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19 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
21 <title>Free Culture
</title>
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
25 <subtitle>Version
2004-
02-
10</subtitle>
29 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
52 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
78 <itemizedlist mark=
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79 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
91 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
95 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
126 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
130 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig,
136 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
137 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright
© 2003 by The New York Times Co.
138 Reprinted with permission.
141 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page
159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
144 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
147 Diagram on page
164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
150 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
154 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
155 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
164 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
167 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
170 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
176 343.7309'
9—dc22
179 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
182 Printed in the United States of America
188 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
196 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
197 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
198 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
199 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
200 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
201 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
202 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
203 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
204 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
205 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
206 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
211 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
215 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
216 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
217 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
223 <title>List of figures
</title>
230 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
231 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
232 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
233 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
238 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
242 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
243 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
244 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
245 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
246 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
247 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
251 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
252 2 Architecture and Law: Force
253 2 Market: Concentration
256 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
257 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
258 2 Constraining Creators
259 2 Constraining Innovators
260 2 Corrupting Citizens
262 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
263 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
267 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
268 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
270 2 1. More Formalities
271 3 Registration and Renewal
274 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
275 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
276 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
285 <chapter id=
"c-preface">
286 <title>PREFACE
</title>
288 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
289 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
290 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
294 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
295 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
296 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
297 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
298 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
303 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
304 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
305 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
306 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
307 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
308 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
311 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
312 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
313 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
315 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
316 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
317 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
320 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
321 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
322 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
323 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
326 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
327 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
328 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
329 free software movement
<footnote>
331 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
332 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
333 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
334 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
335 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
336 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
337 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
338 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
339 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
340 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"
—a culture in
341 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
342 or of creators from the past.
345 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
346 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
347 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
348 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
349 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
350 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
351 culture deem fundamental.
353 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
355 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
356 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
357 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
358 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
359 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
360 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
361 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
362 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
367 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
368 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
369 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
370 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
371 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
372 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
377 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
378 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
379 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
380 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
381 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
382 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
383 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
384 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
385 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
386 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
387 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
388 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
389 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
390 that this work is "merely" derivative.
393 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
394 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
395 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
396 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
397 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
398 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
399 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
400 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
403 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
404 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
405 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
406 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
407 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
411 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
412 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
413 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
414 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
415 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
416 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
417 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
425 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
426 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
428 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
429 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
430 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
431 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
432 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
433 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
436 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
437 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
438 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
439 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
440 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
441 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
444 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
445 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
446 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
449 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
450 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
451 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
452 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
453 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
454 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
455 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
457 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
458 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
460 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
461 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
462 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
463 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
464 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
465 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
466 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
467 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
468 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
470 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
471 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
473 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
474 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
475 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
476 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
477 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
478 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
479 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
480 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
484 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
485 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
486 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
487 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
488 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
489 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
490 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
491 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
493 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
494 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
495 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
496 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
497 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
498 Authorship," Stanford Law Review
48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
499 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
501 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
502 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
507 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
510 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
511 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
512 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
514 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
515 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
516 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
517 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
518 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
520 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
521 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
523 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
524 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
525 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
526 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
527 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
528 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
529 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
530 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
531 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
532 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
533 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
534 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
535 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
536 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
537 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
538 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
541 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
542 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
543 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
544 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
545 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
546 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
547 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
548 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
549 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
550 understanding of radio.
551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
554 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
555 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
556 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
557 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
558 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
559 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
560 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
561 much less transmitter power and static.
564 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
565 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
566 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
567 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
568 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
569 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
570 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
571 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
572 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
575 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
579 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
580 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
581 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
582 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
583 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
584 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
585 box."
<footnote><para>
586 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
587 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
592 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
593 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
594 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
595 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
596 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
597 a handful of networks.
598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
601 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
602 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
603 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
604 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
605 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
609 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
610 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
611 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
612 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
613 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
614 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
616 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
621 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
622 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
623 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
628 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
629 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
630 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
631 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
632 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
633 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
638 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
639 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
640 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
641 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
642 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
643 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
644 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
645 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
646 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
647 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
648 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
653 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
654 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
655 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
656 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
661 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
663 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
664 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
665 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
666 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
667 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
668 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
669 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
673 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
674 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
675 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
676 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
677 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
678 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
679 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
680 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
681 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
682 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
685 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
686 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
687 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
688 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
689 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
690 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
691 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
692 course always public spirited; the reality is something
693 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
694 to themselves, would crumble in
695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
696 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
697 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
698 effect of technological change.
701 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
702 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
703 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
704 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
705 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
706 before.
<footnote><para>
707 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
708 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
709 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
710 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
712 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
716 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
717 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
718 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
719 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
720 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
721 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
722 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
723 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
724 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
727 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
728 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
729 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
730 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
731 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
732 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
736 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
737 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
738 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
739 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
740 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
743 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
744 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
745 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
748 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
749 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
750 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
751 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
752 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
753 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
754 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
755 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
756 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
759 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
760 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
761 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
762 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
763 marketplace.
<footnote>
765 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
766 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
767 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
768 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
769 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
770 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
771 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
773 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
775 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
776 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
777 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
778 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
781 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
782 been erased.
<footnote><para>
783 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
786 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
787 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
788 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
789 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
790 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
791 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
792 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
793 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
794 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
795 culture, more and more a permission culture.
797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
799 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
800 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
801 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
802 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
803 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
804 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
805 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
806 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
807 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
808 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
812 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
813 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
814 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
815 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
816 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
817 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
818 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
819 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
820 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
821 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
822 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
823 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
824 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
825 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
826 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
827 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
828 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
831 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
832 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
833 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
834 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
835 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
836 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
840 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
842 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
843 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
844 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
845 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
846 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
847 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
848 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
849 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
850 Times,
17 January
2002.
851 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
852 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
853 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
857 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
858 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
859 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
860 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
861 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
865 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
866 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
867 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
868 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
871 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
872 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
873 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
874 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
875 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
877 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
878 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
879 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
881 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
882 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
883 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
884 could cultivate and extend our culture.
887 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
888 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
889 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
890 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
891 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
892 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
893 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
894 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
895 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
899 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
901 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
902 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
903 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
905 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
908 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
910 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
911 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
912 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
914 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
915 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
917 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
919 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
920 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
922 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
923 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
924 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
925 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
926 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
927 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
928 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
929 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
930 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
931 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
932 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
933 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
936 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
937 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
939 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
940 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
941 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
942 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
945 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
949 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
951 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
952 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
953 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
954 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
955 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
956 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
960 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
961 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
963 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
968 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
969 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
972 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
973 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
974 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
975 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
976 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
979 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
980 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
981 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
983 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
986 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
987 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
989 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
990 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
991 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
992 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
993 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
994 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
995 this silliness will be much more profound.
996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
999 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1000 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1004 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1005 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1007 French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird sort we
1008 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
1009 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
1010 can be more fully understood.
1013 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1014 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1016 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1017 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1018 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1019 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1021 by the changes to use their power to change the law
—and more
1022 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
1023 who we have always been.
1026 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1027 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1028 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1029 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1030 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1031 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1035 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
1036 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1040 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1041 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1042 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1044 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1045 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1049 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1050 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1051 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1053 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1058 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1059 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1061 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1062 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1063 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1065 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1066 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1069 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1070 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1071 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1073 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1074 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1077 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1079 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1080 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1082 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1083 piercing
—our kids are becoming thieves!
1086 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1087 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1088 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1089 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1092 The idea goes something like this:
1096 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1097 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1098 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1099 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1100 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1104 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1106 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1107 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1108 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1110 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1111 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1113 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1114 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1115 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1116 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1118 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1119 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1120 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1121 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1122 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1124 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1125 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1127 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1129 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1130 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1132 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1133 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1135 It has never taken hold within our law.
1138 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1139 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1140 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1141 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1142 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1145 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1146 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1147 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1148 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1149 copyright law today regulates both.
1152 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1153 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1154 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1155 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1156 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1157 more expense of doing business.
1159 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1161 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1162 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1163 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1164 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1165 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1166 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1167 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1168 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1169 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1170 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1171 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1172 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1173 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1174 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1175 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1176 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1177 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1180 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1181 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1182 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1183 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1184 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1185 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1186 enabled are much more tenuous.
1187 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1189 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1190 this creative class.
1193 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1194 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1195 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1199 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1200 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1202 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1203 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1204 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1205 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1206 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1209 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1210 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1211 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1212 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1213 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1214 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1218 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1219 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1220 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1221 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1225 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1226 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1227 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1228 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1229 synchronization was pretty close.
1232 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1234 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1235 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1236 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1237 wonderful! And it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1239 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1241 (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1246 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1247 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1248 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1251 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1252 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1253 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1254 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1255 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1256 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1257 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1260 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1261 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1262 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1263 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1266 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1267 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1268 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1269 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1270 The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular and among the best of its
1274 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1276 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1277 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1279 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1280 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1281 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1282 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1283 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1284 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1285 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1286 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1288 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1289 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1290 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1291 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1292 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1296 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1297 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1298 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1300 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1301 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1302 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1304 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1305 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1306 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1307 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1308 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1309 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1310 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1311 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1315 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1316 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1317 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1318 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1319 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1320 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1321 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1324 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1325 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1326 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1327 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1328 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1329 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1330 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (
1937),
1331 Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi (
1942), Song of
1332 the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland (
1951), Robin
1333 Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1335 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1336 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)
—not to
1337 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1338 Treasure Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1339 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1340 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1341 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1344 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1345 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1346 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1347 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1348 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1349 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1350 culture around us and makes it something different.
1352 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1353 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1354 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1355 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1356 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1358 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1359 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1361 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1362 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1363 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1365 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1366 Web site associated with this book, available at
1367 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1369 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1370 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1371 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1372 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1375 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1376 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1377 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1378 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1379 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1380 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1381 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1384 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1385 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1386 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1387 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1390 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1391 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1392 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1393 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1394 content from before the Great Depression.
1397 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1398 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1399 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1403 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1404 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1405 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1406 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1407 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1408 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1409 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1412 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1413 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1414 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1415 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1416 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1417 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1418 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1419 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1420 interestingly different way.
1423 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1424 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1425 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1428 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1429 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1430 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1431 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1433 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1434 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1435 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1436 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1437 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1438 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1439 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1442 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1443 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1444 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1445 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1446 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1447 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1448 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1449 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1450 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1453 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1454 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1455 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1456 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1457 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1458 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1459 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1460 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1461 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1462 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1463 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1464 original copyright owner's permission.
1467 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1468 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1469 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1470 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1471 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1474 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1475 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1476 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1478 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1479 York: Perennial,
2000).
1483 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1484 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1485 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1486 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1487 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1488 which are fifty years old."
1491 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1492 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1493 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1494 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1495 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1496 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1497 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1499 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1500 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1501 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1502 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1503 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1504 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1505 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1506 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1510 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1511 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1512 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1513 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1514 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1515 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1516 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1517 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1521 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1522 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1523 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1524 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1525 to prosecute cases like this."
1528 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1529 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1530 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1531 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1533 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1534 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1535 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1536 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1537 their clients or hurt them?
1538 Let's pause for a moment.
1541 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1542 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1543 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1546 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1547 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1548 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1549 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1551 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1553 Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1555 Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1556 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately describes a set of
1557 "property" rights
—copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret
—but the
1558 nature of those rights is very different.
1560 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1562 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1563 intellectual property.
1566 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1567 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1568 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1569 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1570 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1571 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1572 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1573 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1574 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1575 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1576 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1577 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1581 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1582 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1583 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1586 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1590 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1591 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1592 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1593 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1594 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1595 form, whether large or small.
1598 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1599 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1600 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1601 particular find it hard to say why.
1604 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1605 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1606 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1607 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1608 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1609 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1610 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1611 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1612 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1613 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1614 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster
1618 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1619 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1620 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1621 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1622 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1623 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1624 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1625 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1629 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1630 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1631 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1632 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1633 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1634 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1635 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1636 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1637 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1640 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1641 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1642 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1647 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1648 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1649 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1651 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1652 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1653 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1654 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1655 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1656 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1657 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1660 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1661 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1662 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1663 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1664 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1665 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1666 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1667 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1671 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1672 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1674 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1675 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1676 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1677 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1678 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1679 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1680 population of photographers.
1683 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1684 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1685 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1686 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1688 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1689 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1693 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1694 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1695 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1696 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1697 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1698 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1699 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1700 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1701 chemicals.
<footnote>
1704 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1706 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1711 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1712 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1713 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1714 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1715 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1716 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1717 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1718 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1719 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1720 percent.
<footnote><para>
1723 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1724 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1726 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1729 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1733 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1734 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1735 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1736 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1737 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1738 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1739 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1740 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1741 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1742 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1748 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1749 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1750 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1751 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1752 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1753 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1754 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1755 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1756 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1757 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1761 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1762 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1763 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1764 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1765 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1766 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1767 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1768 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1770 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1774 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1775 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1776 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1777 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1778 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1781 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1782 that they thought valuable.
1784 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1786 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1787 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1788 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1789 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1790 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1793 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1794 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1795 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1796 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1797 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1798 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1799 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1800 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1803 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1804 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1805 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1806 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1807 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1808 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1809 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1810 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1811 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1813 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1814 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1815 Review
48 (
1960)
398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1816 Inc.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1821 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1822 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1823 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1824 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1825 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1826 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1827 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1828 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1829 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1830 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1831 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1832 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1833 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1838 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1839 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1840 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1841 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1842 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1843 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1844 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1845 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1846 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1847 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1848 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1849 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1850 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1851 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1852 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1853 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1854 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1855 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1856 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1857 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1858 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1859 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1863 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1864 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1865 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1866 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1867 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1869 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1871 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1872 February
2002, available at
1873 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1875 These buses are filled with technology that
1876 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1877 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1878 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1879 teachers call "media literacy."
1882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1883 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1884 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1885 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1886 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1887 the way people access it."
1890 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1891 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1892 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1896 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1897 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1898 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1900 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1901 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1902 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1904 it is increasingly important to understand the
1905 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1906 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1907 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1909 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1912 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1913 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1914 written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult it is to
1916 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1917 understandable
—few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1918 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1919 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1920 emotion or builds suspense.
1923 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1924 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1925 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1926 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1927 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1928 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1930 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
1932 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1933 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1934 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1937 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1938 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1942 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1944 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1945 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
1947 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1948 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1949 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1950 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1951 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1952 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1953 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1954 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1956 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1957 November
2000, available at
1958 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1960 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1963 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1965 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1966 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1967 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1968 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1969 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1972 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
1973 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
1974 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1975 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1979 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1980 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1981 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1982 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1987 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1988 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1992 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1993 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1995 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1996 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1998 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2000 language for what they need to create or express."
<footnote>
2003 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2004 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2005 </para></footnote> It is to enable
2006 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2011 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2013 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2014 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2015 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2016 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2017 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2018 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2019 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2020 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2021 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2022 students know something about
—gun violence.
2025 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2026 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2027 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2028 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2029 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2030 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2033 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2034 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2035 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2036 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2037 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2038 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2039 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2040 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2041 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2042 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2043 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2044 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2045 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2046 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2047 to this form of expression.
2051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2052 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2053 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2055 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2057 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2058 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part
—and
2060 not the most powerful part
—of constructing meaning. As Daley
2061 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2065 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2066 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2067 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2068 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2069 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2070 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2071 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2072 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2073 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2074 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2075 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2076 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2077 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2078 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2079 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2080 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2081 about the topic. . . .
2084 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2085 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2086 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2087 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2088 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2091 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2092 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2093 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2095 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2096 had a lot of power with this language."
2100 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2101 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2102 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2103 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2104 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2105 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2106 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2107 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2108 world would be watching.
2111 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2112 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2113 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2114 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2115 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2116 entertainment is tragedy.
2118 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2119 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2121 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2122 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2123 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2124 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2125 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2126 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2127 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2128 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2129 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2130 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2131 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2132 was also the Internet.
2135 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2136 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2137 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2138 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2141 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2145 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2146 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2147 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2148 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2149 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2150 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2151 spread practically instantaneously.
2154 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2155 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2156 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2157 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2158 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2159 records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2160 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2163 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2164 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2165 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2166 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2167 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2168 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2169 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2170 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2171 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2172 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2173 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2174 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2177 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2178 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2179 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2180 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2181 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2183 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2184 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2185 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2188 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2189 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2190 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2191 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2192 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2193 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2194 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2195 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2196 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2197 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2198 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2199 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2200 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2201 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2203 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2204 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2208 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2209 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2210 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2212 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2214 Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2216 And in some towns in
2217 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2218 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2223 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2225 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2226 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2228 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2229 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2230 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2232 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2233 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2234 </para></footnote> We say what our
2235 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2238 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2239 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2240 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2242 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2243 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2246 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2250 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2251 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2252 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2253 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2254 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2255 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2258 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2259 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential
2260 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2262 is having an effect.
2265 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2266 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2267 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2269 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2270 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2271 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2272 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2274 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2275 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2276 as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2278 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2279 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2283 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2284 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2285 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2286 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2290 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2291 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2292 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2293 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2294 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2295 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2296 peer-generated rankings.
2299 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2301 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2302 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2303 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2304 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2305 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2306 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2307 get it out of the way."
2309 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2311 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2312 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2313 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2314 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2315 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2317 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2319 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2320 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2321 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2322 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2323 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2324 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2325 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2327 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2328 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2329 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2330 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2331 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2332 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2333 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2335 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2336 Information Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2337 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2338 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2339 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2341 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2342 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2343 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2344 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2347 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2348 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2349 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2350 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2351 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2354 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2355 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2356 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2357 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2358 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2359 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2360 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2361 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2362 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2364 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2366 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2367 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2368 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2369 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2370 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2371 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2374 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2375 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2377 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2378 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2379 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2380 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2381 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2382 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2383 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2384 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2385 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2386 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2391 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2392 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2393 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2396 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2398 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2399 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2400 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2403 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2404 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2406 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2408 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2409 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2410 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2412 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2413 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2414 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2415 tinkering of many others.
2418 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2419 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2420 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2421 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2422 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2425 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2427 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2428 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2429 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2430 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2432 a major apprenticeship platform."
2435 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2436 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2438 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2440 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2441 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2442 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2445 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2446 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2447 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2449 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2450 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2451 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2453 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2454 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2455 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2457 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2459 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2460 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2463 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2467 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2468 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2469 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2470 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2471 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2472 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2473 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2476 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2477 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2478 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2479 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2480 general.
<footnote><para>
2482 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2483 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2484 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2486 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2487 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2490 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2491 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2495 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2496 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2497 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2498 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2499 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2502 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2503 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2504 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2505 the law to close down that technology.
2508 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2509 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2513 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2514 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2516 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2517 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2518 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2519 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2520 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2523 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2524 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2525 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2526 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2527 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2528 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2531 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2532 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2533 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2534 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2535 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2538 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2540 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2541 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2542 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2543 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2544 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2545 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2546 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2547 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2550 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2551 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2552 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2553 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2554 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2555 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2556 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2559 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2560 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2561 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2562 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2563 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2564 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2565 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2566 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2567 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2571 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2572 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2573 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2574 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2575 be on users' computers.
2578 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2579 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2580 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2582 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2584 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2588 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2589 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2590 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2591 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2592 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2593 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2594 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2595 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2596 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2597 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2598 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2599 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2603 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2604 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2605 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2606 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2607 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2608 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2609 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2612 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2613 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2614 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2615 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2616 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2617 easier to use"
—again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2618 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2619 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2620 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2621 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2624 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2625 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2628 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2629 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2630 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2631 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2632 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2633 that Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2636 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2637 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2638 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2639 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2640 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2641 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2642 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion
—six
2643 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2645 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2646 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2647 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2651 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2652 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2653 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2654 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2655 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2658 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2659 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2660 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2661 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2662 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2663 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2664 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2665 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2666 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2669 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2670 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2671 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2672 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2673 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2675 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2676 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2679 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2680 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2683 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2684 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2685 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2686 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2687 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2688 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2689 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2691 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2692 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2693 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2695 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2696 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2697 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2699 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2700 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2704 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2705 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2706 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2711 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2712 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2713 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2714 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2718 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2719 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2720 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2721 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2722 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2726 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2727 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2729 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2730 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2731 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2732 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2733 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2734 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2739 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2741 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2742 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87–93,
2743 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2745 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2746 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2747 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2748 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2749 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2750 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2751 this creative property
2752 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2753 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2756 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2760 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2761 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2762 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2763 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2764 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2765 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2766 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2769 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2770 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2771 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2772 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2773 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2774 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2775 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2776 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2777 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2778 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2780 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2781 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2782 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2783 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2784 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2785 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2786 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2787 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2788 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2789 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2790 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2794 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2795 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2796 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2797 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2798 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2800 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2801 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2803 That led the independents to flee the East
2804 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2805 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2806 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2810 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2811 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2812 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2815 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2816 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2817 Edison's creative property.
2820 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2821 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2823 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2824 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2827 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2828 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2829 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2830 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2831 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2832 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2833 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2834 right to perform it publicly.
2836 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2838 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2839 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2840 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2841 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2842 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2843 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2844 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2845 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2846 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2847 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2848 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2849 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2850 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2851 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2852 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2853 its composer anything.
2856 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2858 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2863 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2864 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2865 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2866 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2867 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2868 rights.
<footnote><para>
2870 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2871 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2872 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2873 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2874 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2875 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2880 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2881 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2882 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2884 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2885 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2887 and the "music publishing industry"
2888 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2890 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2891 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2894 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2895 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2897 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2898 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2902 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2903 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2904 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2905 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2906 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2907 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2909 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2910 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2912 Company of New York).
2913 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2914 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2915 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2916 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2917 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2918 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<footnote><para>
2920 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376
2922 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2924 Graphophone Company Association).
2928 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2929 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2930 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2931 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2933 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2934 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2935 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2938 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2940 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2941 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2944 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2945 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2946 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2947 Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2949 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2953 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2954 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2955 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2957 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2958 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2959 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2961 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2963 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2964 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2965 of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2966 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2967 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2968 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2969 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2970 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2971 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2972 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2974 follow-on creativity.
<footnote><para>
2976 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2977 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2978 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2979 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2980 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2984 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2985 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2986 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2991 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2993 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2995 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2997 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2998 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2999 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3001 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3002 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3003 before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3004 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3005 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3006 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3008 quality, and a greater choice.
<footnote><para>
3010 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3011 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3012 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3013 this report.
</para></footnote>
3017 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3019 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3023 <title>Radio
</title>
3025 Radio was also born of piracy.
3028 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3029 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3031 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning, record
3032 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3034 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3035 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3036 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3038 Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd Cir.
1940). See also Randal C.
3039 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3040 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3041 Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3043 As I described above,
3044 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3045 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3047 money for that performance.
3050 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3051 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3052 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3054 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3055 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3056 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3058 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3059 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3061 of the music for his work.
3063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3066 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3068 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3069 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3071 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3072 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3076 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3078 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3079 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3080 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3083 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3084 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3085 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3086 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3087 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3088 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3089 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3092 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3093 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3094 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3096 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3097 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3098 something for nothing.
3101 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3102 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3105 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3108 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3109 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3110 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3111 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3113 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3114 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3115 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3118 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3119 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3121 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3122 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3123 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3125 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3126 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3127 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3128 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3131 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3132 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3133 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3134 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3136 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3137 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3139 As another broadcaster put it,
3143 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3144 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3145 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3147 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3148 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3153 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3157 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3158 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3159 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3160 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3162 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3163 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3164 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3169 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3170 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3171 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3173 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3174 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3178 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3179 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3183 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3184 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3185 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3186 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3189 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3190 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3192 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3193 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3198 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3199 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3202 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3203 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3204 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3205 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3206 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3207 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3208 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3209 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3210 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3211 created by broadcasters' content.
3214 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3215 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3216 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3217 today
<footnote><para>
3219 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3220 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3221 Information, available at
3222 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3223 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3224 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3226 — then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3227 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3228 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3229 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3230 generation
—until now.
3232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3236 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3238 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3239 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3240 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3241 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3242 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3246 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3247 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3248 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3249 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3250 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3251 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3252 has so often done in the past.
3253 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3255 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3256 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3258 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3259 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3260 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3261 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3262 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3264 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3265 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available at
3267 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3268 Financial Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3270 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3271 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually
3272 worldwide to piracy.
3275 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3276 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3277 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3278 This piracy is wrong.
3281 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3282 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3283 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3285 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3286 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3288 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3289 existence, treated as right.
3292 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3293 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3294 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3295 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3296 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3297 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3299 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3300 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3301 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3304 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3305 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3307 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3309 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3313 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3314 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3315 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3316 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3318 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3319 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3320 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3321 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3322 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3323 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3324 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3325 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3326 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3327 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3328 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3329 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3330 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3331 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3332 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3333 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3334 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3335 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3339 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3340 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3341 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3342 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3343 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3345 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3346 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3347 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3348 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3350 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3351 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3355 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3356 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3357 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3358 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3359 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3360 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3361 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3362 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3363 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3364 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3365 piracy of the tangible.
3368 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3369 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3371 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3372 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3373 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3375 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3376 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3378 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3381 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3382 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3383 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3385 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3386 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3389 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3390 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3391 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3392 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3393 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3395 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3396 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3398 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3399 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3400 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3402 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3405 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3406 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3407 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3408 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3410 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3411 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3414 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3416 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3417 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3419 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3420 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3421 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3422 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3424 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what
—at
3425 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3427 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3432 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3433 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3434 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3435 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3436 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3437 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3438 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3442 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3443 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3444 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3445 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3446 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3447 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3448 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3451 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3452 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3453 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3454 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3457 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3458 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3459 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3460 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3463 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3464 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3469 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3470 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3472 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3473 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3475 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3477 This means we must determine whether
3478 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3480 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3481 author of his profit.
3484 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3485 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3487 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3489 off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3491 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3492 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3493 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3494 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3495 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3496 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3498 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3499 Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89–92,
139.
3500 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3501 put together components that had been developed independently.
3504 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3505 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3506 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3507 system.
<footnote><para>
3509 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3510 San Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3511 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3512 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3514 Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3516 at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3518 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3519 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3520 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3521 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3522 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3523 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3524 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3527 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3529 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3530 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3531 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3533 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3534 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3535 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3536 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3539 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
43 million citizens
3540 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3542 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3543 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3546 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3547 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3548 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3550 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3553 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3554 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3556 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3557 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more carefully
3558 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do
—the kinds of
3559 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3563 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3564 different kinds into four types.
3566 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3569 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3571 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3572 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3573 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3574 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3575 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3576 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3582 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3583 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3584 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3585 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3587 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3588 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3590 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3591 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3595 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3597 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3598 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3599 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3601 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3602 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3603 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3604 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3605 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3607 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3608 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3609 content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same harm
3610 that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3616 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3617 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3622 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3625 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3627 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3628 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<footnote><para>
3630 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148–49.
3632 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3634 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3635 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3636 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer
—and
3638 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3642 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3643 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3645 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3646 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3647 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3648 that is "devastating" the industry.
3651 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3653 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3655 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3656 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
&
3657 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3658 labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3660 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3662 Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report describes the music
3664 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3665 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3666 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3667 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3668 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent
3669 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3670 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3671 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3672 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145–56.
3674 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3675 album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the
3676 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3678 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3681 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3682 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3683 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3684 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3686 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3687 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3689 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3693 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3694 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3695 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3696 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3697 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3698 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3699 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3700 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3703 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3704 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3705 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3706 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3707 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3708 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3709 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3712 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3714 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3715 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3718 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3720 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3722 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3724 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3725 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3726 25 June
2003, available at
3727 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3728 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3729 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3730 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3731 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3733 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3734 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3736 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3738 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3739 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3740 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3741 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3742 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3743 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3746 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3747 February
2003, available at
3748 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3749 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3752 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3753 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3754 High Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie
3755 [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3763 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3764 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3765 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3766 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3768 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3769 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3772 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3773 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3774 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3776 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own
3778 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3779 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3780 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3781 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of Kazaa
3782 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry would have
3783 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3784 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3785 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3787 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3790 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3792 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3793 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3797 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
3798 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3800 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3801 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3803 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3804 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3805 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3807 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3809 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3810 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3814 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3815 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3816 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3818 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3822 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3824 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3826 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3828 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3829 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3830 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3831 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3832 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3834 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3837 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3840 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3841 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3842 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3843 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3844 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3846 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3847 owner for the content they sell.
3849 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3851 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3852 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3853 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3854 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3855 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3856 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3857 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3858 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3859 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3860 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3861 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3864 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3865 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3866 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3867 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3868 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3872 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3873 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3874 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3875 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3876 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3877 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3880 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3881 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3882 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3883 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3884 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3885 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3889 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3890 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3891 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3892 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3895 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3896 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3897 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3898 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3902 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3903 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3904 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of
3905 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3906 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3907 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3908 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3909 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3910 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3911 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3912 found only with time.
3915 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3916 just what you call type A sharing?"
3919 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3921 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3922 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3924 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3926 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3928 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3929 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3930 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3932 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3933 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3935 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3936 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3938 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3942 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3943 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3944 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3945 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3946 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3947 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3948 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3949 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3950 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3953 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3954 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3955 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3957 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3959 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3960 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3961 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3964 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3965 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3966 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3968 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3969 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3970 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3971 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3972 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3974 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3977 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3978 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3979 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3980 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3982 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3987 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3988 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of
3989 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3990 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3992 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3994 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3995 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3996 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3997 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3999 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
4000 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
4001 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
4003 over the future (cable).
4005 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4007 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4008 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4009 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4010 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4011 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4012 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4013 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4014 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4015 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4016 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4017 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4020 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4021 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4022 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4023 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4024 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4025 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4026 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4027 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4029 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4030 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4031 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4032 for the architecture it chose.
4035 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4036 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4037 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4038 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4039 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4040 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4042 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4043 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4044 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4045 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4047 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4048 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4049 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4050 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4051 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4052 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4054 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4056 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4057 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4059 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4062 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4063 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4064 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4065 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4066 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4067 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4068 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4070 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4075 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4076 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4077 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4078 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held
4079 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4080 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4081 technology
—which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4082 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4083 of the American film industry)
—was an illegal
4084 technology.
<footnote><para>
4086 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4091 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4094 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4095 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4100 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4101 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4103 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4105 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4106 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4108 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4110 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4115 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4116 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4118 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4119 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4120 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4124 <title>Table
</title>
4125 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4129 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4130 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4131 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4136 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4137 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4138 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4139 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4142 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4143 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4145 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4148 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4149 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4150 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4151 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4155 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4156 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4157 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4164 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4165 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4167 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4168 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4169 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4170 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4171 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4172 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4173 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4174 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4175 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4176 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293–96.
4178 In each case, throughout our history,
4179 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4183 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4184 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4185 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4186 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4187 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4189 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4190 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4191 the interests at stake.
4192 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4195 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4196 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4197 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4198 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4199 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4201 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4202 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4203 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4204 permission to record a song?
4207 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4208 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4209 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4210 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4212 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4215 Instead, the particular uses that the
4216 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4217 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4218 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4220 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4221 the distribution of content.
4224 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4225 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4226 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4227 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4228 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4229 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4230 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4231 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4232 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4233 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4235 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4241 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4243 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4244 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4246 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4248 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4249 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4251 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4252 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4254 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4256 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4257 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4258 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4259 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4260 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4261 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4262 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4265 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4266 just as any other property is protected."
4268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4272 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4273 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4277 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4278 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4279 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4280 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4281 the price she can get.
4284 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4285 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4286 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4287 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4288 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4289 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4290 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard
—by, for example,
4292 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4293 thing I am taking then?
4296 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4297 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4299 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4301 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4302 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4303 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4304 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4305 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4306 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4307 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4309 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4310 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4311 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4315 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4316 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4317 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4319 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4323 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in
4324 other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4326 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4328 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4330 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4332 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4333 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4335 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4336 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4338 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4343 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4345 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4347 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4348 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4349 significance of this true statement
—"copyright material is property"
—
4350 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4351 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4356 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4357 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4359 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4360 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4362 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4363 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4364 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4365 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4366 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4368 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4371 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4372 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4373 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4375 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4376 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4377 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4378 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4379 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4380 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4381 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4384 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger
<footnote><para>
4386 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4388 University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4391 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4392 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4393 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4395 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4397 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4399 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4402 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4403 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4404 of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4405 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4406 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4408 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4410 by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.
<footnote><para>
4412 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4414 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4416 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in
1731. So why
4417 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in
1774?
4420 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4422 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4423 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4424 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4426 in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4427 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4428 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4430 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4433 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4434 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4435 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4437 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4439 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4440 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4442 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4443 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4445 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4447 of any positive law.
4450 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4451 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4452 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4453 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4455 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4456 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4457 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4459 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4462 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4463 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4465 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4466 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4468 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4469 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4472 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4473 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4474 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4477 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4478 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4479 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4480 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4481 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4482 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4483 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4484 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4486 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4489 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4491 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4492 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4496 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4497 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4498 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4499 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4501 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4502 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4504 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4506 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4508 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4509 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4513 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4514 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4515 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4517 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4519 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4520 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4521 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4522 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4525 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4526 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4528 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4529 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4530 monopolies
—especially
4531 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4532 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4533 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4534 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4536 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4537 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4541 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4543 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4544 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4545 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4546 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4547 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4549 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4552 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4553 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4554 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4555 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4557 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind
—tools of the
4558 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4560 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4561 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4562 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4563 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4565 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4566 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4570 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4571 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4573 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4574 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4575 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4579 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4580 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4581 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4582 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4583 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4584 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4586 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4587 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4588 construction and spread of culture.
4591 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4592 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4593 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4594 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4595 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4596 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4597 they said; they needed more time.
4600 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4601 words that echo today,
4605 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4606 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4608 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4609 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4610 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4611 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4612 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4613 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4615 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4616 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4617 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4618 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4619 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4620 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4621 al.,
8, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4626 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4627 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4628 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4629 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4630 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4631 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4632 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4633 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4634 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4635 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4636 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4637 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4638 way to protect authors.
4641 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4642 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4643 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4644 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4645 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4647 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4648 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4649 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4651 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4652 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4655 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4656 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4657 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4659 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4660 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4664 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4665 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4666 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4667 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4669 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4672 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4674 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4675 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4676 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4677 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4683 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4684 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4685 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4686 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4687 Property."
<footnote><para>
4689 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4692 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4693 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4694 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4697 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4698 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4699 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4702 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4703 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4704 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4705 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4706 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4707 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4709 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4710 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review
29
4715 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4716 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4717 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4718 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4719 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4720 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4721 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4722 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4723 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4726 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4727 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4728 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4729 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4730 with in
1710: How best to limit
4731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4732 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4733 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4734 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4735 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4736 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4737 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4740 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4741 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4743 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4745 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4746 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4747 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4751 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4752 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4753 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4754 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4755 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4756 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4759 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4760 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4761 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4762 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4763 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4764 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4765 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4766 statute were no longer protected.
4769 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4770 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4771 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4772 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4773 House of Lords generally voted.
4776 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4777 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4779 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4780 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4781 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4782 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4783 passed into the public domain.
4785 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4786 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4788 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4789 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4790 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4791 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4792 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4793 and the greatest works in English history
—including those of
4794 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan
—were free of
4798 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4799 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4800 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4801 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4802 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4803 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4804 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4805 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4806 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4812 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4813 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4818 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4819 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4820 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4821 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4822 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4823 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4824 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4825 successors.
<footnote><para>
4832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4833 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4834 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4835 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4836 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4837 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4838 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4839 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4840 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4841 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4842 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4843 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4844 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4845 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4846 readers chose to let it develop
— chose in the books they bought
4847 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4848 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4849 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4850 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4853 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4854 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4855 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4858 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4860 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4861 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4863 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4864 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4865 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4866 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4870 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4871 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4875 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4876 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4877 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4878 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4879 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4883 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4884 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4885 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4886 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4888 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4892 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4893 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4894 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4895 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4896 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4899 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4900 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4901 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4902 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4903 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4906 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4907 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4908 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4909 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4910 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4913 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4914 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4915 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4916 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4917 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4918 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4921 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4922 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4923 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4924 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4925 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4926 confirm what he had been told.
4929 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4930 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4931 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4935 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4936 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4937 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4941 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4942 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4943 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4944 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4945 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4946 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4949 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4950 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4951 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4952 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4953 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4954 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4955 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4956 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4957 says the owner gets to control.
4960 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4961 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4962 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4963 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4964 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4965 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
4969 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4970 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
4972 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4973 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4974 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4975 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4976 Law School,
5 August
2003.
4978 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4979 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons
—and fair use does
4980 not require the permission of anyone.
4983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4984 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4988 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4989 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4990 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4991 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4992 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4993 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4995 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
4998 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4999 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5000 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5001 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5002 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5006 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5007 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5008 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
5009 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
5010 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5011 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
5012 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5013 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5018 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5019 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5020 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5021 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5022 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5023 pockets, me or them.
5024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5028 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5029 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5035 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5036 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5037 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5038 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5039 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5040 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5043 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5044 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5045 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5046 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5051 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5052 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5053 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5054 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5056 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5057 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5058 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5059 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5060 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5062 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5064 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5065 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5066 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5067 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5068 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5069 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5070 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5071 important to his career.
5073 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5075 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5076 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5077 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5078 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5082 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5083 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5084 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5085 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5086 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5088 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5090 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5091 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5092 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5093 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5094 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5097 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5099 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5100 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5102 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5104 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5105 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5106 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5110 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5111 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5112 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5113 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5115 <primary>artists
</primary>
5116 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5121 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5122 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5123 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5124 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5125 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5128 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5129 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5130 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5134 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5135 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5136 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5137 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5138 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5139 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5143 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5144 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5145 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5146 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5147 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5148 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5149 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5150 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5151 started calling people.
5154 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5156 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5157 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5158 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5159 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5160 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5161 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5162 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5163 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5167 It was one year later
—"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5168 were totally in the clear."
5170 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5172 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5173 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5174 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5178 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5179 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5180 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5181 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5182 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5183 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5184 systematically and cleared the rights.
5189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5190 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5191 loved it, and it sold very well.
5193 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5194 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5196 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5197 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5198 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5199 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5200 at all."
<footnote><para>
5202 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5203 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5204 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5206 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5210 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5211 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5212 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5213 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5214 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5218 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5219 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5220 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5221 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5222 compensated for that.
5226 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5227 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5228 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5229 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5230 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5231 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5232 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5236 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5237 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5238 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5239 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5241 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5242 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5243 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5244 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5245 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5246 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5247 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5248 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5249 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5250 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5251 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5252 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5255 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5257 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5258 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5259 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5260 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5261 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5262 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5263 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5264 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5265 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5266 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5267 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5268 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5269 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5270 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5271 "Does this still make sense?"
5274 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5275 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5276 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5277 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5280 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5281 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5284 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5285 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5286 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5287 judges loved every minute of it.
5289 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5291 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5292 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5293 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5294 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5295 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5296 were just violated in this room?"
5298 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5300 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5301 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5302 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5303 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5304 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5305 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5306 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5307 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5308 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5309 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5310 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5311 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5312 couldn't easily do them legally.
5315 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5316 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5317 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5318 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5319 planted in your presentation.
5322 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5324 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5325 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5326 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5327 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5328 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5329 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5330 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5333 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5334 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5335 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5336 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5337 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5340 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5341 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5342 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5343 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5344 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5345 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5346 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5347 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5348 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5349 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5350 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5351 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5355 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5356 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5357 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5358 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5361 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5362 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5364 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5365 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5366 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5367 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5368 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5369 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5373 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5374 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5375 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5376 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5377 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5378 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5379 new audiences, it is Mike."
5382 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5383 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5384 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5385 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5386 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5387 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5388 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5389 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5392 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5393 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5394 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5395 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5396 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5397 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5398 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5399 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5400 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5401 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5402 curse, reserved for the few.
5404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5406 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5407 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5409 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5410 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5411 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5412 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5413 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5414 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5415 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5418 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5419 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5420 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5421 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5422 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5423 well as when those pages changed.
5426 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5427 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5428 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5429 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5434 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5435 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5436 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5439 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5440 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5441 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5442 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5443 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5446 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5447 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5448 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5449 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5450 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5452 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5453 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5454 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5455 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5456 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5460 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5461 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5462 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5463 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5464 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5465 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5466 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5467 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5471 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5472 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5473 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5474 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5475 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5476 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5477 presumes this knowedge.
5480 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5481 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5482 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5483 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5485 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5486 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5487 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5488 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5491 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5492 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5493 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5494 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5495 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5496 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5497 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5498 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5501 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5502 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5503 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5504 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5505 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5506 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5507 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5508 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5509 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5510 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5511 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5512 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5513 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5514 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5515 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5519 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5520 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5521 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5522 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5523 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5526 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5527 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5531 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5532 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5533 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5534 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5535 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5536 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5539 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5540 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5541 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5542 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5543 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5547 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5548 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5549 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5550 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5551 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5552 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5553 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5554 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5556 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5557 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2–3
5558 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5559 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5564 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5565 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5566 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5567 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5568 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5569 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5570 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5571 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5572 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5575 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5577 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5578 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5579 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5580 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5581 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5582 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5586 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5587 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5588 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5589 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5590 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5591 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5592 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5593 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5594 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5595 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5596 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5597 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5598 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5599 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5600 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5601 few minutes
—for free.
5604 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5605 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5606 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5607 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5608 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5612 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5613 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5614 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5615 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5616 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5617 has
—a noncommercial life.
5620 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5621 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5625 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5626 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5627 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5628 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5629 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5632 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5633 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5634 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5635 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5636 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5637 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5641 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5642 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5644 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5645 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5646 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5647 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5648 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5649 College Law Review
44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5650 </para></footnote>). After
5651 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5652 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5653 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5654 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5655 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5658 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5659 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5660 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5661 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5662 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5663 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5664 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5665 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5669 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5670 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5671 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5672 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5673 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5676 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5677 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5678 little practical effect.
5681 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5682 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5683 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5684 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5685 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5686 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5689 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5690 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5691 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5696 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5697 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5698 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5699 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5700 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5701 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5702 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5703 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5704 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5705 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5706 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5710 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5711 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5712 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5713 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5714 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5715 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5718 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5719 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5720 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5721 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5722 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5725 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5726 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5727 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5728 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5729 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5730 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5734 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5735 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5737 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5738 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5739 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5740 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5741 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5742 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5743 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5746 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5747 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5748 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5749 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5750 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5751 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5752 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5753 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5754 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5758 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5759 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5760 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5761 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5762 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5763 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5764 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5765 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5766 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5767 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5771 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5772 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5773 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5774 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5775 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5776 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5777 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5780 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5785 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5786 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5787 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5788 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5789 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5790 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5791 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5792 debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5794 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5795 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5796 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5797 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5798 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5804 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5805 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5806 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5809 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5810 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5811 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5812 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5815 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5816 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5817 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5818 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5819 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5820 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5821 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5822 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5823 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5827 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5828 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5830 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5831 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5832 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5833 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5834 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5835 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5836 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5837 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5838 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5839 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5840 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5841 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5845 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5846 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5847 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5848 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5849 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5850 culture would develop.
5853 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5854 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5855 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5856 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5857 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5858 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5859 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5860 the same would be to
5862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5863 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5864 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5868 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5869 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5870 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5871 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5872 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5873 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5874 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5875 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5876 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5877 Constitution itself.
5880 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5881 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5882 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5883 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5884 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5885 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5886 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5887 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5888 government pays for the privilege.
5891 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5892 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5893 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5894 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5895 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5896 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5897 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5898 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5899 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5900 compensation for your land
5901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5902 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5903 compensation at all.
5906 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5907 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5908 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5909 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5910 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5911 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5915 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5916 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5917 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5918 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5919 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5920 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5921 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5922 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5923 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5924 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5927 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5928 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5929 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5930 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5931 creative property there must be a public domain?
5934 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5935 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5936 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5937 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5938 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5939 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5940 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5941 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5942 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5943 control how culture develops.
5947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5948 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5949 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5950 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5951 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5952 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5953 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5954 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5956 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
5957 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
5958 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
5961 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5962 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5963 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5964 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5965 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5966 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5967 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5968 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5969 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5970 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5971 Web, you can be punished
5972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5973 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5974 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5977 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5978 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5979 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5980 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5981 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5982 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5983 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5984 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5985 the source of the enforcement.
5988 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5989 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5990 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5991 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5992 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5993 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5994 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5995 individual or group might behave.
5998 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5999 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6000 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6001 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6002 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6003 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6004 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6005 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6006 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6007 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
6008 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6009 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6010 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6015 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6016 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6017 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6018 undermined by another.
6021 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6022 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6023 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6024 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6025 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6026 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6027 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6029 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6030 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6033 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6034 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6035 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6036 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6037 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6038 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6039 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6040 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6041 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6042 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6043 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6044 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6047 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6048 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6049 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6051 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6052 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6053 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6054 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6055 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6056 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6057 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6060 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6061 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6062 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6063 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6064 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6065 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6066 used to require that other laws be more
6067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6068 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6069 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6072 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6074 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6075 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6076 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6079 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6080 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6081 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6082 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6083 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6087 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6088 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6089 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6090 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6091 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6092 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6093 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6094 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6095 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6096 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6097 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6098 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6099 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6100 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6101 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6102 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6103 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6104 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6105 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6106 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6107 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6108 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6109 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6110 places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6111 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6112 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6113 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6114 of these groups might face.
6115 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6118 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6119 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6121 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6122 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6123 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6124 rallying makes sense.
6127 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6130 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6131 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6132 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6136 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6137 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6138 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6139 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6140 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6141 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6142 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6143 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6144 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6145 this form of infringement.
6148 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6149 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6150 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6151 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6152 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6153 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6156 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6157 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6158 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6159 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6161 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6162 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6163 looting that results.
6165 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6166 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6167 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6170 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6171 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6172 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6173 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6174 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6175 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6176 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6177 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6178 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6179 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6182 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6183 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6184 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6185 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6186 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6187 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6188 life. Homeowners living in a
6190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6191 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6192 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6193 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6194 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6195 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6196 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6199 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6200 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6201 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6202 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6203 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6204 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6207 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6208 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6209 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6210 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6211 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6212 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6213 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6215 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6216 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6217 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6218 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6219 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6220 October
2003, available at
6221 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6224 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6225 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6226 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6227 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6228 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6229 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6230 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6231 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6232 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6233 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6234 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6237 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6238 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6239 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6241 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6242 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6243 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6244 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6245 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6247 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6250 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6251 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6252 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6253 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6254 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6258 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6259 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6260 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6261 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6262 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6263 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6264 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6265 opportunities for innovation and change.
6268 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6269 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6270 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6271 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6272 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6273 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6274 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6275 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6276 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6277 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6278 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6279 regulation is justified.
6282 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6283 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6284 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6285 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6286 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6287 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6288 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6291 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6294 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6295 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6296 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6297 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6298 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6301 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6302 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6303 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6305 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6307 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6308 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6309 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6310 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6313 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6314 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6315 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6316 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6317 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6318 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6319 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6322 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6323 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6324 culture.
<footnote><para>
6326 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6327 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6329 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6330 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6331 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6332 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6333 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6334 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6336 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6337 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6338 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6339 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6340 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6343 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6344 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6345 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6346 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6347 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6348 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6349 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6350 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6351 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6354 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6355 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6359 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6360 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6362 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6363 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6364 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6365 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6368 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6369 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6370 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6373 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6374 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6375 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6378 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6379 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6380 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6381 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6382 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6383 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6386 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6387 in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6388 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6389 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6390 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6391 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6392 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6395 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6396 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6397 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6398 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6399 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6400 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6401 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6402 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6403 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6404 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6405 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6406 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6410 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6411 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6412 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6413 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6414 years since they first struck its design.
6417 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6418 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6420 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6423 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6424 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6425 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6430 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6431 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6432 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6439 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6440 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6442 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6443 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6444 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6445 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6446 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6447 authorship.
<footnote>
6450 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6451 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6452 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6453 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6454 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6455 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6457 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6458 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6459 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6460 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6461 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6462 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6465 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6466 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6467 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6468 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6469 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6470 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6473 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6474 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6475 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6476 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6477 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6480 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6481 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6482 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6483 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6484 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6485 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6486 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6488 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6489 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6490 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation
6491 of an Industry,
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6492 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6493 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6494 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7–10 (
2002),
6495 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6496 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6497 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6498 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6499 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6500 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6501 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6504 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6505 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6507 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6508 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6509 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6513 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6514 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6515 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6516 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6517 domain.
<footnote><para>
6519 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6520 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6521 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6522 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6523 Studies on Copyright, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6524 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6525 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6526 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6527 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6530 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6531 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6532 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6534 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6535 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6536 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6537 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6538 books; that use
—because it does not involve publication
—is
6542 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6543 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6544 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6545 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6546 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6547 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6550 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6551 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6552 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6553 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6554 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6555 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6556 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6557 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6560 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6561 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6562 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6563 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6566 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6567 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6568 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6571 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6572 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6573 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6574 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6575 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6576 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6577 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6581 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6582 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6583 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6584 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6585 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6586 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6587 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6588 was ninety-five years.
6591 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6592 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6593 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6594 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6595 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6596 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6600 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6601 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6602 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6603 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6604 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6605 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6606 years.
<footnote><para>
6608 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6609 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6610 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6611 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6616 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6617 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6619 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6620 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6621 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6622 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6625 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6626 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6627 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6628 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6629 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6630 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6631 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6632 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6633 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6634 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6635 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6638 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6639 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6640 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6641 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6642 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6643 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6644 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6645 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6646 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6647 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6648 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6649 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6650 on the initial creative work.
6653 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6654 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6655 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6657 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6658 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6659 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6660 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6661 famous
© or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6662 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6663 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6666 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6667 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6668 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6669 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6670 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6671 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6672 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6673 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6674 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6675 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6676 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6680 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6681 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6682 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6683 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6684 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6685 copy available for others to copy.
6688 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6692 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6693 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6694 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6695 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6696 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6697 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6699 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6701 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
6703 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6704 Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6706 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6707 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6708 the United States
—publishers.
6711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6712 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6713 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6714 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
6715 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6716 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6718 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6722 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6723 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6724 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6726 to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6727 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6728 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6731 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6732 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6733 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6736 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6738 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6739 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6740 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6741 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6742 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6743 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6744 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6746 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6747 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6750 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6751 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6753 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6755 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6756 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6757 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6758 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6763 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6764 a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6765 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6766 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6767 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6768 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6769 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6771 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6773 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6775 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6777 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6778 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6779 the wrong of direct piracy.
6782 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6783 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6784 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6786 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
6788 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6789 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6790 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6791 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6793 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6795 These two different uses of my creative work are
6799 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6800 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6801 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6803 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6804 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6808 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6809 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6811 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6812 rights originally granted.
6815 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6816 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6818 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6819 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6820 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6821 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6823 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6824 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6825 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6826 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
6828 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
6829 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
6830 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6835 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6836 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6837 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6838 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6839 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6840 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6841 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6842 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6843 trigger for copyright law.
6846 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6847 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6848 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6849 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6851 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6852 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6853 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6855 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6857 because it is clear that the
6858 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6859 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6862 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6865 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6866 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6867 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6871 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6872 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6873 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6874 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6875 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6876 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6877 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6878 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6879 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6880 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6883 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6884 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6885 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6888 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6889 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6890 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6891 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6892 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6893 diagram on next page).
6896 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6897 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6899 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6900 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6901 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6902 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6905 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6906 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6908 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6909 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6910 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6911 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6912 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6913 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6915 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6916 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6917 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6920 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6921 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6922 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6926 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6927 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6928 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6931 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6932 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6934 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6935 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6936 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6937 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6939 And because of this single,
6940 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6942 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6944 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6945 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6946 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6947 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
6949 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6951 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
6952 burden of this shift.
6955 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6956 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6957 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6958 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6960 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6962 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
6963 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6968 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6970 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6971 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6973 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6975 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6976 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6977 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6978 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6979 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6982 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6983 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6984 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6985 points also become clear:
6988 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6989 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6991 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6993 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6994 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
6995 free culture before the Internet.
6998 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7000 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7001 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7003 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7004 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7006 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7008 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7009 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7011 uses of creative work.
7014 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7016 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7017 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7018 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7019 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7020 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7021 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7023 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7024 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7026 before because reading was not regulated.
7029 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7030 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7032 upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question about
7033 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7034 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7035 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7037 of fair use are not enough.
7040 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7041 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7042 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7043 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7044 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7047 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7049 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7051 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7052 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7053 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7054 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7059 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7061 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7062 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7063 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7064 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7065 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7067 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7068 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7069 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7071 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7072 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7073 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7076 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7077 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7079 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7081 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7082 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7083 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7084 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7085 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7088 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7089 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7090 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7091 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7092 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7093 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7094 Disney's permission.
7097 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7098 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7099 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7100 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7102 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7103 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7104 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7105 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7106 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7107 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7108 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7111 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7112 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7114 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say
7115 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7116 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
&
7118 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7119 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7121 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7122 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7124 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7125 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7126 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7127 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7130 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7131 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7132 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7133 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7135 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7136 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7139 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7140 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7142 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7143 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7144 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7145 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7148 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7149 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7150 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7151 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7152 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7155 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7157 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7158 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7160 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7161 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7162 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7164 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7166 Problems
44 (
1981):
172–73.
7170 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7171 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7172 you were."
<footnote><para>
7174 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1–3.
7176 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7177 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7178 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7181 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7182 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7183 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7184 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7187 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7188 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7189 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7190 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7192 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7193 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7194 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7195 that is not at all funny.
7198 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7201 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7202 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7203 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7205 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7208 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7212 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7213 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7214 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7215 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7216 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7217 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7219 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7222 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7223 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7224 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7227 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7228 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7230 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7231 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7232 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7236 According to my eBook
7237 Reader, I have the permission
7238 to copy to the clipboard of the
7239 computer ten text selections
7240 every ten days. (So far, I've
7241 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7242 I also have the permission to
7243 print ten pages from the book
7244 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7245 the permission to use the Read
7246 Aloud button to hear
7248 read aloud through the
7252 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7253 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7255 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7256 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7257 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7260 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7261 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7264 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7265 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7266 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7269 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7270 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7273 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7274 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7275 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7278 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7281 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7282 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7283 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7284 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7286 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7288 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7289 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7290 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7292 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7293 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7294 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7297 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7298 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7299 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7300 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7303 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7304 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7305 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7306 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7307 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7308 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7309 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7310 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7311 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7313 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7314 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7315 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud
—it's not that the company
7316 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7317 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7320 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7321 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7322 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7323 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7326 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7327 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7328 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7329 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7330 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7331 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7334 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7335 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7337 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7338 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7339 protections as well?
7342 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7346 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7348 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7349 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7350 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7351 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7353 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7354 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7355 Wonderland
".
</title>
7356 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7359 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7360 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7362 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7364 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7367 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7368 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7369 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7370 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7371 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7372 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7375 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7376 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7377 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7378 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7379 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7380 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7381 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7382 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7383 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7384 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7385 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7388 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7389 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7390 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7391 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7392 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7396 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7397 story of mine that makes the same point.
7399 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7401 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7402 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7403 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7406 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7407 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7408 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7410 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7411 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7412 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7415 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7416 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7417 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7418 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7419 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7420 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7423 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7424 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7425 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7426 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7427 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7428 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7429 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7430 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7431 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7432 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7435 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7436 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7437 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7438 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7441 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7443 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7444 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7445 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7446 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7447 than Sony had built.
7450 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7451 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7452 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7453 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7457 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7458 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7459 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7460 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7461 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7462 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7466 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7467 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7468 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7469 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7470 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7471 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7472 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7473 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7474 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7477 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7479 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7480 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7481 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7482 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7483 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7484 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7485 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7486 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7488 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7489 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7491 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7492 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7493 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7494 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7497 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7498 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7499 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7500 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7501 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7502 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7503 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7507 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7508 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7509 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7510 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7514 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7515 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7516 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7517 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7520 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7521 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7522 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7523 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7524 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7525 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7528 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7529 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7530 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7531 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7532 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7533 constituted, succeed.
7536 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7537 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7538 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7543 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7544 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7545 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7549 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7550 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7551 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7555 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7557 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7558 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7559 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7563 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7564 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7565 spreading such information an offense.
7568 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7569 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7570 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7571 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies
—
7572 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7573 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7574 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7577 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7578 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7579 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7580 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7583 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7584 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7585 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7586 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7587 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7588 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7589 have been a copyright violation.
7592 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7593 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7594 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7595 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7596 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7597 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7598 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7600 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7601 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7604 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7605 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7606 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7607 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7608 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7609 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7612 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7613 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7614 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7615 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7616 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7617 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7618 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7619 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7623 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7624 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7625 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7626 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7627 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7628 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7629 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7630 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7631 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7632 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7633 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7634 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7635 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7636 important.
<footnote><para>
7638 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7639 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7640 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7641 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7647 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7648 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7649 the VCR responsible.
7652 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7656 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7659 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7660 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7661 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7662 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7663 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7664 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7667 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7668 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7669 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7670 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7671 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7674 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7675 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7676 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7679 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7680 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7681 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7682 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7683 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7684 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7687 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7688 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7689 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7690 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7691 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7692 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7695 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7696 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7697 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law
—increasing its
7698 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7699 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7700 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7701 owners effect
—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7702 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7705 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7706 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7707 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7708 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7709 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7710 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7711 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7712 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7713 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7718 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7719 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7720 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7721 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7722 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7724 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7725 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7726 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
7730 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7731 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7732 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7733 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7734 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7737 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7738 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7739 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7740 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7741 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7742 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7743 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7744 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7747 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7748 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7749 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7750 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7751 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7752 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7755 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7756 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7758 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7759 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7760 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7761 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7762 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7765 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7766 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7767 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7768 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7769 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7770 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7771 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7772 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7776 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7777 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7778 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7779 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7780 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7783 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7784 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7785 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7786 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7787 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7788 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7789 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7790 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7794 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7797 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7799 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7800 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7801 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7803 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7804 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7805 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7806 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7807 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7808 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7810 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7811 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
7813 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7814 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7816 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7821 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7822 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7824 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200
7825 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7826 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7827 largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's
7828 revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of the
7829 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7832 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7833 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7834 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7835 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7836 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7837 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7838 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7839 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7840 protected
— by the market.
7843 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7844 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7845 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7849 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7850 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7851 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7852 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7853 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7854 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7855 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7856 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7857 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7858 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7860 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7866 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7867 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7868 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7869 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7871 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7872 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7873 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7877 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7878 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7882 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7883 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7884 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7885 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7888 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7889 integration may matter.
7891 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7892 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7893 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7895 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7896 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7897 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7898 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7899 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7902 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7903 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7904 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7905 control.
<footnote><para>
7907 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7908 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7910 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7911 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7912 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7913 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7919 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
7921 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
7922 law required a separation between the networks and the content
7924 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
7925 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7927 percent of it
—was "independent" of the networks.
7930 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
7932 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
7933 In
1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
7935 in
2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
7936 1992, only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
7937 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7938 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
7939 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
7940 last year there was one."
<footnote><para>
7942 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
7943 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th
7944 Cong.,
1st sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
7946 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7947 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
7948 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
7949 Virginia,
27 February
2003.
7951 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television
7952 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
7953 1992 and
2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
7954 produced by network studios increased over
200%, whereas the
7956 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
7957 studios decreased
63%."
<footnote><para>
7962 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7964 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7965 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7966 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7967 owned by the network.
7970 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
7972 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
7973 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7977 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7978 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7979 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7980 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7982 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
7984 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
7985 than a handful.
<footnote><para>
7987 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7988 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
7989 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
7994 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
7995 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7997 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
7998 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
7999 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8001 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8002 without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8003 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8004 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8006 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8008 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8009 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8010 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8011 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8012 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8013 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8015 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8017 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8018 Business School Press,
1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8019 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8020 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8021 Research Policy
14 (
1985):
235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8022 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8023 Built to Last Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform
8024 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
8027 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8028 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8032 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8033 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8034 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8038 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8039 suggest the concern.
8042 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8043 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8044 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8047 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8048 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8049 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8052 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8053 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8054 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8055 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8056 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8057 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8058 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8059 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8060 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8061 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8062 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8063 outweigh these costs.
8066 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8067 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8068 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8072 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8073 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8074 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8075 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8076 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8077 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8078 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8079 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8080 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8081 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8084 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8085 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8088 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8089 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8090 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8094 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8096 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8097 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8098 message will be heard then?
8101 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8102 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8103 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8104 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8105 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8106 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8107 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8108 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8109 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8111 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8112 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8113 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8114 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8115 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8116 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8117 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8118 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8119 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8120 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8121 York Times,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8122 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8123 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8124 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8125 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8126 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8127 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
872
8128 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8129 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8130 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8131 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8132 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8133 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8134 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8138 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8139 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8140 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8141 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8142 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8143 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8144 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8145 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8146 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8149 <sect2 id=
"together">
8150 <title>Together
</title>
8152 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8153 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8154 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8155 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8158 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8159 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8160 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8161 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8165 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8166 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8167 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8168 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8169 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8170 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8174 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8175 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8176 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8180 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8181 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8182 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8183 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8184 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8185 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8186 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8187 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8188 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8189 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8192 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8193 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8194 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8195 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8196 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8197 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8198 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8199 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8200 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8201 technology and the market enable.
8204 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8205 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8207 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8208 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8209 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8210 the development of our culture than now.
8212 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8213 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8214 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8215 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8216 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8217 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8218 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8219 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny
8220 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8221 founding
—is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8222 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8223 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8224 culture that our free society has known.
<footnote><para>
8226 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8227 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8231 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8234 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8235 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8236 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8237 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8238 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8243 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8247 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8248 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8253 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8254 <entry>©</entry>
8258 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8267 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8268 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8269 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8272 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8273 noncommercial work was also free.
8276 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8281 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8285 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8286 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8291 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8292 <entry>©</entry>
8293 <entry>©</entry>
8296 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8305 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8306 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8307 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8308 transformation were still essentially free.
8311 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8312 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8313 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8314 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8315 we could say the law began to look like this:
8320 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8325 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8330 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8331 <entry>©</entry>
8332 <entry>©</entry>
8335 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8336 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8344 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8345 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8347 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8348 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8349 means that the law now looks like this:
8354 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8359 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8364 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8365 <entry>©</entry>
8366 <entry>©</entry>
8369 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8370 <entry>©</entry>
8371 <entry>©</entry>
8378 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8379 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8382 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8383 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8386 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8387 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8388 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8389 these domains actually does any good.
8392 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8393 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8394 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8395 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8396 reasons sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8397 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8398 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8399 rights were more sharply restricted.
8402 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8403 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8404 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8405 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8406 property rights
<footnote><para>
8408 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8409 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8410 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8411 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8412 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8415 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8416 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8417 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8418 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8419 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8420 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8421 almost
180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8425 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8426 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8427 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8428 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8429 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8430 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8431 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8434 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8435 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8436 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8437 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8438 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8439 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8440 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8441 dominates the debate today.
8444 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8445 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8446 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8447 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8448 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8449 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8450 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8451 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8452 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8453 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8460 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8461 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8464 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8465 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8466 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8467 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8469 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8470 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8472 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8473 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8477 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8478 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8479 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8481 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8482 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8483 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8485 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8486 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8487 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8488 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8489 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8490 villagers to explore life as a king.
8493 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8494 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8495 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8496 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8497 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8498 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8499 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8500 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8505 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8506 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8507 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8508 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8509 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8510 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8511 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8512 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8513 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8516 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8517 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8518 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8519 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8522 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8523 is affected," he reports.
8526 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8527 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8531 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8532 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8533 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8534 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8537 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8538 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8539 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8540 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8541 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8542 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8543 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8544 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8547 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8548 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8551 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8552 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8554 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8555 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8556 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8557 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8558 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8559 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8562 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8563 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8564 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8565 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8566 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8567 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8568 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8569 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8570 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8571 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8572 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8573 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8576 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8577 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8578 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8579 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8580 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8581 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8582 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8585 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8586 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8587 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8588 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8589 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8594 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8595 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8596 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8597 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8598 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8599 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8600 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8601 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8602 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8605 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8606 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8607 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8608 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8609 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8612 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8613 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8614 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8615 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8616 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8617 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8618 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8619 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8620 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8621 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8623 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available
8625 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8626 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8627 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8628 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8629 Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
8630 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8631 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8632 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8633 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer,
8634 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F.
8635 Supp.
2d
24 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8636 high as $
90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8637 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8638 from $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8639 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8641 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8643 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8644 August
2003, available at
8645 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8647 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8648 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8649 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003,
8651 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8655 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8657 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8658 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8659 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8660 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8661 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8664 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8665 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8666 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8667 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8668 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8669 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8671 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8672 of the two extremes.
8676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8677 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8678 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8679 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8681 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8682 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8684 and new creativity will be lost.
8687 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8688 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8689 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8690 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8692 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8693 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8694 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8695 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8696 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8701 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8702 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8705 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8706 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8707 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8709 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8710 well produce a totally different industry model.
8713 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8714 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8715 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8716 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8717 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8718 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8719 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8720 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8721 interests.
<footnote><para>
8722 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8723 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8724 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8726 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement
8727 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8729 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8735 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8737 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8738 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8742 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8743 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8744 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8750 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8753 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8754 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8755 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8756 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8758 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8761 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8762 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8764 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8768 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8769 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8770 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8773 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8774 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8776 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8777 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8778 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8779 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8783 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8784 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8785 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8786 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8787 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8789 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8790 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8792 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8793 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8794 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8795 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8796 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8797 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8798 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8799 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8800 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8801 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8802 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8803 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8804 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8807 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8808 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8809 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8810 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8811 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8812 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8813 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8814 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8815 the culture all around.
8818 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8819 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8823 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8824 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8825 storytelling extended across the globe.
8828 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8829 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8830 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8831 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8832 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8833 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8834 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8835 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8836 work is presumptively illegal.
8839 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8840 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8841 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8842 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8843 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8844 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8845 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8846 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8847 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8848 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8849 million.
<footnote><para>
8851 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8852 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8853 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8854 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8855 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8857 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8858 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8859 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8860 suffering.
<footnote>
8862 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8863 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8864 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8865 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8866 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8867 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8869 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8871 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8873 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8874 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8875 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8878 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8879 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8880 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8882 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8883 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8884 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8887 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8889 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8890 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8892 to see a world of underground art
—not because the message is
8894 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8895 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8897 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
8898 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
8901 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8902 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8904 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8905 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8906 critical or reflective.
8909 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8910 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
8911 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8912 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8913 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8914 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8915 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8916 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8917 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8920 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8921 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8922 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8923 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8924 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8925 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8926 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8927 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8928 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8931 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8932 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
8933 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8934 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8935 law regulates such a use.
8939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8940 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8941 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8942 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
8943 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8944 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8945 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8946 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8947 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8950 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8951 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8952 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8953 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8954 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8955 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8956 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8957 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8961 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
8962 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8963 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8964 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8965 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
8966 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8967 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8968 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8969 culture that is free.
8972 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8976 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8977 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8978 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8979 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8980 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8982 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8983 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8984 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8988 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
8989 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
8991 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8992 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8993 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8994 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8995 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8996 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8999 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9000 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9001 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9002 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9003 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9004 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9005 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9008 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9009 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9010 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9011 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9012 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9013 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9014 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9015 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9016 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9017 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9018 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9020 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9022 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9024 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
9025 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9026 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9027 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9028 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9029 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9030 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9031 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9034 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9035 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9036 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9039 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9040 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9041 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9042 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9043 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9044 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9047 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9048 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9049 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9050 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9054 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9055 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9056 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9057 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9058 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9059 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9060 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9061 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9062 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9063 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9066 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9067 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9070 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9071 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9072 the kind of content the users liked.
9075 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9076 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9077 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9078 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9079 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9080 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9081 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9082 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9083 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9084 they had already bought.
9087 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9088 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9089 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9090 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9091 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9092 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9093 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9094 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9097 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9100 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9101 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9102 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9103 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9104 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9105 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9106 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9110 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9111 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9112 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9115 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9116 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9117 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9118 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9120 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9121 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9123 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9124 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9125 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9126 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9127 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9128 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9129 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9131 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9133 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available at
9134 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9135 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9138 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9139 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9141 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9142 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9143 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9144 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9145 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9146 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9147 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9148 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9149 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9152 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9154 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9155 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9156 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9157 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9158 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9159 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9160 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote>
9163 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9165 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9166 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9167 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9172 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9173 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9174 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9175 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9176 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9177 constantly threatened by litigation.
9181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9182 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9183 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9184 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9185 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9186 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9188 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9190 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9191 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9192 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9193 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9194 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9197 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9198 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9199 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9201 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9203 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9204 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9206 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9208 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9209 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9210 overregulatedregulated
9214 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9215 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9217 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture
—a
9219 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9220 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9221 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9222 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9223 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9224 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9225 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9226 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9228 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9229 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9231 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9232 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9233 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9234 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9236 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9239 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9240 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9242 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9244 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9245 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9246 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9247 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9248 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9251 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9252 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9253 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9254 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9255 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9256 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9257 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9258 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9262 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9264 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9265 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9266 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9267 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9268 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9270 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9271 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9276 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9277 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9279 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9280 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9283 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9287 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9288 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9289 impose.
<footnote><para>
9290 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9291 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9293 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9294 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9298 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9299 innovation
—again,
9300 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9304 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9305 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9306 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9307 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9310 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9311 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9312 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9313 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9316 overall this history of copyright
9317 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9318 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9319 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9320 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9323 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9324 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9325 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9326 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9327 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9330 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9331 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9332 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9333 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9334 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9336 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9338 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9339 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9340 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9342 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9343 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9344 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9345 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9348 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9349 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9350 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9351 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9352 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9353 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9355 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9356 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9357 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9358 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9359 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9360 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9361 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9362 World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34, available at
9363 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9366 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9373 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9374 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9375 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9376 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9377 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9378 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9380 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9381 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9384 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9385 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9386 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9387 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9388 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9390 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9391 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9393 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9396 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9398 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9399 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9400 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9401 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9403 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9406 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9407 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9408 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9409 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9411 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9412 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9413 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9414 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9415 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9416 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9417 in to this new form of radio.
9421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9422 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9424 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9426 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9427 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9429 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9430 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9434 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9435 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9437 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9438 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9440 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9441 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9442 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9443 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9445 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9446 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9448 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9449 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9450 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.
<footnote><para>
9451 <!-- f12. --> Lessing,
239.
9456 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not because
9458 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9459 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<footnote><para>
9460 <!-- f13. --> Ibid.,
229.
9464 the growth of this competing technology.
9467 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9468 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9469 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9470 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9471 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9475 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9476 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9479 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9481 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9482 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9483 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9485 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9486 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9487 neutral toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio
9488 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9491 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9492 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9493 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9494 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9495 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9498 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9499 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9500 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9501 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9502 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9503 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9504 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9505 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9506 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9507 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9508 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9509 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9510 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9511 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9512 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9513 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9514 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9515 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9517 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9521 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9522 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9523 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9526 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9528 name of the service;
9531 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9534 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9537 date of transmission;
9540 time of transmission;
9543 time zone of origination of transmission;
9546 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9549 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9552 sound recording title;
9555 ISRC code of the recording;
9558 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9561 featured recording artist;
9570 UPC code of the retail album;
9576 copyright owner information;
9579 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9582 name of the service or entity;
9588 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9591 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9594 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9597 Unique User identifier;
9600 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9605 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9606 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9607 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9608 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9609 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9613 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9614 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9615 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9617 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9619 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9620 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9621 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9625 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9626 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9627 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9628 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9629 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9630 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9633 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9635 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9636 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9637 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9641 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9642 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9643 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9644 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9648 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9649 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9650 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9651 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9652 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9653 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9654 effective to prevent it.
9657 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9658 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9660 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9662 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9663 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9666 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9667 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9668 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9671 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9672 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9673 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
9674 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9675 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9676 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9677 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9678 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9679 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9681 According to the RIAA,
9682 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9683 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9686 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9687 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9689 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9690 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9691 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9693 response by the other.
9696 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9697 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9698 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9699 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9700 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9701 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9702 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9703 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9704 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9705 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9706 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9707 was.
<footnote><para>
9709 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9710 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
9712 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9713 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9714 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9715 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9716 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9717 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9721 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9722 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9723 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9724 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9725 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9726 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9727 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9728 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9729 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9731 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9732 Prohibition," American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9735 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9736 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9737 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9739 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9740 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9741 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9743 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9744 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9745 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9746 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9747 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9749 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9750 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9751 compliance literature).
9753 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9754 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9755 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9758 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9759 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9760 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9761 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9762 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9763 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9764 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9765 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9766 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9767 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9768 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9769 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9770 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9771 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9772 degree of illegality.
9775 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9776 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9777 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9778 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9779 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9780 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9781 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9782 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9783 to consider the alternative.
9787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9788 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9789 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9790 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9791 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9792 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9795 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9796 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9797 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9798 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9799 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9800 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9801 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9802 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9803 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9804 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9805 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9806 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9809 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9810 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9811 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9812 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9813 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9814 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9815 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9816 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9817 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9821 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9824 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9825 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9826 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9827 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9831 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9835 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9836 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9837 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9838 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9839 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9840 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9841 capacities of digital technologies.
9843 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9845 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9846 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9847 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9848 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9849 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9850 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9851 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9852 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9853 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9856 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9857 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9858 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9859 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9860 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9861 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9862 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9863 on people's machines.
9866 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9867 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9868 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9869 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9870 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9871 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9874 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9875 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9876 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9880 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9881 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9882 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9883 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9884 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9885 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9886 freedom to move content easily?
9889 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9890 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9891 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9892 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9893 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9894 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9895 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9896 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9897 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9900 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9901 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9902 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9903 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9904 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9905 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9906 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9909 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9910 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9911 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9912 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9915 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9916 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9920 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9921 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9922 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9923 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9924 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9925 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9926 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9927 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9931 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9936 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9937 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9938 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9939 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9940 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9941 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9942 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9943 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9944 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9948 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9949 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9950 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9953 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
9954 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9955 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9956 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9957 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9958 an Internet user is revealed.
9961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9962 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9963 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9964 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9965 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9966 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9967 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9968 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9969 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
9971 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9972 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9973 Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9974 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9975 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9976 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
9977 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
9978 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9979 Fan, Either," New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9980 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
9985 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9986 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9987 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
9989 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9990 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9991 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
9993 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9994 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9995 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9998 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9999 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10000 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10001 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10002 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10003 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10004 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10005 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10006 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10007 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10008 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10010 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10011 Boston Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10012 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10013 Colleges," Washington Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10014 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10015 Monitor,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10016 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10017 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10018 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News,
30 January
10019 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10020 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
10021 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10022 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10023 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10025 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10026 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10029 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10030 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10031 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10032 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10033 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10034 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10038 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10039 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10044 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10045 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10046 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10047 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10048 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10049 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10050 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10051 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10052 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10053 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10054 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10055 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10056 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10057 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10058 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10059 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10064 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10065 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10066 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10067 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10068 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10069 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10076 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10077 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10081 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10082 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10083 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10084 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10087 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10088 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10089 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10090 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10091 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10095 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10096 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10097 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10098 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10099 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10100 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10104 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10105 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10106 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10107 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10108 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10109 made that is happening all around.
10112 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10113 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10114 gasoline onto this fire.
10117 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10118 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10119 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10120 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10123 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10124 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10125 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10126 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10127 success will require.
10130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10131 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10132 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10134 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10135 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10136 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10137 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10138 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10139 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10143 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10144 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10145 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10146 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10147 them available for free.
10150 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10151 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10152 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10153 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10154 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10156 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10157 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10158 accessible
—today.
10161 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10162 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10163 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10164 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10165 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10166 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10167 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10168 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10169 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10170 commercial publications of public domain works.
10173 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10174 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10175 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10176 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10177 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10178 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10179 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10180 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10181 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10182 generally.
<footnote><para>
10184 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10185 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10186 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10187 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10188 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10189 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10190 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10191 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10192 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10193 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10194 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10195 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10196 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10197 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10198 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10201 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10202 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10203 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10204 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10,
10205 in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10206 terms of existing copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred
10207 would not be free to add any works more recent than
1923 to his
10208 collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10209 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10210 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than
1
10211 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10216 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10217 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10218 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10219 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10221 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10222 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10223 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10224 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10225 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10226 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10227 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10232 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10233 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10234 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10235 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10236 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10237 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10241 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10243 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10245 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10246 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10248 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10252 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10253 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10254 their . . . Writings. . . .
10258 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10259 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10260 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10261 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10262 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10264 "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that are also specific
—
10265 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10268 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10270 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10271 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10272 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10274 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10276 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10277 the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the installment
10278 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10281 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10282 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10284 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10285 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10286 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10287 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10288 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10289 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10290 keep this gravy train going.
10293 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10294 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10295 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10297 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10298 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10299 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do
—and those
10300 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10303 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10304 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10305 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10306 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10308 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10310 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10311 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10312 by anyone for free.
10315 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10316 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10317 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10318 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10322 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10325 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10326 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10330 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10331 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10332 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10333 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10336 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10340 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10341 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10342 they support the bill."
10345 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10346 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10347 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10351 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10352 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10353 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10354 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10357 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10358 correct conclusion:
10361 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10362 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10364 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10367 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10369 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10370 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10373 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10374 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10375 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10376 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10378 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10380 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10381 the copyright term extended.
10384 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10386 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10387 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10390 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10392 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10393 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10394 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10395 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10396 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10397 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10398 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10399 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10401 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10402 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10403 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10404 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10406 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10408 Disney is estimated to have
10409 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10410 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10411 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10413 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10414 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10419 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10420 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10422 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10423 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10424 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10425 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10426 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10428 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10432 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10433 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10434 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10435 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10436 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10438 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10441 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10445 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10446 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10447 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10449 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10450 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10455 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10456 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10458 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10459 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10461 to impose no limit.
10464 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10465 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10466 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10467 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10468 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10469 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10470 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10471 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10472 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10474 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10477 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10479 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10480 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10482 If anything Congress says is interstate
10483 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10484 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10485 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10486 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10491 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10492 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10493 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10494 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10496 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10497 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10498 commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10499 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10500 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10501 to regulate copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10503 And if it is applied to the
10504 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10507 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10509 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10510 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10511 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10513 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10514 existing copyrights.
10517 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10518 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics
—a conservative
10519 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10520 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10522 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10523 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10524 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10525 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10527 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10528 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10531 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10532 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10534 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10535 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy
—piracy of
10536 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10537 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10538 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10540 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10541 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10542 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10543 work. But now these entities were using their power
—expressed
10544 through the power of lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year
10545 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10546 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10549 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10552 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10553 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10554 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
10555 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
10556 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10559 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10560 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10561 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10564 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10566 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10568 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10569 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10570 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10571 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10572 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10573 bought to extend them again.
10576 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10578 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10579 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10581 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10583 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10584 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10585 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10586 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10588 and no longer available as a result.
10591 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10592 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10593 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10594 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10595 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10596 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10597 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10599 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10600 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
10601 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10606 Think practically about the consequence of this
10607 extension
—practically,
10608 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10611 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10612 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10613 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10615 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10618 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10619 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10620 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10621 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10622 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10623 list of books still under copyright.
10626 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10627 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10630 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10632 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10633 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10634 being at least a list?
10637 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10638 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10640 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10642 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10643 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10646 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10648 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10652 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10653 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10654 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10656 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10657 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10658 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10661 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10662 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10663 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10666 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10667 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10669 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10670 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10671 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10672 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10673 know quite well who owns what property.
10676 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10677 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10679 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10680 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10681 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10682 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10683 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10684 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10685 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10688 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10689 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10691 for other creative works is much more dire.
10693 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10695 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10696 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10697 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10698 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10699 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10700 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10701 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10702 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10703 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10704 films."
<footnote><para>
10706 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10707 Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10708 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10709 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9 October
2002.
10714 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10715 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10716 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10717 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10720 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10723 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10724 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10725 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10726 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10727 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10728 work available for distribution.
10731 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10732 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10733 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10734 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10735 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10736 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10737 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10739 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
10740 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10741 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10742 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10747 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10749 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10750 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10751 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10752 locate the copyright owner.
10755 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10756 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10757 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10758 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10759 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10764 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10765 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10766 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10767 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10768 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10769 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10770 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10771 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10772 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10775 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10778 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10780 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10781 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10782 the copyright expires.
10785 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10786 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10787 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10789 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10793 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10794 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10795 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10796 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10798 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10802 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10803 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10805 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10806 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10807 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10809 the commercial life ends.
10812 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10813 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10814 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10816 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10818 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10819 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10820 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10821 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10822 have, we need to have access to this history.
10825 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10828 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10829 this context do no good.
10832 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10833 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10834 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10835 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10836 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10837 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10838 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10839 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10842 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10843 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10844 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10845 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10846 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10847 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10848 market didn't have more to offer.
10851 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10852 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10853 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10854 would not have interfered with anything.
10857 But this situation has now changed.
10860 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10861 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10862 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10863 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10864 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10865 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10866 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10867 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10868 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10869 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10873 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10874 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10875 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10876 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10877 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10878 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10879 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10880 written for a radically different context.
10883 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10884 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10885 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10886 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10887 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10888 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10889 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10890 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10891 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10894 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10895 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10896 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10900 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10901 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10902 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10903 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10904 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10905 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10906 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10907 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10908 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10911 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10912 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10913 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10914 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10917 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10918 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10919 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10920 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10921 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10923 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10924 December
2002, available at
10925 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10930 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10931 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10932 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10933 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10934 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10935 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10938 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10939 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10940 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10941 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10942 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10945 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10946 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10947 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10948 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10949 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10950 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10951 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10952 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10953 power to extend existing terms.
10956 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10957 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10958 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10959 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10962 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10963 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10966 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10967 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10968 overstepped its bounds.
10971 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10972 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10973 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10974 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10975 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10978 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10979 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10980 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
10981 briefs and preparing for argument.
10984 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10985 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10986 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10987 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10988 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10989 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10990 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10991 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10994 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10995 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10996 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10999 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11001 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11002 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11003 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11004 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11007 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11008 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11009 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11011 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11012 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11013 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11015 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11016 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11017 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11018 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11019 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11020 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11021 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11022 most powerful media companies in the world."
11025 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11026 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11027 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11028 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11029 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11030 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11031 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11032 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11034 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11035 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11037 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11038 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11039 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11041 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11042 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11043 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11046 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11047 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11048 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11049 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11050 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11051 why it was unconstitutional.
11054 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11057 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11058 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11059 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11060 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11061 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11063 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11064 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11065 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11066 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11067 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11068 gather the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11069 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11070 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11073 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11074 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11076 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11077 November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11079 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11080 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11081 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11082 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11083 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11084 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11085 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11086 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11089 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11091 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11092 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11093 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11094 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11095 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11098 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11099 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11102 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11103 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11104 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11105 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11106 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11107 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11108 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11111 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11112 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11113 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11114 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11117 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11118 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11119 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11120 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11123 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11124 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11125 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11126 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11127 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11129 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11130 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11131 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11132 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11133 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11134 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11135 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11136 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11137 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11140 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11141 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11142 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11143 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11144 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11145 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11146 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11147 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11150 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11151 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11154 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11155 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11156 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11157 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11158 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11159 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11160 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11161 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11162 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11163 confidence in our argument.
11166 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11167 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11168 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11169 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11173 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11174 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11175 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11176 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11177 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11178 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11182 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11183 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11184 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11185 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11186 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11187 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11189 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537
11190 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11192 That was also the motive of
11193 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11194 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11195 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11197 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11198 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11203 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11204 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11207 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11208 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11209 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11210 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11211 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11212 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11213 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11214 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11215 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11216 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11219 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11220 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11221 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11222 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11223 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11224 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11225 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11228 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11229 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11230 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11231 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11232 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11233 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11234 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11237 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11239 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11240 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11241 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11244 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11245 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11246 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11247 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11248 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11251 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11252 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11253 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11254 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11255 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11256 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11257 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11258 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11261 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11263 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11264 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11265 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11266 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11267 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11268 these retrospective extensions.
11271 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11272 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11273 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11274 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11275 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11276 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11279 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11280 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11281 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11283 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11284 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11285 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11286 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11289 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11290 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11293 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11294 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11295 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11296 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11297 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11298 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11299 copyright be limited.
11302 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11304 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11306 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11307 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11308 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11311 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11312 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11313 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11315 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11318 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11320 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11321 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11322 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11324 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11326 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11327 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11329 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11330 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11331 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11333 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11334 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11337 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11338 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11341 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11342 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11343 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11344 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11346 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11347 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11350 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11352 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11353 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11354 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11355 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11358 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11359 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11360 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11361 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11362 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11364 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11366 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11367 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11368 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11369 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11370 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11371 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11372 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11373 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11374 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11375 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11376 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11379 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11380 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11383 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11384 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11385 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11386 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11388 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11389 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11390 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11391 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11392 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11393 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11394 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11395 family of the Justices.
11398 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11399 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11400 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11401 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11404 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11405 The history was bothering her.
11409 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11410 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11411 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11412 practice that began with the very first act.
11416 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11417 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11418 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11422 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11423 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11425 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11430 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11431 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11432 Kennedy, who observed,
11436 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11437 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11438 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11439 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11440 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11444 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11450 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11451 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11452 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11453 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11455 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11458 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11460 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11461 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11462 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11463 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11464 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11467 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11468 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11469 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11472 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11474 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11480 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11481 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11484 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11485 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11487 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11488 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11489 into the Copyright Clause.
11493 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11494 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11495 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11499 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11501 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11502 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11503 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11508 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11509 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11510 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11511 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11512 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11513 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11514 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause
—
11515 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11517 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11518 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11521 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11522 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11525 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11529 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11530 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11531 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11532 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11534 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11536 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11537 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11538 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11539 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11541 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11543 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in
11544 particular, the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule
11545 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11548 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11549 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11550 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11551 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11552 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11555 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11556 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11557 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11560 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11561 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11562 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11565 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11567 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11569 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11570 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11571 in the Court's opinion.
11575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11576 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11577 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11579 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11582 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11583 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11584 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11585 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11588 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11589 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11590 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11591 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11592 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11593 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11594 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11595 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11599 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11600 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11601 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11602 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11603 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11604 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11605 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11606 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11607 the system we have.
11609 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11611 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11612 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11613 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11614 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11615 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11616 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11617 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11618 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11619 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11621 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11624 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11625 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11626 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11627 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11628 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11629 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11630 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11631 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11632 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11635 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11636 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11637 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11638 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11639 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11642 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11643 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11644 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11647 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11648 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11649 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11650 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11651 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11652 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11653 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11654 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11655 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11656 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11660 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11661 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11662 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11663 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11666 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11667 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11668 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11669 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11670 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11671 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11675 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11677 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11680 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11682 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11683 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11684 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11685 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11686 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11687 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11688 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11689 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11690 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11693 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11694 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11695 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11696 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11697 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11698 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11699 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11700 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11701 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11702 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11703 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11704 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11705 effort to persuade; but I
11706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11707 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11708 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11709 should decide the issue.
11711 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11713 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11714 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11718 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11719 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11720 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11721 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11724 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11725 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11726 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11727 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11731 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11732 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11733 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11734 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11735 issue should not be raised until it is.
11738 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11739 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11740 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11741 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11742 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11743 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11744 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11745 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11746 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11747 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11748 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11751 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11752 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11753 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11754 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11755 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11759 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11760 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11761 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11762 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11763 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11764 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11768 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11769 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11770 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11771 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11772 in the face felt exactly like that.
11775 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11776 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11777 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11778 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11779 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11780 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11781 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11785 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
11786 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11788 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11789 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11790 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11791 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11792 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11793 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11794 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11796 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11798 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11799 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11800 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11801 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11802 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11803 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11804 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11805 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11808 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11809 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11811 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11812 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11813 the work passed into the public domain.
11816 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11817 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11818 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11821 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11822 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11823 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11824 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11825 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11826 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11827 everything else, let the content go.
11829 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11831 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11832 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11833 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11834 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11835 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11836 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11837 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11838 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11839 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11840 the stupid harm of the present system.
11843 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11844 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11845 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11846 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11847 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11848 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11849 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11850 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11851 where copyright owners could be identified.
11853 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11854 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11857 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
11858 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11859 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11861 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11862 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11863 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11864 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11865 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11866 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11867 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11868 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11869 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11870 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11871 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11872 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11873 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11874 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11875 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11876 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11877 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11878 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11879 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11880 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11881 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11882 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11883 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11884 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11887 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11888 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11889 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11890 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11891 know what's protected and what's not.
11893 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11895 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11896 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11897 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11898 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11899 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11900 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11901 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11902 in the loss of widows' only income.
11905 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11906 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11907 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11908 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11909 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11910 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11913 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11914 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11915 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11916 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11918 imposed upon creators.
11921 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11922 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11925 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11926 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11927 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11928 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11929 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11933 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11934 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11935 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11936 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11937 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11938 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11942 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11943 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11944 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11945 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11946 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11947 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
11948 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11949 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11950 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11951 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11952 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11953 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11954 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11955 system of protection for property generally.
11958 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11959 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11960 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11961 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11962 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11963 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11964 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11965 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11968 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11972 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11973 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11974 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11975 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11976 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11977 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11978 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11979 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11982 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11983 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11984 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11985 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11986 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11987 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11988 seen before because there are no formalities.
11991 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11992 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11993 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11994 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11995 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11998 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11999 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12000 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12001 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12002 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12005 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12006 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12007 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12011 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12012 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12013 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12016 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12017 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12018 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12019 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12020 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12021 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12022 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12023 historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial
12024 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12025 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12027 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12029 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12030 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12031 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12032 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12035 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12036 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12037 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12038 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12039 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12040 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12041 something good might happen here.
12044 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12045 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12046 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12047 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12048 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12049 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12052 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12053 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12054 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12056 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12057 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12058 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12059 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12060 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12061 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12062 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12063 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12064 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12065 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12066 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12067 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12068 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12069 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12070 film is a valid derivative use.
12073 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12074 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12075 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12076 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12077 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12078 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12081 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12082 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12083 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12084 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12085 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12086 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12087 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12091 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12092 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12093 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12094 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12100 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12101 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12102 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12103 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12104 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12105 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12106 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12107 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12108 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12111 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12112 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12113 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12114 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12115 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12116 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12117 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12118 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12121 What does this industry really want?
12124 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12125 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12126 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12127 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12128 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12129 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12130 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12134 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12135 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12136 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12137 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12138 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12141 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12142 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12145 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12146 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12147 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12148 and to share its own creation.
12150 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12151 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12153 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12154 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12155 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12156 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12157 block the progress of others.
12160 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12161 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12162 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12163 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12164 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12165 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12166 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12171 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12172 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12174 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12175 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12176 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12177 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12178 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12181 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12182 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12183 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12184 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12185 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12186 the disease almost invisible.
12189 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12190 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12191 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12192 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12194 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12195 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12196 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12197 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12199 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12201 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12202 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12207 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12208 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12209 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12210 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12211 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12212 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12215 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12216 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12217 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12218 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12219 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12220 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12221 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12222 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12226 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12227 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12228 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12229 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12230 costs significantly below the market price.
12233 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12234 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12235 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12236 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12237 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12238 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12239 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12242 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12243 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12244 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12245 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12249 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12250 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12252 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12253 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12254 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12255 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12257 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12258 2000),
14, available at
12259 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12260 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12261 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12262 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57
12263 (statement of James Love).
12266 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12267 asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add pressure to that
12269 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12271 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12273 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12275 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12276 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12278 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12280 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent
—
12281 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12282 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12283 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12284 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12285 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12286 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12288 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12293 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12294 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12295 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12296 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12297 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12298 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12300 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12301 the flow of medications into Africa.
12304 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12305 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12306 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12307 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12308 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12309 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12312 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12313 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12314 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12315 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12316 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12317 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12321 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12323 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12325 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12326 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12327 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12328 May
1999, A1, available at
12329 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12331 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12332 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12334 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999),
12336 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12337 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12338 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12340 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12343 It was because "intellectual property"
12344 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12345 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12346 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12351 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12352 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12353 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12355 cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans, and
12356 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12357 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12358 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12359 many to die for such an abstraction?
12362 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12363 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12364 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12365 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12366 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12367 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12370 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12371 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to sell their
12372 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12373 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12374 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12376 They could be overcome.
12379 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12380 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12381 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12382 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12383 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12384 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12385 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12386 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12388 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12389 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12390 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12391 idea called "intellectual property."
12394 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12395 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12396 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12397 What is the argument?
12400 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12401 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12402 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12403 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12404 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12405 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12406 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12407 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12408 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12409 balanced in just this sense.
12412 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12413 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12415 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12416 tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with consequences
12417 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12418 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12419 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12420 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12421 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12422 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12423 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12424 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12426 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12427 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12428 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12429 this common sense open its eyes.
12432 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12433 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12434 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12435 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12436 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12437 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12438 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12439 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12440 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12441 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12442 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12443 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12446 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12447 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12448 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12449 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12450 August
2003, E1, available at
12451 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12452 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12453 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12454 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12455 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12456 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12457 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12459 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12461 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12462 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12463 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12464 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12465 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12467 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12468 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12470 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12471 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12472 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12474 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12475 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12477 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12479 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12480 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12481 early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12484 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12485 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12486 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12487 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12488 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12491 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12492 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12495 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12497 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12499 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12500 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12504 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12505 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12506 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12508 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12509 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12510 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12511 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12513 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12514 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12515 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12516 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12518 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12519 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12520 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12522 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12524 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12525 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12527 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12528 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12529 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12532 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12534 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12535 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12536 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12540 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12541 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12543 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12544 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12545 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12546 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12547 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12548 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12549 software," for their own internal uses.
12552 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12553 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12555 software. There are many important companies that depend
12557 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12558 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12559 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM is
12560 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12561 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12562 support a mode of software development that is different from
12563 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12564 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12566 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12567 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12569 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12571 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12572 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12574 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12575 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12576 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
2002),
69,
12578 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12580 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12581 Stern School of Business (
3 May
2001), available at
12582 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12586 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12587 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12588 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12589 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12590 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12593 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12594 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12595 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12596 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12597 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12598 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12599 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12600 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12601 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12604 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12605 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12606 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12607 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12608 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12609 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12610 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12612 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12613 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12615 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12618 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12619 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12620 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12621 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12622 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12623 its lobbying efforts.
12626 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12627 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12628 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12629 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12630 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12631 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12632 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12636 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12640 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12641 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12642 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12643 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12644 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12645 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12646 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12647 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12650 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12651 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12652 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12653 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12654 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12655 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12656 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12657 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12658 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12659 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12660 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12663 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12664 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12665 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12666 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12667 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12668 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12669 $
20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12670 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12671 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12672 right to decide what to do with their property.
12675 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12676 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12677 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12679 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12680 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12681 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12682 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12683 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12687 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12688 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12689 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12690 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12691 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12692 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12693 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12694 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12695 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12698 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12699 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12701 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12702 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12704 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210–20.
12705 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12707 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12708 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12709 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12712 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12713 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12714 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12715 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12719 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12720 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12721 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12722 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12723 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12724 say anything wrong. But in the world
12725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12726 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12727 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12731 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12732 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12733 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12734 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12735 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12736 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12737 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12738 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12741 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12742 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12743 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12744 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12745 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12746 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12749 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12750 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12751 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12752 our own country's history).
12755 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12756 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12757 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12758 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12759 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12760 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12761 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12762 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12763 democracy in the world, become?
12766 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12767 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12768 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12770 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12771 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12773 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12775 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12776 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12777 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12778 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12779 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12780 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12781 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12782 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12783 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12784 hearings and a different result.
12787 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12788 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12789 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12790 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12791 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12792 concentration in the media.
12795 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12796 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12797 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12798 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12799 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12802 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12803 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12804 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12805 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12806 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12807 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12808 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12812 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12813 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12814 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12815 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12816 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12819 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12820 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12821 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12822 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12823 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12824 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12827 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12830 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12832 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12833 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12835 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12837 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12838 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12840 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12841 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12842 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News,
9
12843 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12844 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12845 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12846 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
12848 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12850 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12851 music.
<footnote><para>
12853 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12854 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12855 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12857 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12858 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12860 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12861 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12862 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12865 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12866 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12867 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12868 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12869 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12870 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12871 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12872 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12873 kids who use a computer to share content.
12875 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12876 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12877 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12878 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12880 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12881 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12882 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12883 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12884 24 August
2003, available at
12885 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12887 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12888 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12889 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12890 country.
<footnote><para>
12892 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12894 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12897 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12898 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12899 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12900 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12901 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12902 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12903 day into the Causbys.
12906 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12907 potential is ever to be realized.
12909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12913 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12914 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12918 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12919 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12920 maps what might be done.
12923 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12924 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12925 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12926 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12929 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12930 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12931 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12932 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12936 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12937 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12938 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12939 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12940 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12945 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12947 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12948 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
12949 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12950 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12953 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12954 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12955 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
12956 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
12957 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12958 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12959 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12960 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12963 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12964 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12965 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12966 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12970 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12971 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12975 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12976 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12977 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12978 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12979 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12980 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12981 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12982 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12983 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12984 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12985 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12986 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12989 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
12990 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12991 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12992 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12993 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12997 <sect2 id=
"examples">
12998 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13000 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13001 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13002 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13003 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13004 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13005 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13006 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13010 What made it assured?
13012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13014 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13015 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
13016 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13017 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13018 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13019 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13020 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13021 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13022 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13023 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13024 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13025 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13026 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13028 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13030 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13031 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13032 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13033 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13034 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13035 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13036 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13037 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13040 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13041 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13042 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13043 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13044 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13045 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13046 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13050 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13051 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13052 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13053 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13056 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13057 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13058 Law Review
1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13060 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13061 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13062 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13063 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13064 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13065 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13066 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13069 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13070 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13071 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13074 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13075 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13076 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13077 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13078 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13079 care much about controlling their software.
13081 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13083 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13084 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13085 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13086 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13087 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13091 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13092 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13093 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13094 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13095 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13096 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13097 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13098 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13099 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13103 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13104 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13105 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13106 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13107 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13108 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13109 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13112 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13113 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13115 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13116 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13117 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13118 fundamentally weakened.
13121 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13122 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13123 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13124 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13127 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13128 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13129 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13130 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13131 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13132 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13133 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13134 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13138 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13139 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13140 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13141 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13142 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13143 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13146 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13147 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13148 scientific journals are produced.
13151 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13152 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13153 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13154 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13155 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13156 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13157 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13158 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13159 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13160 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13161 and Westlaw are also free
13162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13163 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13164 Court opinion through their respective services.
13167 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13168 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13169 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13170 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13171 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13172 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13173 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13176 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13177 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13178 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13181 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13182 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13183 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13184 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13185 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13186 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13187 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13188 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13189 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13190 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13193 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13194 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13195 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13196 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13197 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13201 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13202 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13203 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13204 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13206 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13207 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13208 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13209 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13210 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13211 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13214 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13215 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13216 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13217 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13218 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13219 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13224 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13225 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13226 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13227 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13230 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13231 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13234 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13235 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13236 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13237 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13238 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13239 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13240 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13241 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13244 Simple
—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13245 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13246 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13247 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13248 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13249 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13250 three expressions together
—a legal license, a human-readable
13252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13253 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13254 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13255 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13256 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13257 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13258 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13259 certain freedoms are given.
13262 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13263 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13264 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13265 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13266 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13267 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13268 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13269 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13270 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13273 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13274 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13275 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13276 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13277 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13278 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13279 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13280 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13284 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13285 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13286 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13287 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13288 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13289 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13291 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13292 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13293 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13296 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13297 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13298 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13299 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13300 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13301 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13302 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13303 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13304 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13305 to begin to build those rules.
13308 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13309 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13310 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13311 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13312 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13315 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13316 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13317 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13318 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13319 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13320 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13321 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13322 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13323 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13324 sales of Cory's book.
13327 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13328 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13329 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13330 was a total success.
13333 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13334 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13336 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13337 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13338 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13339 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13340 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13344 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13345 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13346 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13347 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13348 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13349 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13350 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13351 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13352 with their own art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13353 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13354 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13355 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13356 because the legal costs are so high
<footnote><para>
13359 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13360 Culture Wars (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13361 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13362 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13363 </para></footnote>),
13364 these artists release into the creative environment content
13365 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13368 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13369 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13370 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13371 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13372 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13373 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13374 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13375 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13376 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13380 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13381 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13382 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13383 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13386 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13387 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13390 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13391 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13392 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13393 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13394 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13395 steps are possible.
13398 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13399 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13400 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13401 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13402 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13403 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13404 creativity to spread more easily.
13406 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13411 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13412 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13414 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13415 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13416 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13417 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13418 changes that we need.
13421 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13422 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13423 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13427 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13428 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13430 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13431 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13432 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13433 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13437 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13438 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13442 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13443 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13444 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13445 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13451 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13452 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13453 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13454 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13455 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13456 formalities were getting in the way.
13459 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13460 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13461 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13462 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13463 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13464 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13465 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13466 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13467 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13468 they otherwise could speak.
13471 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13473 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13474 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13475 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13476 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13477 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13478 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13481 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13482 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13483 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13484 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13485 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13486 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13487 developed by others.
13490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13492 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13493 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13495 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13496 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13497 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13498 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13499 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13500 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13501 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13502 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13503 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13504 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13505 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13508 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13509 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13510 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13511 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13512 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13513 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13514 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13517 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13518 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13519 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13520 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13521 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13522 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13523 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13524 with which registration occurs up.
13527 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13528 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13529 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13530 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13531 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13532 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13533 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13534 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13535 formality
—while producing a database
13536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13537 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13541 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13542 <title>MARKING
</title>
13544 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13545 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13546 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13547 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13548 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13549 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13550 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13551 uniformly across all media.
13554 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13555 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13556 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13560 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13561 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13562 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13563 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13564 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13565 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13566 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13567 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13570 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13571 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13572 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13573 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13574 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13575 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13577 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13578 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13579 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13581 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13582 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13583 stop using the work in any new
13584 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13585 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13586 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13590 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13591 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13592 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13593 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13594 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13597 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13598 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13599 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13600 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13601 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13602 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13603 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13604 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13605 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13608 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13609 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13610 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13611 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13612 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13613 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13616 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13617 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13618 make things unclear.
13621 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13622 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13623 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13624 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13625 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13626 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13632 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13633 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13635 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13636 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13640 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13641 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13642 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13643 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13644 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13645 term.
<footnote><para>
13647 "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13649 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13651 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13654 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13655 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13656 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13659 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13662 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13663 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13664 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13665 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13666 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13667 regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
</para></listitem>
13670 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13671 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13672 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13673 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13674 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13675 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13676 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13677 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13683 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13684 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13685 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13686 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13687 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13688 veteran to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
13690 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13691 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13693 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13695 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13696 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13701 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13702 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13703 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in
1923 for the law to
13704 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13705 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13706 fewer authors to create in
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13707 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13708 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13709 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13710 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13711 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13712 not increase their creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done,
13713 and there's nothing we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13716 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13717 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
13718 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13721 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13722 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13723 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13724 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13730 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
13731 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13733 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13734 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13735 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13736 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13737 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13738 the emergence of that new technology.
13741 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13742 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13743 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13744 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13745 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13746 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13747 though that movie is not "my writing."
13750 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13751 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13752 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13754 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13755 University Press,
1967),
32.
13757 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13758 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13759 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13763 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13764 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13765 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13766 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13767 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13772 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13773 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13774 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13775 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13776 Consider each limitation in turn.
13779 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13780 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13783 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13784 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13785 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13786 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13787 after the creative work is done.
13790 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13791 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13792 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13793 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13794 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13795 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13796 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13797 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13798 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13799 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13802 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13803 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13804 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13805 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13806 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13810 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13811 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13812 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13813 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13816 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13817 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13818 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13820 His view is that the law should be written so that
13821 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13824 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13825 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13826 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13827 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13828 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13831 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13833 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13834 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13835 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13836 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13840 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
13841 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13843 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13844 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13845 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13846 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13847 battles around the sharing of music.
13850 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13851 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13852 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13853 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13854 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13855 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13856 innovation on the network.
13859 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13860 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13861 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13862 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13863 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13866 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13867 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13868 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13869 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13871 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13874 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13875 for purchasing CDs.
13879 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13880 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13885 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13886 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13887 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13891 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13892 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13893 owner plainly endorses.
13897 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13898 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13899 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13900 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13901 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13902 significantly weakened.
13905 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13906 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13907 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13908 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13912 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13913 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13917 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13918 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13919 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13920 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13921 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
13922 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13923 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13924 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13925 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13926 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13929 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13930 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13931 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13933 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13934 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13935 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13936 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13937 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13938 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
13939 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
13940 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13941 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13944 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13945 that give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet
13946 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13947 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13948 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13949 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13950 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13951 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13952 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13953 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13954 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13955 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13956 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13957 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13958 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13959 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
13961 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
13962 April
2002, available at
13963 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
13968 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13969 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13970 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
13971 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13972 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13973 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13974 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13975 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13976 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13977 artists get paid, during
13979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13980 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13981 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13984 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13985 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
13986 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13987 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13988 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13989 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13990 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13991 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13992 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13995 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13996 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13997 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13998 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13999 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14000 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14001 way that returns something to the artist.
14004 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14005 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14006 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14007 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14008 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14009 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14010 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14011 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14014 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14015 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14016 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14017 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14018 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14019 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14020 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14025 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14026 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14027 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14028 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14029 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14030 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14031 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14035 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14036 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14037 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14038 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14039 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14040 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14041 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14042 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14045 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14046 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14047 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14048 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14049 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14050 delivering and accessing content.
14053 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14054 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14057 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14058 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14059 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14060 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14061 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14062 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14063 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14064 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14068 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14069 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14070 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14071 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14072 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14073 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14076 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14077 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14079 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14080 10 October
2000), available at
14081 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14082 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14083 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14084 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14085 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14086 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14087 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14088 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14089 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14090 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14091 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14092 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14094 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14095 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14096 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14097 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14099 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14100 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14101 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14102 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14104 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14105 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14106 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14107 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14108 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14109 debate by about a decade. See
14110 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14111 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14112 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14114 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14115 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14116 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14117 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14118 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14119 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14120 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14121 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14125 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14126 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14127 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14128 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14129 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14130 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14131 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14132 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14133 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14134 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14135 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14136 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14137 controlling access.
14140 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14141 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14142 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14143 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14144 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14145 limits on derivative
14147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14148 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14149 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14150 allowed to do with the content itself.
14153 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14154 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14155 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14156 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14157 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14158 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14159 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14160 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14161 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14162 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14163 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14164 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14168 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14169 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14170 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14171 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14172 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14173 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14174 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14175 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14176 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14177 finding ways to compete with "free."
14180 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14181 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14182 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14183 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14184 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14185 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14189 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14194 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14195 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14196 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14197 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14201 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14204 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14207 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14211 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14212 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14217 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14218 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14222 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14223 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14224 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14228 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14229 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14230 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14231 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14232 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14233 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14234 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14235 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14236 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14237 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14238 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14242 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14243 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14244 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14247 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14248 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14252 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14253 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14255 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14256 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14257 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14258 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14261 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14262 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14263 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14264 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14265 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14266 strong view queers the law.
14269 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14270 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14271 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14272 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14273 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14274 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14275 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14276 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14278 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14279 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14284 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14285 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14286 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14289 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14290 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14291 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14292 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14294 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14295 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14296 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14297 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14298 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14299 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14300 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14301 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14302 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14303 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14305 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14306 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14307 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14308 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14309 Rethinking,
174–76.
14311 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14312 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14317 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14318 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14319 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14320 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14321 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14322 practically never be done.
14325 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14326 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14327 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14328 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14329 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14330 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14331 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14332 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14335 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14336 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14337 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14338 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14339 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14340 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14343 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14344 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14345 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14349 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14350 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14351 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14352 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14353 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14354 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14355 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14358 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14359 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14362 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14363 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14364 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14367 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14368 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14369 keep your lawyers away.
14371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14375 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14376 <title>NOTES
</title>
14378 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14379 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14380 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14381 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14382 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14383 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14384 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14385 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14386 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14392 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14393 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14395 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14396 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14397 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14398 to him that this book is dedicated.
14401 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14402 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14403 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14404 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14405 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14406 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14407 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14408 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14409 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14410 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14411 critical eye on much of this.
14414 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14415 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14416 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14417 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14419 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14420 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14421 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14422 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14425 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14426 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14427 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14428 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14429 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14430 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14431 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14432 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14433 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14434 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14435 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14436 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14437 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14438 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14439 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14440 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14441 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14442 a bunch of great replies.)
14445 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14446 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14447 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14448 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14449 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14450 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14451 throughout this book.
14454 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14455 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14456 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14457 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->