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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 </para>
90 <para>
91 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
92 in a Connected World
93 </para>
94 <para>
95 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
96 </para>
97
98 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
99 <para>
100 THE PENGUIN PRESS
101 </para>
102 <para>
103 NEW YORK
104 </para>
105
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
107 <para>
108 FREE CULTURE
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
115 </para>
116
117 <para>
118 LAWRENCE LESSIG
119 </para>
120
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
122 <para>
123 THE PENGUIN PRESS
124 </para>
125 <para>
126 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
127 York, New York
128 </para>
129 <para>
130 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
131 </para>
132 <para>
133 All rights reserved
134 </para>
135 <para>
136 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
137 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
138 Reprinted with permission.
139 </para>
140 <para>
141 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
142 </para>
143 <para>
144 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
145 </para>
146 <para>
147 Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
148 </para>
149 <para>
150 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
151 </para>
152 <para>
153 Lessig, Lawrence.
154 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
155 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
156 </para>
157 <para>
158 p. cm.
159 </para>
160 <para>
161 Includes index.
162 </para>
163 <para>
164 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
165 </para>
166 <para>
167 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
168 </para>
169 <para>
170 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
171 </para>
172 <para>
173 KF2979.L47
174 </para>
175 <para>
176 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
177 </para>
178 <para>
179 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
180 </para>
181 <para>
182 Printed in the United States of America
183 </para>
184 <para>
185 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
186 </para>
187 <para>
188 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
189 </para>
190
191 <para>
192 &translationblock;
193 </para>
194
195 <para>
196 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
197 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
198 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
199 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
200 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
201 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
202 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
203 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
204 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
205 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
206 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
207 </para>
208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
209
210 <para>
211 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
212 it continues still.
213 </para>
214
215 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
216 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
217 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
218 </figure>
219
220 <toc id="toc"></toc>
221
222 <lot>
223 <title>List of figures</title>
224 </lot>
225
226 <!--
227 c PREFACE xiii
228 c INTRODUCTION
229 c "PIRACY"
230 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
231 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
232 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
233 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
234 2 Film
235 2 Recorded Music
236 2 Radio
237 2 Cable TV
238 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
239 2 Piracy I
240 2 Piracy II
241 c "PROPERTY"
242 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
243 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
244 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
245 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
246 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
247 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
248 2 Beginnings
249 2 Law: Duration
250 2 Law: Scope
251 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
252 2 Architecture and Law: Force
253 2 Market: Concentration
254 2 Together
255 c PUZZLES
256 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
257 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
258 2 Constraining Creators
259 2 Constraining Innovators
260 2 Corrupting Citizens
261 c BALANCES
262 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
263 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
264 c CONCLUSION
265 c AFTERWORD
266 1 Us, Now
267 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
268 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
269 1 Them, Soon
270 2 1. More Formalities
271 3 Registration and Renewal
272 3 Marking
273 2 2. Shorter Terms
274 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
275 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
276 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
277 c NOTES
278 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
279 c INDEX
280 -->
281
282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
283
284 </chapter>
285 <chapter id="c-preface">
286 <title>PREFACE</title>
287 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
288 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
289 </indexterm>
290 <para>
291 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
292 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
293 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
294 </para>
295 <blockquote>
296 <para>
297 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
298 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
299 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
300 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
301 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
302 </para></footnote>
303 </para>
304 </blockquote>
305 <para>
306 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
307 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
308 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
309 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
310 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
311 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
312 </para>
313 <para>
314 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
315 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
316 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
317 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
318 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
319 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
320 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
321 </para>
322 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
323 <para>
324 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
325 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
326 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
327 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
328 </para>
329 <para>
330 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
331 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
332 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
333 free software movement<footnote>
334 <para>
335 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
336 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
337 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
338 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
339 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
340 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
341 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
342 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
343 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
344 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
345 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
346 or of creators from the past.
347 </para>
348 <para>
349 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
350 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
351 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
352 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
353 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
354 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
355 culture deem fundamental.
356 </para>
357 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
358 <para>
359 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
360 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
361 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
362 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
363 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
364 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
365 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
366 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
367 he asked,
368 </para>
369 <blockquote>
370 <para>
371 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
372 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
373 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
374 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
375 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
376 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
377 </para></footnote>
378 </para>
379 </blockquote>
380 <para>
381 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
382 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
383 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
384 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
385 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
386 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
387 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
388 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
389 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
390 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
391 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
392 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
393 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
394 that this work is "merely" derivative.
395 </para>
396 <para>
397 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
398 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
399 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
400 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
401 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
402 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
403 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
404 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
405
406 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
407 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
408 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
409 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
410 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
411 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
412 what I advance here.
413 </para>
414 <para>
415 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
416 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
417 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
418 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
419 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
420 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
421 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
422 book is written.
423 </para>
424
425 </chapter>
426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
427
428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
429 <chapter id="c-introduction">
430 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
431 <para>
432 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
433 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
434 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
435 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
436 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
437 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
438 </para>
439 <para>
440 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
441 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
442 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
443 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
444 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
445 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
446 </para></footnote>
447 For many
448 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
449 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
450 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
451 </para>
452 <para>
453 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
454 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
455 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
456 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
457 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
458 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
459 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
460 </para>
461 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
462 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
463 <para>
464 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
465 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
466 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
467 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
468 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
469 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
470 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
471 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
472 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
473 </para>
474 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
475 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
476 <para>
477 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
478 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
479 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
480 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
481 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
482 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
483 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
484 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
485 </para>
486 <blockquote>
487 <para>
488 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
489 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
490 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
491 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
492 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
493 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
494 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
495 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
496 <para>
497 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
498 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
499 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
500 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
501 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
502 Authorship," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
503 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
504 1112&ndash;13.
505 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
506 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
507 </para></footnote>
508 </para>
509 </blockquote>
510 <para>
511 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
512 </para>
513 <para>
514 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
515 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
516 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
518 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
519 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
520 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
521 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
522 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
523 </para>
524 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
525 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
526 <para>
527 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
528 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
529 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
530 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
531 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
532 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
533 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
534 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
535 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
536 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
537 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
538 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
539 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
540 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
541 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
542 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
543 </para>
544 <para>
545 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
546 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
547 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
548 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
549 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
550 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
551 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
552 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
553 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
554 understanding of radio.
555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
556 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
557 </para>
558 <para>
559 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
560 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
561 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
562 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
563 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
564 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
565 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
566 much less transmitter power and static.
567 </para>
568 <para>
569 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
570 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
571 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
572 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
573 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
574 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
575 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
576 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
577 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
578 </para>
579 <para>
580 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
581 </para>
582 <blockquote>
583 <para>
584 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
585 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
586 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
587 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
588 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
589 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
590 box."<footnote><para>
591 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
592 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
593 </para></footnote>
594 </para>
595 </blockquote>
596 <para>
597 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
598 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
599 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
600 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
601 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
602 a handful of networks.
603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
604 </para>
605 <para>
606 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
607 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
608 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
609 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
610 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
611 </para>
612 <blockquote>
613 <para>
614 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
615 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
616 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
617 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
618 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
619 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
620
621 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
622 </para></footnote>
623 </para>
624 </blockquote>
625 <para>
626 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
627 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
628 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
629 described,
630 </para>
631 <blockquote>
632 <para>
633 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
634 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
635 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
636 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
637 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
638 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
639 </para></footnote>
640 </para>
641 </blockquote>
642 <para>
643 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
644 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
645 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
646 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
647 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
648 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
649 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
650 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
651 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
652 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
653 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
654 </para>
655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
656 <blockquote>
657 <para>
658 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
659 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
660 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
661 deviousness.<footnote><para>
662 Lessing, 256.
663 </para></footnote>
664 </para>
665 </blockquote>
666 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
667 <para>
668 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
669 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
670 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
671 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
672 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
673 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
674 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
675 least temporarily.
676 </para>
677 <para>
678 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
679 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
680 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
681 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
682 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
683 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
684 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
685 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
686 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
687 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
688 </para>
689 <para>
690 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
691 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
692 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
693 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
694 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
695 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
696 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
697 course always public spirited; the reality is something
698 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
699 to themselves, would crumble in
700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
701 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
702 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
703 effect of technological change.
704 </para>
705 <para>
706 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
707 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
708 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
709 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
710 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
711 before.<footnote><para>
712 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
713 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
714 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
715 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
716 </para></footnote>
717 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
718 of 2004.
719 </para>
720 <para>
721 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
722 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
723 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
724 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
725 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
726 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
727 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
728 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
729 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
730 </para>
731 <para>
732 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
733 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
734 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
735 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
736 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
737 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
738 has introduced.
739 </para>
740 <para>
741 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
742 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
743 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
744 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
745 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
746 parks or on
747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
748 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
749 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
750 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
751 </para>
752 <para>
753 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
754 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
755 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
756 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
757 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
758 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
759 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
760 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
761 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
762 </para>
763 <para>
764 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
765 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
766 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
767 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
768 marketplace.<footnote>
769 <para>
770 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
771 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
772 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
773 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
774 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
775 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
776 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
777 198&ndash;200.
778 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
779 </para></footnote>
780 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
781 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
782 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
783 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
784 </para>
785 <para>
786 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
787 been erased.<footnote><para>
788 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
789 2001), ch. 13.
790 </para></footnote>
791 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
792 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
793 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
794 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
795 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
796 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
797 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
798 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
799 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
800 culture, more and more a permission culture.
801 </para>
802 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
803 <para>
804 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
805 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
806 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
807 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
808 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
809 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
810 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
811 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
812 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
813 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
814 Causbys.
815 </para>
816 <para>
817 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
818 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
819 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
820 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
821 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
822 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
823 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
824 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
825 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
826 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
827 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
828 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
829 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
830 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
831 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
832 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
833 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
834 </para>
835 <para>
836 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
837 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
838 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
839 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
840 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
841 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
842 remakes them.
843 </para>
844 <para>
845 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
847 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
848 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
849 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
850 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
851 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
852 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
853 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
854 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
855 Times, 17 January 2002.
856 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
857 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
858 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
859 against it.
860 </para>
861 <para>
862 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
863 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
864 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
865 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
866 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
867 Internet.
868 </para>
869 <para>
870 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
871 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
872 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
873 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
874 </para>
875 <para>
876 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
877 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
878 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
879 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
880 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
881 <para>
882 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
883 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
884 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
885 </para></footnote>
886 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
887 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
888 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
889 could cultivate and extend our culture.
890 </para>
891 <para>
892 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
893 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
894 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
895 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
896 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
897 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
898 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
899 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
900 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
901 </para>
902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
903 <para>
904 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
905 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
906 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
907 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
908 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
909 against an industry.
910 </para>
911 <para>
912 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
913 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
914 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
915 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
916 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
917 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
918 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
919 </para>
920 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
921 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
922 <para>
923 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
924 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
925 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
926 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
927 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
928 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
929 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
930 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
931 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
932 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
933 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
934 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
935 trespass.
936 </para>
937 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
938 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
939 <para>
940 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
941 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
942 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
943 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
944 war. Unlike
945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
946 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
947 on its side.
948 </para>
949 <para>
950 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
951 increasingly
952 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
953 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
954 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
955 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
956 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
957 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
958 </para>
959 <para>
960 The puzzle is, Why?
961 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
962 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
963 because
964 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
965 absolute
966 claim was wrong?
967 </para>
968 <para>
969 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
970 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
971 </para>
972 <para>
973 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
974 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
975 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
976 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
977 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
978 </para>
979 <para>
980 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
981 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
982 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
983 Armstrong
984 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
985 more powerful view?
986 </para>
987 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
988 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
989 <para>
990 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
991 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
992 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
993 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
994 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
995 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
996 this silliness will be much more profound.
997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
998 </para>
999 <para>
1000 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1001 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1002 ideas.
1003 </para>
1004 <para>
1005 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1006 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1007 obscure
1008 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
1009 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
1010 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
1011 can be more fully understood.
1012 </para>
1013 <para>
1014 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1015 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1016 government,
1017 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1018 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1019 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1020 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1021 threatened
1022 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
1023 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
1024 who we have always been.
1025 </para>
1026 <para>
1027 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1028 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1029 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1030 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1031 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1032 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1033 </para>
1034 </chapter>
1035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1036 <chapter id="c-piracy">
1037 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1038
1039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1040 <para>
1041 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1042 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1043 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1044 capture.
1045 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1046 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1047 </para>
1048 <blockquote>
1049 <para>
1050 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1051 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1052 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1053 <!-- f1 -->
1054 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1055 </para></footnote>
1056 </para>
1057 </blockquote>
1058 <para>
1059 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1060 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1061 efficient
1062 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1063 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1064 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1065 content
1066 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1068 </para>
1069 <para>
1070 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1071 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1072 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1073 sharing
1074 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1075 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1076 </para>
1077 <para>
1078 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1079 increasingly
1080 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1081 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1082 believe
1083 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1084 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1085 </para>
1086 <para>
1087 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1088 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1089 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1090 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1091 </para>
1092 <para>
1093 The idea goes something like this:
1094 </para>
1095 <blockquote>
1096 <para>
1097 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1098 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1099 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1100 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1101 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1102 piracy.
1103 </para>
1104 </blockquote>
1105 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1106 <para>
1107 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1108 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1109 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1110 <!-- f2 -->
1111 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1112 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1113 </para></footnote>
1114 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1115 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1116 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1117 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1118 <!-- f3 -->
1119 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1120 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1121 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1122 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1123 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1124 </para></footnote>
1125 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1126 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1127 </para>
1128 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1129 <para>
1130 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1131 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1133 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1134 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1135 property.
1136 It has never taken hold within our law.
1137 </para>
1138 <para>
1139 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1140 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1141 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1142 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1143 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1144 </para>
1145 <para>
1146 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1147 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1148 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1149 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1150 copyright law today regulates both.
1151 </para>
1152 <para>
1153 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1154 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1155 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1156 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1157 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1158 more expense of doing business.
1159 </para>
1160 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1161 <para>
1162 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1163 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1164 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1165 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1166 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1167 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1168 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1169 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1170 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1171 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1172 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1173 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1174 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1175 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1176 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1178 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1179 <para>
1180 <!-- f4 -->
1181 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1182 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1183 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1184 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1185 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1186 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1187 enabled are much more tenuous.
1188 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1189 </para></footnote>
1190 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1191 this creative class.
1192 </para>
1193 <para>
1194 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1195 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1196 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1197 </para>
1198
1199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1200 <sect1 id="creators">
1201 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1202 <para>
1203 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1204 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1205 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1206 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1207 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1208 </para>
1209 <para>
1210 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1211 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1212 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1213 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1214 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1215 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1216 </para>
1217 <blockquote>
1218 <para>
1219 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1220 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1221 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1222 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1224 </para>
1225 <para>
1226 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1227 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1228 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1229 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1230 synchronization was pretty close.
1231 </para>
1232 <para>
1233 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1234 electric.
1235 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1236 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1237 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1238 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1239 <!-- f1 -->
1240 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1241 Cartoons
1242 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1243 </para></footnote>
1244 </para>
1245 </blockquote>
1246 <para>
1247 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1248 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1249 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1250 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1251 </para>
1252 <para>
1253 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1254 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1255 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1256 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1257 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1258 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1259 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1260 </para>
1261 <para>
1262 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1263 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1264 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1265 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1266 </para>
1267 <para>
1268 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1269 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1270 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1271 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1272 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1273 genre.
1274 </para>
1275 <para>
1276 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1278 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1279 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1280 <!-- f2 -->
1281 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1282 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1283 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1284 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1285 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1286 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1287 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1288 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1289 </para></footnote>
1290 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1291 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1292 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1293 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1294 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1295 Mouse.
1296 </para>
1297 <para>
1298 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1299 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1300 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1301 <!-- f3 -->
1302 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1303 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1304 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1305 </para></footnote>
1306 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1307 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1308 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1309 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1310 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1311 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1312 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1313 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1314 old.
1315 </para>
1316 <para>
1317 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1318 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1319 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1320 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1321 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1322 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1323 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1324 </para>
1325 <para>
1326 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1327 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1328 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1329 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1330 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1331 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1332 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1333 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1334 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1335 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1337 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1338 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1339 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1340 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1341 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1342 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1343 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1344 </para>
1345 <para>
1346 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1347 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1348 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1349 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1350 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1351 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1352 culture around us and makes it something different.
1353 </para>
1354 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1355 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1356 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1357 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1358 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1359 <!-- f4 -->
1360 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1361 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1362 determining
1363 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1364 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1365 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1366 average
1367 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1368 Web site associated with this book, available at
1369 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1370 </para></footnote>
1371 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1372 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1373 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1374 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1375 </para>
1376 <para>
1377 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1378 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1379 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1380 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1381 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1382 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1383 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1384 </para>
1385 <para>
1386 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1387 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1388 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1389 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1390
1391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1392 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1393 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1394 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1395 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1396 content from before the Great Depression.
1397 </para>
1398 <para>
1399 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1400 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1401 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1402 universal.
1403 </para>
1404 <para>
1405 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1406 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1407 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1408 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1409 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1410 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1411 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1412 </para>
1413 <para>
1414 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1415 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1416 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1417 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1418 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1419 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1420 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1421 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1422 interestingly different way.
1423 </para>
1424 <para>
1425 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1426 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1427 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1428 </para>
1429 <para>
1430 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1431 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1432 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1433 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1435 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1436 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1437 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1438 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1439 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1440 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1441 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1442 </para>
1443 <para>
1444 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1445 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1446 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1447 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1448 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1449 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1450 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1451 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1452 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1453 </para>
1454 <para>
1455 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1456 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1457 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1458 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1459 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1460 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1461 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1462 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1463 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1464 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1465 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1466 original copyright owner's permission.
1467 </para>
1468 <para>
1469 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1470 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1471 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1472 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1473 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1474
1475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1476 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1477 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1478 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1479 <!-- f5 -->
1480 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1481 York: Perennial, 2000).
1482 </para></footnote>
1483 </para>
1484 <para>
1485 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1486 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1487 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1488 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1489 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1490 which are fifty years old."
1491 </para>
1492 <para>
1493 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1494 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1495 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1496 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1497 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1498 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1499 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1500 <!-- f6 -->
1501 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1502 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1503 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1504 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1505 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1506 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1507 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1508 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1509 </para></footnote>
1510 </para>
1511 <para>
1512 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1513 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1514 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1515 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1516 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1517 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1518 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1519 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1520 culture?
1521 </para>
1522 <para>
1523 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1524 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1525 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1526 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1527 to prosecute cases like this."
1528 </para>
1529 <para>
1530 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1531 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1532 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1533 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1535 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1536 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1537 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1538 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1539 their clients or hurt them?
1540 Let's pause for a moment.
1541 </para>
1542 <para>
1543 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1544 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1545 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1546 </para>
1547 <para>
1548 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1549 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1550 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1551 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1552 <!-- f7 -->
1553 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1554 Vaidhyanathan,
1555 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1556 University
1557 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1558 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1559 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1560 nature of those rights is very different.
1561 </para></footnote>
1562 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1563 property;
1564 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1565 intellectual property.
1566 </para>
1567 <para>
1568 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1569 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1570 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1571 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1572 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1573 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1574 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1575 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1576 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1577 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1578 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1579 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1580 the public domain.
1581 </para>
1582 <para>
1583 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1584 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1585 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1586
1587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1588 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1589 freedom is good.
1590 </para>
1591 <para>
1592 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1593 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1594 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1595 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1596 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1597 form, whether large or small.
1598 </para>
1599 <para>
1600 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1601 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1602 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1603 particular find it hard to say why.
1604 </para>
1605 <para>
1606 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1607 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1608 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1609 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1610 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1611 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1612 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1613 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1614 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1615 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1616 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1617 films in 1997.
1618 </para>
1619 <para>
1620 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1621 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1622 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1623 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1624 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1625 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1626 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1627 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1629 </para>
1630 <para>
1631 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1632 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1633 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1634 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1635 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1636 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1637 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1638 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1639 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1640 </para>
1641 <para>
1642 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1643 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1644 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1645 </para>
1646
1647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1648 </sect1>
1649 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1650 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1651 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1652 <para>
1653 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1654 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1655 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1656 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1657 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1658 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1659 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1660 </para>
1661 <para>
1662 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1663 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1664 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1665 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1666 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1667 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1668 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1669 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1670 amateurs.
1671 </para>
1672 <para>
1673 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1674 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1676 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1677 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1678 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1679 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1680 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1681 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1682 population of photographers.
1683 </para>
1684 <para>
1685 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1686 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1687 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1688 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1689 <!-- f1 -->
1690 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1691 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1692 </para>
1693 <blockquote>
1694 <para>
1695 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1696 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1697 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1698 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1699 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1700 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1701 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1702 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1703 chemicals.<footnote>
1704 <para>
1705 <!-- f2 -->
1706 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1707 1977), 53.
1708 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1709 </para></footnote>
1710 </para>
1711 </blockquote>
1712 <para>
1713 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1714 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1715 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1716 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1717 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1718 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1719 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1720 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1721 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1722 percent.<footnote><para>
1723 <!-- f3 -->
1724 Jenkins, 177.
1725 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1726 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1727 <!-- f4 -->
1728 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1729 </para></footnote>
1730 </para>
1731 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1732 <para>
1733
1734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1735 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1736 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1737 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1738 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1739 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1740 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1741 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1742 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1743 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1744 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1745 <!-- f5 -->
1746 Coe, 58.
1747 </para></footnote>
1748 </para>
1749 <para>
1750 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1751 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1752 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1753 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1754 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1755 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1756 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1757 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1758 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1759 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1760 have before.
1761 </para>
1762 <para>
1763 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1764 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1765 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1766 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1767 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1768 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1769 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1770 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1771 <!-- f6 -->
1772 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1773 </para></footnote>
1774 </para>
1775 <para>
1776 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1777 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1778 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1779 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1780 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1781 draw
1782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1783 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1784 that they thought valuable.
1785 </para>
1786 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1787 <para>
1788 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1789 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1790 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1791 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1792 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1793 <para>
1794 <!-- f7 -->
1795 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1796 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1797 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1798 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1799 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1800 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1801 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1802 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1803 </para>
1804 <para>
1805 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1806 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1807 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1808 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1809 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1810 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1811 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1812 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1813 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1814 <!-- f8 -->
1815 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1816 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1817 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1818 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1819 (1993).
1820 </para></footnote>)
1821 </para>
1822 <para>
1823 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1824 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1825 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1826 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1827 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1828 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1829 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1830 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1831 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1832 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1833 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1834 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1835 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1836 </para>
1837 <para>
1838
1839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1840 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1841 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1842 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1843 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1844 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1845 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1846 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1847 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1848 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1849 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1850 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1851 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1852 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1853 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1854 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1855 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1856 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1857 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1858 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1859 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1860 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1861 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1862 learn.
1863 </para>
1864 <para>
1865 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1866 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1867 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1868 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1869 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1870 <!-- f9 -->
1871 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1872 Software
1873 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1874 February 2002, available at
1875 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1876 </para></footnote>
1877 These buses are filled with technology that
1878 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1879 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1880 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1881 teachers call "media literacy."
1882 </para>
1883 <para>
1884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1885 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1886 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1887 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1888 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1889 the way people access it."
1890 </para>
1891 <para>
1892 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1893 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1894 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1895 about.
1896 </para>
1897 <para>
1898 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1899 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1900 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1901 <!-- f10 -->
1902 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1903 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1904 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1905 </para></footnote>
1906 it is increasingly important to understand the
1907 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1908 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1909 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1910 constructing
1911 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1912 </para>
1913 <para>
1914 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1915 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1916 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1917 sequence
1918 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1919 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1920 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1921 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1922 emotion or builds suspense.
1923 </para>
1924 <para>
1925 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1926 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1927 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1928 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1929 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1930 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1931 </para>
1932 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1933 <para>
1934 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1935 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1936 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1937
1938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1939 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1940 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1941 texture."<footnote>
1942 <para>
1943 <!-- f11 -->
1944 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1945 2002.
1946 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1947 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1948 </para></footnote>
1949 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1950 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1951 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1952 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1953 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1954 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1955 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1956 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1957 <!-- f12 -->
1958 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1959 November 2000, available at
1960 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1961 available at
1962 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1963 </para></footnote>
1964 </para>
1965 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1966 <para>
1967 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1968 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1969 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1970 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1971 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1972 </para>
1973 <para>
1974 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1975 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1976 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1977 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1978 </para>
1979 <blockquote>
1980 <para>
1981 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1982 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1983 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1984 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1985 being read-only.
1986 </para>
1987 </blockquote>
1988 <para>
1989 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1990 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1991 twentieth century.
1992 </para>
1993 <para>
1994 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1995 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1996 understanding
1997 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1998 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2000 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2001 appropriate
2002 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
2003 <para>
2004 <!-- f13 -->
2005 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2006 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2007 </para></footnote> It is to enable
2008 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2009 <!-- f14 -->
2010 Ibid.
2011 </para></footnote>
2012 </para>
2013 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2014 <para>
2015 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2016 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2017 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2018 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2019 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2020 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2021 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2022 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2023 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2024 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2025 </para>
2026 <para>
2027 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2028 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2029 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2030 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2031 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2032 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2033 </para>
2034 <para>
2035 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2036 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2037 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2038 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2039 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2040 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2041 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2042 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2043 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2044 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2045 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2046 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2047 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2048 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2049 to this form of expression.
2050 </para>
2051 <para>
2052
2053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2054 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2055 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2056 Daley
2057 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2058 meaning."
2059 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2060 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2061 increasingly,
2062 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2063 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2064 </para>
2065 <blockquote>
2066 <para>
2067 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2068 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2069 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2070 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2071 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2072 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2073 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2074 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2075 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2076 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2077 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2078 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2079 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2080 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2081 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2082 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2083 about the topic. . . .
2084 </para>
2085 <para>
2086 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2087 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2088 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2089 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2090 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2091 </para>
2092 <para>
2093 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2094 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2095 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2097 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2098 had a lot of power with this language."
2099 </para>
2100 </blockquote>
2101 <para>
2102 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2103 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2104 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2105 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2106 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2107 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2108 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2109 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2110 world would be watching.
2111 </para>
2112 <para>
2113 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2114 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2115 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2116 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2117 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2118 entertainment is tragedy.
2119 </para>
2120 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2121 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2122 <para>
2123 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2124 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2125 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2126 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2127 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2128 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2129 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2130 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2131 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2132 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2133 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2134 was also the Internet.
2135 </para>
2136 <para>
2137 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2138 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2139 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2140 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2141 movie
2142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2143 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2144 with sound or text.
2145 </para>
2146 <para>
2147 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2148 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2149 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2150 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2151 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2152 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2153 spread practically instantaneously.
2154 </para>
2155 <para>
2156 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2157 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2158 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2159 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2160 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2161 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2162 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2163 </para>
2164 <para>
2165 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2166 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2167 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2168 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2169 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2170 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2171 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2172 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2173 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2174 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2175 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2176 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2177 </para>
2178 <para>
2179 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2180 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2181 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2182 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2183 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2184 people vote
2185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2186 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2187 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2188 </para>
2189 <para>
2190 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2191 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2192 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2193 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2194 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2195 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2196 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2197 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2198 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2199 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2200 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2201 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2202 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2203 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2204 <!-- f15 -->
2205 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2206 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2207 </para></footnote>
2208 </para>
2209 <para>
2210 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2211 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2212 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2213 <!-- f16 -->
2214 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2215 Political
2216 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2217 </para></footnote>
2218 And in some towns in
2219 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2220 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2221 deliberation"
2222 to occur.
2223 </para>
2224 <para>
2225 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2226 occur.
2227 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2228 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2229 politics
2230 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2231 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2232 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2233 <!-- f17 -->
2234 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2235 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2236 </para></footnote> We say what our
2237 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2238 </para>
2239 <para>
2240 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2241 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2242 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2243 Technologies
2244 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2245 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2246
2247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2248 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2249 place.
2250 </para>
2251 <para>
2252 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2253 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2254 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2255 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2256 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2257 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2258 </para>
2259 <para>
2260 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2261 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2262 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2263 reading
2264 is having an effect.
2265 </para>
2266 <para>
2267 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2268 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2269 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2270 praising
2271 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2272 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2273 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2274 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2275 instances
2276 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2277 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2278 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2279 <!-- f18 -->
2280 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2281 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2282 </para></footnote>
2283 </para>
2284 <para>
2285 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2286 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2287 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2288 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2289 on.
2290 </para>
2291 <para>
2292 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2293 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2294 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2295 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2296 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2297 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2298 peer-generated rankings.
2299 </para>
2300 <para>
2301 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2303 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2304 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2305 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2306 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2307 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2308 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2309 get it out of the way."
2310 </para>
2311 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2312 <para>
2313 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2314 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2315 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2316 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2317 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2318 <!-- f19 -->
2319 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2320 </para></footnote>
2321 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2322 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2323 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2324 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2325 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2326 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2327 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2328 </para>
2329 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2330 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2331 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2332 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2333 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2334 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2335 had seen.<footnote><para>
2336 <!-- f20 -->
2337 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2338 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2339 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2340 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2341 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2342 </para></footnote>
2343 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2344 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2345 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2346 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2347 </para>
2348 <para>
2349 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2350 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2351 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2352 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2353 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2354 <para>
2355 <!-- f21 -->
2356 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2357 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2358 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2359 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2360 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2361 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2362 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2363 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2364 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2365 </para></footnote>
2366 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2367
2368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2369 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2370 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2371 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2372 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2373 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2374 </para>
2375 <para>
2376 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2377 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2378 gatekeeper."
2379 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2380 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2381 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2382 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2383 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2384 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2385 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2386 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2387 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2388 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2389 extraordinary
2390 to report.
2391 </para>
2392 <para>
2393 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2394 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2395 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2396 </para>
2397 <para>
2398 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2399 differently
2400 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2401 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2402 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2403 </para>
2404 <para>
2405 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2406 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2407 lawnmower
2408 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2409 technologies
2410 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2411 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2412 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2414 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2415 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2416 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2417 tinkering of many others.
2418 </para>
2419 <para>
2420 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2421 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2422 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2423 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2424 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2425 </para>
2426 <para>
2427 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2428 platform,"
2429 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2430 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2431 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2432 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2433 becomes
2434 a major apprenticeship platform."
2435 </para>
2436 <para>
2437 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2438 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2439 abstract,
2440 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2441 doing
2442 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2443 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2444 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2445 </para>
2446 <para>
2447 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2448 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2449 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2450 multiple
2451 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2452 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2453 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2454 artistic,
2455 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2456 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2457 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2458 </para>
2459 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2460 <para>
2461 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2462 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2463
2464 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2465 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2466 of recognition.
2467 </para>
2468 <para>
2469 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2470 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2471 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2472 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2473 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2474 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2475 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2476 </para>
2477 <para>
2478 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2479 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2480 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2481 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2482 general.<footnote><para>
2483 <!-- f22 -->
2484 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2485 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2486 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2487 </para></footnote>
2488 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2489 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2490 </para>
2491 <para>
2492 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2493 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2494 and want to learn."
2495 </para>
2496 <para>
2497 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2498 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2499 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2500 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2501 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2502 </para>
2503 <para>
2504 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2505 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2506 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2507 the law to close down that technology.
2508 </para>
2509 <para>
2510 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2511 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2512 </para>
2513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2514 </sect1>
2515 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2516 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2517 <para>
2518 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2519 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2520 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2521 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2522 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2523 </para>
2524 <para>
2525 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2526 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2527 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2528 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2529 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2530 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2531 </para>
2532 <para>
2533 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2534 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2535 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2536 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2537 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2538 </para>
2539 <para>
2540 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2542 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2543 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2544 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2545 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2546 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2547 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2548 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2549 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2550 </para>
2551 <para>
2552 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2553 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2554 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2555 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2556 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2557 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2558 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2559 </para>
2560 <para>
2561 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2562 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2563 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2564 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2565 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2566 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2567 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2568 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2569 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2570 on-line.
2571 </para>
2572 <para>
2573 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2574 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2575 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2576 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2577 be on users' computers.
2578 </para>
2579 <para>
2580 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2581 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2582 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2583 students
2584 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2586 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2587 computer.
2588 </para>
2589 <para>
2590 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2591 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2592 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2593 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2594 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2595 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2596 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2597 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2598 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2599 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2600 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2601 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2602 supposed to do.
2603 </para>
2604 <para>
2605 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2606 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2607 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2608 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2609 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2610 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2611 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2612 </para>
2613 <para>
2614 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2615 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2616 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2617 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2618 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2619 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2620 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2621 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2622 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2623 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2624 </para>
2625 <para>
2626 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2627 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2629 demanded
2630 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2631 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2632 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2633 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2634 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2635 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2636 </para>
2637 <para>
2638 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2639 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2640 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2641 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2642 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2643 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2644 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2645 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2646 <!-- f1 -->
2647 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2648 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2649 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2650 </para></footnote>
2651 </para>
2652 <para>
2653 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2654 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2655 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2656 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2657 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2658 </para>
2659 <para>
2660 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2661 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2662 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2663 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2664 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2665 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2666 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2667 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2668 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2669 </para>
2670 <para>
2671 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2672 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2673 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2674 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2675 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2677 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2678 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2679 </para>
2680 <para>
2681 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2682 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2683 </para>
2684 <para>
2685 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2686 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2687 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2688 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2689 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2690 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2691 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2692 <!-- f2 -->
2693 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2694 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2695 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2696 </para></footnote>
2697 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2698 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2699 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2700 <!-- f3 -->
2701 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2702 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2703 </para></footnote>
2704 </para>
2705 <para>
2706 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2707 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2708 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2709 activist:
2710 </para>
2711 <blockquote>
2712 <para>
2713 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2714 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2715 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2716 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2717 </para>
2718 </blockquote>
2719 <para>
2720 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2721 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2722 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2723 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2724 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2725 </para>
2726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2727 </sect1>
2728 <sect1 id="pirates">
2729 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2730 <para>
2731 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2732 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2733 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2734 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2735 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2736 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2737 </para>
2738 <sect2 id="film">
2739 <title>Film</title>
2740 <para>
2741 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2742 <!-- f1 -->
2743 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2744 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2745 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2746 </para></footnote>
2747 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2748 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2749 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2750 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2751 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2752 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2753 this creative property
2754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2755 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2756 </para>
2757 <para>
2758 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2759 </para>
2760 <blockquote>
2761 <para>
2762 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2763 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2764 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2765 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2766 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2767 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2768 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2769 </para>
2770 <para>
2771 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2772 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2773 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2774 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2775 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2776 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2777 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2778 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2779 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2780 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2781 <!-- f2 -->
2782 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2783 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2784 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2785 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2786 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2787 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2788 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2789 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2790 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2791 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2792 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2793 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2794 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2795 </para>
2796 </blockquote>
2797 <para>
2798 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2799 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2800 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2801 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2802 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2803 <!-- f3 -->
2804 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2805 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2806 </para></footnote>
2807 That led the independents to flee the East
2808 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2809 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2810 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2811 did just that.
2812 </para>
2813 <para>
2814 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2815 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2816 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2817
2818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2819 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2820 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2821 Edison's creative property.
2822 </para>
2823 </sect2>
2824 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2825 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2826 <para>
2827 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2828 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2829 </para>
2830 <para>
2831 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2832 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2833 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2834 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2835 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2836 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2837 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2838 right to perform it publicly.
2839 </para>
2840 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2841 <para>
2842 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2843 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2844 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2845 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2846 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2847 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2848 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2849 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2850 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2851 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2852 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2853 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2854 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2855 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2856 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2857 its composer anything.
2858 </para>
2859 <para>
2860 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2862 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2863 put it,
2864 </para>
2865 <blockquote>
2866 <para>
2867 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2868 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2869 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2870 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2871 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2872 rights.<footnote><para>
2873 <!-- f4 -->
2874 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2875 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2876 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2877 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2878 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2879 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2880 </para></footnote>
2881 </para>
2882 </blockquote>
2883 <para>
2884 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2885 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2886 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2887 <!-- f5 -->
2888 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2889 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2890 </para></footnote>
2891 and the "music publishing industry"
2892 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2893 <!-- f6 -->
2894 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2895 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2896 </para></footnote>
2897 As John Philip
2898 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2899 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2900 <!-- f7 -->
2901 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2902 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2903 </para></footnote>
2904 </para>
2905 <para>
2906 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2907 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2908 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2909 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2910 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2911 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2912 <!-- f8 -->
2913 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2914 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2915 Perforating
2916 Company of New York).
2917 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2918 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2919 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2920 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2921 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2922 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2923 <!-- f9 -->
2924 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2925 (prepared
2926 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2927 American
2928 Graphophone Company Association).
2929 </para></footnote>
2930 </para>
2931 <para>
2932 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2933 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2934 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2935 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2936 control
2937 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2938 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2939 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2940
2941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2942 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2943 authorizes
2944 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2945 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2946 </para>
2947 <para>
2948 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2949 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2950 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2951 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2952 recordings
2953 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2954 by the statute.
2955 </para>
2956 <para>
2957 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2958 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2959 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2960 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2961 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2962 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2963 Grisham.
2964 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2965 </para>
2966 <para>
2967 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2968 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2969 kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2970 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2971 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2972 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2973 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2974 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2975 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2976 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2977 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2978 creativity.<footnote><para>
2979 <!-- f10 -->
2980 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2981 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2982 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2983 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2984 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2985 </para></footnote>
2986 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2987 </para>
2988 <para>
2989 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2990 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2991 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2992 relates,
2993 </para>
2994 <blockquote>
2995 <para>
2996 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2998 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2999 industry
3000 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3001 importance
3002 in the United States and throughout the world; records
3003 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
3004 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3005 access
3006 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3007 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3008 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3009 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3010 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3011 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3012 improved
3013 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
3014 <!-- f11 -->
3015 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3016 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3017 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3018 this report.</para></footnote>
3019 </para>
3020 </blockquote>
3021 <para>
3022 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3023 creative
3024 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3025 </para>
3026 </sect2>
3027 <sect2 id="radio">
3028 <title>Radio</title>
3029 <para>
3030 Radio was also born of piracy.
3031 </para>
3032 <para>
3033 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3034 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3035 <!-- f12 -->
3036 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3037 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3038 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3039 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3040 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3041 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3042 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3043 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3044 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 281.
3045 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3046 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3047 </para></footnote>
3048 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3049 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3050 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3051 </para>
3052 <para>
3053 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3054 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3055 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3056 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3057 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3058 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3059 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3060 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3061 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3062
3063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3064 </para>
3065 <para>
3066 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3067 radio
3068 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3069 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3070 something
3071 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3072 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3073 playing the song.
3074 </para>
3075 <para>
3076 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3077 music.
3078 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3079 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3080 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3081 </para>
3082 <para>
3083 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3084 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3085 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3086 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3087 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3088 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3089 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3090 </para>
3091 <para>
3092 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3093 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3094 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3095 ordinarily
3096 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3097 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3098 something for nothing.
3099 </para>
3100 </sect2>
3101 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3102 <title>Cable TV</title>
3103 <para>
3104
3105 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3106 </para>
3107 <para>
3108 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3109 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3110 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3111 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3113 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3114 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3115 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3116 give away.
3117 </para>
3118 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3119 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3120 <para>
3121 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3122 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3123 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3124 <!-- f13 -->
3125 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3126 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3127 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3128 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3129 Commission).
3130 </para></footnote>
3131 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3132 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3133 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3134 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3135 <!-- f14 -->
3136 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3137 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3138 </para></footnote>
3139 As another broadcaster put it,
3140 </para>
3141 <blockquote>
3142 <para>
3143 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3144 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3145 paid for.<footnote><para>
3146 <!-- f15 -->
3147 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3148 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3149 </para></footnote>
3150 </para>
3151 </blockquote>
3152 <para>
3153 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3154 </para>
3155 <blockquote>
3156 <para>
3157 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3158 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3159 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3160 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3161 <!-- f16 -->
3162 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3163 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3164 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3165 </para></footnote>
3166 </para>
3167 </blockquote>
3168 <para>
3169 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3170 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3171 compensation."<footnote><para>
3172 <!-- f17 -->
3173 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3174 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3175 </para></footnote>
3176 </para>
3177 <para>
3178 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3179 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3180 </para>
3181 <blockquote>
3182 <para>
3183 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3184 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3185 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3186 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3187
3188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3189 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3190 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3191 <!-- f18 -->
3192 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3193 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3194 </para></footnote>
3195 </para>
3196 </blockquote>
3197 <para>
3198 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3199 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3200 </para>
3201 <para>
3202 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3203 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3204 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3205 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3206 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3207 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3208 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3209 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3210 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3211 created by broadcasters' content.
3212 </para>
3213 <para>
3214 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3215 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3216 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3217 today<footnote><para>
3218 <!-- f19 -->
3219 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3220 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3221 Information, available at
3222 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3223 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3224 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3225 </para></footnote>
3226 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3227 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3228 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3229 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3230 generation&mdash;until now.
3231 </para>
3232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3233 </sect2>
3234 </sect1>
3235 <sect1 id="piracy">
3236 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3237 <para>
3238 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3239 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3240 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3241 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3242 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3243 should stop it.
3244 </para>
3245 <para>
3246 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3247 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3248 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3249 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3250 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3251 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3252 has so often done in the past.
3253 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3254 </para>
3255 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3256 <title>Piracy I</title>
3257 <para>
3258 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3259 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3260 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3261 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3262 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3263 <!-- f1 -->
3264 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3265 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3266
3267 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3268 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3269 </para></footnote>
3270 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3271 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3272 worldwide to piracy.
3273 </para>
3274 <para>
3275 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3276 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3277 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3278 This piracy is wrong.
3279 </para>
3280 <para>
3281 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3282 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3283 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3284 foreign
3285 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3286 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3287 developing
3288 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3289 existence, treated as right.
3290 </para>
3291 <para>
3292 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3293 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3294 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3295 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3296 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3297 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3298 violate
3299 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3300 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3301 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3302 </para>
3303 <para>
3304 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3305 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3307 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3308 pirate
3309 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3310 childhood.
3311 </para>
3312 <para>
3313 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3314 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3315 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3316 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3317 <!-- f2 -->
3318 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3319 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3320 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3321 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3322 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3323 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3324 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3325 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3326 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3327 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3328 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3329 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3330 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3331 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3332 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3333 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3334 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3335 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3336 is wrong.
3337 </para>
3338 <para>
3339 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3340 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3341 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3342 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3343 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3344 <!-- f3 -->
3345 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3346 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3347 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3348 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3349 instance
3350 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3351 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3352 </para></footnote>
3353 </para>
3354 <para>
3355 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3356 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3357 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3358 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3359 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3360 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3361 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3362 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3363 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3364 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3365 piracy of the tangible.
3366 </para>
3367 <para>
3368 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3369 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3370 property
3371 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3372 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3373 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3374 licenses
3375 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3376 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3377 copyrighted
3378 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3379
3380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3381 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3382 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3383 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3384 technology
3385 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3386 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3387 </para>
3388 <para>
3389 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3390 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3391 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3392 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3393 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3394 nation
3395 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3396 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3397 benefit
3398 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3399 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3400 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3401 Microsoft.
3402 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3403 </para>
3404 <para>
3405 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3406 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3407 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3408 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3409 become
3410 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3411 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3412 </para>
3413 <para>
3414 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3415 alcoholic
3416 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3417 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3418 ordinarily
3419 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3420 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3421 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3422 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3423 giving
3424 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3425 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3426 copyright
3427 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3428 wrong.
3429 </para>
3430 <para>
3431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3432 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3433 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3434 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3435 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3436 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3437 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3438 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3439 is flat out wrong.
3440 </para>
3441 <para>
3442 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3443 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3444 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3445 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3446 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3447 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3448 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3449 </para>
3450 <para>
3451 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3452 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3453 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3454 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3455 </para>
3456 <para>
3457 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3458 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3459 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3460 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3461 </para>
3462 <para>
3463 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3464 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3465 sharing
3466 to survive.
3467 </para>
3468 </sect2>
3469 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3470 <title>Piracy II</title>
3471 <para>
3472 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3473 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3474 <!-- f4 -->
3475 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3476 </para></footnote>
3477 This means we must determine whether
3478 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3480 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3481 author of his profit.
3482 </para>
3483 <para>
3484 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3485 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3486 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3487 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3488 <!-- f5 -->
3489 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3490 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3491 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3492 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3493 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3494 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3495 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3496 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3497 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3498 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3499 put together components that had been developed independently.
3500 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3501 </para>
3502 <para>
3503 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3504 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3505 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3506 system.<footnote><para>
3507 <!-- f6 -->
3508 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3509 Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3510 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3511 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3512 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3513 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3514 </para></footnote>
3515 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3516 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3517 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3518 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3519 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3520 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3521 or your 20,000 best friends.
3522 </para>
3523 <para>
3524 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3525 Americans
3526 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3527 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3528 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3529 <!-- f7 -->
3530 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3531 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3532 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3533 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3534 </para></footnote>
3535 A survey by the NPD
3536 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3537 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3538 <!-- f8 -->
3539 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3540 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3541 </para></footnote>
3542 The vast
3543 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3544 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3545 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3546 enjoy
3547 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3548 </para>
3549 <para>
3550 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3551 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3552 infringement,
3553 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3554 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3555 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3556 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3557 </para>
3558 <para>
3559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3560 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3561 different kinds into four types.
3562 </para>
3563 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3564 <listitem><para>
3565 <!-- A. -->
3566 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3567 purchasing
3568 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3569 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3570 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3571 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3572 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3573 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3574 instead
3575 of purchasing.
3576 </para></listitem>
3577 <listitem><para>
3578 <!-- B. -->
3579 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3580 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3581 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3582 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3583 succeed.
3584 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3585 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3586 recommendations
3587 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3588 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3589 </para></listitem>
3590 <listitem><para>
3591 <!-- C. -->
3592 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3593 copyrighted
3594 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3595 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3596 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3597 rewarding
3598 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3599 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3600 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3601 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3602 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3603 available.)
3604 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3605 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3606 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3607 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3608 a local collector.
3609 </para></listitem>
3610 <listitem><para>
3611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3612 <!-- D. -->
3613 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3614 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3615 wants to give away.
3616 </para></listitem>
3617 </orderedlist>
3618 <para>
3619 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3620 </para>
3621 <para>
3622 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3623 perspective
3624 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3625 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3626 <!-- f9 -->
3627 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3628 </para></footnote>
3629 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3630 illegal,
3631 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3632 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3633 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3634 certainly
3635 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3636 suggests.
3637 </para>
3638 <para>
3639 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3640 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3641 Hollywood,
3642 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3643 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3644 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3645 that is "devastating" the industry.
3646 </para>
3647 <para>
3648 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3649 harmful
3650 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3651 practice
3652 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3653 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3654 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3655 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3656 <!-- f10 -->
3657 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3658 Industry's
3659 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3660 industry's
3661 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3662 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3663 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3664 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3665 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3666 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3667 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3668 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3669 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3670 </para></footnote>
3671 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3672 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3673 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3674 problem,
3675 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3676 </para>
3677 <para>
3678 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3679 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3680 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3681 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3683 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3684 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3685 <!-- f11 -->
3686 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3687 </para></footnote>
3688 </para>
3689 <para>
3690 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3691 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3692 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3693 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3694 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3695 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3696 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3697 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3698 </para>
3699 <para>
3700 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3701 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3702 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3703 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3704 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3705 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3706 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3707 </para>
3708 <para>
3709 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3710 because
3711 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3712 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3713 </para>
3714 <para>
3715 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3716 percent,
3717 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3718 <!-- f12 -->
3719 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3720 available at
3721 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3722 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3723 25 June 2003, available at
3724 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3725 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3726 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3727 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3728 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3729 music
3730 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3731 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3732 </para></footnote>
3733 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3734 Internet
3735 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3736 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3737 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3738 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3739 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3740 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3741 <!-- f13 -->
3742 <para>
3743 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3744 February 2003, available at
3745 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3746 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3747 </para>
3748 </footnote>
3749 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3750 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3751 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3752 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3753 <!-- f14 -->
3754 Ibid.
3755 </para></footnote>
3756 </para>
3757 <para>
3758
3759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3760 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3761 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3762 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3763 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3764 although
3765 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3766 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3767 </para>
3768 <para>
3769 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3770 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3771 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3772 between
3773 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3774 numbers
3775 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3776 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3777 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3778 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3779 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3780 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3781 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3782 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3783 between
3784 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3785 </para>
3786 <para>
3787 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3788 assume,
3789 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3790 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3791 costs?
3792 </para>
3793 <para>
3794 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3795 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3796 available.
3797 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3798 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3799 <!-- f15 -->
3800 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3801 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3802 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3803 Committee
3804 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3805 statement
3806 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3807 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3808 </para></footnote>
3809 And while it's
3810 conceivable
3811 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3812 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3813 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3814 distributor
3815 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3816 make it available.
3817 </para>
3818 <para>
3819 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3821 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3822 thousands
3823 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3824 <!-- f16 -->
3825 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3826 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3827 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3828 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3829 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3830 National
3831 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3832 Results,"
3833 available at
3834 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3835 </para></footnote>
3836 These
3837 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3838 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3839 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3840 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3841 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3842 companies
3843 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3844 owner for the content they sell.
3845 </para>
3846 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3847 <para>
3848 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3849 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3850 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3851 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3852 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3853 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3854 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3855 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3856 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3857 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3858 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3859 </para>
3860 <para>
3861 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3862 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3863 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3864 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3865 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3866 shut as well?
3867 </para>
3868 <para>
3869 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3870 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3871 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3872 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3873 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3874 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3875
3876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3877 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3878 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3879 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3880 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3881 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3882 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3883 great book!)
3884 </para>
3885 <para>
3886 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3887 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3888 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3889 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3890 </para>
3891 <para>
3892 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3893 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3894 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3895 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3896 unavailable?"
3897 </para>
3898 <para>
3899 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3900 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3901 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3902 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3903 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3904 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3905 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3906 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3907 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3908 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3909 found only with time.
3910 </para>
3911 <para>
3912 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3913 just what you call type A sharing?"
3914 </para>
3915 <para>
3916 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3917 effect
3918 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3919 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3920 Napster
3921 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3922 developed
3923 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3925 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3926 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3927 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3928 <!-- f17 -->
3929 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3930 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3931 MHP, available at
3932 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3933 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3934 Fanning's
3935 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3936 </para></footnote>
3937 </para>
3938 <para>
3939 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3940 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3941 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3942 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3943 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3944 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3945 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3946 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3947 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3948 </para>
3949 <para>
3950 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3951 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3952 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3953 content
3954 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3955 technology.
3956 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3957 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3958 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3959 </para>
3960 <para>
3961 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3962 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3963 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3964 composers,
3965 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3966 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3967 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3968 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3969 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3970 broadcast),
3971 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3972 </para>
3973 <para>
3974 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3975 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3976 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3977 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3978 companies
3979 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3980 </para>
3981 <para>
3982
3983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3984 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3985 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3986 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3987 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3988 Second,
3989 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3990 content
3991 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3992 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3993 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3994 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3995 Congress
3996 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3997 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3998 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3999 control
4000 over the future (cable).
4001 </para>
4002 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
4003 <para>
4004 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4005 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4006 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4007 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4008 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4009 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4010 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4011 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4012 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4013 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4014 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4015 </para>
4016 <para>
4017 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4018 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4019 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4020 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4021 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4022 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4023 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4024 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4026 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4027 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4028 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4029 for the architecture it chose.
4030 </para>
4031 <para>
4032 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4033 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4034 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4035 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4036 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4037 copyright."<footnote><para>
4038 <!-- f18 -->
4039 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4040 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4041 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4042 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4043 </para></footnote>
4044 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4045 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4046 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4047 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4048 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4049 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4050 <!-- f19 -->
4051 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4052 </para></footnote>
4053 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4054 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4055 <!-- f20 -->
4056 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4057 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4058 </para></footnote>
4059 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4060 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4061 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4062 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4063 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4064 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4065 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4066 <!-- f21 -->
4067 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4068 of Jack Valenti).
4069 </para></footnote>
4070 </para>
4071 <para>
4072 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4073 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4074 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4075 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4076 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4077 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4078 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4079 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4080 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4081 technology.<footnote><para>
4082 <!-- f22 -->
4083 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4084 1981).
4085 </para></footnote>
4086 </para>
4087 <para>
4088 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4089
4090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4091 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4092 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4093 Court wrote,
4094 </para>
4095 <blockquote>
4096 <para>
4097 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4098 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4099 market
4100 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4101 authority
4102 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4103 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4104 implicated
4105 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4106 <!-- f23 -->
4107 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4108 </para></footnote>
4109 </para>
4110 </blockquote>
4111 <para>
4112 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4113 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4114 Congress
4115 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4116 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4117 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4118 </para>
4119
4120 <table id="t1">
4121 <title>Table</title>
4122 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4123 <thead>
4124 <row>
4125 <entry>CASE</entry>
4126 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4127 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4128 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4129 </row>
4130 </thead>
4131 <tbody>
4132 <row>
4133 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4134 <entry>Composers</entry>
4135 <entry>No protection</entry>
4136 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4137 </row>
4138 <row>
4139 <entry>Radio</entry>
4140 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4141 <entry>N/A</entry>
4142 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4143 </row>
4144 <row>
4145 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4146 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4147 <entry>No protection</entry>
4148 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4149 </row>
4150 <row>
4151 <entry>VCR</entry>
4152 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4153 <entry>No protection</entry>
4154 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4155 </row>
4156 </tbody>
4157 </tgroup>
4158 </table>
4159
4160 <para>
4161 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4162 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4163 <!-- f24 -->
4164 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4165 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4166 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4167 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4168 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4169 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4170 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4171 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4172 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4173 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4174 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4175 </para></footnote>
4176 In each case, throughout our history,
4177 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4178 work.
4179 </para>
4180 <para>
4181 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4182 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4183 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4184 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4185 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4186 legitimacy
4187 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4188 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4189 the interests at stake.
4190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4191 </para>
4192 <para>
4193 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4194 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4195 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4196 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4197 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4198 regulated?
4199 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4200 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4201 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4202 permission to record a song?
4203 </para>
4204 <para>
4205 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4206 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4207 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4208 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4209 <!-- f25 -->
4210 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4211 (1984).
4212 </para></footnote>
4213 Instead, the particular uses that the
4214 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4215 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4216 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4217 technology
4218 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4219 the distribution of content.
4220 </para>
4221 <para>
4222 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4223 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4224 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4225 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4226 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4227 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4228 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4229 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4230 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4231 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4232 protection
4233 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4234 continue.
4235 </para>
4236 <para>
4237
4238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4239 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4240 superior
4241 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4242 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4243 network.
4244 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4245 efficient.
4246 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4247 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4248 <!-- f26 -->
4249 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4250 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4251 </para></footnote>
4252 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4253 warriors
4254 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4255 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4256 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4257 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4258 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4259 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4260 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4261 </para>
4262 <para>
4263 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4264 just as any other property is protected."
4265 </para>
4266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4267 </sect2>
4268 </sect1>
4269 </chapter>
4270 <chapter id="c-property">
4271 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4272 <para>
4273
4274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4275 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4276 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4277 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4278 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4279 the price she can get.
4280 </para>
4281 <para>
4282 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4283 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4284 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4285 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4286 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4287 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4288 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4289 going
4290 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4291 thing I am taking then?
4292 </para>
4293 <para>
4294 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4295 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4296 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4297 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4298 narrow
4299 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4300 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4301 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4302 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4303 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4304 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4305 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4306 <!-- f1 -->
4307 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4308 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4309 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4310 </para></footnote>
4311 </para>
4312 <para>
4313 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4314 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4315 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4316 expression
4317 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4318 property.
4319 </para>
4320 <para>
4321 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4322 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4323 turning
4324 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4325 "property"
4326 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4327 <!-- f2 -->
4328 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4329 intangible.
4330 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4331 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4332 physical
4333 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4334 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4335 Property?
4336 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4337 373, 429 n. 241.
4338 </para></footnote>
4339 </para>
4340 <para>
4341 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4342 preceding
4343 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4344 material
4345 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4346 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4347 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4348 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4349 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4350 us draw.
4351 </para>
4352
4353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4354 <sect1 id="founders">
4355 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4356 <para>
4357 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4358 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4359 Shakespeare
4360 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4361 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4362 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4363 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4364 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4365 adaptation
4366 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4367 </para>
4368 <para>
4369 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4370 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4371 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4372 <!-- f1 -->
4373 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4374 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4375 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4376 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4377 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4378 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4379 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4380 </para></footnote>
4381 Tonson was the
4382 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4383 <!-- f2 -->
4384 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4385 Vanderbilt
4386 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4387 </para></footnote>
4388 who
4389 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4390 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4391 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4393 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4394 copyright.
4395 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4396 produce
4397 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4398 </para>
4399 <para>
4400 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4401 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4402 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4403 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4404 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4405 renewable
4406 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4407 published
4408 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4409 <!-- f3 -->
4410 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4411 "copyright
4412 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4413 </para></footnote>
4414 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4415 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4416 </para>
4417 <para>
4418 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4419 "copyright"
4420 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4421 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4422 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4423 expired
4424 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4425 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4426 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4427 publishers,
4428 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4429 </para>
4430 <para>
4431 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4432 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4433 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4434 govern
4435 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4436 "positive
4437 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4438 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4439 legislature,
4440 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4441 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4442 expired
4443 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4444 independent
4445 of any positive law.
4446 </para>
4447 <para>
4448 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4449 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4450 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4451 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4452
4453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4454 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4455 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4456 ultimately
4457 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4458 </para>
4459 <para>
4460 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4461 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4462 however,
4463 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4464 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4465 "expired,"
4466 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4467 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4468 </para>
4469 <para>
4470 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4471 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4472 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4473 </para>
4474 <para>
4475 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4476 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4477 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4478 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4479 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4480 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4481 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4482 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4483 reason
4484 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4485 </para>
4486 <para>
4487 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4488 special
4489 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4490 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4491 "booksellers."
4492 </para>
4493 <para>
4494 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4495 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4496 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4497 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4498 others
4499 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4500 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4501 beyond
4502 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4503 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4504 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4505 restrictions
4506 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4507 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4508 perform, and so on.
4509 </para>
4510 <para>
4511 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4512 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4513 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4514 permission
4515 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4516 anything,
4517 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4518 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4519 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4520 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4521 </para>
4522 <para>
4523 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4524 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4525 especially
4526 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4527 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4528 monopolies&mdash;especially
4529 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4530 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4531 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4532 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4533 Monopolies,
4534 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4535 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4536 publishing.
4537 </para>
4538 <para>
4539 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4540 naturally
4541 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4542 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4543 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4544 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4545 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4546 specialinterest
4547 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4548 </para>
4549 <para>
4550 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4551 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4552 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4553 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4555 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4556 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4557 themselves
4558 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4559 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4560 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4561 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4562 <!-- f4 -->
4563 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4564 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4565 </para></footnote>
4566 </para>
4567 <para>
4568 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4569 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4570 Enlightenment
4571 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4572 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4573 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4574 that idea.
4575 </para>
4576 <para>
4577 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4578 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4579 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4580 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4581 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4582 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4583 compromise
4584 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4585 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4586 construction and spread of culture.
4587 </para>
4588 <para>
4589 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4590 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4591 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4592 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4593 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4594 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4595 they said; they needed more time.
4596 </para>
4597 <para>
4598 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4599 words that echo today,
4600 </para>
4601 <blockquote>
4602 <para>
4603 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4604 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4606 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4607 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4608 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4609 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4610 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4611 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4612 <!-- f5 -->
4613 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4614 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4615 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4616 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4617 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4618 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4619 al., 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4620 </para></footnote>
4621 </para>
4622 </blockquote>
4623 <para>
4624 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4625 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4626 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4627 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4628 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4629 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4630 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4631 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4632 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4633 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4634 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4635 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4636 way to protect authors.
4637 </para>
4638 <para>
4639 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4640 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4641 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4642 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4643 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4644 <!-- f6 -->
4645 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4646 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4647 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4648 </para></footnote>
4649 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4650 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4651 </para>
4652 <para>
4653 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4654 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4655 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4656 <!-- f7 -->
4657 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4658 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4659 </para></footnote>
4660 </para>
4661 <para>
4662 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4663 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4664 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4665 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4666 <!-- f8 -->
4667 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4668 1993), 92.
4669 </para></footnote>
4670 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4672 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4673 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4674 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4675 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4676 <!-- f9 -->
4677 Ibid., 93.
4678 </para></footnote>
4679 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4680 </para>
4681 <para>
4682 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4683 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4684 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4685 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4686 Property."<footnote><para>
4687 <!-- f10 -->
4688 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4689 Borwell).
4690 </para></footnote>
4691 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4692 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4693 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4694 </para>
4695 <para>
4696 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4697 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4698 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4699 </para>
4700 <para>
4701 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4702 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4703 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4704 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4705 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4706 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4707 <!-- f11 -->
4708 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4709 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29
4710 (1983): 1152.
4711 </para></footnote>
4712 </para>
4713 <para>
4714 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4715 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4716 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4717 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4718 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4719 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4720 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4721 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4722 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4723 </para>
4724 <para>
4725 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4726 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4727 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4728 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4729 with in 1710: How best to limit
4730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4731 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4732 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4733 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4734 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4735 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4736 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4737 </para>
4738 <para>
4739 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4740 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4741 </para>
4742 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4743 <para>
4744 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4745 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4746 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4747 <!-- f12 -->
4748 Ibid., 1156.
4749 </para></footnote>
4750 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4751 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4752 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4753 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4754 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4755 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4756 </para>
4757 <para>
4758 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4759 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4760 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4761 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4762 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4763 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4764 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4765 statute were no longer protected.
4766 </para>
4767 <para>
4768 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4769 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4770 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4771 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4772 House of Lords generally voted.
4773 </para>
4774 <para>
4775 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4776 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4778 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4779 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4780 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4781 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4782 passed into the public domain.
4783 </para>
4784 <para>
4785 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4786 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4787 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4788 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4789 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4790 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4791 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4792 legal restraint.
4793 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4794 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4795 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4796 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4797 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4798 </para>
4799 <para>
4800 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4801 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4802 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4803 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4804 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4805 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4806 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4807 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4808 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4809 <!-- f13 -->
4810 Rose, 97.
4811 </para></footnote>
4812 </para>
4813 <para>
4814 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4815 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4816 reported:
4817 </para>
4818 <blockquote>
4819 <para>
4820 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4821 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4822 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4823 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4824 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4825 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4826 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4827 successors.<footnote><para>
4828 <!-- f14 -->
4829 Ibid.
4830 </para></footnote>
4831 </para>
4832 </blockquote>
4833 <para>
4834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4835 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4836 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4837 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4838 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4839 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4840 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4841 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4842 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4843 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4844 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4845 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4846 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4847 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4848 readers chose to let it develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought
4849 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4850 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4851 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4852 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4853 </para>
4854 <para>
4855 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4856 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4857 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4858 protected.
4859 </para>
4860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4861 </sect1>
4862 <sect1 id="recorders">
4863 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4864 <para>
4865 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4866 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4867 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4868 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4869 He was their god.)
4870 </para>
4871 <para>
4872 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4873 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4874 today.
4875 </para>
4876 <para>
4877 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4878 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4879 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4880 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4881 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4882 stage.
4883 </para>
4884 <para>
4885 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4886 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4887 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4888 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4889 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4890 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4891 about the scene.
4892 </para>
4893 <para>
4894 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4895 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4896 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4897 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4898 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4899 </para>
4900 <para>
4901 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4902 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4903 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4904 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4905 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4906 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4907 </para>
4908 <para>
4909 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4910 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4911 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4912 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4913 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4914 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4915 </para>
4916 <para>
4917 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4918 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4919 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4920 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4921 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4922 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4923 </para>
4924 <para>
4925 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4926 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4927 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4928 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4929 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4930 confirm what he had been told.
4931 </para>
4932 <para>
4933 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4934 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4935 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4936 about
4937
4938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4939 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4940 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4941 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4942 the money."
4943 </para>
4944 <para>
4945 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4946 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4947 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4948 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4949 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4950 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4951 </para>
4952 <para>
4953 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4954 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4955 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4956 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4957 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4958 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4959 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4960 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4961 says the owner gets to control.
4962 </para>
4963 <para>
4964 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4965 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4966 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4967 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4968 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4969 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4970 by the law.
4971 </para>
4972 <para>
4973 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4974 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4975 <!-- f1 -->
4976 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4977 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4978 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4979 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4980 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4981 </para></footnote>
4982 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4983 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use does
4984 not require the permission of anyone.
4985 </para>
4986 <para>
4987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4988 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4989 </para>
4990 <blockquote>
4991 <para>
4992 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4993 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4994 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4995 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4996 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4997 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4998 </para>
4999 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5000 <listitem><para>
5001 <!-- 1. -->
5002 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5003 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5004 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5005 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5006 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5007 </para></listitem>
5008 <listitem><para>
5009 <!-- 2. -->
5010 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5011 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5012 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
5013 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
5014 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5015 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
5016 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5017 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5018 principle.
5019 </para></listitem>
5020 <listitem><para>
5021 <!-- 3. -->
5022 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5023 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5024 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5025 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5026 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5027 pockets, me or them.
5028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5029 </para></listitem>
5030 <listitem><para>
5031 <!-- 4. -->
5032 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5033 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5034 money.
5035 </para></listitem>
5036 </orderedlist>
5037 </blockquote>
5038 <para>
5039 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5040 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5041 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5042 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5043 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5044 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5045 </para>
5046 <para>
5047 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5048 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5049 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5050 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5051 not.
5052 </para>
5053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5054 </sect1>
5055 <sect1 id="transformers">
5056 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5057 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5058 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5059 <para>
5060 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5061 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5062 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5063 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5064 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5065 </para>
5066 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5067 <para>
5068 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5069 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5070 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5071 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5072 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5073 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5074 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5075 important to his career.
5076 </para>
5077 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5078 <para>
5079 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5080 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5081 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5082 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5083 </para>
5084 <para>
5085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5086 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5087 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5088 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5089 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5090 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5091 </para>
5092 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5093 <para>
5094 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5095 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5096 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5097 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5098 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5099 actor's career."
5100 </para>
5101 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5102 <para>
5103 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5104 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5105 </para>
5106 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5107 <para>
5108 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5109 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5110 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5111 for it."<footnote>
5112 <para>
5113 <!-- f1 -->
5114 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5115 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5116 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5117 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5118 <indexterm>
5119 <primary>artists</primary>
5120 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5121 </indexterm>
5122 </para></footnote>
5123 </para>
5124 <para>
5125 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5126 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5127 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5128 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5129 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5130 </para>
5131 <para>
5132 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5133 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5134 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5135 </para>
5136 <blockquote>
5137 <para>
5138 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5139 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5140 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5141 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5142 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5143 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5144 </para>
5145 <para>
5146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5147 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5148 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5149 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5150 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5151 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5152 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5153 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5154 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5155 started calling people.
5156 </para>
5157 </blockquote>
5158 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5159 <para>
5160 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5161 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5162 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5163 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5164 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5165 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5166 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5167 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5168 career.
5169 </para>
5170 <para>
5171 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5172 were totally in the clear."
5173 </para>
5174 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5175 <para>
5176 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5177 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5178 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5179 </para>
5180 <blockquote>
5181 <para>
5182 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5183 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5184 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5185 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5186 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5187 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5188 systematically and cleared the rights.
5189 </para>
5190 </blockquote>
5191 <para>
5192
5193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5194 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5195 loved it, and it sold very well.
5196 </para>
5197 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5198 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5199 <para>
5200 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5201 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5202 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5203 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5204 at all."<footnote><para>
5205 <!-- f2 -->
5206 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5207 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5208 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5209 </para></footnote>
5210 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5211 has to be made?
5212 </para>
5213 <para>
5214 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5215 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5216 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5217 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5218 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5219 </para>
5220 <blockquote>
5221 <para>
5222 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5223 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5224 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5225 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5226 compensated for that.
5227 </para>
5228 </blockquote>
5229 <para>
5230 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5231 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5232 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5233 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5234 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5235 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5236 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5237 </para>
5238 <blockquote>
5239 <para>
5240 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5241 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5242 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5243 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5245 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5246 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5247 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5248 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5249 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5250 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5251 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5252 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5253 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5254 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5255 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5256 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5257 </para>
5258 </blockquote>
5259 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5260 <para>
5261 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5262 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5263 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5264 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5265 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5266 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5267 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5268 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5269 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5270 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5271 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5272 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5273 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5274 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5275 "Does this still make sense?"
5276 </para>
5277 <para>
5278 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5279 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5280 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5281 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5282
5283 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5284 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5285 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5286 </para>
5287 <para>
5288 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5289 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5290 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5291 judges loved every minute of it.
5292 </para>
5293 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5294 <para>
5295 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5296 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5297 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5298 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5299 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5300 were just violated in this room?"
5301 </para>
5302 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5303 <para>
5304 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5305 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5306 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5307 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5308 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5309 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5310 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5311 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5312 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5313 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5314 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5315 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5316 couldn't easily do them legally.
5317 </para>
5318 <para>
5319 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5320 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5321 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5322 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5323 planted in your presentation.
5324 </para>
5325 <para>
5326 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5328 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5329 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5330 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5331 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5332 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5333 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5334 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5335 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5336 </para>
5337 <para>
5338 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5339 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5340 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5341 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5342 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5343 </para>
5344 <para>
5345 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5346 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5347 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5348 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5349 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5350 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5351 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5352 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5353 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5354 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5355 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5356 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5357 registers the work.
5358 </para>
5359 <para>
5360 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5361 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5362 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5363 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5364 </para>
5365 <para>
5366 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5367 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5369 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5370 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5371 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5372 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5373 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5374 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5375 entertainment."
5376 </para>
5377 <para>
5378 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5379 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5380 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5381 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5382 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5383 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5384 new audiences, it is Mike."
5385 </para>
5386 <para>
5387 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5388 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5389 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5390 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5391 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5392 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5393 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5394 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5395 </para>
5396 <para>
5397 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5398 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5399 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5400 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5401 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5402 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5403 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5404 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5405 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5406 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5407 curse, reserved for the few.
5408 </para>
5409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5410 </sect1>
5411 <sect1 id="collectors">
5412 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5413 <para>
5414 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5415 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5416 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5417 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5418 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5419 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5420 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5421 </para>
5422 <para>
5423 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5424 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5425 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5426 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5427 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5428 well as when those pages changed.
5429 </para>
5430 <para>
5431 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5432 appreciated. In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5433 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5434 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5435 reports.
5436 </para>
5437 <para>
5438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5439 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5440 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5441 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5442 </para>
5443 <para>
5444 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5445 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5446 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5447 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5448 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5449 </para>
5450 <para>
5451 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5452 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5453 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5454 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5455 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5456 <!-- f1 -->
5457 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5458 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5459 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5460 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5461 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5462 </para></footnote>
5463 </para>
5464 <para>
5465 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5466 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5467 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5468 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5469 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5470 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5471 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5472 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5473 truth.
5474 </para>
5475 <para>
5476 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5477 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5478 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5479 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5480 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5481 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5482 presumes this knowedge.
5483 </para>
5484 <para>
5485 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5486 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5487 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5488 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5490 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5491 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5492 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5493 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5494 </para>
5495 <para>
5496 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5497 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5498 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5499 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5500 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5501 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5502 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5503 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5504 </para>
5505 <para>
5506 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5507 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5508 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5509 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5510 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5511 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5512 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5513 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5514 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5515 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5516 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5517 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5518 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5519 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5520 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5521 </para>
5522 <blockquote>
5523 <para>
5524 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5525 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5526 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5527 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5528 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5529
5530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5531 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5532 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5533 </para>
5534 </blockquote>
5535 <para>
5536 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5537 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5538 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5539 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5540 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5541 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5542 </para>
5543 <para>
5544 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5545 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5546 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5547 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5548 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5549 work.
5550 </para>
5551 <para>
5552 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5553 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5554 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5555 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5556 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5557 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5558 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5559 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5560 <!-- f2 -->
5561 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5562 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5563 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5564 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5565 Co., 1992), 36.
5566 </para></footnote>
5567 </para>
5568 <para>
5569 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5570 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5571 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5572 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5573 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5574 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5575 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5576 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5577 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5578 </para>
5579 <para>
5580 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5582 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5583 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5584 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5585 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5586 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5587 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5588 events of that day.
5589 </para>
5590 <para>
5591 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5592 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5593 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5594 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5595 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5596 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5597 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5598 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5599 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5600 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5601 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5602 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5603 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5604 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5605 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5606 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5607 </para>
5608 <para>
5609 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5610 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5611 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5612 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5613 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5614 to find them.
5615 </para>
5616 <para>
5617 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5618 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5619 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5620 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5621 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5622 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5623 </para>
5624 <para>
5625 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5626 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5627 life, if the
5628
5629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5630 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5631 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5632 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5633 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5634 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5635 </para>
5636 <para>
5637 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5638 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5639 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5640 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5641 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5642 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5643 longer sold.
5644 </para>
5645 <para>
5646 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5647 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5648 <!-- f3 -->
5649 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5650 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5651 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5652 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5653 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5654 College Law Review 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5655 </para></footnote>). After
5656 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5657 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5658 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5659 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5660 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5661 </para>
5662 <para>
5663 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5664 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5665 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5666 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5667 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5668 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5669 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5670 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5671 disappears.
5672 </para>
5673 <para>
5674 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5675 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5676 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5677 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5678 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5679 generally, the
5680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5681 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5682 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5683 little practical effect.
5684 </para>
5685 <para>
5686 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5687 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5688 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5689 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5690 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5691 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5692 </para>
5693 <para>
5694 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5695 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5696 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5697 Kahle describes,
5698 </para>
5699 <blockquote>
5700 <para>
5701 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5702 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5703 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5704 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5705 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5706 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5707 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5708 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5709 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5710 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5711 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5712 </para>
5713 </blockquote>
5714 <para>
5715 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5716 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5717 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5718 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5719 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5720 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5721 it;
5722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5723 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5724 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5725 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5726 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5727 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5728 </para>
5729 <para>
5730 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5731 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5732 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5733 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5734 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5735 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5736 </para>
5737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5738 </sect1>
5739 <sect1 id="property-i">
5740 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5741 <para>
5742 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5743 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5744 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5745 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5746 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5747 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5748 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5749 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5750 </para>
5751 <para>
5752 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5753 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5754 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5755 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5756 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5757 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5758 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5759 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5760 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5761 Warner Brothers.
5762 </para>
5763 <para>
5764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5765 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5766 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5767 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5768 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5769 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5770 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5771 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5772 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5773 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5774 Washingtonian way.
5775 </para>
5776 <para>
5777 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5778 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5779 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5780 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5781 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5782 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5783 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5784 </para>
5785 <para>
5786 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5787 perfectly:
5788 </para>
5789 <blockquote>
5790 <para>
5791 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5792 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5793 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5794 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5795 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5796 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5797 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5798 debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5799 <!-- f1 -->
5800 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5801 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5802 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5803 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5804 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5805 Valenti).
5806 </para></footnote>
5807 </para>
5808 </blockquote>
5809 <para>
5810 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5811 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5812 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5813 this:
5814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5815 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5816 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5817 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5818 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5819 </para>
5820 <para>
5821 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5822 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5823 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5824 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5825 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5826 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5827 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5828 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5829 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5830 Washington.
5831 </para>
5832 <para>
5833 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5834 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5835 <!-- f2 -->
5836 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5837 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5838 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5839 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5840 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5841 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5842 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5843 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5844 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5845 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5846 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5847 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5848 in our tradition.
5849 </para>
5850 <para>
5851 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5852 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5853 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5854 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5855 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5856 culture would develop.
5857 </para>
5858 <para>
5859 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5860 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5861 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5862 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5863 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5864 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5865 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5866 the same would be to
5867
5868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5869 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5870 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5871 perfect control.
5872 </para>
5873 <para>
5874 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5875 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5876 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5877 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5878 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5879 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5880 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5881 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5882 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5883 Constitution itself.
5884 </para>
5885 <para>
5886 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5887 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5888 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5889 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5890 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5891 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5892 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5893 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5894 government pays for the privilege.
5895 </para>
5896 <para>
5897 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5898 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5899 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5900 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5901 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5902 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5903 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5904 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5905 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5906 compensation for your land
5907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5908 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5909 compensation at all.
5910 </para>
5911 <para>
5912 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5913 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5914 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5915 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5916 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5917 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5918 itself.
5919 </para>
5920 <para>
5921 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5922 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5923 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5924 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5925 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5926 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5927 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5928 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5929 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5930 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5931 </para>
5932 <para>
5933 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5934 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5935 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5936 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5937 creative property there must be a public domain?
5938 </para>
5939 <para>
5940 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5941 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5942 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5943 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5944 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5945 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5946 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5947 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5948 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5949 control how culture develops.
5950 </para>
5951 <para>
5952
5953 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5954 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5955 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5956 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5957 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5958 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5959 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5960 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5961 </para>
5962 <figure id="fig-1331">
5963 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5964 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5965 </figure>
5966 <para>
5967 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5968 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5969 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5970 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5971 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5972 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5973 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5974 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5975 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5976 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5977 Web, you can be punished
5978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5979 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5980 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5981 </para>
5982 <para>
5983 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5984 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5985 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5986 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5987 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5988 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5989 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5990 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5991 the source of the enforcement.
5992 </para>
5993 <para>
5994 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5995 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5996 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5997 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5998 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5999 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6000 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6001 individual or group might behave.
6002 </para>
6003 <para>
6004 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6005 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
6006 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6007 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6008 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6009 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6010 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6011 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6012 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6013 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
6014 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6015 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6016 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6017 </para>
6018 <para>
6019
6020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6021 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6022 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6023 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6024 undermined by another.
6025 </para>
6026 <para>
6027 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6028 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6029 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6030 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6031 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6032 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6033 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6034 </para>
6035 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6036 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6037 </indexterm>
6038 <para>
6039 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6040 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6041 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6042 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6043 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6044 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6045 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6046 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6047 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6048 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6049 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6050 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6051 </para>
6052 <para>
6053 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6054 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6055 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6056 <!-- f3 -->
6057 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6058 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6059 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6060 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6061 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6062 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6063 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6064 June 1998.
6065 </para></footnote>
6066 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6067 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6068 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6069 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6070 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6071 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6072 used to require that other laws be more
6073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6074 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6075 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6076 driving.
6077 </para>
6078 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6079
6080 <figure id="fig-1361">
6081 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6082 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6083 </figure>
6084 <para>
6085 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6086 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6087 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6088 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6089 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6090 another.<footnote>
6091 <para>
6092 <!-- f4 -->
6093 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6094 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6095 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6096 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6097 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6098 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6099 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6100 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6101 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6102 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6103 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6104 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6105 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6106 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6107 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6108 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6109 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6110 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6111 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6112 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6113 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6114 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6115 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6116 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6117 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6118 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6119 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6120 of these groups might face.
6121 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6122 </para></footnote>
6123 </para>
6124 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6125 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6126 <para>
6127 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6128 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6129 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6130 rallying makes sense.
6131 </para>
6132 <para>
6133 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6134 Internet:
6135 </para>
6136 <figure id="fig-1371">
6137 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6138 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6139 </figure>
6140 <para>
6141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6142 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6143 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6144 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6145 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6146 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6147 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6148 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6149 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6150 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6151 this form of infringement.
6152 </para>
6153 <para>
6154 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6155 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6156 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6157 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6158 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6159 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6160 </para>
6161 <para>
6162 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6163 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6164 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6165 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6166 Iraq
6167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6168 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6169 looting that results.
6170 </para>
6171 <figure id="fig-1381">
6172 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6173 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6174 </figure>
6175 <para>
6176 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6177 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6178 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6179 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6180 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6181 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6182 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6183 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6184 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6185 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6186 </para>
6187 <para>
6188 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6189 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6190 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6191 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6192 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6193 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6194 life. Homeowners living in a
6195
6196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6197 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6198 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6199 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6200 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6201 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6202 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6203 </para>
6204 <para>
6205 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6206 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6207 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6208 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6209 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6210 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6211 </para>
6212 <para>
6213 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6214 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6215 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6216 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6217 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6218 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6219 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6220 <!-- f5 -->
6221 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6222 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6223 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6224 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6225 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6226 October 2003, available at
6227 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6228 </para></footnote>
6229
6230 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6231 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6232 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6233 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6234 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6235 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6236 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6237 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6238 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6239 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6240 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6241 </para>
6242 <para>
6243 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6244 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6245 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6247 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6248 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6249 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6250 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6251 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6252 <!-- f6 -->
6253 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6254 </para></footnote>
6255 And relative to a
6256 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6257 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6258 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6259 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6260 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6261 Brezhnev.
6262 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6263 </para>
6264 <para>
6265 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6266 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6267 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6268 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6269 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6270 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6271 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6272 opportunities for innovation and change.
6273 </para>
6274 <para>
6275 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6276 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6277 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6278 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6279 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6280 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6281 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6282 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6283 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6284 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6285 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6286 regulation is justified.
6287 </para>
6288 <para>
6289 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6291 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6292 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6293 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6294 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6295 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6296 </para>
6297 <para>
6298 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6299 </para>
6300 <para>
6301 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6302 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6303 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6304 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6305 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6306 </para>
6307 <para>
6308 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6309 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6310 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6311 </para>
6312 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6313 <para>
6314 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6315 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6316 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6317 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6318 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6319 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6320 </para>
6321 <para>
6322 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6323 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6324 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6325 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6326 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6327 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6328 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6329 </para>
6330 <para>
6331 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6332 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6333 culture.<footnote><para>
6334 <!-- f7 -->
6335 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6336 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6337 </para></footnote>
6338 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6339 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6340 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6341 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6342 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6343 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6345 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6346 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6347 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6348 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6349 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6350 </para>
6351 <para>
6352 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6353 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6354 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6355 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6356 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6357 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6358 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6359 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6360 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6361 </para>
6362 <para>
6363 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6364 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6365 be lost.
6366 </para>
6367 </sect2>
6368 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6369 <title>Beginnings</title>
6370 <para>
6371 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6372 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6373 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6374 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6375 </para>
6376 <para>
6377 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6378 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6379 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6380 </para>
6381 <para>
6382 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6383 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6384 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6385
6386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6387 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6388 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6389 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6390 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6391 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6392 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6393 </para>
6394 <para>
6395 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6396 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6397 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6398 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6399 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6400 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6401 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6402 </para>
6403 <para>
6404 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6405 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6406 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6407 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6408 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6409 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6410 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6411 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6412 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6413 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6414 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6415 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6416 power.
6417 </para>
6418 <para>
6419 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6420 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6421 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6422 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6423 years since they first struck its design.
6424 </para>
6425 <para>
6426 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6427 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6429 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6430 started here:
6431 </para>
6432 <figure id="fig-1441">
6433 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6434 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6435 </figure>
6436 <para>
6437 We will end here:
6438 </para>
6439 <figure id="fig-1442">
6440 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6441 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6442 </figure>
6443 <para>
6444 Let me explain how.
6445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6446 </para>
6447 </sect2>
6448 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6449 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6450 <para>
6451 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6452 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6453 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6454 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6455 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6456 authorship.<footnote>
6457 <para>
6458 <!-- f8 -->
6459 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6460 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6461 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6462 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6463 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6464 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6465 </para></footnote>
6466 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6467 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6468 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6469 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6470 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6471 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6472 </para>
6473 <para>
6474 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6475 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6476 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6477 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6478 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6479 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6480 </para>
6481 <para>
6482 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6483 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6484 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6485 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6486 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6487 </para>
6488 <para>
6489 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6490 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6491 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6492 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6493 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6494 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6495 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6496 <!-- f9 -->
6497 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6498 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6499 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6500 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6501 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6502 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6503 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6504 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6505 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6506 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6507 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6508 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6509 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6510 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6511 </para>
6512 <para>
6513 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6514 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6515 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6516 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6517 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6518 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6519 copyright, either.
6520 </para>
6521 <para>
6522 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6523 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6524 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6525 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6526 domain.<footnote><para>
6527 <!-- f10 -->
6528 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6529 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6530 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6531 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6532 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6533 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6534 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6535 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6536 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6537 </para>
6538 <para>
6539 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6540 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6541 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6542 <!-- f11 -->
6543 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6544 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6545 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6546 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6547 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6548 effectively free.
6549 </para>
6550 <para>
6551 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6552 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6553 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6554 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6555 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6556 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6557 </para>
6558 <para>
6559 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6560 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6561 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6562 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6563 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6564 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6565 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6566 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6567 </para>
6568 <para>
6569 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6570 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6571 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6572 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6573
6574 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6575 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6576 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6577 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6578 </para>
6579 <para>
6580 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6581 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6582 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6583 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6584 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6585 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6586 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6587 value.
6588 </para>
6589 <para>
6590 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6591 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6592 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6593 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6594 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6595 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6596 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6597 was ninety-five years.
6598 </para>
6599 <para>
6600 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6601 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6602 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6603 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6604 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6605 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6606 them.
6607 </para>
6608 <para>
6609 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6610 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6611 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6612 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6613 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6614 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6615 years.<footnote><para>
6616 <!-- f12 -->
6617 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6618 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6619 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6620 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6621 </para></footnote>
6622 </para>
6623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6624 </sect2>
6625 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6626 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6627 <para>
6628 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6629 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6630 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6631 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6632 </para>
6633 <para>
6634 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6635 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6636 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6637 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6638 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6639 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6640 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6641 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6642 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6643 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6644 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6645 </para>
6646 <para>
6647 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6648 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6649 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6650 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6651 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6652 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6653 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6654 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6655 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6656 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6657 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6658 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6659 on the initial creative work.
6660 </para>
6661 <para>
6662 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6663 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6664 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6666 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6667 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6668 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6669 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6670 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6671 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6672 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6673 </para>
6674 <para>
6675 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6676 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6677 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6678 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6679 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6680 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6681 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6682 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6683 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6684 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6685 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6686 original author.
6687 </para>
6688 <para>
6689 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6690 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6691 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6692 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6693 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6694 copy available for others to copy.
6695 </para>
6696 <para>
6697 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6698 differences.
6699 </para>
6700 <para>
6701 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6702 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6703 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6704 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6705 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6706 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6707 <!-- f13 -->
6708 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6709 Creation
6710 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6711 International
6712 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6713 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6714 </para></footnote>
6715 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6716 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6717 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6718 </para>
6719 <para>
6720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6721 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6722 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6723 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6724 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6725 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6726 creative
6727 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6728 restrained.
6729 </para>
6730 <para>
6731 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6732 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6733 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6734 reduced
6735 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6736 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6737 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6738 </para>
6739 <para>
6740 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6741 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6742 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6743 </para>
6744 <para>
6745 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6746 control
6747 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6748 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6749 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6750 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6751 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6752 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6753 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6754 exclusive
6755 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6756 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6757 </para>
6758 <para>
6759 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6760 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6761 expansion
6762 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6763 copyright.
6764 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6765 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6766 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6767 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6768 </para>
6769 <para>
6770
6771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6772 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6773 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6774 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6775 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6776 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6777 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6778 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6779 protect
6780 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6781 <!-- f14 -->
6782 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6783 2003, available at
6784 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6785 </para></footnote>
6786 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6787 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6788 the wrong of direct piracy.
6789 </para>
6790 <para>
6791 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6792 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6793 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6794 transformative
6795 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6796 <!-- f15 -->
6797 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6798 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6799 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6800 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6801 Constitutionality,"
6802 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6803 </para></footnote>
6804 These two different uses of my creative work are
6805 treated the same.
6806 </para>
6807 <para>
6808 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6809 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6810 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6811 creates
6812 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6813 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6814 originally created?
6815 </para>
6816 <para>
6817 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6818 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6819 simply
6820 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6821 rights originally granted.
6822 </para>
6823 </sect2>
6824 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6825 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6826 <para>
6827 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6828 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6829 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6830 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6831 <!-- f16 -->
6832 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6833 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6834 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6835 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6836 sometimes
6837 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6838 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6839 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6840 </para></footnote>
6841 </para>
6842 <para>
6843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6844 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6845 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6846 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6847 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6848 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6849 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6850 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6851 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6852 trigger for copyright law.
6853 </para>
6854 <para>
6855 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6856 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6857 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6858 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6859 <!-- f17 -->
6860 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6861 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6862 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6863 basis
6864 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6865 </para></footnote>
6866 because it is clear that the
6867 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6868 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6869 </para>
6870 <para>
6871 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6872 empty circle.
6873 </para>
6874 <figure id="fig-1521">
6875 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6876 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6877 </figure>
6878 <para>
6879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6880 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6881 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6882 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6883 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6884 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6885 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6886 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6887 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6888 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6889 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6890 not make a copy.
6891 </para>
6892 <figure id="fig-1531">
6893 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6894 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6895 </figure>
6896 <para>
6897 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6898 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6899 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6900 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6901 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6902 diagram on next page).
6903 </para>
6904 <para>
6905 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6906 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6907 </para>
6908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6909 <figure id="fig-1541">
6910 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6911 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6912 </figure>
6913 <para>
6914 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6915 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6916 unregulated.
6917 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6918 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6919 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6920 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6921 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6922 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6923 </para>
6924 <figure id="fig-1542">
6925 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6926 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6927 </figure>
6928 <para> </para>
6929 <figure id="fig-1551">
6930 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6931 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6932 </figure>
6933 <para>
6934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6935 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6936 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6937 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6938 </para>
6939 <para>
6940 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6941 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6942 <!-- f18 -->
6943 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6944 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6945 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6946 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6947 </para></footnote>
6948 And because of this single,
6949 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6950 category
6951 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6952 unregulated
6953 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6954 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6955 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6956 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6957 category
6958 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6959 copyrighted
6960 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6961 burden of this shift.
6962 </para>
6963 <para>
6964 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6965 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6966 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6967 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6968 nothing
6969 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6970 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6971 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6972 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6973 produced
6974 a copy.
6975 </para>
6976 <para>
6977 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6978 different
6979 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6980 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6981 copyright
6982 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6983 accidental
6984 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6985 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6986 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6987 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6988 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6989 </para>
6990 <para>
6991 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6992 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6993 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6994 points also become clear:
6995 </para>
6996 <para>
6997 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6998 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6999 presumptively
7000 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7001 evidence
7002 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7003 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7004 free culture before the Internet.
7005 </para>
7006 <para>
7007 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7008 transformative
7009 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7010 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7011 transformation
7012 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7013 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7014 releasing
7015 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7016 justification.
7017 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7018 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7019 transformative
7020 uses of creative work.
7021 </para>
7022 <para>
7023 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7024
7025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7026 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7027 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7028 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7029 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7030 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7031 Internet,
7032 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7033 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7034 protected
7035 before because reading was not regulated.
7036 </para>
7037 <para>
7038 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7039 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7040 depend
7041 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7042 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7043 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7044 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7045 protections
7046 of fair use are not enough.
7047 </para>
7048 <para>
7049 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7050 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7051 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7052 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7053 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7054 </para>
7055 <para>
7056 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7057 began
7058 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7059 previews.
7060 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7061 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7062 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7063 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7064 before
7065 you bought it.
7066 </para>
7067 <para>
7068 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7069 distributors
7070 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7071 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7072 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7074 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7075 business
7076 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7077 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7078 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7079 immediately.
7080 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7081 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7082 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7083 </para>
7084 <para>
7085 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7086 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7087 infringed"
7088 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7089 willful
7090 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7091 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7092 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7093 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7094 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7095 </para>
7096 <para>
7097 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7098 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7099 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7100 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7101 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7102 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7103 Disney's permission.
7104 </para>
7105 <para>
7106 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7107 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7108 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7109 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7110 marketplace,
7111 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7112 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7113 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7114 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7115 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7116 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7117 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7118 </para>
7119 <para>
7120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7121 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7122 control
7123 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7124 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7125 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7126 Noble
7127 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7128 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7129 argument
7130 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7131 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7132 exercising
7133 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7134 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7135 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7136 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7137 </para>
7138 <para>
7139 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7140 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7141 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7142 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7143 owners
7144 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7145 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7146 </para>
7147 </sect2>
7148 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7149 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7150 <para>
7151 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7152 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7153 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7154 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7155 </para>
7156 <para>
7157 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7158 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7159 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7160 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7161 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7162 your freedom.
7163 </para>
7164 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7165 <para>
7166 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7167 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7169 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7170 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7171 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7172 <!-- f19 -->
7173 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7174 Contemporary
7175 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7176 </para></footnote>
7177 </para>
7178 <para>
7179 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7180 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7181 you were."<footnote><para>
7182 <!-- f20 -->
7183 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7184 </para></footnote>
7185 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7186 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7187 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7188 </para>
7189 <para>
7190 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7191 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7192 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7193 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7194 </para>
7195 <para>
7196 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7197 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7198 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7199 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7200 copyrighted
7201 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7202 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7203 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7204 that is not at all funny.
7205 </para>
7206 <para>
7207 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7208 </para>
7209 <para>
7210 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7211 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7212 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7213 technology,
7214 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7215 </para>
7216 <para>
7217 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7218 Reader.
7219 </para>
7220 <para>
7221 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7222 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7223 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7224 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7225 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7226 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7228 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7229 called Permissions.
7230 </para>
7231 <figure id="fig-1611">
7232 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7233 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7234 </figure>
7235 <para>
7236 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7237 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7238 </para>
7239 <figure id="fig-1612">
7240 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7241 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7242 </figure>
7243 <para>
7244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7245 According to my eBook
7246 Reader, I have the permission
7247 to copy to the clipboard of the
7248 computer ten text selections
7249 every ten days. (So far, I've
7250 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7251 I also have the permission to
7252 print ten pages from the book
7253 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7254 the permission to use the Read
7255 Aloud button to hear
7256 Middlemarch
7257 read aloud through the
7258 computer.
7259 </para>
7260 <para>
7261 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7262 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7263 </para>
7264 <figure id="fig-1621">
7265 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7266 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7267 </figure>
7268 <para>
7269 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7270 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7271 the book.
7272 </para>
7273 <figure id="fig-1622">
7274 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7275 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7276 </figure>
7277 <para>
7278 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7279 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7280 </para>
7281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7282 <figure id="fig-1631">
7283 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7284 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7285 </figure>
7286 <para>
7287 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7288 </para>
7289 <para>
7290 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7291 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7292 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7293 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7294 under
7295 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7296 <!-- f21 -->
7297 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7298 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7299 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7300 obligation
7301 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7302 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7303 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7304 </para></footnote>
7305 When my e-book of
7306 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7307 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7308 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7309 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7310 </para>
7311 <para>
7312 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7313 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7314 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7315 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7316 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7317 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7318 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7319 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7320 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7321 restrictions:
7322 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7323 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7324 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7325 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7326 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7327 </para>
7328 <para>
7329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7330 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7331 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7332 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7333 </para>
7334 <para>
7335 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7336 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7337 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7338 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7339 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7340 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7341 </para>
7342 <para>
7343 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7344 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7345 technologies
7346 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7347 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7348 protections as well?
7349 </para>
7350 <para>
7351 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7352 eBook Reader.
7353 </para>
7354 <para>
7355 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7356 public
7357 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7358 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7359 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7360 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7361 </para>
7362 <figure id="fig-1641">
7363 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7364 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7365 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7366 </figure>
7367 <para>
7368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7369 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7370 allowed
7371 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7372 "permissions"
7373 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7374 </para>
7375 <para>
7376 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7377 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7378 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7379 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7380 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7381 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7382 </para>
7383 <para>
7384 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7385 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7386 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7387 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7388 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7389 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7390 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7391 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7392 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7393 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7394 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7395 </para>
7396 <para>
7397 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7398 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7399 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7400 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7401 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7402 often crazy.
7403 </para>
7404 <para>
7405 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7406 story of mine that makes the same point.
7407 </para>
7408 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7409 <para>
7410 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7411 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7412 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7413 </para>
7414 <para>
7415 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7416 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7417 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7419 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7420 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7421 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7422 </para>
7423 <para>
7424 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7425 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7426 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7427 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7428 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7429 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7430 </para>
7431 <para>
7432 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7433 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7434 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7435 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7436 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7437 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7438 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7439 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7440 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7441 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7442 </para>
7443 <para>
7444 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7445 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7446 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7447 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7448 ethically.
7449 </para>
7450 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7451 <para>
7452 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7453 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7454 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7455 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7456 than Sony had built.
7457 </para>
7458 <para>
7459 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7460 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7461 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7462 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7463 the
7464
7465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7466 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7467 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7468 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7469 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7470 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7471 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7472 dog to dance?
7473 </para>
7474 <para>
7475 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7476 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7477 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7478 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7479 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7480 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7481 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7482 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7483 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7484 </para>
7485 <para>
7486 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7487 <!-- f22 -->
7488 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7489 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7490 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7491 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7492 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7493 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7494 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7495 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7496 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7497 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7498 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7499 </para></footnote>
7500 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7501 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7502 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7503 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7504 </para>
7505 <para>
7506 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7507 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7508 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7509 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7510 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7511 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7512 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7513 Internet much more.
7514 </para>
7515 <para>
7516 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7517 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7518 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7519 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7520 </para>
7521 <para>
7522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7523 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7524 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7525 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7526 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7527 </para>
7528 <para>
7529 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7530 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7531 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7532 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7533 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7534 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7535 </para>
7536 <para>
7537 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7538 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7539 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7540 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7541 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7542 constituted, succeed.
7543 </para>
7544 <para>
7545 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7546 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7547 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7548 wrote:
7549 </para>
7550 <blockquote>
7551 <para>
7552 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7553 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7554 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7555 </para>
7556 </blockquote>
7557 <para>
7558 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7559 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7560 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7561 </para>
7562 <blockquote>
7563 <para>
7564 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7566 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7567 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7568 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7569 </para>
7570 </blockquote>
7571 <para>
7572 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7573 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7574 spreading such information an offense.
7575 </para>
7576 <para>
7577 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7578 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7579 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7580 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7581 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7582 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7583 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7584 </para>
7585 <para>
7586 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7587 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7588 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7589 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7590 </para>
7591 <para>
7592 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7593 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7594 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7595 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7596 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7597 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7598 have been a copyright violation.
7599 </para>
7600 <para>
7601 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7602 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7603 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7604 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7605 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7606 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7607 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7608 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7609 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7610 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7611 </para>
7612 <para>
7613 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7614 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7615 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7616 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7617 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7618 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7619 </para>
7620 <para>
7621 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7622 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7623 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7624 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7625 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7626 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7627 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7628 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7629 </para>
7630 <blockquote>
7631 <para>
7632 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7633 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7634 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7635 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7636 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7637 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7638 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7639 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7640 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7641 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7642 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7643 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7644 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7645 important.<footnote><para>
7646 <!-- f23 -->
7647 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7648 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7649 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7650 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7651 </para></footnote>
7652 </para>
7653 </blockquote>
7654 <para>
7655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7656 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7657 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7658 the VCR responsible.
7659 </para>
7660 <para>
7661 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7662 the DMCA.
7663 </para>
7664 <para>
7665 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7666 </para>
7667 <para>
7668 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7669 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7670 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7671 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7672 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7673 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7674 </para>
7675 <para>
7676 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7678 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7679 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7680 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7681 and bad uses.
7682 </para>
7683 <figure id="fig-1711">
7684 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7685 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7686 </figure>
7687 <para>
7688 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7689 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7690 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7691 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7692 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7693 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7694 </para>
7695 <para>
7696 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7697 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7698 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7699 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7700 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7701 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7702 </para>
7703 <para>
7704 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7705 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7706 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7707 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7708 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7709 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7710 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7711 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7712 </para>
7713 <para>
7714 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7715 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7716 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7717 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7718 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7719 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7720 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7721 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7722 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7723 </para>
7724 <para>
7725
7726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7727 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7728 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7729 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7730 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7731 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7732 <!-- f24 -->
7733 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7734 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7735 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7736 </para></footnote>
7737 </para>
7738 <para>
7739 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7740 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7741 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7742 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7743 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7744 </para>
7745 <para>
7746 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7747 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7748 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7749 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7750 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7751 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7752 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7753 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7754 </para>
7755 <para>
7756 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7757 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7758 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7759 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7760 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7761 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7762 </para>
7763 </sect2>
7764 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7765 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7766 <para>
7767 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7768 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7769 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7770 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7771 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7772 find better ways
7773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7774 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7775 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7776 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7777 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7778 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7779 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7780 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7781 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7782 control.
7783 </para>
7784 <para>
7785 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7786 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7787 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7788 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7789 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7790 </para>
7791 <para>
7792 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7793 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7794 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7795 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7796 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7797 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7798 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7799 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7800 of the media.
7801 </para>
7802 <para>
7803 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7804 nature.
7805 </para>
7806 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7807 <para>
7808 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7809 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7810 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7811 <!-- f25 -->
7812 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7813 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7814 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7815 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7816 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7817 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7818 <!-- f26 -->
7819 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7820 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7821 </para></footnote>
7822 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7823 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7824 <!-- f27 -->
7825 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7826 31 May 2003.
7827 </para></footnote>
7828 </para>
7829 <para>
7830 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7831 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7833 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7834 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7835 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7836 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7837 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7838 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7839 </para>
7840 <para>
7841 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7842 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7843 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7844 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7845 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7846 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7847 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7848 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7849 protected&mdash; by the market.
7850 </para>
7851 <para>
7852 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7853 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7854 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7855 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7856 </para>
7857 <blockquote>
7858 <para>
7859 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7860 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7861 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7862 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7863 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7864 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7865 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7866 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7867 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7868 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7869 <!-- f28 -->
7870 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7871 2003): 89.
7872 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7873 </para></footnote>
7874 </para>
7875 </blockquote>
7876 <para>
7877 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7878 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7879 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7880 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7881 </para>
7882 <figure id="fig-1761">
7883 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7884 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7885 </figure>
7886 <para>
7887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7888 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7889 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7890 distribute content?
7891 </para>
7892 <para>
7893 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7894 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7895 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7896 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7897 </para>
7898 <para>
7899 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7900 integration may matter.
7901 </para>
7902 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7903 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7904 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7905 <para>
7906 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7907 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7908 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7909 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7910 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7911 </para>
7912 <para>
7913 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7914 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7915 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7916 control.<footnote><para>
7917 <!-- f29 -->
7918 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7919 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7920 Missouri,
7921 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7922 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7923 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7924 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7925 </para></footnote>
7926 </para>
7927 <para>
7928
7929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7930 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7931 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7932 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7933 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7934 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7935 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7936 networks.
7937 </para>
7938 <para>
7939 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7940 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7941 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7942 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7943 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7944 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7945 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7946 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7947 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7948 <!-- f30 -->
7949 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7950 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7951 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7952 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7953 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7954 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7955 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7956 2003.
7957 </para></footnote>
7958 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7959 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7960 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7961 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7962 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7963 63%."<footnote><para>
7964 <!-- f31 -->
7965 Ibid.
7966 </para></footnote>
7967 </para>
7968 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7969 <para>
7970 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7971 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7972 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7973 owned by the network.
7974 </para>
7975 <para>
7976 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7977 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7978 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7979 </para>
7980 <blockquote>
7981 <para>
7982 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7983 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7984 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7985 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7987 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7988 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7989 handful.<footnote><para>
7990 <!-- f32 -->
7991 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7992 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7993 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7994 </para></footnote>
7995 </para>
7996 </blockquote>
7997 <para>
7998 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7999 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8000 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8001 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8002 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8003 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8004 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8005 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8006 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8007 democracy.
8008 </para>
8009 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8010 <para>
8011 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8012 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8013 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8014 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8015 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8016 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8017 <!-- f33 -->
8018 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8019 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
8020 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8021 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8022 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8023 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy 14 (1985):
8024 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8025 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8026 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them
8027 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8028
8029 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8030 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8031 sprinting.
8032 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8033 </para>
8034 <para>
8035 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8036 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8037 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8038 measure.
8039 </para>
8040 <para>
8041 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8042 suggest the concern.
8043 </para>
8044 <para>
8045 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8046 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8047 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8048 </para>
8049 <para>
8050 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8051 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8052 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8053
8054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8055 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8056 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8057 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8058 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8059 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8060 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8061 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8062 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8063 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8064 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8065 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8066 outweigh these costs.
8067 </para>
8068 <para>
8069 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8070 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8071 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8072 these issues.
8073 </para>
8074 <para>
8075 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8076 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8077 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8078 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8079 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8080 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8081 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8082 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8083 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8084 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8085 </para>
8086 <para>
8087 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8088 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8089 </para>
8090 <para>
8091 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8092 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8093 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8094 war. Can you do it?
8095 </para>
8096 <para>
8097 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8099 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8100 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8101 message will be heard then?
8102 </para>
8103 <para>
8104 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8105 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8106 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8107 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8108 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8109 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8110 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8111 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8112 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8113 <!-- f34 -->
8114 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8115 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8116 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8117 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8118 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8119 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8120 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8121 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8122 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8123 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8124 York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8125 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8126 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8127 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8128 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8129 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8130 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
8131 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8132 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8133 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8134 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8135 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8136 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8137 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8138 </para></footnote>
8139 </para>
8140 <para>
8141 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8142 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8143 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8144 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8145 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8146 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8147 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8148 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8149 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8150 </para>
8151 </sect2>
8152 <sect2 id="together">
8153 <title>Together</title>
8154 <para>
8155 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8156 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8157 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8158 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8159 </para>
8160 <para>
8161 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8162 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8163 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8164 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8165 to seem
8166
8167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8168 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8169 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8170 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8171 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8172 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8173 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8174 be redefined.
8175 </para>
8176 <para>
8177 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8178 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8179 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8180 our culture today.
8181 </para>
8182 <para>
8183 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8184 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8185 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8186 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8187 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8188 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8189 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8190 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8191 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8192 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8193 </para>
8194 <para>
8195 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8196 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8197 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8198 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8199 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8200 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8201 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8202 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8203 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8204 technology and the market enable.
8205 </para>
8206 <para>
8207 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8208 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8210 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8211 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8212 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8213 the development of our culture than now.
8214 </para>
8215 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8216 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8217 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8218 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8219 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8220 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8221 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8222 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny
8223 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8224 founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8225 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8226 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8227 culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
8228 <!-- f35 -->
8229 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8230 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8231 </para></footnote>
8232 </para>
8233 <para>
8234 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8235 </para>
8236 <para>
8237 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8238 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8239 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8240 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8241 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8242 </para>
8243
8244 <table id="t2">
8245 <title></title>
8246 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8247 <thead>
8248 <row>
8249 <entry></entry>
8250 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8251 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8252 </row>
8253 </thead>
8254 <tbody>
8255 <row>
8256 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8257 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8258 <entry>Free</entry>
8259 </row>
8260 <row>
8261 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8262 <entry>Free</entry>
8263 <entry>Free</entry>
8264 </row>
8265 </tbody>
8266 </tgroup>
8267 </table>
8268
8269 <para>
8270 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8271 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8272 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8273
8274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8275 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8276 noncommercial work was also free.
8277 </para>
8278 <para>
8279 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8280 </para>
8281
8282 <table id="t3">
8283 <title></title>
8284 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8285 <thead>
8286 <row>
8287 <entry></entry>
8288 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8289 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8290 </row>
8291 </thead>
8292 <tbody>
8293 <row>
8294 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8295 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8296 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8297 </row>
8298 <row>
8299 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8300 <entry>Free</entry>
8301 <entry>Free</entry>
8302 </row>
8303 </tbody>
8304 </tgroup>
8305 </table>
8306
8307 <para>
8308 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8309 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8310 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8311 transformation were still essentially free.
8312 </para>
8313 <para>
8314 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8315 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8316 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8317 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8318 we could say the law began to look like this:
8319 </para>
8320
8321 <table id="t4">
8322 <title></title>
8323 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8324 <thead>
8325 <row>
8326 <entry></entry>
8327 <entry>COPY</entry>
8328 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8329 </row>
8330 </thead>
8331 <tbody>
8332 <row>
8333 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8334 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8335 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8336 </row>
8337 <row>
8338 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8339 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8340 <entry>Free</entry>
8341 </row>
8342 </tbody>
8343 </tgroup>
8344 </table>
8345
8346 <para>
8347 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8348 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8349 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8350 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8351 that the law now looks like this:
8352 </para>
8353
8354 <table id="t5">
8355 <title></title>
8356 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8357 <thead>
8358 <row>
8359 <entry></entry>
8360 <entry>COPY</entry>
8361 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8362 </row>
8363 </thead>
8364 <tbody>
8365 <row>
8366 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8367 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8368 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8369 </row>
8370 <row>
8371 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8372 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8373 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8374 </row>
8375 </tbody>
8376 </tgroup>
8377 </table>
8378
8379 <para>
8380 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8381 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8382 creativity&mdash;
8383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8384 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8385 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8386 </para>
8387 <para>
8388 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8389 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8390 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8391 these domains actually does any good.
8392 </para>
8393 <para>
8394 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8395 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8396 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8397 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8398 reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8399 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8400 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8401 rights were more sharply restricted.
8402 </para>
8403 <para>
8404 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8405 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8406 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8407 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8408 property rights<footnote><para>
8409 <!-- f36 -->
8410 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8411 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8412 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8413 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8414 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8415 Press, 1980).
8416 </para></footnote>)
8417 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8418 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8419 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8420 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8421 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8422 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8423 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8424 free culture.
8425 </para>
8426 <para>
8427 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8428 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8429 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8430 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8431 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8432 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8433 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8434 chapter 7). Adding
8435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8436 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8437 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8438 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8439 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8440 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8441 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8442 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8443 dominates the debate today.
8444 </para>
8445 <para>
8446 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8447 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8448 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8449 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8450 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8451 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8452 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8453 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8454 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8455 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8456 lawyer.
8457 </para>
8458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8459 </sect2>
8460 </sect1>
8461 </chapter>
8462 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8463 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8464 <para></para>
8465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8466 <sect1 id="chimera">
8467 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8468 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8469 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8470 </indexterm>
8471 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8472 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8473 </indexterm>
8474 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8475 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8476 </indexterm>
8477
8478 <para>
8479 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8480 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8481 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8482 <!-- f1. -->
8483 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8484 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8485 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8486 </para></footnote>
8487 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8488 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8489 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8490 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8491 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8492 villagers to explore life as a king.
8493 </para>
8494 <para>
8495 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8496 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8497 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8498 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8499 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8500 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8501 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8502 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8503 alone!'"
8504 </para>
8505 <para>
8506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8507 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8508 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8509 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8510 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8511 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8512 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8513 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8514 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8515 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8516 </para>
8517 <para>
8518 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8519 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8520 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8521 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8522 </para>
8523 <para>
8524 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8525 is affected," he reports.
8526 </para>
8527 <para>
8528 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8529 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8530 his brain."
8531 </para>
8532 <para>
8533 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8534 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8535 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8536 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8537 </para>
8538 <para>
8539 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8540 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8541 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8542 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8543 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8544 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8545 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8546 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8547
8548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8549 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8550 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8551 scene. . . ."
8552 </para>
8553 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8554 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8555 <para>
8556 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8557 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8558 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8559 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8560 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8561 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8562 </para>
8563 <para>
8564 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8565 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8566 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8567 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8568 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8569 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8570 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8571 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8572 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8573 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8574 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8575 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8576 </para>
8577 <para>
8578 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8579 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8580 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8581 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8582 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8583 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8584 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8585 </para>
8586 <para>
8587 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8588 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8589 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8590 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8591 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8592 from Tower.
8593 </para>
8594 <para>
8595
8596 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8597 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8598 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8599 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8600 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8601 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8602 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8603 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8604 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8605 </para>
8606 <para>
8607 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8608 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8609 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8610 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8611 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8612 </para>
8613 <para>
8614 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8615 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8616 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8617 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8618 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8619 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8620 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8621 implemented.<footnote><para>
8622 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8623 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8624 "Copyright
8625 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8626 at
8627 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8628 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8629 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8630 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8631 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8632 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8633 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8634 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8635 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8636 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8637 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8638 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8639 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8640 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8641 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8642 billion
8643 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8644 Elizabeth
8645 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8646 August 2003, available at
8647 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8648 targeting
8649 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8650 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8651 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8652 D3, available at
8653 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8654 </para></footnote>
8655
8656 </para>
8657 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8658 <para>
8659 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8660 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8661 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8662 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8663 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8664 </para>
8665 <para>
8666 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8667 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8668 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8669 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8670 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8671 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8672 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8673 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8674 </para>
8675 <para>
8676
8677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8678 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8679 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8680 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8681 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8682 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8683 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8684 </para>
8685 <para>
8686 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8687 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8688 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8689 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8690 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8691 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8692 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8693 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8694 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8695 protection for copyrighted material,
8696 </para>
8697 <blockquote>
8698 <para>
8699 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8700 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8701 </para>
8702 <para>
8703 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8704 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8705 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8706 answer
8707 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8708 well produce a totally different industry model.
8709 </para>
8710 <para>
8711 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8712 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8713 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8714 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8715 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8716 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8717 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8718 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8719 interests.<footnote><para>
8720 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8721 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8722 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8723 Protection,
8724 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8725 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8726 EMusic.com),
8727 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8728 Congressional
8729 Testimony File.
8730 </para></footnote>
8731 </para>
8732 </blockquote>
8733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8734 <para>
8735 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8736 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8737 changed.
8738 </para>
8739 <para>
8740 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8741 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8742 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8743 </para>
8744
8745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8746 </sect1>
8747 <sect1 id="harms">
8748 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8749 <para>
8750
8751 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8752 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8753 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8754 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8755 prohibition,
8756 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8757 </para>
8758 <para>
8759 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8760 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8761 extend
8762 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8763 justified?
8764 </para>
8765 <para>
8766 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8767 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8768 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8769 our history.
8770 </para>
8771 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8772 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8773 <para>
8774 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8775 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8776 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8777 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8778 </para>
8779 <para>
8780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8781 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8782 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8783 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8784 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8785 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8786 </para>
8787 <sect2 id="constrain">
8788 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8789 <para>
8790 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8791 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8792 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8793 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8794 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8795 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8796 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8797 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8798 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8799 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8800 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8801 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8802 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8803 </para>
8804 <para>
8805 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8806 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8807 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8808 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8809 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8810 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8811 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8812 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8813 the culture all around.
8814 </para>
8815 <para>
8816 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8817 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8818
8819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8820
8821 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8822 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8823 storytelling extended across the globe.
8824 </para>
8825 <para>
8826 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8827 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8828 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8829 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8830 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8831 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8832 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8833 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8834 work is presumptively illegal.
8835 </para>
8836 <para>
8837 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8838 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8839 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8840 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8841 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8842 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8843 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8844 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8845 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8846 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8847 million.<footnote><para>
8848 <!-- f1. -->
8849 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8850 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8851 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8852 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8853 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8854 </para></footnote>
8855 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8856 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8857 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8858 suffering.<footnote>
8859 <para>
8860 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8861 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8862 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8863 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8864 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8865 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8866 available at
8867 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8868 recent months.
8869 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8870 </para></footnote>
8871 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8872 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8873 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8874 </para>
8875 <para>
8876 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8877 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8878 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8879 creative
8880 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8881 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8882 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8883
8884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8885 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8886 create,
8887 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8888 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8889 begin
8890 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8891 necessarily
8892 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8893 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8894 "illegal
8895 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8896 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
8897 available
8898 at
8899 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8900 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8901 </para></footnote>
8902 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8903 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8904 critical or reflective.
8905 </para>
8906 <para>
8907 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8908 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
8909 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8910 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8911 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8912 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8913 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8914 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8915 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8916 </para>
8917 <para>
8918 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8919 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8920 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8921 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8922 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8923 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8924 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8925 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8926 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8927 </para>
8928 <para>
8929 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8930 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
8931 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8932 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8933 law regulates such a use.
8934 </para>
8935 <para>
8936
8937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8938 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8939 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8940 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8941 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8942 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8943 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8944 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8945 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8946 </para>
8947 <para>
8948 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8949 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8950 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8951 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8952 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8953 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8954 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8955 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8956 comfort themselves.
8957 </para>
8958 <para>
8959 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8960 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8961 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8962 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8963 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8964 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8965 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8966 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8967 culture that is free.
8968 </para>
8969 <para>
8970 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8971 </para>
8972 <blockquote>
8973 <para>
8974 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8975 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8976 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8977 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8978 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8980 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8981 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8982 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8983 </para>
8984 </blockquote>
8985 </sect2>
8986 <sect2 id="innovators">
8987 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
8988 <para>
8989 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8990 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8991 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8992 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8993 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8994 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8995 </para>
8996 <para>
8997 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8998 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8999 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9000 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9001 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9002 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9003 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9004 </para>
9005 <para>
9006 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9007 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9008 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9009 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9010 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9011 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9012 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9013 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9014 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9015 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9016 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9017 </para>
9018 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9019 <para>
9020 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9022 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9023 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9024 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9025 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9026 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9027 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9028 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9029 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9030 </para>
9031 <para>
9032 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9033 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9034 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9035 </para>
9036 <para>
9037 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9038 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9039 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9040 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9041 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9042 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9043 </para>
9044 <para>
9045 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9046 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9047 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9048 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9049 Raitt. And so on.
9050 </para>
9051 <para>
9052 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9053 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9054 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9055 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9056 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9057 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9058 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9059 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9060 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9061 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9062 </para>
9063 <para>
9064 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9065 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9066
9067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9068 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9069 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9070 the kind of content the users liked.
9071 </para>
9072 <para>
9073 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9074 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9075 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9076 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9077 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9078 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9079 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9080 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9081 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9082 they had already bought.
9083 </para>
9084 <para>
9085 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9086 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9087 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9088 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9089 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9090 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9091 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9092 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9093 </para>
9094 <para>
9095 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9096 </para>
9097 <para>
9098 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9099 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9100 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9101 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9102 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9103 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9104 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9105 demanded.
9106 </para>
9107 <para>
9108 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9109 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9110 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9111 clients in this
9112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9113 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9114 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9115 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9116 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9117 </para>
9118 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9119 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9120 <para>
9121 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9122 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9123 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9124 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9125 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9126 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9127 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9128 innovation
9129 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9130 Revolution
9131 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9132 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9133 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9134 Times, 28 May 2001.
9135 </para></footnote>
9136 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9137 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9138 industry
9139 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9140 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9141 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9142 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9143 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9144 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9145 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9146 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9147 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9148 </para>
9149 <blockquote>
9150 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9151 <para>
9152 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9153 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9154 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9155 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9156 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9157 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9158 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9159 <para>
9160 <!-- f5. -->
9161 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9162 2003, available at
9163 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9164 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9165 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9166 </para></footnote>
9167 </para>
9168 </blockquote>
9169 <para>
9170 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9171 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9172 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9173 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9174 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9175 constantly threatened by litigation.
9176 </para>
9177 <para>
9178
9179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9180 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9181 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9182 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9183 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9184 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9185 imposes,
9186 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9187 conservative
9188 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9189 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9190 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9191 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9192 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9193 </para>
9194 <para>
9195 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9196 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9197 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9198 systematically
9199 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9200 industries
9201 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9202 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9203 competition.
9204 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9205 competition.
9206 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9207 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9208 overregulatedregulated
9209 market.
9210 </para>
9211 <para>
9212 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9213 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9214 burden
9215 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9216 culture
9217 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9218 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9219 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9220 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9221 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9222 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9223 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9224 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9226 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9227 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9228 creativity.
9229 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9230 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9231 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9232 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9233 technology
9234 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9235 </para>
9236 <para>
9237 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9238 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9239 Internet's
9240 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9241 feature
9242 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9243 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9244 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9245 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9246 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9247 </para>
9248 <para>
9249 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9250 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9251 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9252 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9253 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9254 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9255 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9256 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9257 </para></footnote>
9258
9259 Congress
9260 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9261 "broadcast
9262 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9263 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9264 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9265 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9266 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9267 violators
9268 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9269 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9270 </para></footnote>
9271
9272 </para>
9273 <para>
9274 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9275 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9276 regulation
9277 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9278 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9279
9280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9281 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9282 those requirements.
9283 </para>
9284 <para>
9285 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9286 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9287 impose.<footnote><para>
9288 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9289 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9290 </para></footnote>
9291 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9292 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9293 harm than good.
9294 </para>
9295 <para>
9296 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9297 innovation&mdash;again,
9298 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9299 crowd.
9300 </para>
9301 <para>
9302 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9303 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9304 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9305 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9306 </para>
9307 <para>
9308 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9309 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9310 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9311 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9312 2001).
9313 </para></footnote>
9314 overall this history of copyright
9315 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9316 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9317 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9318 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9319 </para>
9320 <para>
9321 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9322 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9323 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9324 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9325 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9326 </para>
9327 <para>
9328 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9329 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9330 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9331 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9332 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9333 copyright
9334 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9335 music
9336 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9337 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9338 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9339 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9340 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9341 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9342 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9343 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9344 </para></footnote>
9345 It has been
9346 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9347 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9348 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9349 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9350 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9351 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9352 August
9353 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9354 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9355 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9356 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9357 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9358 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9359 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9360 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9361 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9362 </para></footnote>
9363 But there is one
9364 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9365 demise
9366 of Internet radio.
9367 </para>
9368 <para>
9369
9370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9371 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9372 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9373 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9374 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9375 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9376 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9377 copyright
9378 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9379 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9380 </para>
9381 <para>
9382 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9383 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9384 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9385 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9386 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9387 Probably
9388 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9389 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9390 efforts
9391 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9392 </para>
9393 <para>
9394 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9395 technology
9396 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9397 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9398 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9399 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9400 regular
9401 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9402 </para>
9403 <para>
9404 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9405 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9406 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9407 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9408 broadcasters
9409 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9410 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9411 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9412 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9413 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9414 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9415 in to this new form of radio.
9416 </para>
9417 <para>
9418
9419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9420 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9421 improvement
9422 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9423 improvement
9424 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9425 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9426 establish
9427 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9428 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9429 </para>
9430 <blockquote>
9431 <para>
9432 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9433 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9434 radio
9435 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9436 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9437 competition
9438 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9439 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9440 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9441 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9442 communications
9443 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9444 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9445 acquire
9446 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9447 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9448 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9449 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9450 </para></footnote>
9451 </para>
9452 </blockquote>
9453 <para>
9454 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9455 Armstrong
9456 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9457 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9458 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9459 </para></footnote>
9460 to
9461 retard
9462 the growth of this competing technology.
9463 </para>
9464 <para>
9465 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9466 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9467 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9468 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9469 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9470 radio?
9471 </para>
9472 <para>
9473 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9474 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9475
9476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9477 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9478 phenomenon
9479 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9480 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9481 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9482 hypothetical
9483 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9484 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9485 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9486 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9487 </para>
9488 <para>
9489 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9490 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9491 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9492 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9493 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9494 <para>
9495 <!-- f14. -->
9496 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9497 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9498 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9499 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9500 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9501 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9502 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9503 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9504 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9505 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9506 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9507 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9508 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9509 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9510 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9511 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9512 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9513 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9514 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9515 </para></footnote>
9516 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9517 equivalent fee.
9518 </para>
9519 <para>
9520 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9521 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9522 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9523 </para>
9524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9525 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9526 <listitem><para>
9527 name of the service;
9528 </para></listitem>
9529 <listitem><para>
9530 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9531 </para></listitem>
9532 <listitem><para>
9533 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9534 </para></listitem>
9535 <listitem><para>
9536 date of transmission;
9537 </para></listitem>
9538 <listitem><para>
9539 time of transmission;
9540 </para></listitem>
9541 <listitem><para>
9542 time zone of origination of transmission;
9543 </para></listitem>
9544 <listitem><para>
9545 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9546 </para></listitem>
9547 <listitem><para>
9548 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9549 </para></listitem>
9550 <listitem><para>
9551 sound recording title;
9552 </para></listitem>
9553 <listitem><para>
9554 ISRC code of the recording;
9555 </para></listitem>
9556 <listitem><para>
9557 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9558 </para></listitem>
9559 <listitem><para>
9560 featured recording artist;
9561 </para></listitem>
9562 <listitem><para>
9563 retail album title;
9564 </para></listitem>
9565 <listitem><para>
9566 recording label;
9567 </para></listitem>
9568 <listitem><para>
9569 UPC code of the retail album;
9570 </para></listitem>
9571 <listitem><para>
9572 catalog number;
9573 </para></listitem>
9574 <listitem><para>
9575 copyright owner information;
9576 </para></listitem>
9577 <listitem><para>
9578 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9579 </para></listitem>
9580 <listitem><para>
9581 name of the service or entity;
9582 </para></listitem>
9583 <listitem><para>
9584 channel or program;
9585 </para></listitem>
9586 <listitem><para>
9587 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9588 </para></listitem>
9589 <listitem><para>
9590 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9591 </para></listitem>
9592 <listitem><para>
9593 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9594 </para></listitem>
9595 <listitem><para>
9596 Unique User identifier;
9597 </para></listitem>
9598 <listitem><para>
9599 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9600 </para></listitem>
9601 </orderedlist>
9602
9603 <para>
9604 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9605 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9606 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9607 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9608 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9609 does not.
9610 </para>
9611 <para>
9612 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9613 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9614 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9615 </para>
9616 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9617 <para>
9618 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9619 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9620 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9621 </para>
9622 <blockquote>
9623 <para>
9624 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9625 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9626 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9627 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9628 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9629 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9630
9631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9632 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9633 Because
9634 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9635 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9636 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9637 of business. . . ."
9638 </para>
9639 <para>
9640 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9641 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9642 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9643 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9644 </para>
9645 </blockquote>
9646 <para>
9647 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9648 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9649 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9650 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9651 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9652 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9653 effective to prevent it.
9654 </para>
9655 </sect2>
9656 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9657 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9658 <para>
9659 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9660 dinosaurs
9661 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9662 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9663 </para>
9664 <para>
9665 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9666 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9667 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9668 </para>
9669 <para>
9670 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9671 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9672 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9673 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9674 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9675 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9676 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9677 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9678 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9679 </para></footnote>
9680 According to the RIAA,
9681 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9682 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9683
9684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9685 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9686 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9687 increasingly
9688 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9689 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9690 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9691 extreme
9692 response by the other.
9693 </para>
9694 <para>
9695 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9696 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9697 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9698 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9699 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9700 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9701 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9702 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9703 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9704 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9705 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9706 was.<footnote><para>
9707 <!-- f16. -->
9708 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9709 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9710 </para></footnote>
9711 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9712 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9713 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9714 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9715 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9716 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9717 they oppose.
9718 </para>
9719 <para>
9720 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9721 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9722 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9723 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9724 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9725 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9726 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9727 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9728 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9729 <!-- f17. -->
9730 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9731 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9732 </para></footnote>
9733 We have
9734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9735 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9736 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9737 <!-- f18. -->
9738 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9739 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9740 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9741 </para></footnote>
9742 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9743 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9744 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9745 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9746 cheat.<footnote><para>
9747 <!-- f19. -->
9748 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9749 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9750 compliance literature).
9751 </para></footnote>
9752 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9753 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9754 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9755 </para>
9756 <para>
9757 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9758 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9759 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9760 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9761 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9762 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9763 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9764 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9765 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9766 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9767 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9768 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9769 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9770 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9771 degree of illegality.
9772 </para>
9773 <para>
9774 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9775 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9776 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9777 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9778 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9779 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9780 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9781 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9782 to consider the alternative.
9783 </para>
9784 <para>
9785
9786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9787 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9788 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9789 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9790 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9791 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9792 </para>
9793 <para>
9794 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9795 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9796 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9797 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9798 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9799 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9800 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9801 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9802 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9803 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9804 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9805 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9806 </para>
9807 <para>
9808 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9809 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9810 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9811 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9812 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9813 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9814 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9815 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9816 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9817 a nation of felons?
9818 </para>
9819 <para>
9820 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9821 </para>
9822 <para>
9823 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9824 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9825 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9826 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9827 used
9828
9829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9830 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9831 recordings is free.
9832 </para>
9833 <para>
9834 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9835 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9836 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9837 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9838 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9839 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9840 capacities of digital technologies.
9841 </para>
9842 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9843 <para>
9844 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9845 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9846 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9847 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9848 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9849 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9850 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9851 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9852 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9853 </para>
9854 <para>
9855 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9856 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9857 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9858 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9859 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9860 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9861 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9862 on people's machines.
9863 </para>
9864 <para>
9865 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9866 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9867 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9868 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9869 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9870 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9871
9872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9873 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9874 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9875 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9876 management" system.
9877 </para>
9878 <para>
9879 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9880 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9881 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9882 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9883 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9884 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9885 freedom to move content easily?
9886 </para>
9887 <para>
9888 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9889 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9890 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9891 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9892 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9893 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9894 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9895 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9896 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9897 </para>
9898 <para>
9899 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9900 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9901 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9902 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9903 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9904 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9905 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9906 </para>
9907 <para>
9908 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9909 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9910 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9911 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9912 </para>
9913 <para>
9914 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9915 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9916
9917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9918
9919 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9920 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9921 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9922 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9923 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9924 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9925 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9926 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9927 generally.
9928 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9929 </para>
9930 <para>
9931 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9932 explains,
9933 </para>
9934 <blockquote>
9935 <para>
9936 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9937 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9938 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9939 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9940 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9941 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9942 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9943 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9944 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9945 </para>
9946 </blockquote>
9947 <para>
9948 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9949 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9950 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9951 </para>
9952 <para>
9953 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9954 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9955 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9956 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9957 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9958 an Internet user is revealed.
9959 </para>
9960 <para>
9961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9962 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9963 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9964 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9965 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9966 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9967 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9968 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9969 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9970 <!-- f20. -->
9971 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9972 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9973 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9974 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9975 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9976 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9977 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
9978 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9979 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9980 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
9981 </para></footnote>
9982
9983 </para>
9984 <para>
9985 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9986 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9987 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9988 <!-- f21. -->
9989 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9990 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9991 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9992 </para></footnote>
9993 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9994 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9995 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9996 </para>
9997 <para>
9998 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9999 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10000 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10001 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10002 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10003 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10004 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10005 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10006 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10007 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10008 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10009 <!-- f22. -->
10010 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10011 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10012 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10013 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10014 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10015 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10016 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10017 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10018 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
10019 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10020 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10021 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10022 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10023 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10024 </para></footnote>
10025 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10026 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10027 </para>
10028 <para>
10029 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10030 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10031 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10032 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10033 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10034 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10035 college students
10036
10037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10038 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10039 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10040 Says von Lohmann,
10041 </para>
10042 <blockquote>
10043 <para>
10044 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10045 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10046 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10047 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10048 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10049 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10050 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10051 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10052 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10053 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10054 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10055 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10056 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10057 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10058 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10059 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10060 million of them.
10061 </para>
10062 </blockquote>
10063 <para>
10064 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10065 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10066 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10067 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10068 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10069 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10070 </para>
10071
10072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10073 </sect2>
10074 </sect1>
10075 </chapter>
10076 <chapter id="c-balances">
10077 <title>BALANCES</title>
10078
10079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10080 <para>
10081 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10082 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10083 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10084 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10085 </para>
10086 <para>
10087 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10088 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10089 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10090 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10091 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10092 everything around.
10093 </para>
10094 <para>
10095 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10096 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10097 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10098 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10099 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10100 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10101 </para>
10102 <para>
10103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10104 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10105 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10106 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10107 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10108 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10109 made that is happening all around.
10110 </para>
10111 <para>
10112 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10113 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10114 gasoline onto this fire.
10115 </para>
10116 <para>
10117 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10118 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10119 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10120 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10121 </para>
10122 <para>
10123 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10124 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10125 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10126 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10127 success will require.
10128 </para>
10129
10130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10131 <sect1 id="eldred">
10132 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10133 <para>
10134 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10135 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10136 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10137 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10138 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10139 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10140 come alive.
10141 </para>
10142 <para>
10143 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10144 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10145 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10146 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10147 them available for free.
10148 </para>
10149 <para>
10150 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10151 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10152 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10153 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10154 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10156 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10157 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10158 accessible&mdash;today.
10159 </para>
10160 <para>
10161 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10162 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10163 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10164 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10165 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10166 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10167 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10168 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10169 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10170 commercial publications of public domain works.
10171 </para>
10172 <para>
10173 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10174 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10175 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10176 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10177 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10178 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10179 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10180 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10181 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10182 generally.<footnote><para>
10183 <!-- f1. -->
10184 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10185 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10186 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10187 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10188 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10189 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10190 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10191 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10192 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10193 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10194 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10195 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10196 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10197 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10198 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10199 </para>
10200 <para>
10201 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10202 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10203 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10204 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10205 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10206 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10207 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10208 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10209 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10210 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10211 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10212 </para>
10213 <para>
10214
10215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10216 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10217 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10218 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10219 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10220 <!-- f2. -->
10221 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10222 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10223 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10224 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10225 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10226 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10227 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10228 </para></footnote>
10229
10230 </para>
10231 <para>
10232 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10233 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10234 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10235 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10236 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10237 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10238 to undertake.
10239 </para>
10240 <para>
10241 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10242 constitutional
10243 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10244 interpretation.
10245 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10246 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10247 importantly
10248 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10249 </para>
10250 <blockquote>
10251 <para>
10252 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10253 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10254 their . . . Writings. . . .
10255 </para>
10256 </blockquote>
10257 <para>
10258 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10259 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10260 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10261 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10262 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10263 specific&mdash;to "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that
10264 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10265 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10266 </para>
10267 <para>
10268 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10269 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10270 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10271 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10273 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10274 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10275 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10276 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10277 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10278 </para>
10279 <para>
10280 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10281 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10282 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10283 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10284 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10285 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10286 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10287 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10288 this gravy train going.
10289 </para>
10290 <para>
10291 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10292 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10293 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10294 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10295 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10296 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10297 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10298 </para>
10299 <para>
10300 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10301 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10302 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10303 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10304 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10305 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10306 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10307 published by anyone for free.
10308 </para>
10309 <para>
10310 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10311 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10312 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10313 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10314 report:
10315 </para>
10316 <para>
10317 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10318
10319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10320 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10321 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10322 those works.
10323 </para>
10324 <para>
10325 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10326 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10327 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10328 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10329 </para>
10330 <para>
10331 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10332 about it?"
10333 </para>
10334 <para>
10335 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10336 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10337 they support the bill."
10338 </para>
10339 <para>
10340 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10341 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10342 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10343 much is it worth?"
10344 </para>
10345 <para>
10346 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10347 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10348 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10349 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10350 </para>
10351 <para>
10352 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10353 correct conclusion:
10354 </para>
10355 <para>
10356 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10357 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10358 contributions
10359 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10360 </para>
10361 <para>
10362 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10363 contribute
10364 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10365 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10366 </para>
10367 <para>
10368 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10369 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10370 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10371 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10373 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10374 copyrights
10375 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10376 the copyright term extended.
10377 </para>
10378 <para>
10379 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10380 legislation
10381 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10382 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10383 </para>
10384 <para>
10385 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10386 Copyright
10387 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10388 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10389 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10390 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10391 contributions.<footnote><para>
10392 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10393 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10394 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10395 </para></footnote>
10396 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10397 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10398 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10399 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10400 Age," available at
10401 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10402 </para></footnote>
10403 Disney is estimated to have
10404 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10405 cycle.<footnote><para>
10406 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10407 Congressional
10408 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10409 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10410 </para></footnote>
10411
10412 </para>
10413 <para>
10414 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10415 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10416 reality
10417 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10418 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10419 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10420 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10421 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10422 "limited."
10423 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10424 and again.
10425 </para>
10426 <para>
10427 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10428 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10429 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10430 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10431 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10432 scholars,
10433 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10434
10435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10436 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10437 guns near schools.
10438 </para>
10439 <para>
10440 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10441 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10442 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10443 "interstate
10444 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10445 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10446 interstate
10447 commerce.
10448 </para>
10449 <para>
10450 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10451 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10452 activity,
10453 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10454 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10455 interpreted
10456 to impose no limit.
10457 </para>
10458 <para>
10459 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10460 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10461 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10462 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10463 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10464 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10465 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10466 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10467 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10468 government
10469 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10470 </para>
10471 <para>
10472 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10473 arguments,"
10474 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10475 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10476 </para></footnote>
10477 If anything Congress says is interstate
10478 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10479 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10480 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10481 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10482 </para></footnote>
10483
10484 </para>
10485 <para>
10486 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10487 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10488 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10489 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10490 context
10491 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10492 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10493 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10494 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10495 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10496 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10497 </para></footnote>
10498 And if it is applied to the
10499 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10500 Congress
10501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10502 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10503 existing
10504 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10505 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10506 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10507 copyrights
10508 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10509 existing copyrights.
10510 </para>
10511 <para>
10512 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10513 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10514 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10515 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10516 rejected
10517 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10518 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10519 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10520 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10521 boring.
10522 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10523 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10524 </para>
10525 <para>
10526 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10527 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10528 Constitution's
10529 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10530 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10531 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10532 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10533 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10534 already
10535 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10536 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10537 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10538 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10539 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10540 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10541 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10542 </para>
10543 <para>
10544 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10545
10546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10547 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10548 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10549 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10550 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10551 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10552 </para></footnote>
10553 But
10554 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10555 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10556 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10557 </para>
10558 <para>
10559 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10560 copyright
10561 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10562 influence
10563 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10564 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10565 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10566 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10567 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10568 bought to extend them again.
10569 </para>
10570 <para>
10571 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10572 extended.
10573 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10574 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10575 society
10576 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10577 Disney's.
10578 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10579 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10580 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10581 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10582 exploited,
10583 and no longer available as a result.
10584 </para>
10585 <para>
10586 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10587 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10588 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10589 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10590 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10591 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10592 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10593 Congressional
10594 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10595 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10596 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10597 </para></footnote>
10598
10599 </para>
10600 <para>
10601 Think practically about the consequence of this
10602 extension&mdash;practically,
10603 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10604
10605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10606 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10607 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10608 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10609 remaining
10610 9,873. What would you have to do?
10611 </para>
10612 <para>
10613 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10614 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10615 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10616 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10617 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10618 list of books still under copyright.
10619 </para>
10620 <para>
10621 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10622 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10623 </para>
10624 <para>
10625 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10626 owners
10627 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10628 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10629 being at least a list?
10630 </para>
10631 <para>
10632 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10633 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10634 practically
10635 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10636 thousands
10637 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10638 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10639 </para>
10640 <para>
10641 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10642 apologists
10643 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10644 owners?"
10645 </para>
10646 <para>
10647 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10648 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10649 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10650 suggesting
10651 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10652 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10653 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10654 </para>
10655 <para>
10656 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10657 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10658 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10659
10660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10661 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10662 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10663 happen
10664 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10665 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10666 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10667 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10668 know quite well who owns what property.
10669 </para>
10670 <para>
10671 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10672 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10673 already
10674 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10675 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10676 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10677 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10678 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10679 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10680 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10681 </para>
10682 <para>
10683 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10684 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10685 consequence
10686 for other creative works is much more dire.
10687 </para>
10688 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10689 <para>
10690 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10691 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10692 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10693 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10694 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10695 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10696 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10697 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10698 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10699 films."<footnote><para>
10700 <!-- f11. -->
10701 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10702 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10703 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10704 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10705 </para></footnote>
10706
10707 </para>
10708 <para>
10709 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10710 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10711 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10712 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10713 </para>
10714 <para>
10715 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10716
10717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10718 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10719 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10720 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10721 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10722 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10723 work available for distribution.
10724 </para>
10725 <para>
10726 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10727 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10728 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10729 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10730 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10731 mm film.<footnote><para>
10732 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10733 Supporting
10734 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10735 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10736 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10737 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10738 </para></footnote>
10739
10740 </para>
10741 <para>
10742 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10743 important.
10744 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10745 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10746 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10747 locate the copyright owner.
10748 </para>
10749 <para>
10750 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10751 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10752 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10753 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10754 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10755 exceptionally
10756 high.
10757 </para>
10758 <para>
10759 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10760 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10761 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10762 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10763 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10764 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10765 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10766 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10767 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10768 </para>
10769 <para>
10770 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10771
10772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10773 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10774 benefit
10775 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10776 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10777 the copyright expires.
10778 </para>
10779 <para>
10780 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10781 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10782 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10783 canisters
10784 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10785 than dust.
10786 </para>
10787 <para>
10788 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10789 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10790 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10791 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10792 creative
10793 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10794 free expression."
10795 </para>
10796 <para>
10797 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10798 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10799 indicated,
10800 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10801 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10802 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10803 distributors,
10804 the commercial life ends.
10805 </para>
10806 <para>
10807 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10808 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10809 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10810 between
10811 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10812 Friday
10813 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10814 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10815 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10816 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10817 have, we need to have access to this history.
10818 </para>
10819 <para>
10820 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10821
10822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10823 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10824 this context do no good.
10825 </para>
10826 <para>
10827 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10828 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10829 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10830 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10831 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10832 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10833 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10834 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10835 </para>
10836 <para>
10837 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10838 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10839 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10840 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10841 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10842 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10843 market didn't have more to offer.
10844 </para>
10845 <para>
10846 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10847 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10848 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10849 would not have interfered with anything.
10850 </para>
10851 <para>
10852 But this situation has now changed.
10853 </para>
10854 <para>
10855 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10856 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10857 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10858 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10859 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10860 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10861 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10862 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10863 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10864 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10865 </para>
10866 <para>
10867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10868 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10869 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10870 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10871 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10872 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10873 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10874 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10875 written for a radically different context.
10876 </para>
10877 <para>
10878 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10879 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10880 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10881 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10882 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10883 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10884 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10885 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10886 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10887 </para>
10888 <para>
10889 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10890 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10891 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10892 culture widely?"
10893 </para>
10894 <para>
10895 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10896 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10897 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10898 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10899 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10900 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10901 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10902 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10903 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10904 </para>
10905 <para>
10906 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10907 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10908 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10909 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10910
10911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10912 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10913 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10914 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10915 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10916 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10917 <!-- f13. -->
10918 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10919 December 2002, available at
10920 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10921 </para></footnote>
10922
10923 </para>
10924 <para>
10925 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10926 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10927 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10928 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10929 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10930 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10931 </para>
10932 <para>
10933 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10934 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10935 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10936 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10937 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10938 </para>
10939 <para>
10940 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10941 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10942 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10943 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10944 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10945 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10946 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10947 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10948 power to extend existing terms.
10949 </para>
10950 <para>
10951 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10952 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10953 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10954 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10955 </para>
10956 <para>
10957 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10958 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10959
10960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10961 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10962 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10963 overstepped its bounds.
10964 </para>
10965 <para>
10966 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10967 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10968 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10969 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10970 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10971 </para>
10972 <para>
10973 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10974 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10975 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10976 briefs and preparing for argument.
10977 </para>
10978 <para>
10979 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10980 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10981 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10982 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10983 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10984 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10985 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10986 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10987 </para>
10988 <para>
10989 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10990 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10991 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10992 mistake lost it.
10993 </para>
10994 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10995 <para>
10996 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10997 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10998 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10999 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11000 heat
11001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11002 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11003 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11004 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11005 </para>
11006 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11007 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11008 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11009 <para>
11010 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11011 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11012 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11013 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11014 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11015 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11016 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11017 most powerful media companies in the world."
11018 </para>
11019 <para>
11020 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11021 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11022 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11023 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11024 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11025 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11026 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11027 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11028 interpretation
11029 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11030 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11031 unconstitutional,
11032 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11033 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11034 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11035 Constitution,
11036 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11037 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11038 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11039 </para>
11040 <para>
11041 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11042 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11043 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11044 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11045 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11046 why it was unconstitutional.
11047 </para>
11048 <para>
11049 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11050
11051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11052 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11053 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11054 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11055 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11056 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11057 minority.
11058 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11059 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11060 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11061 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11062 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11063 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11064 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11065 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11066 </para>
11067 <para>
11068 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11069 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11070 beginning.
11071 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11072 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11073 Republican
11074 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11075 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11076 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11077 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11078 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11079 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11080 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11081 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11082 </para>
11083 <para>
11084 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11085 supporting
11086 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11087 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11088 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11089 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11090 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11091 </para>
11092 <para>
11093 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11094 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11095
11096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11097 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11098 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11099 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11100 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11101 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11102 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11103 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11104 </para>
11105 <para>
11106 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11107 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11108 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11109 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11110 </para>
11111 <para>
11112 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11113 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11114 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11115 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11116 clear.
11117 </para>
11118 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11119 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11120 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11121 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11122 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11123 <para>
11124 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11125 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11126 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11127 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11128 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11129 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11130 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11131 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11132 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11133 </para>
11134 <para>
11135 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11136 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11137 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11138 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11139 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11140 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11141 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11142 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11143
11144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11145 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11146 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11147 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11148 </para>
11149 <para>
11150 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11151 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11152 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11153 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11154 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11155 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11156 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11157 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11158 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11159 confidence in our argument.
11160 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11161 </para>
11162 <para>
11163 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11164 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11165 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11166 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11167 copyright holders.
11168 </para>
11169 <para>
11170 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11171 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11172 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11173 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11174 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11175 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11176 wanted to control.
11177 </para>
11178 <para>
11179 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11180 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11181 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11182 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11183 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11184 pornography."<footnote><para>
11185 <!-- f14. -->
11186 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11187 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11188 </para></footnote>
11189 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11190 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11191 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11192 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11193 <!-- f15. -->
11194 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11195 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11196 </para></footnote>
11197 That's
11198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11199 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11200 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11201 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11202 </para>
11203 <para>
11204 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11205 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11206 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11207 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11208 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11209 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11210 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11211 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11212 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11213 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11214 </para>
11215 <para>
11216 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11217 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11218 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11219 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11220 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11221 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11222 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11223 </para>
11224 <para>
11225 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11226 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11227 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11228 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11229 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11230 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11231 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11232 powers had limits.
11233 </para>
11234 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11235 <para>
11236 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11237 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11238 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11239 the Constitution
11240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11241 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11242 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11243 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11244 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11245 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11246 </para>
11247 <para>
11248 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11249 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11250 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11251 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11252 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11253 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11254 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11255 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11256 sense.
11257 </para>
11258 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11259 <para>
11260 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11261 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11262 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11263 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11264 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11265 these retrospective extensions.
11266 </para>
11267 <para>
11268 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11269 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11270 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11271 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11272 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11273 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11274 </para>
11275 <para>
11276 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11277 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11278 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11279 overriding
11280 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11281 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11282 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11283 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11284 </para>
11285 <para>
11286 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11287 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11288
11289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11290 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11291 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11292 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11293 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11294 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11295 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11296 copyright be limited.
11297 </para>
11298 <para>
11299 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11300 Congress
11301 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11302 government
11303 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11304 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11305 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11306 </para>
11307 <para>
11308 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11309 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11310 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11311 existing
11312 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11313 </para>
11314 <para>
11315 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11316 extended
11317 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11318 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11319 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11320 existing
11321 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11322 restraint
11323 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11324 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11325 hesitated
11326 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11327 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11328 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11329 arrived
11330 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11331 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11332
11333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11334 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11335 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11336 </para>
11337 <para>
11338 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11339 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11340 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11341 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11342 Congress
11343 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11344 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11345 this central idea.
11346 </para>
11347 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11348 <para>
11349 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11350 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11351 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11352 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11353 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11354 </para>
11355 <para>
11356 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11357 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11358 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11359 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11360 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11361 </para>
11362 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11363 <para>
11364 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11365 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11366 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11367 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11368 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11369 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11370 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11371 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11372 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11373 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11374 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11375
11376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11377 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11378 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11379 </para>
11380 <para>
11381 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11382 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11383 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11384 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11385 congressmen
11386 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11387 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11388 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11389 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11390 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11391 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11392 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11393 family of the Justices.
11394 </para>
11395 <para>
11396 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11397 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11398 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11399 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11400 </para>
11401 <para>
11402 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11403 The history was bothering her.
11404 </para>
11405 <blockquote>
11406 <para>
11407 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11408 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11409 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11410 practice that began with the very first act.
11411 </para>
11412 </blockquote>
11413 <para>
11414 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11415 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11416 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11417 </para>
11418 <blockquote>
11419 <para>
11420 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11421 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11423 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11424 is yes.
11425 </para>
11426 </blockquote>
11427 <para>
11428 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11429 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11430 Kennedy, who observed,
11431 </para>
11432 <blockquote>
11433 <para>
11434 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11435 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11436 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11437 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11438 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11439 </para>
11440 </blockquote>
11441 <para>
11442 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11443 student,
11444 I answered,
11445 </para>
11446 <blockquote>
11447 <para>
11448 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11449 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11450 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11451 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11452 effectively
11453 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11454 </para>
11455 </blockquote>
11456 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11457 <para>
11458 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11459 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11460 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11461 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11462 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11463 </para>
11464 <para>
11465 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11466 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11467 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11468 </para>
11469 <para>
11470 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11471 sympathetic.
11472 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11473
11474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11475 </para>
11476 <blockquote>
11477 <para>
11478 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11479 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11480 </para>
11481 <para>
11482 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11483 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11484 domain
11485 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11486 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11487 into the Copyright Clause.
11488 </para>
11489 </blockquote>
11490 <para>
11491 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11492 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11493 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11494 </para>
11495 <blockquote>
11496 <para>
11497 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11498 unlimited
11499 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11500 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11501 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11502 an unlimited time.
11503 </para>
11504 </blockquote>
11505 <para>
11506 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11507 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11508 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11509 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11510 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11511 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11512 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11513 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11514 specific
11515 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11516 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11517 </para>
11518 <para>
11519 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11520 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11521
11522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11523 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11524 optimistic.
11525 </para>
11526 <para>
11527 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11528 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11529 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11530 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11531 believed
11532 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11533 Copyright
11534 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11535 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11536 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11537 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11538 Copyright
11539 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11540 believe
11541 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11542 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11543 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11544 </para>
11545 <para>
11546 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11547 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11548 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11549 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11550 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11551 </para>
11552 <para>
11553 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11554 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11555 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11556 </para>
11557 <para>
11558 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11559 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11560 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11561 </para>
11562 <para>
11563 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11564 distinguish
11565 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11566 argument
11567 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11568 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11569 in the Court's opinion.
11570 </para>
11571 <para>
11572
11573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11574 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11575 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11576 generally,
11577 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11578 </para>
11579 <para>
11580 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11581 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11582 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11583 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11584 </para>
11585 <para>
11586 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11587 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11588 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11589 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11590 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11591 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11592 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11593 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11594 would not.
11595 </para>
11596 <para>
11597 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11598 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11599 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11600 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11601 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11602 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11603 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11604 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11605 the system we have.
11606 </para>
11607 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11608 <para>
11609 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11610 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11611 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11612 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11613 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11614 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11615 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11616 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11617 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11618 </para>
11619 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11620 <para>
11621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11622 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11623 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11624 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11625 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11626 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11627 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11628 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11629 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11630 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11631 </para>
11632 <para>
11633 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11634 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11635 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11636 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11637 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11638 </para>
11639 <para>
11640 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11641 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11642 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11643 </para>
11644 <para>
11645 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11646 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11647 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11648 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11649 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11650 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11651 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11652 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11653 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11654 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11655 "originalism" now?
11656 </para>
11657 <para>
11658 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11659 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11660 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11661 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11662
11663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11664 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11665 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11666 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11667 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11668 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11669 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11670 own principles.
11671 </para>
11672 <para>
11673 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11674 myself.
11675 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11676 the law as it is.
11677 </para>
11678 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11679 <para>
11680 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11681 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11682 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11683 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11684 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11685 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11686 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11687 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11688 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11689 </para>
11690 <para>
11691 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11692 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11693 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11694 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11695 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11696 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11697 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11698 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11699 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11700 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11701 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11702 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11703 effort to persuade; but I
11704 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11705 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11706 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11707 should decide the issue.
11708 </para>
11709 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11710 <para>
11711 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11712 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11713 Kathleen Sullivan?
11714 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11715 </para>
11716 <para>
11717 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11718 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11719 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11720 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11721 </para>
11722 <para>
11723 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11724 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11725 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11726 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11727 have persuaded.
11728 </para>
11729 <para>
11730 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11731 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11732 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11733 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11734 issue should not be raised until it is.
11735 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11736 </para>
11737 <para>
11738 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11739 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11740 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11741 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11742 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11743 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11744 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11745 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11746 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11747 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11748 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11749
11750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11751 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11752 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11753 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11754 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11755 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11756 </para>
11757 <blockquote>
11758 <para>
11759 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11760 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11761 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11762 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11763 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11764 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11765 </para>
11766 </blockquote>
11767 <para>
11768 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11769 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11770 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11771 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11772 in the face felt exactly like that.
11773 </para>
11774 <para>
11775 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11776 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11777 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11778 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11779 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11780 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11781 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11782 </para>
11783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11784 </sect1>
11785 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11786 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11787 <para>
11788 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11789 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11790 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11791 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11792 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11793 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11794 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11795 </para>
11796 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11797 <para>
11798 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11799 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11800 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11801 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11802 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11803 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11804 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11805 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11806 </para>
11807 <para>
11808 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11809 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11811 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11812 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11813 the work passed into the public domain.
11814 </para>
11815 <para>
11816 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11817 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11818 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11819 </para>
11820 <para>
11821 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11822 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11823 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11824 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11825 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11826 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11827 everything else, let the content go.
11828 </para>
11829 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11830 <para>
11831 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11832 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11833 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11834 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11835 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11836 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11837 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11838 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11839 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11840 the stupid harm of the present system.
11841 </para>
11842 <para>
11843 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11844 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11845 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11846 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11847 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11848 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11849 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11850 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11851 where copyright owners could be identified.
11852 </para>
11853 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11854 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11855 <para>
11856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11857 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11858 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11859 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11860 <!-- f1. -->
11861 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11862 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11863 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11864 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11865 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11866 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11867 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11868 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11869 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11870 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11871 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11872 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11873 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11874 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11875 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11876 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11877 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11878 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11879 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11880 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11881 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11882 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11883 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11884 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11885 </para>
11886 <para>
11887 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11888 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11889 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11890 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11891 know what's protected and what's not.
11892 </para>
11893 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11894 <para>
11895 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11896 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11897 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11898 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11899 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11900 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11901 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11902 in the loss of widows' only income.
11903 </para>
11904 <para>
11905 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11906 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11907 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11908 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11909 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11910 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11911 </para>
11912 <para>
11913 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11914 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11915 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11916 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11917 burden
11918 imposed upon creators.
11919 </para>
11920 <para>
11921 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11922 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11923
11924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11925 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11926 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11927 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11928 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11929 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11930 table.
11931 </para>
11932 <para>
11933 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11934 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11935 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11936 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11937 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11938 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11939 spread.
11940 </para>
11941 <para>
11942 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11943 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11944 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11945 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11946 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11947 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11948 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11949 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11950 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11951 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11952 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11953 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11954 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11955 system of protection for property generally.
11956 </para>
11957 <para>
11958 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11959 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11960 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11961 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11962 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11963 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11964 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11965 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11966
11967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11968 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11969 take their place.
11970 </para>
11971 <para>
11972 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11973 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11974 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11975 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11976 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11977 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11978 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11979 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11980 </para>
11981 <para>
11982 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11983 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11984 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11985 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11986 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11987 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11988 seen before because there are no formalities.
11989 </para>
11990 <para>
11991 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11992 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11993 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11994 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11995 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11996 </para>
11997 <para>
11998 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11999 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12000 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12001 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12002 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12003 </para>
12004 <para>
12005 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12006 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12007 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12008 registration?
12009 </para>
12010 <para>
12011 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12012 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12013 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12014
12015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12016 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12017 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12018 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12019 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12020 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12021 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12022 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12023 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12024 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12025 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12026 </para>
12027 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12028 <para>
12029 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12030 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12031 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12032 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12033 </para>
12034 <para>
12035 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12036 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12037 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12038 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12039 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12040 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12041 something good might happen here.
12042 </para>
12043 <para>
12044 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12045 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12046 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12047 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12048 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12049 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12050 </para>
12051 <para>
12052 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12053 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12054 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12056 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12057 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12058 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12059 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12060 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12061 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12062 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12063 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12064 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12065 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12066 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12067 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12068 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12069 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12070 film is a valid derivative use.
12071 </para>
12072 <para>
12073 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12074 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12075 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12076 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12077 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12078 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12079 </para>
12080 <para>
12081 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12082 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12083 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12084 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12085 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12086 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12087 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12088 threat.
12089 </para>
12090 <para>
12091 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12092 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12093 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12094 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12095 sense?
12096 </para>
12097 <para>
12098
12099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12100 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12101 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12102 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12103 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12104 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12105 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12106 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12107 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12108 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12109 </para>
12110 <para>
12111 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12112 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12113 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12114 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12115 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12116 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12117 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12118 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12119 </para>
12120 <para>
12121 What does this industry really want?
12122 </para>
12123 <para>
12124 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12125 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12126 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12127 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12128 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12129 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12130 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12131 permission first.
12132 </para>
12133 <para>
12134 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12135 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12136 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12137 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12138 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12139 </para>
12140 <para>
12141 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12142 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12143
12144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12145 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12146 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12147 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12148 and to share its own creation.
12149 </para>
12150 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12151 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12152 <para>
12153 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12154 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12155 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12156 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12157 block the progress of others.
12158 </para>
12159 <para>
12160 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12161 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12162 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12163 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12164 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12165 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12166 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12167 </para>
12168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12169 </sect1>
12170 </chapter>
12171 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12172 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12173 <para>
12174 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12175 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12176 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12177 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12178 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12179 </para>
12180 <para>
12181 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12182 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12183 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12184 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12185 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12186 the disease almost invisible.
12187 </para>
12188 <para>
12189 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12190 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12191 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12192 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12193 population:
12194 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12195 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12196 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12197 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12198 available at
12199 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12200 release
12201 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12202 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12203 </para></footnote>
12204 </para>
12205 <para>
12206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12207 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12208 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12209 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12210 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12211 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12212 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12213 </para>
12214 <para>
12215 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12216 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12217 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12218 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12219 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12220 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12221 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12222 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12223 changes.
12224 </para>
12225 <para>
12226 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12227 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12228 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12229 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12230 costs significantly below the market price.
12231 </para>
12232 <para>
12233 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12234 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12235 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12236 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12237 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12238 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12239 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12240 <para>
12241 <!-- f2. -->
12242 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12243 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12244 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12245 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12246 </para></footnote>
12247 </para>
12248 <para>
12249 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12250 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12251 Association
12252 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12253 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12254 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12255 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12256 Prepared
12257 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12258 2000), 14, available at
12259 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12260 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12261 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12262 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12263 (statement of James Love).
12264 </para></footnote>
12265 Through the
12266 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12267 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12268 request,
12269 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12271 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12272 began
12273 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12274 government's
12275 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12276 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12277 companies,
12278 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12279 international
12280 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12281 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12282 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12283 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12284 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12285 <!-- f4. -->
12286 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12287 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12288 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12289 Organization (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12290 </para>
12291 <para>
12292 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12293 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12294 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12295 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12296 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12297 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12298 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12299 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12300 </para>
12301 <para>
12302 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12303 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12304 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12305 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12306 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12307 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12308 </para>
12309 <para>
12310 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12311 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12312 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12313 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12314 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12315 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12316 by U.S. companies.
12317 </para>
12318 <para>
12319 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12320 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12321 argument
12322 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12323 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12324 <!-- f5. -->
12325 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12326 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12327 May 1999, A1, available at
12328 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12329 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12330 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12331 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12332 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12333 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12334 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12335 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12336 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12337 Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12339 </para></footnote>
12340 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12341 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12342 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12343 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12344 </para>
12345 <para>
12346 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12347 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12348 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12349 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12350 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12351 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12352 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12353 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12354 </para>
12355 <para>
12356 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12357 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12358 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12359 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12360 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12361 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12362 </para>
12363 <para>
12364 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12365 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12366 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12367 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12368 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12369 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12370 </para>
12371 <para>
12372 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12373 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12374 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12375 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12376 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12377 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12378 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12379 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12381 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12382 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12383 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12384 idea called "intellectual property."
12385 </para>
12386 <para>
12387 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12388 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12389 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12390 What is the argument?
12391 </para>
12392 <para>
12393 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12394 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12395 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12396 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12397 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12398 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12399 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12400 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12401 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12402 were balanced in just this sense.
12403 </para>
12404 <para>
12405 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12406 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12407 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12408 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12409 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12410 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12411 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12412 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12413 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12414 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12415 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12416 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12417 our
12418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12419 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12420 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12421 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12422 this common sense open its eyes.
12423 </para>
12424 <para>
12425 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12426 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12427 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12428 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12429 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12430 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12431 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12432 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12433 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12434 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12435 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12436 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12437 </para>
12438 <para>
12439 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12440 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12441 meeting.<footnote><para>
12442 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12443 August 2003, E1, available at
12444 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12445 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12446 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12447 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12448 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12449 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12450 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12451 </para></footnote>
12452 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12453 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12454 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12455 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12456 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12457 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12458 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12459 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12460 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12461 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12462 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12463 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12464 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12466 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12467 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12468 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12469 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12470 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12471 </para>
12472 <para>
12473 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12474 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12475 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12476 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12477 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12478 </para>
12479 <para>
12480 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12481 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12482 meeting.
12483 </para></footnote>
12484 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12485 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12486 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12487 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12488 property issues.
12489 </para>
12490 <para>
12491 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12492 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12493 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12494 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12495 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12496 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12497 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12498 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12499 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12500 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12501 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12502 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12503 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12504 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12505 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12506 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12507 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12508 stuff of
12509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12510 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12511 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12512 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12513 </para>
12514 <para>
12515 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12516 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12517 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12518 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12519 </para>
12520 <para>
12521 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12522 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12523 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12524 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12525 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12526 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12527 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12528 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12529 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12530 </para>
12531 <para>
12532 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12533 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12534 noncommercial
12535 software. There are many important companies that depend
12536 fundamentally
12537 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12538 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12539 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12540 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12541 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12542 support a mode of software development that is different from
12543 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12544 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12545 sophisticated.
12546 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12547 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12548 opposition
12549 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12550 license
12551 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12552 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12553 Marketplace
12554 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12555 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12556 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12557 available at
12558 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12559 president,
12560 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12561 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12562 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12563 </para></footnote>
12564 </para>
12565 <para>
12566 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12567 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12568 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12569 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12570 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12571 by
12572 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12573 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12574 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12575 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12576 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12577 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12578 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12579 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12580 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12581 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12582 </para>
12583 <para>
12584 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12585 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12586 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12587 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12588 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12589 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12590 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12591 <!-- f9. -->
12592 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12593 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12594 </para></footnote>
12595 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12596 </para>
12597 <para>
12598 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12599 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12600 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12601 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12602 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12603 its lobbying efforts.
12604 </para>
12605 <para>
12606 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12607 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12608 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12609 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12610 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12611 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12612 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12613 goals of WIPO."
12614 </para>
12615 <para>
12616 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12617 </para>
12618 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12619 <para>
12620 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12621 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12622 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12623 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12624 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12625 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12626 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12627 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12628 </para>
12629 <para>
12630 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12631 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12632 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12633 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12634 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12635 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12636 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12637 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12638 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12639 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12640 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12641 </para>
12642 <para>
12643 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12644 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12645 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12646 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12647 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12648 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12649 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12650 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12651 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12652 right to decide what to do with their property.
12653 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12654 </para>
12655 <para>
12656 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12657 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12658 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12659 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12660 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12661 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12662 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12663 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12664 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12665 way possible.
12666 </para>
12667 <para>
12668 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12669 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12670 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12671 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12672 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12673 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12674 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12675 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12676 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12677 that control.
12678 </para>
12679 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12680 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12681 <para>
12682 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12683 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12684 <!-- f10. -->
12685 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12686 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12687 </para></footnote>
12688 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12689 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12690 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12691 </para>
12692 <para>
12693 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12694 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12695 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12696 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12697 </para>
12698 <blockquote>
12699 <para>
12700 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12701 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12702 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12703 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12704 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12705 say anything wrong. But in the world
12706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12707 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12708 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12709 </para>
12710 </blockquote>
12711 <para>
12712 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12713 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12714 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12715 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12716 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12717 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12718 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12719 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12720 </para>
12721 <para>
12722 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12723 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12724 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12725 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12726 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12727 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12728 </para>
12729 <para>
12730 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12731 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12732 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12733 our own country's history).
12734 </para>
12735 <para>
12736 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12737 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12738 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12739 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12740 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12741 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12742 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12743 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12744 democracy in the world, become?
12745 </para>
12746 <para>
12747 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12748 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12749 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12751 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12752 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12753 </para>
12754 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12755 <para>
12756 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12757 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12758 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12759 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12760 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12761 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12762 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12763 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12764 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12765 hearings and a different result.
12766 </para>
12767 <para>
12768 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12769 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12770 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12771 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12772 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12773 concentration in the media.
12774 </para>
12775 <para>
12776 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12777 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12778 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12779 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12780 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12781 </para>
12782 <para>
12783 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12784 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12785 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12786 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12787 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12788 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12789 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12790 </para>
12791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12792 <para>
12793 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12794 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12795 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12796 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12797 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12798 </para>
12799 <para>
12800 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12801 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12802 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12803 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12804 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12805 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12806 </para>
12807 <para>
12808 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12809 of our tragedy.
12810 </para>
12811 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12812 <para>
12813 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12814 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12815 <!-- f11. -->
12816 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12817 2003, available at
12818 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12819 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12820 2003, available at
12821 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12822 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12823 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12824 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12825 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12826 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12827 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12828 available at
12829 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12830 </para></footnote>
12831 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12832 music.<footnote><para>
12833 <!-- f12. -->
12834 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12835 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12836 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12837 </para></footnote>
12838 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12839 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12840 <!-- f13. -->
12841 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12842 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12843 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12845 </para></footnote>
12846 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12847 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12848 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12849 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12850 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12851 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12852 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12853 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12854 kids who use a computer to share content.
12855 </para>
12856 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12857 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12858 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12859 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12860 <para>
12861 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12862 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12863 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12864 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12865 24 August 2003, available at
12866 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12867 </para></footnote>
12868 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12869 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12870 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12871 country.<footnote><para>
12872 <!-- f15. -->
12873 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12874 available at
12875 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12876 </para></footnote>
12877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12878 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12879 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12880 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12881 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12882 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12883 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12884 day into the Causbys.
12885 </para>
12886 <para>
12887 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12888 potential is ever to be realized.
12889
12890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12891
12892 </para>
12893 </chapter>
12894 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12895 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12896 <para>
12897
12898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12899 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12900 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12901 maps what might be done.
12902 </para>
12903 <para>
12904 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12905 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12906 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12907 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12908 </para>
12909 <para>
12910 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12911 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12912 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12913 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12914 is so important.
12915 </para>
12916 <para>
12917 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12918 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12919 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12920 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12921 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12922 </para>
12923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12924
12925 <sect1 id="usnow">
12926 <title>US, NOW</title>
12927 <para>
12928 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12929 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12930 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12931 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12932 </para>
12933 <para>
12934 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12935 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12936 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12937 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12938 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12939 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12940 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12941 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12942 </para>
12943 <para>
12944 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12945 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12946 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12947 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12948 the
12949
12950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12951 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12952 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12953 unprotected.
12954 </para>
12955 <para>
12956 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12957 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12958 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12959 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12960 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12961 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12962 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12963 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12964 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12965 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12966 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12967 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12968 </para>
12969 <para>
12970 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12971 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12972 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12973 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12974 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12975 before.
12976 </para>
12977
12978 <sect2 id="examples">
12979 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12980 <para>
12981 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12982 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12983 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12984 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12985 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12986 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12987 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12988 assured.
12989 </para>
12990 <para>
12991 What made it assured?
12992 </para>
12993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12994 <para>
12995 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12996 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12997 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12998 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12999 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13000 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13001 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13002 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13003 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13004 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13005 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13006 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13007 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13008 </para>
13009 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13010 <para>
13011 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13012 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13013 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13014 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13015 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13016 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13017 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13018 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13019 </para>
13020 <para>
13021 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13022 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13023 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13024 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13025 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13026 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13027 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13028 disappears.
13029 </para>
13030 <para>
13031 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13032 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13033 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13034 friction did.<footnote><para>
13035 <!-- f1. -->
13036
13037 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13038 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13039 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13040
13041 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13042 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13043 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13044 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13045 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13046 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13047 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13048
13049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13050 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13051 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13052 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13053 </para>
13054 <para>
13055 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13056 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13057 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13058 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13059 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13060 care much about controlling their software.
13061 </para>
13062 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13063 <para>
13064 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13065 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13066 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13067 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13068 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13069 people's work.
13070 </para>
13071 <para>
13072 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13073 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13074 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13075 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13076 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13077 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13078 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13079 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13080 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13081 anything else?
13082 </para>
13083 <para>
13084 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13085 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13086 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13087 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13088 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13089 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13090 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13091 </para>
13092 <para>
13093 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13094 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13096 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13097 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13098 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13099 fundamentally weakened.
13100 </para>
13101 <para>
13102 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13103 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13104 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13105 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13106 </para>
13107 <para>
13108 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13109 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13110 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13111 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13112 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13113 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13114 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13115 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13116 byproduct.
13117 </para>
13118 <para>
13119 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13120 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13121 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13122 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13123 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13124 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13125 </para>
13126 <para>
13127 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13128 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13129 scientific journals are produced.
13130 </para>
13131 <para>
13132 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13133 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13134 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13135 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13136 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13137 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13138 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13139 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13140 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13141 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13142 and Westlaw are also free
13143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13144 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13145 Court opinion through their respective services.
13146 </para>
13147 <para>
13148 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13149 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13150 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13151 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13152 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13153 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13154 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13155 </para>
13156 <para>
13157 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13158 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13159 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13160 </para>
13161 <para>
13162 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13163 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13164 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13165 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13166 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13167 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13168 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13169 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13170 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13171 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13172 </para>
13173 <para>
13174 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13175 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13176 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13177 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13178 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13179 granted before.
13180 </para>
13181 <para>
13182 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13183 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13184 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13185 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13187 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13188 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13189 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13190 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13191 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13192 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13193 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13194 </para>
13195 <para>
13196 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13197 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13198 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13199 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13200 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13201 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13202 and science.
13203 </para>
13204
13205 </sect2>
13206 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13207 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13208 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13209 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13210 </indexterm>
13211 <para>
13212 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13213 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13214 </para>
13215 <para>
13216 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13217 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13218 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13219 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13220 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13221 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13222 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13223 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13224 </para>
13225 <para>
13226 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13227 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13228 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13229 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13230 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13231 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13232 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13233 description, and
13234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13235 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13236 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13237 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13238 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13239 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13240 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13241 certain freedoms are given.
13242 </para>
13243 <para>
13244 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13245 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13246 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13247 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13248 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13249 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13250 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13251 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13252 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13253 </para>
13254 <para>
13255 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13256 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13257 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13258 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13259 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13260 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13261 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13262 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13263 a public domain.
13264 </para>
13265 <para>
13266 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13267 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13268 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13269 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13270 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13271 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13273 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13274 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13275 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13276 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13277 </para>
13278 <para>
13279 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13280 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13281 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13282 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13283 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13284 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13285 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13286 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13287 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13288 to begin to build those rules.
13289 </para>
13290 <para>
13291 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13292 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13293 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13294 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13295 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13296 </para>
13297 <para>
13298 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13299 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13300 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13301 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13302 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13303 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13304 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13305 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13306 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13307 sales of Cory's book.
13308 </para>
13309 <para>
13310 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13311 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13312 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13313 was a total success.
13314 </para>
13315 <para>
13316 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13317 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13319 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13320 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13321 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13322 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13323 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13324 well.
13325 </para>
13326 <para>
13327 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13328 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13329 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13330 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13331 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13332 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13333 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13334 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13335 with their own art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13336 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13337 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13338 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13339 because the legal costs are so high<footnote><para>
13340 <!-- f2. -->
13341
13342 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13343 Culture Wars (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13344 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13345 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13346 </para></footnote>),
13347 these artists release into the creative environment content
13348 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13349 </para>
13350 <para>
13351 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13352 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13353 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13354 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13355 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13356 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13357 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13358 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13359 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13360 say it to others.
13361 </para>
13362 <para>
13363 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13364 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13365 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13366 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13367
13368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13369 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13370 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13371 </para>
13372 <para>
13373 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13374 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13375 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13376 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13377 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13378 steps are possible.
13379 </para>
13380 <para>
13381 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13382 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13383 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13384 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13385 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13386 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13387 creativity to spread more easily.
13388 </para>
13389 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13390
13391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13392 </sect2>
13393 </sect1>
13394 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13395 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13396 <para>
13397 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13398 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13399 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13400 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13401 changes that we need.
13402 </para>
13403 <para>
13404 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13405 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13406 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13407 to our end.
13408 </para>
13409
13410 <sect2 id="formalities">
13411 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13412 <para>
13413 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13414 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13415 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13416 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13417 </para>
13418 <para>
13419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13420 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13421 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13422 protected.
13423 </para>
13424 <para>
13425 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13426 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13427 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13428 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13429 </para>
13430 <para>
13431 Why?
13432 </para>
13433 <para>
13434 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13435 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13436 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13437 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13438 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13439 formalities were getting in the way.
13440 </para>
13441 <para>
13442 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13443 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13444 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13445 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13446 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13447 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13448 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13449 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13450 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13451 they otherwise could speak.
13452 </para>
13453 <para>
13454 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13455 <!-- f1. -->
13456 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13457 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13458 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13459 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13460 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13461 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13462 </para>
13463 <para>
13464 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13465 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13466 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13467 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13468 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13469 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13470 developed by others.
13471 </para>
13472
13473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13474
13475 <sect3 id="registration">
13476 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13477 <para>
13478 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13479 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13480 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13481 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13482 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13483 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13484 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13485 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13486 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13487 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13488 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13489 </para>
13490 <para>
13491 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13492 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13493 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13494 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13495 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13496 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13497 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13498 </para>
13499 <para>
13500 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13501 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13502 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13503 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13504 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13505 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13506 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13507 with which registration occurs up.
13508 </para>
13509 <para>
13510 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13511 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13512 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13513 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13514 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13515 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13516 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13517 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13518 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13520 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13521 </para>
13522
13523 </sect3>
13524 <sect3 id="marking">
13525 <title>MARKING</title>
13526 <para>
13527 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13528 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13529 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13530 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13531 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13532 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13533 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13534 uniformly across all media.
13535 </para>
13536 <para>
13537 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13538 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13539 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13540 use the work.
13541 </para>
13542 <para>
13543 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13544 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13545 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13546 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13547 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13548 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13549 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13550 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13551 </para>
13552 <para>
13553 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13554 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13555 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13556 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13557 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13558 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13559 <!-- f2. -->
13560 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13561 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13562 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13563 </para></footnote>
13564 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13565 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13566 stop using the work in any new
13567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13568 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13569 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13570 their work.
13571 </para>
13572 <para>
13573 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13574 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13575 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13576 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13577 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13578 </para>
13579 <para>
13580 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13581 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13582 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13583 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13584 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13585 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13586 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13587 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13588 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13589 </para>
13590 <para>
13591 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13592 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13593 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13594 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13595 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13596 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13597 </para>
13598 <para>
13599 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13600 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13601 make things unclear.
13602 </para>
13603 <para>
13604 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13605 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13606 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13607 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13608 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13609 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13610 </para>
13611
13612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13613 </sect3>
13614 </sect2>
13615 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13616 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13617 <para>
13618 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13619 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13620 natural authors.
13621 </para>
13622 <para>
13623 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13624 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13625 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13626 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13627 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13628 term.<footnote><para>
13629 <!-- f3. -->
13630 "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13631 available at
13632 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13633 </para></footnote>
13634 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13635 </para>
13636 <para>
13637 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13638 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13639 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13640 terms.
13641 </para>
13642 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13643 <listitem><para>
13644 <!-- (1) -->
13645 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13646 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13647 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13648 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13649 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13650 regulations when it no longer benefits an author. </para></listitem>
13651 <listitem><para>
13652 <!-- (2) -->
13653 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13654 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13655 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13656 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13657 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13658 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13659 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13660 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13661 navigate.
13662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13663 </para></listitem>
13664 <listitem><para>
13665 <!-- (3) -->
13666 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13667 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13668 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13669 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13670 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13671 veteran to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13672 <!-- f4. -->
13673 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13674 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13675 available at
13676 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13677 </para></footnote>
13678 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13679 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13680 single form.
13681 </para></listitem>
13682 <listitem><para>
13683 <!-- (4) -->
13684 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13685 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13686 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to
13687 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13688 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13689 fewer authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13690 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13691 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13692 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13693 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13694 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13695 not increase their creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done,
13696 and there's nothing we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13697 </orderedlist>
13698 <para>
13699 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13700 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13701 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13702 </para>
13703 <para>
13704 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13705 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13706 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13707 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13708 </para>
13709
13710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13711
13712 </sect2>
13713 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13714 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13715 <para>
13716 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13717 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13718 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13719 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13720 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13721 the emergence of that new technology.
13722 </para>
13723 <para>
13724 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13725 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13726 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13727 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13728 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13729 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13730 though that movie is not "my writing."
13731 </para>
13732 <para>
13733 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13734 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13735 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13736 <!-- f5. -->
13737 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13738 University Press, 1967), 32.
13739 </para></footnote>
13740 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13741 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13742 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13743 </para>
13744 <blockquote>
13745 <para>
13746 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13747 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13748 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13749 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13750 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13751 </para></footnote>
13752 </para>
13753 </blockquote>
13754 <para>
13755 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13756 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13757 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13758 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13759 Consider each limitation in turn.
13760 </para>
13761 <para>
13762 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13763 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13764
13765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13766 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13767 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13768 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13769 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13770 after the creative work is done.
13771 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13772 </para>
13773 <para>
13774 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13775 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13776 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13777 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13778 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13779 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13780 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13781 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13782 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13783 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13784 </para>
13785 <para>
13786 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13787 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13788 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13789 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13790 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13791 much more sense.
13792 </para>
13793 <para>
13794 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13795 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13796 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13797 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13798 <para>
13799 <!-- f7. -->
13800 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13801 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13802 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13803 </para></footnote>
13804 His view is that the law should be written so that
13805 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13806 </para>
13807 <para>
13808 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13809 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13810 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13811 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13812 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13813 </para>
13814 <para>
13815 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13817 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13818 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13819 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13820 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13821 </para>
13822 </sect2>
13823
13824 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13825 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13826 <para>
13827 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13828 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13829 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13830 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13831 battles around the sharing of music.
13832 </para>
13833 <para>
13834 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13835 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13836 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13837 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13838 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13839 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13840 innovation on the network.
13841 </para>
13842 <para>
13843 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13844 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13845 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13846 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13847 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13848 </para>
13849 <para>
13850 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13851 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13852 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13853 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13854 </para>
13855 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13856 <listitem><para>
13857 <!-- A. -->
13858 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13859 for purchasing CDs.
13860 </para></listitem>
13861 <listitem><para>
13862 <!-- B. -->
13863 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13864 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13865 </para></listitem>
13866 <listitem><para>
13867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13868 <!-- C. -->
13869 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13870 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13871 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13872 </para></listitem>
13873 <listitem><para>
13874 <!-- D. -->
13875 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13876 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13877 owner plainly endorses.
13878 </para></listitem>
13879 </orderedlist>
13880 <para>
13881 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13882 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13883 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13884 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13885 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13886 significantly weakened.
13887 </para>
13888 <para>
13889 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13890 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13891 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13892 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13893 networks.
13894 </para>
13895 <para>
13896 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13897 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13898 should respond.
13899 </para>
13900 <para>
13901 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13902 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13903 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13904 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13905 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13906 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13907 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13908 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13909 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13910 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13911 </para>
13912 <para>
13913 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13914 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13915 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13917 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13918 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13919 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13920 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13921 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13922 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13923 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13924 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13925 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13926 </para>
13927 <para>
13928 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13929 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
13930 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13931 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13932 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13933 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13934 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13935 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13936 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13937 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13938 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13939 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13940 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13941 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13942 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13943 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13944 <!-- f8. -->
13945 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13946 April 2002, available at
13947 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13948 </para></footnote>
13949
13950 </para>
13951 <para>
13952 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13953 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13954 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13955 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13956 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13957 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13958 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13959 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13960 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13961 artists get paid, during
13962
13963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13964 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13965 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13966 </para>
13967 <para>
13968 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13969 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13970 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13971 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13972 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13973 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13974 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13975 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13976 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13977 </para>
13978 <para>
13979 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13980 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13981 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13982 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13983 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13984 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13985 way that returns something to the artist.
13986 </para>
13987 <para>
13988 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13989 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13990 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13991 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13992 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13993 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13994 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13995 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13996 </para>
13997 <para>
13998 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13999 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14000 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14001 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14002 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14003 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14004 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14005 </para>
14006 <para>
14007
14008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14009 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14010 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14011 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14012 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14013 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14014 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14015 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14016 trade.
14017 </para>
14018 <para>
14019 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14020 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14021 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14022 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14023 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14024 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14025 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14026 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14027 </para>
14028 <para>
14029 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14030 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14031 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14032 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14033 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14034 delivering and accessing content.
14035 </para>
14036 <para>
14037 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14038 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14039 </para>
14040 <para>
14041 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14042 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14043 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14044 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14045 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14046 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14047 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14048 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14049 </para>
14050 <para>
14051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14052 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14053 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14054 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14055 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14056 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14057 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14058 </para>
14059 <para>
14060 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14061 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14062 <para>
14063 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14064 10 October 2000), available at
14065 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14066 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14067 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14068 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14069 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14070 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14071 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14072 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14073 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14074 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14075 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14076 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14077 available at
14078 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14079 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14080 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14081 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14082 2002, available at
14083 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14084 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14085 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14086 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14087 2002, available at
14088 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14089 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14090 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14091 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14092 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14093 debate by about a decade. See
14094 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14095 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14096 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14097 </para></footnote>
14098 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14099 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14100 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14101 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14102 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14103 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14104 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14105 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14106 tax.
14107 </para>
14108 <para>
14109 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14110 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14111 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14112 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14113 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14114 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14115 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14116 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14117 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14118 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14119 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14120 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14121 controlling access.
14122 </para>
14123 <para>
14124 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14125 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14126 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14127 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14128 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14129 limits on derivative
14130
14131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14132 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14133 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14134 allowed to do with the content itself.
14135 </para>
14136 <para>
14137 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14138 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14139 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14140 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14141 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14142 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14143 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14144 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14145 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14146 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14147 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14148 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14149 on-line.
14150 </para>
14151 <para>
14152 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14153 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14154 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14155 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14156 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14157 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14158 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14159 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14160 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14161 finding ways to compete with "free."
14162 </para>
14163 <para>
14164 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14165 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14166 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14167 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14168 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14169 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14170 the law.
14171 </para>
14172 <para>
14173 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14174 </para>
14175 <para>
14176
14177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14178 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14179 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14180 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14181 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14182 create.
14183 </para>
14184 <para>
14185 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14186 by
14187 </para>
14188 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14189 <listitem><para>
14190 <!-- 1. -->
14191 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14192 </para></listitem>
14193 <listitem><para>
14194 <!-- 2. -->
14195 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14196 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14197 statute;
14198 </para></listitem>
14199 <listitem><para>
14200 <!-- 3. -->
14201 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14202 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14203 </para></listitem>
14204 </orderedlist>
14205 <para>
14206 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14207 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14208 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14209 something then?
14210 </para>
14211 <para>
14212 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14213 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14214 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14215 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14216 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14217 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14218 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14219 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14220 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14221 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14222 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14223 pirates.
14224 </para>
14225 <para>
14226 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14227 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14228 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14229
14230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14231 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14232 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14233 </para>
14234 </sect2>
14235
14236 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14237 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14238 <para>
14239 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14240 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14241 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14242 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14243 </para>
14244 <para>
14245 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14246 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14247 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14248 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14249 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14250 strong view queers the law.
14251 </para>
14252 <para>
14253 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14254 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14255 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14256 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14257 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14258 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14259 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14260 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14261 <!-- f10. -->
14262 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14263 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14264 </para></footnote>
14265
14266 </para>
14267 <para>
14268 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14269 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14270 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14271 </para>
14272 <para>
14273 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14274 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14275 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14276 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14277 <!-- f11. -->
14278 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14279 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14280 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14281 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14282 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14283 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14284 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14285 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14286 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14287 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14288 available at
14289 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14290 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14291 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14292 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14293 Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14294 </para></footnote>
14295 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14296 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14297 them it works.
14298 </para>
14299 <para>
14300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14301 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14302 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14303 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14304 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14305 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14306 practically never be done.
14307 </para>
14308 <para>
14309 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14310 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14311 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14312 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14313 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14314 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14315 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14316 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14317 </para>
14318 <para>
14319 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14320 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14321 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14322 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14323 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14324 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14325 </para>
14326 <para>
14327 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14328 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14329 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14330 its review.
14331 </para>
14332 <para>
14333 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14334 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14335 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14336 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14337 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14338 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14339 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14340 </para>
14341 <para>
14342 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14343 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14344
14345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14346 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14347 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14348 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14349 </para>
14350 <para>
14351 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14352 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14353 keep your lawyers away.
14354 </para>
14355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14356 </sect2>
14357 </sect1>
14358 </chapter>
14359 <chapter id="c-notes">
14360 <title>NOTES</title>
14361 <para>
14362 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14363 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14364 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14365 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14366 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14367 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14368 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14369 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14370 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14371 the material.
14372 </para>
14373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14374
14375 </chapter>
14376 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14377 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14378 <para>
14379 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14380 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14381 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14382 to him that this book is dedicated.
14383 </para>
14384 <para>
14385 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14386 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14387 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14388 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14389 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14390 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14391 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14392 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14393 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14394 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14395 critical eye on much of this.
14396 </para>
14397 <para>
14398 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14399 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14400 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14401 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14403 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14404 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14405 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14406 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14407 </para>
14408 <para>
14409 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14410 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14411 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14412 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14413 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14414 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14415 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14416 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14417 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14418 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14419 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14420 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14421 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14422 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14423 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14424 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14425 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14426 a bunch of great replies.)
14427 </para>
14428 <para>
14429 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14430 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14431 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14432 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14433 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14434 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14435 throughout this book.
14436 </para>
14437 <para>
14438 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14439 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14440 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14441 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14442 </para>
14443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14444
14445 </chapter>
14446 </book>