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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig. This version of Free Culture is licensed under a
38 Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
39 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
40 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
41 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
42 </holder>
43 </copyright>
44
45 <abstract>
46 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
47 <para>
48 LAWRENCE LESSIG
49 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
50 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
51 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
52 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
53 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
54 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
55 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
56 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
57 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
58 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
59 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
60 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
61 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
62 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
63 Appeals.
64 </para>
65 </abstract>
66 </bookinfo>
67
68 <colophon>
69 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
70
71 <para>
72 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
73 </para>
74 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
75 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
76 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
77 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
78 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
79 </itemizedlist>
80 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
81
82 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
83 <para>
84 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
85 </para>
86 <para>
87 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
88 </para>
89 <para>
90 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
91 </para>
92
93 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
94 <para>
95 THE PENGUIN PRESS
96 </para>
97 <para>
98 NEW YORK
99 </para>
100
101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
102 <para>
103 FREE CULTURE
104 </para>
105
106 <para>
107 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
108 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
109 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
110 </para>
111
112 <para>
113 LAWRENCE LESSIG
114 </para>
115
116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
117 <para>
118 THE PENGUIN PRESS
119 </para>
120 <para>
121 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
122 York, New York
123 </para>
124 <para>
125 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
126 </para>
127 <para>
128 All rights reserved
129 </para>
130 <para>
131 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
132 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
133 Reprinted with permission.
134 </para>
135 <para>
136 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
137 </para>
138 <para>
139 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
140 </para>
141 <para>
142 Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
143 </para>
144 <para>
145 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
146 </para>
147 <para>
148 Lessig, Lawrence.
149 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
150 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
151 </para>
152 <para>
153 p. cm.
154 </para>
155 <para>
156 Includes index.
157 </para>
158 <para>
159 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
160 </para>
161 <para>
162 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
163 </para>
164 <para>
165 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
166 </para>
167 <para>
168 KF2979.L47
169 </para>
170 <para>
171 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
172 </para>
173 <para>
174 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
175 </para>
176 <para>
177 Printed in the United States of America
178 </para>
179 <para>
180 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
181 </para>
182 <para>
183 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
184 </para>
185
186 <para>
187 &translationblock;
188 </para>
189
190 <para>
191 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
192 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
193 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
194 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
195 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
196 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
197 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
198 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
199 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
200 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
201 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
202 </para>
203 </colophon>
204
205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
206 <dedication>
207 <para>
208 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
209 it continues still.
210 </para>
211
212 <para>
213 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
214 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
215 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
216 </figure>
217 </para>
218 </dedication>
219
220 <toc id="toc"></toc>
221
222 <lot>
223 <title>List of figures</title>
224 </lot>
225
226 <!--
227 c PREFACE xiii
228 c INTRODUCTION
229 c "PIRACY"
230 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
231 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
232 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
233 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
234 2 Film
235 2 Recorded Music
236 2 Radio
237 2 Cable TV
238 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
239 2 Piracy I
240 2 Piracy II
241 c "PROPERTY"
242 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
243 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
244 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
245 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
246 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
247 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
248 2 Beginnings
249 2 Law: Duration
250 2 Law: Scope
251 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
252 2 Architecture and Law: Force
253 2 Market: Concentration
254 2 Together
255 c PUZZLES
256 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
257 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
258 2 Constraining Creators
259 2 Constraining Innovators
260 2 Corrupting Citizens
261 c BALANCES
262 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
263 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
264 c CONCLUSION
265 c AFTERWORD
266 1 Us, Now
267 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
268 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
269 1 Them, Soon
270 2 1. More Formalities
271 3 Registration and Renewal
272 3 Marking
273 2 2. Shorter Terms
274 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
275 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
276 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
277 c NOTES
278 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
279 c INDEX
280 -->
281
282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
283
284 <preface id="preface">
285 <title>PREFACE</title>
286 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
287 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
288 </indexterm>
289 <para>
290 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
291 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
292 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
293 </para>
294 <blockquote>
295 <para>
296 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
297 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
298 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
299 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
300 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
301 </para></footnote>
302 </para>
303 </blockquote>
304 <para>
305 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
306 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
307 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
308 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
309 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
310 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
311 </para>
312 <para>
313 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
314 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
315 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
317 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
318 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
319 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
320 </para>
321 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
322 <para>
323 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
324 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
325 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
326 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
327 </para>
328 <para>
329 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
330 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
331 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
332 free software movement<footnote>
333 <para>
334 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
335 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
336 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
337 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
338 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
339 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
340 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
341 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
342 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
343 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
344 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
345 or of creators from the past.
346 </para>
347 <para>
348 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
349 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
350 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
351 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
352 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
353 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
354 culture deem fundamental.
355 </para>
356 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
357 <para>
358 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
359 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
360 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
361 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
362 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
363 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
364 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
365 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
366 he asked,
367 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
368 </para>
369 <blockquote>
370 <para>
371 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
372 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
373 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
374 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
375 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
376 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
377 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
378 </para></footnote>
379 </para>
380 </blockquote>
381 <para>
382 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
383 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
384 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
385 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
386 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
387 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
388 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
389 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
390 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
391 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
392 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
393 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
394 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
395 that this work is "merely" derivative.
396 </para>
397 <para>
398 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
399 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
400 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
401 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
402 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
403 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
404 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
405 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
406
407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
408 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
409 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
410 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
411 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
412 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
413 what I advance here.
414 </para>
415 <para>
416 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
417 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
418 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
419 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
420 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
421 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
422 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
423 book is written.
424 </para>
425
426 </preface>
427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
428
429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
430 <chapter id="c-introduction">
431 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
432 <para>
433 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
434 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
435 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
436 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
437 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
438 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
439 </para>
440 <para>
441 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
442 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
443 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
444 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
445 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
446 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
447 </para></footnote>
448 For many
449 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
450 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
451 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
452 </para>
453 <para>
454 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
455 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
456 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
457 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
458 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
459 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
460 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
461 </para>
462 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
463 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
464 <para>
465 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
466 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
467 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
468 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
469 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
470 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
471 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
472 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
473 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
474 </para>
475 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
476 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
477 <para>
478 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
479 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
480 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
481 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
482 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
483 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
484 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
485 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
486 </para>
487 <blockquote>
488 <para>
489 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
490 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
491 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
492 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
493 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
494 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
495 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
496 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
497 <para>
498 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
499 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
500 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
501 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
502 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
503 Authorship," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
504 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
505 1112&ndash;13.
506 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
507 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
508 </para></footnote>
509 </para>
510 </blockquote>
511 <para>
512 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
513 </para>
514 <para>
515 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
516 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
517 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
519 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
520 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
521 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
522 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
523 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
524 </para>
525 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
526 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
527 <para>
528 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
529 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
530 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
531 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
532 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
533 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
534 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
535 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
536 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
537 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
538 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
539 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
540 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
541 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
542 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
543 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
544 </para>
545 <para>
546 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
547 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
548 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
549 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
550 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
551 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
552 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
553 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
554 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
555 understanding of radio.
556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
557 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
558 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
559 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
560 </para>
561 <para>
562 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
563 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
564 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
565 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
566 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
567 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
568 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
569 much less transmitter power and static.
570 </para>
571 <para>
572 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
573 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
574 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
575 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
576 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
577 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
578 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
579 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
580 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
581 </para>
582 <para>
583 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
584 </para>
585 <blockquote>
586 <para>
587 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
588 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
589 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
590 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
591 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
592 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
593 box."<footnote><para>
594 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
595 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
596 </para></footnote>
597 </para>
598 </blockquote>
599 <para>
600 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
601 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
602 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
603 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
604 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
605 a handful of networks.
606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
607 </para>
608 <para>
609 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
610 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
611 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
612 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
613 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
614 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
615 </para>
616 <blockquote>
617 <para>
618 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
619 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
620 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
621 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
622 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
623 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
624
625 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
626 </para></footnote>
627 </para>
628 </blockquote>
629 <para>
630 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
631 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
632 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
633 described,
634 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
635 </para>
636 <blockquote>
637 <para>
638 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
639 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
640 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
641 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
642 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
643 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
644 </para></footnote>
645 </para>
646 </blockquote>
647 <para>
648 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
649 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
650 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
651 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
652 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
653 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
654 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
655 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
656 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
657 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
658 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
659 </para>
660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
661 <blockquote>
662 <para>
663 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
664 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
665 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
666 deviousness.<footnote><para>
667 Lessing, 256.
668 </para></footnote>
669 </para>
670 </blockquote>
671 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
672 <para>
673 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
674 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
675 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
676 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
677 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
678 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
679 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
680 least temporarily.
681 </para>
682 <para>
683 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
684 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
685 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
686 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
687 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
688 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
689 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
690 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
691 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
692 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
693 </para>
694 <para>
695 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
696 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
697 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
698 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
699 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
700 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
701 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
702 course always public spirited; the reality is something
703 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
704 to themselves, would crumble in
705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
706 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
707 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
708 effect of technological change.
709 </para>
710 <para>
711 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
712 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
713 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
714 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
715 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
716 before.<footnote><para>
717 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
718 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
719 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
720 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
721 </para></footnote>
722 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
723 of 2004.
724 </para>
725 <para>
726 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
727 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
728 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
729 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
730 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
731 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
732 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
733 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
734 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
735 </para>
736 <para>
737 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
738 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
739 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
740 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
741 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
742 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
743 has introduced.
744 </para>
745 <para>
746 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
747 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
748 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
749 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
750 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
751 parks or on
752 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
753 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
754 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
755 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
756 </para>
757 <para>
758 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
759 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
760 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
761 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
762 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
763 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
764 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
765 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
766 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
767 </para>
768 <para>
769 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
770 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
771 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
772 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
773 marketplace.<footnote>
774 <para>
775 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
776 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
777 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
778 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
779 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
780 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
781 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
782 198&ndash;200.
783 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
784 </para></footnote>
785 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
786 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
787 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
788 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
789 </para>
790 <para>
791 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
792 been erased.<footnote><para>
793 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
794 2001), ch. 13.
795 </para></footnote>
796 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
797 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
798 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
799 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
800 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
801 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
802 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
803 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
804 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
805 culture, more and more a permission culture.
806 </para>
807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
808 <para>
809 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
810 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
811 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
812 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
813 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
814 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
815 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
816 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
817 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
818 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
819 Causbys.
820 </para>
821 <para>
822 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
823 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
824 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
825 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
826 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
827 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
828 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
829 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
830 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
831 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
832 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
833 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
834 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
835 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
836 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
837 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
838 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
839 </para>
840 <para>
841 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
842 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
843 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
844 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
845 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
846 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
847 remakes them.
848 </para>
849 <para>
850 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
852 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
853 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
854 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
855 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
856 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
857 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
858 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
859 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
860 Times, 17 January 2002.
861 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
862 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
863 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
864 against it.
865 </para>
866 <para>
867 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
868 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
869 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
870 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
871 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
872 Internet.
873 </para>
874 <para>
875 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
876 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
877 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
878 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
879 </para>
880 <para>
881 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
882 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
883 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
884 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
885 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
886 <para>
887 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
888 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
889 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
890 </para></footnote>
891 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
892 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
893 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
894 could cultivate and extend our culture.
895 </para>
896 <para>
897 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
898 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
899 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
900 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
901 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
902 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
903 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
904 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
905 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
906 </para>
907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
908 <para>
909 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
910 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
911 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
912 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
913 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
914 against an industry.
915 </para>
916 <para>
917 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
918 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
919 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
920 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
921 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
922 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
923 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
924 </para>
925 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
926 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
927 <para>
928 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
929 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
930 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
931 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
932 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
933 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
934 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
935 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
936 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
937 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
938 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
939 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
940 trespass.
941 </para>
942 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
943 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
944 <para>
945 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
946 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
947 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
948 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
949 war. Unlike
950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
951 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
952 on its side.
953 </para>
954 <para>
955 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
956 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
957 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
958 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
959 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
960 been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses of
961 culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
962 </para>
963 <para>
964 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
965 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
966 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
967 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
968 </para>
969 <para>
970 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
971 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
972 </para>
973 <para>
974 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
975 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
976 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
977 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
978 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
979 </para>
980 <para>
981 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
982 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
983 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
984 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
985 view?
986 </para>
987 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
988 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
989 <para>
990 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
991 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
992 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
993 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
994 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
995 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
996 this silliness will be much more profound.
997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
998 </para>
999 <para>
1000 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1001 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1002 ideas.
1003 </para>
1004 <para>
1005 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1006 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1007 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1008 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1009 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1010 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1011 </para>
1012 <para>
1013 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1014 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1015 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1016 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1017 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1018 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1019 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1020 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1021 fundamental about who we have always been.
1022 </para>
1023 <para>
1024 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1025 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1026 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1027 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1028 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1029 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1030 </para>
1031 </chapter>
1032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1033 <chapter id="c-piracy">
1034 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1035
1036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1037 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1038 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1039 </indexterm>
1040 <para>
1041 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1042 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1043 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1044 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1045 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1046 </para>
1047 <blockquote>
1048 <para>
1049 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1050 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1051 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1052 <!-- f1 -->
1053 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1054 </para></footnote>
1055 </para>
1056 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1057 </blockquote>
1058 <para>
1059 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1060 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1061 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1062 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1063 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1064 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1066 </para>
1067 <para>
1068 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1069 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1070 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1071 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1072 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1073 profit."
1074 </para>
1075 <para>
1076 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1077 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1078 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1079 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1080 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1081 </para>
1082 <para>
1083 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1084 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1085 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1086 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1087 </para>
1088 <para>
1089 The idea goes something like this:
1090 </para>
1091 <blockquote>
1092 <para>
1093 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1094 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1095 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1096 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1097 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1098 piracy.
1099 </para>
1100 </blockquote>
1101 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1102 <para>
1103 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1104 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1105 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1106 <!-- f2 -->
1107 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1108 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1109 </para></footnote>
1110 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1111 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1112 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1113 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1114 <!-- f3 -->
1115 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1116 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1117 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1118 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1119 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1120 </para></footnote>
1121 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1122 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1123 </para>
1124 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1125 <para>
1126 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1127 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1129 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1130 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1131 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1132 </para>
1133 <para>
1134 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1135 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1136 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1137 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1138 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1139 </para>
1140 <para>
1141 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1142 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1143 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1144 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1145 copyright law today regulates both.
1146 </para>
1147 <para>
1148 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1149 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1150 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1151 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1152 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1153 more expense of doing business.
1154 </para>
1155 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1156 <para>
1157 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1158 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1159 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1160 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1161 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1162 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1163 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1164 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1165 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1166 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1167 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1168 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1169 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1170 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1171 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1173 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1174 <para>
1175 <!-- f4 -->
1176 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1177 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1178 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1179 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1180 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1181 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1182 enabled are much more tenuous.
1183 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1184 </para></footnote>
1185 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1186 this creative class.
1187 </para>
1188 <para>
1189 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1190 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1191 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1192 </para>
1193
1194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1195 <sect1 id="creators">
1196 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1197 <para>
1198 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1199 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1200 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1201 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1202 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1203 </para>
1204 <para>
1205 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1206 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1207 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1208 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1209 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1210 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1211 </para>
1212 <blockquote>
1213 <para>
1214 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1215 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1216 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1217 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1219 </para>
1220 <para>
1221 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1222 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1223 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1224 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1225 synchronization was pretty close.
1226 </para>
1227 <para>
1228 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1229 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1230 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1231 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1232 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1233 <!-- f1 -->
1234 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1235 Cartoons (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1236 </para></footnote>
1237 </para>
1238 </blockquote>
1239 <para>
1240 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1241 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1242 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1243 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1244 </para>
1245 <para>
1246 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1247 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1248 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1249 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1250 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1251 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1252 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1253 </para>
1254 <para>
1255 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1256 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1257 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1258 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1259 </para>
1260 <para>
1261 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1262 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1263 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1264 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1265 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1266 genre.
1267 </para>
1268 <para>
1269 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1271 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1272 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1273 <!-- f2 -->
1274 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1275 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1276 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1277 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1278 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1279 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1280 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1281 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1282 </para></footnote>
1283 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1284 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1285 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1286 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1287 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1288 Mouse.
1289 </para>
1290 <para>
1291 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1292 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1293 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1294 <!-- f3 -->
1295 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1296 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1297 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1298 </para></footnote>
1299 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1300 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1301 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1302 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1303 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1304 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1305 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1306 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1307 old.
1308 </para>
1309 <para>
1310 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1311 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1312 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1313 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1314 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1315 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1316 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1317 </para>
1318 <para>
1319 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1320 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1321 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1322 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1323 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1324 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1325 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1326 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1327 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1328 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1330 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1331 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1332 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1333 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1334 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1335 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1336 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1337 </para>
1338 <para>
1339 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1340 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1341 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1342 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1343 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1344 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1345 culture around us and makes it something different.
1346 </para>
1347 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1348 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1349 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1350 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1351 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1352 <!-- f4 -->
1353 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1354 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1355 determining
1356 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1357 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1358 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1359 average
1360 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1361 Web site associated with this book, available at
1362 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1363 </para></footnote>
1364 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1365 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1366 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1367 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1368 </para>
1369 <para>
1370 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1371 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1372 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1373 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1374 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1375 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1376 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1377 </para>
1378 <para>
1379 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1380 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1381 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1382 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1383
1384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1385 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1386 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1387 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1388 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1389 content from before the Great Depression.
1390 </para>
1391 <para>
1392 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1393 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1394 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1395 universal.
1396 </para>
1397 <para>
1398 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1399 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1400 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1401 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1402 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1403 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1404 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1405 </para>
1406 <para>
1407 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1408 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1409 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1410 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1411 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1412 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1413 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1414 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1415 interestingly different way.
1416 </para>
1417 <para>
1418 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1419 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1420 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1421 </para>
1422 <para>
1423 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1424 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1425 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1426 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1428 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1429 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1430 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1431 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1432 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1433 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1434 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1435 </para>
1436 <para>
1437 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1438 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1439 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1440 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1441 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1442 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1443 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1444 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1445 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1446 </para>
1447 <para>
1448 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1449 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1450 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1451 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1452 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1453 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1454 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1455 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1456 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1457 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1458 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1459 original copyright owner's permission.
1460 </para>
1461 <para>
1462 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1463 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1464 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1465 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1466 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1467
1468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1469 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1470 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1471 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1472 <!-- f5 -->
1473 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1474 York: Perennial, 2000).
1475 </para></footnote>
1476 </para>
1477 <para>
1478 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1479 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1480 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1481 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1482 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1483 which are fifty years old."
1484 </para>
1485 <para>
1486 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1487 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1488 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1489 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1490 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1491 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1492 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1493 <!-- f6 -->
1494 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1495 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1496 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1497 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1498 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1499 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1500 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1501 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1502 </para></footnote>
1503 </para>
1504 <para>
1505 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1506 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1507 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1508 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1509 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1510 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1511 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1512 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1513 culture?
1514 </para>
1515 <para>
1516 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1517 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1518 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1519 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1520 to prosecute cases like this."
1521 </para>
1522 <para>
1523 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1524 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1525 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1526 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1528 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1529 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1530 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1531 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1532 their clients or hurt them?
1533 Let's pause for a moment.
1534 </para>
1535 <para>
1536 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1537 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1538 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1539 </para>
1540 <para>
1541 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1542 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1543 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1544 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1545 <!-- f7 -->
1546 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See
1547 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1548 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas
1549 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1550 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1551 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1552 very different.
1553 </para></footnote>
1554 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1555 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1556 property.
1557 </para>
1558 <para>
1559 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1560 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1561 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1562 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1563 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1564 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1565 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1566 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1567 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1568 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1569 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1570 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1571 the public domain.
1572 </para>
1573 <para>
1574 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1575 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1576 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1577
1578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1579 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1580 freedom is good.
1581 </para>
1582 <para>
1583 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1584 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1585 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1586 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1587 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1588 form, whether large or small.
1589 </para>
1590 <para>
1591 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1592 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1593 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1594 particular find it hard to say why.
1595 </para>
1596 <para>
1597 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1598 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1599 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1600 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1601 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1602 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1603 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1604 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1605 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1606 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1607 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1608 films in 1997.
1609 </para>
1610 <para>
1611 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1612 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1613 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1614 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1615 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1616 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1617 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1618 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1620 </para>
1621 <para>
1622 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1623 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1624 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1625 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1626 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1627 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1628 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1629 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1630 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1631 </para>
1632 <para>
1633 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1634 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1635 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1636 </para>
1637
1638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1639 </sect1>
1640 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1641 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1642 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1643 <para>
1644 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1645 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1646 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1647 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1648 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1649 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1650 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1651 </para>
1652 <para>
1653 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1654 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1655 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1656 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1657 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1658 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1659 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1660 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1661 amateurs.
1662 </para>
1663 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1664 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1665 </indexterm>
1666 <para>
1667 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1668 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1670 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1671 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1672 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1673 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1674 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1675 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1676 population of photographers.
1677 </para>
1678 <para>
1679 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1680 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1681 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1682 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1683 <!-- f1 -->
1684 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1685 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1686 </para>
1687 <blockquote>
1688 <para>
1689 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1690 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1691 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1692 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1693 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1694 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1695 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1696 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1697 chemicals.<footnote>
1698 <para>
1699 <!-- f2 -->
1700 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1701 1977), 53.
1702 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1703 </para></footnote>
1704 </para>
1705 </blockquote>
1706 <para>
1707 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1708 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1709 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1710 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1711 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1712 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1713 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1714 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1715 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1716 percent.<footnote><para>
1717 <!-- f3 -->
1718 Jenkins, 177.
1719 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1720 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1721 <!-- f4 -->
1722 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1723 </para></footnote>
1724 </para>
1725 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1726 <para>
1727
1728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1729 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1730 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1731 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1732 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1733 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1734 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1735 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1736 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1737 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1738 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1739 <!-- f5 -->
1740 Coe, 58.
1741 </para></footnote>
1742 </para>
1743 <para>
1744 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1745 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1746 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1747 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1748 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1749 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1750 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1751 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1752 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1753 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1754 have before.
1755 </para>
1756 <para>
1757 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1758 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1759 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1760 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1761 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1762 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1763 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1764 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1765 <!-- f6 -->
1766 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1767 </para></footnote>
1768 </para>
1769 <para>
1770 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1771 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1772 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1773 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1774 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1775 draw
1776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1777 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1778 that they thought valuable.
1779 </para>
1780 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1781 <para>
1782 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1783 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1784 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1785 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1786 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1787 <para>
1788 <!-- f7 -->
1789 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1790 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1791 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1792 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1793 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1794 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1795 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1796 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1797 </para>
1798 <para>
1799 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1800 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1801 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1802 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1803 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1804 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1805 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1806 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1807 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1808 <!-- f8 -->
1809 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1810 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1811 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1812 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1813 (1993).
1814 </para></footnote>)
1815 </para>
1816 <para>
1817 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1818 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1819 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1820 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1821 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1822 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1823 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1824 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1825 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1826 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1827 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1828 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1829 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1830 </para>
1831 <para>
1832
1833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1834 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1835 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1836 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1837 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1838 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1839 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1840 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1841 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1842 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1843 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1844 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1845 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1846 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1847 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1848 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1849 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1850 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1851 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1852 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1853 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1854 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1855 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1856 learn.
1857 </para>
1858 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1859 <para>
1860 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1861 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1862 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1863 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1864 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1865 <!-- f9 -->
1866 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1867 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1868 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1869 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1870 </para></footnote>
1871 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1872 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1873 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1874 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1875 </para>
1876 <para>
1877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1878 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1879 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1880 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1881 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1882 the way people access it."
1883 </para>
1884 <para>
1885 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1886 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1887 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1888 about.
1889 </para>
1890 <para>
1891 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1892 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1893 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1894 <!-- f10 -->
1895 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1896 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1897 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1898 </para></footnote>
1899 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1900 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1901 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1902 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1903 (at least at first) terrible media.
1904 </para>
1905 <para>
1906 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1907 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1908 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
1909 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1910 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
1911 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1912 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1913 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1914 </para>
1915 <para>
1916 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1917 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1918 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1919 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1920 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1921 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1922 </para>
1923 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1924 <para>
1925 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1926 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1927 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1928
1929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1930 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1931 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1932 texture."<footnote>
1933 <para>
1934 <!-- f11 -->
1935 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1936 2002.
1937 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1938 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1939 </para></footnote>
1940 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1941 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1942 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1943 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1944 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1945 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1946 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1947 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1948 <!-- f12 -->
1949 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1950 November 2000, available at
1951 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1952 available at
1953 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1954 </para></footnote>
1955 </para>
1956 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1957 <para>
1958 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1959 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1960 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1961 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1962 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1963 </para>
1964 <para>
1965 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1966 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1967 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1968 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1969 </para>
1970 <blockquote>
1971 <para>
1972 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1973 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1974 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1975 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1976 being read-only.
1977 </para>
1978 </blockquote>
1979 <para>
1980 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1981 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1982 twentieth century.
1983 </para>
1984 <para>
1985 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
1986 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1987 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
1988 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
1989 literacy,
1990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1991 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1992 appropriate language for what they need to create or
1993 express."<footnote>
1994 <para>
1995 <!-- f13 -->
1996 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1997 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1998 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
1999 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2000 <!-- f14 -->
2001 Ibid.
2002 </para></footnote>
2003 </para>
2004 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2005 <para>
2006 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2007 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2008 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2009 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2010 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2011 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2012 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2013 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2014 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2015 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2016 </para>
2017 <para>
2018 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2019 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2020 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2021 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2022 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2023 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2024 </para>
2025 <para>
2026 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2027 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2028 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2029 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2030 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2031 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2032 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2033 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2034 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2035 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2036 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2037 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2038 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2039 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2040 to this form of expression.
2041 </para>
2042 <para>
2043
2044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2045 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2046 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2047 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2048 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2049 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2050 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2051 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2052 our interview,
2053 </para>
2054 <blockquote>
2055 <para>
2056 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2057 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2058 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2059 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2060 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2061 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2062 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2063 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2064 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2065 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2066 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2067 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2068 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2069 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2070 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2071 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2072 about the topic. . . .
2073 </para>
2074 <para>
2075 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2076 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2077 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2078 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2079 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2080 </para>
2081 <para>
2082 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2083 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2084 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2086 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2087 had a lot of power with this language."
2088 </para>
2089 </blockquote>
2090 <para>
2091 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2092 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2093 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2094 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2095 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2096 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2097 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2098 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2099 world would be watching.
2100 </para>
2101 <para>
2102 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2103 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2104 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2105 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2106 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2107 entertainment is tragedy.
2108 </para>
2109 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2110 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2111 <para>
2112 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2113 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2114 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2115 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2116 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2117 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2118 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2119 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2120 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2121 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2122 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2123 was also the Internet.
2124 </para>
2125 <para>
2126 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2127 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2128 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2129 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2130 movie
2131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2132 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2133 with sound or text.
2134 </para>
2135 <para>
2136 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2137 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2138 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2139 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2140 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2141 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2142 spread practically instantaneously.
2143 </para>
2144 <para>
2145 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2146 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2147 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2148 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2149 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2150 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2151 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2152 </para>
2153 <para>
2154 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2155 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2156 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2157 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2158 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2159 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2160 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2161 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2162 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2163 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2164 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2165 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2166 </para>
2167 <para>
2168 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2169 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2170 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2171 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2172 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2173 people vote
2174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2175 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2176 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2177 </para>
2178 <para>
2179 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2180 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2181 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2182 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2183 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2184 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2185 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2186 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2187 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2188 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2189 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2190 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2191 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2192 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2193 <!-- f15 -->
2194 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2195 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2196 </para></footnote>
2197 </para>
2198 <para>
2199 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2200 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2201 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2202 <!-- f16 -->
2203 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2204 Political Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2205 </para></footnote>
2206 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2207 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2208 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2209 </para>
2210 <para>
2211 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2212 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2213 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2214 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2215 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2216 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2217 <!-- f17 -->
2218 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2219 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2220 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2221 little beyond what our friends say.
2222 </para>
2223 <para>
2224 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2225 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2226 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2227 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2228 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2229
2230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2231 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2232 place.
2233 </para>
2234 <para>
2235 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2236 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2237 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2238 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2239 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2240 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2241 </para>
2242 <para>
2243 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2244 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2245 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2246 is having an effect.
2247 </para>
2248 <para>
2249 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2250 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2251 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2252 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2253 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2254 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2255 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2256 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2257 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2258 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2259 <!-- f18 -->
2260 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2261 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2262 </para></footnote>
2263 </para>
2264 <para>
2265 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2266 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2267 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2268 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2269 on.
2270 </para>
2271 <para>
2272 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2273 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2274 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2275 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2276 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2277 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2278 peer-generated rankings.
2279 </para>
2280 <para>
2281 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2283 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2284 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2285 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2286 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2287 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2288 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2289 get it out of the way."
2290 </para>
2291 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2292 <para>
2293 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2294 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2295 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2296 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2297 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2298 <!-- f19 -->
2299 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2300 </para></footnote>
2301 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2302 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2303 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2304 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2305 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2306 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2307 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2308 </para>
2309 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2310 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2311 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2312 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2313 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2314 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2315 had seen.<footnote><para>
2316 <!-- f20 -->
2317 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2318 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2319 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2320 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2321 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2322 </para></footnote>
2323 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2324 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2325 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2326 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2327 </para>
2328 <para>
2329 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2330 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2331 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2332 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2333 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2334 <para>
2335 <!-- f21 -->
2336 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2337 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2338 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2339 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2340 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2341 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2342 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2343 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2344 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2345 </para></footnote>
2346 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2347
2348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2349 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2350 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2351 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2352 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2353 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2354 </para>
2355 <para>
2356 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2357 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2358 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2359 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2360 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2361 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2362 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2363 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2364 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2365 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2366 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2367 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2368 extraordinary to report.
2369 </para>
2370 <para>
2371 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2372 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2373 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2374 </para>
2375 <para>
2376 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2377 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2378 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2379 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2380 affect learning.
2381 </para>
2382 <para>
2383 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2384 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2385 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2386 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2387 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2388 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2390 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2391 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2392 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2393 the tinkering of many others.
2394 </para>
2395 <para>
2396 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2397 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2398 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2399 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2400 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2401 </para>
2402 <para>
2403 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2404 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2405 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2406 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2407 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2408 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2409 </para>
2410 <para>
2411 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2412 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2413 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2414 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2415 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2416 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2417 learn.
2418 </para>
2419 <para>
2420 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2421 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2422 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2423 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2424 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2425 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2426 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2427 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2428 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2429 </para>
2430 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2431 <para>
2432 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2433 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2434
2435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2436 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2437 kind of recognition.
2438 </para>
2439 <para>
2440 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2441 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2442 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2443 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2444 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2445 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2446 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2447 </para>
2448 <para>
2449 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2450 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2451 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2452 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2453 general.<footnote><para>
2454 <!-- f22 -->
2455 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2456 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2457 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2458 </para></footnote>
2459 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2460 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2461 </para>
2462 <para>
2463 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2464 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2465 and want to learn."
2466 </para>
2467 <para>
2468 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2469 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2470 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2471 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2472 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2473 </para>
2474 <para>
2475 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2476 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2477 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2478 the law to close down that technology.
2479 </para>
2480 <para>
2481 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2482 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2483 </para>
2484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2485 </sect1>
2486 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2487 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2488 <para>
2489 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2490 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2491 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2492 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2493 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2494 </para>
2495 <para>
2496 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2497 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2498 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2499 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2500 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2501 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2502 </para>
2503 <para>
2504 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2505 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2506 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2507 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2508 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2509 </para>
2510 <para>
2511 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2513 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2514 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2515 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2516 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2517 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2518 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2519 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2520 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2521 </para>
2522 <para>
2523 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2524 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2525 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2526 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2527 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2528 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2529 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2530 </para>
2531 <para>
2532 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2533 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2534 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2535 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2536 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2537 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2538 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2539 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2540 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2541 on-line.
2542 </para>
2543 <para>
2544 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2545 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2546 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2547 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2548 be on users' computers.
2549 </para>
2550 <para>
2551 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2552 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2553 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2554 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2556 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2557 computer.
2558 </para>
2559 <para>
2560 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2561 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2562 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2563 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2564 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2565 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2566 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2567 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2568 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2569 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2570 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2571 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2572 supposed to do.
2573 </para>
2574 <para>
2575 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2576 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2577 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2578 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2579 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2580 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2581 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2582 </para>
2583 <para>
2584 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2585 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2586 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2587 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2588 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2589 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2590 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2591 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2592 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2593 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2594 </para>
2595 <para>
2596 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2597 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2599 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2600 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2601 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2602 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2603 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2604 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2605 </para>
2606 <para>
2607 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2608 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2609 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2610 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2611 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2612 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2613 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2614 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2615 <!-- f1 -->
2616 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2617 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2618 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2619 </para></footnote>
2620 </para>
2621 <para>
2622 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2623 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2624 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2625 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2626 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2627 </para>
2628 <para>
2629 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2630 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2631 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2632 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2633 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2634 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2635 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2636 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2637 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2638 </para>
2639 <para>
2640 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2641 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2642 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2643 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2644 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2646 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2647 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2648 </para>
2649 <para>
2650 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2651 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2652 </para>
2653 <para>
2654 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2655 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2656 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2657 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2658 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2659 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2660 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2661 <!-- f2 -->
2662 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2663 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2664 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2665 </para></footnote>
2666 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2667 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2668 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2669 <!-- f3 -->
2670 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2671 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2672 </para></footnote>
2673 </para>
2674 <para>
2675 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2676 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2677 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2678 activist:
2679 </para>
2680 <blockquote>
2681 <para>
2682 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2683 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2684 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2685 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2686 </para>
2687 </blockquote>
2688 <para>
2689 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2690 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2691 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2692 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2693 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2694 </para>
2695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2696 </sect1>
2697 <sect1 id="pirates">
2698 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2699 <para>
2700 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2701 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2702 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2703 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2704 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2705 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2706 </para>
2707 <sect2 id="film">
2708 <title>Film</title>
2709 <para>
2710 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2711 <!-- f1 -->
2712 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2713 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2714 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2715 </para></footnote>
2716 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2717 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2718 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2719 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2720 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2721 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2722 this creative property
2723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2724 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2725 </para>
2726 <para>
2727 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2728 </para>
2729 <blockquote>
2730 <para>
2731 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2732 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2733 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2734 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2735 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2736 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2737 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2738 </para>
2739 <para>
2740 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2741 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2742 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2743 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2744 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2745 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2746 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2747 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2748 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2749 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2750 <!-- f2 -->
2751 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2752 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2753 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2754 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2755 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2756 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2757 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2758 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2759 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2760 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2761 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2762 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2763 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2764 </para>
2765 </blockquote>
2766 <para>
2767 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2768 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2769 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2770 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2771 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2772 <!-- f3 -->
2773 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2774 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2775 </para></footnote>
2776 That led the independents to flee the East
2777 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2778 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2779 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2780 did just that.
2781 </para>
2782 <para>
2783 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2784 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2785 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2786
2787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2788 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2789 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2790 Edison's creative property.
2791 </para>
2792 </sect2>
2793 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2794 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2795 <para>
2796 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2797 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2798 </para>
2799 <para>
2800 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2801 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2802 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2803 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2804 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2805 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2806 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2807 right to perform it publicly.
2808 </para>
2809 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2810 <para>
2811 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2812 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2813 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2814 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2815 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2816 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2817 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2818 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2819 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2820 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2821 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2822 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2823 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2824 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2825 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2826 its composer anything.
2827 </para>
2828 <para>
2829 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2831 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2832 put it,
2833 </para>
2834 <blockquote>
2835 <para>
2836 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2837 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2838 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2839 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2840 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2841 rights.<footnote><para>
2842 <!-- f4 -->
2843 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2844 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2845 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2846 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2847 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2848 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2849 </para></footnote>
2850 </para>
2851 </blockquote>
2852 <para>
2853 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2854 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2855 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2856 <!-- f5 -->
2857 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2858 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2859 </para></footnote>
2860 and the "music publishing industry"
2861 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2862 <!-- f6 -->
2863 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2864 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2865 </para></footnote>
2866 As John Philip
2867 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2868 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2869 <!-- f7 -->
2870 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2871 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2872 </para></footnote>
2873 </para>
2874 <para>
2875 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2876 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2877 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2878 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2879 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2880 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2881 <!-- f8 -->
2882
2883 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2884 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2885 Perforating Company of New York).
2886 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2887 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2888 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2889 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2890 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2891 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2892 statute."<footnote><para>
2893 <!-- f9 -->
2894 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2895 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2896 Graphophone Company Association).
2897 </para></footnote>
2898 </para>
2899 <para>
2900 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and the
2901 recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that composers
2902 would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their music. But
2903 rather than simply granting the composer complete control over the
2904 right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2905 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once
2906 the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2907
2908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2909 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2910 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2911 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2912 </para>
2913 <para>
2914 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2915 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2916 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2917 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2918 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2919 the fee set by the statute.
2920 </para>
2921 <para>
2922 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2923 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2924 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2925 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2926 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2927 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2928 Grisham.
2929 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2930 </para>
2931 <para>
2932 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2933 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2934 kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2935 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2936 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2937 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2938 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2939 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2940 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2941 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2942 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2943 creativity.<footnote><para>
2944 <!-- f10 -->
2945 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2946 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2947 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2948 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2949 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2950 </para></footnote>
2951 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2952 </para>
2953 <para>
2954 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2955 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2956 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2957 relates,
2958 </para>
2959 <blockquote>
2960 <para>
2961 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2963 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2964 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2965 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
2966 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
2967 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
2968 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
2969 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
2970 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
2971 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
2972 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
2973 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2974 choice.<footnote><para>
2975 <!-- f11 -->
2976 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2977 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2978 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2979 this report.</para></footnote>
2980 </para>
2981 </blockquote>
2982 <para>
2983 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2984 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2985 </para>
2986 </sect2>
2987 <sect2 id="radio">
2988 <title>Radio</title>
2989 <para>
2990 Radio was also born of piracy.
2991 </para>
2992 <para>
2993 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
2994 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
2995 <!-- f12 -->
2996 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
2997 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
2998 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
2999 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3000 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3001 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3002 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3003 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3004 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 281.
3005 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3006 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3007 </para></footnote>
3008 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3009 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3010 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3011 </para>
3012 <para>
3013 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3014 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3015 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3016 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3017 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3018 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3019 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3020 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3021 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3022
3023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3024 </para>
3025 <para>
3026 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3027 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3028 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3029 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3030 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3031 of playing the song.
3032 </para>
3033 <para>
3034 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3035 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3036 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3037 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3038 </para>
3039 <para>
3040 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3041 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3042 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3043 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3044 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3045 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3046 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3047 </para>
3048 <para>
3049 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3050 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3051 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3052 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3053 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3054 to take something for nothing.
3055 </para>
3056 </sect2>
3057 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3058 <title>Cable TV</title>
3059 <para>
3060
3061 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3062 </para>
3063 <para>
3064 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3065 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3066 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3067 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3069 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3070 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3071 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3072 give away.
3073 </para>
3074 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3075 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3076 <para>
3077 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3078 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3079 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3080 <!-- f13 -->
3081 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3082 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3083 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3084 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3085 Commission).
3086 </para></footnote>
3087 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3088 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3089 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3090 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3091 <!-- f14 -->
3092 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3093 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3094 </para></footnote>
3095 As another broadcaster put it,
3096 </para>
3097 <blockquote>
3098 <para>
3099 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3100 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3101 paid for.<footnote><para>
3102 <!-- f15 -->
3103 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3104 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3105 </para></footnote>
3106 </para>
3107 </blockquote>
3108 <para>
3109 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3110 </para>
3111 <blockquote>
3112 <para>
3113 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3114 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3115 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3116 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3117 <!-- f16 -->
3118 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3119 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3120 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3121 </para></footnote>
3122 </para>
3123 </blockquote>
3124 <para>
3125 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3126 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3127 compensation."<footnote><para>
3128 <!-- f17 -->
3129 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3130 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3131 </para></footnote>
3132 </para>
3133 <para>
3134 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3135 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3136 </para>
3137 <blockquote>
3138 <para>
3139 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3140 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3141 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3142 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3143
3144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3145 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3146 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3147 <!-- f18 -->
3148 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3149 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3150 </para></footnote>
3151 </para>
3152 </blockquote>
3153 <para>
3154 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3155 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3156 </para>
3157 <para>
3158 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3159 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3160 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3161 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3162 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3163 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3164 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3165 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3166 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3167 created by broadcasters' content.
3168 </para>
3169 <para>
3170 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3171 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3172 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3173 today<footnote><para>
3174 <!-- f19 -->
3175 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3176 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3177 Information, available at
3178 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3179 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3180 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3181 </para></footnote>
3182 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3183 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3184 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3185 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3186 generation&mdash;until now.
3187 </para>
3188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3189 </sect2>
3190 </sect1>
3191 <sect1 id="piracy">
3192 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3193 <para>
3194 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3195 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3196 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3197 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3198 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3199 should stop it.
3200 </para>
3201 <para>
3202 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3203 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3204 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3205 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3206 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3207 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3208 has so often done in the past.
3209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3210 </para>
3211 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3212 <title>Piracy I</title>
3213 <para>
3214 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3215 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3216 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3217 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3218 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3219 <!-- f1 -->
3220 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3221 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3222
3223 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3224 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3225 </para></footnote>
3226 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3227 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3228 worldwide to piracy.
3229 </para>
3230 <para>
3231 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3232 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3233 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3234 This piracy is wrong.
3235 </para>
3236 <para>
3237 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3238 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3239 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3240 foreign
3241 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3242 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3243 developing
3244 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3245 existence, treated as right.
3246 </para>
3247 <para>
3248 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3249 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3250 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3251 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3252 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3253 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3254 violate
3255 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3256 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3257 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3258 </para>
3259 <para>
3260 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3261 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3263 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3264 pirate
3265 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3266 childhood.
3267 </para>
3268 <para>
3269 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3270 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3271 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3272 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3273 <!-- f2 -->
3274 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3275 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3276 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3277 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3278 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3279 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3280 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3281 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3282 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3283 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3284 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3285 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3286 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3287 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3288 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3289 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3290 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3291 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3292 is wrong.
3293 </para>
3294 <para>
3295 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3296 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3297 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3298 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3299 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3300 <!-- f3 -->
3301 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3302 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3303 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3304 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3305 instance
3306 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3307 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3308 </para></footnote>
3309 </para>
3310 <para>
3311 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3312 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3313 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3314 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3315 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3316 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3317 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3318 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3319 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3320 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3321 piracy of the tangible.
3322 </para>
3323 <para>
3324 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3325 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3326 property
3327 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3328 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3329 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3330 licenses
3331 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3332 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3333 copyrighted
3334 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3335
3336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3337 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3338 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3339 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3340 technology
3341 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3342 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3343 </para>
3344 <para>
3345 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3346 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3347 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3348 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3349 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3350 nation
3351 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3352 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3353 benefit
3354 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3355 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3356 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3357 Microsoft.
3358 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3359 </para>
3360 <para>
3361 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3362 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3363 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3364 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3365 become
3366 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3367 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3368 </para>
3369 <para>
3370 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3371 alcoholic
3372 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3373 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3374 ordinarily
3375 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3376 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3377 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3378 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3379 giving
3380 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3381 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3382 copyright
3383 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3384 wrong.
3385 </para>
3386 <para>
3387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3388 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3389 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3390 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3391 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3392 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3393 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3394 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3395 is flat out wrong.
3396 </para>
3397 <para>
3398 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3399 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3400 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3401 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3402 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3403 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3404 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3405 </para>
3406 <para>
3407 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3408 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3409 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3410 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3411 </para>
3412 <para>
3413 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3414 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3415 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3416 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3417 </para>
3418 <para>
3419 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3420 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3421 sharing
3422 to survive.
3423 </para>
3424 </sect2>
3425 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3426 <title>Piracy II</title>
3427 <para>
3428 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3429 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3430 <!-- f4 -->
3431 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3432 </para></footnote>
3433 This means we must determine whether
3434 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3436 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3437 author of his profit.
3438 </para>
3439 <para>
3440 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3441 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3442 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3443 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3444 <!-- f5 -->
3445 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3446 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3447 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3448 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3449 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3450 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3451 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3452 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3453 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3454 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3455 put together components that had been developed independently.
3456 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3457 </para>
3458 <para>
3459 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3460 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3461 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3462 system.<footnote><para>
3463 <!-- f6 -->
3464 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3465 Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3466 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3467 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3468 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3469 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3470 </para></footnote>
3471 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3472 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3473 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3474 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3475 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3476 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3477 or your 20,000 best friends.
3478 </para>
3479 <para>
3480 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3481 Americans
3482 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3483 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3484 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3485 <!-- f7 -->
3486 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3487 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3488 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3489 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3490 </para></footnote>
3491 A survey by the NPD
3492 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3493 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3494 <!-- f8 -->
3495 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3496 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3497 </para></footnote>
3498 The vast
3499 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3500 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3501 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3502 enjoy
3503 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3504 </para>
3505 <para>
3506 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3507 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3508 infringement,
3509 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3510 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3511 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3512 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3513 </para>
3514 <para>
3515 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3516 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3517 different kinds into four types.
3518 </para>
3519 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3520 <listitem><para>
3521 <!-- A. -->
3522 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3523 purchasing
3524 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3525 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3526 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3527 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3528 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3529 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3530 instead
3531 of purchasing.
3532 </para></listitem>
3533 <listitem><para>
3534 <!-- B. -->
3535 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3536 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3537 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3538 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3539 succeed.
3540 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3541 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3542 recommendations
3543 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3544 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3545 </para></listitem>
3546 <listitem><para>
3547 <!-- C. -->
3548 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3549 copyrighted
3550 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3551 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3552 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3553 rewarding
3554 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3555 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3556 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3557 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3558 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3559 available.)
3560 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3561 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3562 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3563 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3564 a local collector.
3565 </para></listitem>
3566 <listitem><para>
3567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3568 <!-- D. -->
3569 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3570 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3571 wants to give away.
3572 </para></listitem>
3573 </orderedlist>
3574 <para>
3575 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3576 </para>
3577 <para>
3578 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3579 perspective
3580 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3581 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3582 <!-- f9 -->
3583 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3584 </para></footnote>
3585 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3586 illegal,
3587 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3588 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3589 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3590 certainly
3591 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3592 suggests.
3593 </para>
3594 <para>
3595 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3596 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3597 Hollywood,
3598 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3599 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3600 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3601 that is "devastating" the industry.
3602 </para>
3603 <para>
3604 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3605 harmful
3606 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3607 practice
3608 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3609 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3610 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3611 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3612 <!-- f10 -->
3613 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3614 Industry's
3615 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3616 industry's
3617 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3618 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3619 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3620 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3621 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3622 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3623 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3624 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3625 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3626 </para></footnote>
3627 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3628 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3629 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3630 problem,
3631 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3632 </para>
3633 <para>
3634 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3635 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3636 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3637 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3639 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3640 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3641 <!-- f11 -->
3642 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3643 </para></footnote>
3644 </para>
3645 <para>
3646 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3647 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3648 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3649 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3650 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3651 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3652 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3653 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3654 </para>
3655 <para>
3656 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3657 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3658 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3659 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3660 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3661 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3662 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3663 </para>
3664 <para>
3665 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3666 because
3667 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3668 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3669 </para>
3670 <para>
3671 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3672 percent,
3673 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3674 <!-- f12 -->
3675 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3676 available at
3677 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3678 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3679 25 June 2003, available at
3680 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3681 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3682 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3683 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3684 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3685 music
3686 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3687 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3688 </para></footnote>
3689 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3690 Internet
3691 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3692 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3693 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3694 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3695 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3696 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3697 <!-- f13 -->
3698 <para>
3699 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3700 February 2003, available at
3701 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3702 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3703 </para>
3704 </footnote>
3705 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3706 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3707 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3708 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3709 <!-- f14 -->
3710 Ibid.
3711 </para></footnote>
3712 </para>
3713 <para>
3714
3715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3716 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3717 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3718 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3719 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3720 although
3721 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3722 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3723 </para>
3724 <para>
3725 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3726 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3727 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3728 between
3729 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3730 numbers
3731 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3732 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3733 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3734 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3735 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3736 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3737 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3738 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3739 between
3740 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3741 </para>
3742 <para>
3743 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3744 assume,
3745 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3746 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3747 costs?
3748 </para>
3749 <para>
3750 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3751 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3752 available.
3753 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3754 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3755 <!-- f15 -->
3756 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3757 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3758 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3759 Committee
3760 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3761 statement
3762 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3763 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3764 </para></footnote>
3765 And while it's
3766 conceivable
3767 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3768 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3769 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3770 distributor
3771 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3772 make it available.
3773 </para>
3774 <para>
3775 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3777 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3778 thousands
3779 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3780 <!-- f16 -->
3781 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3782 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3783 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3784 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3785 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3786 National
3787 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3788 Results,"
3789 available at
3790 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3791 </para></footnote>
3792 These
3793 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3794 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3795 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3796 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3797 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3798 companies
3799 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3800 owner for the content they sell.
3801 </para>
3802 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3803 <para>
3804 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3805 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3806 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3807 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3808 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3809 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3810 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3811 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3812 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3813 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3814 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3815 </para>
3816 <para>
3817 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3818 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3819 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3820 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3821 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3822 shut as well?
3823 </para>
3824 <para>
3825 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3826 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3827 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3828 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3829 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3830 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3831
3832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3833 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3834 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3835 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3836 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3837 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3838 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3839 great book!)
3840 </para>
3841 <para>
3842 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3843 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3844 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3845 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3846 </para>
3847 <para>
3848 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3849 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3850 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3851 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3852 unavailable?"
3853 </para>
3854 <para>
3855 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3856 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3857 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3858 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3859 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3860 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3861 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3862 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3863 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3864 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3865 found only with time.
3866 </para>
3867 <para>
3868 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3869 just what you call type A sharing?"
3870 </para>
3871 <para>
3872 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3873 effect
3874 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3875 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3876 Napster
3877 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3878 developed
3879 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3881 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3882 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3883 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3884 <!-- f17 -->
3885 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3886 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3887 MHP, available at
3888 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3889 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3890 Fanning's
3891 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3892 </para></footnote>
3893 </para>
3894 <para>
3895 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3896 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3897 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3898 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3899 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3900 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3901 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3902 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3903 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3904 </para>
3905 <para>
3906 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3907 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3908 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3909 content
3910 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3911 technology.
3912 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3913 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3914 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3915 </para>
3916 <para>
3917 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3918 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3919 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3920 composers,
3921 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3922 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3923 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3924 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3925 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3926 broadcast),
3927 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3928 </para>
3929 <para>
3930 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3931 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3932 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3933 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3934 companies
3935 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3936 </para>
3937 <para>
3938
3939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3940 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3941 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3942 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3943 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3944 Second,
3945 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3946 content
3947 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3948 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3949 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3950 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3951 Congress
3952 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3953 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3954 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3955 control
3956 over the future (cable).
3957 </para>
3958 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3959 <para>
3960 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3961 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3962 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3963 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3964 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3965 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3966 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3967 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3968 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3969 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3970 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3971 </para>
3972 <para>
3973 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3974 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3975 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3976 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3977 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3978 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3979 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3980 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3982 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3983 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
3984 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
3985 for the architecture it chose.
3986 </para>
3987 <para>
3988 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
3989 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
3990 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
3991 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
3992 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
3993 copyright."<footnote><para>
3994 <!-- f18 -->
3995 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
3996 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
3997 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
3998 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
3999 </para></footnote>
4000 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4001 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4002 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4003 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4004 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4005 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4006 <!-- f19 -->
4007 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4008 </para></footnote>
4009 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4010 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4011 <!-- f20 -->
4012 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4013 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4014 </para></footnote>
4015 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4016 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4017 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4018 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4019 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4020 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4021 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4022 <!-- f21 -->
4023 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4024 of Jack Valenti).
4025 </para></footnote>
4026 </para>
4027 <para>
4028 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4029 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4030 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4031 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4032 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4033 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4034 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4035 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4036 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4037 technology.<footnote><para>
4038 <!-- f22 -->
4039 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4040 1981).
4041 </para></footnote>
4042 </para>
4043 <para>
4044 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4045
4046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4047 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4048 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4049 Court wrote,
4050 </para>
4051 <blockquote>
4052 <para>
4053 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4054 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4055 market
4056 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4057 authority
4058 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4059 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4060 implicated
4061 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4062 <!-- f23 -->
4063 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4064 </para></footnote>
4065 </para>
4066 </blockquote>
4067 <para>
4068 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4069 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4070 Congress
4071 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4072 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4073 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4074 </para>
4075
4076 <table id="t1">
4077 <title>Table</title>
4078 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4079 <thead>
4080 <row>
4081 <entry>CASE</entry>
4082 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4083 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4084 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4085 </row>
4086 </thead>
4087 <tbody>
4088 <row>
4089 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4090 <entry>Composers</entry>
4091 <entry>No protection</entry>
4092 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4093 </row>
4094 <row>
4095 <entry>Radio</entry>
4096 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4097 <entry>N/A</entry>
4098 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4099 </row>
4100 <row>
4101 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4102 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4103 <entry>No protection</entry>
4104 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4105 </row>
4106 <row>
4107 <entry>VCR</entry>
4108 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4109 <entry>No protection</entry>
4110 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4111 </row>
4112 </tbody>
4113 </tgroup>
4114 </table>
4115
4116 <para>
4117 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4118 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4119 <!-- f24 -->
4120 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4121 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4122 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4123 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4124 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4125 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4126 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4127 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4128 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4129 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4130 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4131 </para></footnote>
4132 In each case, throughout our history,
4133 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4134 work.
4135 </para>
4136 <para>
4137 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4138 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4139 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4140 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4141 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4142 legitimacy
4143 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4144 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4145 the interests at stake.
4146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4147 </para>
4148 <para>
4149 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4150 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4151 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4152 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4153 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4154 regulated?
4155 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4156 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4157 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4158 permission to record a song?
4159 </para>
4160 <para>
4161 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4162 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4163 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4164 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4165 <!-- f25 -->
4166 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4167 (1984).
4168 </para></footnote>
4169 Instead, the particular uses that the
4170 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4171 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4172 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4173 technology
4174 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4175 the distribution of content.
4176 </para>
4177 <para>
4178 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4179 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4180 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4181 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4182 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4183 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4184 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4185 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4186 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4187 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4188 protection
4189 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4190 continue.
4191 </para>
4192 <para>
4193
4194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4195 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4196 superior
4197 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4198 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4199 network.
4200 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4201 efficient.
4202 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4203 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4204 <!-- f26 -->
4205 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4206 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4207 </para></footnote>
4208 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4209 warriors
4210 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4211 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4212 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4213 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4214 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4215 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4216 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4217 </para>
4218 <para>
4219 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4220 just as any other property is protected."
4221 </para>
4222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4223 </sect2>
4224 </sect1>
4225 </chapter>
4226 <chapter id="c-property">
4227 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4228 <para>
4229
4230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4231 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4232 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4233 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4234 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4235 the price she can get.
4236 </para>
4237 <para>
4238 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4239 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4240 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4241 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4242 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4243 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4244 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4245 going
4246 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4247 thing I am taking then?
4248 </para>
4249 <para>
4250 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4251 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4253 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4254 narrow
4255 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4256 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4257 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4258 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4259 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4260 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4261 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4262 <!-- f1 -->
4263 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4264 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4265 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4266 </para></footnote>
4267 </para>
4268 <para>
4269 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4270 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4271 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4272 expression
4273 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4274 property.
4275 </para>
4276 <para>
4277 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4278 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4279 turning
4280 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4281 "property"
4282 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4283 <!-- f2 -->
4284 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4285 intangible.
4286 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4287 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4288 physical
4289 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4290 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4291 Property?
4292 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4293 373, 429 n. 241.
4294 </para></footnote>
4295 </para>
4296 <para>
4297 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4298 preceding
4299 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4300 material
4301 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4302 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4303 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4304 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4305 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4306 us draw.
4307 </para>
4308
4309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4310 <sect1 id="founders">
4311 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4312 <para>
4313 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4314 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4315 Shakespeare
4316 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4317 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4318 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4319 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4320 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4321 adaptation
4322 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4323 </para>
4324 <para>
4325 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4326 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4327 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4328 <!-- f1 -->
4329 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4330 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4331 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4332 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4333 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4334 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4335 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4336 </para></footnote>
4337 Tonson was the
4338 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4339 <!-- f2 -->
4340 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4341 Vanderbilt
4342 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4343 </para></footnote>
4344 who
4345 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4346 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4347 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4349 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4350 copyright.
4351 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4352 produce
4353 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4354 </para>
4355 <para>
4356 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4357 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4358 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4359 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4360 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4361 renewable
4362 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4363 published
4364 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4365 <!-- f3 -->
4366 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4367 "copyright
4368 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4369 </para></footnote>
4370 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4371 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4372 </para>
4373 <para>
4374 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4375 "copyright"
4376 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4377 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4378 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4379 expired
4380 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4381 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4382 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4383 publishers,
4384 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4385 </para>
4386 <para>
4387 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4388 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4389 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4390 govern
4391 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4392 "positive
4393 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4394 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4395 legislature,
4396 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4397 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4398 expired
4399 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4400 independent
4401 of any positive law.
4402 </para>
4403 <para>
4404 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4405 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4406 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4407 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4408
4409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4410 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4411 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4412 ultimately
4413 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4414 </para>
4415 <para>
4416 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4417 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4418 however,
4419 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4420 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4421 "expired,"
4422 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4423 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4424 </para>
4425 <para>
4426 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4427 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4428 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4429 </para>
4430 <para>
4431 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4432 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4433 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4434 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4435 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4436 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4437 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4438 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4439 reason
4440 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4441 </para>
4442 <para>
4443 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4444 special
4445 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4446 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4447 "booksellers."
4448 </para>
4449 <para>
4450 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4451 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4452 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4453 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4454 others
4455 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4456 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4457 beyond
4458 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4460 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4461 restrictions
4462 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4463 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4464 perform, and so on.
4465 </para>
4466 <para>
4467 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4468 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4469 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4470 permission
4471 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4472 anything,
4473 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4474 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4475 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4476 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4477 </para>
4478 <para>
4479 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4480 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4481 especially
4482 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4483 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4484 monopolies&mdash;especially
4485 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4486 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4487 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4488 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4489 Monopolies,
4490 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4491 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4492 publishing.
4493 </para>
4494 <para>
4495 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4496 naturally
4497 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4498 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4499 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4500 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4501 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4502 specialinterest
4503 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4504 </para>
4505 <para>
4506 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4507 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4508 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4509 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4511 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4512 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4513 themselves
4514 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4515 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4516 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4517 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4518 <!-- f4 -->
4519 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4520 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4521 </para></footnote>
4522 </para>
4523 <para>
4524 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4525 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4526 Enlightenment
4527 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4528 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4529 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4530 that idea.
4531 </para>
4532 <para>
4533 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4534 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4535 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4536 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4537 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4538 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4539 compromise
4540 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4541 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4542 construction and spread of culture.
4543 </para>
4544 <para>
4545 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4546 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4547 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4548 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4549 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4550 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4551 they said; they needed more time.
4552 </para>
4553 <para>
4554 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4555 words that echo today,
4556 </para>
4557 <blockquote>
4558 <para>
4559 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4560 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4562 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4563 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4564 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4565 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4566 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4567 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4568 <!-- f5 -->
4569 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4570 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4571 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4572 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4573 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4574 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4575 al., 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4576 </para></footnote>
4577 </para>
4578 </blockquote>
4579 <para>
4580 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4581 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4582 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4583 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4584 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4585 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4586 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4587 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4588 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4589 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4590 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4591 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4592 way to protect authors.
4593 </para>
4594 <para>
4595 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4596 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4597 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4598 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4599 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4600 <!-- f6 -->
4601 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4602 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4603 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4604 </para></footnote>
4605 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4606 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4607 </para>
4608 <para>
4609 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4610 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4611 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4612 <!-- f7 -->
4613 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4614 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4615 </para></footnote>
4616 </para>
4617 <para>
4618 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4619 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4620 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4621 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4622 <!-- f8 -->
4623 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4624 1993), 92.
4625 </para></footnote>
4626 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4628 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4629 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4630 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4631 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4632 <!-- f9 -->
4633 Ibid., 93.
4634 </para></footnote>
4635 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4636 </para>
4637 <para>
4638 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4639 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4640 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4641 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4642 Property."<footnote><para>
4643 <!-- f10 -->
4644 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4645 Borwell).
4646 </para></footnote>
4647 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4648 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4649 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4650 </para>
4651 <para>
4652 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4653 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4654 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4655 </para>
4656 <para>
4657 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4658 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4659 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4660 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4661 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4662 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4663 <!-- f11 -->
4664 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4665 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29
4666 (1983): 1152.
4667 </para></footnote>
4668 </para>
4669 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4670 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4671 </indexterm>
4672 <para>
4673 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4674 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4675 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4676 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4677 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4678 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4679 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4680 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4681 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4682 </para>
4683 <para>
4684 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4685 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4686 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4687 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4688 with in 1710: How best to limit
4689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4690 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4691 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4692 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4693 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4694 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4695 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4696 </para>
4697 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4698 <para>
4699 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4700 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4701 </para>
4702 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4703 <para>
4704 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4705 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4706 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4707 <!-- f12 -->
4708 Ibid., 1156.
4709 </para></footnote>
4710 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4711 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4712 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4713 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4714 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4715 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4716 </para>
4717 <para>
4718 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4719 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4720 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4721 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4722 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4723 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4724 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4725 statute were no longer protected.
4726 </para>
4727 <para>
4728 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4729 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4730 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4731 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4732 House of Lords generally voted.
4733 </para>
4734 <para>
4735 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4736 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4738 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4739 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4740 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4741 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4742 passed into the public domain.
4743 </para>
4744 <para>
4745 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4746 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4747 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4748 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4749 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4750 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4751 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4752 legal restraint.
4753 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4754 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4755 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4756 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4757 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4758 </para>
4759 <para>
4760 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4761 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4762 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4763 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4764 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4765 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4766 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4767 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4768 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4769 <!-- f13 -->
4770 Rose, 97.
4771 </para></footnote>
4772 </para>
4773 <para>
4774 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4775 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4776 reported:
4777 </para>
4778 <blockquote>
4779 <para>
4780 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4781 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4782 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4783 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4784 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4785 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4786 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4787 successors.<footnote><para>
4788 <!-- f14 -->
4789 Ibid.
4790 </para></footnote>
4791 </para>
4792 </blockquote>
4793 <para>
4794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4795 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4796 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4797 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4798 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4799 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4800 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4801 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4802 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4803 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4804 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4805 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4806 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4807 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4808 readers chose to let it develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought
4809 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4810 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4811 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4812 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4813 </para>
4814 <para>
4815 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4816 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4817 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4818 protected.
4819 </para>
4820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4821 </sect1>
4822 <sect1 id="recorders">
4823 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4824 <para>
4825 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4826 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4827 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4828 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4829 He was their god.)
4830 </para>
4831 <para>
4832 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4833 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4834 today.
4835 </para>
4836 <para>
4837 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4838 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4839 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4840 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4841 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4842 stage.
4843 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4844 </para>
4845 <para>
4846 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4847 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4848 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4849 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4851 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4852 about the scene.
4853 </para>
4854 <para>
4855 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4856 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4857 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4858 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4859 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4860 </para>
4861 <para>
4862 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4863 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4864 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4865 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4866 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4867 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4868 </para>
4869 <para>
4870 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4871 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4872 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4873 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4874 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4875 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4876 </para>
4877 <para>
4878 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4879 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4880 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4881 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4882 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4883 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4884 </para>
4885 <para>
4886 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4887 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4888 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4889 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4890 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4891 confirm what he had been told.
4892 </para>
4893 <para>
4894 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4895 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4896 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4897 about
4898
4899 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4900 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4901 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4902 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4903 the money."
4904 </para>
4905 <para>
4906 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4907 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4908 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4909 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4910 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4911 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4912 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4913 </para>
4914 <para>
4915 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4916 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4917 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4918 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4919 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4920 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4921 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4922 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4923 says the owner gets to control.
4924 </para>
4925 <para>
4926 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4927 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4928 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4929 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4930 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4931 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4932 by the law.
4933 </para>
4934 <para>
4935 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4936 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4937 <!-- f1 -->
4938 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4939 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4940 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4941 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4942 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4943 </para></footnote>
4944 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4945 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use does
4946 not require the permission of anyone.
4947 </para>
4948 <para>
4949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4950 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4951 </para>
4952 <blockquote>
4953 <para>
4954 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4955 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4956 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4957 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4958 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4959 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4960 </para>
4961 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4962 <listitem><para>
4963 <!-- 1. -->
4964 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4965 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4966 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4967 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4968 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4969 </para></listitem>
4970 <listitem><para>
4971 <!-- 2. -->
4972 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4973 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4974 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
4975 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
4976 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4977 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
4978 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4979 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4980 principle.
4981 </para></listitem>
4982 <listitem><para>
4983 <!-- 3. -->
4984 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4985 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4986 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4987 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4988 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4989 pockets, me or them.
4990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4991 </para></listitem>
4992 <listitem><para>
4993 <!-- 4. -->
4994 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
4995 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
4996 money.
4997 </para></listitem>
4998 </orderedlist>
4999 </blockquote>
5000 <para>
5001 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5002 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5003 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5004 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5005 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5006 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5007 </para>
5008 <para>
5009 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5010 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5011 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5012 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5013 not.
5014 </para>
5015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5016 </sect1>
5017 <sect1 id="transformers">
5018 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5019 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5020 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5021 <para>
5022 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5023 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5024 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5025 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5026 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5027 </para>
5028 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5029 <para>
5030 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5031 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5032 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5033 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5034 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5035 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5036 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5037 important to his career.
5038 </para>
5039 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5040 <para>
5041 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5042 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5043 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5044 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5045 </para>
5046 <para>
5047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5048 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5049 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5050 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5051 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5052 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5053 </para>
5054 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5055 <para>
5056 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5057 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5058 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5059 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5060 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5061 actor's career."
5062 </para>
5063 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5064 <para>
5065 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5066 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5067 </para>
5068 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5069 <para>
5070 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5071 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5072 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5073 for it."<footnote>
5074 <para>
5075 <!-- f1 -->
5076 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5077 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5078 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5079 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5080 <indexterm>
5081 <primary>artists</primary>
5082 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5083 </indexterm>
5084 </para></footnote>
5085 </para>
5086 <para>
5087 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5088 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5089 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5090 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5091 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5092 </para>
5093 <para>
5094 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5095 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5096 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5097 </para>
5098 <blockquote>
5099 <para>
5100 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5101 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5102 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5103 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5104 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5105 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5106 </para>
5107 <para>
5108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5109 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5110 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5111 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5112 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5113 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5114 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5115 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5116 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5117 started calling people.
5118 </para>
5119 </blockquote>
5120 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5121 <para>
5122 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5123 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5124 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5125 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5126 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5127 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5128 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5129 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5130 career.
5131 </para>
5132 <para>
5133 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5134 were totally in the clear."
5135 </para>
5136 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5137 <para>
5138 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5139 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5140 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5141 </para>
5142 <blockquote>
5143 <para>
5144 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5145 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5146 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5147 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5148 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5149 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5150 systematically and cleared the rights.
5151 </para>
5152 </blockquote>
5153 <para>
5154
5155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5156 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5157 loved it, and it sold very well.
5158 </para>
5159 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5160 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5161 <para>
5162 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5163 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5164 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5165 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5166 at all."<footnote><para>
5167 <!-- f2 -->
5168 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5169 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5170 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5171 </para></footnote>
5172 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5173 has to be made?
5174 </para>
5175 <para>
5176 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5177 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5178 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5179 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5180 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5181 </para>
5182 <blockquote>
5183 <para>
5184 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5185 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5186 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5187 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5188 compensated for that.
5189 </para>
5190 </blockquote>
5191 <para>
5192 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5193 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5194 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5195 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5196 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5197 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5198 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5199 </para>
5200 <blockquote>
5201 <para>
5202 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5203 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5204 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5205 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5207 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5208 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5209 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5210 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5211 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5212 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5213 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5214 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5215 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5216 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5217 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5218 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5219 </para>
5220 </blockquote>
5221 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5222 <para>
5223 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5224 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5225 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5226 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5227 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5228 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5229 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5230 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5231 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5232 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5233 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5234 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5235 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5236 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5237 "Does this still make sense?"
5238 </para>
5239 <para>
5240 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5241 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5242 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5243 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5244
5245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5246 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5247 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5248 </para>
5249 <para>
5250 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5251 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5252 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5253 judges loved every minute of it.
5254 </para>
5255 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5256 <para>
5257 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5258 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5259 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5260 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5261 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5262 were just violated in this room?"
5263 </para>
5264 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5265 <para>
5266 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5267 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5268 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5269 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5270 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5271 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5272 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5273 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5274 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5275 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5276 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5277 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5278 couldn't easily do them legally.
5279 </para>
5280 <para>
5281 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5282 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5283 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5284 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5285 planted in your presentation.
5286 </para>
5287 <para>
5288 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5290 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5291 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5292 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5293 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5294 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5295 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5296 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5297 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5298 </para>
5299 <para>
5300 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5301 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5302 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5303 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5304 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5305 </para>
5306 <para>
5307 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5308 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5309 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5310 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5311 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5312 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5313 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5314 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5315 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5316 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5317 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5318 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5319 registers the work.
5320 </para>
5321 <para>
5322 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5323 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5324 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5325 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5326 </para>
5327 <para>
5328 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5329 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5331 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5332 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5333 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5334 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5335 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5336 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5337 entertainment."
5338 </para>
5339 <para>
5340 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5341 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5342 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5343 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5344 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5345 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5346 new audiences, it is Mike."
5347 </para>
5348 <para>
5349 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5350 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5351 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5352 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5353 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5354 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5355 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5356 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5357 </para>
5358 <para>
5359 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5360 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5361 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5362 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5363 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5364 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5365 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5366 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5367 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5368 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5369 curse, reserved for the few.
5370 </para>
5371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5372 </sect1>
5373 <sect1 id="collectors">
5374 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5375 <para>
5376 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5377 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5378 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5379 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5380 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5381 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5382 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5383 </para>
5384 <para>
5385 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5386 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5387 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5388 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5389 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5390 well as when those pages changed.
5391 </para>
5392 <para>
5393 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5394 appreciated. In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5395 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5396 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5397 reports.
5398 </para>
5399 <para>
5400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5401 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5402 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5403 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5404 </para>
5405 <para>
5406 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5407 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5408 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5409 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5410 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5411 </para>
5412 <para>
5413 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5414 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5415 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5416 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5417 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5418 <!-- f1 -->
5419 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5420 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5421 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5422 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5423 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5424 </para></footnote>
5425 </para>
5426 <para>
5427 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5428 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5429 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5430 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5431 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5432 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5433 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5434 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5435 truth.
5436 </para>
5437 <para>
5438 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5439 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5440 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5441 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5442 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5443 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5444 presumes this knowedge.
5445 </para>
5446 <para>
5447 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5448 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5449 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5450 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5452 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5453 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5454 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5455 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5456 </para>
5457 <para>
5458 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5459 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5460 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5461 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5462 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5463 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5464 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5465 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5466 </para>
5467 <para>
5468 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5469 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5470 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5471 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5472 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5473 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5474 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5475 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5476 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5477 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5478 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5479 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5480 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5481 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5482 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5483 </para>
5484 <blockquote>
5485 <para>
5486 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5487 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5488 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5489 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5490 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5491
5492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5493 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5494 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5495 </para>
5496 </blockquote>
5497 <para>
5498 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5499 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5500 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5501 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5502 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5503 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5504 </para>
5505 <para>
5506 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5507 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5508 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5509 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5510 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5511 work.
5512 </para>
5513 <para>
5514 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5515 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5516 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5517 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5518 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5519 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5520 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5521 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5522 <!-- f2 -->
5523 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5524 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5525 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5526 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5527 Co., 1992), 36.
5528 </para></footnote>
5529 </para>
5530 <para>
5531 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5532 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5533 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5534 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5535 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5536 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5537 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5538 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5539 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5540 </para>
5541 <para>
5542 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5544 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5545 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5546 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5547 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5548 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5549 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5550 events of that day.
5551 </para>
5552 <para>
5553 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5554 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5555 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5556 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5557 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5558 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5559 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5560 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5561 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5562 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5563 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5564 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5565 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5566 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5567 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5568 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5569 </para>
5570 <para>
5571 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5572 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5573 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5574 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5575 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5576 to find them.
5577 </para>
5578 <para>
5579 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5580 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5581 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5582 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5583 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5584 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5585 </para>
5586 <para>
5587 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5588 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5589 life, if the
5590
5591 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5592 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5593 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5594 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5595 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5596 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5597 </para>
5598 <para>
5599 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5600 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5601 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5602 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5603 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5604 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5605 longer sold.
5606 </para>
5607 <para>
5608 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5609 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5610 <!-- f3 -->
5611 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5612 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5613 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5614 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5615 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5616 College Law Review 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5617 </para></footnote>). After
5618 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5619 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5620 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5621 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5622 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5623 </para>
5624 <para>
5625 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5626 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5627 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5628 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5629 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5630 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5631 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5632 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5633 disappears.
5634 </para>
5635 <para>
5636 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5637 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5638 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5639 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5640 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5641 generally, the
5642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5643 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5644 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5645 little practical effect.
5646 </para>
5647 <para>
5648 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5649 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5650 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5651 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5652 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5653 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5654 </para>
5655 <para>
5656 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5657 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5658 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5659 Kahle describes,
5660 </para>
5661 <blockquote>
5662 <para>
5663 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5664 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5665 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5666 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5667 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5668 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5669 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5670 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5671 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5672 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5673 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5674 </para>
5675 </blockquote>
5676 <para>
5677 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5678 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5679 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5680 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5681 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5682 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5683 it;
5684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5685 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5686 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5687 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5688 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5689 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5690 </para>
5691 <para>
5692 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5693 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5694 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5695 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5696 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5697 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5698 </para>
5699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5700 </sect1>
5701 <sect1 id="property-i">
5702 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5703 <para>
5704 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5705 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5706 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5707 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5708 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5709 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5710 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5711 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5712 </para>
5713 <para>
5714 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5715 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5716 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5717 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5718 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5719 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5720 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5721 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5722 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5723 Warner Brothers.
5724 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5725 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5726 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5727 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5728 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5729 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5730 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5731 </para>
5732 <para>
5733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5734 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5735 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5736 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5737 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5738 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5739 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5740 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5741 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5742 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5743 Washingtonian way.
5744 </para>
5745 <para>
5746 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5747 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5748 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5749 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5750 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5751 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5752 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5753 </para>
5754 <para>
5755 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5756 perfectly:
5757 </para>
5758 <blockquote>
5759 <para>
5760 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5761 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5762 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5763 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5764 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5765 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5766 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5767 debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5768 <!-- f1 -->
5769 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5770 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5771 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5772 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5773 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5774 Valenti).
5775 </para></footnote>
5776 </para>
5777 </blockquote>
5778 <para>
5779 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5780 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5781 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5782 this:
5783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5784 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5785 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5786 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5787 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5788 </para>
5789 <para>
5790 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5791 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5792 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5793 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5794 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5795 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5796 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5797 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5798 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5799 Washington.
5800 </para>
5801 <para>
5802 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5803 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5804 <!-- f2 -->
5805 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5806 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5807 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5808 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5809 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5810 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5811 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5812 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5813 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5814 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5815 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5816 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5817 in our tradition.
5818 </para>
5819 <para>
5820 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5821 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5822 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5823 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5824 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5825 culture would develop.
5826 </para>
5827 <para>
5828 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5829 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5830 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5831 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5832 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5833 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5834 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5835 the same would be to
5836
5837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5838 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5839 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5840 perfect control.
5841 </para>
5842 <para>
5843 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5844 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5845 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5846 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5847 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5848 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5849 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5850 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5851 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5852 Constitution itself.
5853 </para>
5854 <para>
5855 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5856 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5857 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5858 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5859 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5860 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5861 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5862 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5863 government pays for the privilege.
5864 </para>
5865 <para>
5866 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5867 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5868 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5869 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5870 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5871 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5872 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5873 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5874 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5875 compensation for your land
5876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5877 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5878 compensation at all.
5879 </para>
5880 <para>
5881 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5882 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5883 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5884 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5885 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5886 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5887 itself.
5888 </para>
5889 <para>
5890 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5891 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5892 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5893 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5894 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5895 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5896 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5897 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5898 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5899 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5900 </para>
5901 <para>
5902 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5903 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5904 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5905 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5906 creative property there must be a public domain?
5907 </para>
5908 <para>
5909 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5910 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5911 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5912 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5913 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5914 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5915 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5916 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5917 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5918 control how culture develops.
5919 </para>
5920 <para>
5921
5922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5923 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5924 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5925 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5926 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5927 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5928 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5929 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5930 </para>
5931 <figure id="fig-1331">
5932 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5933 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5934 </figure>
5935 <para>
5936 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5937 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5938 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5939 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5940 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5941 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5942 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5943 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5944 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5945 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5946 Web, you can be punished
5947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5948 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5949 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5950 </para>
5951 <para>
5952 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5953 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5954 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5955 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5956 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5957 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5958 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5959 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5960 the source of the enforcement.
5961 </para>
5962 <para>
5963 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5964 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5965 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5966 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5967 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5968 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5969 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5970 individual or group might behave.
5971 </para>
5972 <para>
5973 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5974 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
5975 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5976 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5977 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5978 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5979 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5980 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5981 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5982 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
5983 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5984 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5985 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5986 </para>
5987 <para>
5988
5989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
5990 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
5991 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
5992 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
5993 undermined by another.
5994 </para>
5995 <para>
5996 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
5997 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
5998 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
5999 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6000 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6001 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6002 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6003 </para>
6004 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6005 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6006 </indexterm>
6007 <para>
6008 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6009 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6010 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6011 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6012 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6013 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6014 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6015 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6016 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6017 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6018 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6019 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6020 </para>
6021 <para>
6022 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6023 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6024 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6025 <!-- f3 -->
6026 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6027 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6028 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6029 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6030 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6031 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6032 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6033 June 1998.
6034 </para></footnote>
6035 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6036 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6037 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6038 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6039 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6040 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6041 used to require that other laws be more
6042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6043 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6044 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6045 driving.
6046 </para>
6047 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6048
6049 <figure id="fig-1361">
6050 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6051 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6052 </figure>
6053 <para>
6054 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6055 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6056 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6057 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6058 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6059 another.<footnote>
6060 <para>
6061 <!-- f4 -->
6062 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6063 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6064 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6065 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6066 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6067 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6068 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6069 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6070 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6071 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6072 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6073 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6074 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6075 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6076 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6077 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6078 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6079 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6080 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6081 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6082 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6083 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6084 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6085 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6086 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6087 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6088 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6089 of these groups might face.
6090 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6091 </para></footnote>
6092 </para>
6093 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6094 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6095 <para>
6096 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6097 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6098 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6099 rallying makes sense.
6100 </para>
6101 <para>
6102 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6103 Internet:
6104 </para>
6105 <figure id="fig-1371">
6106 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6107 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6108 </figure>
6109 <para>
6110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6111 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6112 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6113 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6114 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6115 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6116 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6117 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6118 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6119 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6120 this form of infringement.
6121 </para>
6122 <para>
6123 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6124 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6125 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6126 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6127 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6128 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6129 </para>
6130 <para>
6131 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6132 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6133 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6134 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6135 Iraq
6136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6137 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6138 looting that results.
6139 </para>
6140 <figure id="fig-1381">
6141 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6142 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6143 </figure>
6144 <para>
6145 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6146 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6147 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6148 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6149 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6150 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6151 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6152 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6153 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6154 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6155 </para>
6156 <para>
6157 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6158 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6159 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6160 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6161 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6162 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6163 life. Homeowners living in a
6164
6165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6166 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6167 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6168 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6169 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6170 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6171 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6172 </para>
6173 <para>
6174 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6175 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6176 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6177 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6178 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6179 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6180 </para>
6181 <para>
6182 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6183 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6184 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6185 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6186 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6187 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6188 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6189 <!-- f5 -->
6190 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6191 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6192 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6193 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6194 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6195 October 2003, available at
6196 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6197 </para></footnote>
6198
6199 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6200 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6201 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6202 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6203 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6204 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6205 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6206 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6207 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6208 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6209 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6210 </para>
6211 <para>
6212 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6213 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6214 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6216 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6217 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6218 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6219 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6220 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6221 <!-- f6 -->
6222 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6223 </para></footnote>
6224 And relative to a
6225 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6226 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6227 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6228 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6229 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6230 Brezhnev.
6231 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6232 </para>
6233 <para>
6234 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6235 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6236 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6237 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6238 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6239 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6240 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6241 opportunities for innovation and change.
6242 </para>
6243 <para>
6244 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6245 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6246 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6247 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6248 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6249 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6250 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6251 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6252 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6253 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6254 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6255 regulation is justified.
6256 </para>
6257 <para>
6258 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6260 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6261 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6262 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6263 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6264 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6265 </para>
6266 <para>
6267 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6268 </para>
6269 <para>
6270 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6271 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6272 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6273 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6274 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6275 </para>
6276 <para>
6277 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6278 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6279 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6280 </para>
6281 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6282 <para>
6283 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6284 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6285 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6286 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6287 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6288 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6289 </para>
6290 <para>
6291 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6292 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6293 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6294 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6295 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6296 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6297 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6298 </para>
6299 <para>
6300 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6301 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6302 culture.<footnote><para>
6303 <!-- f7 -->
6304 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6305 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6306 </para></footnote>
6307 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6308 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6309 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6310 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6311 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6312 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6314 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6315 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6316 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6317 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6318 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6319 </para>
6320 <para>
6321 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6322 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6323 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6324 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6325 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6326 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6327 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6328 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6329 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6330 </para>
6331 <para>
6332 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6333 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6334 be lost.
6335 </para>
6336 </sect2>
6337 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6338 <title>Beginnings</title>
6339 <para>
6340 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6341 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6342 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6343 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6344 </para>
6345 <para>
6346 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6347 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6348 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6349 </para>
6350 <para>
6351 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6352 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6353 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6354
6355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6356 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6357 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6358 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6359 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6360 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6361 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6362 </para>
6363 <para>
6364 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6365 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6366 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6367 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6368 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6369 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6370 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6371 </para>
6372 <para>
6373 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6374 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6375 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6376 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6377 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6378 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6379 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6380 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6381 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6382 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6383 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6384 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6385 power.
6386 </para>
6387 <para>
6388 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6389 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6390 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6391 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6392 years since they first struck its design.
6393 </para>
6394 <para>
6395 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6396 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6398 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6399 started here:
6400 </para>
6401 <figure id="fig-1441">
6402 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6403 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6404 </figure>
6405 <para>
6406 We will end here:
6407 </para>
6408 <figure id="fig-1442">
6409 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6410 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6411 </figure>
6412 <para>
6413 Let me explain how.
6414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6415 </para>
6416 </sect2>
6417 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6418 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6419 <para>
6420 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6421 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6422 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6423 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6424 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6425 authorship.<footnote>
6426 <para>
6427 <!-- f8 -->
6428 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6429 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6430 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6431 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6432 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6433 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6434 </para></footnote>
6435 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6436 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6437 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6438 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6439 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6440 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6441 </para>
6442 <para>
6443 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6444 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6445 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6446 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6447 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6448 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6449 </para>
6450 <para>
6451 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6452 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6453 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6454 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6455 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6456 </para>
6457 <para>
6458 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6459 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6460 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6461 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6462 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6463 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6464 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6465 <!-- f9 -->
6466 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6467 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6468 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6469 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6470 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6471 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6472 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6473 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6474 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6475 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6476 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6477 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6478 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6479 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6480 </para>
6481 <para>
6482 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6483 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6485 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6486 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6487 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6488 copyright, either.
6489 </para>
6490 <para>
6491 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6492 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6493 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6494 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6495 domain.<footnote><para>
6496 <!-- f10 -->
6497 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6498 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6499 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6500 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6501 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6502 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6503 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6504 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6505 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6506 </para>
6507 <para>
6508 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6509 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6510 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6511 <!-- f11 -->
6512 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6513 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6514 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6515 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6516 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6517 effectively free.
6518 </para>
6519 <para>
6520 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6521 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6522 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6523 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6524 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6525 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6526 </para>
6527 <para>
6528 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6529 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6530 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6531 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6532 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6533 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6534 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6535 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6536 </para>
6537 <para>
6538 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6539 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6540 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6541 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6542
6543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6544 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6545 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6546 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6547 </para>
6548 <para>
6549 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6550 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6551 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6552 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6553 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6554 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6555 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6556 value.
6557 </para>
6558 <para>
6559 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6560 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6561 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6562 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6563 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6564 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6565 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6566 was ninety-five years.
6567 </para>
6568 <para>
6569 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6570 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6571 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6572 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6573 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6574 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6575 them.
6576 </para>
6577 <para>
6578 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6579 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6580 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6581 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6582 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6583 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6584 years.<footnote><para>
6585 <!-- f12 -->
6586 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6587 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6588 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6589 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6590 </para></footnote>
6591 </para>
6592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6593 </sect2>
6594 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6595 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6596 <para>
6597 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6598 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6599 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6600 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6601 </para>
6602 <para>
6603 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6604 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6605 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6606 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6607 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6608 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6609 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6610 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6611 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6612 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6613 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6614 </para>
6615 <para>
6616 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6617 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6618 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6619 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6620 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6621 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6622 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6623 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6624 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6625 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6626 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6627 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6628 on the initial creative work.
6629 </para>
6630 <para>
6631 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6632 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6633 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6635 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6636 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6637 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6638 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6639 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6640 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6641 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6642 </para>
6643 <para>
6644 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6645 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6646 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6647 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6648 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6649 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6650 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6651 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6652 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6653 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6654 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6655 original author.
6656 </para>
6657 <para>
6658 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6659 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6660 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6661 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6662 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6663 copy available for others to copy.
6664 </para>
6665 <para>
6666 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6667 differences.
6668 </para>
6669 <para>
6670 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6671 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6672 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6673 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6674 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6675 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6676 <!-- f13 -->
6677 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6678 Creation
6679 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6680 International
6681 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6682 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6683 </para></footnote>
6684 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6685 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6686 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6687 </para>
6688 <para>
6689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6690 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6691 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6692 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6693 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6694 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6695 creative
6696 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6697 restrained.
6698 </para>
6699 <para>
6700 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6701 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6702 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6703 reduced
6704 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6705 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6706 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6707 </para>
6708 <para>
6709 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6710 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6711 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6712 </para>
6713 <para>
6714 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6715 control
6716 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6717 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6718 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6719 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6720 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6721 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6722 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6723 exclusive
6724 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6725 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6726 </para>
6727 <para>
6728 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6729 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6730 expansion
6731 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6732 copyright.
6733 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6734 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6735 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6736 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6737 </para>
6738 <para>
6739
6740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6741 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6742 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6743 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6744 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6745 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6746 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6747 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6748 protect
6749 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6750 <!-- f14 -->
6751 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6752 2003, available at
6753 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6754 </para></footnote>
6755 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6756 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6757 the wrong of direct piracy.
6758 </para>
6759 <para>
6760 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6761 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6762 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6763 transformative
6764 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6765 <!-- f15 -->
6766 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6767 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6768 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6769 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6770 Constitutionality,"
6771 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6772 </para></footnote>
6773 These two different uses of my creative work are
6774 treated the same.
6775 </para>
6776 <para>
6777 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6778 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6779 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6780 creates
6781 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6782 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6783 originally created?
6784 </para>
6785 <para>
6786 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6787 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6788 simply
6789 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6790 rights originally granted.
6791 </para>
6792 </sect2>
6793 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6794 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6795 <para>
6796 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6797 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6798 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6799 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6800 <!-- f16 -->
6801 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6802 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6803 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6804 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6805 sometimes
6806 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6807 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6808 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6809 </para></footnote>
6810 </para>
6811 <para>
6812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6813 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6814 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6815 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6816 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6817 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6818 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6819 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6820 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6821 trigger for copyright law.
6822 </para>
6823 <para>
6824 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6825 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6826 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6827 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6828 <!-- f17 -->
6829 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6830 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6831 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6832 basis
6833 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6834 </para></footnote>
6835 because it is clear that the
6836 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6837 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6838 </para>
6839 <para>
6840 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6841 empty circle.
6842 </para>
6843 <figure id="fig-1521">
6844 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6845 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6846 </figure>
6847 <para>
6848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6849 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6850 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6851 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6852 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6853 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6854 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6855 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6856 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6857 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6858 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6859 not make a copy.
6860 </para>
6861 <figure id="fig-1531">
6862 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6863 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6864 </figure>
6865 <para>
6866 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6867 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6868 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6869 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6870 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6871 diagram on next page).
6872 </para>
6873 <para>
6874 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6875 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6876 </para>
6877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6878 <figure id="fig-1541">
6879 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6880 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6881 </figure>
6882 <para>
6883 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6884 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6885 unregulated.
6886 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6887 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6888 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6889 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6890 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6891 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6892 </para>
6893 <figure id="fig-1542">
6894 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6895 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6896 </figure>
6897 <para> </para>
6898 <figure id="fig-1551">
6899 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6900 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6901 </figure>
6902 <para>
6903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6904 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6905 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6906 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6907 </para>
6908 <para>
6909 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6910 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6911 <!-- f18 -->
6912 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6913 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6914 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6915 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6916 </para></footnote>
6917 And because of this single,
6918 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6919 category
6920 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6921 unregulated
6922 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6923 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6924 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6925 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6926 category
6927 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6928 copyrighted
6929 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6930 burden of this shift.
6931 </para>
6932 <para>
6933 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6934 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6935 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6936 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6937 nothing
6938 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6940 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6941 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6942 produced
6943 a copy.
6944 </para>
6945 <para>
6946 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6947 different
6948 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6949 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6950 copyright
6951 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6952 accidental
6953 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6954 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6955 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6956 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6957 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6958 </para>
6959 <para>
6960 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6961 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6962 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6963 points also become clear:
6964 </para>
6965 <para>
6966 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6967 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6968 presumptively
6969 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6970 evidence
6971 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6972 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
6973 free culture before the Internet.
6974 </para>
6975 <para>
6976 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6977 transformative
6978 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
6979 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
6980 transformation
6981 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
6982 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
6983 releasing
6984 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
6985 justification.
6986 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
6987 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
6988 transformative
6989 uses of creative work.
6990 </para>
6991 <para>
6992 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
6993
6994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
6995 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
6996 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
6997 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
6998 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
6999 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7000 Internet,
7001 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7002 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7003 protected
7004 before because reading was not regulated.
7005 </para>
7006 <para>
7007 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7008 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7009 depend
7010 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7011 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7012 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7013 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7014 protections
7015 of fair use are not enough.
7016 </para>
7017 <para>
7018 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7019 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7020 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7021 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7022 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7023 </para>
7024 <para>
7025 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7026 began
7027 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7028 previews.
7029 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7030 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7031 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7032 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7033 before
7034 you bought it.
7035 </para>
7036 <para>
7037 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7038 distributors
7039 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7040 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7041 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7043 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7044 business
7045 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7046 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7047 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7048 immediately.
7049 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7050 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7051 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7052 </para>
7053 <para>
7054 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7055 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7056 infringed"
7057 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7058 willful
7059 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7060 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7061 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7062 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7063 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7064 </para>
7065 <para>
7066 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7067 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7068 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7069 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7070 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7071 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7072 Disney's permission.
7073 </para>
7074 <para>
7075 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7076 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7077 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7078 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7079 marketplace,
7080 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7081 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7082 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7083 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7084 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7085 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7086 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7087 </para>
7088 <para>
7089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7090 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7091 control
7092 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7093 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7094 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7095 Noble
7096 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7097 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7098 argument
7099 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7100 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7101 exercising
7102 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7103 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7104 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7105 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7106 </para>
7107 <para>
7108 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7109 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7110 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7111 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7112 owners
7113 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7114 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7115 </para>
7116 </sect2>
7117 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7118 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7119 <para>
7120 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7121 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7122 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7123 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7124 </para>
7125 <para>
7126 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7127 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7128 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7129 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7130 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7131 your freedom.
7132 </para>
7133 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7134 <para>
7135 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7136 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7138 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7139 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7140 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7141 <!-- f19 -->
7142 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7143 Contemporary
7144 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7145 </para></footnote>
7146 </para>
7147 <para>
7148 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7149 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7150 you were."<footnote><para>
7151 <!-- f20 -->
7152 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7153 </para></footnote>
7154 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7155 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7156 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7157 </para>
7158 <para>
7159 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7160 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7161 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7162 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7163 </para>
7164 <para>
7165 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7166 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7167 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7168 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7169 copyrighted
7170 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7171 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7172 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7173 that is not at all funny.
7174 </para>
7175 <para>
7176 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7177 </para>
7178 <para>
7179 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7180 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7181 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7182 technology,
7183 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7184 </para>
7185 <para>
7186 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7187 Reader.
7188 </para>
7189 <para>
7190 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7191 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7192 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7193 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7194 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7195 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7197 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7198 called Permissions.
7199 </para>
7200 <figure id="fig-1611">
7201 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7202 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7203 </figure>
7204 <para>
7205 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7206 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7207 </para>
7208 <figure id="fig-1612">
7209 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7210 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7211 </figure>
7212 <para>
7213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7214 According to my eBook
7215 Reader, I have the permission
7216 to copy to the clipboard of the
7217 computer ten text selections
7218 every ten days. (So far, I've
7219 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7220 I also have the permission to
7221 print ten pages from the book
7222 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7223 the permission to use the Read
7224 Aloud button to hear
7225 Middlemarch
7226 read aloud through the
7227 computer.
7228 </para>
7229 <para>
7230 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7231 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7232 </para>
7233 <figure id="fig-1621">
7234 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7235 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7236 </figure>
7237 <para>
7238 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7239 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7240 the book.
7241 </para>
7242 <figure id="fig-1622">
7243 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7244 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7245 </figure>
7246 <para>
7247 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7248 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7249 </para>
7250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7251 <figure id="fig-1631">
7252 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7253 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7254 </figure>
7255 <para>
7256 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7257 </para>
7258 <para>
7259 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7260 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7261 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7262 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7263 under
7264 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7265 <!-- f21 -->
7266 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7267 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7268 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7269 obligation
7270 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7271 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7272 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7273 </para></footnote>
7274 When my e-book of
7275 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7276 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7277 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7278 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7279 </para>
7280 <para>
7281 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7282 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7283 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7284 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7285 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7286 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7287 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7288 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7289 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7290 restrictions:
7291 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7292 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7293 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7294 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7295 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7296 </para>
7297 <para>
7298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7299 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7300 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7301 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7302 </para>
7303 <para>
7304 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7305 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7306 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7307 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7308 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7309 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7310 </para>
7311 <para>
7312 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7313 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7314 technologies
7315 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7316 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7317 protections as well?
7318 </para>
7319 <para>
7320 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7321 eBook Reader.
7322 </para>
7323 <para>
7324 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7325 public
7326 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7327 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7328 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7329 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7330 </para>
7331 <figure id="fig-1641">
7332 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7333 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7334 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7335 </figure>
7336 <para>
7337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7338 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7339 allowed
7340 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7341 "permissions"
7342 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7343 </para>
7344 <para>
7345 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7346 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7347 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7348 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7349 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7350 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7351 </para>
7352 <para>
7353 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7354 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7355 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7356 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7357 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7358 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7359 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7360 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7361 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7362 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7363 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7364 </para>
7365 <para>
7366 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7367 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7368 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7369 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7370 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7371 often crazy.
7372 </para>
7373 <para>
7374 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7375 story of mine that makes the same point.
7376 </para>
7377 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7378 <para>
7379 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7380 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7381 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7382 </para>
7383 <para>
7384 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7385 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7386 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7388 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7389 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7390 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7391 </para>
7392 <para>
7393 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7394 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7395 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7396 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7397 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7398 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7399 </para>
7400 <para>
7401 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7402 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7403 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7404 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7405 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7406 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7407 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7408 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7409 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7410 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7411 </para>
7412 <para>
7413 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7414 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7415 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7416 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7417 ethically.
7418 </para>
7419 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7420 <para>
7421 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7422 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7423 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7424 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7425 than Sony had built.
7426 </para>
7427 <para>
7428 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7429 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7430 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7431 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7432 the
7433
7434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7435 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7436 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7437 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7438 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7439 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7440 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7441 dog to dance?
7442 </para>
7443 <para>
7444 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7445 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7446 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7447 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7448 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7449 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7450 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7451 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7452 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7453 </para>
7454 <para>
7455 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7456 <!-- f22 -->
7457 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7458 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7459 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7460 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7461 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7462 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7463 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7464 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7465 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7466 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7467 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7468 </para></footnote>
7469 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7470 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7471 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7472 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7473 </para>
7474 <para>
7475 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7476 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7477 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7478 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7479 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7480 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7481 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7482 Internet much more.
7483 </para>
7484 <para>
7485 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7486 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7487 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7488 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7489 </para>
7490 <para>
7491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7492 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7493 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7494 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7495 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7496 </para>
7497 <para>
7498 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7499 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7500 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7501 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7502 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7503 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7504 </para>
7505 <para>
7506 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7507 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7508 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7509 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7510 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7511 constituted, succeed.
7512 </para>
7513 <para>
7514 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7515 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7516 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7517 wrote:
7518 </para>
7519 <blockquote>
7520 <para>
7521 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7522 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7523 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7524 </para>
7525 </blockquote>
7526 <para>
7527 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7528 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7529 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7530 </para>
7531 <blockquote>
7532 <para>
7533 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7535 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7536 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7537 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7538 </para>
7539 </blockquote>
7540 <para>
7541 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7542 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7543 spreading such information an offense.
7544 </para>
7545 <para>
7546 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7547 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7548 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7549 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7550 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7551 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7552 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7553 </para>
7554 <para>
7555 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7556 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7557 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7558 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7559 </para>
7560 <para>
7561 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7562 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7563 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7564 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7565 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7566 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7567 have been a copyright violation.
7568 </para>
7569 <para>
7570 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7571 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7572 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7573 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7574 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7575 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7576 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7578 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7579 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7580 </para>
7581 <para>
7582 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7583 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7584 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7585 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7586 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7587 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7588 </para>
7589 <para>
7590 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7591 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7592 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7593 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7594 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7595 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7596 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7597 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7598 </para>
7599 <blockquote>
7600 <para>
7601 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7602 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7603 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7604 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7605 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7606 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7607 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7608 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7609 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7610 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7611 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7612 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7613 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7614 important.<footnote><para>
7615 <!-- f23 -->
7616 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7617 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7618 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7619 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7620 </para></footnote>
7621 </para>
7622 </blockquote>
7623 <para>
7624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7625 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7626 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7627 the VCR responsible.
7628 </para>
7629 <para>
7630 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7631 the DMCA.
7632 </para>
7633 <para>
7634 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7635 </para>
7636 <para>
7637 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7638 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7639 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7640 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7641 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7642 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7643 </para>
7644 <para>
7645 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7647 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7648 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7649 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7650 and bad uses.
7651 </para>
7652 <figure id="fig-1711">
7653 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7654 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7655 </figure>
7656 <para>
7657 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7658 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7659 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7660 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7661 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7662 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7663 </para>
7664 <para>
7665 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7666 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7667 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7668 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7669 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7670 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7671 </para>
7672 <para>
7673 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7674 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7675 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7676 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7677 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7678 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7679 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7680 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7681 </para>
7682 <para>
7683 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7684 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7685 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7686 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7687 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7688 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7689 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7690 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7691 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7692 </para>
7693 <para>
7694
7695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7696 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7697 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7698 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7699 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7700 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7701 <!-- f24 -->
7702 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7703 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7704 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7705 </para></footnote>
7706 </para>
7707 <para>
7708 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7709 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7710 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7711 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7712 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7713 </para>
7714 <para>
7715 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7716 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7717 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7718 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7719 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7720 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7721 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7722 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7723 </para>
7724 <para>
7725 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7726 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7727 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7728 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7729 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7730 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7731 </para>
7732 </sect2>
7733 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7734 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7735 <para>
7736 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7737 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7738 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7739 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7740 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7741 find better ways
7742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7743 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7744 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7745 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7746 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7747 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7748 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7749 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7750 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7751 control.
7752 </para>
7753 <para>
7754 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7755 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7756 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7757 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7758 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7759 </para>
7760 <para>
7761 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7762 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7763 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7764 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7765 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7766 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7767 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7768 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7769 of the media.
7770 </para>
7771 <para>
7772 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7773 nature.
7774 </para>
7775 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7776 <para>
7777 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7778 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7779 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7780 <!-- f25 -->
7781 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7782 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7783 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7784 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7785 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7786 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7787 <!-- f26 -->
7788 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7789 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7790 </para></footnote>
7791 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7792 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7793 <!-- f27 -->
7794 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7795 31 May 2003.
7796 </para></footnote>
7797 </para>
7798 <para>
7799 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7800 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7801 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7802 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7803 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7804 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7805 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7806 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7807 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7808 </para>
7809 <para>
7810 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7811 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7812 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7813 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7814 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7815 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7816 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7817 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7818 protected&mdash; by the market.
7819 </para>
7820 <para>
7821 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7822 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7823 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7824 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7825 </para>
7826 <blockquote>
7827 <para>
7828 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7829 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7830 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7831 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7832 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7833 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7834 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7835 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7836 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7837 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7838 <!-- f28 -->
7839 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7840 2003): 89.
7841 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7842 </para></footnote>
7843 </para>
7844 </blockquote>
7845 <para>
7846 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7847 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7848 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7849 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7850 </para>
7851 <figure id="fig-1761">
7852 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7853 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7854 </figure>
7855 <para>
7856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7857 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7858 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7859 distribute content?
7860 </para>
7861 <para>
7862 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7863 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7864 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7865 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7866 </para>
7867 <para>
7868 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7869 integration may matter.
7870 </para>
7871 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7872 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7873 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7874 <para>
7875 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7876 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7877 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7878 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7879 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7880 </para>
7881 <para>
7882 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7883 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7884 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7885 control.<footnote><para>
7886 <!-- f29 -->
7887 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7888 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7889 Missouri,
7890 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7891 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7892 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7893 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7894 </para></footnote>
7895 </para>
7896 <para>
7897
7898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7899 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7900 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7901 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7902 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7903 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7904 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7905 networks.
7906 </para>
7907 <para>
7908 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7909 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7910 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7911 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7912 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7913 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7914 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7915 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7916 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7917 <!-- f30 -->
7918 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7919 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7920 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7921 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7922 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7923 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7924 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7925 2003.
7926 </para></footnote>
7927 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7928 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7929 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7930 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7931 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7932 63%."<footnote><para>
7933 <!-- f31 -->
7934 Ibid.
7935 </para></footnote>
7936 </para>
7937 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7938 <para>
7939 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7940 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7941 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7942 owned by the network.
7943 </para>
7944 <para>
7945 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7946 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7947 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7948 </para>
7949 <blockquote>
7950 <para>
7951 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7952 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7953 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7954 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7956 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7957 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7958 handful.<footnote><para>
7959 <!-- f32 -->
7960 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7961 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7962 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7963 </para></footnote>
7964 </para>
7965 </blockquote>
7966 <para>
7967 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7968 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7969 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7970 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7971 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7972 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
7973 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
7974 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
7975 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
7976 democracy.
7977 </para>
7978 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
7979 <para>
7980 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
7981 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
7982 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
7983 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
7984 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
7985 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
7986 <!-- f33 -->
7987 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
7988 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
7989 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
7990 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
7991 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
7992 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy 14 (1985):
7993 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
7994 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
7995 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them
7996 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
7997
7998 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
7999 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8000 sprinting.
8001 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8002 </para>
8003 <para>
8004 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8005 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8006 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8007 measure.
8008 </para>
8009 <para>
8010 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8011 suggest the concern.
8012 </para>
8013 <para>
8014 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8015 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8016 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8017 </para>
8018 <para>
8019 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8020 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8021 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8022
8023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8024 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8025 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8026 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8027 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8028 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8029 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8030 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8031 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8032 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8033 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8034 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8035 outweigh these costs.
8036 </para>
8037 <para>
8038 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8039 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8040 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8041 these issues.
8042 </para>
8043 <para>
8044 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8045 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8046 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8047 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8048 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8049 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8050 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8051 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8052 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8053 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8054 </para>
8055 <para>
8056 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8057 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8058 </para>
8059 <para>
8060 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8061 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8062 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8063 war. Can you do it?
8064 </para>
8065 <para>
8066 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8068 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8069 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8070 message will be heard then?
8071 </para>
8072 <para>
8073 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8074 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8075 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8076 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8077 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8078 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8079 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8080 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8081 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8082 <!-- f34 -->
8083 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8084 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8085 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8086 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8087 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8088 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8089 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8090 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8091 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8092 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8093 York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8094 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8095 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8096 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8097 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8098 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8099 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
8100 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8101 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8102 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8103 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8104 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8105 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8106 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8107 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8108 </para></footnote>
8109 </para>
8110 <para>
8111 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8112 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8113 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8114 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8115 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8116 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8117 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8118 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8119 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8120 </para>
8121 </sect2>
8122 <sect2 id="together">
8123 <title>Together</title>
8124 <para>
8125 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8126 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8127 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8128 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8129 </para>
8130 <para>
8131 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8132 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8133 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8134 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8135 to seem
8136
8137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8138 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8139 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8140 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8141 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8142 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8143 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8144 be redefined.
8145 </para>
8146 <para>
8147 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8148 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8149 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8150 our culture today.
8151 </para>
8152 <para>
8153 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8154 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8155 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8156 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8157 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8158 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8159 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8160 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8161 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8162 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8163 </para>
8164 <para>
8165 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8166 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8167 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8168 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8169 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8170 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8171 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8172 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8173 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8174 technology and the market enable.
8175 </para>
8176 <para>
8177 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8178 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8180 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8181 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8182 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8183 the development of our culture than now.
8184 </para>
8185 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8186 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8187 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8188 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8189 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8190 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8191 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8192 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny
8193 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8194 founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8195 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8196 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8197 culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
8198 <!-- f35 -->
8199 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8200 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8201 </para></footnote>
8202 </para>
8203 <para>
8204 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8205 </para>
8206 <para>
8207 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8208 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8209 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8210 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8211 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8212 </para>
8213
8214 <table id="t2">
8215 <title></title>
8216 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8217 <thead>
8218 <row>
8219 <entry></entry>
8220 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8221 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8222 </row>
8223 </thead>
8224 <tbody>
8225 <row>
8226 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8227 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8228 <entry>Free</entry>
8229 </row>
8230 <row>
8231 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8232 <entry>Free</entry>
8233 <entry>Free</entry>
8234 </row>
8235 </tbody>
8236 </tgroup>
8237 </table>
8238
8239 <para>
8240 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8241 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8242 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8243
8244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8245 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8246 noncommercial work was also free.
8247 </para>
8248 <para>
8249 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8250 </para>
8251
8252 <table id="t3">
8253 <title></title>
8254 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8255 <thead>
8256 <row>
8257 <entry></entry>
8258 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8259 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8260 </row>
8261 </thead>
8262 <tbody>
8263 <row>
8264 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8265 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8266 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8267 </row>
8268 <row>
8269 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8270 <entry>Free</entry>
8271 <entry>Free</entry>
8272 </row>
8273 </tbody>
8274 </tgroup>
8275 </table>
8276
8277 <para>
8278 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8279 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8280 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8281 transformation were still essentially free.
8282 </para>
8283 <para>
8284 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8285 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8286 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8287 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8288 we could say the law began to look like this:
8289 </para>
8290
8291 <table id="t4">
8292 <title></title>
8293 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8294 <thead>
8295 <row>
8296 <entry></entry>
8297 <entry>COPY</entry>
8298 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8299 </row>
8300 </thead>
8301 <tbody>
8302 <row>
8303 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8304 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8305 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8306 </row>
8307 <row>
8308 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8309 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8310 <entry>Free</entry>
8311 </row>
8312 </tbody>
8313 </tgroup>
8314 </table>
8315
8316 <para>
8317 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8318 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8319 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8320 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8321 that the law now looks like this:
8322 </para>
8323
8324 <table id="t5">
8325 <title></title>
8326 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8327 <thead>
8328 <row>
8329 <entry></entry>
8330 <entry>COPY</entry>
8331 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8332 </row>
8333 </thead>
8334 <tbody>
8335 <row>
8336 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8337 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8338 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8339 </row>
8340 <row>
8341 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8342 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8343 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8344 </row>
8345 </tbody>
8346 </tgroup>
8347 </table>
8348
8349 <para>
8350 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8351 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8352 creativity&mdash;
8353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8354 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8355 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8356 </para>
8357 <para>
8358 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8359 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8360 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8361 these domains actually does any good.
8362 </para>
8363 <para>
8364 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8365 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8366 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8367 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8368 reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8369 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8370 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8371 rights were more sharply restricted.
8372 </para>
8373 <para>
8374 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8375 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8376 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8377 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8378 property rights<footnote><para>
8379 <!-- f36 -->
8380 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8381 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8382 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8383 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8384 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8385 Press, 1980).
8386 </para></footnote>)
8387 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8388 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8389 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8390 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8391 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8392 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8393 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8394 free culture.
8395 </para>
8396 <para>
8397 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8398 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8399 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8400 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8401 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8402 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8403 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8404 chapter 7). Adding
8405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8406 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8407 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8408 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8409 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8410 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8411 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8412 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8413 dominates the debate today.
8414 </para>
8415 <para>
8416 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8417 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8418 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8419 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8420 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8421 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8422 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8423 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8424 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8425 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8426 lawyer.
8427 </para>
8428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8429 </sect2>
8430 </sect1>
8431 </chapter>
8432 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8433 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8434 <para></para>
8435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8436 <sect1 id="chimera">
8437 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8438 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8439 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8440 </indexterm>
8441 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8442 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8443 </indexterm>
8444 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8445 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8446 </indexterm>
8447
8448 <para>
8449 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8450 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8451 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8452 <!-- f1. -->
8453 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8454 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8455 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8456 </para></footnote>
8457 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8458 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8459 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8460 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8461 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8462 villagers to explore life as a king.
8463 </para>
8464 <para>
8465 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8466 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8467 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8468 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8469 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8470 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8471 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8472 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8473 alone!'"
8474 </para>
8475 <para>
8476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8477 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8478 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8479 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8480 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8481 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8482 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8483 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8484 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8485 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8486 </para>
8487 <para>
8488 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8489 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8490 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8491 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8492 </para>
8493 <para>
8494 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8495 is affected," he reports.
8496 </para>
8497 <para>
8498 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8499 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8500 his brain."
8501 </para>
8502 <para>
8503 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8504 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8505 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8506 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8507 </para>
8508 <para>
8509 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8510 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8511 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8512 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8513 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8514 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8515 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8516 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8517
8518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8519 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8520 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8521 scene. . . ."
8522 </para>
8523 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8524 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8525 <para>
8526 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8527 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8528 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8529 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8530 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8531 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8532 </para>
8533 <para>
8534 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8535 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8536 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8537 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8538 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8539 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8540 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8541 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8542 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8543 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8544 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8545 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8546 </para>
8547 <para>
8548 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8549 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8550 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8551 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8552 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8553 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8554 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8555 </para>
8556 <para>
8557 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8558 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8559 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8560 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8561 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8562 from Tower.
8563 </para>
8564 <para>
8565
8566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8567 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8568 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8569 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8570 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8571 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8572 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8573 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8574 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8575 </para>
8576 <para>
8577 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8578 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8579 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8580 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8581 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8582 </para>
8583 <para>
8584 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8585 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8586 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8587 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8588 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8589 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8590 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8591 implemented.<footnote><para>
8592 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8593 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8594 "Copyright
8595 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8596 at
8597 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8598 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8599 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8600 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8601 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8602 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8603 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8604 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8605 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8606 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8607 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8608 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8609 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8610 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8611 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8612 billion
8613 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8614 Elizabeth
8615 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8616 August 2003, available at
8617 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8618 targeting
8619 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8620 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8621 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8622 D3, available at
8623 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8624 </para></footnote>
8625
8626 </para>
8627 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8628 <para>
8629 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8630 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8631 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8632 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8633 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8634 </para>
8635 <para>
8636 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8637 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8638 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8639 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8640 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8641 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8642 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8643 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8644 </para>
8645 <para>
8646
8647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8648 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8649 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8650 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8651 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8652 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8653 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8654 </para>
8655 <para>
8656 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8657 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8658 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8659 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8660 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8661 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8662 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8663 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8664 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8665 protection for copyrighted material,
8666 </para>
8667 <blockquote>
8668 <para>
8669 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8670 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8671 </para>
8672 <para>
8673 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8674 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8675 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8676 answer
8677 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8678 well produce a totally different industry model.
8679 </para>
8680 <para>
8681 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8682 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8683 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8684 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8685 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8686 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8687 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8688 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8689 interests.<footnote><para>
8690 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8691 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8692 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8693 Protection,
8694 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8695 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8696 EMusic.com),
8697 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8698 Congressional
8699 Testimony File.
8700 </para></footnote>
8701 </para>
8702 </blockquote>
8703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8704 <para>
8705 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8706 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8707 changed.
8708 </para>
8709 <para>
8710 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8711 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8712 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8713 </para>
8714
8715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8716 </sect1>
8717 <sect1 id="harms">
8718 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8719 <para>
8720
8721 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8722 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8723 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8724 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8725 prohibition,
8726 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8727 </para>
8728 <para>
8729 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8730 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8731 extend
8732 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8733 justified?
8734 </para>
8735 <para>
8736 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8737 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8738 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8739 our history.
8740 </para>
8741 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8742 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8743 <para>
8744 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8745 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8746 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8747 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8748 </para>
8749 <para>
8750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8751 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8752 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8753 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8754 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8755 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8756 </para>
8757 <sect2 id="constrain">
8758 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8759 <para>
8760 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8761 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8762 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8763 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8764 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8765 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8766 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8767 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8768 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8769 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8770 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8771 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8772 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8773 </para>
8774 <para>
8775 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8776 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8777 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8778 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8779 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8780 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8781 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8782 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8783 the culture all around.
8784 </para>
8785 <para>
8786 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8787 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8788
8789 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8790
8791 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8792 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8793 storytelling extended across the globe.
8794 </para>
8795 <para>
8796 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8797 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8798 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8799 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8800 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8801 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8802 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8803 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8804 work is presumptively illegal.
8805 </para>
8806 <para>
8807 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8808 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8809 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8810 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8811 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8812 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8813 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8814 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8815 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8816 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8817 million.<footnote><para>
8818 <!-- f1. -->
8819 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8820 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8821 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8822 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8823 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8824 </para></footnote>
8825 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8826 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8827 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8828 suffering.<footnote>
8829 <para>
8830 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8831 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8832 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8833 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8834 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8835 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8836 available at
8837 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8838 recent months.
8839 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8840 </para></footnote>
8841 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8842 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8843 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8844 </para>
8845 <para>
8846 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8847 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8848 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8849 creative
8850 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8851 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8852 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8853
8854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8855 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8856 create,
8857 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8858 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8859 begin
8860 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8861 necessarily
8862 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8863 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8864 "illegal
8865 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8866 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
8867 available
8868 at
8869 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8870 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8871 </para></footnote>
8872 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8873 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8874 critical or reflective.
8875 </para>
8876 <para>
8877 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8878 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
8879 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8880 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8881 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8882 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8883 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8884 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8885 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8886 </para>
8887 <para>
8888 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8889 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8890 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8891 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8892 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8893 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8894 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8895 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8896 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8897 </para>
8898 <para>
8899 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8900 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
8901 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8902 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8903 law regulates such a use.
8904 </para>
8905 <para>
8906
8907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8908 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8909 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8910 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8911 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8912 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8913 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8914 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8915 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8916 </para>
8917 <para>
8918 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8919 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8920 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8921 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8922 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8923 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8924 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8925 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8926 comfort themselves.
8927 </para>
8928 <para>
8929 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8930 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8931 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8932 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8933 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8934 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8935 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8936 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8937 culture that is free.
8938 </para>
8939 <para>
8940 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8941 </para>
8942 <blockquote>
8943 <para>
8944 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8945 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8946 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8947 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8948 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8950 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8951 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8952 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8953 </para>
8954 </blockquote>
8955 </sect2>
8956 <sect2 id="innovators">
8957 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
8958 <para>
8959 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8960 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8961 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8962 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8963 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8964 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8965 </para>
8966 <para>
8967 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8968 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8969 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8970 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8971 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8972 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8973 affecting culture are more fundamental.
8974 </para>
8975 <para>
8976 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
8977 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
8978 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
8979 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
8980 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
8981 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
8982 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
8983 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
8984 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
8985 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
8986 against the competitors of tomorrow.
8987 </para>
8988 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
8989 <para>
8990 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
8991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
8992 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
8993 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
8994 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
8995 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
8996 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
8997 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
8998 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
8999 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9000 </para>
9001 <para>
9002 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9003 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9004 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9005 </para>
9006 <para>
9007 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9008 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9009 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9010 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9011 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9012 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9013 </para>
9014 <para>
9015 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9016 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9017 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9018 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9019 Raitt. And so on.
9020 </para>
9021 <para>
9022 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9023 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9024 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9025 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9026 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9027 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9028 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9029 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9030 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9031 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9032 </para>
9033 <para>
9034 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9035 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9036
9037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9038 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9039 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9040 the kind of content the users liked.
9041 </para>
9042 <para>
9043 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9044 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9045 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9046 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9047 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9048 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9049 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9050 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9051 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9052 they had already bought.
9053 </para>
9054 <para>
9055 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9056 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9057 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9058 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9059 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9060 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9061 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9062 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9063 </para>
9064 <para>
9065 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9066 </para>
9067 <para>
9068 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9069 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9070 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9071 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9072 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9073 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9074 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9075 demanded.
9076 </para>
9077 <para>
9078 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9079 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9080 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9081 clients in this
9082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9083 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9084 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9085 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9086 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9087 </para>
9088 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9089 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9090 <para>
9091 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9092 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9093 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9094 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9095 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9096 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9097 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9098 innovation
9099 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9100 Revolution
9101 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9102 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9103 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9104 Times, 28 May 2001.
9105 </para></footnote>
9106 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9107 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9108 industry
9109 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9110 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9111 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9112 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9113 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9114 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9115 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9116 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9117 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9118 </para>
9119 <blockquote>
9120 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9121 <para>
9122 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9123 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9124 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9125 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9126 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9127 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9128 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9129 <para>
9130 <!-- f5. -->
9131 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9132 2003, available at
9133 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9134 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9135 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9136 </para></footnote>
9137 </para>
9138 </blockquote>
9139 <para>
9140 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9141 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9142 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9143 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9144 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9145 constantly threatened by litigation.
9146 </para>
9147 <para>
9148
9149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9150 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9151 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9152 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9153 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9154 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9155 imposes,
9156 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9157 conservative
9158 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9159 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9160 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9161 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9162 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9163 </para>
9164 <para>
9165 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9166 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9167 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9168 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9169 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9170 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9171 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9172 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9173 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9174 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9175 </para>
9176 <para>
9177 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9178 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9179 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9180 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9181 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9182 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9183 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9184 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9185 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9186 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9187 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9188 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9190 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9191 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9192 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9193 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9194 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9195 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9196 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9197 </para>
9198 <para>
9199 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9200 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9201 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9202 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9203 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9204 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9205 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9206 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9207 </para>
9208 <para>
9209 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9210 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9211 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9212 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9213 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9214 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9215 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9216 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9217 </para></footnote>
9218
9219 Congress
9220 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9221 "broadcast
9222 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9223 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9224 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9225 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9226 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9227 violators
9228 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9229 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9230 </para></footnote>
9231
9232 </para>
9233 <para>
9234 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9235 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9236 regulation
9237 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9238 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9239
9240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9241 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9242 those requirements.
9243 </para>
9244 <para>
9245 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9246 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9247 impose.<footnote><para>
9248 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9249 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9250 </para></footnote>
9251 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9252 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9253 harm than good.
9254 </para>
9255 <para>
9256 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9257 innovation&mdash;again,
9258 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9259 crowd.
9260 </para>
9261 <para>
9262 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9263 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9264 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9265 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9266 </para>
9267 <para>
9268 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9269 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9270 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9271 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9272 2001).
9273 </para></footnote>
9274 overall this history of copyright
9275 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9276 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9277 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9278 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9279 </para>
9280 <para>
9281 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9282 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9283 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9284 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9285 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9286 </para>
9287 <para>
9288 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9289 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9290 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9291 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9292 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9293 copyright
9294 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9295 music
9296 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9297 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9298 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9299 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9300 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9301 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9302 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9303 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9304 </para></footnote>
9305 It has been
9306 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9307 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9308 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9309 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9310 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9311 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9312 August
9313 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9314 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9315 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9316 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9317 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9318 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9319 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9320 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9321 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9322 </para></footnote>
9323 But there is one
9324 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9325 demise
9326 of Internet radio.
9327 </para>
9328 <para>
9329
9330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9331 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9332 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9333 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9334 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9335 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9336 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9337 copyright
9338 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9339 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9340 </para>
9341 <para>
9342 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9343 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9344 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9345 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9346 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9347 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9348 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9349 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9350 recording artists.
9351 </para>
9352 <para>
9353 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9354 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9355 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9356 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9357 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9358 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9359 metropolitan area.
9360 </para>
9361 <para>
9362 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9363 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9364 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9365 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9366 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9367 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9368 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9369 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9370 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9371 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9372 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9373 </para>
9374 <para>
9375
9376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9377 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9378 improvement
9379 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9380 improvement
9381 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9382 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9383 establish
9384 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9385 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9386 </para>
9387 <blockquote>
9388 <para>
9389 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9390 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9391 radio
9392 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9393 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9394 competition
9395 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9396 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9397 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9398 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9399 communications
9400 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9401 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9402 acquire
9403 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9404 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9405 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9406 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9407 </para></footnote>
9408 </para>
9409 </blockquote>
9410 <para>
9411 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9412 Armstrong
9413 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9414 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9415 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9416 </para></footnote>
9417 to
9418 retard
9419 the growth of this competing technology.
9420 </para>
9421 <para>
9422 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9423 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9424 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9425 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9426 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9427 radio?
9428 </para>
9429 <para>
9430 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9431 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9432
9433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9434 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9435 phenomenon
9436 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9437 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9438 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9439 hypothetical
9440 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9441 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9442 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9443 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9444 </para>
9445 <para>
9446 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9447 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9448 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9449 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9450 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9451 <para>
9452 <!-- f14. -->
9453 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9454 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9455 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9456 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9457 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9458 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9459 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9460 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9461 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9462 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9463 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9464 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9465 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9466 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9467 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9468 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9469 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9470 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9471 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9472 </para></footnote>
9473 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9474 equivalent fee.
9475 </para>
9476 <para>
9477 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9478 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9479 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9480 </para>
9481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9482 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9483 <listitem><para>
9484 name of the service;
9485 </para></listitem>
9486 <listitem><para>
9487 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9488 </para></listitem>
9489 <listitem><para>
9490 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9491 </para></listitem>
9492 <listitem><para>
9493 date of transmission;
9494 </para></listitem>
9495 <listitem><para>
9496 time of transmission;
9497 </para></listitem>
9498 <listitem><para>
9499 time zone of origination of transmission;
9500 </para></listitem>
9501 <listitem><para>
9502 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9503 </para></listitem>
9504 <listitem><para>
9505 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9506 </para></listitem>
9507 <listitem><para>
9508 sound recording title;
9509 </para></listitem>
9510 <listitem><para>
9511 ISRC code of the recording;
9512 </para></listitem>
9513 <listitem><para>
9514 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9515 </para></listitem>
9516 <listitem><para>
9517 featured recording artist;
9518 </para></listitem>
9519 <listitem><para>
9520 retail album title;
9521 </para></listitem>
9522 <listitem><para>
9523 recording label;
9524 </para></listitem>
9525 <listitem><para>
9526 UPC code of the retail album;
9527 </para></listitem>
9528 <listitem><para>
9529 catalog number;
9530 </para></listitem>
9531 <listitem><para>
9532 copyright owner information;
9533 </para></listitem>
9534 <listitem><para>
9535 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9536 </para></listitem>
9537 <listitem><para>
9538 name of the service or entity;
9539 </para></listitem>
9540 <listitem><para>
9541 channel or program;
9542 </para></listitem>
9543 <listitem><para>
9544 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9545 </para></listitem>
9546 <listitem><para>
9547 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9548 </para></listitem>
9549 <listitem><para>
9550 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9551 </para></listitem>
9552 <listitem><para>
9553 Unique User identifier;
9554 </para></listitem>
9555 <listitem><para>
9556 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9557 </para></listitem>
9558 </orderedlist>
9559
9560 <para>
9561 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9562 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9563 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9564 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9565 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9566 does not.
9567 </para>
9568 <para>
9569 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9570 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9571 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9572 </para>
9573 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9574 <para>
9575 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9576 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9577 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9578 </para>
9579 <blockquote>
9580 <para>
9581 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9582 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9583 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9584 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9585 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9586 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9587
9588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9589 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9590 Because
9591 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9592 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9593 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9594 of business. . . ."
9595 </para>
9596 <para>
9597 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9598 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9599 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9600 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9601 </para>
9602 </blockquote>
9603 <para>
9604 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9605 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9606 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9607 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9608 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9609 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9610 effective to prevent it.
9611 </para>
9612 </sect2>
9613 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9614 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9615 <para>
9616 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9617 dinosaurs
9618 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9619 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9620 </para>
9621 <para>
9622 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9623 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9624 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9625 </para>
9626 <para>
9627 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9628 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9629 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9630 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9631 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9632 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9633 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9634 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9635 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9636 </para></footnote>
9637 According to the RIAA,
9638 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9639 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9640
9641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9642 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9643 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9644 increasingly
9645 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9646 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9647 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9648 extreme
9649 response by the other.
9650 </para>
9651 <para>
9652 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9653 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9654 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9655 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9656 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9657 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9658 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9659 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9660 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9661 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9662 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9663 was.<footnote><para>
9664 <!-- f16. -->
9665 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9666 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9667 </para></footnote>
9668 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9669 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9670 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9671 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9672 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9673 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9674 they oppose.
9675 </para>
9676 <para>
9677 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9678 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9679 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9680 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9681 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9682 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9683 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9684 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9685 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9686 <!-- f17. -->
9687 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9688 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9689 </para></footnote>
9690 We have
9691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9692 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9693 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9694 <!-- f18. -->
9695 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9696 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9697 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9698 </para></footnote>
9699 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9700 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9701 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9702 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9703 cheat.<footnote><para>
9704 <!-- f19. -->
9705 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9706 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9707 compliance literature).
9708 </para></footnote>
9709 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9710 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9711 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9712 </para>
9713 <para>
9714 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9715 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9716 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9717 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9718 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9719 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9720 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9721 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9722 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9723 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9724 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9725 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9726 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9727 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9728 degree of illegality.
9729 </para>
9730 <para>
9731 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9732 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9733 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9734 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9735 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9736 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9737 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9738 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9739 to consider the alternative.
9740 </para>
9741 <para>
9742
9743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9744 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9745 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9746 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9747 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9748 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9749 </para>
9750 <para>
9751 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9752 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9753 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9754 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9755 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9756 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9757 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9758 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9759 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9760 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9761 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9762 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9763 </para>
9764 <para>
9765 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9766 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9767 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9768 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9769 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9770 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9771 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9772 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9773 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9774 a nation of felons?
9775 </para>
9776 <para>
9777 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9778 </para>
9779 <para>
9780 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9781 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9782 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9783 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9784 used
9785
9786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9787 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9788 recordings is free.
9789 </para>
9790 <para>
9791 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9792 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9793 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9794 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9795 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9796 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9797 capacities of digital technologies.
9798 </para>
9799 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9800 <para>
9801 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9802 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9803 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9804 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9805 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9806 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9807 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9808 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9809 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9810 </para>
9811 <para>
9812 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9813 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9814 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9815 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9816 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9817 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9818 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9819 on people's machines.
9820 </para>
9821 <para>
9822 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9823 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9824 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9825 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9826 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9827 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9828
9829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9830 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9831 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9832 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9833 management" system.
9834 </para>
9835 <para>
9836 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9837 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9838 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9839 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9840 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9841 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9842 freedom to move content easily?
9843 </para>
9844 <para>
9845 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9846 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9847 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9848 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9849 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9850 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9851 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9852 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9853 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9854 </para>
9855 <para>
9856 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9857 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9858 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9859 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9860 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9861 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9862 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9863 </para>
9864 <para>
9865 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9866 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9867 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9868 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9869 </para>
9870 <para>
9871 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9872 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9873
9874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9875
9876 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9877 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9878 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9879 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9880 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9881 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9882 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9883 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9884 generally.
9885 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9886 </para>
9887 <para>
9888 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9889 explains,
9890 </para>
9891 <blockquote>
9892 <para>
9893 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9894 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9895 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9896 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9897 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9898 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9899 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9900 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9901 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9902 </para>
9903 </blockquote>
9904 <para>
9905 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9906 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9907 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9908 </para>
9909 <para>
9910 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9911 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9912 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9913 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9914 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9915 an Internet user is revealed.
9916 </para>
9917 <para>
9918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9919 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9920 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9921 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9922 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9923 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9924 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9925 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9926 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9927 <!-- f20. -->
9928 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9929 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9930 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9931 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9932 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9933 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9934 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
9935 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9936 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9937 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
9938 </para></footnote>
9939
9940 </para>
9941 <para>
9942 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9943 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9944 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9945 <!-- f21. -->
9946 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9947 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9948 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9949 </para></footnote>
9950 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9951 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9952 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9953 </para>
9954 <para>
9955 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9956 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
9957 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9958 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9959 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9960 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9961 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9962 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9963 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
9964 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
9965 to deploy,<footnote><para>
9966 <!-- f22. -->
9967 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
9968 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
9969 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
9970 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
9971 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
9972 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
9973 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
9974 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
9975 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
9976 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9977 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
9978 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
9979 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
9980 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
9981 </para></footnote>
9982 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
9983 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
9984 </para>
9985 <para>
9986 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
9987 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
9988 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
9989 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
9990 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
9991 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
9992 college students
9993
9994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
9995 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
9996 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
9997 Says von Lohmann,
9998 </para>
9999 <blockquote>
10000 <para>
10001 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10002 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10003 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10004 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10005 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10006 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10007 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10008 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10009 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10010 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10011 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10012 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10013 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10014 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10015 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10016 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10017 million of them.
10018 </para>
10019 </blockquote>
10020 <para>
10021 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10022 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10023 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10024 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10025 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10026 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10027 </para>
10028
10029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10030 </sect2>
10031 </sect1>
10032 </chapter>
10033 <chapter id="c-balances">
10034 <title>BALANCES</title>
10035
10036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10037 <para>
10038 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10039 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10040 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10041 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10042 </para>
10043 <para>
10044 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10045 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10046 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10047 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10048 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10049 everything around.
10050 </para>
10051 <para>
10052 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10053 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10054 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10055 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10056 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10057 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10058 </para>
10059 <para>
10060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10061 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10062 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10063 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10064 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10065 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10066 made that is happening all around.
10067 </para>
10068 <para>
10069 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10070 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10071 gasoline onto this fire.
10072 </para>
10073 <para>
10074 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10075 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10076 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10077 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10078 </para>
10079 <para>
10080 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10081 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10082 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10083 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10084 success will require.
10085 </para>
10086
10087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10088 <sect1 id="eldred">
10089 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10090 <para>
10091 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10092 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10093 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10094 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10095 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10096 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10097 come alive.
10098 </para>
10099 <para>
10100 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10101 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10102 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10103 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10104 them available for free.
10105 </para>
10106 <para>
10107 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10108 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10109 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10110 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10111 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10113 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10114 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10115 accessible&mdash;today.
10116 </para>
10117 <para>
10118 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10119 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10120 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10121 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10122 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10123 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10124 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10125 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10126 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10127 commercial publications of public domain works.
10128 </para>
10129 <para>
10130 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10131 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10132 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10133 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10134 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10135 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10136 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10137 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10138 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10139 generally.<footnote><para>
10140 <!-- f1. -->
10141 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10142 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10143 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10144 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10145 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10146 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10147 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10148 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10149 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10150 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10151 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10152 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10153 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10154 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10155 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10156 </para>
10157 <para>
10158 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10159 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10160 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10161 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10162 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10163 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10164 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10165 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10166 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10167 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10168 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10169 </para>
10170 <para>
10171
10172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10173 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10174 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10175 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10176 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10177 <!-- f2. -->
10178 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10179 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10180 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10181 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10182 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10183 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10184 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10185 </para></footnote>
10186
10187 </para>
10188 <para>
10189 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10190 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10191 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10192 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10193 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10194 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10195 to undertake.
10196 </para>
10197 <para>
10198 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10199 constitutional
10200 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10201 interpretation.
10202 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10203 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10204 importantly
10205 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10206 </para>
10207 <blockquote>
10208 <para>
10209 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10210 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10211 their . . . Writings. . . .
10212 </para>
10213 </blockquote>
10214 <para>
10215 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10216 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10217 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10218 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10219 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10220 specific&mdash;to "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that
10221 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10222 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10223 </para>
10224 <para>
10225 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10226 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10227 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10228 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10230 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10231 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10232 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10233 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10234 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10235 </para>
10236 <para>
10237 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10238 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10239 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10240 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10241 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10242 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10243 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10244 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10245 this gravy train going.
10246 </para>
10247 <para>
10248 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10249 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10250 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10251 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10252 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10253 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10254 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10255 </para>
10256 <para>
10257 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10258 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10259 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10260 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10261 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10262 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10263 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10264 published by anyone for free.
10265 </para>
10266 <para>
10267 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10268 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10269 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10270 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10271 report:
10272 </para>
10273 <para>
10274 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10275
10276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10277 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10278 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10279 those works.
10280 </para>
10281 <para>
10282 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10283 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10284 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10285 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10286 </para>
10287 <para>
10288 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10289 about it?"
10290 </para>
10291 <para>
10292 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10293 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10294 they support the bill."
10295 </para>
10296 <para>
10297 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10298 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10299 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10300 much is it worth?"
10301 </para>
10302 <para>
10303 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10304 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10305 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10306 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10307 </para>
10308 <para>
10309 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10310 correct conclusion:
10311 </para>
10312 <para>
10313 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10314 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10315 contributions
10316 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10317 </para>
10318 <para>
10319 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10320 contribute
10321 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10322 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10323 </para>
10324 <para>
10325 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10326 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10327 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10328 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10330 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10331 copyrights
10332 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10333 the copyright term extended.
10334 </para>
10335 <para>
10336 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10337 legislation
10338 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10339 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10340 </para>
10341 <para>
10342 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10343 Copyright
10344 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10345 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10346 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10347 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10348 contributions.<footnote><para>
10349 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10350 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10351 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10352 </para></footnote>
10353 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10354 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10355 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10356 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10357 Age," available at
10358 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10359 </para></footnote>
10360 Disney is estimated to have
10361 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10362 cycle.<footnote><para>
10363 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10364 Congressional
10365 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10366 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10367 </para></footnote>
10368
10369 </para>
10370 <para>
10371 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10372 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10373 reality
10374 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10375 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10376 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10377 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10378 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10379 "limited."
10380 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10381 and again.
10382 </para>
10383 <para>
10384 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10385 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10386 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10387 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10388 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10389 scholars,
10390 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10391
10392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10393 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10394 guns near schools.
10395 </para>
10396 <para>
10397 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10398 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10399 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10400 "interstate
10401 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10402 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10403 interstate
10404 commerce.
10405 </para>
10406 <para>
10407 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10408 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10409 activity,
10410 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10411 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10412 interpreted
10413 to impose no limit.
10414 </para>
10415 <para>
10416 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10417 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10418 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10419 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10420 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10421 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10422 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10423 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10424 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10425 government
10426 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10427 </para>
10428 <para>
10429 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10430 arguments,"
10431 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10432 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10433 </para></footnote>
10434 If anything Congress says is interstate
10435 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10436 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10437 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10438 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10439 </para></footnote>
10440
10441 </para>
10442 <para>
10443 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10444 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10445 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10446 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10447 context
10448 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10449 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10450 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10451 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10452 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10453 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10454 </para></footnote>
10455 And if it is applied to the
10456 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10457 Congress
10458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10459 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10460 existing
10461 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10462 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10463 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10464 copyrights
10465 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10466 existing copyrights.
10467 </para>
10468 <para>
10469 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10470 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10471 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10472 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10473 rejected
10474 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10475 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10476 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10477 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10478 boring.
10479 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10480 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10481 </para>
10482 <para>
10483 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10484 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10485 Constitution's
10486 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10487 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10488 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10489 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10490 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10491 already
10492 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10493 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10494 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10495 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10496 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10497 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10498 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10499 </para>
10500 <para>
10501 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10502
10503 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10504 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10505 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10506 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10507 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10508 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10509 </para></footnote>
10510 But
10511 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10512 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10513 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10514 </para>
10515 <para>
10516 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10517 copyright
10518 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10519 influence
10520 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10521 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10522 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10523 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10524 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10525 bought to extend them again.
10526 </para>
10527 <para>
10528 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10529 extended.
10530 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10531 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10532 society
10533 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10534 Disney's.
10535 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10536 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10537 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10538 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10539 exploited,
10540 and no longer available as a result.
10541 </para>
10542 <para>
10543 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10544 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10545 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10546 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10547 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10548 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10549 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10550 Congressional
10551 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10552 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10553 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10554 </para></footnote>
10555
10556 </para>
10557 <para>
10558 Think practically about the consequence of this
10559 extension&mdash;practically,
10560 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10561
10562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10563 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10564 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10565 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10566 remaining
10567 9,873. What would you have to do?
10568 </para>
10569 <para>
10570 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10571 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10572 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10573 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10574 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10575 list of books still under copyright.
10576 </para>
10577 <para>
10578 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10579 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10580 </para>
10581 <para>
10582 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10583 owners
10584 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10585 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10586 being at least a list?
10587 </para>
10588 <para>
10589 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10590 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10591 practically
10592 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10593 thousands
10594 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10595 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10596 </para>
10597 <para>
10598 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10599 apologists
10600 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10601 owners?"
10602 </para>
10603 <para>
10604 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10605 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10606 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10607 suggesting
10608 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10609 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10610 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10611 </para>
10612 <para>
10613 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10614 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10615 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10616
10617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10618 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10619 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10620 happen
10621 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10622 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10623 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10624 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10625 know quite well who owns what property.
10626 </para>
10627 <para>
10628 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10629 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10630 already
10631 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10632 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10633 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10634 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10635 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10636 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10637 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10638 </para>
10639 <para>
10640 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10641 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10642 consequence
10643 for other creative works is much more dire.
10644 </para>
10645 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10646 <para>
10647 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10648 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10649 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10650 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10651 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10652 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10653 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10654 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10655 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10656 films."<footnote><para>
10657 <!-- f11. -->
10658 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10659 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10660 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10661 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10662 </para></footnote>
10663
10664 </para>
10665 <para>
10666 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10667 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10668 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10669 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10670 </para>
10671 <para>
10672 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10673
10674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10675 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10676 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10677 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10678 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10679 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10680 work available for distribution.
10681 </para>
10682 <para>
10683 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10684 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10685 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10686 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10687 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10688 mm film.<footnote><para>
10689 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10690 Supporting
10691 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10692 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10693 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10694 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10695 </para></footnote>
10696
10697 </para>
10698 <para>
10699 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10700 important.
10701 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10702 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10703 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10704 locate the copyright owner.
10705 </para>
10706 <para>
10707 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10708 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10709 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10710 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10711 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10712 exceptionally
10713 high.
10714 </para>
10715 <para>
10716 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10717 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10718 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10719 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10720 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10721 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10722 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10723 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10724 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10725 </para>
10726 <para>
10727 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10728
10729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10730 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10731 benefit
10732 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10733 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10734 the copyright expires.
10735 </para>
10736 <para>
10737 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10738 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10739 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10740 canisters
10741 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10742 than dust.
10743 </para>
10744 <para>
10745 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10746 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10747 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10748 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10749 creative
10750 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10751 free expression."
10752 </para>
10753 <para>
10754 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10755 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10756 indicated,
10757 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10758 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10759 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10760 distributors,
10761 the commercial life ends.
10762 </para>
10763 <para>
10764 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10765 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10766 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10767 between
10768 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10769 Friday
10770 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10771 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10772 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10773 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10774 have, we need to have access to this history.
10775 </para>
10776 <para>
10777 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10778
10779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10780 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10781 this context do no good.
10782 </para>
10783 <para>
10784 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10785 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10786 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10787 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10788 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10789 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10790 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10791 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10792 </para>
10793 <para>
10794 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10795 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10796 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10797 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10798 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10799 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10800 market didn't have more to offer.
10801 </para>
10802 <para>
10803 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10804 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10805 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10806 would not have interfered with anything.
10807 </para>
10808 <para>
10809 But this situation has now changed.
10810 </para>
10811 <para>
10812 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10813 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10814 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10815 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10816 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10817 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10818 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10819 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10820 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10821 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10822 </para>
10823 <para>
10824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10825 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10826 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10827 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10828 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10829 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10830 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10831 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10832 written for a radically different context.
10833 </para>
10834 <para>
10835 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10836 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10837 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10838 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10839 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10840 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10841 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10842 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10843 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10844 </para>
10845 <para>
10846 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10847 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10848 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10849 culture widely?"
10850 </para>
10851 <para>
10852 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10853 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10854 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10855 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10856 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10857 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10858 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10859 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10860 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10861 </para>
10862 <para>
10863 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10864 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10865 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10866 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10867
10868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10869 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10870 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10871 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10872 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10873 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10874 <!-- f13. -->
10875 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10876 December 2002, available at
10877 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10878 </para></footnote>
10879
10880 </para>
10881 <para>
10882 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10883 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10884 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10885 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10886 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10887 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10888 </para>
10889 <para>
10890 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10891 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10892 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10893 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10894 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10895 </para>
10896 <para>
10897 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10898 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10899 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10900 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10901 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10902 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10903 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10904 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10905 power to extend existing terms.
10906 </para>
10907 <para>
10908 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10909 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10910 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10911 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10912 </para>
10913 <para>
10914 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10915 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10916
10917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10918 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10919 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10920 overstepped its bounds.
10921 </para>
10922 <para>
10923 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10924 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10925 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10926 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10927 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10928 </para>
10929 <para>
10930 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10931 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10932 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10933 briefs and preparing for argument.
10934 </para>
10935 <para>
10936 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10937 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10938 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10939 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10940 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10941 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10942 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10943 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10944 </para>
10945 <para>
10946 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10947 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10948 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10949 mistake lost it.
10950 </para>
10951 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10952 <para>
10953 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10954 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10955 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10956 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10957 heat
10958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10959 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10960 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10961 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10962 </para>
10963 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
10964 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
10965 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10966 <para>
10967 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
10968 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
10969 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
10970 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
10971 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
10972 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
10973 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
10974 most powerful media companies in the world."
10975 </para>
10976 <para>
10977 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
10978 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
10979 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
10980 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
10981 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
10982 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
10983 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
10984 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
10985 interpretation
10986 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
10987 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
10988 unconstitutional,
10989 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
10990 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
10991 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
10992 Constitution,
10993 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
10994 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
10995 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
10996 </para>
10997 <para>
10998 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
10999 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11000 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11001 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11002 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11003 why it was unconstitutional.
11004 </para>
11005 <para>
11006 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11007
11008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11009 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11010 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11011 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11012 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11013 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11014 minority.
11015 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11016 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11017 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11018 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11019 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11020 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11021 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11022 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11023 </para>
11024 <para>
11025 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11026 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11027 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11028 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11029 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11030 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11031 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11032 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11033 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11034 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11035 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11036 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11037 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11038 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11039 </para>
11040 <para>
11041 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11042 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11043 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11044 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11045 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11046 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11047 </para>
11048 <para>
11049 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11050 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11051
11052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11053 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11054 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11055 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11056 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11057 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11058 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11059 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11060 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11061 </para>
11062 <para>
11063 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11064 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11065 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11066 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11067 </para>
11068 <para>
11069 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11070 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11071 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11072 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11073 clear.
11074 </para>
11075 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11076 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11077 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11078 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11079 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11080 <para>
11081 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11082 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11083 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11084 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11085 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11086 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11087 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11088 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11089 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11090 </para>
11091 <para>
11092 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11093 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11094 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11095 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11096 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11097 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11098 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11099 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11100
11101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11102 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11103 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11104 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11105 </para>
11106 <para>
11107 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11108 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11109 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11110 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11111 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11112 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11113 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11114 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11115 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11116 confidence in our argument.
11117 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11118 </para>
11119 <para>
11120 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11121 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11122 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11123 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11124 copyright holders.
11125 </para>
11126 <para>
11127 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11128 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11129 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11130 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11131 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11132 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11133 wanted to control.
11134 </para>
11135 <para>
11136 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11137 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11138 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11139 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11140 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11141 pornography."<footnote><para>
11142 <!-- f14. -->
11143 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11144 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11145 </para></footnote>
11146 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11147 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11148 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11149 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11150 <!-- f15. -->
11151 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11152 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11153 </para></footnote>
11154 That's
11155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11156 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11157 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11158 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11159 </para>
11160 <para>
11161 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11162 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11163 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11164 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11165 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11166 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11167 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11168 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11169 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11170 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11171 </para>
11172 <para>
11173 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11174 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11175 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11176 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11177 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11178 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11179 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11180 </para>
11181 <para>
11182 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11183 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11184 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11185 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11186 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11187 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11188 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11189 powers had limits.
11190 </para>
11191 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11192 <para>
11193 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11194 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11195 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11196 the Constitution
11197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11198 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11199 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11200 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11201 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11202 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11203 </para>
11204 <para>
11205 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11206 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11207 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11208 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11209 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11210 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11211 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11212 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11213 sense.
11214 </para>
11215 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11216 <para>
11217 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11218 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11219 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11220 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11221 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11222 these retrospective extensions.
11223 </para>
11224 <para>
11225 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11226 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11227 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11228 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11229 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11230 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11231 </para>
11232 <para>
11233 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11234 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11235 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11236 overriding
11237 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11238 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11239 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11240 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11241 </para>
11242 <para>
11243 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11244 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11245
11246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11247 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11248 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11249 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11250 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11251 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11252 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11253 copyright be limited.
11254 </para>
11255 <para>
11256 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11257 Congress
11258 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11259 government
11260 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11261 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11262 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11263 </para>
11264 <para>
11265 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11266 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11267 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11268 existing
11269 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11270 </para>
11271 <para>
11272 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11273 extended
11274 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11275 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11276 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11277 existing
11278 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11279 restraint
11280 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11281 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11282 hesitated
11283 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11284 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11285 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11286 arrived
11287 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11288 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11289
11290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11291 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11292 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11293 </para>
11294 <para>
11295 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11296 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11297 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11298 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11299 Congress
11300 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11301 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11302 this central idea.
11303 </para>
11304 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11305 <para>
11306 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11307 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11308 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11309 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11310 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11311 </para>
11312 <para>
11313 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11314 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11315 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11316 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11317 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11318 </para>
11319 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11320 <para>
11321 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11322 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11323 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11324 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11325 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11326 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11327 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11328 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11329 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11330 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11331 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11332
11333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11334 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11335 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11336 </para>
11337 <para>
11338 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11339 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11340 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11341 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11342 congressmen
11343 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11344 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11345 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11346 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11347 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11348 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11349 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11350 family of the Justices.
11351 </para>
11352 <para>
11353 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11354 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11355 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11356 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11357 </para>
11358 <para>
11359 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11360 The history was bothering her.
11361 </para>
11362 <blockquote>
11363 <para>
11364 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11365 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11366 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11367 practice that began with the very first act.
11368 </para>
11369 </blockquote>
11370 <para>
11371 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11372 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11373 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11374 </para>
11375 <blockquote>
11376 <para>
11377 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11378 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11380 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11381 is yes.
11382 </para>
11383 </blockquote>
11384 <para>
11385 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11386 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11387 Kennedy, who observed,
11388 </para>
11389 <blockquote>
11390 <para>
11391 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11392 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11393 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11394 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11395 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11396 </para>
11397 </blockquote>
11398 <para>
11399 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11400 student,
11401 I answered,
11402 </para>
11403 <blockquote>
11404 <para>
11405 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11406 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11407 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11408 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11409 effectively
11410 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11411 </para>
11412 </blockquote>
11413 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11414 <para>
11415 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11416 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11417 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11418 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11419 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11420 </para>
11421 <para>
11422 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11423 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11424 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11425 </para>
11426 <para>
11427 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11428 sympathetic.
11429 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11430
11431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11432 </para>
11433 <blockquote>
11434 <para>
11435 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11436 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11437 </para>
11438 <para>
11439 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11440 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11441 domain
11442 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11443 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11444 into the Copyright Clause.
11445 </para>
11446 </blockquote>
11447 <para>
11448 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11449 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11450 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11451 </para>
11452 <blockquote>
11453 <para>
11454 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11455 unlimited
11456 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11457 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11458 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11459 an unlimited time.
11460 </para>
11461 </blockquote>
11462 <para>
11463 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11464 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11465 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11466 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11467 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11468 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11469 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11470 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11471 specific
11472 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11473 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11474 </para>
11475 <para>
11476 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11477 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11478
11479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11480 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11481 optimistic.
11482 </para>
11483 <para>
11484 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11485 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11486 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11487 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11488 believed
11489 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11490 Copyright
11491 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11492 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11493 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11494 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11495 Copyright
11496 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11497 believe
11498 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11499 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11500 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11501 </para>
11502 <para>
11503 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11504 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11505 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11506 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11507 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11508 </para>
11509 <para>
11510 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11511 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11512 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11513 </para>
11514 <para>
11515 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11516 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11517 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11518 </para>
11519 <para>
11520 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11521 distinguish
11522 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11523 argument
11524 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11525 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11526 in the Court's opinion.
11527 </para>
11528 <para>
11529
11530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11531 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11532 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11533 generally,
11534 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11535 </para>
11536 <para>
11537 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11538 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11539 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11540 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11541 </para>
11542 <para>
11543 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11544 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11545 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11546 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11547 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11548 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11549 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11550 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11551 would not.
11552 </para>
11553 <para>
11554 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11555 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11556 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11557 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11558 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11559 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11560 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11561 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11562 the system we have.
11563 </para>
11564 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11565 <para>
11566 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11567 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11568 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11569 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11570 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11571 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11572 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11573 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11574 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11575 </para>
11576 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11577 <para>
11578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11579 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11580 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11581 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11582 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11583 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11584 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11585 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11586 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11587 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11588 </para>
11589 <para>
11590 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11591 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11592 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11593 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11594 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11595 </para>
11596 <para>
11597 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11598 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11599 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11600 </para>
11601 <para>
11602 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11603 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11604 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11605 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11606 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11607 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11608 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11609 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11610 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11611 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11612 "originalism" now?
11613 </para>
11614 <para>
11615 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11616 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11617 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11618 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11619
11620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11621 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11622 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11623 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11624 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11625 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11626 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11627 own principles.
11628 </para>
11629 <para>
11630 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11631 myself.
11632 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11633 the law as it is.
11634 </para>
11635 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11636 <para>
11637 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11638 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11639 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11640 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11641 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11642 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11643 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11644 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11645 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11646 </para>
11647 <para>
11648 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11649 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11650 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11651 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11652 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11653 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11654 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11655 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11656 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11657 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11658 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11659 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11660 effort to persuade; but I
11661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11662 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11663 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11664 should decide the issue.
11665 </para>
11666 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11667 <para>
11668 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11669 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11670 Kathleen Sullivan?
11671 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11672 </para>
11673 <para>
11674 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11675 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11676 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11677 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11678 </para>
11679 <para>
11680 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11681 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11682 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11683 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11684 have persuaded.
11685 </para>
11686 <para>
11687 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11688 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11689 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11690 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11691 issue should not be raised until it is.
11692 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11693 </para>
11694 <para>
11695 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11696 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11697 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11698 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11699 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11700 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11701 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11702 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11703 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11704 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11705 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11706
11707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11708 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11709 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11710 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11711 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11712 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11713 </para>
11714 <blockquote>
11715 <para>
11716 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11717 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11718 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11719 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11720 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11721 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11722 </para>
11723 </blockquote>
11724 <para>
11725 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11726 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11727 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11728 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11729 in the face felt exactly like that.
11730 </para>
11731 <para>
11732 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11733 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11734 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11735 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11736 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11737 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11738 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11739 </para>
11740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11741 </sect1>
11742 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11743 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11744 <para>
11745 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11746 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11747 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11748 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11749 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11750 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11751 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11752 </para>
11753 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11754 <para>
11755 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11756 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11757 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11758 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11759 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11760 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11761 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11762 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11763 </para>
11764 <para>
11765 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11766 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11768 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11769 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11770 the work passed into the public domain.
11771 </para>
11772 <para>
11773 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11774 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11775 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11776 </para>
11777 <para>
11778 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11779 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11780 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11781 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11782 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11783 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11784 everything else, let the content go.
11785 </para>
11786 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11787 <para>
11788 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11789 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11790 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11791 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11792 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11793 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11794 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11795 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11796 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11797 the stupid harm of the present system.
11798 </para>
11799 <para>
11800 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11801 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11802 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11803 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11804 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11805 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11806 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11807 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11808 where copyright owners could be identified.
11809 </para>
11810 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11811 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11812 <para>
11813 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11814 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11815 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11816 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11817 <!-- f1. -->
11818 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11819 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11820 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11821 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11822 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11823 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11824 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11825 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11826 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11827 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11828 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11829 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11830 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11831 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11832 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11833 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11834 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11835 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11836 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11837 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11838 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11839 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11840 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11841 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11842 </para>
11843 <para>
11844 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11845 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11846 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11847 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11848 know what's protected and what's not.
11849 </para>
11850 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11851 <para>
11852 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11853 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11854 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11855 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11856 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11857 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11858 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11859 in the loss of widows' only income.
11860 </para>
11861 <para>
11862 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11863 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11864 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11865 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11866 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11867 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11868 </para>
11869 <para>
11870 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11871 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11872 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11873 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11874 burden
11875 imposed upon creators.
11876 </para>
11877 <para>
11878 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11879 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11880
11881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11882 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11883 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11884 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11885 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11886 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11887 table.
11888 </para>
11889 <para>
11890 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11891 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11892 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11893 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11894 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11895 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11896 spread.
11897 </para>
11898 <para>
11899 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11900 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11901 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11902 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11903 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11904 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11905 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11906 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11907 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11908 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11909 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11910 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11911 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11912 system of protection for property generally.
11913 </para>
11914 <para>
11915 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11916 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11917 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11918 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11919 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11920 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11921 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11922 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11923
11924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11925 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11926 take their place.
11927 </para>
11928 <para>
11929 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11930 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11931 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11932 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11933 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11934 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11935 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11936 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11937 </para>
11938 <para>
11939 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11940 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11941 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11942 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11943 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11944 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11945 seen before because there are no formalities.
11946 </para>
11947 <para>
11948 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11949 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11950 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11951 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11952 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11953 </para>
11954 <para>
11955 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11956 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11957 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11958 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11959 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
11960 </para>
11961 <para>
11962 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11963 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11964 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
11965 registration?
11966 </para>
11967 <para>
11968 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
11969 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
11970 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
11971
11972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
11973 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
11974 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
11975 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
11976 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
11977 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
11978 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
11979 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
11980 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
11981 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
11982 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
11983 </para>
11984 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11985 <para>
11986 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
11987 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
11988 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
11989 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
11990 </para>
11991 <para>
11992 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
11993 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
11994 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
11995 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
11996 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
11997 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
11998 something good might happen here.
11999 </para>
12000 <para>
12001 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12002 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12003 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12004 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12005 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12006 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12007 </para>
12008 <para>
12009 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12010 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12011 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12013 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12014 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12015 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12016 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12017 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12018 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12019 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12020 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12021 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12022 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12023 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12024 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12025 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12026 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12027 film is a valid derivative use.
12028 </para>
12029 <para>
12030 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12031 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12032 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12033 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12034 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12035 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12036 </para>
12037 <para>
12038 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12039 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12040 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12041 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12042 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12043 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12044 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12045 threat.
12046 </para>
12047 <para>
12048 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12049 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12050 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12051 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12052 sense?
12053 </para>
12054 <para>
12055
12056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12057 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12058 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12059 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12060 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12061 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12062 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12063 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12064 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12065 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12066 </para>
12067 <para>
12068 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12069 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12070 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12071 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12072 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12073 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12074 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12075 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12076 </para>
12077 <para>
12078 What does this industry really want?
12079 </para>
12080 <para>
12081 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12082 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12083 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12084 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12085 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12086 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12087 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12088 permission first.
12089 </para>
12090 <para>
12091 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12092 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12093 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12094 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12095 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12096 </para>
12097 <para>
12098 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12099 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12100
12101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12102 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12103 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12104 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12105 and to share its own creation.
12106 </para>
12107 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12108 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12109 <para>
12110 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12111 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12112 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12113 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12114 block the progress of others.
12115 </para>
12116 <para>
12117 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12118 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12119 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12120 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12121 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12122 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12123 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12124 </para>
12125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12126 </sect1>
12127 </chapter>
12128 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12129 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12130 <para>
12131 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12132 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12133 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12134 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12135 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12136 </para>
12137 <para>
12138 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12139 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12140 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12141 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12142 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12143 the disease almost invisible.
12144 </para>
12145 <para>
12146 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12147 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12148 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12149 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12150 population:
12151 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12152 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12153 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12154 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12155 available at
12156 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12157 release
12158 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12159 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12160 </para></footnote>
12161 </para>
12162 <para>
12163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12164 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12165 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12166 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12167 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12168 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12169 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12170 </para>
12171 <para>
12172 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12173 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12174 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12175 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12176 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12177 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12178 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12179 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12180 changes.
12181 </para>
12182 <para>
12183 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12184 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12185 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12186 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12187 costs significantly below the market price.
12188 </para>
12189 <para>
12190 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12191 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12192 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12193 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12194 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12195 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12196 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12197 <para>
12198 <!-- f2. -->
12199 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12200 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12201 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12202 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12203 </para></footnote>
12204 </para>
12205 <para>
12206 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12207 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12208 Association
12209 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12210 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12211 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12212 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12213 Prepared
12214 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12215 2000), 14, available at
12216 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12217 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12218 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12219 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12220 (statement of James Love).
12221 </para></footnote>
12222 Through the
12223 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12224 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12225 request,
12226 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12228 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12229 began
12230 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12231 government's
12232 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12233 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12234 companies,
12235 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12236 international
12237 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12238 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12239 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12240 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12241 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12242 <!-- f4. -->
12243 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12244 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12245 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12246 Organization (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12247 </para>
12248 <para>
12249 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12250 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12251 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12252 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12253 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12254 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12255 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12256 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12257 </para>
12258 <para>
12259 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12260 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12261 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12262 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12263 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12264 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12265 </para>
12266 <para>
12267 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12268 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12269 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12270 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12271 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12272 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12273 by U.S. companies.
12274 </para>
12275 <para>
12276 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12277 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12278 argument
12279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12280 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12281 <!-- f5. -->
12282 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12283 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12284 May 1999, A1, available at
12285 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12286 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12287 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12288 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12289 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12290 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12291 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12292 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12293 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12294 Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12296 </para></footnote>
12297 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12298 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12299 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12300 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12301 </para>
12302 <para>
12303 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12304 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12305 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12306 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12307 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12308 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12309 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12310 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12311 </para>
12312 <para>
12313 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12314 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12315 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12316 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12317 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12318 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12319 </para>
12320 <para>
12321 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12322 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12323 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12324 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12325 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12326 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12327 </para>
12328 <para>
12329 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12330 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12331 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12332 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12333 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12334 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12335 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12336 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12338 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12339 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12340 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12341 idea called "intellectual property."
12342 </para>
12343 <para>
12344 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12345 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12346 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12347 What is the argument?
12348 </para>
12349 <para>
12350 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12351 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12352 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12353 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12354 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12355 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12356 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12357 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12358 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12359 were balanced in just this sense.
12360 </para>
12361 <para>
12362 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12363 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12364 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12365 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12366 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12367 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12368 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12369 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12370 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12371 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12372 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12373 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12374 our
12375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12376 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12377 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12378 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12379 this common sense open its eyes.
12380 </para>
12381 <para>
12382 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12383 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12384 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12385 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12386 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12387 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12388 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12389 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12390 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12391 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12392 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12393 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12394 </para>
12395 <para>
12396 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12397 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12398 meeting.<footnote><para>
12399 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12400 August 2003, E1, available at
12401 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12402 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12403 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12404 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12405 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12406 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12407 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12408 </para></footnote>
12409 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12410 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12411 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12412 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12413 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12414 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12415 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12416 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12417 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12418 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12419 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12420 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12421 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12423 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12424 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12425 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12426 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12427 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12428 </para>
12429 <para>
12430 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12431 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12432 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12433 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12434 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12435 </para>
12436 <para>
12437 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12438 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12439 meeting.
12440 </para></footnote>
12441 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12442 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12443 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12444 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12445 property issues.
12446 </para>
12447 <para>
12448 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12449 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12450 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12451 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12452 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12453 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12454 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12455 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12456 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12457 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12458 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12459 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12460 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12461 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12462 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12463 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12464 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12465 stuff of
12466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12467 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12468 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12469 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12470 </para>
12471 <para>
12472 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12473 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12474 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12475 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12476 </para>
12477 <para>
12478 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12479 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12480 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12481 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12482 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12483 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12484 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12485 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12486 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12487 </para>
12488 <para>
12489 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12490 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12491 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12492 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12493 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12494 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12495 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12496 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12497 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12498 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12499 <!-- f8. -->
12500 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12501 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12502 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12503 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12504 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12505 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12506 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," Government Policy
12507 Toward Open Source Software (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12508 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12509 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12510 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12511 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, The Commercial Software
12512 Model, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12513 May 2001), available at
12514 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12515 </para></footnote>
12516 </para>
12517 <para>
12518 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12519 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12520 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12521 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12522 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12523 by
12524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12525 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12526 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12527 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12528 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12529 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12530 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12531 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12532 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12533 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12534 </para>
12535 <para>
12536 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12537 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12538 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12539 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12540 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12541 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12542 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12543 <!-- f9. -->
12544 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12545 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12546 </para></footnote>
12547 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12548 </para>
12549 <para>
12550 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12551 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12552 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12553 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12554 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12555 its lobbying efforts.
12556 </para>
12557 <para>
12558 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12559 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12560 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12561 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12562 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12563 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12564 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12565 goals of WIPO."
12566 </para>
12567 <para>
12568 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12569 </para>
12570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12571 <para>
12572 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12573 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12574 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12575 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12576 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12577 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12578 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12579 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12580 </para>
12581 <para>
12582 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12583 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12584 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12585 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12586 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12587 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12588 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12589 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12590 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12591 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12592 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12593 </para>
12594 <para>
12595 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12596 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12597 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12598 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12599 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12600 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12601 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12602 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12603 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12604 right to decide what to do with their property.
12605 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12606 </para>
12607 <para>
12608 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12609 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12610 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12612 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12613 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12614 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12615 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12616 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12617 way possible.
12618 </para>
12619 <para>
12620 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12621 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12622 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12623 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12624 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12625 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12626 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12627 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12628 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12629 that control.
12630 </para>
12631 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12632 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12633 <para>
12634 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12635 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12636 <!-- f10. -->
12637 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12638 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12639 </para></footnote>
12640 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12641 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12642 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12643 </para>
12644 <para>
12645 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12646 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12647 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12648 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12649 </para>
12650 <blockquote>
12651 <para>
12652 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12653 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12654 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12655 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12656 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12657 say anything wrong. But in the world
12658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12659 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12660 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12661 </para>
12662 </blockquote>
12663 <para>
12664 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12665 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12666 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12667 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12668 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12669 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12670 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12671 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12672 </para>
12673 <para>
12674 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12675 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12676 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12677 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12678 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12679 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12680 </para>
12681 <para>
12682 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12683 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12684 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12685 our own country's history).
12686 </para>
12687 <para>
12688 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12689 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12690 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12691 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12692 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12693 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12694 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12695 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12696 democracy in the world, become?
12697 </para>
12698 <para>
12699 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12700 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12701 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12702 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12703 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12704 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12705 </para>
12706 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12707 <para>
12708 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12709 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12710 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12711 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12712 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12713 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12714 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12715 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12716 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12717 hearings and a different result.
12718 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12719 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12720 </para>
12721 <para>
12722 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12723 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12724 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12725 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12726 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12727 concentration in the media.
12728 </para>
12729 <para>
12730 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12731 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12732 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12733 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12734 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12735 </para>
12736 <para>
12737 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12738 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12739 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12740 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12741 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12742 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12743 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12744 </para>
12745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12746 <para>
12747 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12748 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12749 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12750 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12751 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12752 </para>
12753 <para>
12754 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12755 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12756 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12757 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12758 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12759 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12760 </para>
12761 <para>
12762 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12763 of our tragedy.
12764 </para>
12765 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12766 <para>
12767 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12768 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12769 <!-- f11. -->
12770 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12771 2003, available at
12772 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12773 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12774 2003, available at
12775 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12776 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12777 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12778 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12779 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12780 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12781 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12782 available at
12783 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12784 </para></footnote>
12785 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12786 music.<footnote><para>
12787 <!-- f12. -->
12788 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12789 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12790 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12791 </para></footnote>
12792 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12793 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12794 <!-- f13. -->
12795 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12796 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12797 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12799 </para></footnote>
12800 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12801 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12802 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12803 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12804 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12805 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12806 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12807 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12808 kids who use a computer to share content.
12809 </para>
12810 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12811 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12812 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12813 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12814 <para>
12815 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12816 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12817 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12818 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12819 24 August 2003, available at
12820 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12821 </para></footnote>
12822 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12823 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12824 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12825 country.<footnote><para>
12826 <!-- f15. -->
12827 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12828 available at
12829 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12830 </para></footnote>
12831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12832 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12833 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12834 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12835 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12836 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12837 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12838 day into the Causbys.
12839 </para>
12840 <para>
12841 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12842 potential is ever to be realized.
12843
12844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12845
12846 </para>
12847 </chapter>
12848 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12849 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12850 <para>
12851
12852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12853 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12854 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12855 maps what might be done.
12856 </para>
12857 <para>
12858 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12859 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12860 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12861 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12862 </para>
12863 <para>
12864 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12865 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12866 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12867 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12868 is so important.
12869 </para>
12870 <para>
12871 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12872 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12873 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12874 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12875 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12876 </para>
12877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12878
12879 <sect1 id="usnow">
12880 <title>US, NOW</title>
12881 <para>
12882 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12883 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12884 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12885 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12886 </para>
12887 <para>
12888 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12889 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12890 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12891 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12892 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12893 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12894 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12895 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12896 </para>
12897 <para>
12898 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12899 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12900 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12901 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12902 the
12903
12904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12905 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12906 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12907 unprotected.
12908 </para>
12909 <para>
12910 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12911 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12912 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12913 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12914 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12915 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12916 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12917 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12918 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12919 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12920 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12921 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12922 </para>
12923 <para>
12924 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12925 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12926 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12927 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12928 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12929 before.
12930 </para>
12931
12932 <sect2 id="examples">
12933 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12934 <para>
12935 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12936 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12937 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12938 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12939 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12940 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12941 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12942 assured.
12943 </para>
12944 <para>
12945 What made it assured?
12946 </para>
12947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12948 <para>
12949 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12950 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12951 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12952 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12953 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12954 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12955 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12956 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12957 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12958 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12959 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12960 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12961 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12962 </para>
12963 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
12964 <para>
12965 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12966 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
12967 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
12968 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
12969 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
12970 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
12971 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
12972 protected by the friction disappears, too.
12973 </para>
12974 <para>
12975 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
12976 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
12977 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
12978 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
12979 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
12980 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
12981 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
12982 disappears.
12983 </para>
12984 <para>
12985 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
12986 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
12987 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
12988 friction did.<footnote><para>
12989 <!-- f1. -->
12990
12991 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
12992 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
12993 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
12994
12995 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
12996 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
12997 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
12998 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
12999 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13000 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13001 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13002
13003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13004 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13005 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13006 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13007 </para>
13008 <para>
13009 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13010 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13011 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13012 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13013 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13014 care much about controlling their software.
13015 </para>
13016 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13017 <para>
13018 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13019 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13020 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13021 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13022 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13023 people's work.
13024 </para>
13025 <para>
13026 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13027 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13028 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13029 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13030 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13031 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13032 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13033 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13034 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13035 anything else?
13036 </para>
13037 <para>
13038 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13039 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13040 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13041 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13042 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13043 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13044 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13045 </para>
13046 <para>
13047 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13048 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13050 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13051 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13052 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13053 fundamentally weakened.
13054 </para>
13055 <para>
13056 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13057 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13058 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13059 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13060 </para>
13061 <para>
13062 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13063 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13064 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13065 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13066 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13067 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13068 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13069 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13070 byproduct.
13071 </para>
13072 <para>
13073 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13074 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13075 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13076 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13077 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13078 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13079 </para>
13080 <para>
13081 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13082 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13083 scientific journals are produced.
13084 </para>
13085 <para>
13086 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13087 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13088 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13089 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13090 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13091 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13092 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13093 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13094 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13095 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13096 and Westlaw are also free
13097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13098 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13099 Court opinion through their respective services.
13100 </para>
13101 <para>
13102 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13103 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13104 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13105 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13106 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13107 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13108 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13109 </para>
13110 <para>
13111 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13112 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13113 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13114 </para>
13115 <para>
13116 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13117 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13118 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13119 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13120 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13121 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13122 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13123 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13124 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13125 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13126 </para>
13127 <para>
13128 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13129 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13130 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13131 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13132 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13133 granted before.
13134 </para>
13135 <para>
13136 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13137 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13138 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13139 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13141 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13142 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13143 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13144 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13145 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13146 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13147 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13148 </para>
13149 <para>
13150 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13151 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13152 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13153 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13154 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13155 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13156 and science.
13157 </para>
13158
13159 </sect2>
13160 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13161 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13162 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13163 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13164 </indexterm>
13165 <para>
13166 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13167 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13168 </para>
13169 <para>
13170 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13171 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13172 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13173 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13174 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13175 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13176 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13177 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13178 </para>
13179 <para>
13180 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13181 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13182 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13183 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13184 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13185 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13186 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13187 description, and
13188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13189 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13190 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13191 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13192 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13193 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13194 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13195 certain freedoms are given.
13196 </para>
13197 <para>
13198 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13199 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13200 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13201 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13202 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13203 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13204 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13205 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13206 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13207 </para>
13208 <para>
13209 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13210 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13211 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13212 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13213 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13214 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13215 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13216 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13217 a public domain.
13218 </para>
13219 <para>
13220 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13221 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13222 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13223 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13224 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13225 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13227 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13228 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13229 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13230 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13231 </para>
13232 <para>
13233 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13234 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13235 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13236 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13237 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13238 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13239 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13240 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13241 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13242 to begin to build those rules.
13243 </para>
13244 <para>
13245 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13246 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13247 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13248 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13249 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13250 </para>
13251 <para>
13252 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13253 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13254 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13255 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13256 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13257 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13258 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13259 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13260 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13261 sales of Cory's book.
13262 </para>
13263 <para>
13264 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13265 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13266 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13267 was a total success.
13268 </para>
13269 <para>
13270 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13271 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13273 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13274 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13275 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13276 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13277 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13278 well.
13279 </para>
13280 <para>
13281 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13282 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13283 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13284 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13285 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13286 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13287 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13288 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13289 with their own art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13290 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13291 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13292 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13293 because the legal costs are so high<footnote><para>
13294 <!-- f2. -->
13295
13296 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13297 Culture Wars (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13298 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13299 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13300 </para></footnote>),
13301 these artists release into the creative environment content
13302 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13303 </para>
13304 <para>
13305 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13306 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13307 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13308 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13309 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13310 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13311 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13312 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13313 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13314 say it to others.
13315 </para>
13316 <para>
13317 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13318 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13319 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13320 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13321
13322 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13323 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13324 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13325 </para>
13326 <para>
13327 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13328 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13329 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13330 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13331 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13332 steps are possible.
13333 </para>
13334 <para>
13335 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13336 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13337 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13338 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13339 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13340 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13341 creativity to spread more easily.
13342 </para>
13343 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13344
13345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13346 </sect2>
13347 </sect1>
13348 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13349 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13350 <para>
13351 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13352 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13353 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13354 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13355 changes that we need.
13356 </para>
13357 <para>
13358 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13359 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13360 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13361 to our end.
13362 </para>
13363
13364 <sect2 id="formalities">
13365 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13366 <para>
13367 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13368 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13369 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13370 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13371 </para>
13372 <para>
13373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13374 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13375 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13376 protected.
13377 </para>
13378 <para>
13379 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13380 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13381 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13382 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13383 </para>
13384 <para>
13385 Why?
13386 </para>
13387 <para>
13388 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13389 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13390 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13391 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13392 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13393 formalities were getting in the way.
13394 </para>
13395 <para>
13396 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13397 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13398 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13399 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13400 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13401 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13402 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13403 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13404 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13405 they otherwise could speak.
13406 </para>
13407 <para>
13408 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13409 <!-- f1. -->
13410 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13411 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13412 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13413 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13414 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13415 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13416 </para>
13417 <para>
13418 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13419 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13420 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13421 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13422 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13423 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13424 developed by others.
13425 </para>
13426
13427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13428
13429 <sect3 id="registration">
13430 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13431 <para>
13432 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13433 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13434 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13435 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13436 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13437 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13438 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13439 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13440 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13441 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13442 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13443 </para>
13444 <para>
13445 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13446 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13447 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13448 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13449 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13450 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13451 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13452 </para>
13453 <para>
13454 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13455 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13456 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13457 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13458 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13459 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13460 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13461 with which registration occurs up.
13462 </para>
13463 <para>
13464 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13465 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13466 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13467 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13468 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13469 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13470 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13471 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13472 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13474 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13475 </para>
13476
13477 </sect3>
13478 <sect3 id="marking">
13479 <title>MARKING</title>
13480 <para>
13481 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13482 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13483 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13484 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13485 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13486 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13487 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13488 uniformly across all media.
13489 </para>
13490 <para>
13491 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13492 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13493 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13494 use the work.
13495 </para>
13496 <para>
13497 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13498 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13499 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13500 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13501 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13502 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13503 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13504 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13505 </para>
13506 <para>
13507 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13508 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13509 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13510 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13511 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13512 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13513 <!-- f2. -->
13514 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13515 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13516 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13517 </para></footnote>
13518 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13519 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13520 stop using the work in any new
13521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13522 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13523 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13524 their work.
13525 </para>
13526 <para>
13527 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13528 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13529 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13530 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13531 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13532 </para>
13533 <para>
13534 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13535 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13536 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13537 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13538 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13539 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13540 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13541 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13542 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13543 </para>
13544 <para>
13545 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13546 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13547 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13548 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13549 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13550 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13551 </para>
13552 <para>
13553 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13554 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13555 make things unclear.
13556 </para>
13557 <para>
13558 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13559 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13560 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13561 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13562 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13563 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13564 </para>
13565
13566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13567 </sect3>
13568 </sect2>
13569 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13570 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13571 <para>
13572 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13573 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13574 natural authors.
13575 </para>
13576 <para>
13577 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13578 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13579 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13580 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13581 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13582 term.<footnote><para>
13583 <!-- f3. -->
13584 "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13585 available at
13586 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13587 </para></footnote>
13588 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13589 </para>
13590 <para>
13591 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13592 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13593 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13594 terms.
13595 </para>
13596 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13597 <listitem><para>
13598 <!-- (1) -->
13599 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13600 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13601 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13602 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13603 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13604 regulations when it no longer benefits an author. </para></listitem>
13605 <listitem><para>
13606 <!-- (2) -->
13607 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13608 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13609 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13610 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13611 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13612 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13613 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13614 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13615 navigate.
13616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13617 </para></listitem>
13618 <listitem><para>
13619 <!-- (3) -->
13620 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13621 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13622 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13623 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13624 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13625 veteran to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13626 <!-- f4. -->
13627 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13628 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13629 available at
13630 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13631 </para></footnote>
13632 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13633 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13634 single form.
13635 </para></listitem>
13636 <listitem><para>
13637 <!-- (4) -->
13638 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13639 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13640 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to
13641 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13642 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13643 fewer authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13644 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13645 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13646 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13647 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13648 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13649 not increase their creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done,
13650 and there's nothing we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13651 </orderedlist>
13652 <para>
13653 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13654 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13655 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13656 </para>
13657 <para>
13658 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13659 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13660 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13661 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13662 </para>
13663
13664 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13665
13666 </sect2>
13667 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13668 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13669 <para>
13670 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13671 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13672 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13673 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13674 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13675 the emergence of that new technology.
13676 </para>
13677 <para>
13678 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13679 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13680 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13681 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13682 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13683 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13684 though that movie is not "my writing."
13685 </para>
13686 <para>
13687 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13688 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13689 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13690 <!-- f5. -->
13691 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13692 University Press, 1967), 32.
13693 </para></footnote>
13694 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13695 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13696 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13697 </para>
13698 <blockquote>
13699 <para>
13700 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13701 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13702 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13703 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13704 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13705 </para></footnote>
13706 </para>
13707 </blockquote>
13708 <para>
13709 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13710 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13711 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13712 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13713 Consider each limitation in turn.
13714 </para>
13715 <para>
13716 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13717 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13718
13719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13720 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13721 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13722 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13723 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13724 after the creative work is done.
13725 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13726 </para>
13727 <para>
13728 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13729 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13730 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13731 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13732 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13733 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13734 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13735 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13736 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13737 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13738 </para>
13739 <para>
13740 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13741 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13742 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13743 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13744 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13745 much more sense.
13746 </para>
13747 <para>
13748 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13749 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13750 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13751 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13752 <para>
13753 <!-- f7. -->
13754 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13755 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13756 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13757 </para></footnote>
13758 His view is that the law should be written so that
13759 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13760 </para>
13761 <para>
13762 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13763 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13764 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13765 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13766 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13767 </para>
13768 <para>
13769 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13771 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13772 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13773 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13774 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13775 </para>
13776 </sect2>
13777
13778 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13779 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13780 <para>
13781 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13782 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13783 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13784 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13785 battles around the sharing of music.
13786 </para>
13787 <para>
13788 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13789 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13790 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13791 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13792 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13793 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13794 innovation on the network.
13795 </para>
13796 <para>
13797 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13798 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13799 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13800 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13801 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13802 </para>
13803 <para>
13804 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13805 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13806 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13807 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13808 </para>
13809 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13810 <listitem><para>
13811 <!-- A. -->
13812 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13813 for purchasing CDs.
13814 </para></listitem>
13815 <listitem><para>
13816 <!-- B. -->
13817 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13818 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13819 </para></listitem>
13820 <listitem><para>
13821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13822 <!-- C. -->
13823 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13824 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13825 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13826 </para></listitem>
13827 <listitem><para>
13828 <!-- D. -->
13829 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13830 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13831 owner plainly endorses.
13832 </para></listitem>
13833 </orderedlist>
13834 <para>
13835 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13836 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13837 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13838 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13839 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13840 significantly weakened.
13841 </para>
13842 <para>
13843 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13844 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13845 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13846 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13847 networks.
13848 </para>
13849 <para>
13850 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13851 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13852 should respond.
13853 </para>
13854 <para>
13855 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13856 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13857 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13858 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13859 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13860 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13861 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13862 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13863 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13864 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13865 </para>
13866 <para>
13867 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13868 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13869 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13871 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13872 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13873 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13874 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13875 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13876 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13877 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13878 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13879 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13880 </para>
13881 <para>
13882 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13883 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
13884 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13885 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13886 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13887 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13888 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13889 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13890 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13891 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13892 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13893 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13894 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13895 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13896 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13897 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13898 <!-- f8. -->
13899 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13900 April 2002, available at
13901 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13902 </para></footnote>
13903
13904 </para>
13905 <para>
13906 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13907 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13908 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13909 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13910 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13911 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13912 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13913 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13914 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13915 artists get paid, during
13916
13917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13918 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13919 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13920 </para>
13921 <para>
13922 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13923 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13924 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13925 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13926 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13927 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13928 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13929 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13930 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13931 </para>
13932 <para>
13933 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13934 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13935 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13936 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13937 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13938 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13939 way that returns something to the artist.
13940 </para>
13941 <para>
13942 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13943 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13944 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13945 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13946 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13947 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13948 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13949 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13950 </para>
13951 <para>
13952 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13953 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13954 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13955 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13956 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13957 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13958 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13959 </para>
13960 <para>
13961
13962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13963 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
13964 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
13965 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
13966 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
13967 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
13968 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
13969 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
13970 trade.
13971 </para>
13972 <para>
13973 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
13974 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
13975 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
13976 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
13977 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
13978 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
13979 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
13980 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
13981 </para>
13982 <para>
13983 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
13984 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
13985 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
13986 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
13987 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
13988 delivering and accessing content.
13989 </para>
13990 <para>
13991 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
13992 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
13993 </para>
13994 <para>
13995 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
13996 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
13997 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
13998 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
13999 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14000 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14001 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14002 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14003 </para>
14004 <para>
14005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14006 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14007 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14008 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14009 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14010 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14011 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14012 </para>
14013 <para>
14014 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14015 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14016 <para>
14017 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14018 10 October 2000), available at
14019 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14020 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14021 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14022 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14023 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14024 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14025 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14026 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14027 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14028 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14029 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14030 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14031 available at
14032 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14033 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14034 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14035 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14036 2002, available at
14037 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14038 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14039 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14040 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14041 2002, available at
14042 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14043 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14044 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14045 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14046 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14047 debate by about a decade. See
14048 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14049 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14050 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14051 </para></footnote>
14052 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14053 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14054 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14055 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14056 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14057 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14058 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14059 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14060 tax.
14061 </para>
14062 <para>
14063 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14064 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14065 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14066 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14067 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14068 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14069 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14070 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14071 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14072 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14073 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14074 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14075 controlling access.
14076 </para>
14077 <para>
14078 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14079 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14080 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14081 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14082 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14083 limits on derivative
14084
14085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14086 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14087 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14088 allowed to do with the content itself.
14089 </para>
14090 <para>
14091 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14092 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14093 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14094 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14095 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14096 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14097 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14098 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14099 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14100 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14101 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14102 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14103 on-line.
14104 </para>
14105 <para>
14106 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14107 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14108 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14109 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14110 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14111 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14112 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14113 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14114 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14115 finding ways to compete with "free."
14116 </para>
14117 <para>
14118 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14119 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14120 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14121 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14122 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14123 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14124 the law.
14125 </para>
14126 <para>
14127 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14128 </para>
14129 <para>
14130
14131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14132 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14133 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14134 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14135 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14136 create.
14137 </para>
14138 <para>
14139 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14140 by
14141 </para>
14142 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14143 <listitem><para>
14144 <!-- 1. -->
14145 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14146 </para></listitem>
14147 <listitem><para>
14148 <!-- 2. -->
14149 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14150 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14151 statute;
14152 </para></listitem>
14153 <listitem><para>
14154 <!-- 3. -->
14155 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14156 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14157 </para></listitem>
14158 </orderedlist>
14159 <para>
14160 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14161 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14162 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14163 something then?
14164 </para>
14165 <para>
14166 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14167 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14168 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14169 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14170 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14171 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14172 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14173 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14174 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14175 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14176 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14177 pirates.
14178 </para>
14179 <para>
14180 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14181 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14182 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14183
14184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14185 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14186 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14187 </para>
14188 </sect2>
14189
14190 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14191 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14192 <para>
14193 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14194 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14195 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14196 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14197 </para>
14198 <para>
14199 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14200 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14201 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14202 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14203 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14204 strong view queers the law.
14205 </para>
14206 <para>
14207 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14208 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14209 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14210 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14211 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14212 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14213 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14214 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14215 <!-- f10. -->
14216 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14217 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14218 </para></footnote>
14219
14220 </para>
14221 <para>
14222 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14223 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14224 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14225 </para>
14226 <para>
14227 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14228 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14229 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14230 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14231 <!-- f11. -->
14232 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14233 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14234 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14235 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14236 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14237 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14238 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14239 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14240 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14241 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14242 available at
14243 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14244 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14245 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14246 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14247 Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14248 </para></footnote>
14249 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14250 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14251 them it works.
14252 </para>
14253 <para>
14254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14255 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14256 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14257 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14258 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14259 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14260 practically never be done.
14261 </para>
14262 <para>
14263 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14264 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14265 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14266 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14267 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14268 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14269 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14270 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14271 </para>
14272 <para>
14273 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14274 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14275 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14276 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14277 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14278 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14279 </para>
14280 <para>
14281 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14282 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14283 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14284 its review.
14285 </para>
14286 <para>
14287 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14288 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14289 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14290 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14291 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14292 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14293 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14294 </para>
14295 <para>
14296 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14297 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14298
14299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14300 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14301 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14302 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14303 </para>
14304 <para>
14305 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14306 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14307 keep your lawyers away.
14308 </para>
14309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14310 </sect2>
14311 </sect1>
14312 </chapter>
14313 <chapter id="c-notes">
14314 <title>NOTES</title>
14315 <para>
14316 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14317 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14318 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14319 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14320 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14321 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14322 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14323 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14324 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14325 the material.
14326 </para>
14327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14328
14329 </chapter>
14330 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14331 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14332 <para>
14333 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14334 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14335 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14336 to him that this book is dedicated.
14337 </para>
14338 <para>
14339 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14340 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14341 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14342 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14343 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14344 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14345 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14346 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14347 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14348 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14349 critical eye on much of this.
14350 </para>
14351 <para>
14352 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14353 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14354 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14355 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14357 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14358 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14359 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14360 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14361 </para>
14362 <para>
14363 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14364 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14365 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14366 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14367 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14368 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14369 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14370 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14371 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14372 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14373 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14374 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14375 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14376 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14377 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14378 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14379 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14380 a bunch of great replies.)
14381 </para>
14382 <para>
14383 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14384 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14385 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14386 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14387 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14388 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14389 throughout this book.
14390 </para>
14391 <para>
14392 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14393 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14394 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14395 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14396 </para>
14397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14398
14399 </chapter>
14400 </book>