 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6319 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6320 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6321 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6322 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6323 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6324 </para>
6325 <para>
6326 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6327 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6328 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6329 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6330 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6331 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6332 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6333 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6334 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6335 </para>
6336 <para>
6337 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6338 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6339 be lost.
6340 </para>
6341 </sect2>
6342 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6343 <title>Beginnings</title>
6344 <para>
6345 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6346 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6347 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6348 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6349 </para>
6350 <para>
6351 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6352 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6353 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6354 </para>
6355 <para>
6356 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6357 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6358 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6359
6360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6361 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6362 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6363 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6364 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6365 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6366 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6367 </para>
6368 <para>
6369 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6370 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6371 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6372 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6373 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6374 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6375 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6376 </para>
6377 <para>
6378 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6379 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6380 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6381 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6382 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6383 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6384 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6385 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6386 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6387 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6388 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6389 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6390 power.
6391 </para>
6392 <para>
6393 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6394 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6395 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6396 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6397 years since they first struck its design.
6398 </para>
6399 <para>
6400 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6401 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6403 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6404 started here:
6405 </para>
6406 <figure id="fig-1441">
6407 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6408 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6409 </figure>
6410 <para>
6411 We will end here:
6412 </para>
6413 <figure id="fig-1442">
6414 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6415 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6416 </figure>
6417 <para>
6418 Let me explain how.
6419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6420 </para>
6421 </sect2>
6422 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6423 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6424 <para>
6425 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6426 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6427 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6428 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6429 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6430 authorship.<footnote>
6431 <para>
6432 <!-- f8 -->
6433 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6434 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6435 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6436 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6437 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6438 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6439 </para></footnote>
6440 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6441 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6442 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6443 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6444 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6445 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6446 </para>
6447 <para>
6448 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6449 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6450 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6451 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6452 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6453 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6454 </para>
6455 <para>
6456 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6457 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6458 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6459 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6460 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6461 </para>
6462 <para>
6463 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6464 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6465 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6466 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6467 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6468 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6469 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6470 <!-- f9 -->
6471 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6472 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6473 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6474 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6475 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6476 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6477 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6478 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6479 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6480 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6481 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6482 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6483 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6484 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6485 </para>
6486 <para>
6487 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6488 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6490 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6491 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6492 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6493 copyright, either.
6494 </para>
6495 <para>
6496 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6497 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6498 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6499 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6500 domain.<footnote><para>
6501 <!-- f10 -->
6502 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6503 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6504 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6505 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6506 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6507 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6508 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6509 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6510 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6511 </para>
6512 <para>
6513 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6514 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6515 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6516 <!-- f11 -->
6517 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6518 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6519 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6520 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6521 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6522 effectively free.
6523 </para>
6524 <para>
6525 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6526 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6527 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6528 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6529 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6530 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6531 </para>
6532 <para>
6533 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6534 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6535 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6536 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6537 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6538 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6539 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6540 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6541 </para>
6542 <para>
6543 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6544 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6545 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6546 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6547
6548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6549 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6550 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6551 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6552 </para>
6553 <para>
6554 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6555 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6556 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6557 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6558 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6559 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6560 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6561 value.
6562 </para>
6563 <para>
6564 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6565 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6566 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6567 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6568 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6569 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6570 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6571 was ninety-five years.
6572 </para>
6573 <para>
6574 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6575 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6576 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6577 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6578 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6579 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6580 them.
6581 </para>
6582 <para>
6583 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6584 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6585 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6586 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6587 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6588 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6589 years.<footnote><para>
6590 <!-- f12 -->
6591 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6592 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6593 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6594 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6595 </para></footnote>
6596 </para>
6597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6598 </sect2>
6599 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6600 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6601 <para>
6602 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6603 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6604 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6605 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6606 </para>
6607 <para>
6608 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6609 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6610 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6611 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6612 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6613 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6614 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6615 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6616 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6617 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6618 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6619 </para>
6620 <para>
6621 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6622 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6623 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6624 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6625 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6626 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6627 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6628 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6629 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6630 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6631 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6632 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6633 on the initial creative work.
6634 </para>
6635 <para>
6636 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6637 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6638 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6640 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6641 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6642 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6643 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6644 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6645 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6646 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6647 </para>
6648 <para>
6649 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6650 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6651 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6652 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6653 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6654 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6655 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6656 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6657 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6658 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6659 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6660 original author.
6661 </para>
6662 <para>
6663 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6664 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6665 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6666 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6667 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6668 copy available for others to copy.
6669 </para>
6670 <para>
6671 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6672 differences.
6673 </para>
6674 <para>
6675 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6676 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6677 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6678 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6679 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6680 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6681 <!-- f13 -->
6682 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6683 Creation
6684 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6685 International
6686 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6687 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6688 </para></footnote>
6689 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6690 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6691 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6692 </para>
6693 <para>
6694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6695 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6696 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6697 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6698 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6699 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6700 creative
6701 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6702 restrained.
6703 </para>
6704 <para>
6705 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6706 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6707 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6708 reduced
6709 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6710 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6711 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6712 </para>
6713 <para>
6714 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6715 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6716 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6717 </para>
6718 <para>
6719 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6720 control
6721 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6722 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6723 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6724 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6725 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6726 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6727 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6728 exclusive
6729 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6730 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6731 </para>
6732 <para>
6733 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6734 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6735 expansion
6736 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6737 copyright.
6738 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6739 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6740 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6741 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6742 </para>
6743 <para>
6744
6745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6746 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6747 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6748 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6749 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6750 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6751 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6752 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6753 protect
6754 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6755 <!-- f14 -->
6756 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6757 2003, available at
6758 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6759 </para></footnote>
6760 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6761 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6762 the wrong of direct piracy.
6763 </para>
6764 <para>
6765 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6766 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6767 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6768 transformative
6769 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6770 <!-- f15 -->
6771 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6772 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6773 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6774 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6775 Constitutionality,"
6776 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6777 </para></footnote>
6778 These two different uses of my creative work are
6779 treated the same.
6780 </para>
6781 <para>
6782 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6783 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6784 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6785 creates
6786 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6787 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6788 originally created?
6789 </para>
6790 <para>
6791 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6792 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6793 simply
6794 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6795 rights originally granted.
6796 </para>
6797 </sect2>
6798 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6799 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6800 <para>
6801 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6802 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6803 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6804 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6805 <!-- f16 -->
6806 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6807 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6808 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6809 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6810 sometimes
6811 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6812 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6813 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6814 </para></footnote>
6815 </para>
6816 <para>
6817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6818 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6819 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6820 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6821 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6822 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6823 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6824 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6825 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6826 trigger for copyright law.
6827 </para>
6828 <para>
6829 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6830 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6831 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6832 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6833 <!-- f17 -->
6834 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6835 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6836 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6837 basis
6838 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6839 </para></footnote>
6840 because it is clear that the
6841 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6842 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6843 </para>
6844 <para>
6845 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6846 empty circle.
6847 </para>
6848 <figure id="fig-1521">
6849 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6850 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6851 </figure>
6852 <para>
6853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6854 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6855 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6856 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6857 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6858 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6859 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6860 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6861 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6862 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6863 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6864 not make a copy.
6865 </para>
6866 <figure id="fig-1531">
6867 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6868 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6869 </figure>
6870 <para>
6871 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6872 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6873 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6874 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6875 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6876 diagram on next page).
6877 </para>
6878 <para>
6879 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6880 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6881 </para>
6882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6883 <figure id="fig-1541">
6884 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6885 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6886 </figure>
6887 <para>
6888 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6889 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6890 unregulated.
6891 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6892 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6893 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6894 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6895 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6896 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6897 </para>
6898 <figure id="fig-1542">
6899 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6900 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6901 </figure>
6902 <para> </para>
6903 <figure id="fig-1551">
6904 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6905 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6906 </figure>
6907 <para>
6908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6909 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6910 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6911 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6912 </para>
6913 <para>
6914 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6915 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6916 <!-- f18 -->
6917 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6918 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6919 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6920 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6921 </para></footnote>
6922 And because of this single,
6923 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6924 category
6925 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6926 unregulated
6927 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6928 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6929 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6930 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6931 category
6932 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6933 copyrighted
6934 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6935 burden of this shift.
6936 </para>
6937 <para>
6938 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6939 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6940 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6941 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6942 nothing
6943 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6945 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6946 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6947 produced
6948 a copy.
6949 </para>
6950 <para>
6951 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6952 different
6953 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6954 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6955 copyright
6956 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6957 accidental
6958 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6959 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6960 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6961 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6962 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6963 </para>
6964 <para>
6965 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6966 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6967 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6968 points also become clear:
6969 </para>
6970 <para>
6971 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6972 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6973 presumptively
6974 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6975 evidence
6976 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6977 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
6978 free culture before the Internet.
6979 </para>
6980 <para>
6981 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6982 transformative
6983 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
6984 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
6985 transformation
6986 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
6987 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
6988 releasing
6989 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
6990 justification.
6991 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
6992 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
6993 transformative
6994 uses of creative work.
6995 </para>
6996 <para>
6997 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
6998
6999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7000 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7001 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7002 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7003 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7004 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7005 Internet,
7006 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7007 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7008 protected
7009 before because reading was not regulated.
7010 </para>
7011 <para>
7012 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7013 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7014 depend
7015 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7016 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7017 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7018 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7019 protections
7020 of fair use are not enough.
7021 </para>
7022 <para>
7023 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7024 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7025 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7026 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7027 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7028 </para>
7029 <para>
7030 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7031 began
7032 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7033 previews.
7034 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7035 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7036 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7037 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7038 before
7039 you bought it.
7040 </para>
7041 <para>
7042 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7043 distributors
7044 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7045 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7046 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7048 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7049 business
7050 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7051 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7052 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7053 immediately.
7054 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7055 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7056 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7057 </para>
7058 <para>
7059 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7060 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7061 infringed"
7062 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7063 willful
7064 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7065 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7066 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7067 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7068 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7069 </para>
7070 <para>
7071 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7072 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7073 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7074 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7075 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7076 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7077 Disney's permission.
7078 </para>
7079 <para>
7080 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7081 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7082 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7083 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7084 marketplace,
7085 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7086 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7087 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7088 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7089 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7090 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7091 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7092 </para>
7093 <para>
7094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7095 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7096 control
7097 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7098 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7099 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7100 Noble
7101 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7102 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7103 argument
7104 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7105 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7106 exercising
7107 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7108 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7109 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7110 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7111 </para>
7112 <para>
7113 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7114 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7115 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7116 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7117 owners
7118 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7119 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7120 </para>
7121 </sect2>
7122 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7123 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7124 <para>
7125 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7126 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7127 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7128 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7129 </para>
7130 <para>
7131 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7132 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7133 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7134 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7135 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7136 your freedom.
7137 </para>
7138 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7139 <para>
7140 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7141 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7143 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7144 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7145 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7146 <!-- f19 -->
7147 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7148 Contemporary
7149 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7150 </para></footnote>
7151 </para>
7152 <para>
7153 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7154 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7155 you were."<footnote><para>
7156 <!-- f20 -->
7157 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7158 </para></footnote>
7159 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7160 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7161 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7162 </para>
7163 <para>
7164 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7165 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7166 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7167 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7168 </para>
7169 <para>
7170 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7171 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7172 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7173 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7174 copyrighted
7175 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7176 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7177 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7178 that is not at all funny.
7179 </para>
7180 <para>
7181 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7182 </para>
7183 <para>
7184 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7185 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7186 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7187 technology,
7188 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7189 </para>
7190 <para>
7191 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7192 Reader.
7193 </para>
7194 <para>
7195 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7196 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7197 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7198 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7199 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7200 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7202 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7203 called Permissions.
7204 </para>
7205 <figure id="fig-1611">
7206 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7207 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7208 </figure>
7209 <para>
7210 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7211 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7212 </para>
7213 <figure id="fig-1612">
7214 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7215 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7216 </figure>
7217 <para>
7218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7219 According to my eBook
7220 Reader, I have the permission
7221 to copy to the clipboard of the
7222 computer ten text selections
7223 every ten days. (So far, I've
7224 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7225 I also have the permission to
7226 print ten pages from the book
7227 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7228 the permission to use the Read
7229 Aloud button to hear
7230 Middlemarch
7231 read aloud through the
7232 computer.
7233 </para>
7234 <para>
7235 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7236 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7237 </para>
7238 <figure id="fig-1621">
7239 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7240 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7241 </figure>
7242 <para>
7243 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7244 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7245 the book.
7246 </para>
7247 <figure id="fig-1622">
7248 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7249 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7250 </figure>
7251 <para>
7252 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7253 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7254 </para>
7255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7256 <figure id="fig-1631">
7257 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7258 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7259 </figure>
7260 <para>
7261 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7262 </para>
7263 <para>
7264 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7265 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7266 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7267 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7268 under
7269 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7270 <!-- f21 -->
7271 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7272 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7273 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7274 obligation
7275 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7276 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7277 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7278 </para></footnote>
7279 When my e-book of
7280 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7281 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7282 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7283 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7284 </para>
7285 <para>
7286 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7287 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7288 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7289 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7290 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7291 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7292 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7293 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7294 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7295 restrictions:
7296 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7297 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7298 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7299 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7300 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7301 </para>
7302 <para>
7303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7304 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7305 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7306 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7307 </para>
7308 <para>
7309 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7310 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7311 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7312 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7313 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7314 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7315 </para>
7316 <para>
7317 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7318 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7319 technologies
7320 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7321 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7322 protections as well?
7323 </para>
7324 <para>
7325 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7326 eBook Reader.
7327 </para>
7328 <para>
7329 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7330 public
7331 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7332 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7333 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7334 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7335 </para>
7336 <figure id="fig-1641">
7337 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7338 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7339 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7340 </figure>
7341 <para>
7342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7343 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7344 allowed
7345 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7346 "permissions"
7347 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7348 </para>
7349 <para>
7350 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7351 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7352 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7353 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7354 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7355 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7356 </para>
7357 <para>
7358 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7359 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7360 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7361 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7362 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7363 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7364 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7365 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7366 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7367 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7368 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7369 </para>
7370 <para>
7371 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7372 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7373 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7374 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7375 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7376 often crazy.
7377 </para>
7378 <para>
7379 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7380 story of mine that makes the same point.
7381 </para>
7382 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7383 <para>
7384 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7385 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7386 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7387 </para>
7388 <para>
7389 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7390 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7391 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7393 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7394 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7395 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7396 </para>
7397 <para>
7398 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7399 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7400 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7401 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7402 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7403 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7404 </para>
7405 <para>
7406 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7407 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7408 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7409 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7410 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7411 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7412 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7413 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7414 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7415 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7416 </para>
7417 <para>
7418 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7419 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7420 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7421 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7422 ethically.
7423 </para>
7424 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7425 <para>
7426 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7427 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7428 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7429 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7430 than Sony had built.
7431 </para>
7432 <para>
7433 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7434 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7435 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7436 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7437 the
7438
7439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7440 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7441 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7442 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7443 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7444 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7445 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7446 dog to dance?
7447 </para>
7448 <para>
7449 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7450 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7451 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7452 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7453 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7454 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7455 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7456 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7457 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7458 </para>
7459 <para>
7460 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7461 <!-- f22 -->
7462 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7463 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7464 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7465 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7466 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7467 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7468 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7469 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7470 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7471 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7472 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7473 </para></footnote>
7474 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7475 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7476 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7477 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7478 </para>
7479 <para>
7480 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7481 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7482 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7483 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7484 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7485 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7486 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7487 Internet much more.
7488 </para>
7489 <para>
7490 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7491 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7492 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7493 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7494 </para>
7495 <para>
7496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7497 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7498 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7499 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7500 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7501 </para>
7502 <para>
7503 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7504 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7505 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7506 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7507 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7508 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7509 </para>
7510 <para>
7511 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7512 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7513 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7514 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7515 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7516 constituted, succeed.
7517 </para>
7518 <para>
7519 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7520 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7521 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7522 wrote:
7523 </para>
7524 <blockquote>
7525 <para>
7526 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7527 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7528 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7529 </para>
7530 </blockquote>
7531 <para>
7532 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7533 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7534 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7535 </para>
7536 <blockquote>
7537 <para>
7538 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7540 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7541 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7542 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7543 </para>
7544 </blockquote>
7545 <para>
7546 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7547 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7548 spreading such information an offense.
7549 </para>
7550 <para>
7551 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7552 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7553 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7554 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7555 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7556 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7557 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7558 </para>
7559 <para>
7560 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7561 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7562 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7563 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7564 </para>
7565 <para>
7566 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7567 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7568 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7569 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7570 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7571 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7572 have been a copyright violation.
7573 </para>
7574 <para>
7575 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7576 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7577 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7578 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7579 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7580 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7581 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7583 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7584 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7585 </para>
7586 <para>
7587 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7588 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7589 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7590 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7591 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7592 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7593 </para>
7594 <para>
7595 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7596 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7597 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7598 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7599 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7600 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7601 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7602 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7603 </para>
7604 <blockquote>
7605 <para>
7606 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7607 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7608 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7609 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7610 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7611 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7612 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7613 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7614 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7615 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7616 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7617 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7618 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7619 important.<footnote><para>
7620 <!-- f23 -->
7621 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7622 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7623 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7624 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7625 </para></footnote>
7626 </para>
7627 </blockquote>
7628 <para>
7629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7630 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7631 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7632 the VCR responsible.
7633 </para>
7634 <para>
7635 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7636 the DMCA.
7637 </para>
7638 <para>
7639 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7640 </para>
7641 <para>
7642 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7643 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7644 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7645 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7646 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7647 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7648 </para>
7649 <para>
7650 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7652 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7653 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7654 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7655 and bad uses.
7656 </para>
7657 <figure id="fig-1711">
7658 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7659 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7660 </figure>
7661 <para>
7662 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7663 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7664 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7665 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7666 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7667 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7668 </para>
7669 <para>
7670 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7671 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7672 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7673 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7674 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7675 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7676 </para>
7677 <para>
7678 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7679 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7680 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7681 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7682 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7683 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7684 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7685 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7686 </para>
7687 <para>
7688 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7689 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7690 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7691 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7692 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7693 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7694 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7695 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7696 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7697 </para>
7698 <para>
7699
7700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7701 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7702 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7703 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7704 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7705 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7706 <!-- f24 -->
7707 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7708 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7709 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7710 </para></footnote>
7711 </para>
7712 <para>
7713 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7714 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7715 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7716 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7717 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7718 </para>
7719 <para>
7720 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7721 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7722 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7723 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7724 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7725 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7726 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7727 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7728 </para>
7729 <para>
7730 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7731 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7732 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7733 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7734 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7735 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7736 </para>
7737 </sect2>
7738 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7739 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7740 <para>
7741 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7742 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7743 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7744 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7745 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7746 find better ways
7747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7748 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7749 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7750 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7751 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7752 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7753 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7754 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7755 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7756 control.
7757 </para>
7758 <para>
7759 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7760 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7761 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7762 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7763 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7764 </para>
7765 <para>
7766 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7767 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7768 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7769 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7770 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7771 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7772 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7773 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7774 of the media.
7775 </para>
7776 <para>
7777 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7778 nature.
7779 </para>
7780 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7781 <para>
7782 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7783 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7784 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7785 <!-- f25 -->
7786 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7787 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7788 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7789 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7790 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7791 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7792 <!-- f26 -->
7793 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7794 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7795 </para></footnote>
7796 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7797 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7798 <!-- f27 -->
7799 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7800 31 May 2003.
7801 </para></footnote>
7802 </para>
7803 <para>
7804 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7805 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7807 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7808 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7809 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7810 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7811 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7812 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7813 </para>
7814 <para>
7815 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7816 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7817 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7818 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7819 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7820 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7821 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7822 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7823 protected&mdash; by the market.
7824 </para>
7825 <para>
7826 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7827 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7828 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7829 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7830 </para>
7831 <blockquote>
7832 <para>
7833 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7834 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7835 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7836 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7837 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7838 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7839 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7840 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7841 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7842 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7843 <!-- f28 -->
7844 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7845 2003): 89.
7846 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7847 </para></footnote>
7848 </para>
7849 </blockquote>
7850 <para>
7851 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7852 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7853 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7854 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7855 </para>
7856 <figure id="fig-1761">
7857 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7858 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7859 </figure>
7860 <para>
7861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7862 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7863 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7864 distribute content?
7865 </para>
7866 <para>
7867 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7868 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7869 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7870 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7871 </para>
7872 <para>
7873 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7874 integration may matter.
7875 </para>
7876 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7877 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7878 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7879 <para>
7880 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7881 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7882 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7883 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7884 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7885 </para>
7886 <para>
7887 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7888 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7889 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7890 control.<footnote><para>
7891 <!-- f29 -->
7892 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7893 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7894 Missouri,
7895 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7896 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7897 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7898 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7899 </para></footnote>
7900 </para>
7901 <para>
7902
7903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7904 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7905 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7906 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7907 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7908 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7909 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7910 networks.
7911 </para>
7912 <para>
7913 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7914 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7915 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7916 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7917 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7918 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7919 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7920 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7921 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7922 <!-- f30 -->
7923 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7924 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7925 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7926 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7927 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7928 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7929 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7930 2003.
7931 </para></footnote>
7932 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7933 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7934 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7935 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7936 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7937 63%."<footnote><para>
7938 <!-- f31 -->
7939 Ibid.
7940 </para></footnote>
7941 </para>
7942 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7943 <para>
7944 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7945 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7946 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7947 owned by the network.
7948 </para>
7949 <para>
7950 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7951 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7952 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7953 </para>
7954 <blockquote>
7955 <para>
7956 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7957 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7958 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7959 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7961 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7962 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7963 handful.<footnote><para>
7964 <!-- f32 -->
7965 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7966 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7967 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7968 </para></footnote>
7969 </para>
7970 </blockquote>
7971 <para>
7972 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7973 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7974 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7975 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7976 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7977 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
7978 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
7979 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
7980 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
7981 democracy.
7982 </para>
7983 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
7984 <para>
7985 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
7986 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
7987 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
7988 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
7989 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
7990 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
7991 <!-- f33 -->
7992 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
7993 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
7994 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
7995 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
7996 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
7997 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy 14 (1985):
7998 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
7999 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8000 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them
8001 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8002
8003 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8004 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8005 sprinting.
8006 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8007 </para>
8008 <para>
8009 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8010 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8011 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8012 measure.
8013 </para>
8014 <para>
8015 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8016 suggest the concern.
8017 </para>
8018 <para>
8019 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8020 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8021 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8022 </para>
8023 <para>
8024 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8025 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8026 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8027
8028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8029 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8030 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8031 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8032 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8033 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8034 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8035 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8036 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8037 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8038 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8039 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8040 outweigh these costs.
8041 </para>
8042 <para>
8043 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8044 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8045 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8046 these issues.
8047 </para>
8048 <para>
8049 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8050 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8051 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8052 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8053 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8054 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8055 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8056 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8057 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8058 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8059 </para>
8060 <para>
8061 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8062 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8063 </para>
8064 <para>
8065 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8066 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8067 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8068 war. Can you do it?
8069 </para>
8070 <para>
8071 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8073 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8074 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8075 message will be heard then?
8076 </para>
8077 <para>
8078 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8079 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8080 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8081 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8082 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8083 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8084 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8085 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8086 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8087 <!-- f34 -->
8088 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8089 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8090 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8091 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8092 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8093 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8094 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8095 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8096 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8097 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8098 York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8099 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8100 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8101 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8102 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8103 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8104 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
8105 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8106 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8107 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8108 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8109 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8110 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8111 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8112 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8113 </para></footnote>
8114 </para>
8115 <para>
8116 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8117 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8118 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8119 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8120 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8121 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8122 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8123 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8124 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8125 </para>
8126 </sect2>
8127 <sect2 id="together">
8128 <title>Together</title>
8129 <para>
8130 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8131 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8132 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8133 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8134 </para>
8135 <para>
8136 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8137 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8138 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8139 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8140 to seem
8141
8142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8143 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8144 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8145 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8146 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8147 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8148 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8149 be redefined.
8150 </para>
8151 <para>
8152 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8153 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8154 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8155 our culture today.
8156 </para>
8157 <para>
8158 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8159 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8160 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8161 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8162 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8163 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8164 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8165 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8166 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8167 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8168 </para>
8169 <para>
8170 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8171 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8172 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8173 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8174 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8175 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8176 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8177 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8178 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8179 technology and the market enable.
8180 </para>
8181 <para>
8182 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8183 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8185 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8186 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8187 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8188 the development of our culture than now.
8189 </para>
8190 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8191 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8192 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8193 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8194 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8195 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8196 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8197 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny
8198 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8199 founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8200 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8201 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8202 culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
8203 <!-- f35 -->
8204 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8205 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8206 </para></footnote>
8207 </para>
8208 <para>
8209 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8210 </para>
8211 <para>
8212 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8213 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8214 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8215 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8216 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8217 </para>
8218
8219 <table id="t2">
8220 <title></title>
8221 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8222 <thead>
8223 <row>
8224 <entry></entry>
8225 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8226 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8227 </row>
8228 </thead>
8229 <tbody>
8230 <row>
8231 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8232 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8233 <entry>Free</entry>
8234 </row>
8235 <row>
8236 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8237 <entry>Free</entry>
8238 <entry>Free</entry>
8239 </row>
8240 </tbody>
8241 </tgroup>
8242 </table>
8243
8244 <para>
8245 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8246 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8247 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8248
8249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8250 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8251 noncommercial work was also free.
8252 </para>
8253 <para>
8254 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8255 </para>
8256
8257 <table id="t3">
8258 <title></title>
8259 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8260 <thead>
8261 <row>
8262 <entry></entry>
8263 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8264 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8265 </row>
8266 </thead>
8267 <tbody>
8268 <row>
8269 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8270 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8271 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8272 </row>
8273 <row>
8274 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8275 <entry>Free</entry>
8276 <entry>Free</entry>
8277 </row>
8278 </tbody>
8279 </tgroup>
8280 </table>
8281
8282 <para>
8283 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8284 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8285 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8286 transformation were still essentially free.
8287 </para>
8288 <para>
8289 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8290 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8291 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8292 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8293 we could say the law began to look like this:
8294 </para>
8295
8296 <table id="t4">
8297 <title></title>
8298 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8299 <thead>
8300 <row>
8301 <entry></entry>
8302 <entry>COPY</entry>
8303 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8304 </row>
8305 </thead>
8306 <tbody>
8307 <row>
8308 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8309 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8310 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8311 </row>
8312 <row>
8313 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8314 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8315 <entry>Free</entry>
8316 </row>
8317 </tbody>
8318 </tgroup>
8319 </table>
8320
8321 <para>
8322 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8323 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8324 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8325 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8326 that the law now looks like this:
8327 </para>
8328
8329 <table id="t5">
8330 <title></title>
8331 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8332 <thead>
8333 <row>
8334 <entry></entry>
8335 <entry>COPY</entry>
8336 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8337 </row>
8338 </thead>
8339 <tbody>
8340 <row>
8341 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8342 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8343 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8344 </row>
8345 <row>
8346 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8347 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8348 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8349 </row>
8350 </tbody>
8351 </tgroup>
8352 </table>
8353
8354 <para>
8355 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8356 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8357 creativity&mdash;
8358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8359 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8360 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8361 </para>
8362 <para>
8363 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8364 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8365 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8366 these domains actually does any good.
8367 </para>
8368 <para>
8369 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8370 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8371 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8372 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8373 reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8374 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8375 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8376 rights were more sharply restricted.
8377 </para>
8378 <para>
8379 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8380 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8381 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8382 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8383 property rights<footnote><para>
8384 <!-- f36 -->
8385 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8386 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8387 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8388 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8389 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8390 Press, 1980).
8391 </para></footnote>)
8392 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8393 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8394 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8395 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8396 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8397 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8398 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8399 free culture.
8400 </para>
8401 <para>
8402 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8403 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8404 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8405 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8406 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8407 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8408 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8409 chapter 7). Adding
8410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8411 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8412 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8413 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8414 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8415 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8416 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8417 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8418 dominates the debate today.
8419 </para>
8420 <para>
8421 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8422 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8423 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8424 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8425 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8426 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8427 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8428 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8429 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8430 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8431 lawyer.
8432 </para>
8433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8434 </sect2>
8435 </sect1>
8436 </chapter>
8437 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8438 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8439 <para></para>
8440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8441 <sect1 id="chimera">
8442 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8443 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8444 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8445 </indexterm>
8446 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8447 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8448 </indexterm>
8449 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8450 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8451 </indexterm>
8452
8453 <para>
8454 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8455 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8456 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8457 <!-- f1. -->
8458 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8459 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8460 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8461 </para></footnote>
8462 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8463 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8464 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8465 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8466 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8467 villagers to explore life as a king.
8468 </para>
8469 <para>
8470 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8471 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8472 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8473 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8474 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8475 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8476 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8477 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8478 alone!'"
8479 </para>
8480 <para>
8481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8482 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8483 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8484 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8485 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8486 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8487 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8488 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8489 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8490 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8491 </para>
8492 <para>
8493 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8494 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8495 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8496 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8497 </para>
8498 <para>
8499 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8500 is affected," he reports.
8501 </para>
8502 <para>
8503 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8504 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8505 his brain."
8506 </para>
8507 <para>
8508 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8509 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8510 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8511 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8512 </para>
8513 <para>
8514 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8515 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8516 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8517 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8518 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8519 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8520 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8521 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8522
8523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8524 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8525 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8526 scene. . . ."
8527 </para>
8528 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8529 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8530 <para>
8531 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8532 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8533 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8534 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8535 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8536 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8537 </para>
8538 <para>
8539 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8540 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8541 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8542 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8543 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8544 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8545 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8546 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8547 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8548 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8549 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8550 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8551 </para>
8552 <para>
8553 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8554 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8555 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8556 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8557 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8558 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8559 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8560 </para>
8561 <para>
8562 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8563 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8564 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8565 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8566 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8567 from Tower.
8568 </para>
8569 <para>
8570
8571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8572 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8573 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8574 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8575 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8576 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8577 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8578 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8579 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8580 </para>
8581 <para>
8582 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8583 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8584 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8585 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8586 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8587 </para>
8588 <para>
8589 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8590 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8591 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8592 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8593 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8594 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8595 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8596 implemented.<footnote><para>
8597 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8598 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8599 "Copyright
8600 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8601 at
8602 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8603 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8604 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8605 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8606 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8607 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8608 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8609 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8610 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8611 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8612 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8613 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8614 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8615 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8616 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8617 billion
8618 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8619 Elizabeth
8620 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8621 August 2003, available at
8622 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8623 targeting
8624 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8625 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8626 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8627 D3, available at
8628 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8629 </para></footnote>
8630
8631 </para>
8632 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8633 <para>
8634 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8635 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8636 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8637 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8638 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8639 </para>
8640 <para>
8641 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8642 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8643 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8644 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8645 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8646 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8647 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8648 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8649 </para>
8650 <para>
8651
8652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8653 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8654 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8655 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8656 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8657 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8658 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8659 </para>
8660 <para>
8661 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8662 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8663 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8664 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8665 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8666 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8667 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8668 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8669 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8670 protection for copyrighted material,
8671 </para>
8672 <blockquote>
8673 <para>
8674 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8675 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8676 </para>
8677 <para>
8678 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8679 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8680 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8681 answer
8682 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8683 well produce a totally different industry model.
8684 </para>
8685 <para>
8686 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8687 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8688 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8689 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8690 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8691 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8692 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8693 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8694 interests.<footnote><para>
8695 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8696 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8697 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8698 Protection,
8699 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8700 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8701 EMusic.com),
8702 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8703 Congressional
8704 Testimony File.
8705 </para></footnote>
8706 </para>
8707 </blockquote>
8708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8709 <para>
8710 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8711 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8712 changed.
8713 </para>
8714 <para>
8715 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8716 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8717 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8718 </para>
8719
8720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8721 </sect1>
8722 <sect1 id="harms">
8723 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8724 <para>
8725
8726 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8727 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8728 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8729 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8730 prohibition,
8731 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8732 </para>
8733 <para>
8734 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8735 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8736 extend
8737 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8738 justified?
8739 </para>
8740 <para>
8741 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8742 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8743 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8744 our history.
8745 </para>
8746 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8747 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8748 <para>
8749 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8750 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8751 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8752 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8753 </para>
8754 <para>
8755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8756 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8757 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8758 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8759 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8760 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8761 </para>
8762 <sect2 id="constrain">
8763 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8764 <para>
8765 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8766 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8767 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8768 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8769 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8770 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8771 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8772 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8773 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8774 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8775 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8776 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8777 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8778 </para>
8779 <para>
8780 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8781 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8782 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8783 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8784 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8785 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8786 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8787 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8788 the culture all around.
8789 </para>
8790 <para>
8791 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8792 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8793
8794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8795
8796 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8797 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8798 storytelling extended across the globe.
8799 </para>
8800 <para>
8801 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8802 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8803 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8804 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8805 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8806 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8807 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8808 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8809 work is presumptively illegal.
8810 </para>
8811 <para>
8812 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8813 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8814 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8815 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8816 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8817 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8818 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8819 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8820 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8821 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8822 million.<footnote><para>
8823 <!-- f1. -->
8824 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8825 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8826 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8827 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8828 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8829 </para></footnote>
8830 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8831 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8832 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8833 suffering.<footnote>
8834 <para>
8835 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8836 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8837 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8838 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8839 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8840 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8841 available at
8842 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8843 recent months.
8844 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8845 </para></footnote>
8846 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8847 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8848 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8849 </para>
8850 <para>
8851 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8852 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8853 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8854 creative
8855 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8856 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8857 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8858
8859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8860 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8861 create,
8862 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8863 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8864 begin
8865 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8866 necessarily
8867 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8868 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8869 "illegal
8870 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8871 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
8872 available
8873 at
8874 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8875 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8876 </para></footnote>
8877 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8878 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8879 critical or reflective.
8880 </para>
8881 <para>
8882 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8883 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
8884 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8885 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8886 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8887 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8888 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8889 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8890 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8891 </para>
8892 <para>
8893 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8894 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8895 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8896 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8897 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8898 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8899 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8900 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8901 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8902 </para>
8903 <para>
8904 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8905 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
8906 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8907 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8908 law regulates such a use.
8909 </para>
8910 <para>
8911
8912 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8913 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8914 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8915 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8916 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8917 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8918 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8919 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8920 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8921 </para>
8922 <para>
8923 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8924 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8925 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8926 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8927 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8928 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8929 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8930 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8931 comfort themselves.
8932 </para>
8933 <para>
8934 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8935 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8936 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8937 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8938 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8939 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8940 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8941 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8942 culture that is free.
8943 </para>
8944 <para>
8945 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8946 </para>
8947 <blockquote>
8948 <para>
8949 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8950 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8951 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8952 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8953 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8955 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8956 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8957 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8958 </para>
8959 </blockquote>
8960 </sect2>
8961 <sect2 id="innovators">
8962 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
8963 <para>
8964 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8965 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8966 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8967 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8968 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8969 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8970 </para>
8971 <para>
8972 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8973 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8974 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8975 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8976 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8977 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8978 affecting culture are more fundamental.
8979 </para>
8980 <para>
8981 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
8982 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
8983 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
8984 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
8985 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
8986 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
8987 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
8988 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
8989 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
8990 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
8991 against the competitors of tomorrow.
8992 </para>
8993 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
8994 <para>
8995 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
8996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
8997 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
8998 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
8999 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9000 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9001 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9002 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9003 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9004 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9005 </para>
9006 <para>
9007 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9008 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9009 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9010 </para>
9011 <para>
9012 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9013 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9014 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9015 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9016 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9017 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9018 </para>
9019 <para>
9020 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9021 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9022 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9023 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9024 Raitt. And so on.
9025 </para>
9026 <para>
9027 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9028 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9029 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9030 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9031 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9032 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9033 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9034 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9035 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9036 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9037 </para>
9038 <para>
9039 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9040 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9041
9042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9043 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9044 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9045 the kind of content the users liked.
9046 </para>
9047 <para>
9048 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9049 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9050 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9051 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9052 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9053 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9054 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9055 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9056 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9057 they had already bought.
9058 </para>
9059 <para>
9060 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9061 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9062 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9063 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9064 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9065 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9066 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9067 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9068 </para>
9069 <para>
9070 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9071 </para>
9072 <para>
9073 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9074 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9075 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9076 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9077 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9078 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9079 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9080 demanded.
9081 </para>
9082 <para>
9083 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9084 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9085 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9086 clients in this
9087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9088 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9089 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9090 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9091 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9092 </para>
9093 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9094 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9095 <para>
9096 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9097 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9098 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9099 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9100 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9101 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9102 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9103 innovation
9104 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9105 Revolution
9106 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9107 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9108 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9109 Times, 28 May 2001.
9110 </para></footnote>
9111 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9112 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9113 industry
9114 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9115 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9116 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9117 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9118 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9119 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9120 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9121 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9122 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9123 </para>
9124 <blockquote>
9125 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9126 <para>
9127 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9128 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9129 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9130 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9131 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9132 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9133 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9134 <para>
9135 <!-- f5. -->
9136 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9137 2003, available at
9138 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9139 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9140 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9141 </para></footnote>
9142 </para>
9143 </blockquote>
9144 <para>
9145 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9146 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9147 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9148 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9149 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9150 constantly threatened by litigation.
9151 </para>
9152 <para>
9153
9154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9155 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9156 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9157 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9158 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9159 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9160 imposes,
9161 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9162 conservative
9163 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9164 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9165 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9166 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9167 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9168 </para>
9169 <para>
9170 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9171 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9172 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9173 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9174 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9175 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9176 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9177 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9178 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9179 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9180 </para>
9181 <para>
9182 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9183 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9184 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9185 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9186 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9187 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9188 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9189 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9190 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9191 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9192 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9193 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9195 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9196 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9197 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9198 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9199 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9200 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9201 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9202 </para>
9203 <para>
9204 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9205 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9206 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9207 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9208 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9209 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9210 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9211 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9212 </para>
9213 <para>
9214 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9215 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9216 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9217 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9218 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9219 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9220 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9221 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9222 </para></footnote>
9223
9224 Congress
9225 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9226 "broadcast
9227 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9228 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9229 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9230 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9231 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9232 violators
9233 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9234 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9235 </para></footnote>
9236
9237 </para>
9238 <para>
9239 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9240 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9241 regulation
9242 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9243 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9244
9245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9246 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9247 those requirements.
9248 </para>
9249 <para>
9250 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9251 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9252 impose.<footnote><para>
9253 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9254 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9255 </para></footnote>
9256 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9257 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9258 harm than good.
9259 </para>
9260 <para>
9261 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9262 innovation&mdash;again,
9263 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9264 crowd.
9265 </para>
9266 <para>
9267 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9268 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9269 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9270 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9271 </para>
9272 <para>
9273 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9274 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9275 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9276 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9277 2001).
9278 </para></footnote>
9279 overall this history of copyright
9280 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9281 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9282 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9283 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9284 </para>
9285 <para>
9286 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9287 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9288 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9289 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9290 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9291 </para>
9292 <para>
9293 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9294 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9295 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9296 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9297 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9298 copyright
9299 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9300 music
9301 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9302 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9303 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9304 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9305 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9306 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9307 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9308 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9309 </para></footnote>
9310 It has been
9311 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9312 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9313 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9314 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9315 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9316 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9317 August
9318 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9319 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9320 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9321 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9322 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9323 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9324 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9325 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9326 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9327 </para></footnote>
9328 But there is one
9329 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9330 demise
9331 of Internet radio.
9332 </para>
9333 <para>
9334
9335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9336 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9337 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9338 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9339 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9340 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9341 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9342 copyright
9343 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9344 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9345 </para>
9346 <para>
9347 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9348 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9349 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9350 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9351 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9352 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9353 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9354 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9355 recording artists.
9356 </para>
9357 <para>
9358 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9359 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9360 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9361 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9362 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9363 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9364 metropolitan area.
9365 </para>
9366 <para>
9367 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9368 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9369 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9370 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9371 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9372 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9373 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9374 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9375 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9376 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9377 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9378 </para>
9379 <para>
9380
9381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9382 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9383 improvement
9384 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9385 improvement
9386 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9387 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9388 establish
9389 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9390 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9391 </para>
9392 <blockquote>
9393 <para>
9394 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9395 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9396 radio
9397 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9398 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9399 competition
9400 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9401 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9402 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9403 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9404 communications
9405 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9406 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9407 acquire
9408 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9409 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9410 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9411 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9412 </para></footnote>
9413 </para>
9414 </blockquote>
9415 <para>
9416 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9417 Armstrong
9418 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9419 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9420 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9421 </para></footnote>
9422 to
9423 retard
9424 the growth of this competing technology.
9425 </para>
9426 <para>
9427 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9428 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9429 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9430 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9431 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9432 radio?
9433 </para>
9434 <para>
9435 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9436 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9437
9438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9439 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9440 phenomenon
9441 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9442 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9443 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9444 hypothetical
9445 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9446 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9447 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9448 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9449 </para>
9450 <para>
9451 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9452 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9453 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9454 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9455 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9456 <para>
9457 <!-- f14. -->
9458 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9459 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9460 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9461 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9462 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9463 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9464 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9465 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9466 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9467 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9468 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9469 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9470 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9471 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9472 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9473 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9474 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9475 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9476 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9477 </para></footnote>
9478 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9479 equivalent fee.
9480 </para>
9481 <para>
9482 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9483 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9484 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9485 </para>
9486 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9487 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9488 <listitem><para>
9489 name of the service;
9490 </para></listitem>
9491 <listitem><para>
9492 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9493 </para></listitem>
9494 <listitem><para>
9495 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9496 </para></listitem>
9497 <listitem><para>
9498 date of transmission;
9499 </para></listitem>
9500 <listitem><para>
9501 time of transmission;
9502 </para></listitem>
9503 <listitem><para>
9504 time zone of origination of transmission;
9505 </para></listitem>
9506 <listitem><para>
9507 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9508 </para></listitem>
9509 <listitem><para>
9510 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9511 </para></listitem>
9512 <listitem><para>
9513 sound recording title;
9514 </para></listitem>
9515 <listitem><para>
9516 ISRC code of the recording;
9517 </para></listitem>
9518 <listitem><para>
9519 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9520 </para></listitem>
9521 <listitem><para>
9522 featured recording artist;
9523 </para></listitem>
9524 <listitem><para>
9525 retail album title;
9526 </para></listitem>
9527 <listitem><para>
9528 recording label;
9529 </para></listitem>
9530 <listitem><para>
9531 UPC code of the retail album;
9532 </para></listitem>
9533 <listitem><para>
9534 catalog number;
9535 </para></listitem>
9536 <listitem><para>
9537 copyright owner information;
9538 </para></listitem>
9539 <listitem><para>
9540 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9541 </para></listitem>
9542 <listitem><para>
9543 name of the service or entity;
9544 </para></listitem>
9545 <listitem><para>
9546 channel or program;
9547 </para></listitem>
9548 <listitem><para>
9549 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9550 </para></listitem>
9551 <listitem><para>
9552 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9553 </para></listitem>
9554 <listitem><para>
9555 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9556 </para></listitem>
9557 <listitem><para>
9558 Unique User identifier;
9559 </para></listitem>
9560 <listitem><para>
9561 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9562 </para></listitem>
9563 </orderedlist>
9564
9565 <para>
9566 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9567 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9568 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9569 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9570 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9571 does not.
9572 </para>
9573 <para>
9574 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9575 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9576 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9577 </para>
9578 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9579 <para>
9580 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9581 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9582 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9583 </para>
9584 <blockquote>
9585 <para>
9586 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9587 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9588 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9589 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9590 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9591 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9592
9593 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9594 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9595 Because
9596 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9597 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9598 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9599 of business. . . ."
9600 </para>
9601 <para>
9602 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9603 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9604 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9605 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9606 </para>
9607 </blockquote>
9608 <para>
9609 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9610 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9611 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9612 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9613 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9614 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9615 effective to prevent it.
9616 </para>
9617 </sect2>
9618 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9619 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9620 <para>
9621 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9622 dinosaurs
9623 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9624 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9625 </para>
9626 <para>
9627 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9628 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9629 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9630 </para>
9631 <para>
9632 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9633 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9634 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9635 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9636 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9637 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9638 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9639 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9640 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9641 </para></footnote>
9642 According to the RIAA,
9643 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9644 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9645
9646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9647 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9648 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9649 increasingly
9650 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9651 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9652 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9653 extreme
9654 response by the other.
9655 </para>
9656 <para>
9657 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9658 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9659 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9660 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9661 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9662 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9663 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9664 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9665 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9666 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9667 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9668 was.<footnote><para>
9669 <!-- f16. -->
9670 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9671 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9672 </para></footnote>
9673 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9674 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9675 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9676 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9677 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9678 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9679 they oppose.
9680 </para>
9681 <para>
9682 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9683 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9684 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9685 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9686 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9687 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9688 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9689 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9690 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9691 <!-- f17. -->
9692 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9693 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9694 </para></footnote>
9695 We have
9696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9697 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9698 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9699 <!-- f18. -->
9700 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9701 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9702 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9703 </para></footnote>
9704 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9705 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9706 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9707 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9708 cheat.<footnote><para>
9709 <!-- f19. -->
9710 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9711 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9712 compliance literature).
9713 </para></footnote>
9714 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9715 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9716 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9717 </para>
9718 <para>
9719 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9720 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9721 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9722 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9723 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9724 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9725 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9726 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9727 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9728 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9729 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9730 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9731 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9732 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9733 degree of illegality.
9734 </para>
9735 <para>
9736 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9737 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9738 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9739 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9740 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9741 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9742 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9743 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9744 to consider the alternative.
9745 </para>
9746 <para>
9747
9748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9749 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9750 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9751 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9752 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9753 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9754 </para>
9755 <para>
9756 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9757 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9758 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9759 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9760 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9761 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9762 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9763 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9764 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9765 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9766 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9767 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9768 </para>
9769 <para>
9770 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9771 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9772 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9773 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9774 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9775 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9776 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9777 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9778 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9779 a nation of felons?
9780 </para>
9781 <para>
9782 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9783 </para>
9784 <para>
9785 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9786 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9787 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9788 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9789 used
9790
9791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9792 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9793 recordings is free.
9794 </para>
9795 <para>
9796 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9797 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9798 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9799 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9800 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9801 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9802 capacities of digital technologies.
9803 </para>
9804 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9805 <para>
9806 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9807 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9808 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9809 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9810 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9811 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9812 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9813 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9814 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9815 </para>
9816 <para>
9817 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9818 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9819 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9820 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9821 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9822 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9823 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9824 on people's machines.
9825 </para>
9826 <para>
9827 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9828 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9829 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9830 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9831 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9832 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9833
9834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9835 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9836 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9837 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9838 management" system.
9839 </para>
9840 <para>
9841 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9842 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9843 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9844 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9845 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9846 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9847 freedom to move content easily?
9848 </para>
9849 <para>
9850 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9851 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9852 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9853 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9854 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9855 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9856 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9857 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9858 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9859 </para>
9860 <para>
9861 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9862 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9863 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9864 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9865 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9866 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9867 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9868 </para>
9869 <para>
9870 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9871 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9872 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9873 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9874 </para>
9875 <para>
9876 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9877 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9878
9879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9880
9881 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9882 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9883 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9884 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9885 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9886 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9887 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9888 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9889 generally.
9890 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9891 </para>
9892 <para>
9893 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9894 explains,
9895 </para>
9896 <blockquote>
9897 <para>
9898 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9899 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9900 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9901 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9902 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9903 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9904 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9905 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9906 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9907 </para>
9908 </blockquote>
9909 <para>
9910 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9911 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9912 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9913 </para>
9914 <para>
9915 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9916 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9917 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9918 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9919 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9920 an Internet user is revealed.
9921 </para>
9922 <para>
9923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9924 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9925 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9926 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9927 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9928 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9929 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9930 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9931 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9932 <!-- f20. -->
9933 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9934 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9935 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9936 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9937 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9938 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9939 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
9940 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9941 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9942 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
9943 </para></footnote>
9944
9945 </para>
9946 <para>
9947 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9948 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9949 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9950 <!-- f21. -->
9951 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9952 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9953 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9954 </para></footnote>
9955 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9956 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9957 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9958 </para>
9959 <para>
9960 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9961 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
9962 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9963 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9964 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9965 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9966 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9967 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9968 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
9969 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
9970 to deploy,<footnote><para>
9971 <!-- f22. -->
9972 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
9973 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
9974 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
9975 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
9976 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
9977 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
9978 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
9979 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
9980 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
9981 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9982 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
9983 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
9984 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
9985 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
9986 </para></footnote>
9987 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
9988 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
9989 </para>
9990 <para>
9991 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
9992 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
9993 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
9994 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
9995 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
9996 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
9997 college students
9998
9999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10000 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10001 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10002 Says von Lohmann,
10003 </para>
10004 <blockquote>
10005 <para>
10006 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10007 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10008 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10009 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10010 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10011 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10012 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10013 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10014 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10015 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10016 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10017 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10018 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10019 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10020 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10021 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10022 million of them.
10023 </para>
10024 </blockquote>
10025 <para>
10026 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10027 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10028 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10029 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10030 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10031 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10032 </para>
10033
10034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10035 </sect2>
10036 </sect1>
10037 </chapter>
10038 <chapter id="c-balances">
10039 <title>BALANCES</title>
10040
10041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10042 <para>
10043 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10044 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10045 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10046 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10047 </para>
10048 <para>
10049 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10050 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10051 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10052 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10053 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10054 everything around.
10055 </para>
10056 <para>
10057 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10058 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10059 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10060 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10061 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10062 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10063 </para>
10064 <para>
10065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10066 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10067 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10068 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10069 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10070 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10071 made that is happening all around.
10072 </para>
10073 <para>
10074 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10075 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10076 gasoline onto this fire.
10077 </para>
10078 <para>
10079 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10080 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10081 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10082 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10083 </para>
10084 <para>
10085 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10086 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10087 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10088 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10089 success will require.
10090 </para>
10091
10092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10093 <sect1 id="eldred">
10094 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10095 <para>
10096 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10097 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10098 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10099 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10100 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10101 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10102 come alive.
10103 </para>
10104 <para>
10105 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10106 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10107 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10108 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10109 them available for free.
10110 </para>
10111 <para>
10112 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10113 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10114 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10115 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10116 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10117 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10118 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10119 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10120 accessible&mdash;today.
10121 </para>
10122 <para>
10123 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10124 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10125 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10126 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10127 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10128 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10129 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10130 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10131 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10132 commercial publications of public domain works.
10133 </para>
10134 <para>
10135 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10136 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10137 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10138 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10139 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10140 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10141 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10142 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10143 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10144 generally.<footnote><para>
10145 <!-- f1. -->
10146 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10147 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10148 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10149 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10150 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10151 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10152 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10153 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10154 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10155 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10156 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10157 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10158 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10159 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10160 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10161 </para>
10162 <para>
10163 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10164 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10165 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10166 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10167 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10168 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10169 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10170 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10171 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10172 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10173 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10174 </para>
10175 <para>
10176
10177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10178 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10179 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10180 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10181 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10182 <!-- f2. -->
10183 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10184 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10185 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10186 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10187 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10188 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10189 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10190 </para></footnote>
10191
10192 </para>
10193 <para>
10194 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10195 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10196 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10197 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10198 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10199 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10200 to undertake.
10201 </para>
10202 <para>
10203 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10204 constitutional
10205 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10206 interpretation.
10207 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10208 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10209 importantly
10210 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10211 </para>
10212 <blockquote>
10213 <para>
10214 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10215 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10216 their . . . Writings. . . .
10217 </para>
10218 </blockquote>
10219 <para>
10220 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10221 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10222 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10223 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10224 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10225 specific&mdash;to "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that
10226 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10227 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10228 </para>
10229 <para>
10230 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10231 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10232 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10233 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10235 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10236 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10237 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10238 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10239 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10240 </para>
10241 <para>
10242 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10243 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10244 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10245 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10246 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10247 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10248 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10249 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10250 this gravy train going.
10251 </para>
10252 <para>
10253 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10254 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10255 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10256 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10257 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10258 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10259 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10260 </para>
10261 <para>
10262 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10263 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10264 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10265 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10266 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10267 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10268 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10269 published by anyone for free.
10270 </para>
10271 <para>
10272 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10273 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10274 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10275 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10276 report:
10277 </para>
10278 <para>
10279 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10280
10281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10282 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10283 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10284 those works.
10285 </para>
10286 <para>
10287 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10288 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10289 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10290 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10291 </para>
10292 <para>
10293 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10294 about it?"
10295 </para>
10296 <para>
10297 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10298 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10299 they support the bill."
10300 </para>
10301 <para>
10302 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10303 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10304 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10305 much is it worth?"
10306 </para>
10307 <para>
10308 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10309 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10310 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10311 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10312 </para>
10313 <para>
10314 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10315 correct conclusion:
10316 </para>
10317 <para>
10318 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10319 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10320 contributions
10321 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10322 </para>
10323 <para>
10324 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10325 contribute
10326 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10327 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10328 </para>
10329 <para>
10330 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10331 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10332 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10333 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10335 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10336 copyrights
10337 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10338 the copyright term extended.
10339 </para>
10340 <para>
10341 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10342 legislation
10343 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10344 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10345 </para>
10346 <para>
10347 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10348 Copyright
10349 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10350 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10351 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10352 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10353 contributions.<footnote><para>
10354 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10355 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10356 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10357 </para></footnote>
10358 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10359 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10360 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10361 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10362 Age," available at
10363 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10364 </para></footnote>
10365 Disney is estimated to have
10366 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10367 cycle.<footnote><para>
10368 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10369 Congressional
10370 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10371 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10372 </para></footnote>
10373
10374 </para>
10375 <para>
10376 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10377 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10378 reality
10379 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10380 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10381 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10382 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10383 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10384 "limited."
10385 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10386 and again.
10387 </para>
10388 <para>
10389 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10390 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10391 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10392 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10393 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10394 scholars,
10395 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10396
10397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10398 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10399 guns near schools.
10400 </para>
10401 <para>
10402 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10403 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10404 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10405 "interstate
10406 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10407 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10408 interstate
10409 commerce.
10410 </para>
10411 <para>
10412 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10413 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10414 activity,
10415 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10416 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10417 interpreted
10418 to impose no limit.
10419 </para>
10420 <para>
10421 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10422 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10423 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10424 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10425 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10426 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10427 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10428 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10429 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10430 government
10431 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10432 </para>
10433 <para>
10434 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10435 arguments,"
10436 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10437 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10438 </para></footnote>
10439 If anything Congress says is interstate
10440 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10441 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10442 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10443 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10444 </para></footnote>
10445
10446 </para>
10447 <para>
10448 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10449 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10450 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10451 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10452 context
10453 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10454 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10455 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10456 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10457 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10458 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10459 </para></footnote>
10460 And if it is applied to the
10461 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10462 Congress
10463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10464 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10465 existing
10466 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10467 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10468 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10469 copyrights
10470 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10471 existing copyrights.
10472 </para>
10473 <para>
10474 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10475 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10476 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10477 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10478 rejected
10479 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10480 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10481 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10482 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10483 boring.
10484 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10485 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10486 </para>
10487 <para>
10488 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10489 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10490 Constitution's
10491 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10492 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10493 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10494 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10495 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10496 already
10497 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10498 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10499 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10500 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10501 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10502 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10503 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10504 </para>
10505 <para>
10506 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10507
10508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10509 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10510 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10511 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10512 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10513 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10514 </para></footnote>
10515 But
10516 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10517 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10518 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10519 </para>
10520 <para>
10521 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10522 copyright
10523 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10524 influence
10525 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10526 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10527 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10528 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10529 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10530 bought to extend them again.
10531 </para>
10532 <para>
10533 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10534 extended.
10535 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10536 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10537 society
10538 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10539 Disney's.
10540 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10541 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10542 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10543 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10544 exploited,
10545 and no longer available as a result.
10546 </para>
10547 <para>
10548 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10549 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10550 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10551 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10552 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10553 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10554 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10555 Congressional
10556 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10557 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10558 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10559 </para></footnote>
10560
10561 </para>
10562 <para>
10563 Think practically about the consequence of this
10564 extension&mdash;practically,
10565 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10566
10567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10568 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10569 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10570 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10571 remaining
10572 9,873. What would you have to do?
10573 </para>
10574 <para>
10575 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10576 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10577 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10578 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10579 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10580 list of books still under copyright.
10581 </para>
10582 <para>
10583 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10584 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10585 </para>
10586 <para>
10587 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10588 owners
10589 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10590 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10591 being at least a list?
10592 </para>
10593 <para>
10594 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10595 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10596 practically
10597 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10598 thousands
10599 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10600 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10601 </para>
10602 <para>
10603 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10604 apologists
10605 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10606 owners?"
10607 </para>
10608 <para>
10609 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10610 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10611 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10612 suggesting
10613 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10614 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10615 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10616 </para>
10617 <para>
10618 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10619 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10620 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10621
10622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10623 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10624 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10625 happen
10626 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10627 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10628 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10629 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10630 know quite well who owns what property.
10631 </para>
10632 <para>
10633 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10634 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10635 already
10636 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10637 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10638 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10639 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10640 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10641 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10642 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10643 </para>
10644 <para>
10645 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10646 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10647 consequence
10648 for other creative works is much more dire.
10649 </para>
10650 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10651 <para>
10652 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10653 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10654 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10655 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10656 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10657 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10658 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10659 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10660 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10661 films."<footnote><para>
10662 <!-- f11. -->
10663 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10664 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10665 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10666 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10667 </para></footnote>
10668
10669 </para>
10670 <para>
10671 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10672 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10673 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10674 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10675 </para>
10676 <para>
10677 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10678
10679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10680 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10681 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10682 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10683 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10684 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10685 work available for distribution.
10686 </para>
10687 <para>
10688 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10689 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10690 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10691 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10692 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10693 mm film.<footnote><para>
10694 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10695 Supporting
10696 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10697 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10698 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10699 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10700 </para></footnote>
10701
10702 </para>
10703 <para>
10704 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10705 important.
10706 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10707 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10708 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10709 locate the copyright owner.
10710 </para>
10711 <para>
10712 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10713 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10714 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10715 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10716 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10717 exceptionally
10718 high.
10719 </para>
10720 <para>
10721 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10722 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10723 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10724 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10725 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10726 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10727 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10728 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10729 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10730 </para>
10731 <para>
10732 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10733
10734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10735 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10736 benefit
10737 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10738 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10739 the copyright expires.
10740 </para>
10741 <para>
10742 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10743 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10744 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10745 canisters
10746 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10747 than dust.
10748 </para>
10749 <para>
10750 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10751 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10752 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10753 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10754 creative
10755 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10756 free expression."
10757 </para>
10758 <para>
10759 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10760 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10761 indicated,
10762 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10763 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10764 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10765 distributors,
10766 the commercial life ends.
10767 </para>
10768 <para>
10769 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10770 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10771 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10772 between
10773 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10774 Friday
10775 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10776 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10777 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10778 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10779 have, we need to have access to this history.
10780 </para>
10781 <para>
10782 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10783
10784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10785 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10786 this context do no good.
10787 </para>
10788 <para>
10789 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10790 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10791 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10792 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10793 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10794 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10795 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10796 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10797 </para>
10798 <para>
10799 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10800 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10801 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10802 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10803 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10804 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10805 market didn't have more to offer.
10806 </para>
10807 <para>
10808 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10809 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10810 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10811 would not have interfered with anything.
10812 </para>
10813 <para>
10814 But this situation has now changed.
10815 </para>
10816 <para>
10817 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10818 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10819 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10820 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10821 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10822 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10823 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10824 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10825 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10826 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10827 </para>
10828 <para>
10829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10830 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10831 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10832 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10833 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10834 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10835 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10836 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10837 written for a radically different context.
10838 </para>
10839 <para>
10840 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10841 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10842 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10843 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10844 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10845 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10846 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10847 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10848 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10849 </para>
10850 <para>
10851 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10852 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10853 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10854 culture widely?"
10855 </para>
10856 <para>
10857 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10858 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10859 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10860 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10861 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10862 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10863 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10864 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10865 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10866 </para>
10867 <para>
10868 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10869 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10870 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10871 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10872
10873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10874 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10875 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10876 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10877 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10878 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10879 <!-- f13. -->
10880 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10881 December 2002, available at
10882 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10883 </para></footnote>
10884
10885 </para>
10886 <para>
10887 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10888 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10889 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10890 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10891 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10892 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10893 </para>
10894 <para>
10895 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10896 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10897 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10898 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10899 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10900 </para>
10901 <para>
10902 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10903 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10904 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10905 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10906 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10907 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10908 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10909 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10910 power to extend existing terms.
10911 </para>
10912 <para>
10913 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10914 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10915 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10916 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10917 </para>
10918 <para>
10919 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10920 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10921
10922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10923 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10924 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10925 overstepped its bounds.
10926 </para>
10927 <para>
10928 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10929 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10930 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10931 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10932 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10933 </para>
10934 <para>
10935 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10936 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10937 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10938 briefs and preparing for argument.
10939 </para>
10940 <para>
10941 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10942 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10943 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10944 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10945 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10946 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10947 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10948 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10949 </para>
10950 <para>
10951 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10952 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10953 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10954 mistake lost it.
10955 </para>
10956 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10957 <para>
10958 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10959 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10960 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10961 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10962 heat
10963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10964 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10965 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10966 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10967 </para>
10968 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
10969 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
10970 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10971 <para>
10972 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
10973 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
10974 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
10975 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
10976 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
10977 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
10978 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
10979 most powerful media companies in the world."
10980 </para>
10981 <para>
10982 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
10983 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
10984 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
10985 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
10986 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
10987 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
10988 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
10989 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
10990 interpretation
10991 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
10992 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
10993 unconstitutional,
10994 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
10995 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
10996 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
10997 Constitution,
10998 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
10999 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11000 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11001 </para>
11002 <para>
11003 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11004 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11005 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11006 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11007 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11008 why it was unconstitutional.
11009 </para>
11010 <para>
11011 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11012
11013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11014 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11015 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11016 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11017 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11018 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11019 minority.
11020 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11021 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11022 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11023 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11024 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11025 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11026 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11027 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11028 </para>
11029 <para>
11030 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11031 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11032 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11033 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11034 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11035 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11036 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11037 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11038 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11039 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11040 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11041 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11042 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11043 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11044 </para>
11045 <para>
11046 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11047 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11048 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11049 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11050 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11051 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11052 </para>
11053 <para>
11054 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11055 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11056
11057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11058 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11059 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11060 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11061 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11062 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11063 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11064 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11065 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11066 </para>
11067 <para>
11068 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11069 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11070 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11071 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11072 </para>
11073 <para>
11074 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11075 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11076 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11077 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11078 clear.
11079 </para>
11080 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11081 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11082 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11083 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11084 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11085 <para>
11086 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11087 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11088 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11089 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11090 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11091 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11092 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11093 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11094 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11095 </para>
11096 <para>
11097 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11098 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11099 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11100 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11101 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11102 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11103 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11104 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11105
11106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11107 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11108 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11109 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11110 </para>
11111 <para>
11112 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11113 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11114 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11115 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11116 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11117 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11118 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11119 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11120 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11121 confidence in our argument.
11122 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11123 </para>
11124 <para>
11125 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11126 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11127 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11128 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11129 copyright holders.
11130 </para>
11131 <para>
11132 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11133 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11134 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11135 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11136 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11137 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11138 wanted to control.
11139 </para>
11140 <para>
11141 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11142 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11143 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11144 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11145 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11146 pornography."<footnote><para>
11147 <!-- f14. -->
11148 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11149 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11150 </para></footnote>
11151 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11152 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11153 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11154 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11155 <!-- f15. -->
11156 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11157 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11158 </para></footnote>
11159 That's
11160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11161 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11162 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11163 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11164 </para>
11165 <para>
11166 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11167 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11168 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11169 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11170 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11171 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11172 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11173 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11174 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11175 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11176 </para>
11177 <para>
11178 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11179 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11180 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11181 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11182 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11183 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11184 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11185 </para>
11186 <para>
11187 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11188 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11189 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11190 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11191 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11192 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11193 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11194 powers had limits.
11195 </para>
11196 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11197 <para>
11198 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11199 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11200 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11201 the Constitution
11202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11203 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11204 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11205 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11206 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11207 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11208 </para>
11209 <para>
11210 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11211 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11212 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11213 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11214 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11215 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11216 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11217 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11218 sense.
11219 </para>
11220 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11221 <para>
11222 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11223 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11224 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11225 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11226 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11227 these retrospective extensions.
11228 </para>
11229 <para>
11230 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11231 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11232 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11233 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11234 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11235 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11236 </para>
11237 <para>
11238 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11239 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11240 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11241 overriding
11242 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11243 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11244 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11245 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11246 </para>
11247 <para>
11248 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11249 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11250
11251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11252 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11253 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11254 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11255 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11256 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11257 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11258 copyright be limited.
11259 </para>
11260 <para>
11261 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11262 Congress
11263 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11264 government
11265 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11266 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11267 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11268 </para>
11269 <para>
11270 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11271 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11272 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11273 existing
11274 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11275 </para>
11276 <para>
11277 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11278 extended
11279 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11280 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11281 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11282 existing
11283 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11284 restraint
11285 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11286 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11287 hesitated
11288 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11289 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11290 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11291 arrived
11292 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11293 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11294
11295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11296 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11297 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11298 </para>
11299 <para>
11300 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11301 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11302 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11303 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11304 Congress
11305 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11306 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11307 this central idea.
11308 </para>
11309 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11310 <para>
11311 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11312 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11313 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11314 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11315 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11316 </para>
11317 <para>
11318 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11319 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11320 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11321 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11322 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11323 </para>
11324 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11325 <para>
11326 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11327 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11328 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11329 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11330 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11331 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11332 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11333 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11334 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11335 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11336 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11337
11338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11339 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11340 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11341 </para>
11342 <para>
11343 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11344 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11345 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11346 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11347 congressmen
11348 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11349 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11350 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11351 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11352 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11353 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11354 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11355 family of the Justices.
11356 </para>
11357 <para>
11358 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11359 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11360 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11361 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11362 </para>
11363 <para>
11364 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11365 The history was bothering her.
11366 </para>
11367 <blockquote>
11368 <para>
11369 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11370 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11371 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11372 practice that began with the very first act.
11373 </para>
11374 </blockquote>
11375 <para>
11376 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11377 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11378 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11379 </para>
11380 <blockquote>
11381 <para>
11382 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11383 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11385 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11386 is yes.
11387 </para>
11388 </blockquote>
11389 <para>
11390 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11391 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11392 Kennedy, who observed,
11393 </para>
11394 <blockquote>
11395 <para>
11396 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11397 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11398 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11399 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11400 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11401 </para>
11402 </blockquote>
11403 <para>
11404 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11405 student,
11406 I answered,
11407 </para>
11408 <blockquote>
11409 <para>
11410 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11411 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11412 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11413 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11414 effectively
11415 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11416 </para>
11417 </blockquote>
11418 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11419 <para>
11420 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11421 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11422 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11423 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11424 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11425 </para>
11426 <para>
11427 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11428 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11429 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11430 </para>
11431 <para>
11432 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11433 sympathetic.
11434 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11435
11436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11437 </para>
11438 <blockquote>
11439 <para>
11440 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11441 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11442 </para>
11443 <para>
11444 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11445 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11446 domain
11447 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11448 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11449 into the Copyright Clause.
11450 </para>
11451 </blockquote>
11452 <para>
11453 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11454 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11455 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11456 </para>
11457 <blockquote>
11458 <para>
11459 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11460 unlimited
11461 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11462 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11463 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11464 an unlimited time.
11465 </para>
11466 </blockquote>
11467 <para>
11468 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11469 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11470 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11471 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11472 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11473 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11474 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11475 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11476 specific
11477 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11478 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11479 </para>
11480 <para>
11481 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11482 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11483
11484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11485 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11486 optimistic.
11487 </para>
11488 <para>
11489 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11490 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11491 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11492 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11493 believed
11494 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11495 Copyright
11496 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11497 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11498 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11499 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11500 Copyright
11501 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11502 believe
11503 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11504 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11505 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11506 </para>
11507 <para>
11508 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11509 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11510 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11511 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11512 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11513 </para>
11514 <para>
11515 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11516 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11517 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11518 </para>
11519 <para>
11520 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11521 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11522 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11523 </para>
11524 <para>
11525 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11526 distinguish
11527 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11528 argument
11529 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11530 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11531 in the Court's opinion.
11532 </para>
11533 <para>
11534
11535 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11536 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11537 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11538 generally,
11539 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11540 </para>
11541 <para>
11542 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11543 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11544 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11545 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11546 </para>
11547 <para>
11548 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11549 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11550 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11551 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11552 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11553 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11554 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11555 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11556 would not.
11557 </para>
11558 <para>
11559 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11560 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11561 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11562 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11563 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11564 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11565 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11566 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11567 the system we have.
11568 </para>
11569 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11570 <para>
11571 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11572 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11573 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11574 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11575 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11576 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11577 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11578 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11579 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11580 </para>
11581 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11582 <para>
11583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11584 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11585 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11586 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11587 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11588 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11589 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11590 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11591 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11592 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11593 </para>
11594 <para>
11595 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11596 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11597 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11598 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11599 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11600 </para>
11601 <para>
11602 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11603 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11604 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11605 </para>
11606 <para>
11607 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11608 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11609 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11610 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11611 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11612 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11613 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11614 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11615 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11616 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11617 "originalism" now?
11618 </para>
11619 <para>
11620 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11621 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11622 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11623 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11624
11625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11626 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11627 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11628 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11629 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11630 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11631 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11632 own principles.
11633 </para>
11634 <para>
11635 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11636 myself.
11637 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11638 the law as it is.
11639 </para>
11640 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11641 <para>
11642 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11643 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11644 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11645 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11646 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11647 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11648 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11649 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11650 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11651 </para>
11652 <para>
11653 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11654 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11655 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11656 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11657 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11658 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11659 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11660 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11661 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11662 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11663 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11664 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11665 effort to persuade; but I
11666 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11667 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11668 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11669 should decide the issue.
11670 </para>
11671 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11672 <para>
11673 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11674 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11675 Kathleen Sullivan?
11676 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11677 </para>
11678 <para>
11679 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11680 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11681 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11682 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11683 </para>
11684 <para>
11685 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11686 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11687 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11688 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11689 have persuaded.
11690 </para>
11691 <para>
11692 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11693 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11694 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11695 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11696 issue should not be raised until it is.
11697 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11698 </para>
11699 <para>
11700 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11701 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11702 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11703 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11704 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11705 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11706 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11707 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11708 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11709 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11710 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11711
11712 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11713 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11714 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11715 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11716 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11717 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11718 </para>
11719 <blockquote>
11720 <para>
11721 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11722 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11723 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11724 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11725 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11726 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11727 </para>
11728 </blockquote>
11729 <para>
11730 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11731 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11732 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11733 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11734 in the face felt exactly like that.
11735 </para>
11736 <para>
11737 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11738 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11739 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11740 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11741 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11742 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11743 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11744 </para>
11745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11746 </sect1>
11747 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11748 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11749 <para>
11750 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11751 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11752 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11753 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11754 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11755 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11756 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11757 </para>
11758 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11759 <para>
11760 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11761 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11762 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11763 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11764 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11765 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11766 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11767 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11768 </para>
11769 <para>
11770 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11771 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11773 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11774 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11775 the work passed into the public domain.
11776 </para>
11777 <para>
11778 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11779 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11780 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11781 </para>
11782 <para>
11783 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11784 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11785 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11786 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11787 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11788 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11789 everything else, let the content go.
11790 </para>
11791 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11792 <para>
11793 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11794 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11795 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11796 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11797 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11798 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11799 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11800 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11801 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11802 the stupid harm of the present system.
11803 </para>
11804 <para>
11805 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11806 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11807 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11808 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11809 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11810 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11811 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11812 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11813 where copyright owners could be identified.
11814 </para>
11815 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11816 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11817 <para>
11818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11819 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11820 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11821 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11822 <!-- f1. -->
11823 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11824 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11825 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11826 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11827 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11828 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11829 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11830 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11831 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11832 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11833 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11834 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11835 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11836 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11837 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11838 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11839 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11840 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11841 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11842 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11843 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11844 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11845 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11846 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11847 </para>
11848 <para>
11849 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11850 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11851 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11852 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11853 know what's protected and what's not.
11854 </para>
11855 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11856 <para>
11857 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11858 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11859 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11860 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11861 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11862 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11863 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11864 in the loss of widows' only income.
11865 </para>
11866 <para>
11867 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11868 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11869 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11870 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11871 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11872 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11873 </para>
11874 <para>
11875 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11876 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11877 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11878 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11879 burden
11880 imposed upon creators.
11881 </para>
11882 <para>
11883 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11884 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11885
11886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11887 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11888 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11889 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11890 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11891 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11892 table.
11893 </para>
11894 <para>
11895 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11896 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11897 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11898 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11899 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11900 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11901 spread.
11902 </para>
11903 <para>
11904 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11905 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11906 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11907 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11908 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11909 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11910 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11911 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11912 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11913 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11914 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11915 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11916 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11917 system of protection for property generally.
11918 </para>
11919 <para>
11920 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11921 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11922 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11923 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11924 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11925 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11926 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11927 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11928
11929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11930 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11931 take their place.
11932 </para>
11933 <para>
11934 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11935 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11936 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11937 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11938 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11939 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11940 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11941 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11942 </para>
11943 <para>
11944 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11945 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11946 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11947 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11948 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11949 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11950 seen before because there are no formalities.
11951 </para>
11952 <para>
11953 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11954 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11955 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11956 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11957 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11958 </para>
11959 <para>
11960 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11961 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11962 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11963 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11964 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
11965 </para>
11966 <para>
11967 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11968 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11969 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
11970 registration?
11971 </para>
11972 <para>
11973 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
11974 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
11975 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
11976
11977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
11978 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
11979 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
11980 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
11981 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
11982 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
11983 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
11984 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
11985 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
11986 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
11987 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
11988 </para>
11989 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11990 <para>
11991 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
11992 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
11993 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
11994 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
11995 </para>
11996 <para>
11997 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
11998 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
11999 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12000 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12001 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12002 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12003 something good might happen here.
12004 </para>
12005 <para>
12006 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12007 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12008 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12009 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12010 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12011 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12012 </para>
12013 <para>
12014 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12015 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12016 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12018 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12019 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12020 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12021 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12022 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12023 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12024 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12025 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12026 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12027 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12028 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12029 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12030 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12031 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12032 film is a valid derivative use.
12033 </para>
12034 <para>
12035 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12036 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12037 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12038 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12039 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12040 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12041 </para>
12042 <para>
12043 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12044 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12045 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12046 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12047 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12048 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12049 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12050 threat.
12051 </para>
12052 <para>
12053 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12054 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12055 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12056 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12057 sense?
12058 </para>
12059 <para>
12060
12061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12062 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12063 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12064 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12065 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12066 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12067 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12068 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12069 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12070 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12071 </para>
12072 <para>
12073 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12074 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12075 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12076 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12077 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12078 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12079 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12080 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12081 </para>
12082 <para>
12083 What does this industry really want?
12084 </para>
12085 <para>
12086 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12087 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12088 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12089 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12090 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12091 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12092 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12093 permission first.
12094 </para>
12095 <para>
12096 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12097 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12098 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12099 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12100 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12101 </para>
12102 <para>
12103 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12104 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12105
12106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12107 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12108 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12109 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12110 and to share its own creation.
12111 </para>
12112 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12113 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12114 <para>
12115 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12116 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12117 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12118 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12119 block the progress of others.
12120 </para>
12121 <para>
12122 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12123 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12124 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12125 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12126 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12127 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12128 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12129 </para>
12130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12131 </sect1>
12132 </chapter>
12133 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12134 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12135 <para>
12136 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12137 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12138 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12139 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12140 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12141 </para>
12142 <para>
12143 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12144 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12145 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12146 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12147 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12148 the disease almost invisible.
12149 </para>
12150 <para>
12151 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12152 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12153 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12154 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12155 population:
12156 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12157 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12158 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12159 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12160 available at
12161 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12162 release
12163 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12164 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12165 </para></footnote>
12166 </para>
12167 <para>
12168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12169 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12170 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12171 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12172 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12173 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12174 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12175 </para>
12176 <para>
12177 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12178 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12179 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12180 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12181 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12182 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12183 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12184 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12185 changes.
12186 </para>
12187 <para>
12188 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12189 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12190 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12191 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12192 costs significantly below the market price.
12193 </para>
12194 <para>
12195 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12196 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12197 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12198 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12199 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12200 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12201 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12202 <para>
12203 <!-- f2. -->
12204 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12205 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12206 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12207 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12208 </para></footnote>
12209 </para>
12210 <para>
12211 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12212 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12213 Association
12214 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12215 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12216 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12217 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12218 Prepared
12219 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12220 2000), 14, available at
12221 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12222 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12223 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12224 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12225 (statement of James Love).
12226 </para></footnote>
12227 Through the
12228 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12229 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12230 request,
12231 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12233 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12234 began
12235 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12236 government's
12237 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12238 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12239 companies,
12240 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12241 international
12242 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12243 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12244 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12245 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12246 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12247 <!-- f4. -->
12248 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12249 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12250 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12251 Organization (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12252 </para>
12253 <para>
12254 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12255 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12256 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12257 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12258 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12259 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12260 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12261 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12262 </para>
12263 <para>
12264 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12265 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12266 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12267 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12268 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12269 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12270 </para>
12271 <para>
12272 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12273 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12274 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12275 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12276 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12277 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12278 by U.S. companies.
12279 </para>
12280 <para>
12281 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12282 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12283 argument
12284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12285 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12286 <!-- f5. -->
12287 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12288 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12289 May 1999, A1, available at
12290 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12291 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12292 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12293 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12294 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12295 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12296 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12297 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12298 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12299 Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12301 </para></footnote>
12302 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12303 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12304 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12305 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12306 </para>
12307 <para>
12308 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12309 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12310 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12311 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12312 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12313 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12314 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12315 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12316 </para>
12317 <para>
12318 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12319 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12320 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12321 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12322 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12323 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12324 </para>
12325 <para>
12326 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12327 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12328 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12329 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12330 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12331 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12332 </para>
12333 <para>
12334 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12335 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12336 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12337 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12338 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12339 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12340 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12341 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12343 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12344 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12345 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12346 idea called "intellectual property."
12347 </para>
12348 <para>
12349 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12350 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12351 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12352 What is the argument?
12353 </para>
12354 <para>
12355 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12356 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12357 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12358 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12359 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12360 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12361 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12362 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12363 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12364 were balanced in just this sense.
12365 </para>
12366 <para>
12367 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12368 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12369 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12370 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12371 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12372 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12373 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12374 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12375 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12376 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12377 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12378 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12379 our
12380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12381 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12382 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12383 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12384 this common sense open its eyes.
12385 </para>
12386 <para>
12387 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12388 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12389 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12390 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12391 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12392 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12393 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12394 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12395 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12396 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12397 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12398 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12399 </para>
12400 <para>
12401 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12402 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12403 meeting.<footnote><para>
12404 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12405 August 2003, E1, available at
12406 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12407 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12408 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12409 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12410 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12411 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12412 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12413 </para></footnote>
12414 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12415 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12416 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12417 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12418 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12419 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12420 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12421 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12422 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12423 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12424 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12425 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12426 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12428 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12429 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12430 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12431 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12432 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12433 </para>
12434 <para>
12435 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12436 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12437 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12438 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12439 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12440 </para>
12441 <para>
12442 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12443 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12444 meeting.
12445 </para></footnote>
12446 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12447 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12448 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12449 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12450 property issues.
12451 </para>
12452 <para>
12453 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12454 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12455 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12456 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12457 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12458 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12459 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12460 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12461 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12462 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12463 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12464 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12465 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12466 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12467 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12468 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12469 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12470 stuff of
12471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12472 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12473 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12474 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12475 </para>
12476 <para>
12477 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12478 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12479 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12480 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12481 </para>
12482 <para>
12483 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12484 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12485 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12486 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12487 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12488 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12489 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12490 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12491 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12492 </para>
12493 <para>
12494 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12495 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12496 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12497 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12498 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12499 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12500 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12501 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12502 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12503 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12504 <!-- f8. -->
12505 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12506 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12507 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12508 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12509 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12510 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12511 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," Government Policy
12512 Toward Open Source Software (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12513 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12514 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12515 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12516 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, The Commercial Software
12517 Model, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12518 May 2001), available at
12519 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12520 </para></footnote>
12521 </para>
12522 <para>
12523 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12524 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12525 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12526 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12527 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12528 by
12529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12530 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12531 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12532 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12533 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12534 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12535 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12536 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12537 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12538 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12539 </para>
12540 <para>
12541 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12542 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12543 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12544 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12545 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12546 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12547 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12548 <!-- f9. -->
12549 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12550 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12551 </para></footnote>
12552 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12553 </para>
12554 <para>
12555 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12556 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12557 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12558 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12559 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12560 its lobbying efforts.
12561 </para>
12562 <para>
12563 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12564 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12565 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12566 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12567 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12568 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12569 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12570 goals of WIPO."
12571 </para>
12572 <para>
12573 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12574 </para>
12575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12576 <para>
12577 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12578 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12579 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12580 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12581 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12582 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12583 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12584 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12585 </para>
12586 <para>
12587 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12588 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12589 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12590 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12591 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12592 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12593 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12594 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12595 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12596 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12597 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12598 </para>
12599 <para>
12600 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12601 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12602 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12603 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12604 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12605 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12606 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12607 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12608 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12609 right to decide what to do with their property.
12610 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12611 </para>
12612 <para>
12613 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12614 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12615 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12617 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12618 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12619 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12620 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12621 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12622 way possible.
12623 </para>
12624 <para>
12625 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12626 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12627 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12628 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12629 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12630 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12631 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12632 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12633 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12634 that control.
12635 </para>
12636 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12637 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12638 <para>
12639 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12640 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12641 <!-- f10. -->
12642 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12643 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12644 </para></footnote>
12645 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12646 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12647 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12648 </para>
12649 <para>
12650 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12651 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12652 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12653 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12654 </para>
12655 <blockquote>
12656 <para>
12657 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12658 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12659 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12660 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12661 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12662 say anything wrong. But in the world
12663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12664 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12665 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12666 </para>
12667 </blockquote>
12668 <para>
12669 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12670 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12671 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12672 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12673 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12674 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12675 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12676 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12677 </para>
12678 <para>
12679 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12680 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12681 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12682 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12683 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12684 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12685 </para>
12686 <para>
12687 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12688 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12689 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12690 our own country's history).
12691 </para>
12692 <para>
12693 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12694 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12695 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12696 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12697 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12698 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12699 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12700 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12701 democracy in the world, become?
12702 </para>
12703 <para>
12704 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12705 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12706 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12708 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12709 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12710 </para>
12711 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12712 <para>
12713 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12714 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12715 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12716 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12717 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12718 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12719 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12720 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12721 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12722 hearings and a different result.
12723 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12724 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12725 </para>
12726 <para>
12727 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12728 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12729 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12730 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12731 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12732 concentration in the media.
12733 </para>
12734 <para>
12735 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12736 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12737 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12738 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12739 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12740 </para>
12741 <para>
12742 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12743 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12744 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12745 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12746 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12747 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12748 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12749 </para>
12750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12751 <para>
12752 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12753 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12754 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12755 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12756 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12757 </para>
12758 <para>
12759 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12760 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12761 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12762 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12763 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12764 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12765 </para>
12766 <para>
12767 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12768 of our tragedy.
12769 </para>
12770 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12771 <para>
12772 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12773 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12774 <!-- f11. -->
12775 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12776 2003, available at
12777 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12778 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12779 2003, available at
12780 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12781 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12782 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12783 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12784 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12785 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12786 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12787 available at
12788 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12789 </para></footnote>
12790 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12791 music.<footnote><para>
12792 <!-- f12. -->
12793 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12794 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12795 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12796 </para></footnote>
12797 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12798 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12799 <!-- f13. -->
12800 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12801 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12802 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12804 </para></footnote>
12805 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12806 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12807 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12808 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12809 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12810 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12811 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12812 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12813 kids who use a computer to share content.
12814 </para>
12815 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12816 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12817 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12818 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12819 <para>
12820 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12821 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12822 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12823 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12824 24 August 2003, available at
12825 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12826 </para></footnote>
12827 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12828 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12829 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12830 country.<footnote><para>
12831 <!-- f15. -->
12832 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12833 available at
12834 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12835 </para></footnote>
12836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12837 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12838 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12839 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12840 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12841 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12842 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12843 day into the Causbys.
12844 </para>
12845 <para>
12846 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12847 potential is ever to be realized.
12848
12849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12850
12851 </para>
12852 </chapter>
12853 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12854 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12855 <para>
12856
12857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12858 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12859 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12860 maps what might be done.
12861 </para>
12862 <para>
12863 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12864 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12865 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12866 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12867 </para>
12868 <para>
12869 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12870 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12871 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12872 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12873 is so important.
12874 </para>
12875 <para>
12876 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12877 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12878 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12879 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12880 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12881 </para>
12882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12883
12884 <sect1 id="usnow">
12885 <title>US, NOW</title>
12886 <para>
12887 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12888 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12889 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12890 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12891 </para>
12892 <para>
12893 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12894 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12895 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12896 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12897 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12898 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12899 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12900 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12901 </para>
12902 <para>
12903 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12904 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12905 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12906 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12907 the
12908
12909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12910 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12911 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12912 unprotected.
12913 </para>
12914 <para>
12915 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12916 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12917 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12918 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12919 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12920 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12921 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12922 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12923 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12924 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12925 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12926 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12927 </para>
12928 <para>
12929 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12930 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12931 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12932 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12933 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12934 before.
12935 </para>
12936
12937 <sect2 id="examples">
12938 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12939 <para>
12940 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12941 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12942 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12943 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12944 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12945 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12946 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12947 assured.
12948 </para>
12949 <para>
12950 What made it assured?
12951 </para>
12952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12953 <para>
12954 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12955 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12956 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12957 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12958 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12959 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12960 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12961 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12962 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12963 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12964 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12965 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12966 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12967 </para>
12968 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
12969 <para>
12970 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12971 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
12972 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
12973 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
12974 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
12975 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
12976 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
12977 protected by the friction disappears, too.
12978 </para>
12979 <para>
12980 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
12981 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
12982 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
12983 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
12984 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
12985 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
12986 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
12987 disappears.
12988 </para>
12989 <para>
12990 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
12991 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
12992 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
12993 friction did.<footnote><para>
12994 <!-- f1. -->
12995
12996 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
12997 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
12998 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
12999
13000 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13001 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13002 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13003 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13004 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13005 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13006 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13007
13008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13009 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13010 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13011 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13012 </para>
13013 <para>
13014 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13015 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13016 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13017 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13018 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13019 care much about controlling their software.
13020 </para>
13021 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13022 <para>
13023 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13024 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13025 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13026 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13027 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13028 people's work.
13029 </para>
13030 <para>
13031 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13032 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13033 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13034 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13035 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13036 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13037 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13038 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13039 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13040 anything else?
13041 </para>
13042 <para>
13043 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13044 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13045 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13046 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13047 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13048 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13049 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13050 </para>
13051 <para>
13052 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13053 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13055 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13056 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13057 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13058 fundamentally weakened.
13059 </para>
13060 <para>
13061 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13062 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13063 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13064 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13065 </para>
13066 <para>
13067 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13068 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13069 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13070 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13071 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13072 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13073 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13074 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13075 byproduct.
13076 </para>
13077 <para>
13078 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13079 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13080 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13081 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13082 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13083 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13084 </para>
13085 <para>
13086 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13087 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13088 scientific journals are produced.
13089 </para>
13090 <para>
13091 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13092 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13093 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13094 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13095 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13096 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13097 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13098 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13099 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13100 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13101 and Westlaw are also free
13102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13103 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13104 Court opinion through their respective services.
13105 </para>
13106 <para>
13107 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13108 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13109 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13110 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13111 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13112 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13113 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13114 </para>
13115 <para>
13116 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13117 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13118 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13119 </para>
13120 <para>
13121 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13122 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13123 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13124 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13125 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13126 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13127 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13128 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13129 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13130 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13131 </para>
13132 <para>
13133 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13134 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13135 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13136 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13137 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13138 granted before.
13139 </para>
13140 <para>
13141 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13142 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13143 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13144 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13146 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13147 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13148 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13149 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13150 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13151 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13152 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13153 </para>
13154 <para>
13155 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13156 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13157 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13158 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13159 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13160 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13161 and science.
13162 </para>
13163
13164 </sect2>
13165 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13166 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13167 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13168 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13169 </indexterm>
13170 <para>
13171 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13172 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13173 </para>
13174 <para>
13175 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13176 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13177 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13178 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13179 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13180 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13181 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13182 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13183 </para>
13184 <para>
13185 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13186 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13187 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13188 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13189 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13190 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13191 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13192 description, and
13193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13194 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13195 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13196 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13197 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13198 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13199 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13200 certain freedoms are given.
13201 </para>
13202 <para>
13203 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13204 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13205 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13206 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13207 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13208 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13209 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13210 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13211 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13212 </para>
13213 <para>
13214 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13215 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13216 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13217 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13218 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13219 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13220 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13221 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13222 a public domain.
13223 </para>
13224 <para>
13225 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13226 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13227 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13228 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13229 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13230 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13232 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13233 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13234 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13235 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13236 </para>
13237 <para>
13238 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13239 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13240 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13241 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13242 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13243 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13244 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13245 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13246 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13247 to begin to build those rules.
13248 </para>
13249 <para>
13250 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13251 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13252 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13253 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13254 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13255 </para>
13256 <para>
13257 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13258 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13259 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13260 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13261 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13262 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13263 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13264 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13265 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13266 sales of Cory's book.
13267 </para>
13268 <para>
13269 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13270 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13271 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13272 was a total success.
13273 </para>
13274 <para>
13275 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13276 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13278 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13279 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13280 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13281 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13282 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13283 well.
13284 </para>
13285 <para>
13286 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13287 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13288 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13289 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13290 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13291 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13292 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13293 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13294 with their own art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13295 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13296 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13297 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13298 because the legal costs are so high<footnote><para>
13299 <!-- f2. -->
13300
13301 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13302 Culture Wars (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13303 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13304 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13305 </para></footnote>),
13306 these artists release into the creative environment content
13307 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13308 </para>
13309 <para>
13310 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13311 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13312 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13313 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13314 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13315 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13316 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13317 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13318 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13319 say it to others.
13320 </para>
13321 <para>
13322 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13323 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13324 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13325 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13326
13327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13328 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13329 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13330 </para>
13331 <para>
13332 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13333 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13334 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13335 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13336 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13337 steps are possible.
13338 </para>
13339 <para>
13340 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13341 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13342 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13343 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13344 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13345 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13346 creativity to spread more easily.
13347 </para>
13348 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13349
13350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13351 </sect2>
13352 </sect1>
13353 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13354 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13355 <para>
13356 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13357 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13358 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13359 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13360 changes that we need.
13361 </para>
13362 <para>
13363 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13364 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13365 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13366 to our end.
13367 </para>
13368
13369 <sect2 id="formalities">
13370 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13371 <para>
13372 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13373 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13374 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13375 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13376 </para>
13377 <para>
13378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13379 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13380 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13381 protected.
13382 </para>
13383 <para>
13384 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13385 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13386 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13387 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13388 </para>
13389 <para>
13390 Why?
13391 </para>
13392 <para>
13393 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13394 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13395 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13396 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13397 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13398 formalities were getting in the way.
13399 </para>
13400 <para>
13401 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13402 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13403 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13404 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13405 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13406 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13407 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13408 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13409 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13410 they otherwise could speak.
13411 </para>
13412 <para>
13413 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13414 <!-- f1. -->
13415 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13416 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13417 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13418 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13419 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13420 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13421 </para>
13422 <para>
13423 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13424 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13425 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13426 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13427 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13428 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13429 developed by others.
13430 </para>
13431
13432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13433
13434 <sect3 id="registration">
13435 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13436 <para>
13437 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13438 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13439 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13440 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13441 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13442 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13443 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13444 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13445 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13446 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13447 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13448 </para>
13449 <para>
13450 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13451 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13452 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13453 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13454 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13455 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13456 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13457 </para>
13458 <para>
13459 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13460 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13461 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13462 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13463 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13464 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13465 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13466 with which registration occurs up.
13467 </para>
13468 <para>
13469 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13470 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13471 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13472 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13473 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13474 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13475 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13476 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13477 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13479 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13480 </para>
13481
13482 </sect3>
13483 <sect3 id="marking">
13484 <title>MARKING</title>
13485 <para>
13486 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13487 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13488 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13489 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13490 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13491 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13492 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13493 uniformly across all media.
13494 </para>
13495 <para>
13496 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13497 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13498 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13499 use the work.
13500 </para>
13501 <para>
13502 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13503 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13504 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13505 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13506 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13507 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13508 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13509 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13510 </para>
13511 <para>
13512 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13513 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13514 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13515 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13516 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13517 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13518 <!-- f2. -->
13519 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13520 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13521 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13522 </para></footnote>
13523 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13524 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13525 stop using the work in any new
13526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13527 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13528 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13529 their work.
13530 </para>
13531 <para>
13532 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13533 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13534 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13535 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13536 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13537 </para>
13538 <para>
13539 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13540 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13541 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13542 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13543 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13544 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13545 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13546 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13547 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13548 </para>
13549 <para>
13550 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13551 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13552 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13553 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13554 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13555 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13556 </para>
13557 <para>
13558 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13559 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13560 make things unclear.
13561 </para>
13562 <para>
13563 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13564 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13565 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13566 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13567 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13568 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13569 </para>
13570
13571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13572 </sect3>
13573 </sect2>
13574 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13575 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13576 <para>
13577 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13578 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13579 natural authors.
13580 </para>
13581 <para>
13582 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13583 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13584 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13585 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13586 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13587 term.<footnote><para>
13588 <!-- f3. -->
13589 "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13590 available at
13591 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13592 </para></footnote>
13593 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13594 </para>
13595 <para>
13596 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13597 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13598 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13599 terms.
13600 </para>
13601 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13602 <listitem><para>
13603 <!-- (1) -->
13604 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13605 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13606 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13607 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13608 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13609 regulations when it no longer benefits an author. </para></listitem>
13610 <listitem><para>
13611 <!-- (2) -->
13612 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13613 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13614 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13615 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13616 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13617 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13618 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13619 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13620 navigate.
13621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13622 </para></listitem>
13623 <listitem><para>
13624 <!-- (3) -->
13625 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13626 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13627 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13628 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13629 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13630 veteran to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13631 <!-- f4. -->
13632 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13633 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13634 available at
13635 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13636 </para></footnote>
13637 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13638 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13639 single form.
13640 </para></listitem>
13641 <listitem><para>
13642 <!-- (4) -->
13643 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13644 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13645 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to
13646 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13647 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13648 fewer authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13649 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13650 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13651 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13652 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13653 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13654 not increase their creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done,
13655 and there's nothing we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13656 </orderedlist>
13657 <para>
13658 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13659 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13660 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13661 </para>
13662 <para>
13663 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13664 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13665 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13666 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13667 </para>
13668
13669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13670
13671 </sect2>
13672 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13673 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13674 <para>
13675 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13676 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13677 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13678 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13679 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13680 the emergence of that new technology.
13681 </para>
13682 <para>
13683 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13684 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13685 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13686 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13687 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13688 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13689 though that movie is not "my writing."
13690 </para>
13691 <para>
13692 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13693 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13694 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13695 <!-- f5. -->
13696 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13697 University Press, 1967), 32.
13698 </para></footnote>
13699 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13700 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13701 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13702 </para>
13703 <blockquote>
13704 <para>
13705 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13706 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13707 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13708 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13709 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13710 </para></footnote>
13711 </para>
13712 </blockquote>
13713 <para>
13714 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13715 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13716 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13717 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13718 Consider each limitation in turn.
13719 </para>
13720 <para>
13721 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13722 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13723
13724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13725 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13726 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13727 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13728 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13729 after the creative work is done.
13730 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13731 </para>
13732 <para>
13733 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13734 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13735 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13736 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13737 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13738 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13739 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13740 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13741 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13742 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13743 </para>
13744 <para>
13745 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13746 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13747 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13748 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13749 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13750 much more sense.
13751 </para>
13752 <para>
13753 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13754 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13755 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13756 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13757 <para>
13758 <!-- f7. -->
13759 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13760 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13761 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13762 </para></footnote>
13763 His view is that the law should be written so that
13764 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13765 </para>
13766 <para>
13767 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13768 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13769 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13770 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13771 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13772 </para>
13773 <para>
13774 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13776 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13777 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13778 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13779 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13780 </para>
13781 </sect2>
13782
13783 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13784 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13785 <para>
13786 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13787 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13788 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13789 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13790 battles around the sharing of music.
13791 </para>
13792 <para>
13793 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13794 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13795 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13796 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13797 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13798 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13799 innovation on the network.
13800 </para>
13801 <para>
13802 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13803 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13804 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13805 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13806 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13807 </para>
13808 <para>
13809 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13810 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13811 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13812 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13813 </para>
13814 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13815 <listitem><para>
13816 <!-- A. -->
13817 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13818 for purchasing CDs.
13819 </para></listitem>
13820 <listitem><para>
13821 <!-- B. -->
13822 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13823 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13824 </para></listitem>
13825 <listitem><para>
13826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13827 <!-- C. -->
13828 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13829 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13830 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13831 </para></listitem>
13832 <listitem><para>
13833 <!-- D. -->
13834 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13835 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13836 owner plainly endorses.
13837 </para></listitem>
13838 </orderedlist>
13839 <para>
13840 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13841 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13842 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13843 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13844 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13845 significantly weakened.
13846 </para>
13847 <para>
13848 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13849 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13850 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13851 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13852 networks.
13853 </para>
13854 <para>
13855 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13856 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13857 should respond.
13858 </para>
13859 <para>
13860 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13861 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13862 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13863 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13864 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13865 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13866 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13867 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13868 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13869 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13870 </para>
13871 <para>
13872 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13873 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13874 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13876 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13877 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13878 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13879 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13880 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13881 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13882 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13883 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13884 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13885 </para>
13886 <para>
13887 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13888 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
13889 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13890 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13891 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13892 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13893 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13894 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13895 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13896 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13897 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13898 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13899 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13900 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13901 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13902 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13903 <!-- f8. -->
13904 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13905 April 2002, available at
13906 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13907 </para></footnote>
13908
13909 </para>
13910 <para>
13911 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13912 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13913 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13914 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13915 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13916 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13917 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13918 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13919 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13920 artists get paid, during
13921
13922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13923 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13924 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13925 </para>
13926 <para>
13927 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13928 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13929 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13930 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13931 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13932 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13933 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13934 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13935 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13936 </para>
13937 <para>
13938 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13939 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13940 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13941 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13942 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13943 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13944 way that returns something to the artist.
13945 </para>
13946 <para>
13947 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13948 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13949 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13950 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13951 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13952 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13953 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13954 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13955 </para>
13956 <para>
13957 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13958 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13959 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13960 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13961 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13962 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13963 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13964 </para>
13965 <para>
13966
13967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13968 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
13969 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
13970 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
13971 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
13972 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
13973 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
13974 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
13975 trade.
13976 </para>
13977 <para>
13978 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
13979 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
13980 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
13981 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
13982 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
13983 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
13984 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
13985 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
13986 </para>
13987 <para>
13988 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
13989 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
13990 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
13991 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
13992 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
13993 delivering and accessing content.
13994 </para>
13995 <para>
13996 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
13997 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
13998 </para>
13999 <para>
14000 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14001 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14002 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14003 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14004 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14005 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14006 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14007 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14008 </para>
14009 <para>
14010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14011 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14012 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14013 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14014 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14015 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14016 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14017 </para>
14018 <para>
14019 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14020 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14021 <para>
14022 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14023 10 October 2000), available at
14024 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14025 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14026 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14027 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14028 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14029 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14030 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14031 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14032 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14033 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14034 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14035 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14036 available at
14037 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14038 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14039 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14040 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14041 2002, available at
14042 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14043 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14044 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14045 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14046 2002, available at
14047 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14048 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14049 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14050 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14051 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14052 debate by about a decade. See
14053 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14054 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14055 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14056 </para></footnote>
14057 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14058 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14059 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14060 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14061 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14062 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14063 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14064 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14065 tax.
14066 </para>
14067 <para>
14068 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14069 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14070 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14071 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14072 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14073 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14074 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14075 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14076 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14077 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14078 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14079 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14080 controlling access.
14081 </para>
14082 <para>
14083 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14084 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14085 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14086 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14087 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14088 limits on derivative
14089
14090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14091 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14092 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14093 allowed to do with the content itself.
14094 </para>
14095 <para>
14096 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14097 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14098 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14099 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14100 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14101 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14102 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14103 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14104 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14105 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14106 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14107 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14108 on-line.
14109 </para>
14110 <para>
14111 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14112 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14113 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14114 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14115 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14116 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14117 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14118 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14119 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14120 finding ways to compete with "free."
14121 </para>
14122 <para>
14123 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14124 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14125 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14126 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14127 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14128 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14129 the law.
14130 </para>
14131 <para>
14132 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14133 </para>
14134 <para>
14135
14136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14137 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14138 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14139 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14140 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14141 create.
14142 </para>
14143 <para>
14144 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14145 by
14146 </para>
14147 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14148 <listitem><para>
14149 <!-- 1. -->
14150 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14151 </para></listitem>
14152 <listitem><para>
14153 <!-- 2. -->
14154 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14155 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14156 statute;
14157 </para></listitem>
14158 <listitem><para>
14159 <!-- 3. -->
14160 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14161 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14162 </para></listitem>
14163 </orderedlist>
14164 <para>
14165 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14166 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14167 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14168 something then?
14169 </para>
14170 <para>
14171 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14172 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14173 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14174 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14175 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14176 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14177 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14178 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14179 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14180 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14181 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14182 pirates.
14183 </para>
14184 <para>
14185 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14186 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14187 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14188
14189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14190 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14191 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14192 </para>
14193 </sect2>
14194
14195 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14196 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14197 <para>
14198 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14199 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14200 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14201 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14202 </para>
14203 <para>
14204 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14205 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14206 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14207 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14208 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14209 strong view queers the law.
14210 </para>
14211 <para>
14212 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14213 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14214 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14215 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14216 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14217 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14218 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14219 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14220 <!-- f10. -->
14221 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14222 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14223 </para></footnote>
14224
14225 </para>
14226 <para>
14227 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14228 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14229 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14230 </para>
14231 <para>
14232 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14233 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14234 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14235 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14236 <!-- f11. -->
14237 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14238 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14239 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14240 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14241 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14242 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14243 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14244 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14245 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14246 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14247 available at
14248 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14249 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14250 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14251 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14252 Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14253 </para></footnote>
14254 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14255 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14256 them it works.
14257 </para>
14258 <para>
14259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14260 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14261 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14262 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14263 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14264 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14265 practically never be done.
14266 </para>
14267 <para>
14268 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14269 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14270 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14271 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14272 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14273 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14274 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14275 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14276 </para>
14277 <para>
14278 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14279 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14280 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14281 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14282 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14283 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14284 </para>
14285 <para>
14286 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14287 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14288 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14289 its review.
14290 </para>
14291 <para>
14292 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14293 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14294 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14295 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14296 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14297 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14298 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14299 </para>
14300 <para>
14301 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14302 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14303
14304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14305 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14306 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14307 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14308 </para>
14309 <para>
14310 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14311 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14312 keep your lawyers away.
14313 </para>
14314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14315 </sect2>
14316 </sect1>
14317 </chapter>
14318 <chapter id="c-notes">
14319 <title>NOTES</title>
14320 <para>
14321 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14322 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14323 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14324 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14325 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14326 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14327 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14328 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14329 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14330 the material.
14331 </para>
14332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14333
14334 </chapter>
14335 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14336 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14337 <para>
14338 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14339 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14340 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14341 to him that this book is dedicated.
14342 </para>
14343 <para>
14344 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14345 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14346 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14347 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14348 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14349 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14350 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14351 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14352 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14353 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14354 critical eye on much of this.
14355 </para>
14356 <para>
14357 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14358 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14359 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14360 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14362 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14363 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14364 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14365 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14366 </para>
14367 <para>
14368 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14369 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14370 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14371 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14372 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14373 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14374 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14375 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14376 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14377 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14378 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14379 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14380 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14381 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14382 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14383 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14384 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14385 a bunch of great replies.)
14386 </para>
14387 <para>
14388 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14389 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14390 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14391 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14392 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14393 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14394 throughout this book.
14395 </para>
14396 <para>
14397 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14398 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14399 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14400 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14401 </para>
14402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14403
14404 </chapter>
14405 </book>